

UNITED KINGDOM

COUNTRY READER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Fisher Howe	1941-1945	Executive Officer, Office of Strategic Services, London
Don Carroll Bliss, Jr.	1941-1947	Economic Counselor, London
Raymond A. Hare	1942-1945	Political Officer for Middle East Affairs, London
Eugene Rosenfeld	1944-1946	News Reporter and Editor, London
Jacques Reinstein	1945-1946	Peace Treaties Conference, London
Robert E. Asher	1946-1947	Mission for Economic Affairs, London
Albert E. Hemsing	1946-1947	Film Reviewer, London
Arthur F. Blaser, Jr.	1946-1948	Assistant to the Treasury Representative, Department of the Treasury, London
Herbert E. Weiner	1947-1949	Assistant Labor Attaché, Labor Department, London
Thomas W. Wilson	1947-1949	Information Officer, The Marshall Plan, London
Nicholas Shapiro Lakas	1948-1950	Consular Officer, Glasgow, Scotland
William C. Trimble	1948-1951	First Secretary, London
Abraham M. Sirkin	1948-1952 1952-1957	Press Officer, The Marshall Plan, London Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIA, London
William R. Tyler	1950	Adviser, Tripartite Meeting, London
Jack A. Sulser	1950-1951	Consular Officer, London and Newcastle on Tyne
Walter M. McClelland	1950 1950-1952	Displaced Persons Officer, London Consular Officer, Liverpool

Hugh G. Appling	1950-1952	Political Officer, London
William J. Galloway	1950-1952	Special Assistant to Ambassador Spofford, North Atlantic Council, London
Raymond F. Courtney	1950-1954	First Secretary and Consul, London
Thomas J. Dunnigan	1950-1952 1952-1954	Political Officer, London Staff Aide to Ambassador, London
Chester E. Beaman	1951-1954	Personnel Officer, London
William K. Hitchcock	1951-1956	Regional Civil Air Attaché, London
Edward L. Killham	1952-1955	Consular Officer, London
Robert W. Zimmermann	1952-1956	Political Officer, London
Stanley D. Schiff	1953-1954	Economic Officer, Liverpool
Robert B. Houston	1953-1954	Vice Consul, Edinburgh, Scotland
Walter M. McClelland	1953-1955	Political Officer, London
Chester E. Beaman	1954-1955	Consul, Cardiff, Wales
Dwight J. Porter	1954-1955	Administrative Officer, London
William D. Wolle	1954-1955	Consular Officer, Manchester
Dayton S. Mak	1954-1956	Political Officer, London
John Edgar Williams	1955-1956	Ambassador's Aide, London
Lloyd Jonnes	1956	Economic Officer, Economic Cooperation Administration, London
Howard Meyers	1956-1959	Political-Military Officer, London
Rockwood H. Foster	1956-1960	Far East Affairs, London
Lillian Eleanor Ostermeier	1956-1969	Secretary to the Minister and Ambassadors, London
William C. Burdett	1957-1958	Political Officer/Consul General, London

Edwin McCammon Martin	1957-1959	Economic Minister, London
Grant V. McClanahan	1957-1962	Near East – Political Officer, London
Joseph N. Greene, Jr.	1958-1959	Imperial Defense College, London
William D. Morgan	1958-1960	Consular Officer, Birmingham
Joseph A. Greenwald	1958-1962	Assistant Commercial Officer, London
John F. Correll	1959-1964	Labor Attaché, London
James T. Pettus, Jr.	1959-1971	Information Attaché and Press Officer, London
David D. Newsom	1960-1962	Middle East Issues, London
John S. Service	1960-1962	Consul, Liverpool
Mark C. Lissfelt	1960-1964	Visitors Bureau and Administrative Officer, London
James L. Tull	1960-1965	Staff Assistant to the Ambassador, London
Raymond F. Courtney	1961-1963	Political/Military Officer, London
Selwa S. Roosevelt	1961-1967	Spouse of CIA Officer, London
Willis C. Armstrong	1962-1963	Britain/Canada Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Oscar Vance Armstrong	1962-1964	Political Officer, London
Hermann Frederick Eilts	1962-1964	Political Officer, London
John N. Hutchinson	1962-1966	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, London
David G. Nes	1963-1964	Imperial Defense College, London
Richard A. Ericson	1963-1965	Political Officer, London
Arthur A. Hartman	1963-1967	Head of Economic Section, London
Thomas L. Hughes	1963-1969	Director, Intelligence & Research

Arnold Denys	1964-1966	Communicator, London
Ellen M. Johnson	1964-1966	Secretary to Labor Attaché, London
J. Phillip McLean	1964-1966	Consular Officer, Edinburgh, Scotland
Willis C. Armstrong	1964-1967	Minister for Economic Affairs, London
Philip M. Kaiser	1964-1969	Deputy Chief of Mission, London
Harriet Curry	1964-1969	Secretary to the Deputy Chief of Mission, Philip M. Kaiser, London
Michael Pistor	1964-1969	Student Affairs Officer, USIS, London
Jonathan B. Rickert	1965-1966	Consular Officer, London
Paul F. Du Vivier	1965-1968	Consul, Edinburgh, Scotland
Sheldon D. Krys	1965-1969	Special Assistant to the Ambassador, London
Robert E. Hunter	1965-1968	Student and Lecturer, London School of Economics, London
	1968-1970	Teacher/Lecturer, London School of Economics, London
William J. Galloway	1965-1974	Political Officer, London
Nancy E. Johnson	1965-1978	Student and Private Employment
Charles T. Cross	1966-1967	Asian Affairs, London
Stephen E. Palmer, Jr.	1966-1968	Political Officer for Middle East Affairs, London
Ronald I. Spiers	1966-1968	Counselor for Political Affairs, London
Henry Reiter Webb, Jr.	1966-1968	Assistant Agricultural Attaché, London
Jonathan D. Stoddart	1966-1969	Political/Military Officer, London
Peter J. Skoufis	1966-1971	Counselor for Administration, London
Jack A. Sulser	1968-1972	Political Officer, London

Alan G. James	1968-1976	Political Officer, London
Bernard F. Shinkman	1968-1976	Publishing, London
Thomas L. Hughes	1969-1970	Deputy Chief of Mission, London
Joseph N. Greene, Jr.	1970-1971	Deputy Chief of Mission, London
Stephen H. Rogers	1970-1972	Counselor for Economic Affairs, London
Lacy A. Wright	1970-1972	Aide to Ambassador, Commercial Officer, London
Eugene Rosenfeld	1970-1975	Press Attaché, USIS, London
Morton I. Abramowitz	1971-1972	Institute for International Strategic Services, London
Lawrence H. Hyde	1972-1974	Vice Consul for Political Affairs, Belfast, Northern Ireland
William M. Woessner	1972-1977	Political Officer/Political Counselor, London
Carl Edward Dillery	1973-1976	Political/Military Officer, London
Henry E. Mattox	1973-1975	Commercial Officer, London
David L. Hobbs	1973-1976	Visa Officer, London
Michael Pistor	1973-1976	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, London
Larry C. Williamson	1973-1977	Commercial Attaché, London
Roy T. Haverkamp	1974-1975	Political Officer for African Affairs, London
Ronald I. Spiers	1974-1977	Deputy Chief of Mission, London
Douglas G. Hartley	1974-1978	Commercial Attaché, London
Jack R. Binns	1974-1979	Political Counselor, London
Elliot Richardson	1975-1976	Ambassador, United Kingdom
Roger Schrader	1975-1979	British Trade Union Congress, London

Anne Legendre Armstrong	1976-1977	Ambassador, United Kingdom
John W. Holmes	1976-1979	Economic Counselor, London
Irving Sablosky	1976-1979	Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, London
Jack A. Sulser	1977-1978	Political Counselor, London
Burnett Anderson	1977-1979	Director, USIS, London
Herbert E. Weiner	1977-1980	Labor Attaché, London
John W. Kimball	1977-1980	Political Officer, London
Edward Gibson Lanpher	1977-1982	Political Officer, London
James Dobbins	1978-1981	Political-Military Officer, London
Lange Schermerhorn	1978-1981	Commercial Officer, London
Richard H. Melton	1979-1982	Political Officer, London
Diane Dillard	1980-1982	Consular Officer, London
Aurelius “Aury” Fernandez	1980-1982	Press Attaché, USIS, London
David Lambertson	1981	Royal College of Defense Studies, London
Keith C. Smith	1981-1982	Desk Officer, United Kingdom and Ireland, Washington. DC
Timothy Deal	1981-1985	Energy Attaché, London
Roger G. Harrison	1981-1985	Deputy Political Counselor, London
Robert Hopper	1982-1986	Political Officer, London
David M. Evans	1982-1986	Political Advisor to the Commander-in- Chief, POLAD, London
Lawrence P. Taylor	1985-1989	Economic Counselor, London
Miles S. Pendelton Jr.	1985-1989	Political Officer, London
Richard Ogden	1985-1989	Economic Counselor, London

Franklin E. Huffman	1986-1987	Junior Officer Trainee, USIS, London
Aurelius “Aury” Fernandez	1986-1989	Press Attaché, USIS, London
Ronald J. Neitzke	1986-1990	Political Officer, American republic Affairs, London
Lynne Lambert	1987-1990	Trade Policy Officer, London
Donald A. Kruse	1988-1989	Political Advisor to USCICUSNAVEUR, London
Katherine P. Kennedy	1988-1991	Pursuing Ph.D., University of Kent
Paul H. Tyson	1989-1993	Energy Officer, London
Bernard F. Shinkman	1990-1994	Information Officer, USIS, London
William P. Kiehl	1991-1992	Deputy Political Affairs Officer, USIS, London
Nancy E. Johnson	1991-1994	Political Officer, Middle East, London
Edward C. McBride	1991-1995	Cultural Attaché, USIS, London
Timothy Deal	1992-1996	Deputy Chief of Mission, London
Geoffrey W. Chapman	1993-1996	Deputy Political Counselor, London
William J. Crowe Jr.	1994-1997	Ambassador, United Kingdom
Robin Berrington	1995-1999	Cultural Attaché, London

FISHER HOWE
Executive Officer, Office of Strategic Services
London (1941-1945)

Mr. Howe was born and raised in Illinois, graduated from Harvard University, and after several years in private business, joined the Office of Strategic Services in London, England. He served with the OSS throughout World War II, after which he joined the State Department serving as Deputy Chief of Mission in The Hague and Oslo. His several assignments in Washington include service as

Executive Secretary of the Department of State. Mr. Howe was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: So we're talking about September of '41 and within two months we were at war.

HOWE: Three and I had already been at least two months in England.

Q: What happened?

HOWE: Anecdotally, the day I got out of the exams I went down and looked into Nelson Rockefeller's organization dealing with Latin America where I had an introduction and I was told there was no room for me there. But there was a new organization down the street and why didn't I go look there? I did. Again, anecdotally, there was a very pretty receptionist there and I asked to see a list of the names.

She said, "It's much too secret for me to show you the directory." Then she asked me where I'd gone to college and wondered what kind of professors I'd had and when I'd gone down the list and came to Professor James Finney Baxter, and William Lager, she asked, "Which one do you want to have an appointment with?"

I proceeded to have an appointment. By another major coincidence I made a courtesy call on a friend of my father's who happened to be Assistant Secretary of Navy. He didn't tell me, but he had dinner with William J. Donovan that night and the next morning I got a call from the Director's office saying, "You are now Special Assistant to the Director of OSS, Mr. "Wild Bill" Donovan."

Q: With the OSS, could you explain, this is right at the beginning...

HOWE: It was called the coordinator of information. It wasn't 'til four or five months later at least that it was broken up into OWI (Office of War Information) or OFF, Office of Facts and Figures or whatever. It was Robert Sherwood that became the head of it. Donovan became OSS. By that time I was over in London and in fact was executive officer for both offices until they got squared away.

Q: This was of course the precursor to the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). By the time you were over in London I guess we were at war or had we...? Did the war already start?

HOWE: I was on the station platform in Glasgow meeting some OSS people, Sterling Haden the actor, Percy Winner, correspondent, who were OSS people who had arrived by ship. We heard on the station platform that Pearl Harbor had taken place. When we woke up the next morning in London, everybody in London threw their arms around us because we were then in the war with them.

Q: What was your work with the OSS to begin with?

HOWE: I was executive officer of the London office. Three of us went over together. The Director, Bill Whitney, and Edmund Taylor, a correspondent who had written the book Strategy of Terror that was very widely respected at the time. I managed the office and indeed Whitney resigned a few months later and I was really in charge of the office until David Bruce came over and Whitney Shepardson came over. Donovan would come over and I would go and stay at Claridges with him and be his aide de camp as he saw all the top figures in London.

He told me early on, "Now I'll let you go out and secure three or four buildings." He knew that it was going to grow. I thought he was crazy but proceeded to get what later became the Headquarters building and two others which were used by OSS for the rest of the war.

Q: There must have been a tremendous learning time, because you were really starting out with nothing.

HOWE: Both diplomatically and intelligence-wise. I did not get any training in intelligence before. I was their rival liaison with the two British intelligences. One the famous Broadway or MI-6 and somewhat with MI-5 which was the security, like the FBI and very much with SOE (Special Operations Executive), the action side - the secret action type. So I was working with them. Same time we had initially an office in the embassy. I was in touch with the ambassador, John Winant. We were together in parallel with Harriman's office there, and the executive officer of that Winthrop Brown later ambassador in Laos and Korea. He and I lived together. Also Ed Gullion, later ambassador to Congo, with one of the fellows who we shared an apartment, Assistant Air Attaché Tracy Barnes, later very prominent in CIA. He was another who lived in the apartment with us. So we were very much exposed to what was going on. Charlie Noise who was later deputy, United Nations, was another one. We had a very, very fancy good apartment-flat-in London.

Q: What was the initial thrust of the OSS?

HOWE: It was combined, in much too big a combination, of being secret intelligence, secret operations, which are mutually in conflict very often, research and analysis which is the think-tanks to make sense of the raw intelligence and propaganda, both white and dark propaganda. It had all of these together until it was broken up. The white intelligence, which is to say the open USIA went with Sherwood and the OWI forerunner and the intelligence and operations stayed with Ed. Black propaganda, morale operations, stayed with Donovan as did the research and analysis.

Q: Was there a problem of one with the British saying, "Look we're doing this. You just come and give us some help and we'll produce it all?" I mean to start in the middle of a war to assemble something like this is quite ..."

HOWE: Very mixed. Very mixed. The SOE people were enormously hospitable. In fact we used their communications at first in London. Very helpful. The traditional old line Secret Service MI 6 was very distant and very unfriendly. The head of it didn't hide his dislike. However, they jointly had in Washington a representative, Bill Stevenson, known for the book Intrepid who represented both and was a very powerful man. A fine gentleman, Sir William Stevenson. I knew

him before I left. I knew him when he came to England. He and a Colonel Ellis later running into some troubles as to his loyalty though. In recent years actually. Looking back people have questioned whether he had in fact been loyal-whether he was in fact subject to, I don't know... I think it was Russian influence. Like others that we keep hearing about that were doubtful of their loyalty to the U.S. Anyway they were initially trying to help OSS get started and they did.

Bill Stevenson was an enormous help and his office was which was a big office in New York. They personally and organizationally guided OSS. But to your point, were they helpful, as the war went on I think it could be said the farther away you were from action, that is the heart of where the war was going on, the more strife there was between Americans and British. In London, there was except for this coldness on the part of Broadway, the MI 6 people, there was warmth and sharing. It was talked about jokingly. They'd bring the brains and we'd bring the money.

Later on it took on different forms when we had different tactical approaches. Conspicuous in the Air Force for instance as to whether it would be night bombing or whether it would be day bombing and saturation bombing and that kind of thing. The same kinds of things were applied in the intelligence. We were very dependent upon the British, particularly SOE in London, in Algiers, in Cairo and in the Far East where I eventually was in Ceylon, on their transportation. It was their special airplanes, their submarines that infiltrated our agents. That gave them a very controlling element over our operations. Fortunately SOE was usually very helpful. In Cairo, they could be very destructive.

Q: When you're trying to establish a think-tank or whatever you call it, people getting things, examining facts, data that comes in, how did you assemble people in England for example who knew enough to be useful and yet not have already been working for the British?

HOWE: We had a research and analysis section within the London office. Alan Evans was the head of it. He was a scholar, who later was head of the research and analysis section of the State Department when OSS R&A (Research and Analysis) moved over to the State Department. He had two or three scholars that worked with him. They were gleaned the appropriate information from research services in England and making sure it got back to headquarters research, which was where Bill Langer and Finney Baxter were and Sherman Kent and hundreds of well, well known scholars, were working in the R&A division of OSS, but it was an outpost of research. When OSS set up branches in Algiers and Cairo, they would have an R&A person there just to help get the kinds of documentation as well as the types of raw material that were appropriate to sifting out and getting the estimates that would be the ultimate outcome.

Q: During the time you were in London, how did the U.S. embassy fit in to what you were doing, or did it?

HOWE: Very ambivalently. The State Department never liked OSS. Adolph Berger was the Assistant Secretary of State. He went to great lengths, the Head of G-2 went to great lengths to scuttle everything Donovan and OSS tried to do. That was partially reflected in the embassy but not entirely. The embassy was in difficulty because Ambassador Winant had followed Kennedy who had been a very controversial ambassador. No sooner had he, Winant, arrived than the

president sent Harriman over as a Lend Lease Administrator and a personal link with Churchill so that Winant always was one step out of it.

We were using the SOE communications. When I was in charge before the new head came over to OSS, Winant had called me in one day and said, "Look we want to cooperate and be helpful but I think we need to see all your communications."

I said, "I want to cooperate Mr. Ambassador, but I will have to get instructions on this."

I wired back a very full and careful personal telegram to Donovan asking for instructions. I heard nothing. That was Donovan's way of leaving me out there, but I think he had trust that I wasn't going to do it unless I was instructed and I didn't, and the Subject didn't come up again. One inquiry did follow and I simply said, "I was not yet instructed."

It was indicative of a condition which has gone through our diplomacy ever since. How do you deal with the communications in our embassies? We can come back to it, but at a later time in my life I was deputy head of intelligence in the State Department and the liaison with CIA and at that point I negotiated a formal "treaty" with the operations side of CIA, with Dick Helms, who later became head of CIA. A treaty which was code named STOSO. "S" "T" for State, "O" "S" "O" for the Office of Special Operations which was the CIA organization. It set a new line on diplomatic cover, diplomatic passports and so on. Once negotiated, I had to then go back and sell it to such powerful people as Lenny Merchant and Doc Matthews and Loy Henderson and Butterworth who were then the chief people in the State Department.

Q: In the London atmosphere, I would have thought it would be very difficult to sort out. You had all these governments in exile, the greatest being de Gaulle and the French but you had others, the Danes, the Norwegians, the Dutch, the Belgians, Yugoslavs I guess, all of whom had their own particular view of the world, their own interests. I imagine these would still be a source of information but it would be difficult to judge them.

HOWE: It was indeed, and very political and controversial. We, America, had an embassy on Barkley Square accredited to all the exiled European governments. It was in a sense parallel to the main embassy in Grosvenor Square and the name has gone out of my head who the ambassador was. Very fine fellow. Very friendly. We used to be helpful to them.

Revert to one of your earlier questions about R&A. As the war went on, the R&A groups came over and sat down jointly with the British and worked out targets, worked out specific evaluations that were directly pertinent to both the political and the military side. Walt Rothschild, Charlie Kindleberger, others, they were sitting right with them. What made me think of it was they also had an office in Barkley Square in the same building with our ambassador to the exiled countries. At a later time there was also the counterintelligence branch of OSS protecting our own security and intelligence, known as X2, headed by Bill Murphy-why has his first name gone out of my head?

Q: Robert Murphy?

HOWE: No. No. No. He was Donovan's personal secretary and he later became Head of X2 and he was a good friend of mine. He had a group of people, very brilliant fellows, prominent people in the academic world who came over and sat with the British in working out the counterintelligence efforts to protect our positive intelligence effort.

Q: Well it sounds as though the research and analysis and the counterintelligence really became joint operations with the British where the operations remained somewhat more...

HOWE: Somewhat. We never did anything joint on intelligence with the British MI6. They resisted everything and scuttled much of what we were trying to do. Some of the SOE things were joint.

Jumping ahead, I was sent down to Algiers by Donovan to be a liaison between the British camp in Algiers and the American OSS camp, the SOE camp of the British. The head of that was an old friend from London. The American head was Bill Eddy. I knew them both well. They were somewhat at odds with each other and I went down to be a liaison and went on operations with the British as an American officer. So we did combine on some things with SOE. The Jedburgs, which were the advanced parties that went in just before D-Day to set up communications and liaison with the *Maquis*, were, I think, in many cases joint British. Stuart also was one of those.

Q: The Maquis being the French...

HOWE: The French underground.

Q: What about when you were in London? What was the feeling toward the Free French, de Gaulle and all?

HOWE: Very mixed. Very mixed and very political, contentious, even in Washington and everywhere else. The British government was divided and the American government was divided as to which French you were going to talk with and de Gaulle was being very prickly and very difficult. I didn't myself get into the substance of the intelligence operation. By the time we were being acclimated, I was pulled off from being an executive director. I had been commissioned in the Navy and was getting commando training and parachute training ready to go off and operate somewhere. So that I did not get myself involved in any of the headquarters operations intelligence or operations.

Q: What was commando and parachute training like in those days?

HOWE: Tough. Rough. Commando training, we went up to Scotland for two or three weeks and were ruggedly run up and down mountains, taught how to use a 45, how to scale cliffs and cross rivers, how to use dynamite or other explosives. I had never had a gun in my hand until I got over there and learned how to deal with a 45 automatic, which is a pretty lethal kind of a thing to have in your hand. I came back absolutely fit and went to Ridgway where they were training - it was a British thing - but they were training some German perspective spies, perspective infiltrators. I was the only American with a team of 10 Germans and I couldn't speak to them or certainly know what they were doing. It was a week long course with about five or six jumps,

low jumps and out of a hole of an airplane, not out of the side of it. I never had taken an operational jump.

The next to the last jump that I took, they had to teach the Germans how they set up a reception party on the ground. How they sent out the lights and what they do about the parachutes and so on. So I was the agent to follow them. There we were in an airplane and the Germans all went out and I was in the airplane by myself over the hole with the pilot way up in front. We were the only ones in the airplane and we had to fly over the place three times before they had the thing set up properly. He leaned around from the front cabin and said, "All right you can jump now." And I had to jump into the black darkness. It was very low. You jumped at I think it was 300 feet, with a ripcord that went almost immediately and then you were on the ground within a very short time.

Q: It was also before the days of maneuverable parachutes and all that.

HOWE: Yes. Yes. Anyway it was an experience I was glad to have had.

Q: How did they use you then after this training?

HOWE: I was trained also in small boats because as a Naval officer although the parachuting was a little foreign to a Naval officer. I was probably going to be and was in fact, destined to be on the maritime unit of OSS, which was designed for a sea infiltration. So I was sent down after I had gotten the training, including kayak training in and out of submarines, even some submerged water, putting limpets on boats down in training in South Hampton - I was sent down to Algiers and we moved into Corsica. I went in on one operation when the Germans were still there, to land supplies in the little town of Porto. The Germans were six or seven miles away but the citizens of Porto were there to greet us in the middle of the night and help us unload. Later I came back to set up a base in Calvi in northern - and then in Bastia - in northern Corsica, ready to land agents in northern Italy but particularly in southern France. I helped set up that base there with a British unit - a mixed British unit - of air, Navy, merchant Navy and soldiers and I the oddball American Navy officer. We set up this mixed thing that was prepared to land agents. Before we got the first operation going, Dick Heppner had been made Head of CBI, OSS and he asked that I be assigned out to be the head of the maritime unit looking to the infiltration out there by sea. So I went out to India and then down to Ceylon.

Q: CBI standing for China, Burbank, India.

HOWE: Which was initially with Mundantin in New Delhi then Mundantin moved down to Kandy in central Ceylon, Sri Lanka and we, OSS, set up a camp in Kandy, OSS headquarters. We had camps Bill Ripley was head of intelligence out there. He and I are old friends, toured around and found camps in Gaul and Saos and Trincomalee in the north. I was in Trincomalee training agents and going on one operation.

Q: What were the agents doing?

HOWE: They were Indonesian. They were going to go into Indonesia. The ones that were going into Burma and Thailand were mostly handled up near Calcutta, at another OSS outfit up there under Eifler and ...I read his name last night and I can't remember his name.

Q: You were dealing with Indonesia at that time. What was the attitude toward the Dutch?

HOWE: Very friendly. Very open. The Dutch had a naval unit in Trincomalee flying boats. I don't know what they were actually accomplishing. Of course Indonesia had been theirs so they had a very strong focus on Indonesia. That was the closest free spot that you could get to get across to Indonesia. We went on one submarine operation. We went to a little island if you can see here...

Q: We're looking at a little island here off Sumatra.

HOWE: It's the island of Sinalue, which was the northwestern most - what do you call a range of islands that are off shore?

Q: Archipelago.

HOWE: Yes. We took a British submarine with four or five agents and we were exploring whether that island could be a base for operations into Indonesia. We put them ashore and went around to the other side and picked them up, very luckily. Because it was a terrible and we had to wait three days beyond our meeting time before they came out.

Q: From your perspective, what was the role of Indonesia at that time? Did we expect to be doing much in Indonesia?

HOWE: It was Japanese-held. It was clearly along with Singapore, and the whole peninsula there, was going to be critical, the recapture - or seemed to be. In part I think it was geopolitical in the sense that MacArthur was so much involved with the other islands out there. Mundantín was very interested in getting operations going on the underside. It turned out to be important in Vietnam and Thailand and Burma to some extent, but of course the real focus was island hopping into Japan and the atomic bomb. So in the final end it may not have had that criticality.

Q: Looking at this, by the time you got down to the CBI, I take it the State Department was almost out of the picture, wasn't it? Because our embassy at that point was up in London and was there much to it then?

HOWE: There was a political advisor, none other than John Davies, who was political advisor to Mundantín and/or Stilwell. He had the rank, I think, of consul general, and was very much in evidence and a very fine officer and a brilliant and amusing fellow who became a friend later. That was perfectly friendly out in the field. In Washington one had a constant sense that both G2, as I mentioned, and the State Department resented everything that was to be done.

When I first went over to London, I flew through Lisbon where, because of the difficulty of flying from there on up through London I had to stay there for a number of days and I stayed

with two Foreign Service officers who were assigned to Portugal. I got the clear sense that at that level they were probably second secretaries at the time, Goodyear and Boswell - very friendly to me but very resentful. Why do we have this organization here? That's what we're here to do. We can pass on any political information. We don't need any other people to go out and get intelligence or information.

I think this was so up in London. Gullion was first secretary or second secretary there. He was friendly, as I say, shared an apartment with us. I don't think he was resentful and Doc Matthews was always very friendly. Henry Stebbins, the administrative officer, was very helpful. So we didn't run into that resentment but we were always aware of the fact that the State Department just didn't like any part of it.

Part of this was Donovan. Part of it was the nature of it. Donovan demanded, attracted, and was great, as a leader. He attracted royalty from a wide number of very prominent, very effective people. But he also was a hard driving operator in the government circles so there were a lot of people in Washington that resented his close ties with Roosevelt. And he was totally dependent on those ties.

Q: I think one of the most interesting stories about looking at the Foreign Service is how essentially the State Department was almost completely bypassed during the war. Then in 1945 they were essentially handed the world and said, "Here it's your baby now," without much training because of this operational thing which stopped the normal diplomatic business.

HOWE: It's difficult for me to take other than the position that they brought this on themselves. The leadership then, G. Helman Shaw and what's his name, Long, Assistant Secretary Samuel Long - were totally traditionalists about it. I think Wells was, too, and Burly, I think, was not a Foreign Service officer, but he took a very limited view of the role and a very closed one.

I think it's not unrelated when I report that I passed the Foreign Service exams, written, and was scheduled to take the oral exams in I think February of '42. Donovan arranged for me to be able to fly home to take them and I took them and passed them. G. Helman Shaw said, "You will go be a vice consul down in Guayaquil."

Doc Matthews wrote over and Donovan pleaded with them and said, "Look he's doing this job over there. It's totally related to diplomacy. He's in the embassy. Defer him, do something else."

Doc Matthews wrote over and said, "Look, this guy's helping us all, defer him, hold onto him"

No way, so I had to have my name withdrawn from the Foreign Service. They wouldn't have anything to do with it. They dealt with Foreign Service auxiliaries as being second class citizens. This was typical of a very inflexible service.

Q: Also, the Secretary of State, sort of was almost bypassed for most of the war, Cordell Hull. His main interest seemed to be trade and Latin America, both of which were of lesser interest during the war. It was not a glorious time for the Foreign Service.

HOWE: No. It certainly wasn't. That whole situation was probably his own ineptness in a lot of the critical elements of foreign diplomacy. But in part it was that Sumner Wells had an old boy relationship with the president which he exploited.

Q: They both went to Groton.

HOWE: Groton. Yes. You know that Ben Wells has now come out with a book, his book, on his father which would be very interesting. It got a very good review in the Post I think or it was probably the Times because Ben used to be a correspondent for the Times.

Q: I'll have to look for that.

HOWE: You'd be very interested in it. I haven't read it yet.

Q: Anyway, this is interesting to capture the Foreign Service, well State Department, in this critical period. It just didn't measure up.

HOWE: It didn't and it's sad. It was resistant to anything new, different that the war time desperately demanded of it. They wanted to be the old line. Whether the British Foreign Service was the same, it's hard to know. The people that I knew in England I don't remember associating much with regular Foreign Service officers, British, because all my associations were with the intelligence types.

DON CARROLL BLISS, JR.
Economic Counselor
London (1941-1947)

Ambassador Bliss was born in Michigan and educated at Dartmouth College. He entered the Foreign Service in 1923, specializing primarily in the Commercial and Economic fields. During his long and distinguished career, the Ambassador served in Tokyo, Bombay, Batavia, Alexandria, Singapore, Prague, Bangkok, Athens, Cairo, Paris, Calcutta, London, Ottawa and Addis Ababa, where he was U.S. Ambassador from 1957 to 1960.

BLISS: The all night flight was a repeat of the previous one – far out to sea, high and cold – and in the morning there was the English coast. Opaque screens were placed over the windows but we found that they were readily removable. We flew for some time over the checkerboard of the countryside, with a fighter patrol circling about, and eventually landed on the estuary at Poole. Royalty (Kent) was there to meet royalty, we cleared customs, immigration and censors, all very easily for me, and I was in England!

The motor trip to Bournemouth was a delight, over smooth highways between green hedges and gardens brilliant with rhododendron and lupine, and there wasn't a sign of bomb damage. At the railway station I ran into two of the Marine officers who had left Lagos ten days before me, much

to my disgust at the time, but they had arrived from Lisbon only the previous night due to their enforced stopover at Bathurst.

The train up to London passed through Southampton, and there was plenty of bomb damage along the line, but an unbroken row of enormous cranes still stood on the docks and the port was far from being out of action. Plenty of bomb damage coming into Waterloo, also, but the gigantic power station at Battersea hadn't a visible scar. There was bomb damage along the Strand, and some on the Savoy Hotel itself, where I got a comfortable room and had a real bath again in a real bathroom. Hot water flowed from the taps and valet, maid or waiter could be summoned by a touch of the bell. Civilization.

The hotel in Curzon Street where I settled in was not quite that civilized but it had the advantage of being within walking distance of the Embassy, which I found established on the first three floors of an apartment house at No. 1 Grosvenor Square. The Germans had been bombing Mayfair, I was told, in order to teach upper crust Londoners the lessons previously delivered to the inhabitants of modest row-houses in the East End, and there was ample evidence of it. The rubble had been cleared away, but the facade of my hotel was pockmarked and there was no glass in the boarded-up window of my plain little single room. Between Curzon Street and No. 1, as we always called it, a number of buildings were missing on Chesterfield Hill and in Farm Street, while in Grosvenor Square itself there were gaps in the skyline. In the middle of the Square a barrage balloon operated by a detachment of WAC's floated over the tangle of trees and untended shrubbery that had once been a garden enclosed by iron railings long since fed to the blast furnaces. No. 1 had escaped damage so far, but the back of the deserted Italian Embassy two doors away was gone, and with it a crowded Royal Artillery Mess.

The Embassy staff had suffered no casualties, I was told, although my old friend and colleague Henry Stebbins had missed becoming one only by a miracle. Henry had rented quarters in a mansion diagonally across the Square from No. 1, and one night he was groping his way home after working late when the alert sounded, but not much was happening in the vicinity as he climbed the stairs to his room and closed the black-out curtains. Dinner was long gone, and he stepped across the passage to his pantry for a snack before going to bed. Meanwhile a lone bomber strayed overhead, and Henry was just reaching for the peanut butter when a stunning crash knocked him flat, deafened, blinded and nearly suffocated by plaster dust. After a bit he pulled himself together, climbed to his feet and fumbled his way in the dark to the bedroom door. He was about to step through when fresh night air struck his face and he drew back just in time. The bedroom wasn't there! Henry turned up later at No. 1 with all of his possessions in a paper bag. Saved by a peanut butter sandwich, he said.

I quickly learned for myself that in London a black-out was really black, not blue, that an air raid alert was not for practice, that bombers overhead were not for show. For my first raid it was almost bed-time when the sirens wailed and a distant drumfire of anti-aircraft guns announced enemy bombers following the Thames estuary to their target. Nearer and nearer, louder and louder, it came, with the inevitability of an approaching thunderstorm, until all hell broke loose with a deafening crash as the big guns opened up in Green Park, only a few hundred yards away, followed instantly by more heavies and the rows of rocket-launchers in Hyde Park, the mobile Bofors batteries set up in West End parks and open Squares. Together they created one

continuous earsplitting pandemonium of gunfire interspersed with the occasional hollower boom of an exploding bomb or landmine in the distance and the patter of shrapnel raining down. Outside the night was illuminated by the muzzle flashes of guns, the brilliant flares dropped by the raiders, the pyrotechnics of shells and rockets bursting overhead the glare of searchlight beams fixing on the tiny silver shapes of bombers high above the city.

But I saw none of this brilliant display from my darkened room and could only crouch in a corner to protect myself according to the conventional wisdom from flying glass that actually wasn't there. There was nothing else to do, nowhere to go, no safety to be found in a world erupting in a cacophony of crashes. After only a few days in London I knew little about the defenses, had never heard a gun fired, was unable to interpret what I was hearing. Imagination created a vision of shattered buildings out of every salvo, widespread devastation out of every explosion, leaping flames out of the glare seeping through the boarded-up window. I could not appreciate that most of the din was created by the defenses and I could see nothing at all of sights that later became thrilling and even beautiful.

How long it lasted I cannot say, but it went on and on, interminably, until blind fear of the unknown merged into impatience and impatience into resentment. In that hour no epithets applied to the Germans were too harsh. By the time it all died away, perhaps half or three quarters of an hour later, I was an initiate, a Londoner for the duration.

When I climbed Chesterfield Hill in the morning Mayfair stood just as it was the evening before. No buildings were down, no new gaps appeared in the skyline around the Square, and the barrage balloon still nestled among the trees, ready to rise again when called upon to keep bombers from coming in low. The morning bulletin described the raid as "short and sharp" and the damage as "light." I might claim that I had reached London before the Germans; but not before they had also arrived by air and were making their presence felt.

RAYMOND A. HARE
Political Officer for Middle East Affairs
London (1942-1945)

Ambassador Raymond A. Hare was born in West Virginia in 1901 and received his bachelor's degree from Grinnell College. He later taught at Robert College in what was then Constantinople. Ambassador Hare's career in the Foreign Service included posts in France, Egypt, Lebanon, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Republic. He was interviewed by Dayton Mak in 1987.

HARE: Finally, I was transferred to our Embassy in London, where I set up a section in the Embassy to deal particularly with Near East matters and act as sort of liaison with the Near East people in the foreign office. This proved to be a useful device as it made possible a continuing liaison at the so called "working level" of the foreign office. While major decisions were, of course, made at a high level, the actual spade work was done at the lower levels. It was mutually useful and an example of my idea of the way such affairs should be run, if at all possible.

My contacts in the foreign office were often with people with whom I had worked in Cairo. This made for an easy and more constructive relationship. Many years later I was again able to make good use of my old Foreign Office contacts. Assistant Secretary George McGhee sent me to London to negotiate what became known as the Tri-partite Declaration with the British. My old friend from the past, Michael Wright, who had been my main contact in Cairo, was my opposite number there. Sometime later Michael and I worked together again, this time in Washington, in connection with a joint British-American meeting to discuss our past war interests and "to clear the air and see where we stood," that is, after the war. This, incidentally was meant to be a very confidential meeting, so much in fact, that we set up a dummy conference on economic matters with publicity while we held our real meeting secretly in the bowels of the Pentagon. I was secretary of our delegation and Michael was secretary of his.

I recall that we did not however try to come up with an agreed joint record. The result was primarily an agreement that we recognized that Britain had certain continuing responsibilities and that we were not challenging them, but time had changed and there had been developments in our American interests, which had to be taken into account. I think this avoidance of an agreed statement was a good thing. Often, if you try to refine your differences, you start falling apart. An agreed document can often times be an obstacle to really constructive work.

While our pre-war policy was of letting the British to more or less "carry on," we were necessarily more engaged there than before. There was the development of oil discoveries by American companies and we had certain strategic interests there as well. But basically we continued our wartime tradition. That situation couldn't and didn't last long, however. Post-war Britain was much weakened, as was France. We found ourselves being forced to assume responsibilities which we had previously assiduously avoided. This business of sliding into a position of predominant power was not a comfortable posture for us. We quickly discovered that, despite dropping gold all over the place and generally acting the part of angels, the role of "Mister Big" is a tough one to play, because people just do not like "Mister Big." It has been time and again, in Cuba, the Philippines, and throughout Latin American that, despite common interest and sincere attempts to be helpful, a small country does not like a foreign country that is in a position of dominance.

So the United States moved into the Middle East picture, not out of desire to dominate, but primarily to maintain a Western position there. At the same time our co-belligerents in the war, the Russians, were getting rather belligerent, but this time in opposition to western interest, talking about North Africa and Islands in the Aegean and things of that kind-generally throwing their weight around in the Middle East. While some of this was probably posturing, their general demeanor was seen as serious, and keeping the Russians out of the Middle East became and continues to be a centerpiece of American policy. This policy has not been completely successful. One need only look at the Soviet assistance in building Egypt's Aswan dam and the substantial arms they have supplied to various of the Mid East countries. All in all, however, they, too, have had their problems.

I was ambassador to Egypt during the Nasser period, and I recall that he told me in the course of one of our many chats: "If they (the Russians) ever make the mistake of getting into the Middle

East politically, you'll see what will happen, we will show them." It was very clear that the Egyptians and others weren't about to get rid of the British only to inherit the Russians. Nasser also made an interesting remark regarding Lebanon at a time when there was trouble between Lebanon and Syria, which was then backed by the Egyptians. "You know one thing," he said, "you can be certain of: I'll never touch Lebanon-never! If there was even one small group opposing me, they would raise hell and I wouldn't do it." And he didn't. He had a lot of sense, you know.

Now for a little story in connection with the Chicago Aviation conference. The conference pretty quickly settled down into a competition between the differing attitudes on aviation policy between the Americans and the British. The British favored the "chosen instrument" policy whereby a country would have one principle carrier (e.g. BOAC), whereas we favored a policy where there would be free competition. Since we were talking about things of real significance there was obviously considerable spirited discussions. One day the head of the British delegation, asked to be excused from the discussions as he had some important business to attend to that afternoon, something that had been planned for some time. We said "all right," and as there wasn't anything to be accomplished without the British there, some of us decided to take the afternoon off, too, and go see "Oklahoma." And who should be seated directly in front of us but the head of the British delegation! When he saw us he laughed and said "You know, before I left London, Noel Coward told me, if there was one thing I did in the States, I should see 'Oklahoma'." So there he was.

In 1950 there was a Foreign Ministers' meeting in London which I attended. We were supposed to prepare some briefing papers for our delegation. We in the advance party went to London ahead of our delegation, and there we got a message from Washington saying "couldn't we cut down on the amount of material we had put in the briefing papers?" So we went to work and cut them down and sent them over to Paris. Then we got another message from Paris asking "Couldn't we cut down some more?" On the day of the conference I rode to the meetings with Dean Acheson. We were supposed, as I recall, to discuss the matter of the Italian colonies in Africa at the meeting. The Secretary said to me in the car, "Ray, what line am I supposed to take, anyway?" So all the briefing he had on the subject was what I gave him in the car going to the meeting. But he was so knowledgeable that a few words sufficed. I don't want to imply that all the preparation of briefing papers is worthless. Not at all. It is good to do all this ground work from which you can extrapolate ideas as needed.

At that time, when George McGhee was Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and African Affairs, I was his Deputy and my office was next to his. One day he came bursting through the door with his usual verve, and said "Ray, we've got to do something about the Middle Eastern arms business." This being a period when the armistice agreements were running out and there was danger of an arms race developing. "This situation could easily get out of hand, and we big powers have to do something about it," he said. So he and I worked on the draft of an agreement which subsequently became known as the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. I was sent to London to negotiate it with the British. There I found my old friend from Cairo days, Michael Wright. I remember that at our first group meeting, Michael, in a spirit of camaraderie, tried to arrange the table so we could be closer together. This was just after the war and the furnishings in the Foreign Office were pretty well worn.

So they had pulled together several tables to make one big one and covered the whole thing with a big green baize cloth. When Michael tried to move the table it just collapsed, water pitcher and all. We all had a good laugh.

Michael took me over to the Imperial Staff, and he and I explained the document; and we got that approved. Up to this time we had not discussed our plans with the French, who were not then playing a very active role in the Middle East, following their war time difficulties. However, they had, of course played a historically significant role in the area and we felt that the time had come to see if they might be disposed to participate with us. So we put it up to the French Foreign Minister at the end of the conference. He was visibly annoyed to be brought in on such a take it or leave it basis. But he was a wise man who had the wisdom to see that, although the French position had been greatly weakened, our suggestion could be a step in the restoration of French prestige. So without actual tripartite negotiations there developed the Tripartite Declaration.

EUGENE ROSENFELD
News Reporter and Editor
London (1944-1946)

Eugene Rosenfeld was born in New York in 1922. He started his career as a news reporter and was assigned to the Office of War Information in London in 1944. He later became a Foreign Service Reserve officer in 1952 and served in New Delhi, Dar es Salaam, Addis Ababa, and Saigon. He received a meritorious honor award in 1967. Mr. Rosenfeld was interviewed by Jack O'Brien in 1989.

ROSENFELD: I met Chris in 1943. We courted, as they say, for about eight months, got married in April of 1944. Just before that I had gone up to New York to be interviewed for an overseas job. I had been drafted and rejected as 4-F because of my eyes. I had attempted to get an Army commission as a censor or something because I had some French, to go over to North Africa. I was rejected on that, too.

So I figured the only way I was going to get some next to the action kind of thing was to get into overseas OWI operations. Young guys were pretty patriotic in those days. When I went up to New York and was interviewed they said, "Okay, with your background and whatever, we can send you over to be a writer-editor in the Allied Press Service operation." That was in London as part of SHAEF, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, the Eisenhower headquarters, psychological warfare. We produced copies for military and civilian broadcasts, leaflets, etc.

In London there were a lot of very exciting times, obviously -- the buzz bombs, for one thing and the other -- meeting a lot of very special people. I actually met Ed Murrow there once when I was covering a press conference at Ambassador Winant's office at the embassy.

Murrow was there and we met and talked briefly. I recalled this to him some twenty odd years later; he did not remember it, of course, because he had met a lot of people, but there was a connection.

Anyway, after this London assignment, which went on until the end of 1945, when I was supposed to close down the office -- most of the people had gone on to the continent, the occupation of Germany, Radio Luxembourg, some of the other establishments that had been set up after the European war was over -- you know, the Vienna Kurier Neue Auslese and all of these other publications that had been set up in occupied areas, and a number of the people I still know to this day were in that batch that went over.

Anyway, I had to close up the office at the end of 1945. I was asked to stay on to help out with the U.S. delegation to the U.N. They were having their first meeting in London at Church House in January of 1946. The U.N. had been set up six or seven months earlier in San Francisco, as you may remember. This first session went on for two or three weeks in London. I helped out on a variety of things, getting things organized, writing reports, doing public relations for what was then called a public liaison branch of State Department.

After that was over, Chris and I -- Chris had joined me had come over in September of 1945. She managed to be, I think, the first OWI wife to make it across and so we were together in London for three or four months. It was rough, it was cold, it was rationed, and it was wonderful.

JACQUES REINSTEIN
Peace Treaties Conference
London (1945)

Jacques Reinstein was born in 1911 in Savannah, Georgia. He attended the University of Basel, Switzerland, the Alliance Francaise, Paris, Georgetown University, and American University. He then joined the Department of State in 1936 as an Economic Analyst and Assistant to the Secretary of State. After a long career in the Department of State, he was sent to France as Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs. He was interviewed by Willis Armstrong in 1989.

Q: That had been worked out?

REINSTEIN: That was worked out in the European Advisory Conference, which sat in London and Ambassador Winant was our principal representative.

Q: Phil Mosley made an effort to recruit me for that and I didn't go.

REINSTEIN: Well, Phil was his strong right hand. Another thing which had an absolute immediate impact was the decision to set up a Council of Foreign Ministers. The Council of Foreign Ministers, which would consist of the five members of the Security Council. It was to be the counterpart of the Security Council in the areas in which the UN didn't have jurisdiction.

Q: And also the peace treaties.

REINSTEIN: The peace treaties or anything else because Article 107 of the United Nations charter excludes from jurisdiction of the UN any matters relating to any country which has been at war with any member of the United Nations which, of course, in the beginning was the Wartime Alliance. And then it was shifted to this organization.

The Council of Foreign Ministers really was a kind of continuation of, having invited the French and the Chinese in, of the wartime planning agencies of the top leaders of the Alliance. Well, the State Department, in its wartime planning, had come to the conclusion that one of the great mistakes made at the end of the First World War was that it had peace treaties too rapidly. It sat down and wrote treaties when passions were high and there should be a cooling off period before you decide to settle affairs. But this thinking never got to the new Secretary of State or the new President. And so we were somewhat appalled, when we got the text of the agreement, to find that the Council of Foreign Ministers had not only been set up to deal with peace treaties and other matters, but that it was agreed that its first meeting would take place in London in the first week of September.

Q: Potsdam was in what, August?

REINSTEIN: Yes. August 1, 2, and 3 in 1945. We had a month to get ready for this conference. I was Acting Chief of the Financial Division at that point. And my boss, George Lutherner, was in Europe with a number of other people attached to Mr. Ed Pauley's mission. Ed Pauley was American representative on the Inter-allied German Reparation Commission. He had set it up with the British and the Soviets at Soviet insistence. And they were wandering around Europe trying to figure out what was going on. They drained a lot of bright people from the State Department. They were locked up in what turned out to be a rather futile exercise.

Anyhow, I was the boy at home in charge in that particular area. And I was told to pull together some interdepartmental committee and go to work on the economic causes of peace treaties with Italy, Balkan satellites, and Finland. Well, the first thing I did was to get out the Treaty of Versailles. When I was in college I had looked at the war guilt clause and one or two other things, but I never looked at the treaty as a whole to see what was in it. I must say I was appalled to find all the technical stuff that had to be dealt with putting things back to work again, on which absolutely no work had been done. The Potsdam agreement said that each foreign minister would be accompanied by a high ranking deputy and a small staff.

The next thing that happened was I ran into Freeman Matthews in the State Department cafeteria around about mid-August or a little thereafter. And he said, "Oh, you're going to London with Secretary Byrnes." I said, "I am?" He said, "Yes."

My wife was then seven months pregnant and my two older boys were up in New Hampshire. I managed to get to her by telephone, we had no telephone ourselves up there, that evening. And said to her, "Look, I think you'd better come home right away because I'm going off to London to work on the peace treaties. I have no idea how long I'll be gone and when I'll ever get back." We organized my personal life quite rapidly. We went off with really nothing in the way of

preparations at all. Fortunately, from that viewpoint, they never really got a story on the subject and the conference broke down.

Now the conference, this was the first real nasty split with the Soviets. I watched it happen and I never understood just what happened. And I've never seen much in the way of speculation about this, why, all of a sudden, did the Soviets become destructive. They were destructive in certain ways already. We had a number of rows with them about one thing or another, but we arrived at some working relations.

For example, we had in Poland the matter of the German currency. We asked them if they would like to have the same currency we were using and they said yes. And they said they would be very glad to cooperate in that respect. But that said that they would want to have plates so they could print it themselves. Well, this was one of our first major, practical problems. In the first place, the currency technicians said we couldn't do it as a practical matter. That if you did not have all of your currency printed under rigidly maintained controls, quality controls, temperature, it would be too easy to counterfeit. So they were overruled on that for political reasons.

Then we ran into another curious problem, which we were having to print so much currency for use here, there, and elsewhere that it strained the capacity of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. It just couldn't handle all this. As a matter of fact, we even ran out of storage space in the Pacific because we had two types of yen, one for the main Japanese Islands and one for Taiwan. We didn't know what was going to happen with Taiwan. We didn't want to use the same kind of currency but you had to get the Japanese yen there so we had type A and type B. Type B, I think, was for Taiwan. So you shipped this currency out so it would be nearby when you had landings. But then the plans were changed as to whether you would attack Taiwan first or you would attack Japanese main islands first. And every time they made a change in the plans you would have to ship the currency back to California because you didn't have adequate storage facilities up front. This is the kind of problem we had.

Q: So what the Russians actually did was engage in legal counterfeiting?

REINSTEIN: Well, no. Well, the next problem we ran into was that, when we ran out of our own capacity, we went to the private bank printing companies. There were a number of them and they produced a very high grade of currency. And they have smaller countries which don't have that kind of facility. And the German mark was being printed by a company in Boston. They refused to turn the materials over to the Soviets. They said it was contrary to the traditions of the industry.

Q: I'm sure that's right.

REINSTEIN: That got us into a real pickle. At that point, I must say, I lost out on some of that. While the government had the authority under the draft act to take over private property, requisition it for good and sufficient technical reasons, which had to do with the Draft Act in the first place, this authority didn't extend to this kind of a case so we couldn't requisition the plant. And at one point there was a Senate investigation on German currency after the war.

All the documents were requisitioned by the Senate committee, which has an interesting list of the people who were involved. Those who knew everything were five, and those who knew most of it were another five. I find my name in that one. And interesting pieces of paper were in that document.

One is a rather raspy memorandum from George Lutheran to me saying that he had discovered that the Eastern Europeans were handling these financial matters without telling us anything about it and would I please get into this thing and see it was done properly. I can't remember what specific matter it was, but the EE was negotiating with the Soviets without talking to us, bringing us in at all, and we had to stop that.

There is another memorandum, a fascinating memorandum, of conversation with Ambassador Gromyko when they explained to him the problem they had with the currency printing plates, that they couldn't take the plates away from the company. It is a rather entertaining memorandum because Gromyko, you know, said, "Why should they be concerned? We're not going to compete with them. This is a government operation. We're all in this together." But it was highly suspicious that we had decided to backtrack for political reasons.

Anyhow, they were very sensitive about this kind of thing because the outcome of the war was not fully certain at this particular point. Somehow or other they managed to get the stuff away from the private printing company and the Soviets sent something like 14 airplanes to pick up the paper, the ink, the plates, and all the rest of it. They were loaded up here at National Airport. At the very last minute one of the planes was unloaded and some trucks came up with a lot of delicacies of one kind or another which were loaded instead. Whether all the Soviet planes got back, I've often wondered, because they had to fly way up over Siberia. Aids for flying were not all that good in those days, particularly, in bad weather.

Q: These were Soviet transport planes that went across the Alaska-Siberian route?

REINSTEIN: Yes.

Q: Which we had well established during the war.

REINSTEIN: We had it well established.

Q: For ferry service, because I was very familiar with that.

REINSTEIN: Yes.

Q: But that was for combat planes.

REINSTEIN: That's right.

Q: Of course, we had a route and we had refueling available.

REINSTEIN: Yes. Well, somehow or other, they got back. And, eventually, at one of our meetings they sent us samples. And we had a guy from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing and he said they were absolutely identical. He could detect no defect. So they pulled it off and they printed as much as they wanted. On what basis they ever handed it out to their people, I don't know. But knowing some of their rules, for instance, every officer was allowed to ship home two private automobiles, if he could lay his hands on them.

Q: The reason I raised the question about counterfeiting was there was no limit on the allowance they could print.

REINSTEIN: Absolutely no limit.

Q: And it was all cashable in our part of Germany if they wanted to.

REINSTEIN: We never found much evidence of leakage. You know, there was some at border places. You did have a certain amount of leakage.

Q: But it was circulated freely among Germans?

REINSTEIN: Yes. Some soldiers sold Mickey Mouse watches to the Russians. This paper money, I guess, was handed out rather freely, at least to some people, didn't mean all that much because they didn't observe some of the niceties.

Anyhow, the point is well taken, which is you had people issuing money with no central plan.

Q: No central control.

REINSTEIN: No central control and no understanding as to any of the financial arrangements. The currency, all kopeck's, reichsmarks and occupation marks, were exchangeable freely all over Germany. But, on the other hand, there weren't all that many things to use money for except to pay salaries and things of that nature.

Q: Services. There weren't any goods, there were services.

REINSTEIN: Yes.

Q: And the Russians didn't pay for the goods they took home, they just took the goods.

REINSTEIN: That's right, they didn't. So we never had any idea what they were doing. When this conference in London started, we got it put off a week, finally. And we went over on the first Queen Elizabeth, which the Government had put to use as a transport during the war. Both Queens were used as transports. By this time, every time they came they brought back 18,000 men. We landed blacked out because the Queen couldn't outrun a German Sub and they weren't sure whether there was some lurking around or not. We rounded up all of them. We had never had any episode which somebody escaped from our control. But we just weren't sure. Like

Confederate raiders, one of them that never heard about the end of the Civil War, kept sinking Union shipping for awhile after the war was over. So you never know.

Anyhow, we got there and the American delegation consisted of ten people, the Secretary of State, Jimmy Dunn; Ted Achilles was assigned to the embassy in London and he was secretary of the delegation. We had a guy who was an expert on waterways, because it was a great interest of Mr. Truman's. We wanted to make sure that they established the proper control over the brokerage. And I was supposed to deal with all the economic matters that applied to treaties of peace by myself. There was Phil Mosley, I guess, and a couple of others. But the whole delegation amounted to ten people. Mr. Molotov arrived with a delegation of 87 officials; we're talking about officials, not secretaries.

Anyhow, the discussions got started and they didn't really do very much about peace treaties. They took up a variety of subjects which were rather hot. One of which was the withdrawal of troops from Iran. And one of the achievements, and the Soviets did not renege on it, was the agreement to withdraw Allied forces from Iran, the British from the South and Soviets from the North. That agreement, as far as I know, was respected.

Then another question came up which was the Soviets wanted a trusteeship over Libya. I think this was a genuine misunderstanding. During the San Francisco conference, or maybe here at another conference, I don't know which, the Soviets talked to Stettinius about this and asked if they would be eligible for a trusteeship and indicated an interest in Libya. Stettinius said, "Yes, they would be eligible. But the Soviets, I think, thought they had a commitment from Stettinius and thought they were getting a trusteeship. The British, of course, were dead set against it. The French were, too.

Q: So was the U.S. Navy, I'm sure.

REINSTEIN: So was the U.S. Navy. Anyhow, that didn't work out. We had a discussion of Germany at French insistence. The French had one day on Germany. The French said that before we went further along dealing with Germany, they would like to have a discussion of what our long term objections were going to be. What they wanted to do was partition Germany and they made this quite clear. Mr. Molotov said that all this was not appropriate for discussion and should be taken up through diplomatic channels. Well, there was quite a tussle about that. Mr. Byrnes said, "Look, what the heck are diplomatic channels but just conversations between us. If you are going to take it up through diplomatic channels why can't we talk about it here?" The Soviets were absolutely adamant against having any discussions with the council at that stage about Germany.

Q: They probably didn't have a position.

REINSTEIN: Yes, I think they did. If they didn't, they developed one. Well, the French said very well, they would take it up through diplomatic channels. But they wanted to make clear that they would not cooperate in the administration of Germany in their zone of occupation until these discussions had taken place. So it was the French who first really broke down the negotiations. It may have been very useful to the Soviets to hide behind the French at this early stage.

Discussions did take place. Couve de Murville, who was Bidault's representative. He was acting as the President of the French Provisional Government, President, Prime Minister, Chief of State. He was nominal Chief of State. By that time, you see, De Gaulle had quit. So somewhere along there, and I don't remember the exact time, when we got to Paris later, Bidault was acting. De Gaulle was still around. Bidault was the Foreign Minister and after De Gaulle quit he was then put in as nominal head of state.

Couve de Murville was his deputy, but Elly Alpha was the top economic guy, although, Couve's opinion was respected, also. He led the French delegation to each of the capitals. They came to Washington in December of 1945 and outlined their position to us on the partition of Germany. On our side the delegation consisted of Jimmy Dunn, representing the Secretary, and Jimmy Riddleberger, and myself. I can't remember whether there was anybody else. It was a small group. And we listened to them politely and then told them that we weren't buying the partition of Germany, and this is the answer they got from the other capitals, including Moscow. Between the French and the Soviets, we got off to a pretty bad start in Germany. Our idea had been to set up a government of technicians.

Q: For all of Germany?

REINSTEIN: For all of Germany, that's right. Which we did manage to do in Austria. I forget what genius it was who worked this out. The Austrian arrangement was different from the German arrangement because the Austrian Government was allowed to act unless all four vetoed some action. We let the Austrian Government function.

Q: But there was an Austrian Government?

REINSTEIN: It was constituted. I mean, after all, there was no Austrian Government after the Anschluss.

Q: No, but there wasn't a German government in Austria. It was an Austrian Government?

REINSTEIN: Yes, it was an Austrian Government. Yes, the remnants of the old political parties composed of the Socialists and the Catholics managed to get together and form a government.

Q: There was a government of technicians in being?

REINSTEIN: Yes. In effect, it was constituted. And this was really what we wanted to do in Germany but we were never able to do.

Q: Because of the Russians, primarily?

REINSTEIN: Because of the Russians and also the French. The French continued to drag their feet and they were rather slow in working toward this.

Q: When did the Russian position become clear? At this conference? And what was the Russian position?

REINSTEIN: At that point, I was working on Italy and the Balkans and I just didn't have time to read German traffic, telegram traffic about Germany. And so I did lose touch. Let me explain what happened first in London. At some point things went sour. I don't know why. I heard from a German defector directly an explanation, but I don't know whether it's any good. At any rate, all of a sudden Mr. Molotov said all the discussions were improper because there were people in the room who had no business being in the room. And the British secretariat had prepared papers indicating what decisions needed to be made and Mr. Molotov refused to approve these papers because all the actions had been illegal.

Well, they sat and argued and argued about that for a week or ten days. And finally the conference broke down and the Soviets went home. Mr. Byrnes went home but he left a Corporal's Guard led by Jimmy Dunn in London indicating our willingness to sit down and go to work or whatever else we had to do. There were about four of us who were left there. I think Tommy Thompson turned up for that. I was left there as one of the hostages.

I finally managed to get myself loose because my wife was about to produce a child. I had the interesting experience of flying across the Atlantic in a DC-4 military transport which took four days to get from London to Washington. The ventilation and heating system went wacky during the flight, which had no seats, incidentally. It was a cargo plane. They had compartments. They simply moved up a couple of benches along the wall. The walls were curved so there was nothing to lean back against. They didn't even have proper seats. Dunn came home also, of course, so we were both here for those discussions with the French.

At Christmastime, Secretary Byrnes went to Moscow with two objectives. One was to start up the peace treaty process again and persuade them to come back. And the other was to make another attempt to sell our plan for dealing with atomic materials for atomic weapons. You may remember, having dropped two of these bombs and discovering how horrible the results were, we proposed an internationalized control.

Q: I remember that effort, yes.

REINSTEIN: You know, people tend to forget this. Byrnes didn't get anywhere on atomic weapons but he did get their agreement to start discussions with peace treaties. And those were started up in January of 1946.

We went back to London. This time there was at least a little more staff. I was able to take two people with me. Bill Gray and Julia Shira worked for me in the Financial Division. She was a very bright gal and he was a very bright young fellow. Anyhow, I had a little help to get started.

Well, as I say, Secretary Byrnes had gotten the Soviets to agree to reopen discussions. They compromised. The first compromise was to exclude from participation in the discussion of any particular problems in the peace treaties any country which had not been at war with those countries. This excluded the Chinese from everything because they had only been at war with Japan and we were not dealing with Japan. And it excluded the French from the Balkans, but not

from Italy or Germany. And it excluded the United States from discussion with Finland, because we were not at war with Finland.

Q: It left the smaller powers like the Dutch and the Belgians out in the cold. The Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Belgium, they were all invaded by the Germans.

REINSTEIN: The idea was that the principal powers would draft treaties of peace. Then they would have a conference and invite the other countries to come and comment.

Q: That's the pattern that was used on Japan later. That brought it down to the British, Russians, and us. How about the Canadians?

REINSTEIN: No. The Canadians weren't there.

Q: But they were at war with Germany.

REINSTEIN: You see, there were a number of countries that were at war with Germany but they were not members of the Big Five.

Q: You were subtracting France and China from the Big Five to make a council of three. I get it.

REINSTEIN: Let's go back and pick up this business about when did the Soviets manifest their lack of cooperation. As I say, being occupied with Italy primarily at that point, it was sometime before we got to the Balkans. I had virtually no possibility of paying much attention to what was going on elsewhere. My task was to somehow develop some positions, in the first place, for Italy and then see where we should go from there. So I really did not follow the developments in Germany at this stage.

We're talking about 1945 before the creation of the geographic duels, when matters were divided between political and economic, although, economic matters were cleared with the political people; the political people didn't clear things with the economic people.

Q: That's not new.

REINSTEIN: That's not new. I can remember a marvelous fight within the Department. At the time of the fall of France we had frozen all the French assets here, including large dollar balances and a big hunk of gold that was in the vaults of the Federal Reserve Bank in New York. At some point the Swiss legation in charge of French interests, this was after our break with Vichy when we took the position that the Vichy government didn't exist anymore. And so we had the rather curious situation. After all, we wanted the Swiss to protect our interests in France and the Swiss maintained that they were in charge of French interests acting for Vichy. We pretended that the Swiss were acting on their own, not getting instructions from Vichy. At some point the Swiss sent a letter to one of the New York banks asking what the state of the accounts was.

Q: Where's my monthly statement, in other words?

REINSTEIN: The bank took it up with us. We had a case not long ago where the State Department's Institutional Memory [failed], where I can't remember what the problem was, but it was a nasty, little one, but people thought the Secretary of State had functional impairments.

At the time of the fall of the low countries we had frozen the assets and they had governments in exile and we allowed the governments in exile to use a certain amount of money, to use their own money, really. The Dutch wanted to requisition all private assets. We had a merry dance on that subject for a period of time. Anyhow, I think it was the French-American Banking Corporation wrote to the State Department and asked for funds.

Oh, what I left out was at the time of the fall of Yugoslavia, it wasn't clear whether there was any Yugoslavia government left and there was concern that the Germans would get hold of the Yugoslav official assets. They whipped through Congress a piece of legislation which provided the Secretary of State would determine who was authorized to operate official accounts and, if he gave a certification to the bank that the person before him was authorized to have that authority and was, in fact, a proper representative, the bank was protected against suit. So it was an ingenious piece of legislation. At a late stage, I was one who gave the certification.

Q: You became the Secretary of State for this purpose?

REINSTEIN: For that purpose, yes.

Q: You were also immune from suit, I trust.

REINSTEIN: I assume so. I got involved in the final settlement of the suit between the Bank of Belgium and the Bank of France because the Belgians had shipped their gold to Paris and then the French shipped it down to Africa. The Vichy government, under German pressure, brought the gold back and turned it over to Bank of Belgium in Brussels and it disappeared. Anyhow, the Bank of Belgium brought suit against the Bank of France. They had a very clever lawyer named John Foster Dulles.

Mr. Dulles handled this case and he had a series of delaying actions. He completely outmaneuvered the other side. After the French Liberation he just asked for it and they finally made a settlement. They reimbursed the Belgians and accepted their claim. It was part of the reparation thing which is another part of the German reparations that I handled while I was in Paris. Let's go back and mention that.

But to get back to the question of how things fell apart, I really don't know. The State Department began to move in and try to work out policy for Germany. And you had the division between political people handling Central Europe, except they added Switzerland to it. Switzerland was previously considered part of Western Europe. Central Europe was Germany and Austria. In developing a very competent staff that was organized under Bill Clayton, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, we got some extremely bright people, Charles Kimmelberger, a well-known economist, MIT

Q: Ed Martin was in there somewhere, too.

REINSTEIN: Ed Martin came along later. They set up an office of occupied territories, later divided between Japan, Korea, and Germany, Austria. And then they had brought in a fellow who I had substituted for twice under circumstances that affected my career substantially, Emile Dupres. Emile had been in the OSS during the war. He was in Italy and was supposed to come back and be the financial advisor of the Liberated Areas Division. He never came back. I was told to temporarily take charge of that problem and so that was how I got officially involved in financial work and how I came to be Jimmy Dunn's deputy in the occupation planning exercise.

And as I say, it's interesting how things work. Dunn was an absolute master at making things work without anyone quite realizing how he did it and he had an extraordinary knack for that. When we got into this whole question of recognizing De Gaulle earlier, I went to him and said, "Look, Jimmy, I think I know what we're going to do but it seems to me you ought to have your French desk officer deal with this." And Dunn said, "No, you go ahead and handle it." Of course, I was used to dealing with the Treasury people. You know, if somebody they didn't know suddenly turned up, they probably wouldn't have listened to him at all; whereas, they would listen to me.

So I found myself dealing with all kinds of political problems as Dunn's deputy. Then Dunn took me back to London. He took me to London first, I guess. I take it he was the guy who had picked me for the job and he took me back with him. I had tried, without any success, to get the Department to pay some attention to these peace treaty problems. But they were coping with these immediate problems of making things work at all and I think they regarded Mr. Byrnes's fascination with peace treaties as a curious, silly idea that he had. They really wouldn't give us any backup or help.

Well, the first thing I had to do was on the way over on the Queen Mary I drafted a sort of general statement of what we were trying to work out in the economic proposals in the Italian peace treaty. I went over it with Dunn and then we shipped it back to Washington and said, "Unless we are instructed to do something differently, this is the line we are going to take." We never received any instructions. On matters which we had no particular background or competence, we didn't get any help at all. So we started off in a rough way. We soon found that we were not making any headway with the Soviets at all.

Q: This was in London, England?

REINSTEIN: Yes, in London.

Q: This is 1946?

REINSTEIN: This is early 1946. In principle, the drafting work was to be done in time for a peace conference to be called inviting all the rest of the countries into the process by the first of May. That was the date that had been established for holding a peace conference. Well, it became very clear quite rapidly that nothing was happening at all. About the only thing that happened was they sent a fact-finding commission down to look at the situation on the spot. That was Phil Mosley, I guess, and our contingent. It was a lengthy debate about where and what the

terms of reference of the commission would be. That used up practically all the time of the deputies for a long time.

Finally, discussions broke down completely. The Soviets wanted the commission to go into a province which had no Slavs in it at all. It had some Austrians but we were not dealing with that. So Dunn said, "All right. They can go there but only on two conditions. One is that the commission also goes to a city where the entire Italian population had been deported. Obviously, the Italians were not going to get back.

Q: And the Russians had no occupation role?

REINSTEIN: They had no occupation role at all. That was one condition. The other condition was that they would only go there if time permits. The Soviets refused to accept the phrase, "if time permits," and so discussions were suspended all together for about ten days until they finally came around. They were getting people organized to put on demonstrations for the benefit of the commission.

When we came back, we were driving to our office for a meeting and we passed by Buckingham Palace. They were just about to have the changing of the guards so there was quite a crowd. And someone said, "The crowds are looking in the wrong direction."

The level of discussion that took place, indicated by my experience with the Soviets, we were the economic committee. Of course, I was the representative. I sat on vast numbers of committees, the Italian Reparation Commission, the Port Authority, the Committee on A Free Port Authority for the city of Trieste. My British opposite number was Arnold J. Tweenby, who had absolutely no knowledge of courts or anything like that at all.

But the economic committee was instructed to prepare invitations to the country for people to make reparation claims against. And so we got started off by the Soviet representative saying that the invitation should only go to countries which had suffered from Italian aggression. That would have limited the list, presumably, to Yugoslavia, Greece, and the Soviet Union.

Q: What about the British?

REINSTEIN: Yes, I guess the British would have been, too.

Q: Well, they would have had to have been because of Malta, Libya and all that.

REINSTEIN: But it included Canada and other countries and all the occupied countries which had claims. Among other countries, Brazil, which had forces on the Italian front as part of the American Fifth Army. Anyhow, we never discussed the formula because I objected to it. I said this prejudices a question. All we were supposed to do was ask people what their positions were, if they had any claims and, if so, what for and the like. Well, we debated this for about 27 hours in a series of meetings. We just went over the same conditions over and over again.

A very entertaining poem, which was done by my British colleagues, should be added at some point to this documentation. It's really very entertaining. As a matter of fact, I did a song, too, based on this incident that we sung to the tune of As Time Goes By. We had a couple songs done to that tune.

We made a report to the deputies about what the positions were. When it got to the deputies, Mr. Dunn rejected the report. This is about what was going on. Finally, I guess Mr. Byrnes intervened at this point and called for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers to try to get something done to be held in Paris. So we went to Paris.

Q: This is the three foreign ministers?

REINSTEIN: Well, at that point, that solved a bunch of problems because you couldn't very well exclude the host. So as a second compromise, the French were allowed back in and so we could talk to Harris Wolf. Mr. Dunn decided that, for tactical reasons, we should table complete drafts of all the treaties under discussion. So I was working at night because we were going to meetings in the daytime. I went to all the meetings of the deputies.

We did get into the discussion of the Soviet reparation claims against Germany. They put that forward. They wanted \$300 million in reparations in U.S. dollars from Italy. So we began a tussle with the Italian reparation problem and the deputies because we said we would pump in money into Italy and we just could not agree with the Soviet statement of taking it out. It would affect our financing their reparation claim and we weren't to accept that position. Eventually, they later compromised on that.

ROBERT E. ASHER
Mission for Economic Affairs
London (1946-1947)

Robert E. Asher was born in 1910 in Chicago. He attended Dartmouth, the University of Chicago and the University of Berlin. His career included posts mainly in Germany, Switzerland, and England. He also spent a year as part of the Land-Lease Administration in North Africa. He has held several positions in the State Department and the Brookings Institution. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in November 2000.

ASHER: I was offered a job by the State Department with the Mission for Economic Affairs in London, which was within the embassy framework. Headed by, when I got the offer, Tom Blaisdell who had been in the War Production Board and I knew him from that. His deputy, Paul R. Porter, and his colleague, Theodore Geiger, were old friends of mine.

The rationale for maintaining a Mission for Economic Affairs was that there were some temporary economic agencies headquartered in London. One called the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe was dealing with certain economic needs of Europe – timber, for example

– long before the Marshall Plan, that is two or three years before it became operational. There was a European Coal Organization, which was trying to allocate U.S. and Polish coal to those countries in Europe that needed it. Another organization called the European Central Inland Transport Organization was trying to deal with the sad fact that Germany had corralled all the railroad cars that were in Europe and repainted them. And the Dutch, the Danes and everybody wanted their cars back. Identifying and allocating them was one of ECITO's jobs. So there were these three "E Organizations" they were called, emergency organizations, with the U.S. represented in all of them by personnel from the Mission for Economic Affairs.

Among the things I was expected to do was to represent the U.S. in the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe, which had representation from these former governments of countries that were based in London during the war, what did they call them -- governments in exile. The executive secretary of the EECE was a very able Englishman named Eric Wyndham-White, who later headed the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. So we had an international committee, and we discussed a lot of the economic problems of Europe. Curiously, after trying for weeks to get myself on the State Department payroll from UNRRA, I was told, "Well, you were there all the time. Because when you left Lend Lease they put you into State Department status and gave you a leave of absence for UNRRA. You didn't really have to go through all this."

Q: You were in London from when to when?

ASHER: From November 1946 to the middle of 1947. Yes, when the UN got going and the Economic Commission for Europe was established, I was a member of the first U.S. delegation, along with Paul Porter of our London office. Under Secretary of State Will Clayton headed the delegation. Our mission, shortly after the first session of the ECE was moved to Geneva. We became the U.S. Resident Delegation to the Economic Commission for Europe.

Q: While you were in London, you were there of course in the early days, but it seems that British took longer to pull out of rationing, even than Germany and France.

ASHER: That's true, they were very slow about doing this. But the result was to put a better lid on the maldistribution of income and privilege, I think. And there was a more orderly process than the black markets that flourished in continental Europe. Not that there weren't any black markets in Britain, but the British were

Q: More disciplined

ASHER: Much more disciplined. And the country was badly damaged. Well, there was damage all through Europe, there is no question about that, but people forget that the British were also trying to become more of a classless society than was true of other places. And the Labor Government was strong. Labor felt reasonably strong in the coalition government under Churchill, and stronger still after the electorate booted out Churchill, to the surprise of a lot of American observers. London was a sort of European capital in those early post-war months. It was exciting to be in for a lot of reasons. Not only the resumption of additional theater and music and cultural programs, the reopening of the museums, but also because there were many

European continentals there, and the planning of large scale reconstruction was a big job. The U.S. was considered to be, and rightly, the source from which most of the supplies were going to come. The situation didn't get better, as you know, very quickly, and the Marshall Plan was a belated but marvelous answer.

Q: Were you feeling at that time while you were in London that the U.S. wasn't rising as much as it should have to the occasion?

ASHER: Yes. But, we were also aware that the U.S. itself was sort of demobilizing from a war-time economy. The U.S. population had been denied its automobiles, its brand new tires, its canned goods and all sorts of things, needs that politically had to be satisfied. Roosevelt's sudden death was mourned throughout the world and Truman hadn't come in with a golden reputation.

Q: No. You stopped Lend Lease right there after the war had ended, the ship's turned around.

ASHER: Truman was very anxious to get back to what he thought was normalcy. And it was possible to do so in the U.S. He wasn't eager to be the first president not to let private relief do the job abroad, as Herbert Hoover had done after World War One. So the programs of the temporary agencies were somewhat starved. But, one knew that you couldn't turn the government around in two weeks. I think most people were reasonably patient. There was a Greek-Turkish aid program in 1946-47, I think, but nothing called the Marshall Plan until well after that. There was plenty to do in London and some friendships were made that served us well when we did get into the Marshall Plan period, or when we began work in Geneva or UN Headquarters in New York. For several years I kept running into people I had known in London.

Q: What was really built up was an international cadre.

ASHER: Yes. These three emergency organizations in London were folded into the Economic Commission for Europe when it came into being as the first regional organization of the UN Economic and Social Council. As I recall it now, I think it was in the spring of 1946 that the UN sent abroad a mission called the Temporary Subcommission on Devastated Areas. One group came to London. One part went to Asia. The London team was headed by a good economist, Isador Lubin, who had been a Commissioner for Labor Statistics under Roosevelt and then an anonymous assistant at the White House. I worked with them for several days. Our people were headquartered at the Mission for Economic Affairs in the London Embassy and, because they had worked with the so-called "E Organizations," were becoming well-informed on the needs of Europe, the supplies available, which were shortest, what kinds of priorities should be established, and so on...

Q: When you are talking about Europe you are talking about what we refer today as "whole Europe," including the Soviet Union?

ASHER: Yes. But it was pretty clear from the UNRRA experience that the Soviets were going to demand things but they wouldn't be willing to supply information, to have missions come to them to ask questions, and so on. If all this could be arranged under the U.N., it might give them

some cover and some protection, but basically they weren't prepared for the U.N. personnel either. They were sovereignty-conscious to the n-th degree. Very difficult to work with.

ALBERT E. HEMSING
Film Reviewer
London (1946-1947)

Albert E. Hemsing was born in 1921 and educated at New York University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1951 serving in Paris, Bonn, and Berlin, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed in Robert Amerson in 1989.

HEMSING: As the war came to an end, OWI operations abroad ground to a halt so suddenly that many a mess was left around the world. One such mess was in the UK where OWI had conducted a large film program. In November 1946 Herb Edwards asked me to go to London ("for one or two months at most") to bring some order into the motion picture operation there, to write a report on what a more modest State Department film program there ought to look like, and, finally, to break in a new motion picture officer whom Herb was recruiting from UCLA.

I docked in Southampton on November 11, after ten stormy days on His Majesty's troop transport, the S.S. Franconia and arrived in London with something like the great expectations of Dickens' Pip. I was not to be disappointed.

The film program was in a mess. Among other things, I discovered a whole hangar at an RAF base near Oxford, piled perilously high with thousands of cans of U.S. feature films, 40 titles in 8-10 language versions, with some 20 prints of each feature. These were the films which OWI had stockpiled on behalf of the major Hollywood companies, so that they could be put into the movie houses the moment the U.S. Army occupied a new area. They had been reported "lost" more than a year and a half earlier, and had been replaced with new prints at tremendous cost. Now they could only be sold as scrap.

On the weekends I used every minute to explore London. I had a great time in the museums, galleries, theaters and concert halls. Socially, I learned that American notions of British reserve were pretty much myth. Using my assignment to come up with a report on the recommended shape of a post-war USIS film operation as a calling card, I got in touch with such British documentary "greats" as John Grierson, Edgar Anstey and others. They were kind enough to invite an American 25 year old into their circle.

Objectively, of course, London was in terrible shape that harsh winter. Coal was very short, and food even in shorter supply. I remember, for example, a luncheon at the Oxford-Cambridge Club in Pall Mall with Sir Oliver Bell, head of the British Film Institute. The cavernous place had not been properly heated for months. Lunch consisted of about a dozen miniature European shrimp, lost on a silver platter. But, with several unrationed whiskeys before and a few glasses of port for dessert, we managed. Sir Oliver did not look like Mr. Beefeater himself for nothing.

ARTHUR F. BLASER, JR.
Assistant to the Treasury Representative, Department of the Treasury
London (1946-1948)

Arthur F. Blaser, Jr. was born in 1908 and raised in the Cleveland, Ohio area. He received his undergraduate degree from Yale University in 1929. He received his M.B.A. from Harvard University in 1932 and his Ph.D. in economics in 1941 Columbia University. It was a position at the Department of the Treasury that sparked his interest in foreign affairs. In addition to the United Kingdom, Mr. Blaser also served in Japan, Germany, and Brazil. He was interviewed by Raymond Ewing on October 16, 1996.

BLASER: Later I was transferred to the British Empire and Middle East division. At the end of 1946 I was asked to go to London as an assistant to the Treasury Representative there. Treasury at that time had an arrangement with the State Department whereby it would send mostly senior people to embassies in countries where the US had a large financial interest, to work on the Ambassador's staff to assist on financial matters on which they had special knowledge or expertise. While in Washington I had worked on the post-war loan to Britain, (\$3.75 billion) and the Lend Lease settlement, and that was part of the work in London. A big part of the job was to help keep track of the financial situation in Britain and report on that to Washington. Also I had to become expert on the complicated system of exchange controls and to help American business men and private citizens with the problems they encountered with the controls.

In the fall of 1948 I was recalled to Washington and rejoined the British Empire and Middle East section. The work was somewhat similar to that which I had been doing before and in London. One big event was the devaluation of the British pound. This involved a lot of analysis, much of it window dressing, until those in authority decided what the deal was going to be.

Q: And that in effect prepared you for your first overseas assignment which was...when did you go to London?

BLASER: We flew to London on the last day of 1946 and landed there New Year's eve. We went to our hotel and looked down the corridor, and there the fog was coming into the corridor from outside. That was my introduction to London.

Q: It's hard to think of a more difficult day to arrive at a Foreign Service post than New Year's eve. I guess only exceeded maybe by Christmas eve would perhaps be even worse. You were in London, you were part of the embassy, part of the economic section.

BLASER: Yes, I guess you'd say that. I don't remember exactly the organizational details. I had a more senior Treasury representative under whose direct supervision I worked, but we were in close touch with the Ambassador. I'm a little unclear. I believe when I first arrived in London there was a sort of an interregnum, there was no ambassador and the minister was in charge. It's been so long I can't recall the actual details.

Q: In that period, in the 1946-47 immediate post-war period, do you recall where else the Treasury Department had representatives? There weren't very many, or were there?

BLASER: No, not a great many. We had a man in Paris, one in Rome, one in the Middle East who was based in Cairo but traveled around, and one in Brazil. We also had somebody in Japan. Just a handful, there was no widespread thing. Their link to Treasury was to the Office of Monetary Research which later became the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs. That title was a little more apt in later years. With State Department concurrence they sent people where there were heavy United States financial interests and commitments.

Q: We certainly had interests and commitments in Britain at that time, and I guess you were reporting, analyzing the British economy as well as the operation of exchange controls because that was very regulated.

BLASER: Yes, it was indeed. And then we had to watch the progress of the loan too. But in general, of course, that simply related to Britain's success in international trade, and international finance which would enable the UK to generate the money to service the loan.

I would like to take one minute to go back to the scene in the US. When the Congress was debating whether or not it would approve the British loan which was \$3 billion, seven hundred and fifty million dollars, plus a lend lease settlement. I was in the gallery in the House of Representatives and it was quite dramatic. The speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, abandoned the chair, and came down on the floor and made a stirring speech. He said the loan would help to buttress our system against the advance of communism, "something which I abhor." It was dramatic really. You could just feel it in the hall that that speech had put the loan across. I went back and telephoned my office on this development.

Q: That was a very important step. The British government at the time that you were there, and when the loan was approved, was under Labor wasn't it?

BLASER: Yes. Well, that was the interesting thing. As you know, the British kicked Winston Churchill out shortly after the close of the war and Labor was in, and Clement Attlee was prime minister. Lewis Douglas, the former director of the Bureau of the Budget had come to London as the Ambassador. And Sam Berger, who later became Ambassador in Korea and elsewhere, was the labor attaché. He was top dog in the embassy staff from the time Labor took over because he knew all the Labor people. He became the Ambassador's right arm. This was a little amusing in that the old embassy stalwarts who had ruled the roost before Labor came in were not quite as influential in the embassy as they had been. Sam knew the whole UK Government power structure, so he was in.

Q: You and your colleague from Treasury had a lot of contacts with the Bank of England and Treasury.

BLASER: Yes, Treasury mostly. The Bank of England was sort of the handmaiden and the Treasury was where the power was. We kept in touch with them.

Q: Well, anyone who has had an assignment in London always, of course, looks back on it as a great experience, and I think for your first Foreign Service assignment that must have been very special. How long were you in London? A couple of years?

BLASER: Yes, just a couple of months short of two years.

Q: And then you came back to Washington?

BLASER: Yes, that's right. We came back in '48 and didn't go out again until '56.

Q: And part of that time you continued to be involved with British financial monetary affairs.

BLASER: Yes, I did. One thing that happened while I was back in Washington was the devaluation of the pound. We had a lot of sort of hurry-up economic studies. Some colleagues and I went to New York and went into the stores, and checked with clerks about British merchandise. We found in general it was pretty expensive. The whole idea, of course, was to buttress the need for a reduction in value of the pound. So there was a lot of pulling and hauling, and staff work. But as it developed, as you might expect, this was a matter so important that the staff work was just sort of trimming, and the people who had to make the decision finally made it. That was that.

HERBERT E. WEINER
Assistant Labor Attaché, Labor Department
London (1947-1949)

Herbert E. Weiner was born in New York City. He was a teacher Brooklyn before he entered the Army. He was interviewed in 1991 and 1993 by Roger Schrader and Linda and Eric Christenson respectively.

WEINER: It took Pearl Harbor to get us in; two years after Germany had gone to war. The feeling after World War II was one of *no return* to the post-World War I situation. This was going to be a new world. It was going to be reconstructed. But suspicion was there. In a sense, you could say that this was demonstrated politically in the election in Britain in 1945. Churchill was a war hero. Nobody questioned that. But who was it that said Churchill had mobilized the English language and taken it to war? And he did it effectively. I remember on Sunday afternoons my grandmother, who had been an immigrant from Poland, listened religiously to Churchill in those scratchy short wave broadcasts and she would proclaim he was a great man. He had a tremendous following.

Before the 1945 election, the embassy and the American public, and I think the American government, expected that since Churchill was such a great war leader and so universally recognized, he would walk in. The labor attaché said, "No. Labor will win." The others didn't know what was going on down below. And Labor swept to victory in 1945 general election with

the biggest majority in parliamentary history. I believe it was a hundred and forty-six seats in Parliament over the Conservatives and Liberals as the Opposition. This was a massive Labor victory. And the verdict was: Churchill is a great man. (And in all my dealings with Labor people after that, there was never any question about his being revered, and about his being the personification of the best in Britain.) But they did not want his domestic policies or to go back to the Conservative party policies of the post-World War I period.

It may not be popular today in terms of current political perspectives, but there was at that time tremendous support for a break with the past in economic and social policy and therefore for the Labor Party throughout Britain. In the United States two things were recognized: one, the United States was now an international power whether it wanted to be or not; and isolationism was out. Two, the government had to play a larger role in the economy because the individual did not have very much influence or control over serious social and economic problems, but did have the pain.

Well, a lot of that increased government involvement had started under Roosevelt with the Social Security System and so forth. There was a great deal of suspicion among working people about governments and doubts about the benefits of the free market system. Roosevelt recognized early on that he needed the support of working people in the United States for his domestic policies.

Now it was recognized that if American foreign policy was going to be successful, it had to concentrate on several things. One: The guiding political principle in our foreign policy was that we did not want a resurgence of dictatorships. In those days, the issue was a resurgence of a Nazi Germany or a Fascist Italy or a militaristic Japan. These were the targets. The Soviet Union was considered to be our ally, not one with which we were particularly happy, but a convenient ally. I remember the remark Churchill once made: "I would get in bed with the devil if he is on my side." The point was that politically there was to be no return to dictatorships of any sort, and the promotion of democracy became enshrined in American foreign policy as an objective. The feeling was that wars are bred in a crucible of dictatorship, and that democratic governments are unlikely to go to war.

Secondly, there had to be economic growth; and thirdly, the benefits of this economic growth should go to the whole population. We could not have extremes of rich and poor. If a country is going to be unified and economically vibrant, everybody has to feel that he or she is benefiting from economic growth; everybody had to feel that he or she could participate politically; and everybody has to feel that he or she is a free individual.

Within that framework, there were subsets, for example, the feeling that you had to obviate war in Europe. And there was much public discussion of an old issue, namely the unification of Europe. People saw the United States of America as prosperous, big, and vibrant. What if it had a counterpart in Europe, say a United States of Europe? This was not a new idea. It had been advocated at the end of World War I.

The argument ran that by integrating the economies in Europe, and more particularly weaving together the German and French economies, you would obviate a major cause of the wars in Europe that had taken place for a whole century before. Economic integration would obviate a

source of war in Europe. Also it would promote economic growth through a more effective division of labor, the creation of large markets, and mass production. These would be "good things."

There is a tendency today to say that promoting democracy is our newest foreign policy gimmick. Democracy has been an active, specific part of the foreign policy of the United States since the end of World War II. We have an interest in it. That doesn't mean that every government is going to be friendly. Some will be friendlier than others at various times. But by democracy we are not just talking about a parliamentary process. We are talking about building institutions that have a stake in democracy for their own existence, and collectively would constitute a sort of balance of power in society. Sometimes some groups would be more influential than others, but there would be others to offset them.

This stake in institutional democracy embraces for the individual the idea that to make it work requires personal freedoms and civil liberties including freedom of religion, freedom of press, alternative political parties, free speech, freedom of association, freedom from forced labor, et al. All these things are built in correctives. Democracy also has to have free institutions: Churches, which are free to organize and propagate their beliefs; free trade unions, not just for the sake of collective bargaining, but so that people would feel that they could have more freedom to exercise more equitably in the labor market.

Well, the labor aspect became very important right after World War II, and everybody could see the need. I recall my arrival in London. I was amazed. We had not really suffered in the United States during the war. As a matter of fact, we had done very well. There had been a tremendous expansion of the economy. The standard of living in the United States was higher after the war than before the war. The gross national product, I think, was just about double what it had been. Unemployment had disappeared. Real wages were up. Whole new industries had developed.

In Britain, you could see there was destruction. London was in rubble. If you went to a restaurant to eat, you had the choice of having bread or a "sweet" dessert with your meal; and there was a five shilling limit on the charge for a meal. I remember one time soon after I arrived, one of the fellows said, "Let's go to lunch." I said, "Where?" "Oh, well, there's a bombed out movie theater, and the only thing left is the lobby. They have turned the lobby into a little restaurant." But despite all the rubble, there was a feeling of optimism. There was a feeling you had to do something. Not only *want* to do, but *can* do.

The other thing was that we knew in this country was that we could not go back. But isolationism was still very strong. President Truman, whom I consider one of the great Presidents of the United States, understood the concept of aligning political forces. And what he did was something which, when I look back, I find really remarkable. The home of isolationism at that time was the Republican Party. And the two leading Republicans in Congress were Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, who was the Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Robert Taft of Ohio. Truman brought Vandenberg in on his side. Vandenberg saw that the United States could not just return to where it had been before the war. Senator Taft hung on to his isolationism, but Truman, in effect, had split the Republican

Party and could add those who split to his support on foreign policy issues in the Democratic Party.

But to carry out an internationalist foreign policy, Truman had a lot of selling to do, and among other people he had to sell were those in the unions. It's not that unions were so large, but for every union member there are a couple of other people in the family who share his or her sympathies. So the constituency is far larger than the union membership. And also the importance of the numbers is equaled by the importance of the strategic position of the unions. In other words, you don't have to have a lot of members, if you can have them in the right place.

During the early days of the Cold War, I used the following illustration. "If you want to knock out the railways of France, how many troops and how many bombers would you need? You only need one railwaymen's union." So I used to tell this story to help people keep these things in mind, because it was within the ranks of labor where a good part of the "Cold War" began to take place. Well, Truman got the unions on board -- both the old AFL and old CIO, which had been bitter rivals. And within the CIO at that time, there was still considerable Communist influence among about ten of its affiliates. But the leadership, CIO President Philip Murray from the Steelworkers and Secretary-Treasurer, Jim Carey, of the Electrical Workers, were both very patriotic men, and there was no question where their loyalties were.

Now, the AFL at that time was headed by President William Green and Secretary-Treasurer George Meany. They had become converted to internationalism. Meany was an internationalist in large part because of a feud he had with Green. Meany involved himself in international affairs because Green wouldn't let him do anything else, and he became a genuine foreign policy expert on a national level. I remember I used to meet George Meany on occasion, and he really knew whereof he spoke. He understood international politics.

Anyway, on June 5, 1947, General Marshall in a speech at Harvard University announced in general terms the Marshall Plan. I remember some time afterwards I was at my first economics section staff meeting at our embassy in London, and I was in terrible fear of the Economic Counselor, who in those days in London was next to God. His name was Don Bliss. And I recall the staff standing around the room; it was show and tell time, and everybody told his little bit of story. He looked at me, and I said, with some trepidation, "Sir, in view of the speech General Marshall made at Harvard, are we supposed to do anything about it?" And he said, "Well, young man, as you advance in the Foreign Service, you will discover that the politicians make these speeches. Our job in the Foreign Service is to tell them what they meant, and then to figure out what to do. If it succeeds, they are the heroes, if it fails, we are the bums."

And so this was my introduction to the Marshall Plan. Well, Truman, on the domestic side, got support from major Republican businessmen and the trade union leadership. One of the most important people on his side was Paul Hoffman, then President of the Studebaker Corporation, who had gained an enormously favorable reputation in this country for his war work and how he had converted the Studebaker plant to war production. And Studebaker had very good labor relations.

So these were all people who came from different sides, yet they had viewpoints that were at least complementary. They could understand the importance of doing something, and that the United States could not live by itself. And the other thing was that you could *see* the damage and the need for aid to reconstruct Europe. You only had to travel. We had reached a point where the dollar was the only real currency, and where the balance of payments were so bad, that it was like someone playing poker and only one party had any chips.

There were other things that struck me when I came to London. I can still remember my very first night. There were really no places to sleep. A lot of the hotels had been damaged and the rates for what there was were ridiculous. So the embassy found me a room in the home of a widow who had about five or six rooms she used to rent out in this big old house. A woman officer of the British Navy (a WREN), some other man, and I were there. It was December, and I was just plain cold. And I still remember that my mother had kept telling me, "Take these winter long johns." And I said, "Why?" And she said, "Oh, you know, the socialists 'don't give steam' (heat).

Anyway, I arrived in London and I was shivering. I had come off the boat at Southampton and taken the boat train to London, then made my way by taxi to this address. I can still remember the place. It was called Cromwell Road, right near the Kensington Museum. Anyway, I was cold and she had some food, chopped up cabbage. It wasn't exactly sumptuous, and I was shivering. And she said, "Well, come and sit by the fire." Well, it turned out to be an electric fire. There was a lot of fog in those days, and the windows were badly fitted because the place had been badly shaken by the German bombing. The fog would seep through the window sills. So you could be sitting here, and just about six or eight feet away was a so-called "fire" in the fireplace. And you would see this yellow fog, because the houses all burned coal. London in those days was either black or yellow. If it were raining, it would be yellow fog, and it would choke you. Sometimes fog was so thick that the buses had to stop running.

And my landlady said, "Now, you stand this way towards the fire, but now turn around so it gets the other side of you," because there wasn't enough heat. And so I would turn around. She said, "It's like toast. You toast a little bit on either side." And I said, "You know, I've never seen a fireplace before. I came from an apartment in the Bronx. We had a radiator in the corner of the room." And she said, "You move the sofa up closer to the fire. Isn't this cozy?" I said, "Well, I guess it is." And finally she said, "Don't you have fireplaces?" I said, "No. Frankly, I never saw a fireplace in any house I've ever been in." She said, "You don't say? Then what do you sit around?" And that was my introduction to London.

Then I said to her, "Well, I understand there is now a socialist government here? But where is the class struggle?" "Oh," she said -- she was a conservative -- "that's going on. It's just that there's a different class struggling." And this conversation would go on. I was a Roosevelt New Dealer, and she was an old line Tory conservative. But we got along very well.

Her name was Marie Rowell. She was a widow of a doctor, and she had a couple of grown children. Because of the war damage, there was always something to fix. She also had all sorts of men friends who would come over and fix things. I said, "Marie, that's wonderful. You are getting all kinds of free labor." -- You could not find any labor for hire, and everything was

terribly expensive. I said, "What's the secret of your success in getting these people to come over and fix things." She said, "It's very, very simple. Don't waste your credit on small favors. Save it for big ones." And she was getting her house fixed. I learned a lot from her about human nature.

But in any case, the British were a good natured society in the sense that people knew times were difficult. Food was rationed. There were black marketeers, but black marketing was not rampant. Britain was a country of law abiding citizens. Things were tough, and there were black marketeers; but this hadn't cut into the cloth of the society. And I got a lesson in economics. I had been an economics major at Columbia; and when I went into the Foreign Service, I still had my dissertation to write for my doctorate. I didn't write that until a few years later.

But my real education in economics came in London on a very interesting day, February 12, 1948. The House of Commons had been destroyed during the blitz when the Germans were sending the VE rockets over London; so the House of Commons was meeting in the old House of Lords; and there were very few seats for outsiders. The House of Commons was having a great debate on economic policy, in particular, on the incomes policy. I was the assistant to the Labor Attaché. I was sent there to see whether the Government would get the cooperation of the trade unions to restrain wage demands, to work longer hours, and to reduce or eliminate strikes. A big claim to power of the Labor Government was that it had the confidence of working people, so that a Labor Government could ask for restraint and sacrifices. A Tory Government, on the other hand, would not have had that kind of confidence, and that confidence was essential. And so I went to the House of Commons. We had only one ticket in the embassy, and I was given that very treasured ticket.

The debate in the House began at 11 a.m. and went on until 10 p.m. in the evening. I sat there afraid to give up my seat, crunched in the gallery of the House of Lords, leaning over the rail; and I saw an all star show of some of the greatest economic and political minds of the day. I heard Sir Stafford Cripps, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer and then considered a brilliant politico-economic mind, lay out what British economic policy of restraint should be. The issue was restraints on wages, prices, and profits. Everybody had to restrain himself was the policy, and the buzz word was *productivity*. After Sir Stafford Cripps had spoken, Churchill spoke for the Conservatives, then Clement Davies, the leader of the Liberal Party, then Herbert Morrison, the powerful Home Secretary in the Labor Government and in the Labor Party.

Q: Clement Attlee?

WEINER: Clement Attlee was Prime Minister. Then you heard Attlee. Then came the heart-searing left, Aneurin Bevan, who got up and spoke with his heart in the coal mines. "These miners, who are struggling in the pits, who are soaking in all that coal dust. . . " He was talking about the Welsh miners. Then his wife, Jennie Lee, who could bring you to tears, spoke. This was the greatest political theater I have ever seen in my life. I learned more about economics and its interrelationship with politics sitting there for 11 hours in my seat in the House of Lords. And believe me, I had to go, but I wasn't going to give in, and I sat there. I think I had a piece of candy in my pocket, and that's all I had that day. I listened to the debate -- and I don't think that I have ever forgotten the lessons I learned about economic and political policy, and how you combine them to make people understand what they must do to save the country. And knowing

about government policy by itself was not enough. Would the British Trade Union Congress support the government? Did it, in turn, have the support of its members? You had a lot of union members, about 8,000,000 in the British Trade Union Congress and possibly another 1,000,000 in independent unions, accounting for 40 percent of the labor force. Unions covered every major industry in the country.

Q: How did the unions react to the idea of productivity?

WEINER: That was the *key word*. Productivity was the big buzz word, and here's where the importance of organized labor came in. We knew, and governments throughout western Europe knew, that productivity had to be increased if there was going to be more to eat and more to live on. It was simple.

Q: And how was that going to be achieved?

WEINER: And it couldn't be achieved without investment and without the cooperation of working people. And we kept driving home one lesson: Increases in productivity come only a little bit from working harder. Big increases in productivity come from working smarter with more and more *capital*. The big block towards increasing productivity was not a question of working harder. British workers were working harder than anybody I had ever seen in my life. They were working long hours, but the results were hardly enough. They were working with antiquated or broken down machinery. Assembly lines were short, where they should have been long. Moreover, there was great distrust left over from the Depression period, when increased productivity meant losing your job. You produced more; you lost your job. Why? Because there was a mentality, and I believe it still exists to a large extent in many parts of Europe, that there is just so much "in the pie," or it only grows a little bit, and so you have got to keep cutting that pie at the expense of somebody else.

We have a concept, and I think that it is a normal subconscious concept in this country that I believe explains why we often run into problems in our dealings with Europeans, that of a *growing pie*. Each one gets more of a growing pie. Europeans think of a fixed pie, and a lot of that has to do with the way that their societies are constructed and also their suspicions. So the question was how do you get British workers to understand the benefits to them from increased productivity. Governments cannot talk to them; they don't trust governments, which they believe had always sided against the working man. Even a Labor Government has its troubles. Certainly they are not going to believe the American government. America is the heart of capitalism. We hoped they would believe American workers.

And here is where what others called a silly, crackpot idea began to bear fruit. A man came out to our Embassy in 1948 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' new Productivity Office, I believe it was called, and he came up with an idea. His name was Jim Silberman, and I think that then was the only time in my life I have ever seen him. As the "kid" in the Embassy, it was my job to shepherd him around to meet various people.

He said, "It's no good to send an economic mission of experts from Britain to the U.S. or from the U.S. to Britain and so forth. What you have to do is send workers, not one or two, but

hundreds of them, thousands of them. Let them get to know each other's cultures. Let them learn. Workers will listen to other workers where they won't listen to their employers or to the government." And that was the beginning of "people to people diplomacy." Nobody else in the Embassy would touch him because they said he was a "crack pot." "What does he mean we are going to send hundreds or thousands of workers. He's a nut case." I went around with him. They figured, "Well, Herb is okay. He's a youngster. No one will blame him for anything. He can get away with it."

I remember an incident at that time very, very vividly. We went to call on the Director General of the British Employers Confederation, which is the counterpart of our National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). We were talking about the textile industry, which was mainly concentrated in the Midlands, particularly in Manchester. Now the textile industry was in a bind. And I remember him saying, "Well, you Americans are so wasteful. We have these weaving machines and other machines, and they are as good as new. They may be a hundred years old, but you know, we shine them up and we oil them. We keep them in good shape. And besides, wages, after all, are low." Remember, Britain had been losing its textile industry to the colonies, to India and so forth. And so he said, "Why should we invest in new machinery?" He had no concept of obsolescence, and this was true in much of British industry. Well, I can't put a figure on it, but I found this was a very strong British attitude towards investment.

Being a smart aleck, I said to him, "Well, Sir, would you therefore advocate a general wage rise." What I had in mind was the American experience, where because of the pressure of increasing wages, businessmen kept investing in more efficient machinery. The British had no such concept, so there was a problem of educating the employers, the business managements, and the investors as well. On the part of the working people, there was a fear about investment in machinery, a fear that workers would lose their jobs if they increase productivity, and the fear of unemployment was *very, very strong*.

So, the AFL and the CIO began to send representatives to Europe under the aegis of the Marshall Plan programs. The labor attaché at that time in London, Sam Berger. He had been hired initially by W. Averell Harriman as labor consultant for the Harriman special economic mission to Britain during the war. Harriman recognized the importance of the idea of knowing what Labor people wanted. At war's end, Sam Berger became the labor attaché at the Embassy in London, where Ambassador Lewis Douglas recognized the importance of labor's role in the post-war reconstruction of Britain. As a matter of fact, Sam (who died on February 12, 1980) was becoming a legend by that time. He was the one in the Embassy who had predicted the Labor Party's victory in the 1945 general election in Britain. He seemed to know everybody in the Labor Party. He had links to the cabinet. The other people in the embassy were still dealing only with the old British establishment and the gentility of British society. But they didn't know what was going on in the guts of the country. I went to the coal mines, to the pubs; I lived with these guys. There was a tendency among the old line political officers in the embassy to ask, "Who are these socialist upstarts?" But these socialist upstarts had the power in the factories, and that's where "the war" was going to be, where the economic war was going to be won, and where the peace was going to be won. Workers had to see that they were going to get something for their efforts and that things were going to improve.

Ambassador Harriman had recognized that. He had hired Sam Berger who had been a captain in the U.S. Army but had earlier specialized in labor affairs while he was in the United States. Sam had studied labor relations at the University of Wisconsin with Selig Perlman, who was the dean of the labor economists in those days. Anyway, Jim Silberman was not getting any hearing until one day he seemed to hit pay dirt. He ran into a fellow who was the principal back room advisor to Herbert Morrison, who was a very powerful cabinet minister in the Labor Government. In Labor Party ideological terms, he was about in the center. And the advisor sold the idea to Morrison, who in turn sold it to Sir Stafford Cripps. And sometime afterwards, Cripps went to Paris for a meeting with Harriman, who, I think, by this time had been appointed head of the Marshall Plan for all of Europe and was headquartered in Paris. Out of the blue, Cripps and Harriman announced the creation of the "Anglo-American Productivity Committee." Among other things its projects involved having working people visit back and forth to try to get a transference of culture and attitudes towards production.

By now, however, the big complicating political factor was the rise of the Soviet Union. There we ran into a real problem. During the war, and this was true throughout western Europe, the Communists had gained an enormous amount of popular credibility for their role in partisan warfare, particularly among working people, and in the trade unions in France, in Italy, and to a large extent in Britain. As a result they had considerable influence. Also, they had a "papacy," and the "papacy" was in Moscow. The Soviet Union, as a conscious political decision, decided to fight the Marshall Plan. The Communists claimed it was a device for the United States to take over domination of Europe and to impose capitalism on it and to isolate the Soviet Union. .

And so the Soviet Union took "the war" to the factory floor. At the time popular speculation about possible Soviet ambitions focused on a possible military sweep through Western Europe since all the Western armies had virtually been dispersed. But we realized soon afterwards that what the Soviet Union couldn't take earlier by force, they thought they could win without military action by warring on the factory floor, by preventing increases in productivity, by strikes, and by industrial warfare. And that was the key to their plan.

Oh, I misspoke earlier and referred to a joint communiqué by Sir Stafford Cripps and Averell Harriman. It was Paul Hoffman, not Averell Harriman. I remember that when the announcement was made, it caught the embassy by surprise, and I was gloating over the inclusion of Jim Silberman's idea.

Q: Okay, the battle was going to be won. . .

WEINER: Now, they were talking about the factory floor. One of the things I have heard people say -- and this bothers me and maybe it is a generation gap -- is that the Marshall Plan was our answer to the "Cold War." The Marshall Plan took root for different reasons, and the "Cold War" evolved after the Marshall Plan was underway, although there were already suspicions in the West about the post-war intentions of the U.S.S.R. mixed with the hope that somehow the wartime alliance would cooperate to rebuild Europe. The Soviet Union chose to make the Marshall Plan the arena for the "Cold War."

The Marshall Plan was specifically aimed at the economic reconstruction of a physically devastated Europe. And as soon as it was announced, the leading statesmen of western Europe began to organize a conference, which took place in July of 1948 in Paris, to coordinate their positions on the Marshall Plan. Editorial Note: The actual date was July 12, 1947

Q: 1947

WEINER: No, July 1948 was the meeting. The announcement was July 1947.

Q: Yes, but then they met within a month after that.

WEINER: Was it a month? Well, maybe it was. I had thought it was 1948.

Q: Molotov came to Paris in 1947, and then they met a few days after that.

WEINER: Well, I stand corrected then.

Q: That's why we were able to get it through Congress.

WEINER: All right. Well, then I stand corrected. Now, I've learned something.

Q: The Marshall Plan was finally passed by Congress in March of 1948, then the conference became the organization, and so the organizational entity of the organization.

WEINER: Well, which became the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OECD) in those days.

Q: That was in 1948.

WEINER: I see. Okay, I had it wrong then. You are right. The July 1948 higher level Paris meeting was for organizing the implementation of the Marshall Plan by the European powers. Editorial Note: See "The Marshall Plan: Origins and Implementation," Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, April 1967. But I remember this. The reaction was immediately positive. This was not a long considered reaction. Somewhere I have seen references that the Marshall Plan was a reaction to what was really only a monetary crisis. It was a hell of a lot more than that. Everybody could see the damage. You could walk around Europe and see it. There was no question. I remember the announcement that the Anglo-American Productivity Committee had been set up, and I was just sitting there gloating, but I dared not say anything because someone would have smacked down that saucy kid. And I thought Jim Silberman's recommendations had come good, and he had been vindicated.

Anyway, on the Cold War, the atmosphere at the time was that the Soviet Union had been an ally, and had suffered terribly during the war with heavy casualties, physical damage and so forth. There was no real love for the Soviets, but there was a tremendous amount of Communist influence, particularly in the various ranks of organized labor. Not domination, but enough influence to affect policy.

Now, what happened was that each time the Soviet Union took a step, people were rather puzzled. The Cold War was not something declared. Nobody even used the term "Cold War." It sort of crept up on us incrementally. We took a "What are they up to?" kind of approach. And then you got almost a defining moment when the Soviet Union pressured Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia against becoming parties to the Marshall Plan. They were all at different stages in their deliberations on the Marshall Plan. I think that Poland had actually accepted an invitation to the July 1947 conference and then was told to pull back. Czechoslovakia had been about to accept, and then President Edvard Benes was called to Moscow and told he would have to give up the idea. Tito in Yugoslavia was considering it and let out hints, but never went in. Then the Soviet Union itself, which had been offered an invitation, denounced the Marshall Plan as a plot for the capitalist Americans to establish hegemony over western Europe.

Well, war broke out on the factory floor, and so you had the situation in Britain, in France, in Italy, and in the low countries where Communist-dominated or influenced unions began to call all sort of strikes. It even took place in Australia, where I was transferred to in late 1949. The same Cold War was being fought in Australia through strikes in the coal mines and steel mills, called on the flimsiest of excuses using industrial issues for in effect politically motivated strikes. At one time Communist trade union leaders almost succeeded in tying up Marshall Plan shipments in the North Atlantic. I remember working feverishly with my boss, Sam Berger, over a weekend to prevent a general tie up of the North Atlantic sea routes.

It is interesting how skillful these guys were. That's why I have always argued, you don't need a majority, you just need a purposeful fraction to do the damage. What happened was this. A freighter arrived from Canada, which had been organized by a Communist-dominated seaman's union called the "Canadian Seaman's Union," which was a small union. The American seaman's union, the Seafarers International Union, also had a very powerful branch in Canada. And what happened was that this ship docked in London, and those seamen called a strike aboard ship, complaining about working conditions and so forth. And the parties couldn't settle the strike.

Now, when you get into labor negotiations, you can never tell what are the real issues and what are the surface issues. Sometimes you spend your time trying to figure out what is really bothering the parties, "which tooth really hurts," and you can't tell. The vessel itself was not of any great importance, but the Communists were very skillful. And they said, "Well, the men said they're not going to work." So the company flew a new crew over. Now flying was not very common, but the company felt strongly enough and actually flew in a crew from the U.S. These crewmen were all members of the Seafarers International Union, the American union, which had a branch in Canada which was still the biggest of the seamen's unions then.

"Ah hah," said the leaders of the local strike on the ship, "they are sending in strike breakers from the U.S. This ship is declared black." Now there was strong Communist influence in those days on the British docks. You didn't have to explain the issue or anything. "They're out, we're out." So, the London dockers struck in sympathy, initially against American ships.

"Well," said the captain of that ship, "that's all right. We won't unload in London; we'll go to Liverpool." So they arrived in Liverpool, and the fellows on the docks in Liverpool said, "Well,

how do you like that? That ship is black," meaning boycotted. The Liverpool dockers wouldn't work the ship. So the ship went on to Bristol, and the Bristol dockworkers declared the ship black. Before you knew it, about 20,000 dockers were out on a sympathy and protest strike tying up all shipping, all starting from this one obscure incident.

"Well," said the American dockers, which was the International Longshoremen's Association (AFL) at the time, "if the British dockers are going to boycott our ships, we are going to boycott British ships." Well, all these Marshall Plan shipments in the North Atlantic were threatened by a complete tie up. That's how skillful this operation was.

I remember Sam Berger and I worked like dogs sending cables to the State Department. And the man who was in charge of labor affairs in the State Department at that time was Daniel Horowitz. He had been the first American labor attaché, and he is still alive. I'm trying to get him to do an oral history. Sam was sending cables saying, "Please get to International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) and tell them not to strike British ships in retaliation." Meanwhile, we were contacting the General Secretary of the British Transport and General Workers Union, Arthur Deakin, who was an anti-Communist although nominal President of the World Federation of Trade Unions, the Communist-dominated international labor confederation. But that's a separate story.

What happened was the following: The American labor leaders were informed, "Look, this dock strike is a political game. Don't fall for it. Get somebody here so you can talk it over with the head man," i.e. Arthur Deakin. (Mind you these strikes were called locally, and they just catch fire.) And so what happened was that the two top U.S. and U.K. dock union leaders somehow got in touch with each other. The American said, "Look, call your guys off. We won't do anything to your ships." Then Prime Minister Attlee got on the radio to ask people in the name of the Labor Government go back to work. (The dockers would never have done that for a Tory Government.) Troops were not the answer. That would have inflamed the situation. If you had had troops out there, you would have had every union in the country out on a general protest strike. So out of loyalty to the Labor Government and with pleas from their own top labor union leadership, the dockers began to go back to work. There was also tremendous public pressure on the dockers not to jeopardize the interests of the country. The American longshoremen worked the British ships, and eventually the strike died. But this was an illustration of how the Communists tried to disrupt the economy through labor unrest. Now, multiply that by what happened in the coal mines, in the steel industry, and just about anywhere you turned. This kind of warfare was carried on in Europe, at least all through western Europe, especially in France, where the central labor federation fell under Communist control, and in Italy, where the central federation had also fallen under Communist control.

During the days of the wartime grand alliance and early post-war period, the British Trade Union Congress and the Soviet All Union Central Council of Trade Unions laid the groundwork to form in 1945 what was called the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). It was fed by a hope that the wartime alliance would carry into a common effort, on the labor level, to rebuild a world in which workers benefited from the prosperity of their countries. The post-World War II world was going to be "the brave new world." However, once the Soviet Union denounced the Marshall Plan, the Communists -- and here the Communists again were very clever, very skillful

-- demonstrated their control of the WFTU Secretariat with Louis Saillant, a French Communist, as General Secretary. The top WFTU names were not Communists: Arthur Deakin, the General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union, which was the biggest union in Britain with about a million to 1.2 million members, was, President of the WFTU and, if anything, an anti-Communist. Jim Carey, who was a Vice President of the WFTU, had made a reputation for defeating the Communists in the CIO and was trying to get the WFTU to support the Marshall Plan. The WFTU, however, took the position, "We are not political. We do not support it, because we are not political. We are a trade union organization." Moreover, their affiliated organizations. . . were looking for a lead. Some non-Communist affiliates said, "The WFTU is neutral. Okay, we are neutral, too." That was not what we, the U.S., wanted. We wanted support.

Anyway, what happened was the WFTU did split, in essence, over the Marshall Plan. There were other technical issues that were used, but the basic issue was over support for the reconstruction of Europe. And later on in November 1949, a new international federation, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) was formed. It is still in existence and very important and is the big survivor. Both the AFL, which would never join the WFTUC -- and here the basic issue was one of democracy -- and the CIO joined in founding the ICFTU. The foreign policy differences between the CIO and the AFL was reflected in the tendency of the CIO and the TUC to take the position that Communist-controlled unions could be brought around to reasonable positions, and that you have to keep talking and maintain contact. The AFL said, "No. It isn't only a matter of their support for the Soviet Union. By their inclination, the leadership in these organizations saw labor unions as a political instrument to bring about the destruction of a free society. These people do not want a free society. Democratic unions have to have a stake in democracy, so that they can be independent. Free unionism means independent of government, independent of the employer, independent to organize, and independent to make their own decisions. Labor unions in the Soviet Union are tools of the government and tools of a political party. These were the principles at stake in the U.S. in the battles for control of the garment unions, in the United Automobile Workers Union (UAW) and other U.S. unions when the Communists at one time tried to capture the leadership of the unions. The AFL argued the Communist unions were using associations with non-Communist unions to gain acceptability for themselves.

And I knew two of the men personally involved in the international trade union wars over the Marshall Plan, Jay Lovestone and Irving Brown. Lovestone (December 15, 1897-March 7, 1990) had been a founding member of the U.S. Communist Party and eventually became at 29 its general secretary. Over the years after his expulsion in 1927 on Stalin's orders, Lovestone became an uncompromising anti-Communist and eventually Director of the AFL-CIO International Department as well as a very close advisor on international affairs to George Meany.

Lovestone's emissary during the "Cold War" was Irving Brown, AFL Representative in Europe (Paris) for some 40 years before his death in 1989. Brown (November 21, 1911-February 10, 1989) became in time very close to Lane Kirkland, Meany's successor. In later years, Brown's relations with Lovestone became strained in a personality conflict, which both sought to hide from their common political enemies.

Lovestone and Brown argued, "It's not just that a union is a collection of workers; it's a question of whether you believe in democracy? We're not saying what form of democracy, but democracy in a sense that they believe a union should be totally independent to act on behalf of its membership. That is the union must be free to be independent of government, political parties and employers. It must be free to bargain and free to act within the law. It must have a stake in democracy."

The ICFTU has taken on that position. The British TUC, the CIO, and the [Netherlands] Confederation of Free Trade Unions (NVV) walked out of the WFTU in January 1949 and were central in forming the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in November 1949. The AFL joined as a founder and driving force in establishing the ICFTU. And from then on, it became a question, not only of contests in Western Europe, but throughout the world, subsequently to establish free trade unions in the newly independent areas in Africa, in Asia, and in Latin America.

The question came up of how to organize the Marshall Plan. And here the argument was that the organization should be outside the Department of State and staffed by people with backgrounds in the private sector. It should have all the advantages of autonomy, to be able to work more freely. So a separate organization was formed named the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), and Paul Hoffman was sent to Paris, I believe. I forget what his title was at the time. And they set up missions in each country for ECA.

Q: Harriman was sent to Paris.

WEINER: Was it Harriman who went to Paris? I forget. I remember the names Hoffman and Harriman. I forget just what the sequence was. I would have to brush up on that.

Q: And your role was within the . . .

WEINER: My role was within the embassy. I was the assistant to the labor attaché. What happened in London was they sent us an ECA Mission to Britain, which was technically within the umbrella of the embassy, but was an independent unit in the way in which it reported back to ECA Headquarters in Washington. In that unit, they had a labor advisor, Jim Killian, who incidentally died a few years ago. He had been a Vice President of the United Paperworkers International Union (AFL), which was a substantial union at the time.

Killian's main concern was with working people. Now the labor attaché and I were also concerned with working people, but ECA was specifically concerned with the *programs* that were being developed under the Marshall Plan, technical assistance of one sort or another and international exchanges of workers in factories. We used to work pretty well together. Jim was a very nice guy. But one of the questions we used to have was where do our jurisdictions start and stop. We never really worked it out as far as I could see. It depended an awful lot on personal relationships. Killian wasn't really quite sure what he was supposed to be selling. He came over with the idea that they in ECA were new ambassadors or something like that.

And there was the question of double teaming in a way, because they would go to some of the same contacts we had. There was some confusion, but fortunately the personalities worked together well, so our relations didn't turn into "turf battles" or anything like that. These were all fresh people, not out of the government bureaucracy. And the labor attaché became the economic expert. I spent most of my time reporting on the trials and tribulations of the coal industry, which was the *key* industry at that time in Britain.

The British miners union, or what was called the National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), has now just about disintegrated, together with the coal industry. When I was in Britain, there were 600,000 unionized miners. Now the NUM claims possibly 18,000 members. They were a big power in the Labor Party, a big power in the TUC. They were sort of the "aristocrats" of the labor movement. In the public mind they personified organized labor, and there was great sympathy for miners because they had such dirty jobs.

I didn't really appreciate this until my turn came to crawl on my belly through a hundred year old mine in Doncaster. The president of the mine workers union said, "Herb, if you really want to be a labor attaché and want to understand us, you have to come with me and crawl through a mine." I did! Boy, I never forgot that experience. I suddenly began to realize that a hot shower was a hell of a lot more important than just any shower. It was not like bathing in the morning. It became an industrial necessity, because your ears, your nose, every pore had coal dust in it. I had to stand under that hot shower, for I don't know how long, to wash out that dust, and even then it didn't wash it out completely.

And I began to understand why, for example, a miner would walk out if he had cold tea instead of hot tea, because that was the only thing he had to keep him going or give him a break. I began to understand that these are not just personal comforts. I began to understand why it was so important to dock workers that there be covering in rain. You put on your rain coat and go for a walk in the rain. To a dock worker, those are his working conditions. If he stands outside pulling boxes or managing loading or something, he will be pretty well beat if he doesn't have any covering. People say, "Ah, what are they making such a fuss about? They walked out because it is raining." I began to understand the difference between personal comfort and what things are crucial to working people.

Q: Can you remember some specific instances of how the British coal industry made capital investments in order to increase productivity, or in weaving or textiles, or any of the other industries? Or to reconfigure the assembly lines?

WEINER: I do not remember specific cases of reconfiguration, but what I do remember is that the big issue in collective bargaining was *productivity*. And so consequently, there would be "clauses." Now, Britain does not have legally enforceable collective bargaining contracts the way we have in the U.S. Such a labor contract could make a union vulnerable to all sorts of law suits, especially from unofficial "wildcat strikes." Britain has a completely different legal structure. Unions don't have the same degree of membership discipline as in the United States. Here in the U.S. a union seeks a contract to give it legal standing and establish its recognition. In Britain, it's quite the opposite. Their system of law only gives unions rights by way of *immunity*. For example, in Britain the employment contract is seen as being between the individual worker and

his employer. Here, a collective bargaining contract is seen as between the union and the employer. In Britain, if a union calls people out on strike, the employer theoretically could sue the union for inducing a breach of contract. To give unions standing, Britain had to give them immunity from their equivalent of the anti-trust laws and immunity from the contract laws. So, in Britain, there isn't the same kind of contract, but there are agreements of all sorts, and they are sort of informal, and they say the most popular lady in Britain is "Tina Lea." This Is Not A Legally Enforceable Agreement. A lot of them are handshake agreements and so forth.

But what you did have -- and this became very important -- was that unions in their agreements would agree to measures to increase *productivity*. This became the buzz word. That might involve shifting workers around in the plant -- they didn't shift easily -- and mainly their acceptance of new machinery. This would involve tradeoffs: Somebody would be guaranteed a job or would have a voice in the introduction of machinery. Well, in that situation, that was rather practical because there was a chronic shortage of labor in Britain at the time.

But there was another reason to be careful about efforts to shift labor. Britain is not like the U.S. where people go from one job to another and move from one part of the country to another. We Americans buy a house here and sell a house there. In Britain, the work force was tied to existing housing. Housing is short. So British workers look for work in their locality. They don't readily move to take a job somewhere else, because they can't find a place to live, and rents are terribly high. So the labor force is really tied very much to where people live, and they can't readily move. It becomes a real matter of social adjustment. Also work groups tend to become social groups, especially in the coal mines. Now that's breaking down somewhat, but because of the cost of housing, the labor force is not as mobile. We are blessed in this country by a labor force that is highly mobile compared to other countries.

Q: And also a class struggle and animosity between. . .

WEINER: It's an easy thing to say, but I think underneath it all, there is a class consciousness. When they took a poll here in this country and they asked people whether they were in the middle class, something like 94 percent of the people thought they were. I used to use this illustration: You walk up to any worker in this country and ask, "What class are you?" and he answers, "I'm in the middle class." Why? He doesn't think of himself as staying a worker all of his life. He wants to be the boss or have his own business. In Britain, the guy figured he didn't have much hope of not being a worker.

Also, remember, the British are carrying class consciousness over from a different kind of society. We had the advantage of building a society from scratch. British workers tend to see themselves as, "Well, my father was a worker; I'm a worker." He sees himself as part of a class. We Americans have "a thing" about working for a living. It's a "good thing." In our own history, for instance, there were times back in the 1830s when newspapers used to carry articles signed "working man" or "mechanic" on any particular issue in a letter to the editor. And it would turn out this "working man" or "mechanic" was actually a pretty wealthy man who probably did not think of himself as "working class." In Britain, the "working man" thinks of himself as "working class."

But when you think of it in another way, it's not quite that. British class identification is hardly clearly defined. Britishers of different "classes" may go to different schools in some cases. In Britain now, Oxford and Cambridge, for instance, are publicly funded, and "working class" students go there. Oxford and Cambridge are no longer bastions of the aristocracy. There you can get a free education more readily than in the US. But, I would say class is a state of mind. After all, look at the prime ministers. Ernest Bevin never got out of grade school, but he was a tremendous foreign minister. Clement Attlee was seen as coming from the middle class. He was a well to do guy. Why was he seen as middle class? Because he had been a major in the army.

The late Harold Laski was a professor, and one of the leading theorists of the Labor Party and the Socialists. These people like Laski are intellectual socialists. I don't know if they would call themselves "working class" or "middle class" or what. But the tendency is to think of stratified classes, even today. Thatcher didn't come from a wealthy family. Nor did Major. Major had been on the dole. His father had been unemployed. Ask him if he's working class. "Well, I was a working man." But go through the listings of the people in the government, even the Tory government, and you'll find people from "working class" origins. And if you go into the Labor leadership, what do you find? Take John Smith, the late leader of the Labor Party. He was highly regarded by all elements constituting the Labor Party. He was never a factory worker. He was a Queen's Counsel, a lawyer from Scotland. Tony Blair, who on Smith's sudden death in 1994 won the Labor Party's leadership, also is a barrister from a well to do family who told his Labor Party at the 1996 Annual Conference that class divisions have no place in a modern country in the 21st Century. You go through his shadow cabinet. These are not horny-handed sons of toil. The concept of working class is a convenient thing. If you ask, they say "working class." But it is not a very useable political concept. Thatcher's father was a grocer. She made her money on her lecture tours after she was prime minister. That's what made her rich. She wasn't rich before. She married a well to do man, but she was what you might call in the United States "middle class."

Q: But whatever there was in terms of class consciousness, how did that bump up against the Marshall Plan? How did the Marshall Plan bump up against the notion? How did that effect each other?

WEINER: In terms of the attitude of working people towards the Marshall Plan, there always was a mixture of feelings. I wrote my doctorate on the attitude of British Labor towards public ownership, and it dealt a bit about where socialism fitted into Labor thinking. And this socialism colored, shall we say, the thinking and the dogma of people who were trade union members and/or affiliated to the Labor Party. Their attitude towards the United States, and towards productivity, and towards the reconstruction of Europe was that they wanted everybody to benefit and not just "the capitalists." It was the capitalists that sent them to war in World War I; but World War II was the "people's war." They fought it. And so their attitude was, if anybody's going to make money, they wanted to share it. And so there was always a tinge -- and there still is a tinge in the Labor Party among the more doctrinaire elements -- of seeing the United States ideologically as the bastion of capitalism

And when the Soviet Union became an important power, it was seen, especially in the early days, as "the workers state." And there was a tendency among British socialists to say, "Oh, but the dictatorship is temporary; it is a passing phase," and so forth. "The Communists are socialists in

a hurry." There was also a tendency to put a mild interpretation on the excesses of the Soviet Union, even through Stalinism, and to have a colored interpretation of seeing the United States as being the home of unbridled capitalism and trying to propagate capitalism to the disadvantage of the workers. But in the end, the relationship between the United States and Britain, whether with a Labor government or a Tory government, was that we are the two primary democracies. And so the relationship between the United States government, whether a Republican or a Democrat administration, and the British Government, whether Tory or Labor, was built on the feeling of mutual interest.

But the feeling of suspicion towards American capitalism among British socialists was always there. The counterpart feeling among conservatives was "Who are these upstart Americans who want to take over our empire?" There was some of that around in Britain, and there still is some of that around, but it is not a governing feature of Tory politics.

But feeling among workers in Britain was "Don't touch our popular social programs. Don't touch our national health service. That's national policy. Everybody shares. They see the Tories as doing things to benefit the rich." This is the general attitude. And there are those kinds of feelings around. But at the same time, for example, the Labor Party program today doesn't talk about socialism. The word doesn't appear. It doesn't talk about nationalization of industry -- although the major nationalization took place under a labor government -- but not so much for ideological reasons. I wrote in my book on British nationalization that nationalization as applied in specific cases had become pragmatic national policy and applied by Conservative, Liberal, and Labor governments.

People don't know or haven't focused on the fact that broadcasting in Britain, for example, was nationalized under the Baldwin Conservative government largely at the behest of radio manufacturers who wanted somebody to broadcast something so they could sell radios and with broad public support that control of the medium should not be left in private hands. The Government appointed the Crawford Committee to report on the matter and the Committee actually sent a delegation to the United States. It looked at American radio in those days and they said, "Ah! Terrible, commercials," and so forth. And that is how Britain ended up with government owned radio. The airlines were nationalized under a law passed by the Conservative Chamberlain government. London transport was nationalized by a succession of Labor and National governments. Electricity was nationalized largely because there was no uniform electricity. There is a wide variety wall sockets and varying voltages within the city of London.

In the coal industry there were many small mines and continual coal strikes. There was a lot of strife. As a matter of fact, that was what set off the so-called general strike of 1926. But these small coal mines didn't lend themselves to large investment. When coal was nationalized, sure there was a lot of argument mainly over what price the government would pay. There was nobody with the legal authority to make these properties contiguous, so you could develop large scale mining, and nobody with the capital willing to invest in large scale mining. This nationalization had initially been developed as a Labor Party policy and carried out under a Labor government.

Now there were other cases of nationalization, as for example with the railroads, that were more doctrinaire. But in any case, the railroads needed investment, and there wasn't much private investment available to update railroads, especially after World War II. So, you have to be careful about equating Labor with socialization and nationalization. I have a quotation in my book from Churchill, who, as far back as 1910, advocated, as a Liberal Government minister in those days, nationalization of the railroads. These were seen as public issues. Now, I'm not saying that later on nationalization didn't divide political parties with the Tories generally being against and Labor being for. But if Labor comes into office, Labor is not going to re-nationalize what the Tories de-nationalized. Far from it. Nationalization does not appear on Labor's election platform. So the ideological blurring that has taken place has really blurred the so-called classes. People still tend to talk in those terms, but in terms of its practical impact on politics, if you're going to talk so much about class solidarity, why is it that in the last three elections a minority of union members voted Labor? In the last general election in 1992, only 44 percent of union members, mind you, voted Labor. And yet theoretical socialists talk about the bond of solidarity of the working class.

It's a highly questionable concept. There hasn't been a popular majority Labor vote for the Labor Party since the 1979 election. Class solidarity is nice and neat, but I wouldn't base election policy on it. I wouldn't base party policy on it. Do you know what the Labor Party platform is today? It's advocating a good climate for investment. Investment is primary. The Labor Party has become the standard bearers of investment, any kind of investment. Bring your money.

Q: We've heard from someone else -- I can't remember now who said it -- the British didn't invest in as smart a way as Germany or France or the Netherlands.

WEINER: If you want me to say it, I'll say it. Well, on my very first assignment in London, we were in no particular section. I was assigned there temporarily on a probationary basis as a probationary Foreign Service Officer, supposedly on a six month stint. The Labor Attaché had a peculiar position in the Embassy or rather a unique position in the Embassy. He was constantly pushed from one place to another, but he had a very strong relationship with the Ambassador because of his network of political connections; that is, connections with the Labor Government (the Attlee Labour Government), the Labour Party's national organization, and with the trade unions which were very, very closely associated with the government (the British Trades Union Congress). That was Sam Berger and he had already in his own time established himself as having unique influence. He was able to maintain his standing because he was the only one with real insights into the Labor Party, the Trades Union Congress and the Labor Government. The election of the Labor Government in 1945 had been a surprise. Sam had been the only one in the Embassy who had predicted it. The characteristic of embassies in that period or until that period had been to deal mainly with a handful of people in power, namely the government. In Britain most of the time they had been Tories, i.e. Conservative Governments. Consequently Sam had a position of unique influence, also having been very close to W. Averell Harriman who had been chief of the economic assistance mission to London during World War II, and subsequently with Ambassador Lewis Douglas. Since Sam was outside the orthodox structure that you found in Embassies he was frequently pushed from one office to another and constantly had to rely on his top level associations (with the Ambassador and others) to maintain his unique position. To a degree that filtered down to me as an assistant, but we were largely let alone because a lot of

people in the embassy in the Political and in the Economic Sections were not sure what we were doing or why we were doing it or, for that matter, how to deal with these new post-war problems that were arising. These were major issues of incomes policy, of the relationship of the trade unions to the Labor Government, of the attitudes of the trade unions towards our efforts to get the Marshall Plan underway in Britain. All this was new and largely untouched by what had been the usual orthodox government to government diplomatic relationships. It was new territory. Also, the Cold War was young. Other people in the Embassy did not know much about Socialists or Communists and really did not know where to start. They were accustomed to dealing with orthodox political parties, the establishment political parties in Britain being the Liberals and Conservatives; but there wasn't anybody in the Embassy who knew very much about the Labor Party or its ideological outlook.

THOMAS W. WILSON
Information Officer, The Marshall Plan
London (1947-1949)

Thomas W. Wilson was born in Baltimore in 1912. After Graduating from Princeton University, he worked as a reporter for the Baltimore Evening Sun and later the Paris Herald. He served on the National Defense Advisory Commission, the War Production Board and the Economic Warfare Agency in World War II. After the War, he worked as an Information Officer for the Marshall Plan, and would later serve as a Political Advisor to the United Nations. Mr. Wilson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 30 1996.

Q: Well we want to pick this up when you got involved with the Marshall Plan. When and how did that come about?

WILSON: By this time for reasons that are not particularly relevant, I was vice president of an educational film company in New York when I got a telephone call from Alfred Friendly who became managing editor of the Washington Post. He had been a friend of mine as a correspondent. He said he had made an appointment the next day for me in New York with Thomas K. Finletter who was going to London as head of the Marshall Plan delegation mission to the United Kingdom about my going with him as his information officer. I said I'm sorry I can't do that. I've been away for two and a half years and have just come back from Russia. I have to find a place to live; my family is rearranged, reconnected for the first time in years. Al said do me a favor, I made an appointment for you. At least go see him and tell him why you can't do it. So I went to see him at the appointed time. Tom Finletter, I don't know if he had been coached by Friendly by now or not. It turned out he told me about what he was going to do and told me how important it was to get the right information out, that this was a prime concern of the Congress and so forth and so on. I just wanted to ask your advice about how to do this if you were in that spot. I absolutely fell flat on my face. I told him. He ended up by saying I'm taking the Queen Elizabeth. Do you suppose you could fly over and be there before I get there. I'd love to have you with me. What did I say? Yes! So I sold the house and packed up the family and went to London and met Tom when he got off the Queen Elizabeth.

Q Well how long were you involved with the Marshall Plan?

WILSON: About four years. I took a year's leave of absence from my company and when that year was up, Averill Harriman, who was running it in Europe who I met in the War Production Board and in Moscow in the Reparations Commission asked me to come to Paris. So I told the company I couldn't get back and moved to Paris.

Q: Let's talk first about Finletter who was later Secretary of the Air Force. How was he to work for during this time in London?

WILSON: I thought he was wonderful to work for. He had what I tend to think of as a high level New York lawyer's mind - like a trap. He was very fast. He's been dead for quite a while now. He was a guy who decided what his priority was. He'd focus everything in his head and in his actions and his timing and scheduling and so forth on that. Everything else would get brushed to the side. On that point, he was terrific. But he also was a great delegator; he would occasionally want to know what I was doing, but that was about all. I had an easy job in a way. The British were running an adult economic information program under Stafford Cripps who was running the Treasury at that time. He had a small group of very able people. They were trying to educate the British on the economic problems of the UK after the war. Their economy was absolutely dependent on the Marshall Plan, and they knew it. They didn't want to deny it; they actually wanted people to understand it because it involved some serious shifts in British attitudes toward their role in the world which some of their people didn't like at all. Some of their publishers didn't like at all, so educating the British public about the Marshall Plan and its place within the context of the British postwar problem was something they very much wanted to do. So that all I had to do was suggest to them what I thought would be a good idea, and they did it. I did very little directly in the way of information activity. I remember the Congress seemed to be more interested in the idea of whether people over there knew where they were getting this all and were properly appreciative than anything else. This was the subject that a long string of American visitors and delegates most wanted to know about. When I would be visited by traveling Congressmen and they wanted to know about whether the British really appreciated the help the American people were giving them, I took an editorial out of my desk and handed it to them. This editorial was very bitter that they were sick and tired of hearing about the Marshall Plan and what wonderful people the Americans were for giving it to them for nothing. They said we get this in the press, on the radio, in the newsreels, the next thing you know we will be getting it from the pulpit. It was from the Daily Worker, and that's it. That beats the Congress every time.

Q: Did you have any battles with the British press or the BBC or anything at that time?

WILSON: Really almost none. The Beaverbrook press...

Q: Lord Beaverbrook. He was the big media baron I guess you would call him.

WILSON: They were old imperialists and they thought that it was a disgrace for the British Empire to accept handouts from their friends. But most of the working people knew better; they

working people in the press knew better. No, we had no problems, practically no problems at all with the British press people. The British did depend on the Marshall Plan; so did everybody else. The facts were pretty clear. We were asking nothing. We had a good product as they would say in the commercial world.

Q: You went out there when? Was this about '46 or so? When did you go out to London?

WILSON: '47. The Speech was '47 at Harvard.

Q: George Marshall made a commencement speech at Harvard in June of '47 I think.

WILSON: That's right so this was early '48 when the act was passed and the money and things had begun to flow. But then it was '49 when I went to Paris.

NICHOLAS SHAPIRO LAKAS
Consular Officer
Glasgow, Scotland (1948-1950)

Mr. Lakas was born and raised in New York City and educated at George Washington University and the University of Wisconsin. Entering the Foreign Service in 1948 he became a specialist in Foreign Commercial and Economic Affairs and served in Washington with both the Departments of State and Commerce, Mr. Lakas had assignments in Egypt, Ireland, Scotland, Kuwait, Libya and South Korea. Mr. Lakas was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: Today is March 11, 2002. Nick, we're at 1948, Glasgow. What was it like there at that point?

LAKAS: We landed from Southampton from the SS America, and stayed overnight in London. We were put on the express train to Glasgow. It took us eight hours to reach Glasgow. We got there at dusk. We disembarked, and out of the mist, there appeared a young man who looked at us very carefully and said, "You are Americans?" I said, "Yes, we are." He said, "My name is Warren Kelsey of the consulate general in Glasgow, welcome." That's how it started. He put us in a cab and came with us to a boarding house, where he had been staying. We stayed there for perhaps a month or two, until we found rental quarters. The following day, we reported to the consul general. He was Dale C. McDonough, a terrific guy, who was a great leader. I was introduced to him. Within two hours, I found myself handling shipping, and shipping manifests. I was taking care of seamen, who came in on American freighters. They were having problems of one kind or another, medical or whatever. I did that for about two months. The next thing I knew I was reassigned to do visas.

Q: Let's talk a little about the shipping and all, and sailors. Glasgow being a major city, I would think that American sailors could really find a lot of trouble.

LAKAS: Yes they did. The Clyde River was a great place for them to come into, to offload their cargo. It was quite a busy place. The problems we had, generally, were misconduct, and sometimes their papers were not in order. On top of that, we had to check the manifest on the cargo they were taking, and the cargo they were offloading. They would have to come in in those days and pick up their clearances from us at the office, or I would be summoned down to the ship by the captain to officiate some problem they had.

Q: Signing seamen off.

LAKAS: That's right, exactly, and getting them back on the plane. If they were ill, we would have to put them in a hospital, if they required hospitalization. We had to make sure they got the greatest care possible. After that, when they were released, we put them on a train to London, where the shipping people in the embassy took over from there.

Q: How did the British police deal with the seamen?

LAKAS: From the very outset, I was very impressed with their civility, their memory of our alliance during the war, and their willingness to overlook a few things here and there, so long as the consulate was involved in making sure this would not happen again.

Q: Get the people out.

LAKAS: It meant less concern for them. It worked out very well.

Q: I must say that this is a great tool of the consular officer, by saying, "If you stay here, it's a problem for you, it's a problem for me, if you go, it's a problem for people back in the United States."

This is tape two, side one, with Nick Lakas.

LAKAS: I was going to say to you that the superintendent of police was a very good friend of the consul general. He participated in our receptions. He made sure he was with us. When he asked us for assistance, relevant to some of the things they had to do, and which we could be helpful, we assisted. There was a rapport there that was absolutely enormous. Every time one of us arrived or left, we sent a note to the superintendent letting them know we had arrived or were leaving for a post. You know that from your own experience.

Q: Well, then, you moved to the visa side of things. What was the visa situation like?

LAKAS: We had visas, and we had immigration. On the immigration side, we had applications; many of them from the private sector of Scotland. The labor party had come into power in England at that time. The middle-class Scots saw fit to go elsewhere. We had also the Polish Free Army; General Anders. They were accommodated in Scotland. They too wanted to have visas to go to the states. From there, we were never sure of their background. We had to worry about tuberculosis. We had to be concerned about communist background.

Q: With the Polish people, I imagine that a lot were being sponsored by Polish organizations; particularly in Chicago, and the Midwest. Was this true or not?

LAKAS: I don't remember the sponsoring affidavits. All I know is there would be a huge pile on my desk that needed to be reviewed. We tried to do it as quickly as we possibly could. We had an excellent medical staff of Scottish medical people, helping us with that too. But, I don't remember where the supporting affidavits came from.

Q: What about war brides?

LAKAS: Yes. Under the GI Bill, we had a number of those. I think in the first year and a half, the bulk of the applications came to me, and after that, it sort of trailed off. But, it was a very essential element of the work I did in the visa section. We had to examine x-rays, along with everything we did. It was the old style visa.

Q: When you say you had to examine x-rays, did you look at them yourself?

LAKAS: Yes, I did. I was taught where to look for spots. It was really a cursory examination, just to make sure that (1) the x-rays were there; (2) they seemed reasonably clear, and there was some document appended to them by a doctor saying that things were fine.

Q: What about non-immigrant visas? Did you have a problem with people who were going to stay? This was at a time when people were getting a little tired of the British Isles, the citizens there. This was a difficult time.

LAKAS: In the beginning, it was not a paramount issue to us, so long as there was some observance of law, at that time, when it existed. We went ahead and did a minimum amount of interviewing for the Scots visitors. They was a preference for the British Isles, and for Germany, and western Europe. It was later when we had the McCarran Act passed.

Q: That was around 1955, 1956. No, it was 1954, I think.

LAKAS: We had to take a much more stringent look at the non-immigrant people.

Q: Was there a problem on immigrant visas with screening out prostitutes, particularly if it was a GI marriage?

LAKAS: Well, there was a clause, if I can recall what it was, of derogatory conduct. I think this is what it referred to. The police were very good at giving us the screening needed for all the visas. I can't remember at this moment, because it was so long ago, as to the number that we uncovered. I don't think it was a serious problem, or else I would have remembered what was going on.

Q: Well, what about life in Glasgow at this time? In 1948, they had a bad winter. In a way, the food situation, living situation, was worse than during war time.

LAKAS: We were very impressed with the courage, the stamina, the endurance of the Scots. Throughout the business of rationing, everything was rationed, including chocolates. We at the consulate were part of the rationing program. Meat was very difficult to obtain. But, eventually, we at the consulate were able to work through the embassy, in London, to use the commissary, not only for food, but for liquor that we needed for our receptions. The Scots themselves were very hospitable, very warm, very responsive. They seemed to feel that they would go slow on reconstruction, to make the work last longer. They were concerned about a depression coming in, or an economic recession. When we went to Italy, during 1949, on the holiday, we were astonished to see how quickly the Italians had covered up the craters, and were rebuilding. They had destroyed buildings in Naples and elsewhere. But, the labor aspect in Great Britain gave us the feeling that the word was, "Take your time."

Q: Was there the feeling among the people at the consulate general about a certain unhappiness with the labor situation? I'm not speaking about the party as much as the unions, and all that?

LAKAS: Yes. Are you speaking, people, officers of the consulate, or the local employees?

Q: Well, I mean, both.

LAKAS: We simply reported that, as you just described. That the unions were really becoming a headache in the recovery process. The locals in our office would joke about this. As they joked about all the frailties of their lives, under the war system. But, basically, yes, this is why there was a surge for immigration visas from the Scots. They saw their opportunity as being elsewhere.

Q: Well, for the next four or five decades... I'm talking about the labor movement, the unions, were sort of considered to be the British sickness. It impeded everything. Margaret Thatcher came in and knocked that out.

LAKAS: That is what I remember. You're correct. This is the talk that went on. I think the report that went out of the consulate, down to the embassy, conveyed the view from Glasgow. We also had a consulate in Edinburgh. We could see copies of that, and it was the same thing coming out of Edinburgh.

Q: Well, between Edinburgh and Glasgow... Edinburgh being sort of the intellectual capital, and Glasgow being the working capital of Scotland (this is in very rough terms.) Did you feel that there was a competition? Did you pick up anything?

LAKAS: Between the two cities or between the two offices?

Q: Between the two offices.

LAKAS: No. We never felt that. We sort of envied our consulate in Edinburgh for being in such a lovely area. Our consul general would sometimes be assigned by the embassy in London to go and relieve the consul there while he was on home leave. He would invite us to come and tour Edinburgh. There was a nice rapport. Henry Day was then the consul

Q: What about life for you and your wife in Glasgow.

LAKAS: We were newly married, virtually still on our honeymoon. She took to Glasgow like a duck takes to water. She was not particularly comfortable with the dampness. She liked the Scotswomen and they liked her a great deal. There would be articles in the newspaper about Eleanor's dress, Eleanor doing this, Eleanor doing that, written by women journalists. We would invite a number of them to our home for Thanksgiving, and they would help us do the turkey. It was that kind of rapport. I admired my wife for doing that. They saw her as a genuine, New Milford, Connecticut girl. It was our first experience outside the country.

Q: I'm sure it was a very positive one, wasn't it?

LAKAS: Yes it was. I stood there and was very pleased. I was very much in demand, and very popular.

Q: Were you doing visas, more or less, after that?

LAKAS: Yes. The three- year tour of duty included shipping at first. Then, the rest of the time, visa work. The consul general would occasionally come in to me and say, "I would like you to go and cover the agricultural exhibit, and I want you to give me a report of what you see there. We want to send it to the Department of Agriculture." Of course, I found it humorous, which he didn't know. I'm a New York City kid, and what I knew about agriculture, you could put in a peanut bag. In fact, I didn't know the difference between a bull and a cow. I would go over and do the best I could. He was quite pleased with this. Then, he would come in some other time and say, "I would like you to go and attend this function, where Robeson is going to appear."

Q: Robeson, being the...?

LAKAS: The singer.

Q: Paul Robeson.

LAKAS: They wanted me to give my view on what the reaction of the crowd was, and what was being said. Then, he would also come in from time to time and say, "I would like you to drive me to Burns country. I'm invited to attend a rotary truck meeting, and I would like you to drive. You can attend the meeting, too." Out of all the officers, and there were seven of us, I thought that sometimes he would reach out for me, because he thought maybe I was dependable. The greatest memory I have is when he asked me one day who was going to be the duty officer for Saturday. I said, "I am, Sir." He said, "Fine, we have some legal matters to attend to. You'll get a call from me." That call was really camouflaged for his marriage to an American lady he had known at the Department of State, who came over for the wedding. The wedding took place in the registrar's office of Glasgow. He turned to me and said, "Can I borrow your wedding ring?" I said, "Certainly." It was a great memory. When I became principal officer in Cork Island the following assignment, he actually came with his bride to pay his respects, to a man very junior to him.

Q: You mentioned Paul Robeson. Did you get involved in following the communist party, and Glasgow being a working area, I would suspect it would have a fairly strong party in those days.

LAKAS: Not me. The political officer probably was doing that. It was difficult to dodge the Poles. They would come running up to you at your residence and ask for an appointment to speak with you about their problems at the camp they were staying in, and how things were “going on” in the camp that ought to be known by us. I would dutifully take down what was being said, in respect to the office, and pass it onto the political officer. What they did with it, I have no idea. But, I was in no position to play the role of political officer.

Q: You had the impression that it was a fairly strong party there.

LAKAS: Yes there was. I didn’t know exactly what was going on. This was all new to me. But, I’m aware that we had coverage.

Q: 1948 was sort of a critical year, as far as the Cold War was concerned. You had the coup in Czechoslovakia, and the Berlin airlift, I believe, was going on at that time. Things were cranking up, the Soviet Union was seen in quite a different way, in 1948, on. Was this all impacting what the consulate was doing?

LAKAS: I personally had some peripheral feeling for what was going on. I didn’t know exactly what we were doing about it. I was in one room, dealing only with visas. My desk was loaded with visas cases to be studied. I saw suddenly the arrival of a USIS officer from London to take up station with us. I saw the political officer, David Ness, active in certain instances, but I did not know totally just exactly what was going on. I had my hands full, just handling the visa cases. I would hear things, but I didn’t know exactly.

Q: Were you getting anything from the family about the Civil War in Greece at this time?

LAKAS: The letters we received from home made some references to the Civil War, but they were not extensive references. I saw in the local newspapers in Glasgow, about the British and the Americans coming into Greece. We had a radio that was able to pick up USA and Greece as well. I would tune in at 11:00 at night to try to pick up BBC news, for example, going to Greece. But, I have no real knowledge of it.

Q: Then, in 1951, you would have moved?

LAKAS: September 1950.

Q: 1950. By the way, although you were a staff officer, you certainly were getting what one could call an FSO-line type work, weren’t you?

LAKAS: Absolutely. I can’t tell you how both Glasgow and Cork gave me a platform to launch myself into the essential career of an FSO. Later on, when the Wriston Program came in, and we were transferred to the career side of the State Department, we were more than prepared to undertake the FSO duties. Yes. Being sent to Cork in 1950, primarily to handle interrogations of

a case that was pending, the idea, at that time, was for me to finish those and then go on home for reassignment. Cork was really temporarily, but it turned out it became permanent, for three years.

WILLIAM C. TRIMBLE
First Secretary
London (1948-1951)

William C. Trimble was born in Baltimore, Maryland. He entered the Foreign Service in 1931. His career included assignments in Seville, Buenos Aires, Estonia, Paris, Mexico City, London, the Hague, Rio de Janeiro, Bonn, and Phnom Penh. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: *What were you doing in London? I have you there from '48 to 1951.*

TRIMBLE: Yes, I was and doing various jobs, two in particular ones. One was working on German matters, reporting on the British, their views on Germany at that time, keeping in touch with our High Commission, working on various agreements as the International Authority for the Ruhr and the Occupation Statute for Germany. And, let's see, we helped with food for the Germans and liaison with the military in Germany and particularly Bob Murphy, at that time Political Advisor to General Clay, who was then head --

Q: *The High Commissioner in Germany.*

TRIMBLE: And on German matters also in London with the British and French, for they and the Americans were working together. The Russians wouldn't work with us. That was one job I had and continued to have. And my other was reporting on British domestic politics -- the Labor Party, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party -- with my two excellent assistants, as well as Sam Burger.

Q: *He was my boss when I was in Vietnam.*

TRIMBLE: Really?

Q: *He was assistant -- yes, I have a high regard for him. In fact, it's I feel one of the great tragedies of this oral history program that we didn't get Sam Burger.*

TRIMBLE: Sam was a brilliant officer, and he worked on the Labor Party aspect, because you couldn't work on both Conservatives and Labor, and he had many contacts -- he had been labor attaché -- and he was very good.

Q: *I was told he was really our opening in the Embassy, that the Embassy had naturally gravitated towards the conservative side just because these were where the contacts had been and traditionally had been.*

TRIMBLE: Yes, that was true under Lew Douglas, whose picture is up there.

Q: *Okay. We were talking about our contacts with the --*

TRIMBLE: With various parties, political parties. Lew Douglas was a very fine chief, a very good ambassador. But his contacts were with the Conservative Party and what remained of the Liberal Party, which was disappearing rapidly. So I had two assistants, one a very good girl, Tibbetts, as well as Sam Berger before he left.

Q: *Margaret Tibbetts?*

TRIMBLE: Yes.

Q: *Both of them later became ambassadors.*

TRIMBLE: Yes. She worked with me on a report on the British attitude towards the United States. This was roughly the time of the Korean War. There was a great deal of criticism about it there, and we drafted what was thought to be an excellent paper on the subject. I don't know whatever happened to it. It's probably in the files somewhere.

Sam was transferred, as I recall, shortly after the British elections of 1950. The outcome of that in 1951 we predicted right on the nose how it was going to come out. That's when the Labor Party finally went out. I found that work very, very interesting.

Q: *Can I go back to a couple of points here?*

TRIMBLE: Yes.

Q: *One, you say you dealt with matters dealing with Germany, with the British. Now, am I right in thinking that the British, for very obvious reasons, took a much harder line on the Germans than the Americans did? We have a tendency to say, "Well, let bygones be bygones, and let's get on with it," particularly with the Korean War coming up, but also not just the Korean War, but you arrived just about the time Czechoslovakia went under. Whereas, the British have long, deep and justifiable concerns about Germany, and they weren't as magnanimous as the Americans with the Atlantic between them. I mean, did you have to deal with this problem? And how did you deal with it?*

TRIMBLE: Yes. Although the agreements worked out -- the occupation statute, etc. -- were a tripartite thing: the French, British and ourselves, we had, because we were supplying most of the aid, food and so forth to Germany, was called a weighted vote. An American vote meant more than the British vote or the French vote.

Q: *Wherever you sat, you were at the head of the table.*

TRIMBLE: In a sense. But you had to be very careful about using it. We did have the weighted vote, because England couldn't help. Their economy was such they could not. Neither could

France. And we did, and we had different ideas what future Germany should be than the British did. As Douglas' deputies -- he was too busy with other matters -- Julius Holmes, the Minister of the Embassy and I did the negotiations, and it was a little difficult.

By and large, I found the British people in the Foreign Office I worked with as opposed to the British Treasury -- Stafford Cripps is another matter -- were very broad-minded and very able. The Under Secretary for German Affairs (Yvon Kirkpatrick) had served as Embassy Counselor in Germany before the war. He knew Germans. He knew greatly about them and felt that Germany would become a democracy again. And, by and large, the Foreign Office people were very cooperative.

Q: In other words, with the Foreign Office you were dealing with professionals who were looking at this as a practical measure. But you mentioned the Treasury and Stafford Cripps. What was the problem there?

TRIMBLE: He didn't like the Germans. That's all. He didn't want any financial help to them and tried to -- Treasury was pretty nasty. But I will say that Bevin, Secretary of State was excellent.

Q: Was this Ernest Bevin?

TRIMBLE: Ernest Bevin. Ernie. He was outstanding.

Q: He was probably the premier foreign minister that Britain has had.

TRIMBLE: Oh, there's no question about it. I'll tell you one story. He was a very good friend of Dean Acheson. I remember Mr. Bevin had to go to the hospital for an unnamed operation. We reported it to Washington and Mr. Acheson sent a message, for the Embassy to deliver -- "Best wishes" and so forth. It was just after the operation. So I delivered it to Mr. Bevin's personal private secretary who said, "You know, Bill, Ernie told me he thought he would hear from his friend Dean, and told me to tell him 'It's not me lead but me latter end.'" [Laughter]

Q: Oh, wonderful!

TRIMBLE: Hemorrhoids.

Q: Yes.

TRIMBLE: He was excellent.

Q: Looking at this, I've never really understood why was it that Britain seemed to move so poorly out of the post-war period. I mean, they had rationing for something like seven years later. When I was in Germany close to that period, you know, things were really ticking.

TRIMBLE: And they were in Belgium, and they were in Holland, too.

Q: What was the problem?

TRIMBLE: Well, their industry had been pretty badly hurt during the war, very badly hurt. There was social unrest, not really major strikes, but labor unions were pretty difficult. There was a class feeling between the Tories and the Labor Party, and they wouldn't really work together. They had had to during the war, but now one Party was in power, and social differences were found in schools and almost every part of life. And they were groping.

They lost their position as a great world power, and they resented that, and they resented us for possessing it -- many people still do for taking over their role. And their economy was in pretty bad shape. They were depending entirely upon oil from abroad. They hadn't developed the North Sea oil fields yet. And we came with the Marshall Plan. They appreciated it but resented the fact that they had to take aid from us.

They didn't really start recovering until about four or five years later. And they had loss of life, of course, and the destruction was very great in the cities. And there was that insular feeling of the British, and then there's also jealousy of us, which is understandable. I can understand it.

Q: But at your level, you were able, not with the Treasury, but with the foreign office, you --

TRIMBLE: Yes, they were broader-minded people, and most of the people were. I had friends in Parliament and so forth, both parties and very good people. But there was a certain resistance to us but understandable. It's a proud country and having been at the top they would get irritated with us. I can see their point of view. But by and large, the relationship was good, particularly with Ernie Bevin because he was very able. And Mr. Attlee was pretty good, too.

Q: Well, then you moved. You went as minister of --

TRIMBLE: Since I had dealt with German matters in London from 1948 to '51, and the time of an assignment is generally three years, the Department wanted to send me as political counselor in Germany. That was at the time of McCarthy and the original selection, I've forgotten his name, had been an old China hand so was in McCarthy's black book.

Q: John Stewart Service or one of those?

TRIMBLE: No.

Q: John Patton Davis?

TRIMBLE: One of them. I can't remember.

Q: I mean, there were a number of them.

TRIMBLE: Anyhow, he was meant to go as political counselor -- this is still in the period of military government, High Commission, rather. Jack McCloy -- I think it was Jack, said, "I'm not going to take anybody else. I'm irritated with this McCarthy thing, and until this man is vindicated, I'll leave his position open." But McCarthy was finally able to get the man out, and I was sent there as Minister of the Embassy.

ABRAHAM M. SIRKIN
Press Officer, The Marshall Plan
London (1948-1952)

Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIA
London (1952-1957)

Mr. Sirkin was born in 1914 in Barre, Vermont, and attended Columbia College, graduating in 1935. He was drafted into the U.S. Army in 1941. After he left the Army he served at number of posts with USIA and USIS, including England, India, and Greece. Mr. Sirkin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

SIRKIN: Anyway it was a fascinating interview, courtesy of General MacArthur's Chief of Staff, and I ended up in London as the Marshall Plan got going. So I got interested in doing presswork for the Marshall Plan and ended up getting hired as an assistant to the information guy to the Marshall Plan mission to the United Kingdom.

Q: You picked this job up, you didn't get all the way home then? So in '48 you got into the Marshall Plan? You did it from when to when?

SIRKIN: I ended up in London for nine years. The Marshall Plan ended up in '52 or '53, and all the people who were doing information work for the Marshall Plan were absorbed into the new U.S. Information Agency which had been created. Dulles insisted he didn't want the propaganda people in the State Department so he let them have their own organization.

Q: Let's talk first about the Marshall Plan. In '48 what was the status when you arrived there? Can you talk a little bit about how you saw both the UK and the beginning of the whole Marshall Plan business?

SIRKIN: I got to the UK in '48 when there was still rationing, even potatoes and certainly meats and much of London looked like Tokyo. Downtown, the financial district of London, the so called City was just as flat as most of the City of Tokyo or Yokohama and they were just getting back on their feet and I began to make my contacts with the financial and labor and industrial correspondents and economic writers of the London Press. They were glad to have American help and also resentful that they had to take American help but our job was to rub it in that we were the ones giving it, because it was actually in the legislation. First of all, every bag of wheat or can of orange juice or whatever had the Marshall Plan insignia on it, paid for by the Marshall Plan. There was a plaque at the Vienna State Opera House, this was rebuilt with Marshall Plan money. In this case, it wasn't the dollars, it was just the counterpart fund, but it was under the control of the U.S. and there was to be an information program to make sure that the people in Europe knew what we were doing. So it was a fairly sizable information effort all over Europe run from Paris.

Q: So you were from about '48 to '52 period, you were working on the British side of things?

SIRKIN: I continued on when and USIA took over I became sort of the Deputy Public Affairs Officer until I left in 1957.

Q: What type of things would you be doing?

SIRKIN: I wrote press releases and distributed them to papers, British press not just the London press, about what shipments were coming in, millions of tons of wheat and cotton, and orange juice and machine tools. We would write about those. I remember there was an investment guarantee program. The Cabot family of Massachusetts had Cabot Carbon and they put some money into some British firm and that had a dollar guarantee so a press release on that. I made contact with the British financial and industrial correspondents, and with the BBC, which was very important, not only the BBC domestic but also the BBC world service. I had a lot of good contacts. The easiest ways to entertain these people was to invite them to the Embassy for lunch where we had meat from Denmark or New Zealand, which we couldn't get on the market for the first couple of years in restaurants in London. Fed them ideas, stories and BBC did a number of...

Q: I would think that it would be rather difficult, I mean, obviously these people are, as with any country, would be proud of what they had done during the war, the fact that you had to publicize I mean you could feed the information, but they didn't have to publish it. I would think that there would be a desire not to do this. A lot of stuff was coming in and what was in it for the British press to say...?

SIRKIN: This was news, this was encouraging for big imports were coming in that they weren't able to pay for because of the dollar gap. I refreshed my mind about all these things last week at Harvard [at the Marshall Plan 50th anniversary conference] because there was an orgy of reminiscence there about what went on. As a matter of fact, one of the people there was Sir Eric Roll; they kept calling him Lord Roll. But anyway at that time he was the British representative at these Marshall Plan meetings in Paris to set the whole thing up from a European point of view. It was interesting to get the flavor of the extent to which these British officials were grateful because they didn't know how, especially in the sterling area. Also the Mission head in Britain was Thomas Finletter, who later was Secretary of the Air Force, a big Democratic politician. My wife had known Finletter when she was on the board of United World Federalists with him in New York. She came over to work in the Mission and ended up in the economic research unit Finletter created to produce the quintessential study of the Sterling Area, the loss of whose resources to the UK was not well understood at the end of the war.

Their foreign exchange had been utilized to buy war supplies and they were down to nothing. But it wasn't just Britain, The sterling area had in a sense a common pool of money and so he authorized a little research section to analyze what had happened to the sterling area. They ended up with a huge staff and when this came out it made a big splash in the British press. They themselves had not done such a study. They all knew it anyway, but this was the foreigners, the Americans coming in. Commodity by commodity, I know my wife was working on cocoa from Africa, what had happened in terms of imports, of sales, exports and how that affected the British financial situation. And, how that contributed to the dollar debt.

Q: You know this struck me and I'm not an economist but for some reason I come away with the impression that the results of the war rationing and all that lasted longer in Britain than they did say in Germany and yet in Germany everything had been devastated. I've never quite understood that.

SIRKIN: My wife had gone over to visit the winter of 1948 and a couple of her friends were organizing and running The Friends' Service Committee Community Center in Berlin. Coming from London where there was still rationing and you couldn't get, let's say, clotted cream from Devon because it was all for export. She was astonished when she ordered coffee and kuchen in a café on the Kurfurstendam and was asked if she wanted her kuchen "mit schlag"; the whipped cream came out as big as the cake! And there were real sausages, which the Brits didn't see for another two years.

Q: With clotted cream! I never quite understood why this happened this way?

SIRKIN: Partly because the British were determined to restore their foreign exchange and were very insistent that everything go for export that could go for export to pay for loans from the U.S., whereas the Germans were a little bit more lenient about this. Of course, the big thing that I realized at the meeting of the national plan veterans as we were called, was that the crucial thing wasn't that the U.S. taxpayer was putting in 13 billion dollars or that kind of money in those years. Most of it stayed in the United States; but it was the taxpayers, American farmers, cotton people and fruit growers and a few machine tool people who got it. But the money came out of the taxpayers. They also had a research guy from LSE (London School of Economics) at this thing who had written a book going over all the same things we used to hear from the communists in 1949, 1950 about it's all a capitalist idea of dominating the European economies and it's all for the benefit of the people back in the States; "It really didn't do any good, Europe would have recovered anyway without this". It was beginning to recover, but recovery would obviously have been much slower.

I have to go back to your question about resentment. My wife made a little speech at Harvard about this because it struck her. I got involved early, as part of my work with the Marshall Plan, with something that Sir Stafford Cripps, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Paul Hoffman, the Head of the Marshall Plan, set up: the Anglo American Council on Productivity. At the end of the war American industry had shoved ahead and the British were stuck with bombed out factories. The British sent teams of owners, managers, and workers to the equivalent industry in the U.S. for three to four weeks. They came back and wrote a report and maybe introduced some of these things to speed up Britain's productivity. When this was first announced, and my wife remembers reading it in the Daily Express, a very chauvinistic national press. "Grandchild to teach the grandmother how to suck eggs." But I did a lot of work to publicize these teams in the first instance and the man I worked with in the British Treasury was a man with a very impressive beard named Commander Whitehead who later went out on the private economy and became the Chief Salesman for Schweppes for a few years.

Q: Oh, yes, he was the Schweppes man when gin and tonic first became a drink and it was a hard sell. The stuff really was pretty bitter.

SIRKIN: This was in '48-'49 and he was a very efficient, very lively, very bright guy, very articulate and we worked out a common strategy of how to get the British press interested in covering these stories. He gave me some suggestions and advice and I worked with the British Office of the Anglo American Council on Productivity and helped them publicize and get press and radio attention to the first early reports.

Q: What about the magazine The Economist? I would think that would have been a natural target for you.

SIRKIN: I got to know some of the people there. One of the editors became a good friend. I forget this was a bit later, but I think when Senator Humphrey after he left as Vice President, became Senator again. I guess this was in the '50s.

Q: The '60s

SIRKIN: Was it that late?

Q: Yes, Senator Humphrey had become Vice President under Johnson. Johnson left, then he came back to be a Senator again in the early '70s. He died around then, too.

SIRKIN: While I was in London he came through in the '50s. This was before he was Vice President. London like Paris and Rome was full of constant American top notch visitors from Congress and what not and it so happened all the bigwigs in the Embassy were busy that evening so on short notice they asked me to entertain, and get a few people together for dinner with Humphrey. So I quickly was able to get the Deputy Editor of the Economist to dinner plus the Economic Counselor of the Embassy and a few others.

Years later I met him at some disarmament thing in Geneva and I introduced myself, "Remember, you had dinner with me in our house in 1950, '60, '55 whatever." He says, "No, it was '56." He had had it with these British guys who talk very royal, economic people that are very clever. The American Editor of the Economist who had three or four pages in each issue, was Nancy Balfour, at that time. She became a very close friend of ours and had a great art interest and was able to get us to have tea with the sculptor, Henry Moore. He gave us tea at his place and showed us around his open-air sculptor garden and all the things he was working on. All this as a result of being introduced by Nancy Balfour, the Editor of the American Section. We still used to go visit her every time we came through London.

Q: Most of this time I think the Labor Government was in?

SIRKIN: At the end of my time there it was Churchill and Eden. Churchill for a while and then Eden. I watched Churchill give his farewell speech at the House of Commons.

Q: Particularly during the early years, but this goes from '48 to '57. Did you run across a problem, with what I would call the far left wing of the Labor Party, the left wing intellectuals both in the press and all and trying to deal with them?

SIRKIN: I don't know that I had any direct confrontations with people like that. I had a few situations in which I was able to address that issue in some respects, but I read their stuff from the left wing publications, such as Tribune that was on the left wing of the Labor Party; it wasn't communist but it was critical of America and took a strong, very socialist position. We knew there was a vocal group of that sort. One thing I managed to do in relation to that issue wasn't an economic thing, it was in the field of art. We were in cultural affairs, too, later. The American Museum of Modern Art in New York lent an exhibit to the British, I think it was the Tate Gallery, of some of the more interesting developments of American abstract art. Jackson Pollack and all these big names and several others. So I thought this would be a good opportunity since this was the kind of art at the time where the left was listening a little bit to the Soviet argument against abstract art.

Q: They wanted tractor drivers and realistic art.

SIRKIN: The fellow traveling crowd was against abstract art. So I managed to get USIA to pay for a visit from somebody I knew who could describe, explain abstract art to the British. There was this professor Meyer Shapiro from Columbia who had a worldwide reputation. He is an explainer of what the value is of some of these lines and curves and whatnot. I had to argue a lot just for one country but apparently Germany heard about this, and agreed they would like to have him, too. But we brought him over and got the third program of the BBC, at that time the intellectual program of the BBC and they immediately wanted him for a lecture about modern art in relation to the exhibit opening at the Tate. He gave the lecture. The BBC puts out a magazine called The Listener, which at that time had about 8,000,000 circulation. It was a cheap magazine, as it was just text. The week he was there they put him on the front page of The Listener and ran the text of his speech. Then we fixed to have him give a few lectures right in the hotbed of this more or less leftist crowd at Hampstead Art Society and he was willing to lecture. In a sense, he was a Trotskyite. He was obviously very knowledgeable about how to needle in style.

So I went to that lecture and sure enough some of this fellow traveling crowd started to make fun of abstract art. He started shooting back with his very sophisticated retorts and kept the crowd almost with him. They met their match because he knew all the answers, all the questions and I thought in that respect he managed to do a little bit of a nick in that approach to things. But that wasn't on the main issue, it wasn't on the economic issue. It was in the art field.

Q: Did you find a growing rift between the outlook of the United States and the outlook of the British intellectuals or not?

SIRKIN: I really don't think so. If there was one, this was also the period when I guess it was the CIA invention, but there was a magazine called Encounter, edited theoretically by Steven Spender and Irving Kristol. I got to know Irving Kristol through various contacts pretty well. I didn't realize until it appeared in the Senate Hearings that some of the money came from the CIA, but it was a very good operation. This was sort of the liberal answer to the communist attraction for the intellectuals and they did pretty well. We got a lot of the intellectuals to come to some of our things. Robert Frost came over. We had a big reception inviting all these intellectuals, some of whom were a little bit on the left, far on the left, but they came to the American Embassy.

They weren't immune from our invitations and attractions. So I don't think it was very sharp in England, not as it was on the continent.

Q: Particularly in France. In the first place in '56, we had the Suez Crisis and there was a time when the, I won't say the British people, but the British Government under Eden moved ahead to attack Egypt and the United States under Eisenhower would not support him.

SIRKIN: Not only that but he either did or threatened to put the Sixth Fleet in between.

Q: What did that do?

SIRKIN: I used to have a little card identifying me as a member of the U.S. Delegation to SCUA, the Suez Canal Users Association.

Q: This was Dulles'?

SIRKIN: Yes, and as the Press Officer at that time, I sat right behind Dulles representing the U.S. The week he came to London to attend a meeting of this cooked up organization, the Suez Canal Users Association, under the leadership of the Dutch or some continental foreign minister, was a bit of a trying time. I went along with the Ambassador several times to Macmillan's Office. I was sitting outside Macmillan's Office when our Ambassador was delivering.

Q: Who was our Ambassador?

SIRKIN: Winthrop Aldrich, who had been head of probably the richest bank in the city, Chase. Also his mother was a Rockefeller so that was a bit of a strain between the U.S. and the British. I had no insights into it any more than what you read in the papers at the time.

Q: Did you get any of the feeling about watching Dulles and Eden and all about the antipathy between these two?

SIRKIN: I was never in the same room with Eden and, the only time I was with Dulles was sitting behind him at the formal meeting with a room full of people, and Eden wasn't there. One little thing about Dulles that is of interest to some people. My boss at the time, the PAO (I was just a Deputy), was fellow named Brad Connors who a little bit before that had run into a windmill of Joe McCarthyism. He had been a leading official of USIA and was really sort of harassed by McCarthy. When he was in Washington he had done a lot of work with Dulles in connection with various publicities. He was a very strong minded and knowledgeable guy. He was a chain smoker, rather heavyset with a cigar ash falling down on his vest. At one point when Dulles was in London they gathered all the Ambassadors from Western Europe to have a meeting. At some reception at the Ambassador's house, where a lot of the Ambassadors were gathering, Dulles came in. Dulles and Brad Connors had a meeting in the anteroom of the Ambassador's residence and I don't know what the issue was, but Brad Connors raised his voice to Dulles and said, "Mr. Secretary, you can't do that." All the Ambassadors looked around thinking, who the hell is that? Dulles had great trust in the judgment and knowledge of this guy and he did what he was told by Brad Connors. Mrs. Aldrich apparently raised the question to

Dulles about whether this guy with the cigarette ash is really the best person to have as the main spokesman for the U.S. in London. Dulles immediately said this guy is the smartest guy there is. You have a jewel here.

Q: Dealing with other cultures during this nine year period with the British, particularly dealing with the press there, did you find that there was indeed a special relationship as compared with other countries or not? What was your impression?

SIRKIN: Yes, the record is full of this discussion of how the Americans and the British are divided by a common language and things of that sort. One interesting example, I don't know if it relates exactly to your question or not, but twice while I was there the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors was Arthur Burns, Professor of Economics at Columbia. I gathered my friends, the City Editors- the City in England means the financial district- for a brief session with Professor Burns and they asked him as an advisor how he kept up-to-date. He told them about his own personal method which was to call departments of the U.S. Government which keep economic and population and other statistics, so that every Monday morning or afternoon he would get phone calls with the latest figures, and not wait until official reports which could be a week or two later, and thus to advise the President on economic activity. I don't know to what extent he had dealings with the Federal Reserve., but at least for the Council of Economic Advisors, up-to-the-minute information was also useful if it was a week or two ahead of the official reports. These British financial writers were sitting there with their mouths open and then they said, "Can you imagine our Treasury doing anything like this?" So the next time he came through, a year or two later, they asked me to ask Mr. Burns to describe that system that he had of getting way ahead just by making informal phone calls. Would you please invite so and so from the British Treasury to attend? They thought this was a magnificent example of Americans informality and efficiency and of not being stuffy.

Q: In 1957, I take it by this time you were married?

SIRKIN: Yes, we were married and had three children.

Q: Okay, so that's what you are doing during those nine years?

SIRKIN: She worked in a different area so I hardly ever saw her during work, but I got to see her the first time when we were playing softball behind what is now the residence for the American Ambassador, but at that time was the home of Barbara Hutton. We were playing softball, I guess the U.S. Marine team against the British Treasury. So that's where we first met and we enjoyed London together and got married and had three children.

Q: 1957 you left?

SIRKIN: 1957 I left. I returned home.

WILLIAM R. TYLER

**Adviser, Tripartite Meeting
London (1950)**

William Tyler was born in Paris, France in 1920. He served with the United States Information Agency in France and Washington, DC. He then entered the Foreign Service and served in Washington, DC, the Netherlands, France, and Germany. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1987.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, we were discussing some points that were not really covered in the first two interviews. Specifically, some of the international meetings you attended. And we developed a small listing of those which--your participation--you had some interesting perspective in. So could we start with the tripartite meeting in London? This was the North Atlantic Council. This was 1950--when would this have been, about?

TYLER: This was in 1950. I think it was in the early the summer of 1950. It was not a North Atlantic Council meeting. It was a tripartite meeting; a three-powers meeting to discuss the future of NATO's role.

Q: Who were the three powers were--at that time?

TYLER: U.S., U.K., and France.

Q: And you were . . .

TYLER: At that time I was stationed at the embassy in Paris; I'd been stationed there since 1948 as Public Affairs Counselor. I was not yet a Foreign Service Officer.

Q: So your role at this meeting was what?

TYLER: It was as adviser, adviser to our delegation. Adviser, I should add, with a small "a." But in order to be aware of, and report on, the public relations aspects, the international information aspects of the meeting, and also to render any service that I could to our delegation because of my special knowledge of the political situation in France, and of the French perspective in general.

Q: I was going to say, that you were there really more than just as a public affairs person.

TYLER: Yes. David Bruce wanted me there, and that was that.

Q: David Bruce was our Ambassador at that time. Before we move on--you served under David Bruce--could you give me a little idea of what his operating style was like?

TYLER: David Bruce asked that I be included in our delegation to this meeting. Specifically, he asked me to put down for him my ideas on the information and public relations role of NATO in the future.

Q: I wonder if you could mention what type of ambassador David Bruce was? Not good, bad, or indifferent; but how did he operate?

TYLER: He operated in the most flexible and informal way you can imagine. In a meeting he encouraged general conversation, he welcomed and solicited people's ideas, and he never seemed to be trying to cast the discussion in a way which reflected specifically his views, but to solicit and encourage opinions by others.

Q: Well now, you went to this meeting as an adviser. Who were the participants at the meeting? It was with foreign ministers?

TYLER: It was three foreign ministers. Dean Acheson was our representative. Of course David Bruce was there. And I guess that the British Foreign Secretary then--I hope I'm not mistaken--was Ernest Bevin.

Q: Ernest Bevin?

TYLER: Yes. So there were Dean Acheson, Ernest Bevin, and Robert Schuman.

Q: Well, now how did this work. I mean, you were there as a knowledgeable person on France. Did you sit behind somebody's shoulder and whisper to them?

TYLER: It seemed very informal. We were quite a small delegation. I sat in on the meetings and took the notes. My principal job was to send back telegrams to USIS for suggestions as to how to treat, or to emphasize, or to play any particular aspects of the meeting which were germane to our interests and to our view of our relation within the Alliance. It was also my job to keep our delegation informed on the French and international press treatment of aspects of the conference important to us.

Q: Now did Dean Acheson draw on your knowledge at all?

TYLER: Yes, well, we knew each other personally already, and so we could discuss matters informally. Our relationship was as informal as our relative positions permitted. Chip Bohlen was also there. He was then the Minister in Paris. But apart from that I can only really remember David Bruce, Chip Bohlen, and Dean Acheson.

Q: What were some of the issues that came up, particularly as pertaining to France, your field of expertise?

TYLER: Actually, my field of expertise went beyond France. The issues really went beyond the--the issues were more concerned with the future of the North Atlantic Alliance, in terms of its role and relation to the Soviet Union and the problems that we had to envisage and had to face, which were already very clear. Remember that this was, I guess, just about the time of the Korean War--or just before June 25, when it broke out. So in London military considered reports from the British and the French on matters relating to the strategic--the political and military strategic--role of the Alliance.

Q: *What were our concerns, as far as the delegation went, with France?*

TYLER: You mean at that time?

Q: *Yes, did we know the French wanted something that we didn't want the French to have? Or that we wanted something the French didn't want us to have?*

TYLER: Our thinking was directed toward the future, and cooperation, within the Alliance as a whole, rather than simply the French. Although I was Public Affairs Officer for France-- whatever expertise I might have had on internal French matters did not come into discussion.

JACK A. SULSER
Consular Officer
London and Newcastle on Tyne (1950-1951)

Jack A. Sulser was born in Illinois in 1925. Prior to receiving his graduate degree from the University of Wisconsin in 1950, he served with the U.S. Army overseas during World War II. After joining the Foreign Service, Mr. Sulser served in a number of posts including Dusseldorf, Newcastle on Tyne, Bologna, Vienna, and Frankfurt. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1994.

SULSER: Facing this two year wait after passing the FSO examinations, I applied all over the place for something to occupy me in the meantime, including a management intern position in the State Department. I took that examination, which was an oral group examination, passed that. I applied over in the Pentagon, because they had a vacancy in the Balkan section of Air Force Intelligence, and I had done the Balkan history work at Wisconsin and my thesis on Albania. They were interested in hiring me but were in a temporary civil service hiring freeze. And I applied at the CIA, and they said I'd hear from them eventually if they had a need. But before any of these things could materialize, the State Department offered me an FSS appointment for the Polish veterans displaced persons program at the Embassy in London.

I had been in England for a couple of months in the Army, liked London very much, had had a three day pass there just before we went across the Channel to get involved in the Battle of the Bulge. I was very happy to take this appointment in London as a vice consul issuing visas to Poles who had served under British command in the Second World War. It was a very interesting experience and fit in also with my interest in Eastern Europe. When Germany and the Soviet Union divided up Poland, the Russians were left with about half a million Polish POWs. After Germany attacked the Soviets, the British persuaded the Russians to release about a quarter million of these Poles. The Russians took them down to Iran and the British took them over, outfitted them, organized them into units, the largest of which was a corps under General Ladislav Anders. There were Polish ships in the Royal Navy, there were Polish squadrons in the Royal Air Force, and there was a Polish Armored Division as well. All these Poles had fought under British command.

When the war ended and the Communists wound up on top in Poland, many of these Poles did not want to go back. A good many stayed in Great Britain, nearly 200,000 of them. They were not eligible for American visas under the original displaced persons act, which applied only on the continent of Europe, not in the British Isles. But the Polish community in the United States lobbied Congress efficiently. In 1950 they passed an amendment to the displaced persons act to provide for 15,000 visas for these Poles in Britain, and the Department recruited three people who were on the FSO waiting list to go over and administer this program. I was one of those. Since we were new to the Foreign Service, London gave us two experienced officers, and I was the third officer in that unit. One of the other new fellows, Dick Adams, was put in the regular visa section, and the other new man, Walt McClelland, was transferred to Liverpool shortly after we arrived in England.

The program was originally to be one year duration, but by that time most of the Poles were so settled in Britain that they didn't come forward very rapidly to use up the 15,000 visas that we were authorized to issue. We advertised in the newspapers in Britain, the only time I'm aware of when the United States advertised for people to apply for immigrant visas to come live in the United States! But we advertised in the British and the Polish language newspapers, and we worked through all the Polish organizations in Britain, of which there were several, to promote the program. When the year elapsed, we hadn't even issued 10,000, so it was extended another six months. By the time the program lapsed after 18 months, we had issued about 12,000 visas. By that time, too, my FSO appointment had come through, much sooner than expected, in March of '51 already, after entering as a staff officer in July of 1950.

They had originally said that when the FSO appointment came, I'd go back to the United States, go through the regular officer course at FSI and all that, but since I was already abroad that never happened. They just sent me new papers, new rank, new commission, new position and just continue to do what I was doing. So I never did come back to take the basic officer course or any other course at FSI. I never had a course of training at the Foreign Service Institute, which I regretted because years later one of my jobs in the Foreign Service was chief of the training assignments branch, responsible for assigning people to the Foreign Service Institute, never having taken a course there myself.

When the Polish veterans program expired in December of '51, I was sent up to the consulate in Newcastle in January of '52. I had done a final report on the program, what we did, how it had been set up, what problems we had had, what we had done with it and what the final results were. It was the first Foreign Service despatch that I had ever done, this sort of history of the Polish veterans program, for the record, and then went up to Newcastle, which was a two man consulate. In those days we still had about ten consulates spread around the British Isles. The fellow who had entered with me, Dick Adams, who had been in the regular visa section, was sent to Bradford. We'd had one man in the program in Glasgow, who issued visas, otherwise London issued them for the rest of the U.K., that was Toby Belcher, who later became identified with Cyprus, became ambassador to Cyprus. I went then to Newcastle, having done only Polish veterans displaced persons visas in London, and of course there was nothing of that in Newcastle. We had non-immigrant visas and commercial invoices, because in those days every export to the United States had to be accompanied by a consular commercial invoice. Those were the two

main pieces of work in Newcastle. We had three British ladies. One did the visas, one did the commercial invoices, and one did the general administration there. A week after I arrived in Newcastle the principal officer, Harold Pease, went on home leave, leaving me alone in a post when I had only been in this one very specialized duty in London, at a time when London was the largest post we had in the Foreign Service.

Our NATO mission was still in London, we still had a large AID mission there, so we had I think three people with the title Ambassador and three people with the title Minister and pages and pages of American Foreign Service people there. In those days the Foreign Service list was arranged by rank, and within rank, alphabetically for each post. Since I was the lowest grade officer there was and my name began with S, it was the last name in six pages of the Foreign Service list for London. But suddenly I was in Newcastle and after one week I was the U.S. representative. Having been totally anonymous in London, I was photographed and interviewed by all the newspapers in Newcastle -- new vice consul in Newcastle. I got there shortly before the Lord Lieutenant's annual banquet for the Newcastle consular corps, which was sizeable, mostly honorary people, and this was a white tie and decorations affair. My boss, Harold Pease, told me that I'd have a lot of use for white tie in Newcastle, it's a very formal society, you'll be invited to dinner a lot. If the invitation says nothing about dress it's understood that it's black tie, "smoking;" if it's anything special it'll be white tie. It'll pay you to have your own set of tails. So I went to a local tailor and he rushed out a set of tails for me for the Lord Lieutenant's annual banquet, which took place only about ten days after I got there, a few days after the principal officer left. Fortunately, on the day of the banquet I was out in the street and ran into the Portuguese consul general, mentioned to him how my wife and I were looking forward to this affair that evening, our first big gathering in Newcastle. He looked at me, very surprised, and said, "Oh, the ladies are not invited." It hadn't even occurred to me that a white tie affair would be for men only, so I rushed back to the office, called my wife, and said, "You don't have to worry about your dress for tonight. I'm going alone." And there we were, all the local gentlemen, dignitaries, all in white tie and decorations, a very, very formal sort of stilted affair. Later that year the Lord Mayor gave his annual banquet for the consular corps, and for the first time in history they decided to invite the spouses as well. So the ladies went to that one. Those were the two big affairs every year in Newcastle. During the Lord Mayor's banquet so many remarks were made about how this was an experiment, to have the ladies there, and it seemed to be going rather well and maybe they would try it again the following year; if nothing untoward happened during the rest of the evening, it might be considered a success and they'd try it again!

But it was a great experience for me to be alone in Newcastle and do what had to be done, which was not an awful lot. I had time to get out and meet local politicians. In London one of the few friends I had made outside of the visa section was the labor attaché, because by chance he and my mother had gone to high school together. He had gone into the railway clerks union and become, I think, executive vice president, and had gotten a one time Foreign Service reserve appointment as labor attaché in London. My mother had somehow kept track of this man, and when I got to London she said, "Oh, you must look up my old high school friend Glenn Atkinson." I did, and through him I met many of the British union contacts of his. When I was transferred to Newcastle he informed some of his union friends that I was coming, so I was well treated by the union people in Newcastle, who also happened to be Labor Party officials. One of them, who was on the executive committee of the northeast Labor Party, invited me to attend

their annual party gathering, from which the non-Labor press was excluded. He gave me a set of delegate's credentials. I was nervous. This was the first foreign political gathering I had ever been to. I kept my mouth shut so that people wouldn't realize I was an American. My host knew, of course, and he explained things to me as it went on, but I didn't try to talk to other people. I spent the whole day there, and when I got back to the house that evening I dictated my first ever political report -- to my wife -- and sent it in. I got a commendation from the British desk in the Department because it was the first account they had had of how Party leader Hugh Gaitskell explained the loss of the General Elections two months earlier to an audience of party faithful. I also got a letter of reprimand from the political counselor in London (to whom I had sent a copy of my report) because he said that, since foreign government representatives were not invited to this convention, I was exposing the U.S. government to embarrassment by attending. My report had specified that I was the only foreigner there. I should have just not mentioned that, not bragged about it.

Q: How did you find the Labor movement in Newcastle? Were they sort of militantly left wing communist, or what have you?

SULSER: There were some. But the people that Glenn had referred me to were certainly not in that category, including Sam Watson of the Miners Union and Lord Westwood of General & Municipal Workers. They were the moderate wing of the Party, which still dominated in those days. The militant left wing, which was very communist influenced was small by comparison.

I want to tell you about my wife. On the ship going over to England, which was the Queen Elizabeth, there was a new Foreign Service secretary as well as we three new FSS vice consuls. After we got to London, I dated this girl once or twice. In March of '51, after we had been there seven months or so, she gave a cocktail party, and there I met another girl who was a secretary in the political section. I took her out after the cocktail party and began to date her regularly. After about six weeks I proposed to her and she accepted. When my transfer to Newcastle came through eight months later, we decided to get married. In those days she had to resign from the Foreign Service. A woman couldn't be married and remain in the Foreign Service. Her Foreign Service career was confined to London and then accompanying me the rest of the time. Thus, I had in my house in Newcastle a wife who until the month before had been a Foreign Service secretary. When I got home from the Labor Party convention, she was already in bed, so I got in bed alongside her and dictated my first Foreign Service report to my bride of only a few days. We were married January 26, 1952. I came back from Newcastle after two weeks for the wedding in London. That was an unusual experience.

Since the principal officer was going on home leave two days after the wedding, he invited us to stay in the government residence. From being the anonymous, most junior officer in London I was not only temporarily the government representative in Newcastle, but we were in this magnificent government residence which had goodness knows how many bedrooms, servants, a tennis court in the backyard, a government car in the garage. No chauffeur, I had to drive it myself. I made use of it to tour the consular district during the four and a half months the principal officer was gone, leaving me in charge. Northumberland, the North Riding of Yorkshire, Cumberland, Westmoreland and Durham were in my district, including the Lake District and Hadrian's Wall, the old Roman Wall across northern England. It was really a very

nice life, a nice honeymoon too in this lovely home. When the principal officer came back, we moved into a very modest apartment down in Tynemouth, overlooking the North Sea. I took the train back and forth to work every day, about 20 minutes in each direction. Life was a lot quieter after the principal officer came back. He was happy to have me do what little political and economic reporting I could generate there.

After nine months I was transferred to Bologna, which was a USIS sub-post of the consulate in Florence. I was assigned to Florence but resident in Bologna. I had home leave and transferred there.

WALTER M. McCLELLAND
Displaced Persons Officer
London (1950)

Consular Officer
Liverpool (1950-1952)

Walter M. McClelland was born in 1922 and raised in Oklahoma City. He graduated from the University of Virginia, where he was involved in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). He received his commission when he joined the Navy in 1944. After his tour with the Navy, he entered Harvard Law School and graduate school until 1950. Mr. McClelland then joined the Foreign Service, serving in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, and Egypt. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 20, 1995.

Q. You were in London from when to when?

MCCLELLAND: Let me just say that because my assignment to the Displaced Persons Program was "urgent", there was no time for any training. The Department gave me two weeks in the Consular Affairs Bureau -- at which time I tried to find out what a Visa looked like (I had never seen one in my life!) Then, off I went. I had to go without Franna and my son because Franna was having our second child and the Department would not let her travel at that point. So off I went on the Queen Mary on August 15th.

Q. What year?

MCCLELLAND: 1950.

Q. 1950 you were there. I was trying to get the two dates. You were there until when?

MCCLELLAND: I was only there until the end of that year. My FSO appointment came through in November. And before Franna and the children could get to London (where, of course, I had rented a place to live), I was transferred to Liverpool.

Q. So, really you were only in London a few months in 1950. What was the Displaced Persons Act and what were you doing?

MCCLELLAND: The Displaced Persons Act, at least as far as the UK office was concerned, was primarily to provide immigration services for the "General Anders Poles" who were refugees in Britain. The program was very recent and I was not needed because no one else in the program was there. So, for the first month or so I was located in the Visa Section of Embassy London, learning visa work. Later, when the rest of the DP personnel arrived, they began working with the Poles. About that time, however, I left for Liverpool.

Q. Did you ever get involved with the Displaced Persons at all there?

MCCLELLAND: Not really. Eventually the office moved up to Liverpool and we would see some of the Displaced Persons personnel from time to time, but I was not a part of that office.

Q. I think, just for a historical note, could you explain who the General Anders Poles were?

MCCLELLAND: I really do not know much about them. I just know that General Anders was a Polish General with a contingent of soldiers, or countrymen, who fought with the allies.

Q. If I'm not mistaken, I think they were soldiers who had sort of drifted through the Soviet Union, had come down through Iran and came back to Britain. They were trained as a Polish contingent and became at least a Polish Division, I think, with the 8th Army in Italy and were responsible for capturing Casino. They fought extremely well. But then Poland became a Communist Country and they were definitely not welcome there. We had a strong Polish lobby in the United States, so those who did not want to stay in Great Britain came to the United States. I think that is the genesis of this.

MCCLELLAND: That sounds about right.

Q. Were there any problems giving visas to the Brits?

MCCLELLAND: Being a Non-immigrant Visa Officer was an excruciating experience for me. Being a brand new officer I wanted to be conscientious and follow regulations closely. I had problems with elderly women, widows, who wanted to go visit their sons or daughters in the US, and I felt certain they were never coming back to England. I asked them why they would ever come back? They would say "Well, I just would. This is my home." I felt they had a perfectly good reason for going but, on the other hand, I did not think they had "non-immigrant status." So I would often end up refusing these poor, dear ladies and felt very unhappy about it.

Q. You did this until the end of 1950. Then what happened?

MCCLELLAND: Then I was commissioned as a Foreign Service Officer and unexpectedly transferred to Liverpool. (I had been assured by my senior officers in London that I would be allowed to stay in London.) When Franna called to the State Department about sending our household effects to London, she was informed by a friend: "Don't tell anyone that I told you this,

but Walter is being transferred to Liverpool." When she called the Administrative Section of EUR she was assured that the State Department worked in "well oiled grooves" and she shouldn't worry about it. She was also told "on pain of dire consequences" not to tell me that I was being transferred. So, although I was painting and fixing up a house for her arrival, she couldn't say anything. Also, our effects could not be sent to Liverpool because the orders were not issued yet. It turned out that when Franna and our two sons arrived at London in November, I had just been "officially" transferred. My orders were in effect, so after a week in London we drove on to Liverpool.

Q. You were in Liverpool from when to when?

MCCLELLAND: From the last part of 1950 to the end of 1952.

Q. What did we have there? Was it a Consulate General?

MCCLELLAND: Yes, it was a Consulate General. It had been a very important post in the old days and was still the only Consulate General in England outside London. The office was located in the Cunard Building, on the Pier Head, with a sweeping view of the Mersey Estuary. The Royal Liver (pronounced Ly-ver) Building was just across the street, where the Lord Mayor had his office. Liverpool was a very interesting post, and we found the British wonderfully hospitable.

Q. Who was the Consul General?

MCCLELLAND: John F. Huddleston, a very kind and considerate FSO who was just about to retire.

Q. How did the Consulate General operate? Was it strictly a visa place? What were they doing?

MCCLELLAND: Issuing immigrant and non-immigrant visas was important, but at that time we also had Consular Invoices to certify, shipping services, passports and US Citizen welfare -- all the standard consular functions. The post also had some really knowledgeable British employees who were most helpful to me, as a young officer, learning the ropes.

I did a bit of everything: Non-immigrant visas, some immigrant visas, commercial work, protection of US seamen, some economic and political reporting, etc. I gained good experience in almost every consular field.

Q. Did you have any major seamen problems while you were there?

MCCLELLAND: I remember, one time, going up to Morcombe Bay, where some US flag ships put in, with my very experienced British shipping clerk. There was a great contention between the Captain and the seamen. I talked to the Captain and several of the men. In the end, several men agreed to leave the ship and an amicable agreement was reached with the others. It was an interesting situation and we were able to resolve it, but this sort of thing did not happen often.

Q. How about visas? Were you still having cases of elderly ladies going to join their sons and daughters?

MCCLELLAND: A few, but we had more cases of students and younger people going over and I still had to worry about whether or not they were bona fide visitors. Since the British could almost always get an immigrant visa if they wanted one, there was less concern in the UK than, say, in Egypt, where that was not the case.

Q. It was still a period of great austerity in England, wasn't it?

MCCLELLAND: Yes. When we first arrived in Liverpool, food, clothing, and coal were still rationed. We had to have ration books and live on British rations because we were Consular and not Diplomatic. Franna and I have often joked that in our entire Foreign Service career, our greatest "hardship post" was Liverpool rather than any Middle East post! Liverpool was damp and chilly most of the time, and electricity was cut off some time most days, usually late afternoon. We did not have any gas heat, but we managed with our one coal fire and woolen underwear. Nevertheless, we enjoyed Liverpool. The Brits we knew were very hospitable and they invited us to be part of their clubs and social groups. We were invited to many dances and parties and came to feel very much a part of the community.

Q. You still hadn't had any formal training in the Foreign Service. You say you took home leave and came back around 1952?

HUGH G. APPLING
Political Officer
London (1950-1952)

Hugh G. Appling was born in California in 1921. He was educated in California and then joined the U.S. Army, serving overseas during World War II. After the war, he attended Stanford University where he received his master's degree in 1947. Soon afterwards, Mr. Appling joined the Foreign Service. His assignments included Vienna, London, Damascus, Manila, Saigon, and Canberra. He received an award for heroism in 1970. Mr. Appling was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in January 1990.

Q: I'd like to move on to the latter part of your career. You were in London, were you not in 1951-53.

APPLING: I was there as part of the staff of the U.S. representative to NATO and after one year the whole organization moved to Paris.

Q: You were there for the formation of NATO then.

APPLING: Yes we were building the organization. Fascinating exercise.

Q: What was your responsibility?

APPLING: I was a political officer and the reporting officer for the meetings of the representatives to NATO. I also did a lot of political-military work. I was negotiator for the Status of Forces Agreement, which with the Parallel Agreement in Japan, was the prototype of such agreements. A great experience for a young officer.

Q: How did the officers around you view West Germany? Was there some suspicion?

APPLING: Again, I think it was a transition period. When we got to London there was still the idea of a quarantined Germany, certainly though not the Morgenthau plan of destroying Germany industry. But wiser heads already saw the strength of Germany and felt it would be wise to include it in the larger European family. I think particularly of Livie Merchant, one of the heroes of my life. He saw clearly that a close relationship with Western Europe and Germany included in that family was really the only way to expect a stable peace. This was not in order to sustain an aggressive position against the Soviet Union. It was to keep Germany from exclusion and let it restore itself.

Q: Did you have a problem adjusting to this?

APPLING: No I didn't. I had been to Germany several times since the war and saw the beginnings of reconstruction. I could see that this was not a nation to suppress.

Q: How was France viewed at that particular time?

APPLING: To be quite frank, I almost feel that I have never served in France. We were in Paris but I had little contact with French political circles, nor was I working day to day with French policy except in the NATO framework where they were esteemed partners.

Q: How about France within NATO? Was it a full member?

APPLING: They were then full members and leaders of NATO. The French gave to us some of their most distinguished public servants. They had a strong delegation and were significant in shaping the organization. Perhaps in the back of some minds was the idea of French predominance as the strongest European nation but this was not their posture.

Q: How about the Soviet threat.

APPLING: In 1950 the reality of the Soviet threat was clear. The concept of NATO goes back long before that. Many in the Foreign Service, such as Ted Achilles, had a vision of a European/American Community. This was given a powerful thrust by the Korean War and by the Soviet recalcitrance in Eastern Europe. The military/defense aspects of NATO were there when I got there.

WILLIAM J. GALLOWAY
Special Assistant to Ambassador Spofford, North Atlantic Council
London (1950-1952)

Mr. Galloway was born and raised in Texas and educated at Texas A&M. After service in the US Army in World War II, he joined the State Department in 1948. In his career as Foreign Affairs Officer, Mr. Galloway held a number of high level positions dealing primarily with International organizations including NATO and the European Union. His overseas posts include London, Paris and Vienna. In Washington, Mr. Galloway served as Special Assistant to the Director General of the Foreign Service and as Executive Assistant to the Undersecretary for Management. Mr. Galloway was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: Today is the 15th of October, 1999. Bill, you when was this that you were going to be deputy to Spofford?

GALLOWAY: Not deputy, special assistant.

Q: Who was he and what was the job?

GALLOWAY: I have already briefly recounted Spofford's background, professionally as partner in a prestigious New York law firm and his military service when he attained the rank of brigadier general.. He was appointed our first U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Council Deputies with the rank of Ambassador. Other countries also designated council deputies. The North Atlantic Council, the highest authority under the Treaty, was composed of the foreign ministers of the member nations. SHAPE was already getting organized. The need for a stronger, permanent political body became evident. Thus, the North Atlantic Council Deputies, who would act as the Council in permanent session, was established in London. There was some French opposition to having it in England, but at that juncture, with the rest of the NATO military being organized forward on the continent, everybody except the French seemed more comfortable having this body in London. There, without other NATO distractions immediately at hand, it could get itself organized and try to establish a broad strategy for NATO as a whole.

Q: I want to get right at the beginning. You did this from what, 1948 to until when ?..

GALLOWAY: This was in either late '49 or early '50 that the North Atlantic Council Deputies was established. I did this until '52 I guess it was.

Q: Could you talk now about how it was put together and what were the council's goals?

GALLOWAY: Well, this political body was supposed to implement and develop the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This was important because the military structure was being established, and member governments wanted political authority in control of NATO. The need and sentiment for establishment of the Council Deputies was a bit slower in its manifestation

than other developments under the Treaty. So, its birth was in some haste and its members began congregating in London to address immediately the needs of NATO, how to meet them, and to organize its own institution and staff. From late '49 or early '50, we commuted from Washington to London for several series of meetings, and we moved over there in late '50. We stayed there about a year and a half in offices made available by the UK Government in Belgrave Square in London's west end. In short order the Council Deputies created subsidiary bodies for defense financial and economic matters, and for military production and supply. Their jobs were to try to get the defense establishments of the member nations to provide the money and the wherewithal to build installations, and provide for equipment that would be needed by NATO forces in Europe.

Meanwhile, progress was being made on the military side. SHAPE was located initially in the Majestic Hotel on the Champs Elysees. Later, the French government made space and facilities available on the outskirts of Paris. It should be noted that these actions came about to some extent because in the North Atlantic Council Deputies which met for several months in 1950, the French mounted a very strong campaign for three things: the stationing of American troops in Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty, the creation of a command structure with an American supreme commander, and for all that to be located in France. Those were their three objectives. They pushed them in the meetings of the North Atlantic Council Deputies all during that period of time - and they came to fruition. Also in the North Atlantic Council Deputies, we were wrestling with how to transform the military organization from the regional planning groups established earlier into military structure under the supreme commander. This was accomplished by the delineation and designation of appropriate subordinate commands by the supreme commander to cover the entire NATO area.

Q: Yes, northern command, southern command, central command.

GALLOWAY: Yes, that transformation came about naturally enough to make it easy for the Council Deputies to approve it and pass it on to the military to implement. It did take the planning groups out of their amorphous state as planners and put them into a military chain of command with echelons of headquarters under a supreme commander. The first requirement was to prepare plans to develop force structures, equipment requirements, communications channels, and overall requirements for the defense of the NATO area. The initial integrated plan to come up through NATO commands to the Military Committee was as I recall MC-48 in its designation. It called for the raising and maintenance of roughly 98 divisions for the defense of the area.

Well, the finances and the wherewithal were not available in the countries for a force of that size. Each of them had its own forces, but not too many of them had contemplated any serious increase of these forces. Their main objective was, and it was achieved, to get the United States to station forces physically in Europe under an American supreme commander, which was accomplished with General Eisenhower.

Q: Well, during this time at the very beginning, what were you and Mr. Spofford doing? I mean what was Mr. Spofford doing and what were you doing to assist him?

GALLOWAY: We had within the U.S. delegation to the Council Deputies, political, economic, and military officers much along the lines of the organization of an embassy staff. Ted Achilles was number two to Spofford and also head of political affairs. Dick Breithut was our chief economist and the representative on the finance and economic committee. A two star general, Dan Callahan, was named as the chief of the military production and supply board. Very quickly a new word came into the language, at least into the English language, "infrastructure," which was a term that encompassed all of the necessary barracks, living spaces, storage depots, communications, everything that would be needed by the forces. So the Council Deputies established an infrastructure committee, which worked with the other bodies already underway. Initially, agreements were sought and reached on locations for headquarters, communications units, depots for all military equipment, lines of communications, etc. Also, during this period of time, military organization operated under the command and instructions of the supreme commander who reported to the standing group, the three U.S., U.K. and French representatives. The standing group met here in Washington, so there was a lot of back and forth between Washington and Paris in those days. But with Eisenhower as commander, his influence and his stature were such that most of the countries put their cases directly to him on what they wanted, what they needed and how much help they would have to have from other sources in NATO. These countries were still recovering from WWII and they didn't have any extra cash or money to float loans. Also, there was a general opinion that the Germans should bear a substantial share of the financial burden even though they were not going to have any forces. So all of these different issues were worked out one way or another in the North Atlantic Council Deputies.

Q: How did you find having come from this very collegial joint effort in drafting the treaty, did you find sort of national interests began to intrude more when you got to the sort of committee council?

GALLOWAY: Yes. It was, I think, inevitable because the time had come to deal directly with the physical resources and forces that would be needed to implement the treaty's military capacity. Under the Council Deputies, we had a political committee, the financial and economic committee, the supply board and additional ad hoc working groups. The French worked to some extent slower in this context.

We started out in the lower groups to get issues up the ladder for the Council Deputies consideration. Or sometimes we would be given a mandate by the Council Deputies. We had constant meetings. As we got down into the details of the command structure, the communications, the locations, the size of forces, we usually ended in a situation which, in essence, was that the United States was perhaps the only one who had enough resources to make a substantial dent in the whole list of requirements. However, arrangements were negotiated so that the forces in being on the continent and in Europe would be designated as NATO forces, would serve under the regional integrated NATO staffs and commanders, who, in turn, received orders and instructions through the international integrated staff at SHAPE and the supreme commander. In the central area there was a French commander, in the north a British commander. In the south, the command became southern Europe and western Mediterranean which did not go to the Italians but to an American admiral.

Q: It remains that way today.

GALLOWAY: It remains that way. The southern command is primarily the 6th Fleet. So, all of these staffs and commands began to take shape and to produce an international effort. There was certainly an overall consistent opinion about what they wanted to do. The difficulties came primarily when the combined staff and planning work resulted in 98 divisions as the requirements of NATO.

Q: I don't think the United States during WWII had more than 84 divisions. We had large divisions, but I think we were keeping right around 85 divisions.

GALLOWAY: Yes. Well, this was a figure which obviously was political. It was set high so that it would have its effect on the countries to produce as much as they could in western Europe, and at the same time, it would send a signal to eastern Europe that they would be confronted by substantial force.

By this time in '53, it was apparent that the original hopes for the North Atlantic Council Deputies, in terms of exercising substantial political influence on the member governments, had fallen short. They had been successful in furthering the organizational development under the Treaty, but increasing the defense efforts in forces and other requirements lagged. Moreover, the Council Deputies had never really attained the political status to move governments; they were, in practice, representatives who functioned only as their governments allowed. This weakness in the political arena also had a tangential effect of more political importuning directed at General Eisenhower. Government ministers were not reticent in making the case to him as to why their countries deserved special consideration and should not be expected to shoulder the additional burdens inherent in meeting the defense requirements laid down by the NATO military. It was a turning point for NATO, and the time for reassessment and brainstorming was at hand. You might say that it was time for political thinking and action to explore better ways of staying in step and hopefully getting ahead of the movement on the military side.

Various ways to improve the situation were floated, and these finally came into focus for the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon. It was proposed that the Council Deputies be transformed into the Council in permanent session to be Chaired by a Secretary General of international stature, and that this new structure would move from London to Paris. That would put the top political authority on the continent, give it more direct access to European governments and lend its influence to the military establishment. The foreign ministers reached agreement along these lines at the Lisbon meeting and undertook to anoint a Secretary General of NATO. The first choice of most was Sir Oliver Franks, then British Ambassador in Washington. The Chairman of the Council, Foreign Minister Pearson of Canada, recessed the meeting while he talked to Sir Oliver by telephone. When the meeting resumed and Mr. Pearson recounted the conversation, it was clear that Sir Oliver had been taken by surprise and was not prepared to respond immediately. While Pearson expressed cautious optimism that he would accept, that did not happen; instead, Sir Oliver declined the appointment. Further discussion in the Council failed to produce another name at that time. The Council decided to adjourn without naming a Secretary General, but also to charge the UK Government with the responsibility for proposing to the Council someone of the high international stature wanted for the position. In a relatively short time, Lord Ismay was proposed and accepted as the first Secretary General of

NATO. So, we pulled up stakes in London, moved to Paris and transformed ourselves into members of the U S Delegation to the North Atlantic Council under its new leadership, the Secretary General.

Q: You know, during this, again I am going back to the time you were there, other than trying to locate the council's headquarters in Paris, were the French fully on board?

GALLOWAY: They were fully on board in the sense that what they really wanted to achieve was to have Americans stationed on the continent in such numbers that if anything happened, the United States would immediately have to be involved militarily. As NATO began to grow from its infancy, the cold war, of course, was in flux, and the question of Germany still loomed over everything else. There were different ideas about how the Germans might be integrated into the NATO military forces. As this back and forth continued, the French eventually came up with the proposal to form a European Defense Community with a European Defense Force under it, including West Germany. This possible scenario took quite a lot of time to negotiate and to prove unacceptable in the end.

Q: Was that during this '50-'52 time?

GALLOWAY: That was later on.

Q: I am trying to keep this focused on this time you were there.

GALLOWAY: The time I was there. In Paris I was special assistant to Livy Merchant. Moving from London to Paris, we had a change of scene, change of characters and change of organization. The organizational changes sought to consolidate U.S. regional activities in Europe. The new permanent North Atlantic Council, the continuation of U.S. military aid programs as well as economic aid programs, and U S representation to the European regional economic organization, first the OEEC and later the OECD. Retired general William Draper was designated to head all U.S. elements in those areas. We had our offices in the Hotel Talleyrand. Under Draper was a Deputy, a retired air force general Anderson, and then Livy Merchant. All three had the rank of Ambassador. Draper was the U.S. member of the permanent North Atlantic Council which had been given the Palais de Chaillot for its new headquarters; de facto, Merchant was the working permanent representative.

Lord Ismay arrived on the scene and began the establishment of a permanent staff and secretariat for the Council. In one of his earlier meetings, Ismay noted that he was not yet fluent in French, but rather had a command of the language somewhat like that of his old boss, Prime Minister Churchill, which he described as English words with French endings. He promised to improve his own fluency. I should have mentioned earlier that from the beginning of the establishment of NATO, it had been agreed that all of its meetings and discussions would be carried on in English and French without interpretation; however, documents would be published in both languages. Subordinate committees were formed under the Council, including a Political Committee. This was where I did most of my work, serving as the U.S. member or alternate. By the time I left in '53, the Council and its staff were well established. Their authority was recognized and accepted in a manner that focused member governments attention more than had the earlier Council

Deputies. They gained more influence as time went on, and there was evidently the reality of political authority over the military. Eisenhower had served his term as supreme commander and then was persuaded to come back and accept the presidency of Columbia. That must have been '53. He was succeeded by, who was the airborne commander?

Q: Vandenberg?

GALLOWAY: Vandenberg. No not Hoyt Vandenberg. No it was, he later went out to Korea. He was famous for carrying a grenade.

Q: Oh, yes, Ridgeway.

GALLOWAY: He succeeded Eisenhower. There had been speculation that Gruenther would take over, but I think that in the hierarchy of the army there may have been an inclination to show that there were competent senior officers other than Eisenhower and his followers who had grown up in NATO. Ridgeway was certainly a senior four star general following Eisenhower's five stars.

I have neglected to record that Doug MacArthur II had been Political Adviser to Eisenhower throughout his tour as SACEUR, where he became, along with Gruenther, the third member of the inner cabinet.

It was only natural that he would be named from the State Department to that post. So, both he and I profited in the long run from George Perkins' moves back in 1950. I went with Spofford and MacArthur with Ike. That pretty well blew away the cloud Wahwee had cast over me when I had recommended MacArthur for the assignment as Deputy of Regional Affairs when he was already Director of Western Europe his long held goal.

Q: Now during this time, in June 1950, the Korean War started. You know people you were working with, how much was the Soviet threat perceived to be imminent?

GALLOWAY: I don't think it had much effect on European perception of the imminence of the Soviet threat. Certainly the other NATO governments fully supported the United States in its decision under the UN to help preserve South Korea. I remember the working group meeting following the U.S. decision. The UK representative, Derek Hoyer-Millar, his voice choking with emotion, made a brief but powerful statement complimenting the U.S. for acting the way a great power should. That was warmly received by the others. Indeed, several NATO countries were able to send forces under UN auspices to join with the U.S. They were in fact token forces for the most part, but they did emphasize the policy of their governments. I don't think that event in itself affected to any considerable degree the attitude toward the Soviet Union. Some of my colleagues speculated that the Soviet Union was beginning to learn how to work and act internationally. It was involved in the four power occupation of Germany. It was involved in the four power occupation of Austria. It had the satellite countries under military occupation. It had its hands full. There were no serious Soviet threats, moves or announcements to raise the threshold in Korea, except for Khrushchev's blandishment later on.

Q: That's not now.

GALLOWAY: In this early period, the NATO powers just held to a steady course. The fact that Soviet forces and the Allied forces were cheek to jowl in Germany and Austria was a state of affairs that existed, and it stayed pretty much that way until a later time when the first opportunity suddenly came on the Austrian treaty.

Q: In '54-'55. Was there concern on the part of the people of particularly the French Communist party, the Italian Communist Party?

GALLOWAY: Not after that one election.

Q: The '48 election in Italy.

GALLOWAY: That was the height of concern. I think the way that election came out removed many of the undercurrents that had been running around in western Europe. Moreover, that event had the ancillary effect of encouraging other political parties in the various countries to reinforce themselves and assume more prominent roles in the political swim. In France it worked to such an extent that everybody wanted to organize a party and take part in the government. Of course, they had a succession of prime ministers and new governments during the fourth republic. They were just being French; however, the French civil service is an excellent bureaucratic administrative body. Our experience through NATO contacts with the French at the diplomatic levels was solid and continuous. We had very few disputes per se with the French. Frequently they wanted to add some petty little thing or some *cache* that would make a passage more French in tone.

Q: Use of the language, something of that nature.

GALLOWAY: Yes, but those things were soon understood by everybody, and we were able to deal with them without difficulty.

RAYMOND F. COURTNEY
First Secretary and Consul
London (1950-1954)

Raymond F. Courtney was born in Illinois in 1908. He received both his undergraduate and graduate degrees from Harvard, also attending the University of Paris. During World War II, he served as a commander in the U.S. Navy overseas. His tours of duty in the Foreign Service included Sofia, Nicosia, and London. Mr. Courtney was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: When you all departed from Bulgaria, where did you go?

COURTNEY: This was early in 1950. I went to London. We got to Paris on the train and went our various separate ways. I received orders to go right to London. There I was assigned to

replace the outgoing personal assistant to Ambassador Lewis Douglas. I did that for his final six months. He was just on the point of leaving. When he left and was replaced by Walter Gifford, I asked if I couldn't go back to Eastern European business. I was reassigned within the Embassy and worked on Eastern European affairs for the rest of my almost four years in London.

Q: What was your impression of Lewis Douglas as an ambassador and how he operated?

COURTNEY: Mr. Douglas was, of course, a shrewd, capable businessman. A very positive personality. A good diplomat. At times he was very emotional. At that time he was winding down his service as ambassador. He and his family had become very close to the royal family and that figured rather prominently in their lives. He was also very much concerned with his son's oil business in Texas. He was giving a fair amount of attention to that. From time to time he could be impetuous and arbitrary, but I think he had been a very good and effective ambassador.

Q: From your perspective, how were relations between the United States and Britain at that time, at the operating level?

COURTNEY: Very good, I think. The job on my desk was largely an exchange of information primarily with the Foreign Office, of course, concerning developments in Russia and Eastern Europe. I tried to get some moral support and maybe some effective benefit from trying to help the informal governments in exile that were in London then. They were very informal, but the Foreign Office was trying to give them some encouragement, and insofar as one in my position or my superior's position could do, we were trying to do the same.

So, to go back to a more direct answer to your question, as far as my experience went, our relationship was very free and open and cooperative. As for what I could observe of more senior people...Julius Holmes was Minister for a time and then was replaced by Walt Butterworth when Gifford came on board. I think they all enjoyed a very friendly, cooperative relationship with the British.

Q: You were sitting there exchanging information about what we were finding out about what was really a closed society behind the Iron Curtain, did you get any indication of the strengths and weaknesses of the British reporting versus the American reporting?

COURTNEY: I would hesitate to say.

Q: Would you say that both the British and the Americans were pretty much on the same track as to how they were observing these developments? This was the period when the Cold War was really going into the deep freeze. Today historians are wondering...Well, I wonder how much of this was sort of domestic politics in the United States, etc., etc. Did you have any feeling that the British were seeing it from a different perspective than we were?

COURTNEY: I think I would have to say that it seemed to me that we were pretty much on the same wavelength. I can't recall any incident or instance that I was aware of that indicated a difference in point of view.

Q: From what I gather, I don't think there was. It was a pretty abysmal situation there and it would be hard to be overly impressed.

COURTNEY: We were both, I think, appraising the Soviet buildup much in the same way. I think, so far as I knew, we were agreed on the objectives more or less and what we should do to withstand it.

Q: We are talking now in 1992 and it is hard for everybody to get used to talking about former Soviet Union because of the change really in the last few months. How did we view the "Soviet threat" in this 1950-54 period from your vantage point in London?

COURTNEY: I can recall their expressions of respect for George Kennan's analysis of the problem and our means of facing it.

Q: This was the long telegram and the containment policy and the Mr. X article.

COURTNEY: So far as to our appraisal of the Soviet military ambitions and threat, I think we probably saw it much in the same terms. I think we were, to the best of my knowledge, in harmony in the need for NATO and the role that the United States should take in NATO. I think the Brits were still emotionally happy to be working with the Yanks still, in the peace time which had followed the war fever. I am sure that they viewed the Soviet threat as deadly serious and very inimical to British interests even though by now British interests were on a different scale then they had been pre-war with their empire still intact.

Q: As you were exchanging this information, was there anybody on the American side saying... "You have to be a little careful about dealing with the British because they still have some of these Communist types who came out of Cambridge, Oxford, etc." Later on we had the McLeans, the Kim Philbys and etc. Was there any inkling that you were getting from the American side saying to be a little careful about this, or not?

COURTNEY: No, I was unaware of any hesitancy or caution.

Q: You left London in 1954 and then you went to Nicosia where you served from 1954- 57. What was the situation on Cyprus when you went there?

COURTNEY: The British were just in the process of moving their Middle East military command from Egypt to Cyprus. The Governor General, who had been there some time, Armitage, was winding down. In conjunction with this military move the new Governor General, John Harding, former CIGS...

Q: That is Chairman of the Imperial General Staff.

COURTNEY: Yes. I guess Armitage left shortly after I arrived. There was a good reason to believe that political foment was brewing, but it had not quite surfaced at the time I arrived.

Q: That was the EOKA and all that.

COURTNEY: Yes. I got there in September and so far as I was aware, everything was quite quiet. In January, 1955, they apprehended a schooner running guns in. Then on Easter came the first violent action and that was the blowup of a number of electrical power lines and installations, accompanied by public declarations by the EOKA people that the revolt was on. It was soon after that that it was definitely learned that Colonel George Grivas was on the island and beginning to direct guerrilla and terrorist operations. From that point on, of course, the violence developed and the British tried to counter it with troops. By the time I left in 1957 they had substantial forces there trying to restore order.

Q: What did we have on the island? What were we up to?

COURTNEY: We, the United States Foreign Service, were not very well prepared for what was there, and I was certainly completely unprepared. My post had been vacant for about three months because the man who was there had to leave and I was delayed, to the annoyance of the Department. I was delayed in trying to wind up a job I was doing in London, a tripartite British, French, American exchange agreement. Anyway, I knew nothing about the situation and on arrival found myself in a pleasant surrounding with a very comfortable house and a good office and staff.

Q: You were what?

COURTNEY: I was the Consul, it was a small post. I was beginning to learn what I could from scratch. There was also an NSA monitoring station on the island.

Q: NSA being National Security Agency.

COURTNEY: It was also handling a certain amount of official traffic through the area and that was its ostensible reason for being there. It was ostensibly under the Consulate, although the cover was pretty thin.

Our official interest there had been limited to having a representative in that area to observe and look after a very few consular needs. There was not much business association, except for the Cyprus Mines Corporation which was a very profitable copper mining enterprise there. This was owned by the Mudd family in California who had succeeded in discovering the old Roman copper mines and developing them very successfully and shipping out substantial amounts of copper. There were some asbestos enterprises, but I don't think there was any American interests in those. They were European, I think. There was not much else in the way of commercial interests on the part of the United States.

As the situation developed, of course, it became more useful that we had a better equipped observation post there to try to know what was developing. In the course of my three years there we added substantially to our staff and communication facilities.

Q: Let's talk a bit about relations with Makarios, who at that point was the Greek Cypriot leader and with the Turkish minority. And were there any contacts with representatives of EOKA when you were there? Were people coming to you as a counter force to the Brits?

COURTNEY: No. I did not have any contact with any representative of EOKA. I enjoyed and found my contact with Makarios very interesting. For the most part I was just there to exchange chitchat really. Without any instructions I tried not to mislead him into thinking I was making any official representation of the United States government. But, of course, I think it was right, and I think the Department agreed, that it was good that I could have an open relationship with him and talk about the problems. I took it upon myself to ask him why he didn't free himself from the dictation of Grivas and declare for full independence rather than enosis, union with Greece. The old Greek Cypriots had gotten along fairly happily together under first the Turkish rule and then the British colonial rule. It wasn't really necessary that they divide so violently. If he could sponsor a movement for independence with the British colonial regime ending, which was obvious and the British knew it and would accept a new status. Maybe this was rather naive and presumptuous on my part to talk like this, but he seemed to be interested in listening. Also he was not a free man by that time, he was not able to disassociate himself from the military and political support that was coming from Athens. He had to stand for enosis without due consideration for the Turkish interests there.

Q: Did you have much contact at that point with the Turkish minority?

COURTNEY: A little bit, yes. Denktash was very active then and I got to know him a bit, although not so much as the Greeks.

Q: What about the British? It was not a happy time as their empire was dissolving around them. I know in other parts of the world you met up with the local British officials being rather unhappy because they felt the United States was standing around to pick up the pieces in one way or another. Did you feel this when you were on Cyprus from the local British civil authorities?

COURTNEY: No, I honestly don't think so. I certainly wasn't aware of it and don't think it was there. Prime Minister Anthony Eden mentioned us favorably in talking to Parliament one day, which, of course, was reflecting an official view, but I think it was genuine. I did not sense any of that kind of resentment on the part of the Britishers who I knew.

Q: You were there at a very difficult time for American and British relations...the Suez crisis in October 1956 in which Cyprus was the main staging point. Could you explain what you were doing then and what the situation was from your vantage point as this thing built up?

COURTNEY: All I could do was observe the buildup and report that. I know by then that CIA was reporting the buildup quite independently of anything I was reporting. But your question was?

Q: Well, one of the things that happened, particularly in London, was that all of a sudden the wires went dead. Here you are in a local place but in many ways a critical spot because this was

where the British launched their attack on the canal. Did you find all of a sudden nobody was answering your calls or you couldn't get on the base, or anything like that?

COURTNEY: No. Not at all. I am sure that my contact with the Governor General was just as free as it had been. And also with the military officers.

Q: What about afterwards? At a certain point Eisenhower said that he was not with the British. This was a major...

COURTNEY: Dulles gave the British Ambassador a dreadful dressing down.

Q: Then you went back to London where you were from 1961-63. What were you doing there?

COURTNEY: Well, I was carrying on as a consequence of my work in the Department. I was, in fact, a political/military officer on the staff. That phrase was just be established. It was a matter of exchanging defense information and working in cooperation with the Foreign Office on these defense problems.

Q: You were there during Skybolt?

COURTNEY: Yes, that is the particular incident I remember most colorfully.

Q: Could you give some background for somebody who is reading this about what Skybolt was?

COURTNEY: Well, Skybolt was an air launched cruise missile that we were developing. The British very much wanted to obtain it for their air force, also. There was a particular meeting where McNamara came over met with Thornycroft, the British Minister of Defense. Thornycroft made an impassioned, eloquent plea for Skybolt. He said that the effectiveness of the British Air Force in the future depended on them having this weapon too. Well, we didn't give it too them. I don't know the full reasons. One was I think that we were not entirely satisfied as to its merit and I don't think it figured eventually very largely in the Air Force arsenal.

Q: But it had quite an impact on the British political scene, didn't it?

COURTNEY: Not that much, I think. Not so much as Thornycroft declared. He said that the survival of that government depended on their success. Well, that was an over statement in my recollection.

Q: How were political/military relations with the British during this time?

COURTNEY: I would say, again, very satisfactory. To go back just a bit, when I was in the Department I sat in on a meeting when our Atomic Energy Commission reached the decision to share our knowledge of the hydrogen bomb with the British delegation. And so far as I am aware, that kind of relationship continued during my time in London.

Q: *David Bruce was your Ambassador most of the time. What was your impression of him and how he operated?*

COURTNEY: He was great. He was a splendid ambassador. A fine man and a very good ambassador.

Q: *Did he take much interest in this political/military relationship with the British?*

COURTNEY: Yes, he did as a matter of fact. He kept in very close touch with them.

Q: *So you found yourself briefing him fairly often on such matters?*

COURTNEY: Yes, I did.

Q: *Were there any great problems with the Kennedy/Macmillan relationship?*

COURTNEY: Not that I am aware of.

THOMAS J. DUNNIGAN
Political Officer
London (1950-1952)

Staff Aide to Ambassador
London (1952 - 1954)

Thomas J. Dunnigan was born in Ohio in 1921. He served in the U.S. Army from 1943 to 1946. Mr. Dunnigan received his A.B. from John Carroll University in 1943 and his M.A. from the George Washington University in 1967. In 1946, he entered the Foreign Service. His posts included Germany, Great Britain, the Philippines, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Israel. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: *Well, you then left and you went to London. You were there from '50 to '54. What were you doing?*

DUNNIGAN: My time in London was split into two periods. The first two and a half years, I was in the political section. I was reporting on German and Austrian affairs, which were very important because, of course, the British were associates with us in the occupation of both those countries, and we were trying to write an Austrian peace treaty at the time, and there were negotiations on Germany, what to do with it. The Bonn Republic had just come into existence and so forth. Also, my other job was helping report on the Liberal and Conservative parties in Britain. I worked under Bill Trimble in both those, who was our first secretary at the time there.

Then, at the change of administration when Eisenhower took over from Truman, we sent a new ambassador, Winthrop Aldrich, and I was made his staff aide. So my last nearly two years was spent as staff aide to the ambassador.

Q: Then go back to the first part. How did you work with your British colleagues on Austrian and German policies?

DUNNIGAN: Extremely closely. We were down there with them almost every day in the Foreign Office, going over our mutual messages, you know, saying that Washington thinks we should do this, and they'd say, yes, we can do this and that, but we couldn't go that far. Usually they were holding us back a little bit, it seemed to me. But they were friendly. They had outstanding leadership from Frank Roberts, who, I guess, would be the equivalent of something like an under secretary for German affairs. They elevated that position to a very high one. And Dennis Allen and Pat Roberts, both of whom became outstanding British ambassadors later, headed in sequence the German section there. And we worked very closely with them.

Q: Was there a divergence in feelings? I mean, the British, of course, had been fighting the Germans for a long time. We came in some time afterwards, and maybe we were more inclined to forgive and forget. Was this a problem or not?

DUNNIGAN: It was absolutely a problem. You're absolutely right, they had a different outlook. They really didn't like Germans. And most Americans who spent any time in Germany did, in my experience. But the British just did not like them. And the Germans sensed this; they knew right away to play off the Americans against the British.

I'll tell you a little story. Once, in Berlin, one of our very senior officers, who later became an ambassador in many countries, after having come back from a Control Council meeting where all four of the powers had sat, had a gin and tonic, and then he threw the ice out and said, "We may be the dumbest people in the world, but the British are the most stupid." Now this was in relation to a move they made supporting the Russians that he felt was crazy, but I just add that as an indication of the reaction you would get from certain people.

I saw this frequently in the houses of Parliament, because I went down there to follow all the German and Austrian debates, there was a gut, almost vitriolic, anti-German feeling, particularly on the Labor benches.

Q: Well, that's surprising.

DUNNIGAN: Yes. Less so on the Liberals, and the Conservatives were generally less inclined certainly than Labor to take that attitude. No, you couldn't be there long without noticing.

Q: Was this because of the war, or do you think this went farther back?

DUNNIGAN: I think it went back to at least World War I and the tremendous slaughter of British manhood then and the behavior of the kaiser that grew up. They felt he let the side down.

Q: Yes, *Queen Victoria's grandson*.

DUNNIGAN: Exactly. No, it went back to at least World War I, but of course what happened in World War II exacerbated it. Now it was a little ameliorated on the Conservative side because so many of them had been, I guess, "caught out." In the thirties they had been all for appeasing Hitler and the Germans, and it was only Churchill's fortitude and persistence that brought Britain to where it was, where they finally began to re-arm and so forth. So, many of the Conservatives were not in much of a position to take a very loud stance, but the Labor people did.

Q: *Would you say our embassy was more comfortable with the Conservatives than with Labor?*

DUNNIGAN: Indeed. I think there's little question about that. We had an excellent man who blazed the way, before my time, with the Labor Party. He was the only man in 1945 who had any Labor contacts, a man named Sam Burger. And Sam was widely regarded by the Labor people even when I got there, and he'd departed some time before that. He was followed, the torch was picked up, by Dave Linebaugh and Wanda Zengotita in my time, and they had close links with the Labor Party. But we had a large political section, a large economic section, and there was no question in my mind they were much comfortable with the Conservative people. They were more like them, I think.

Q: *Also, there is an ideology in the Labor Party that we just don't have in the United States. I mean, you could be union, but that's a nuts and bolts thing, it has nothing to do with: "It's us against them," because we all hope to be "them" at some point.*

DUNNIGAN: And we don't go around singing "The Red Flag," you know, and things like this, which they do, and did.

Q: *Were there any particular issues where you found that we and the British were dealing with German and Austrian affairs where we really were having a hard time resolving?*

DUNNIGAN: Yes, of course. This was the period when NATO was building, and we were involved in Korea. And we felt strongly that there had to be a German defense contribution. This was first stated by Secretary Acheson, I believe, in the summer of 1950. And it horrified the British. And it horrified the French to an extent, too. And it horrified some Germans... But we persisted and said, "Look, we cannot bear this entire burden of defending everything by ourselves, particularly since it's Germany we're going to defend in Europe. And we think that these people must contribute to their own defense." Well, Chancellor Adenauer was chary of that at first, but he agreed finally that they could do so. And then the British were distressed, they were torn. They could see the logic of our position, but their intestinal feeling was that this was a bad thing to do.

Q: *Was this at your level, too, the people that you were dealing with?*

DUNNIGAN: Oh, yes. You'd go out and speak to groups, I booked several Labor groups, and there was no question about it that they didn't care for the idea of putting guns back in Jerry's hands again -- they're just too good at it, you know, and so forth.

So that was one of the big issues while I was there, the whole question of how to arrange a German defense contribution.

Q: How did we feel in the embassy? I mean, I'm talking about at your level and the people. Were there problems there, or was this: "Well, what the hell, we've got to do it."?

DUNNIGAN: I felt that we had to do it. I'd served in Germany, I'd been in Berlin during the blockade, and I guess I saw things more in black and white. And I felt it was necessary that we got some help there. I didn't like the idea, I'll say that. If it could have been done any other way, I would have felt much better. But the more I thought about it and the more I read about it and the more I heard, the more I came around to believing that we had to go that route. There were others in the embassy who never really accepted it, I know that. They weren't directly involved; you would hear this in cafeteria conversations and cocktail party conversations and so forth.

But an agreement was finally worked out. We went through the tortuous period, of course. I was no longer working with German Affairs, but I was still in London trying to set up this European Defense Community that was torpedoed at the last moment by the French Parliament in their pique about Indochina. Now this left everything up in the air, because we'd put all our marbles behind that. We'd been sold on that idea by the French. I remember a long series of telegrams in the summer of '51 from David Bruce -- telegrams that were very well done, drafted, I know, by Martin Herz, most of them -- explaining why the French felt it was necessary that there was a German contribution and it had to be part of European units, no separate German divisions and things of this nature. Well, the U.S. bought this and we pushed it, and that was shot down in flames by the French themselves later.

Now, after I left London, to just finish the story, this was brought to a conclusion by Anthony Eden in one of his finest hours. He was foreign minister in the last Churchill government, and he flew around Europe on a whirlwind tour and persuaded the others that there had to be a German contribution, and it had to come through NATO, and that certain safeguards could be set up through the Western European Union and so forth.

That was the way it was finally arranged. West Germany, the Federal Republic, was given its sovereignty. The end of the occupation came on the 5th of May, '55. At the same time, Germany was accepted into NATO. It was all part of the deal.

Q: But, at your level, this was a major bone of contention, too?

DUNNIGAN: It was a bone of contention. A major one? Yes, I would think so, although, as I say, Korea was on everybody's minds in those days.

Now the Austrian side, we were negotiating the Austrian peace treaty. I would go to a meeting or two on that. I was not the negotiator, of course, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson was. But he had help from Red Dowling and Francis Williams, who had come over, and we worked closely with them. The issues there were involved. The Trieste question came up then. The Austrian treaty was taken care of, but Trieste was another issue then.

Q: While you were in Britain, they were going through a very difficult economic time, weren't they?

DUNNIGAN: It was bad.

Q: And this must have been kind of hard, wasn't it, to be from the United States where things were going very nicely, thank you, in way, and to see Britain really going through the equivalent of wartime rationing.

DUNNIGAN: Yes, they were. And, in fact, the rationing was worse than wartime. When we got to London, we, along with the British, got eight penny worth of meat a week. Now that isn't much meat, even though prices were far lower then. And various other commodities were rationed. For instance, even though we were at the embassy, we could not buy Scotch whiskey. We could import bourbon, but we could not buy Scotch whiskey. It was all going for export in those years. Little things like that.

It was the last year of the Attlee administration, the first Labor government after the war, and it had run out of steam, it had run out of ideas. And they were beginning to squabble amongst themselves about the costs of the free health service and so forth. All that was mounting up.

It's true, Britain had not made its comeback. It was only beginning. The last couple of years we were there, things began to get a little better.

Q: Tom, you were the ambassador's aide, to whom?

DUNNIGAN: Winthrop Aldrich.

Q: I wonder if you could characterize him. I don't know the gentleman, but, you know, it looks like you just look at his name and you say, oh, my God, another one of these rich guys who paid his way into the Court of Saint James. How was he as an ambassador?

DUNNIGAN: That's an interesting question. He was a formidable person. A blueblood of the bluest. A nephew of the Rockefellers and the uncle of Nelson Rockefeller, David Rockefeller and so forth. He'd been chairman of the board of the Chase Bank before he came over. It wasn't Chase Manhattan at the time, it was just the Chase Bank. He had been a well known yachtsman. He'd been a naval officer in World War I. A Harvard graduate of the Class of 1905. Married a wealthy woman, Harriet, in New York. Was very big in New York and Newport society. A great contributor to the Republican Party. And extremely Anglophile. Before the war, he'd entertained the Prince of Wales and others. He knew them all. He knew all of the figures of that generation. And the British were pleased to have him, because they knew, when he was nominated, that he was an Anglophile. Now, at that time, Mr. Aldrich was about 68 when he arrived, so he was not a young man, but he was distinguished looking. He worked on the big problems and understood them. We had a magnificent DCM in Julius Holmes, who could run the embassy like a smooth machine, and did run it, and took much of the load off the ambassador. But when there was something to be taken up with the prime minister or the foreign minister, Winthrop Aldrich

would do it. And he'd do it well. He had their confidence. And he was well connected socially in Britain. He knew every duke and duchess and many of the earls and so forth in the UK. He lived well, entertained well. He was responsible for getting the present residence, Winfield House, released by the U.S. Air Force, which was using it as an officers' club. The Air Force turned down his request, so he merely wrote a letter to his good friend Harold Talbot, the secretary of the Air Force. Within a month, the deed had been done. So he did many things.

I think one of his finest hours in my time came during the Iranian oil crisis and Mossadegh. You know, after Anglo-Iranian had been nationalized in '51, the shah had flown and Mossadegh had taken over. Our business interests were heavily affected there. And the British were distressed by this, so we worked closely with them. Herbert Hoover, Jr., an oil man, was sent over and spent some months with us there, working only on that problem, working with the British, working with the embassy. (A very fine gentleman, I will add, I liked him a lot.)

But nothing could get done. The Iranians were playing their tricks on us. And I well remember one day, it must have been in the mid-summer of '53, Mr. Aldrich and Hoover and, I believe, Evan Wilson, who was then our Middle East expert in London, met, and somebody else from Washington was there. And Aldrich came out with his jaw set and he said, "We've got to settle this thing. I'm going down to see Eden." So he went down to see Eden, and that was the beginning of the end. The British caved in on certain points. We said, "You've got to, because this is going too far. It's hurting both our countries much too much." And we got a settlement. And the shah was back within a few months.

I don't know the inner details of that, and I don't know if the book has ever been written about it, because it was very closely held at the time.

Q: But, again, you know, looking at this thing, career or non-career, sometimes a man with the credentials such as Aldrich can talk in ways that somebody who just does not have those connections...

DUNNIGAN: Could never have done. Could never have done. And that's why I don't resent our sending non-career people to posts like London. I think there can be utility. Now you get somebody who is a hybrid, like David Bruce, who's been both, then, of course, you're in the best of both worlds.

Q: Yes, Ellsworth Bunker is another.

DUNNIGAN: Ellsworth Bunker, those people, but they're few and far between.

CHESTER E. BEAMAN
Personnel Officer
London (1951-1954)

Chester E. Beaman was born in Indiana in 1916. He received his bachelor's degree from Depauw University in 1938. His career includes positions in London, Wales, Cairo, Port Said, Philippines, Syria, and Malta. Mr. Stuart was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in September 1999.

BEAMAN: I was thus assigned to London as personnel officer. That was February 1951.

Q: You were in London from 1951 to when?

BEAMAN: 1954. Then I was in Cardiff, Wales from 1954 to the end of 1955.

Q: Let's stick to London first. What was the embassy like when you arrived?

BEAMAN: Big. SHAFE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe) was there. That office later was transferred to Paris. But the embassy itself was very big. For example, the Political Section had several political officers. Their role was divided into British relations with Asia, British relations with Africa, British relations with the U.S., etc. It not only was big in terms of personnel, we were scattered around Grosvenor's Square in one five story building and several old Georgian houses. Workwise, there wasn't any feeling that I was an outsider. By that time, I was considered an insider. Two things happened in my case. One, personnel administration, big as the job was, didn't keep me busy. I talked to my boss about it, did he have anything else? The first thing he did was make me protocol officer in addition to personnel work. Queen Mary had died at that time. I had developed a protocol book based on her funeral and other arrangements. Then, of course, the Queen was coronated about a year after I got there. Anyway, I was protocol officer, responsible for assuring that officers and staff were advised of the British way of doing things...

In staff meetings, they kept talking about an emergency project. They talked about the need to get it "moving." Finally, being new, I said, "What is it we're talking about?" They said, "It's emergency evacuation. So and So was doing it. He's gone and we need somebody." I didn't say it in the meeting, but I went around to the administrative officer later and said, "Is there any way I can help on this?" So I took on a job that practically doubled my work. I found the previous officer had made only a few notes on legal paper. Otherwise, there was a file of books and manuals on evacuation.

Q: We're talking about E&E (emergency evacuation) plans.

BEAMAN: That's right. Over the next year, I developed a plan for evacuation of Americans plus certain others from Europe in case the Russians started rolling over the borders. Consequently, we had good relations with the British. They were going to use the British navy and we would pick evacuees up at certain specified points. The big problem was that the previous incumbents of this job had been using the total annual tourist figures. In other words, 400,000 tourists in Europe, and the Russians start rolling across. Well, I pointed out finally that all 400,000 in a year would not all be there at one time. The number was going to be considerably less than that, probably 50,000 in summer. We changed the evacuation plan accordingly.

Q: Too, as the tensions go up, tourism goes down.

BEAMAN: That's right. There were also plans for taking out other diplomats and selected foreigners.

Q: Tell me about being protocol officer. What sort of problems did you have?

BEAMAN: One thing was that everybody had to be accredited to the foreign office. Believe it or not, some of our military people stationed in Singapore and Hong Kong because these were British territories, had to be accredited by the foreign office in London and put on the embassy's diplomatic list. Periodically I sent them groups of invitations to official British functions, knowing the attachés would never appear. A more major task was seeing that all new officers were accredited by the foreign office soon after they arrived. There were certain laws and regulations relating to utilities, renting, leasing, etc., which I had to explain. I handled cases of complaints of some American staff about living conditions. One example - a British woman living below an American fed cats on the steps. The complaint was there were always food scraps at the bottom of his steps. I had to go to the foreign office to see if there was anything which could be done about the problem. It persuaded her to clean up after the cats.

Another case: a man wanted to present a sword to Eisenhower, who was President. This father came in with his grown son. They had this very rusty looking sword that had the Swiss spelling of Eisenhower along its blade. The son wanted to present it to the President. I accepted it. Then I took it down to the shop in the embassy and had them polish it. It looked beautiful. Then we had the problem of getting it to Washington. There weren't any funds for it. The DCM was going back and he took it on his leave. He knew Eisenhower, so he presented it.

A lot of the protocol was routine. Every officer who was assigned, during his or her first year was invited to one night reception at the palace and one garden reception. Only the senior officers went every year. I had to make out a schedule and make sure all the officers got their appearance before the court, so to speak.

Another task involved people just coming up and asking me: "I'm going to have a dinner next Friday. Will you rank these guests for me?" I could easily rank the Americans. I had to do a little studying if there were foreigners involved, as I had to find out which ambassador or which counselor outranked the other.

In addition to the emergency evacuation and protocol, the next thing that came up was the purchase of scarce or special books. The officer who had the job was leaving. The political counselor wanted somebody to do it. They wanted me to do it. The administrative counselor, however, put his foot down and said, "No. He's got too much as it is." So I never purchased books for the Department.

Q: Did you get involved in presentations at court? I recall reading the diary of someone who was our sort of third secretary in London from 1854-1870 or something like that. One of the big things that he had to worry about was wealthy Americans bringing their daughters to be presented at court. Had that gone by the time you had the protocol job?

BEAMAN: No, I never got involved in anything of that sort that I recall. They may have consulted somebody higher up. There was a rule that the daughter of any woman who had been presented at court could ask for her daughter's presentation.

Q: How about congressional delegations? Did that develop?

BEAMAN: Not in London. My biggest job in that was in Manila. There were congressional delegations, like there were in HICOG, in Germany, but they were usually handled by the political officers.

Q: There was a lady who was very well-known, an Englishwoman, who was particularly good at getting anything, doing anything, for people who came there. Does that ring a bell with you?

BEAMAN: I think you are referring to Jane Autin. During my time she worked in General Services, handling housing matters. After I left apparently she arranged VIP visit schedules. Perhaps some protocol matters. In any event, she got praise from Kissinger and other high ranking officials. She was, as you noted, an FSN. When she died a few years ago, her obituary was in the Department Newsletter.

Q: During this 1951-1954 period, who was the ambassador?

BEAMAN: Walter Gifford; he was from AT&T. He was the first ambassador. He was succeeded by Winthrop Aldrich.

Q: Did the ambassador from your point of view make much of a difference or life just went on?

BEAMAN: I assume the ambassador had connections with the palace and with the high-ranking political people. In working on this emergency evacuation, I quite often went with the political counselor to the foreign office to exchange ideas with the British. Those were the days when Churchill was the Prime Minister.

Q: Ambassadors come and go. Gifford, I don't think he's crossed my radar in all these years.

BEAMAN: I remember him because I was taking him someplace where he was supposed to make a speech and he was worried about his suit, whether his suit looked all right. The other memory of him is that at a garden party, he and Adlai Stevenson were walking along together, and it dawned on me that Stevenson was not a tall man, as I thought he was. Back home, they talked about his being a new Lincoln, but he and Gifford were both short men.

Q: Rotund and small.

BEAMAN: That's right. As you know, Stevenson died on the steps of the embassy in later years.

Q: Were you making any moves about getting an FSO appointment while you were in London? You left in 1954 and went to Cardiff?

BEAMAN: Yes. There was the oral exam for Foreign Service officers.

Q: Do you recall that?

BEAMAN: Very definitely. I gave you this paper on Wristonization. You might want to cover this special topic later. But in any event, I set up the schedule for the examination. There were 40 people in London who had applied to become regular Foreign Service officers. I set up the schedule and, of course, I was scheduled also. There were five officers who came to give the exam. One was an ambassador. There were two political counselors. One was from Agriculture. I think maybe the other was from USIS. In any event, there were five of them that examined me. I estimated that in a few hours time, they threw about 100 questions at me. If they saw I was beginning to answer correctly, they quickly moved to another question. I had been advised by Foreign Service officer friends, "Look, if you don't know an answer, say so. Let them go on to the next." So I did that. Whenever I didn't feel confident to answer, I said so. The questions were more substantive than the original exam that I took in Germany. I tried to anticipate their questions. I read the "Times of London," cover to cover, including the court calendar and everything else, for about three or four months before the exam. I reasoned that because I had served in Germany, they were going to ask me questions about Germany. I had all of the monthly publications from HICOG. I reread those. I also reasoned that while I was in the Army, I was stationed in California and Utah, so they would probably ask me statistical-type information about the West. They did. Exactly. Then they would ask such questions as "What should we do about the Oder-Neisse Line?" I said, "Well, unless we're willing to fight the Russians, I think we just have to leave it as it is for the time being." The substantive-type questions were on current events. In any event, I was the only one approved out of the 40. I don't think that was right. There were others who were, I figured, equally qualified, but for whatever reason, they didn't select them. I hate to point a finger, but I feel part of the reason was that the old Foreign Service, as I might call it, was reluctant to take in much new blood.

Q: Oh, absolutely. The Wriston program was fought tooth and nail.

BEAMAN: Yes. I came in under Section 517. I had done enough work that related to the Foreign Service that they were willing to accept me. An interesting thing was this: I had friends who were regular Foreign Service officers, but I had never been invited to their parties because the parties were usually for political purposes or a trade delegation, which were not my field. I was a personnel officer. Only after they had heard that I had passed the exam, I wasn't even an officer yet, they started inviting me to their homes. That was one angle. The other angle was that when the appointment finally came through, Washington said I could not continue to be a personnel officer and be a Foreign Service officer. Consequently, they assigned me to Cardiff. The Department considered Cherbourg and Cardiff. They found out Mrs. Beaman was pregnant, and they said, "Oh, we don't want to send him to Cherbourg. An easier move would be to send him to Cardiff." So I was moved to Cardiff to become principal officer strictly because, as a Foreign Service officer at that time, I could not be in administrative work.

WILLIAM K. HITCHCOCK
Regional Civil Air Attaché
London (1951-1956)

Upon graduating from programs at the University of Colorado and American University, Mr. William K. Hitchcock joined the Department of State in 1947. Mr. Hitchcock's career posts included England, France, Spain, India, and Vietnam. Mr. Hitchcock was interviewed by Stephen Low in 1998.

HITCHCOCK: Then, at the end of 1951, I was asked to go to London as Regional Civil Air Attaché. I was happy at the chance to go because I planned soon to make myself available for integration unto the career foreign service under the so-called Wriston program.

Q: Was this the period of integration?

HITCHCOCK: Yes. Lateral entry they also called it.

Q: The New York Banker Program?

HITCHCOCK: Yes, the Wriston Program. I had no doubt it would be a good career move for me in the long run. But, in the short run, I was a bit concerned because I had been rising rapidly on the civil service side of the Department and was somewhat concerned that joining the Foreign Service might cause me to lose some of my career momentum.

That I might have some reason for concern became evident when my assignment to London as regional Civil Air Attaché, a FSR-2 (Foreign Service Reserve grade 2) position, was processed at the FSR-3 grade because my young age would make it difficult to qualify me as an FSO-2! Anyway, I arrived in London in June 1952 as a reserve officer and finally was converted to an FSO in March 1955. (As it turned out I was promoted to FSO-2 in March 1960, and finally made FSO-1 in May 1965. By then, age had ceased being a point of interest to me in relation to my assignments.)

Q: Still FSO-1 in that Foreign Service was a very, very senior position.

HITCHCOCK: Yes, it was. It was the highest rank one could hold in the Foreign Service at the time, although there were some career ambassadors under the 1946 Act.

Q: You were four years in London? As the Air Attaché?

HITCHCOCK: As the Regional Civil Air Attaché, stationed in London but also accredited to many of the countries of northwestern Europe. I did a lot of traveling in that part of the world during those four years. The job was especially interesting, because civil aviation was just beginning to take shape globally and the operations of U.S. airlines to and through Europe were central to its success.

Q: What were the kinds of issues?

HITCHCOCK: Bilateral agreements covering air routes, commercial rights, passenger traffic, and so forth. We either negotiated these agreements or, which was more likely at that particular time since more of the agreements had been negotiated, we were trying to keep them working. If the economic issues weren't difficult enough, new issues arose from the technical advances in equipment. For example, when the British brought the jet powered Comet airliner into commercial service.

Apart from the aviation and economic importance attached to these issues, they were also politically charged because most of the European airlines were state owned. Also, in the late 40s and early 1950s, a number of new airlines began to appear somewhat to the surprise of American air carriers who expected such a development but somewhat later. KLM [Holland], SAS [Scandinavian], SABENA [Belgium], SWISSAIR [Switzerland] were examples and, with surprising speed, they began offering competitive service and capturing a fair amount of the then available traffic.

This development was also a challenge to the kind of competitive, open air transport agreement we (and the British) had been encouraging other countries to adopt.

Q: Air France and Alitalia were government owned, weren't they?

HITCHCOCK: At that time almost all international air carriers were supported financially by their governments, as, indeed, ours were by us.

Q: Not in the same way, were they?

HITCHCOCK: No, technically not in the same way. Our airlines were privately owned. But, under the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, we were committed to a national policy of promoting the development of domestic and international air transportation - and that included financial assistance, such as carrying the U.S. mail.

I found my association with civil aviation both in the Department and as Regional Civil Air Attaché in London enjoyable and challenging. This was an interesting introduction to Foreign Service policy responsibilities at a high level. We were dealing with top people in the European governments, as well as our own. By this one assignment I had done the top job in the aviation business. But I had no intention of making it my lifetime career, I saw myself as an onward and upward type and indeed had accepted the London assignment fully intending to join the Foreign Service and expanding my horizons. So I applied, was accepted and sworn in when in London.

EDWARD L. KILLHAM
Consular Officer
London (1952-1955)

Edward L. Killham was born in Illinois in 1926. He received a B.S. from Northwestern University in 1949, an M.A. from Columbia University in 1950, and a M.P.A. from Harvard University in 1957. He joined the U.S. Army during World War II and served from 1944 to 1946 in Europe. Mr. Killham's Foreign Service posts included the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Belgium, Austria, and Spain. He was interviewed by Robert Martens on December 18, 1992.

Q: What was your first post?

KILLHAM: London.

Q: You did consular work there I presume?

KILLHAM: Yes. I had four months in Edinburgh as well, early in 1953. That was the time of the big purges of the McCarthyite era, of course, after the change of administration. The vice consul in Edinburgh was shifted somewhere else so I went up there to take care of things. The Consul General there, Charles Derry, was an extremely nice man and it was one of the most stimulating periods that I spent in the Foreign Service. I was brand new in the Service and the feeling of active involvement in representing the U.S. in a small post was quite different from my early experience in London, which consisted mostly of signing consular invoices.

ROBERT W. ZIMMERMANN
Political Officer
London (1952-1956)

Robert W. Zimmermann was born in Illinois in 1919. He attended the University of Minnesota, receiving his undergraduate degree in 1940. He received a M.B.A. degree from Harvard University before joining the U.S. Navy during World War II. Soon after his service in the Navy, Mr. Zimmermann entered the Foreign Service, serving in Lima, Bangkok, Lisbon, Madrid, and Barcelona. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 10, 1992.

Q: Well, then what were you doing in this London assignment?

ZIMMERMANN: In London I worked on the South Asia/Far East desk. The Embassy was set up, as you know, like a small State Department with a South Asia/Far East section, a Near East section, Latin America...which I picked up because nobody else spoke Spanish and I was interested in keeping a hand in... and there were divisions for internal political reporting as well. I was the junior officer and the number two to Art Ringwalt, who was an old China hand. We covered everything from Afghanistan on.

Much time was consumed by liaison with the Foreign Office. I would say three or four days out of five I would be at the Foreign Office for part of the day, talking with desk people and being permitted to read some of their despatches, coming back and reporting to Washington.

The Korean War was in full bloom and Dien Bien Phu, I believe, took place during that time. It was a very busy time. We were especially worried about several Americans being held by the Chinese Communists. We were working through the British trying to get them out.

Q: The British had relations with the Chinese and we didn't.

ZIMMERMANN: One interesting little vignette. While I was in London I had a bad case of sciatica and the doctor ordered me to get out of the dampness for a couple of weeks. I went to Italy. One evening, I was walking around Venice just looking at book stores. There was one filled with a lot of communist books. Suddenly I heard behind me American voices commenting on the books. I turned around because something they had said had indicated they had just come out of China. The two were priests we had very recently succeeded in getting out. I introduced myself, noting that I had been working in London on their case through the British. We knew they had left, but here they were in Venice.

I also asked for and did Latin America liaison. Part of this was during the time of Arbenz in Guatemala. I was very good friends, from earlier days in Lima, of the Guatemalan Ambassador who confided in me a number of times.

Q: Talking about Arbenz. This was the CIA's one major coup. He was a leftist who was gotten rid of certainly with American intelligence assistance.

ZIMMERMANN: So I have heard. I think Ambassador Purjoy wrote a great deal about this.

Q: I assume you would talk to the British on this. What was the reaction there to this kind of action?

ZIMMERMANN: You mean the British reaction, the official British Foreign Office reaction? For one thing it is not their primary sphere of influence so they generally followed our lead. But I think they thought we always meddled too much and just didn't let things take their course.

Q: What about the British Foreign Office people. Did our two foreign services mesh well as far as working together at this particular period of time?

ZIMMERMANN: Oh, I think we had very good relations with them and with the Colonial Office as well. We had excellent relations. Ringwalt was operating on a somewhat higher level than I did, but we were both down there all the time and always seemed welcome. The same was true in the Near East. Joe Palmer was doing the Near East when we got there and then Evan Wilson.

Q: Were there any points of conflict between the British and United States that you were aware of in East Asian problems?

ZIMMERMANN: Well, there was always the argument of recognition of China. But it was done on rather an intellectual plane. There were problems, obviously, that developed around people like Krishna Menon, as well there might be.

Q: Krishna Menon was Minister of Defense of India and loved to stick needles into the Americans and was intensely disliked by most anybody who dealt with him.

ZIMMERMANN: I well remember going with Art Ringwalt to a lecture one evening in London on something about South Asia. Krishna Menon was there. He walked right over to me and started talking to me in a very friendly fashion. It quickly turned out that he thought I was the new Minister from Lebanon! As soon as he found out I was from the US, he abruptly walked off.

I think all those discussions with the British were on an intellectual basis, I don't recall any sort of real...well, problems that stemmed from those differences, yes...

Q: The British recognized China and we didn't and for many years this was a major policy decision on our part. At the time did you get any feel that the British were getting a lot more out of having recognized China?

ZIMMERMANN: No, I didn't. And I don't think the British thought so either.

Q: What I gather was that it really didn't make much difference. China was going to do their own thing.

ZIMMERMANN: Yes, that is the impression I had. If I remember right, I think some of the British were privately saying, "Well, what good did it do us?"

Q: They almost had to let it run its course, which took about 30 years.

ZIMMERMANN: They had made their move, we made ours and it didn't make much difference in the end. However, it did give us a channel to talk to the Chinese in terms of those Americans who were incarcerated. But that might have been done through some other country, too, if the British hadn't been able to assist.

Q: Did you get much feedback from the Department?

ZIMMERMANN: Not a whole lot of feedback. Obviously we got into the annual thing about agendas at the UN and all that. Those were largely instructions and we discussed them with the British. But not much feedback. It was largely reporting on our side of what the British told us. That was the basic thing.

Q: The ambassador there was Winthrop Aldrich and I know it was a huge organization there, but did you get any feel of how he operated and was evaluated by those who worked for him?

ZIMMERMANN: My impression was that everybody looked to the DCM more than to Aldrich. The DCM was really running the operation. He ran the staff meetings and everything else. Aldrich was seldom there. The DCM at first was Julius Holmes and then Walt Butterworth.

Q: So you had two very competent professionals.

ZIMMERMANN: Absolutely, and everybody looked directly to them. I just had no real personal feeling about Aldrich and I don't think many did.

STANLEY D. SCHIFF
Economic Officer
Liverpool (1953-1954)

Stanley D. Schiff was born in New Jersey in 1925. He received his Bachelor's degree from Rutgers University in 1948, and his Master's Degree from Columbia University the following year. He served as a First Lieutenant overseas in the US Army from 1943 to 1946. Entering the Foreign Service in 1949, his postings include Baden, Strasbourg, Liverpool, Trinidad, Pakistan, and Brussels. Schiff was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 9, 2000.

Q: You went off to Liverpool for this aborted assignment. You were in Liverpool from when to when?

SCHIFF: I got to Liverpool in late 1953 and left at the end of '54.

Q: How was living in England at that time?

SCHIFF: Tough. Some food items were still being rationed. Living quarters were hard to find. One of my more amusing experiences was in looking for a place to live. By that time, we had three children. We ended up staying in a hotel in a small village outside Liverpool for close to three months, which is the maximum that we were allowed. I had advertised in one of the Liverpool papers for a house in a nice neighborhood. First of all, I learned what the definition of "nice neighborhood" was and how elastic that could be. Then I got one call from a guy on the Isle of Man, asking me if I wouldn't really like to rent a house that he had there. How was I supposed to get there? "Well, you can fly." This was one unrich American who couldn't fly. That was tough.

Then living in a hotel with three little kids, the oldest of whom was five... We had brought our German maid with us, who had been with us since two of the kids were born. So, we were a curiosity in this hotel. If you've seen the play "Separate Tables," you can appreciate the hotel atmosphere. This was peopled mainly by elderly women, most of whom were widows of cotton brokers who had been quite prominent in Liverpool society in the pre-war period. They couldn't afford to keep up their big houses any longer, so they moved into a hotel. Our kids were objects of intense curiosity. The food in this hotel was not great. Our son, who was the oldest of the kids, about five, one night in a not very muffled voice said, "I don't like English cooking. I like French cooking." We weren't declared persona non grata, but... But housing was tough there.

Q: Who was our consul general at the time?

SCHIFF: Sheldon Thomas. There was flux in England at the time. One of the things which was happening was that the first trickle of West Indians was beginning to migrate into England. This created social tensions, particularly in certain cities and brought out a not very nice quality among some of the English middle class - racist attitudes. It wasn't limited to middle class. It was also true of working class people - not where we were, but in places like Manchester and similar industrial cities in the Midlands where working class whites were beginning to fear the job competition from blacks as well as other forms of intercourse which they didn't like. This was happening at a time when Britain was not in great shape economically. Nevertheless, it was an interesting time to be there.

Q: What sort of work were you doing?

SCHIFF: Besides administrative work, I was doing a lot of economic and political-economic reporting. Liverpool was unusual among major British cities at that time because most of the others were controlled politically by Labour. Because it had a particular demographic structure, Liverpool was still controlled by Conservatives. The reason for this was the fact that Liverpool was the principal point of entry for the Irish who were migrating for jobs. This tended to swell the local Catholic population. What you had was voting along religious lines rather than class lines. The Protestant white working class, which might have voted for Labour in other cities, in Liverpool voted because of their religious sentiments for the Conservatives. So the Conservatives were still in power. That changed in the period that I was there.

Q: The interesting thing is that if one were to go and eat in Germany, which had been defeated during the war, and do the same in England, you'd probably eat a lot better in Germany.

SCHIFF: Oh, you would.

Q: This was reflected in other things, too. What was the reason for this? Germany was essentially doing better than England.

SCHIFF: I'm not sure. There are some who would probably attribute it to the different rules of the trade unions. German trade unions by comparison to the British and American were very docile. I think that made a difference. There were also concerns on the part of British business that there were too many restrictive labor practices in Britain which had the effect of limiting productivity.

But other than these generalities, I don't remember what the explanation was. The British were also heavily dependent on imports, and they were having trouble exporting.

Q: Did you have much dealing with the British authorities?

SCHIFF: Some. They were one of several sources. My special beat was the labor side of things. So, my contacts were with the labor unions and with the Labour Party. But some were with other government officials who were not politically affiliated one way or another. But I don't recall that I depended heavily on British officials for information.

Q: Were we at the consulate general looking at the British trade unions as being a hindrance to the development of Great Britain?

SCHIFF: I can remember one particular source of concern. It was not so much with productivity as it was with the politics of trade unions. That was the role of the communists, and I don't use the term loosely. These were Party members. They had considerable influence among dock workers, which was the big union there. On the other hand, I was quite well acquainted with the man who was the head of the Dock Workers Union, who always reminded me of the actor Victor McLaughlin in physical appearance. He was not a communist by any means; he was a socialist. I can remember going to a big meeting that the Communist Party staged where they actually succeeded in fomenting a strike under very questionable circumstances. It was that kind of thing that was a matter of concern.

Q: Did the hand of the embassy rest at all on your work?

SCHIFF: Not a great deal.

Q: In '55, you left Liverpool. Where did you go?

SCHIFF: Trinidad.

ROBERT B. HOUSTON
Vice Consul
Edinburgh, Scotland (1953-1954)

Robert B. Houston was born in Missouri in 1923. He received his bachelor of science degree at Harvard University in 1943. Mr. Houston was a radio engineer in the Navy Research Laboratory during World War II. His Foreign Service career included posts in Accra, Vienna, Edinburgh, Warsaw, and Sofia. While detailed to the East European Studies Department of the Indiana University, he earned a graduate degree in that field. Mr. Houston was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert on May 14, 1990.

HOUSTON: I might note that Edinburgh was my fourth Foreign Service post, and I was going to a slot that could be performed by someone who was brand new. The Consul General there was a very kindly man who would have just loved to have a neophyte to educate. Edinburgh had never been on my April Fool's wish list, but one did not think then of challenging an assignment, you did what you were told.

I drove my car from Vienna to Edinburgh, and the family flew out later for what we thought would be a relatively long assignment. But it turned out not to be nearly that long. It was a delightful place to be. I had Scottish ancestry. My names are Robert Bruce and they treated me like one of them. My fondest memory, I think, was of going to a celebration, at the ruined Arbroath Abbey, of the anniversary of the declaration of Scottish independence. Afterwards, we

all repaired to a local restaurant for a proper banquet, with all the things Scottish people eat and drink. Some of the speeches there were extremely fiery. I thought that Scotland Yard could break in at any time and arrest the lot of us for treason. This was not so far fetched. This was during the time the Stone of Scone was still missing from Westminster Abbey, secreted somewhere in Scotland. It turned out later our Public Affairs officer had unknowingly been the custodian of the Stone of Scone for a period when Scotland Yard was looking for it. Friends had foisted it on him unknowingly.

Q: He just had it in his basement or something?

HOUSTON: He had it in his basement, he was just storing a trunk for a friend. It later turned out that the trunk had the Stone of Scone in it. We still have Scottish friends from that period there, and exchange visits with them. The place where we lived was a miserable Victorian house. It was advertised as centrally heated because it had in a scullery a small one pint coal burner that heated a two rail towel rack in the bathroom. This rack was the only "radiator" in the house. We had fireplaces in every other room, which had been converted to electric fires. The first time the guy came to read the meter, he said that we must have been using electricity all the time. The next time, he found the meter did not have enough capacity to keep track of all the electricity we were using to keep warm. They had to put in their very largest meter. In December in our hall, the temperature could get up to around 50 degrees with the heating we had. But Edinburgh was a delightful place. We learned about chilblains, and eating Scottish lamb. A Scottish dog bit me, but the National Health Service fixed it for free. Our children got free orange juice. This was quite an experience for us.

Q: In those days they had not yet discovered oil so Edinburgh was not the great commercial place?

HOUSTON: The city had the Edinburgh festival so it was a great cultural center. The city very much depended on coal, and bad coal at that. The center of the city was black. Now they have gotten rid of the smoke, the city looks much better.

We had barely started our touring of Scotland when in the fall of 1954, orders came transferring us to Bangkok, Thailand by way of home leave in the United States.

WALTER M. MCCLELLAND
Political Officer
London (1953-1955)

Walter M. McClelland was born in 1922 and raised in Oklahoma City. He graduated from the University of Virginia, where he was involved in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). He received his commission when he joined the Navy in 1944. After his tour with the Navy, he entered Harvard Law School and graduate school until 1950. Mr. McClelland then joined the Foreign Service,

serving in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, and Egypt. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 20, 1995.

MCCLELLAND: I was given home leave and transfer orders in late 1952, so we went home for Christmas and then went on to London in early 1953. I was assigned to London as Third Secretary and Assistant to the Minister and Political Counselor in the Political Section of the Embassy. This was a wonderful assignment and I remained there for the next three years.

Q. So you were in London from 1952 to 1955?

MCCLELLAND: I was there from the beginning of 1953 to late 1955.

Q. Starting off with our Embassy, who was our Ambassador at the time?

MCCLELLAND: Ambassador Aldrich arrived about the same time we did. W. Walton Butterworth was the Political Minister.

Q. He was a highly respected Foreign Service Officer of long standing.

MCCLELLAND: Absolutely. Andy Foster, also a great FSO, was the Political Counselor.

Q. What was your feeling about the Embassy during this period?

MCCLELLAND: I was really delighted to be a part of this very important diplomatic post and to be in a position to know what was going on in the political sphere. One of my most interesting jobs was to read all the incoming telegrams and tell the Minister and Counselor which ones I thought were most important and needed immediate action.

My impression of the whole Embassy was that it was very well run. Mr. Butterworth knew how things ought to go. He was really the one that did the managing of the day to day business. The Ambassador was primarily engaged at the Foreign Minister level and had many other high level contacts, although we did see him at weekly staff meetings and at large social functions. The Political Section was a very talented group of officers and I learned a great deal from them.

Q. What were you doing most of the time that you were there?

MCCLELLAND: Most of the time I was there, I was working as Assistant to Mr. Butterworth and Mr. Penfield, reading telegrams, drafting replies, doing other follow up as needed. In addition to this, as the most junior officer in the Political Section, all the odd jobs came my way. Shortly after my arrival in London the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II was scheduled to take place and I was detailed to assist in making some of the arrangements and, during the actual festivities, to ensure that the Official US Representatives were properly cared for. This was a pleasure!

Shortly afterwards came a RIF (Reduction in Force) and the Embassy staff had to be reduced by about 30 percent. As a result, several officers were dismissed, but their duties remained, and I

was given their former responsibilities. Among the abolished positions were Publications Procurement Officer, Geographic Attaché, Special Assistant for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, and two or three others. I could not, of course, carry out all their duties, but I did have to answer the telegrams addressed to them and keep local British staff doing what they could.

I was also tasked with making arrangements for American official visitors who would be attending a conference or talking to British officials on topics related to my special assignments. I was deeply involved in Law of the Sea matters and a conference on fishing rights, among others. Some of my contacts in the Foreign Office continued to be my friends throughout my Foreign Service Career.

Q. It was in October, 1956, just before you left, when the Suez crisis boiled up. This was probably the depths of the Anglo-American cooperation, even to today. How did the Suez thing hit you? Were you seeing glimmers of this and how it developed?

MCCLELLAND: Yes, very much so. I remember when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles came over. I was introduced to him one morning while I was standing in the Ambassador's office but I was not directly involved in the subject -- this was above my level of responsibility.

There was a lot going on. Messrs. Cohn and Schine, of Senator McCarthy's staff, came to Embassy London about that time and caused a lot of trouble. Also this was around the time of the celebrated Rosenberg Spy Case and the Embassy was being besieged with protesters. I was selected to receive and talk to a delegation of the protesters. It was a real learning experience!

Q. How about Cohn and Schine? These were two people sent by Senator McCarthy, two young lads, who sort of made a spectacle out of themselves in most places by going around and trying to find subversive books in libraries. How did the Embassy treat them?

MCCLELLAND: What could the Embassy do? They came as "official" Congressional representatives, were received "properly", and had long sessions with the Minister and the Ambassador.

I think the people who suffered most were the "Old China Hands" in our Political Section since they were involved in our old China policy. But, here again, I was too junior to be involved in such matters.

Q. Back to the Suez thing. Almost all cooperation between the British and the Americans stopped for a short period. I am told all doors were shut. Did you feel that at all?

MCCLELLAND: I didn't really. At my level, the only Third Secretary on the Diplomatic List, it didn't seem to make any difference -- or perhaps this occurred after I left. Some British colleagues would complain about Senator McCarthy and try to give us a hard time -- but I never felt cut off.

Q. Did you get any feel towards the end of this time -- I realize you were at the very bottom -- about any reflections from the Embassy about the apparent antipathy between Anthony Eden and John Foster Dulles?

MCCLELLAND: No, I really didn't have any feel for the antipathy we read about in the papers. I was not personally involved in the Secretary's dealings with Anthony Eden. This was way above my level.

Q. You left there at the end of 1956. You'd really spent a lot of time in London, six years, which is a tremendous amount of time as a junior officer. What did you see yourself doing? Were you making any moves to build up your career in any particular areas?

MCCLELLAND: I was actually stationed at Embassy London only 3 years as a Foreign Service Officer in the Political Section, from 1953-56. In 1950 I was assigned to the Embassy Visa Section for only a few months before going on to Liverpool as part of the Displaced Persons Program.

I thought my assignment in London was wonderful for my career! I had had some Consular Experience in Liverpool and this assignment was giving me experience in political work under the very able tutelage of Jim Penfield and W. Walton Butterworth -- not to mention experience in the various other jobs I had with a good deal of responsibility. I found political work very interesting and wanted to continue doing this as much as possible.

As it turned out, I must have made a good impression on Joe Palmer at Embassy London, because when he returned to the Department he arranged to have me transferred back there to his office, European Regional Affairs, (EUR/RA) instead of going on to another post as I had expected.

CHESTER E. BEAMAN
Consul
Cardiff, Wales (1954-1955)

Chester E. Beaman was born in Indiana in 1916. He received his bachelor's degree from Depauw University in 1938. His career includes positions in London, Wales, Cairo, Port Said, Philippines, Syria, and Malta. Mr. Stuart was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in September 1999.

Q: Were you making any moves about getting an FSO appointment while you were in London? You left in 1954 and went to Cardiff?

BEAMAN: Yes. There was the oral exam for Foreign Service officers.

Q: Do you recall that?

BEAMAN: Very definitely. I gave you this paper on Wristonization. You might want to cover this special topic later. But in any event, I set up the schedule for the examination. There were 40 people in London who had applied to become regular Foreign Service officers. I set up the schedule and, of course, I was scheduled also. There were five officers who came to give the exam. One was an ambassador. There were two political counselors. One was from Agriculture. I think maybe the other was from USIS. In any event, there were five of them that examined me. I estimated that in a few hours time, they threw about 100 questions at me. If they saw I was beginning to answer correctly, they quickly moved to another question. I had been advised by Foreign Service officer friends, "Look, if you don't know an answer, say so. Let them go on to the next." So I did that. Whenever I didn't feel confident to answer, I said so. The questions were more substantive than the original exam that I took in Germany. I tried to anticipate their questions. I read the "Times of London," cover to cover, including the court calendar and everything else, for about three or four months before the exam. I reasoned that because I had served in Germany, they were going to ask me questions about Germany. I had all of the monthly publications from HICOG. I reread those. I also reasoned that while I was in the Army, I was stationed in California and Utah, so they would probably ask me statistical-type information about the West. They did. Exactly. Then they would ask such questions as "What should we do about the Oder-Neisse Line?" I said, "Well, unless we're willing to fight the Russians, I think we just have to leave it as it is for the time being." The substantive-type questions were on current events. In any event, I was the only one approved out of the 40. I don't think that was right. There were others who were, I figured, equally qualified, but for whatever reason, they didn't select them. I hate to point a finger, but I feel part of the reason was that the old Foreign Service, as I might call it, was reluctant to take in much new blood.

Q: Oh, absolutely. The Wriston program was fought tooth and nail.

BEAMAN: Yes. I came in under Section 517. I had done enough work that related to the Foreign Service that they were willing to accept me. An interesting thing was this: I had friends who were regular Foreign Service officers, but I had never been invited to their parties because the parties were usually for political purposes or a trade delegation, which were not my field. I was a personnel officer. Only after they had heard that I had passed the exam, I wasn't even an officer yet, they started inviting me to their homes. That was one angle. The other angle was that when the appointment finally came through, Washington said I could not continue to be a personnel officer and be a Foreign Service officer. Consequently, they assigned me to Cardiff. The Department considered Cherbourg and Cardiff. They found out Mrs. Beaman was pregnant, and they said, "Oh, we don't want to send him to Cherbourg. An easier move would be to send him to Cardiff." So I was moved to Cardiff to become principal officer strictly because, as a Foreign Service officer at that time, I could not be in administrative work.

Q: You were in Cardiff from 1954 to 1955?

BEAMAN: Yes. It was a little over a year. My son was born a couple of months after we got there, and I think he was a year and a half old when I was approved for Arabic language training. That was another thing that I kept trying to get. I had the feeling that the Arabic side of the story of Middle East turmoil was not being heard. Not that I was against Israel. In fact, in visiting Israel, I understood their situation, and I used to tell the Arabs when I got assigned there, "Look,

you're not going to push those people into the sea. They have an excellent army, an excellent economy, and a united country." I had applied for Arabic language training sometime before. From Cardiff, we had gone home on leave and were going to come back to Cardiff. By the time I got to Washington, they said, "We are assigning you to Arab language training." The reason was that they had previously assigned a person who was Jewish. They didn't know that he was Jewish, and when they found out, they said, "Oh, we can't do this. Beaman's been after the assignment, so give it to him."

Q: Let's talk a little bit about Cardiff. Technically, it was the equivalent to the capital of Wales?

BEAMAN: It officially became the capital of Wales after I left.

Q: This was the principal city of Wales.

BEAMAN: That's right. Even though I wanted to get into economic work and an Arab specialty, that was one of my best posts. It was best because, first, my son was born there and local friends celebrated with us by sending gifts and flowers. But the other thing was that I was my own boss. Not belittling, but the norm of previous consuls had been to clip items out of the newspaper, put them in a report, and send them to London. I started visiting people. I visited workers institutes in the coal mine areas. I even went down into the coal mine. I came up saying, "They can have that job. I don't want it." I had to drive the official car myself. I would just jump in the car and go up in the valleys or go over to Swansea and go through a steel mill. I had a grand time. I did a lot of speaking and visiting. I also made certain friends, like a Labour MP by the name of George Thomas, who later became speaker of the House of Commons and eventually Viscount Tony Pandy. We had a friendship that lasted 40 years before he died a couple of years ago. When I sent condolences to the newspaper respecting his death, I got letters from people who went back to my time. They were writing to me or my wife.

Q: What were our concerns? What were you doing?

BEAMAN: I was trying to project a good image of the United States. Those were the days when Dulles was Secretary. Unfortunately, the State Department would put out very dull booklets of very dull speeches that he made and would send those to the consulate. I put them out on the consulate's counter or I would distribute them to officials. But this wasn't the way to do it. That is why I made a lot of speeches. I tried to interpret U.S. policy or what was going on to the people. Once, I went down to a seaman's institute on the docks. I expected heat from the seamen, but after my talk they came around and wanted me to have tea with them. These were blacks mostly, and they were asking about segregation in the U.S. It was the first time a consul had been there. Whether they agreed with what I had to say, that's beside the point. The fact is that I was down there trying to interpret the things that we were being connected with. One of my memories is the time the U.S. was warning China about its threatening Taiwan. Here I am, the consul, walking along the street. They knew me. They would come up and stand in front of me, grab my lapels, and say, "You're trying to get us into war over Quemoy and Matsu." I would just back off and laugh and say, "What are you talking about?" Then, I gave a paragraph talk on U.S. policy. It was fun. It was probably my best post.

Q: Were you involved in visas, passports?

BEAMAN: Yes, but I had a vice consul who just loved to sign and process papers. I left most of that to him. I would sign when it was expected.

Q: In Cardiff, was it a Labour local government?

BEAMAN: No, not completely. George Thomas was Labour. He represented Cardiff West. Callahan, another Labour MP, represented the dock area. Beyond that, the MPs were Tories, as were a number of city officials. I cultivated both sides. The pubs were closed on Sunday, so I held my cocktail parties on Sunday after church. I had Tories and Labour people mixed together.

Q: You were there how long?

BEAMAN: It was only about a year and a half.

DWIGHT J. PORTER
Administrative Officer
London (1954-1955)

Dwight J. Porter was born in Oklahoma in 1916. He received his bachelor's degree from Grinnell College in 1938. During World War II, Mr. Porter served in the U.S. Marine Corps. His Foreign Service career included posts in Frankfurt, Bonn, London, Vienna, and Beirut. Mr. Porter was interviewed by Ambassador Horace G. Torbert on November 5, 1990.

PORTER: I then went to London in 1954.

Q: Who was the top person?

PORTER: Winthrop Aldrich. Uncle Winthrop. He had come out of Chase [Bank] at rather advanced years. Winthrop was not terribly happy with the career Foreign Service, I don't know why. There were a lot of interesting stories about that which I found interesting. Many of them never told. I suppose this might be as good a time as any as most of the principles are dead or would not care less at this point.

For some reason or other I was on the right side of Winthrop Aldrich. One of the reasons may have been that I knew Wild Bill Donovan and after I got to London Wild Bill came to town and as we all know Wild Bill was terribly suspicious of any Foreign Service officer and had as little to do with them as possible, but in my case he seemed to like it because I had known him. I think my Marine Corps training somehow set me apart. So Wild Bill would come in and ask me to come to the Hotel and he would talk to me for hours about what was going on. Wild Bill at that point was a roving ambassador living in Bangkok. There was that brief period when he was given sort of a regional responsibility out in the Far East, I guess primarily he was still doing

intelligence work. But under Ike he was sort of keeping a roving watch on the whole area. He would often come to Britain, which he dearly loved. So I think maybe through the Wild Bill connection I got on the good side of Winthrop Aldrich. There was quite a bit of transition going on in the local CIA scene at that point. I had been rather deeply involved in intelligence activities in Germany because part of the process in building there was building an intelligence apparatus. So I got to know almost all the cast of characters.

Wild Bill had come over to sort of oversee or review our US-British intelligence activities. He must have set Aldrich up to this, but Aldrich was very angry at his DCM who was Walt Butterworth; Aldrich just could not get along with Walt.

Q: Walt was a bit inclined to take authority as far as it would go.

PORTER: He had had his years as financial attaché and dealt with the little old lady of Threadneedle St. and knew his England very well, and Walt was a dominating personality. My old friend, Jim Penfield, was a political officer and I suppose that some of that animosity rubbed off on Jim who would not hurt anybody. So one day Aldrich called me in, he was just steaming mad, and he said, "From now on you are going to be the only liaison in this embassy with CIA" (I never really understood this), and he said, "furthermore I don't want you to discuss this with any other officers in the embassy." All the people who wrote my efficiency ratings among other things. At that point I could see that there was nothing to do but say, "Yes, sir" and leave the room. I just decided to sweat it out. I did tell one or two of the Agency people what I had been instructed to do and told them to ignore that and to go ahead and do their business and to keep me advised and try not to have me trampled under foot. It all ultimately worked out because the ambassador must have forgotten about it. I will never forget it, it was a moving day in my experience.

England at that point was an intriguing place, we were there just after the coronation, a year after, and found already that Germany in 1954 was enjoying the comforts of life much more than the British. The slow, hard rebuilding process took a long time. Other than for some of my skullduggery that I mentioned previously, it was a basically fascinating tour. Win Brown was, of course, really deputy economic person, was the head of what was the Marshall Plan operation, it was technically over, but there were all sorts of residual activities. Linc Gordon was the economic chief and Win was his deputy.

My next job was coming back to Washington where I got involved as executive director of the Economic Bureau, which was a surprise to me, but I enjoyed it because it came both in my discipline, economics, and administration. At that point there was a deputy under secretary for economics, which was the top economic job -- Herb Prochnow, very few people remember him. He was a Chicago banker who was a very nice fellow, but more of a banker than an economist and not really understanding of international matters. He had written a successful joke book and was really a very nice man, but was not a period in the Economic Bureau when the leadership was might have been needed at that point. That was a major era of trade negotiations and development of the GATT.

Q: Was there an assistant secretary?

PORTER: There was an assistant secretary who was the famous Finn, Caverjaro. He was a good economist, but not a leader of men, that is the best way to put it. An academic type, again a very nice person. He knew his job but again was not an administrator. So while all this was happening, Herbie Hoover Jr. showed up. He was really the reason why I was in this job. He was Under Secretary at that point. He had been running the Iranian mess, you remember when the Shah was briefly evicted and Hoover was the honcho in that whole exercise along with Kim Roosevelt. Later on Hoover was our representative on the Suez Canal negotiations after the unfortunate 1956 episode. I had gotten to know him in London and he had talked to Aldrich. The two of them had plotted to send me back as somebody to help bring the economic area out of the doldrums, or at least that is what I was told.

WILLIAM D. WOLLE
Consular Officer
Manchester (1954-1955)

William D. Wolle was born in Iowa 1928. He attended Morningside College, from which he received a bachelor's degree in 1949. He received a graduate degree from Columbia University. He entered the Foreign Service in 1951 and in subsequent years served in Baghdad, Manchester, Beirut, Jeddah, Kuwait, and Amman. On March 6, 1991, Charles Stuart Kennedy conducted this interview.

WOLLE: I arrived back in Washington only to find out that the orders had been changed. Instead of Glasgow I was to go to Manchester, England. It was a downer for a little bit, but not for long because I soon realized there probably wasn't that much difference between the two. My work probably wouldn't be much different. And as I looked at the map and realized that Manchester was centrally located within Great Britain I thought I could probably cover the map pretty well on weekends and vacations. So I was pleased.

Q: *I have you in Manchester from 1954-57.*

WOLLE: Yes, from mid 1954 until November, 1956.

Q: *What were you doing there?*

WOLLE: Manchester was a three officer post. A senior Foreign Service officer, often an officer given Manchester as his retirement post; and two junior officers. Both of us juniors had served in one post previously. Marian Nash had served in Germany. We were doing consular work. One of us concentrated on visa services and the other on passport and citizenship work. There was quite a bit of passport work because we still had several American air bases in our consular district and because of dependents this meant quite a heavy passport load.

Q: *Who was Consul General when you were there?*

WOLLE: The Consul General when I arrived was Paul Pearson and before I left (I had a few months in charge in between which was good experience) Rufus Lane arrived. For both it proved to be a retirement post.

My own work was first the one kind of consular work and then the other, but interspersed with it I had the good fortune to do some reporting on the cotton industry...the Manchester region being its center. I knew little or nothing about the cotton industry, so learned a lot.

The interesting thing about that consular district, Manchester, was that at earlier times in the history of our relations with the UK, we had had no fewer than five or six consulates located at cities which by the mid-50s were within the Manchester consular district. We had had, in fact as recently as 1953, consulates at Bradford and Newcastle. In earlier years we had consulates at Sheffield, Stoke-on-Trent, Hull and Nottingham. Of course now even Manchester is closed.

Q: It is London and Edinburgh now. Were you able to get around and do some economic or political reporting?

WOLLE: I was doing very little except for the cotton and other textile industries. The officer in charge did a certain amount of political reporting. He, of course, was sort of under the control of the supervisory consul general in London, a fellow by the name of Tom Bailey for a good part of that period. Bailey would come up from time to time to see if we were doing our job.

By the way there were just two countries during those years, the mid-50s, who maintained consular establishments in Manchester staffed by career officers. The Swiss and the Americans. There were about 18-20 countries who had honorary consuls...in fact the honorary ones were usually consul generals, with rows of ribbons!. So there was an active Manchester Consular Corps, with monthly luncheons. Most of these honorary consuls were successful business people and traders who took great pride in representing foreign countries. Some of them actually conducted a fair number of official services...shipping, consular invoices, etc. The Corps' presence was particularly welcomed by the Lord Mayor of Manchester who at his annual formal dinner loved having all of the consuls, be they honorary or not, lined up along side him to show them off to the citizens.

Q: How did you find relations with the British? The war was over but the post-war period lasted a long time.

WOLLE: Yes, and in fact a few things were still rationed when I arrived although that soon went off. I think eggs and meat were about the last items rationed. Our relations were excellent except at the very end because the last couple of months of my time coincided with the British/French/Israeli attack at Suez. Their little game was spoiled by Eisenhower, so in those last few weeks I may not have been such a welcome commodity in town.

Q: Even at that level did you feel things sort of closing down?

WOLLE: From this distance looking back it is kind of hard to say. The close friends that we had were still close friends. They found differences in terms of British and American policy but it

wasn't so much that it was uncomfortable for us. Just a bit of apprehension that somebody might get at you with a vigorous argument and you might spoil a friendship before you left.

By the way, the business of a consulate in a place like that at that time, the extreme amount of consular work and consular invoices and certifying crew lists, because we had several seaports in the district, the work was really carried on extensively by the very loyal local employees. We had about 10 or 11 in the Consulate. Many of them had been working in an American Consulate either there or in Liverpool for as long as 20-30 years. They were the most sincere and loyal people that you could ever hope to meet. They were also good teachers just as my first local assistant in Baghdad had been.

By the way they had undergone severe bombings during World War II. The building in which we rented space was damaged in several air raids. This says all the more for the loyalty of some of the people who stuck it out.

DAYTON S. MAK
Political Officer
London (1954-1956)

Dayton S. Mak was born in South Dakota in 1917. He received his undergraduate and graduate degrees from the University of Arizona and George Washington University respectively. During his 30 year career in the Foreign Service, he served in Hamburg, Jeddah, London, Kuwait City, Beirut, and Washington, DC. Mr. Mak was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 9, 1989.

Q: *Well, you were in London from 1954 to 1956. What was your job there?*

MAK: I was political officer. We had a two man desk in the political section, headed by Evan Wilson, which dealt with the British foreign office on Middle East and non-colonial African affairs. We had a myriad of problems at that time. It was an absolutely fascinating time, and I never worked harder in the Foreign Service, ever. It was an almost 24 hour a day job, and I thoroughly enjoyed it.

Q: *Who was our ambassador when you were?*

MAK: Winthrop Aldrich.

Q: *Did he take much interest in what you were doing?*

MAK: Oh, he took an interest. Yes. The problems of the Middle East were such that our highest government officials were interested in and were involved in them. While the Ambassador didn't take a daily hand in the situations he knew everything that was going on and was invariably interested and helpful.

Q: What were the concerns that you were dealing with, and how did you go about dealing with these?

MAK: Well, first of all was the British evacuation of the bases in the Suez Canal zone. We were purely observers in that operation. Evan and I would visit our contacts at the foreign office daily and receive briefings on the status of the British negotiations for the evacuation of the British forces from their Suez canal zone bases. We could then report this information by telegram to Washington. Of course, others in the Embassy -- at higher levels -- also reported parallel information from their high level sources, which called for considerable cooperation and coordination among us. It was a time consuming job but very interesting.

Q: What was sort of our feeling as far as you got? I mean, we were glad they were getting out? We felt it was time and all that?

MAK: Well, yes. We felt there was no alternative. The British, in the first place, couldn't afford it. They couldn't afford financially to continue these bases. They had to withdraw; they knew it. They would have liked to have stayed if they could have afforded it, but they couldn't, and we weren't going to contribute to their staying. We didn't see any real reason for them to stay, except we wanted to be sure that the canal was kept open and available to us. I wouldn't say there was no friction between the British and the Egyptians, because there was a lot of friction. The British didn't get all they wanted, but agreement was reached.

Q: For us, we were more or less observers saying, "It's going to happen anyway." What other type of thing did you do?

MAK: Well, then we had the Persian oil agreement. Mossadegh had been ousted and our oil companies were negotiating with the Persians. The American and the British oil companies were together, and, there again, mine was a time consuming task. It was just a midnight oil job. The oil companies would get their negotiating instructions through the State Department channels at midnight, and since I lived a block from the embassy, I would be called to deliver the midnight (NIACT) messages to the American negotiators.

Q: Night action telegrams.

MAK: Right. And I would trot over to the embassy in the middle of the night and then trot the messages over to Davies Street, the office of one of the oil companies where the negotiations were being held. This happened night after night after night after night. I was a messenger boy. Just a messenger boy. And about the same time, the British were involved in the Buraimi oases dispute with Saudi Arabia.

Now, Buraimi is, as you know, an oasis in the Southern Arabian peninsula between Abu Dhabi and Oman and Saudi Arabia. And it was thought to be a likely site for oil. The Saudis had claims on it. Abu Dhabi and Oman had claims on it. While the British represented these groups and pressed their claims. The U.S., on the other hand, because of ARAMCO's interest, were supporting the Saudi claims. As a result there was an ongoing dispute and negotiations between ARAMCO and the British and the British and us. There again, we were merely observing and

reporting at the embassy, the negotiations being primarily between the ARAMCO (representing the Saudi claims) and the British representing the Abu Dhabi and Omani sheikhs.

We had to keep on top of all this primarily to report to Washington. It was just a reportorial job, but it really brought out a very interesting thing to me, something I hadn't been aware of before or run up against it -- how very sensitive the British were over their protectorates along the Persian or Arabian Gulf and in Southern Arabia.

As a matter of fact one fairly senior officer in the Foreign Office (Ian Samuel), showing his impatience with our attitude toward the Buraimi problem, said, "You know, Dayton, the greatest mistake we have made in this area was to allow you Americans to open a consulate in Kuwait." I didn't pay much attention to this officer's petulant remark, but it did demonstrate to me the depth of feeling in the British government about our intrusion in their bailiwick, the Persian Gulf and Southern Arabia. That for certain has worked its way out.

Q: When I was there in '58 to '60, it was still very much resented and particularly our ARAMCO's rather progressive attitude toward Saudi Arabia of trying to share; whereas, the British had very much the colonial attitude and kept feeling that ARAMCO was giving away the store to the detriment of the other oil companies there.

MAK: That's a point that I've always kept in mind and mentioned to many, many people -- the really intelligent attitude of ARAMCO in dealing with the Saudis. They always dealt with them as partners and never as adversaries, and it made such a vast difference.

Q: Well, I mean, the answer, of course, is ARAMCO is still there, and many of these other ones are not. I mean, ARAMCO is Saudi, but still it is the same central concern, whereas the other ones are not.

MAK: They were very wise. I won't go into all the reasons I think they did it, but anyway, that's another story.

In London, then, our duties were primarily reportorial. This meant visiting the Foreign Office daily discussing the various issues and exchanging information, as appropriate. This, of course had the blessing of the State Department. We would pass on information of mutual interest to them and they would do the same with us, often letting us read their official incoming and outgoing messages. So it worked very well. This made for a very long day. By the time you got back to the embassy and drafted the telegraphic reports, the hour could be pretty late. However, I thought it a lot of fun, and I enjoyed it thoroughly.

The most important event, or series of events, had to do with the Suez Canal takeover by Nasser, and that began just before I was suppose to be transferred back to Washington.

Q: In 1956.

MAK: In 1956, yes. We were being given a farewell dinner party by the Chargé d'affaires (Andrew Foster) in his home, and we had a number of my contacts from the Foreign Office and

other friends there. We were just about to go into dinner -- when the head of what they called the Foreign Office African Department was called to the telephone. When he came back he said, "I'm afraid I have to leave. We have just learned that President Nasser has nationalized the Suez Canal Company." This, we knew, was about the same as a declaration of war.

Well, that ended my dinner party. I had to go back, the Chargé (our host) had to go back to our embassy to see what the tickers were saying, and to be in touch with the Department reporting developments in London and receiving instructions as to what we should do. At the same time the Andrea Doria had been rammed, and the ticker was filled with news of both of these events.

Q: Andrea Doria was the Italian ship that was rammed and sunk off of Long Island, so it was a big disaster.

MAK: The British, of course, were outraged by Nasser's move. The French were likewise outraged, because they too had shares in the Suez Canal Company. This meant that, in effect, the Egyptians could do what they wanted with the Suez Canal now that they owned the company that owned and ran it. So this began long weeks of discussions, reporting and following events as the unfolded.

As you may remember the British and the French were rattling their swords and being very angry about the whole thing. Secretary Dulles wanted to quiet them down, and tried all sorts of measures to get both sides to negotiate. The French and British were adamant, though they agreed to discuss ways of bringing the opposing sides together to try to solve matters peacefully. The British, the French and we met several times in London, the respective delegations being headed by Selwyn Lloyd (British), Pinot (French) and Dulles (U.S.). I served as a minor member of our delegation, primarily as note taker, drafter of position papers and general "handyman." In the end the British and French weren't satisfied with any of this, so they, in collaboration with the Israelis, geared up their armed forces and set out to attack Egypt.

Q: Had you left at that time?

MAK: No.

Q: You were kept on?

MAK: My transfer was canceled.

Q: Yes. Your leave had been canceled.

MAK: My leave and my transfer had been canceled and I was told to stay on. Meanwhile, we'd packed all of our effects for transfer to Washington. We moved into a furnished apartment in the chancery, and then my wife and daughter went on to Washington to look for a house. I stayed on for some time. Until December, 1957, in fact.

Q: You say you went to these meetings as an observer. I've talked to others, and the accounts are that there was an almost chemical reaction between Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd and John

Foster Dulles. They really didn't like each other. Did you sense this, and was this a topic of anything sort of after meetings? Did you get this, or were you too far removed from it?

MAK: My recollection is that there wasn't anyone there who really liked or trusted Foster Dulles. They felt he was a meddler, a "goody goody," who just didn't understand the gravity of Nasser's actions.

Q: You mean on the British side?

MAK: On the British side and the French. Of course, no one liked Pinot, the French Foreign Minister either.

Anyway. No one liked what Dulles was trying to do. They didn't think Dulles was doing anything but trying to stall and that he was not looking out for Western interests. He was being helpful to Nasser for his own reasons, or reasons which the British and French didn't share at all, and they didn't just dislike him, they despised him, at least, that was my impression.

Q: Were you getting this at your level of contacts?

MAK: Oh, yes.

Q: The people you were talking to called the working level, what sort of things were you getting? What sort of comments?

MAK: Well, in the first place, to go back just a bit, during the early period we didn't know what the British and French were planning to do. There were suspicions back in Washington that they were up to something, but they weren't telling us. I got wind of this through a top secret message to the ambassador, which I of course had seen when I delivered it to him. It asked, in effect, "What are the British up to? They have been acting very strangely here in Washington." And they asked, "Is something going on?"

Armed with that knowledge, I paid particular attention to what people at the desk level, at the Foreign Office, were thinking and saying. They told me that they were puzzled as they were getting nothing from their own people about what the Israelis were doing in Sinai, or even what their own high level planners were thinking with regard to Nasser's nationalization of the canal. The desk level people told me they were in effect being frozen out from the top.

Q: These are the British desks?

MAK: British desk officers, yes. They told me they were being frozen out, and they didn't understand it; they didn't know what was going on. These were tense times. The newspapers were full of things about British army and naval movements as well as Israeli army movements.

Q: I'm just trying to get a feeling for the attitude at the working level, rather than saying, "I won't comment on this." Even the British side, they were sort of saying --

MAK: Perplexed.

Q: Perplexed, saying, "Hell, I don't know what's happening."

MAK: They didn't know. They literally did not know. Then when it was announced that the fleet was en route to Egypt and when the bombs were dropped on the runways and elsewhere in Egypt, several of the desk officers submitted their resignations in disgust.

Q: These are the British desk officers?

MAK: Yes, British desk officers. So there were ambivalent attitudes toward the whole operation, you see.

Q: At the embassy level, was the general feeling that there is something going to happen? What was your speculation and that of the people with whom you were working?

MAK: I'm trying to remember. I don't believe we thought the British would invade. I don't think we thought that they'd go that far, because we had issued very strong against it. Our ambassador had been instructed to go in and tell them, "Look, don't do anything." That's my recollection. So we thought they probably wouldn't, but they did and, of course, this infuriated Dulles. And it made a lot of people frightened in England.

Q: What happened to your relations with the desk people? You say some resigned. Were you sort of feeling there was almost a revolt within the Foreign Office?

MAK: There was a minor revolt. Yes, there was, at the lower level. Anyway, the U.S., Russia and others pressured the British and the French to withdraw, without defeating Nasser. The bitterness of the British and French towards us, and particularly Dulles, was intense. More conferences were called (by the U.S.) to find ways to clear the canal and ensure its safe and efficient operation to the benefit of all nations. Meanwhile, I was stuck in London with my family in Washington -- I wanted to join my wife and daughter there. We wanted to get a house, and I'd been assigned as Libya desk officer. I said, "I really want to go home." So finally the embassy said, "Okay."

Q: When did you go back?

MAK: That was December.

Q: That was '56. One, you were getting part of this revolt, but were you also getting people who came from the more hard line British that were giving you a difficult time in your contacts? I mean, "What are you Americans doing? You called us off just before we were ready to take over everything."

MAK: Well, there was definitely some of that, but I would say the general feeling was that it had been a great mistake.

Q: This is on the British side?

MAK: Yes. And linking up with the Israelis and the French wasn't terribly popular, anyway. It was the wrong war at the wrong time for the wrong reason, I guess.

Q: While this was going on, obviously the focus was there. I was in Frankfurt at the time, and we were saying, "What the hell is all this nonsense?" because we were concerned about the Hungarian revolt at the same time, because we felt this was the real game and this other thing is a sideshow which is diminishing our ability to deal. Did you have the October revolt in Hungary, was that playing any factor in the deliberations that you saw or not or concern?

MAK: I can't answer your question directly. I can say this. I do recall, now that you mention it, that everyone said, "My, God. What an awful time to have a crisis over Suez when something really important is going on." I don't know if you remember that the Russians threatened to rocket London during that period, and I mean people took this seriously. We were nervous. But that didn't happen. The world was not interested in Suez. That was a minor show. It should never have happened.

Q: All right. We'll stop this and pick it up when we can get together again.

MAK: Yes. Just the last thing. The Department didn't know I was coming home. They were sending a message saying that my transfer was canceled indefinitely.

Q: Okay, Dayton. We'll pick this up. Dayton, you had mentioned something that you thought you'd might mention about when you were in London.

MAK: Yes. It has to do with the various conferences that Secretary Dulles and the foreign ministers of U.K., Selwyn Lloyd and the French foreign minister, were having after Suez Canal debacle. Secretary Dulles was thinking up various schemes to get the canal users to have an association of some kind to operate the canal, and what I'm going to tell you is just an example of the tiny little things that go into making up a conference of this kind and silly little things that go into the making of decisions in that case.

Q: This is just the sort of thing we like to get. It gives a better feel for how things work.

MAK: Well, of course, one reason I'm telling you this is it was my idea, and so I'm patting myself on the back. [Laughter]

Q: Well, looking back on your Foreign Service career, as you know, you've done these interviews yourself, there are two questions asked. What gave you the greatest satisfaction?

MAK: I think there's no doubt. My time in London. My time in London was fascinating. I worked with some of the brightest people I've ever known, the kindest people I've ever known. I had the most responsible jobs in my whole career in the Foreign Service were in London. There were the most fascinating problems that I had to deal with, not necessarily at a upper level, I don't mean that.

You were feeling you were accomplishing.

MAK: I felt I was accomplishing something. I know that I was respected. I felt that I did my best work there. It was exhilarating in every way, and I worked my tail off.

JOHN EDGAR WILLIAMS
Ambassador's Aide
London (1955-1956)

John Edgar Williams was born in South Carolina. He graduated from the University of North Carolina, Yale University and Victoria University. He has served in a variety of posts in England, Spain, Argentina, Italy, Uruguay, New Zealand and Canada. Mr. Williams was interviewed by Dr. Anne R. Phillips in 1995.

WILLIAMS: I had been there only six months when one evening I got a call from somebody in the Department of State saying, "Would you like to go to London?" I said, "Would I like to go to London!" What happened was, the Ambassador in London was Winthrop Williams Aldrich of the Massachusetts Aldriches of the Chase National Bank. That was before it became Chase Manhattan. He was looking for a junior aide. He had a senior aide, but he needed a junior aide. So, another fellow and myself were two candidates. They said they were going to bring us both into the Foreign Service and then let the Ambassador interview us and see which one he wanted, then both of us were going to go to London in one capacity or another. So, the Ambassador chose me, and I became the Ambassador's junior aide there.

Q: *Were you scared when you went for the interview?*

WILLIAMS: Yes.

Q: *But, you knew you were going to get to London anyway, or hoped?*

WILLIAMS: Well, yeah, unless the Ambassador told them that I don't want this fellow at all.

Q: *What do you think helped you get the job?*

WILLIAMS: You know, I really don't know. I can't think why the Ambassador chose me over the other fellow, but I kind of wish he hadn't, because the other fellow went into the economic section and that's where I later ended up, in the economic cone and I sort of wished that I had gotten an earlier start at it. Although, working for the Ambassador was very interesting in many ways. I don't think it really helped my career along that much as a first assignment.

Q: *I see. So, that was London, what year?*

WILLIAMS: Actually, I arrived in January of '55.

Q: *What was it like when you got there? Did you think, oh my, this is the Foreign Service?*

WILLIAMS: Oh boy, yes. I'm not only in the Foreign Service, I'm at this great prestigious post of London.

Q: *What about the Ambassador himself?*

WILLIAMS: Well, you know the old saying, "de mortuis nil nisi bonum," but he was kind of a stuffed shirt. Even though I was his Junior Aide, I didn't see an awful lot of him, because of his confidential work was done with his confidential aide, who was not a Foreign Service Officer. He had brought in to the Foreign Service as a Reserve Officer when Aldrich was appointed Ambassador. Ambassadors had a lot more leeway then than they do now. I'd see him every day, but I didn't sit down and have long talks with him or anything like that. I had a bit of a problem about that. A lot of people in the Embassy thought that, since I was in the Ambassador's office, that it would be a great thing to get me on their side on whatever little controversies they had going at the time. So, I had a lot of people pulling and tugging at me and unfortunately, I think I fell for a couple of these things and sort of took sides, which I shouldn't have done.

Q: *Who were these people?*

WILLIAMS: The Consular Section wanted more space, or the Commercial Section wanted another position established. All kinds of just little bureaucratic things like that.

Q: *What was the location or address? Where in London?*

WILLIAMS: Grosvenor Square. The building that was our Embassy then is now the Canadian High Commission. Our new Embassy is across the square, where we had the old Consular Section in my time. They tore down a lot of the old eighteenth century houses over there and built the new Embassy, once we managed to buy all of that section of Grosvenor Square. It's a lovely location.

Q: *So that was January '55 and people pulling and tugging and so at some point, the next step was?*

WILLIAMS: The next step was –

Q: *Actually, I wanted to ask you that it wasn't that far, that long after the end of World War II, what was London like?*

WILLIAMS: London still showed a lot of the devastation of the bombing and there were a lot of vacant lots with pieces of wall around and piles of rubble. One interesting thing that was struck me was this. I had kept my commission in the Army Reserve and every year I would go for two weeks to Germany to do my active duty training. I went to various places in Germany, both when I was in London and later when I was in Madrid. I went to Frankfurt, Stuttgart,

Schweinfurt, Nuremberg, and other places. The Germans were far ahead of the British in rebuilding. It made me wonder what made the difference.

Q: How would one account for that?

WILLIAMS: I really don't know. Maybe the work ethic. I just have a feeling that maybe the Germans were harder workers and they had more of a feeling like, well, here's a task, let's get on with it. I don't know quite what to say about the British. It seems as though they worked awfully hard during the war, but I think there was sort of a let-down after the war in many ways, politically and the work ethic-wise. In fact, I recall at that time there was a Labor Member of Parliament who got a little annoyed at the practices that he saw of a gang working on the street near his house. So he would time them, from the time they got there in the morning and he would see how many people were working at any particular time of day, what time they went to lunch, what time they came back from lunch, what time they took their breaks and so on. Really, it was pretty shocking when he went public with this. It came out in a newspaper. They apparently would show up to work in a very leisurely way, not at the time they were supposed to, but maybe a half hour later. Then, they would go and do a little work then they would take their morning tea break, then they would take a long lunch period and then work a little more, then there would be an afternoon tea break and then they would all leave before the time they were supposed to leave. Well, the MP got annoyed at this, but when he went public, a great storm of criticism descended on him from his own party. He was a "traitor to the working class." Oh boy! I could not imagine that anything like that would have occurred in Germany.

Q: That's interesting. I guess I'm thinking about Spain and about the next step. Any other earth-shaking developments in London?

WILLIAMS: Yes. Well, I only lasted for a year as the Ambassador's Aide, because an inspector came through. We have these inspections periodically. The first inspector that inspected me is now a retired Ambassador and lives down in Southern Pines, Findley Burns. I've reminded Findley of this, although I don't think he remembered it too clearly. He was the first inspector with whom I ever came in contact, and he asked me all kinds of questions about my job. How might it be improved or how might the efficiency of the office be improved?

I told him I thought the efficiency of the office could be improved by abolishing my job and distributing the duties among several other people whom I named.

Q: The fellow said, "How can we make this more efficient," and so you said?

WILLIAMS: I said, "Abolish my job and redistribute the duties among other people." When the word of this got back to the Ambassador he abolished me. Actually, I was sent over to the Consular section, where I did my apprenticeship as a Consular Officer for the following year.

Q: Where was the Consular section?

WILLIAMS: It was not in the main Embassy building, but across Grosvenor Square in one of the old homes. I think it was Lord and Lady Bailey's old home, actually. Anyway, it was a lovely old

house. My desk was right in front of this great fireplace with a wonderful mantel, it was just terrific. Anyway, we had an awful lot of visa applicants. At first, I was in the visa part of the operation, non-immigrant visas; then for several months I did immigrant visas; then I did protection and welfare of American citizens. People who had one kind of a problem or another were always wandering into the Embassy wanting us to solve their problems. Some of them really did have problems and others, well, they would have had problems anywhere. But this was all interesting too. It was all very interesting to me, because I gave visas to a lot of very interesting people.

Q: Any you want to name or think of or just types of people.

WILLIAMS: Well, most of them, the people I'm thinking of were entertainers or movie actors or actresses. Right now, names don't occur to me, but they were well known at the time. Among the people that showed up at my office when I was doing protection, welfare and notariats. Consuls are like notaries public. Bob Hope was among my notariats clients. I do remember Fleur Cowles. She was the heiress of the Look Magazine publishing empire, the Cowles Publications. She was a character.

Q: What did she look like or sound like?

WILLIAMS: Oh, she was quite a distinguished looking lady. I remember one remark she made. We were talking about various prominent people most of whom she knew quite well and I didn't know. Anyway, I don't remember why we were having this long conversation, but she talked about some gentleman of whom she said, "He's so well known, good Lord, why his who's who is seven inches long." Then she said, "Oh, maybe I shouldn't put it like that."

Q: Oh my goodness!

WILLIAMS: I met a lot of interesting people. I did that for a while, then I got word that they were going to transfer me to Madrid. By the way, I was then engaged to an English girl and I didn't want to leave London. But, they needed a Consular Officer in Madrid, and I was young and single and easily transferable, so I got transferred. This was in November of '56 so I didn't quite finish out my two full years. I was a couple of months short of my two years in London.

LLOYD JONNES
Economic Officer, Economic Cooperation Administration
London (1956)

Lloyd Jonnes was born in Ohio in 1924. He graduated from Antioch College in 1948 and served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1943 to 1945. Working for the ECA and USAID programs, he served overseas at posts including Switzerland, Austria, the UK, Libya, Turkey, Vietnam, and Indonesia. He was interviewed by W. Haven North on August 19, 1986.

JONNES: My next assignment was to London in 1956, the year of the Suez War that embittered British- American relations. I was transferred from Vienna to London to take a position as an assistant Treasury Attaché in the office of the Treasury, but technically I was part of the ICA mission -- there was a small group in London that was closing down the operations of the Marshall Plan and its successor agencies. The justification for our being there at all was to insure a reasonably, orderly conclusion of our operations. I think there were five ECA officers. Two of us were in the Treasury office doing general economic reporting. In point of fact, much of my activity apart from reporting on the balance of payment was concerned with various agreements for contributions by the United States to the British government for support for one or another aspect of the common defense.

Q: But the Marshall Plan had ended?

JONNES: Yes, the plan had ended in 1952. There were residual activities, however, and by the time I got there they had a number of small programs involved in the sale of our agricultural commodities of one type or another against sterling payment, and the question was then how should the proceeds of these sales be used. We were also very interested in helping the British with their procurement of various types of military equipment, and the financing of this became the subject matter of our day to day operations. There's not really much to be said because I was really outside the mainstream of development work. The mission as such in London was terminated in mid-'57 and all of us except the accountant left. Two of us went to the mission in Libya.

Q: A lot of activity was really related to the military procurement and analysis?

JONNES: And to the sale of agricultural commodities.

Q: And technical assistance?

JONNES: I had nothing to do with that..

Q: They were continuing, but you had nothing to do with it?

JONNES: Technical assistance under our aegis was virtually at an end..

Q: You weren't there very long?

JONNES: A year. A very pleasant year in spite of Suez, but an interlude.

HOWARD MEYERS
Political-Military Officer
London (1956-1959)

Howard Meyers was born and raised in New York City. He attended the University of Michigan and then Harvard Law School, before joining the U.S. Army in 1942. He entered the Foreign Service in 1955, working mainly in the Arms Control area. He served in several posts in England, Japan, and Belgium, as well as in the U.S. Mr. Meyers was interviewed by Peter Moffat in 2000.

Q: After you got your reward: an assignment to London, one that would be coveted by all your colleagues, I'm sure.

MEYERS: I knew a number who were very anxious to have the job. I was actually the first political-military officer in London. Obviously there had been officers long before me dealing with these issues, but I had the combined responsibility for defense, atomic energy - both peaceful and warlike - and arms control before during and after the Suez crisis. It was one of the most exhilarating times to be in London and it was certainly difficult. In the midst of this period, one of my carefully unnamed but very senior British colleagues, who came from a British family with a very long and distinguished military background, he himself had won the Military Cross during World War II, wanted to take me to lunch at his club, which was "Boodle's," the most conservative, old fashioned club in all of London, and he wanted to take me there so he could wave me like a banner of defiance. I managed to take him to lunch instead, in the more neutral atmosphere of a restaurant.

On the other hand, I went to lunch with two charming, well-bred American ladies, who screamed at me in disagreement with U.S. policy. On this subject, as I kept on saying to them feebly, I had nothing to do with the formulation of this policy back in Washington. I am grateful that I didn't, though I did try to explain why I thought we were right. The British and the French didn't have the sealift or the airlift sufficient to bring enough troops to bear quickly to be decisive. Only the Israelis, who egged the British and the French on to doing this, were able to move as they did for their own purposes, but certainly not our principal allies.

That was a great time to be there. As you can see from what I am talking about, I had the background of these many, many months over the years of being in these arms control discussions, and coming to know the people with whom I would be in contact all the time on vastly divergent issues. It gave me a leg up in doing my work and enjoying this marvelous country, Britain, as it was coming out of this period of deprivation. You know, of all of my experiences, the one that most moved me was the dedication of the Eisenhower Chapel in St. Paul's Cathedral. We were very well represented by the then Vice President, Richard Milhous Nixon. The entire Cathedral was filled. The Dean of St. Paul's gave the address and he ended it by quoting from that fascinating chapter in the second volume of *Pilgrim's Progress* in which Valiant for Truth crosses the River Jordan to the City of God. It is a wonderful one in which, without giving you all the details, Valiant for Truth as he goes down into the river, has all the trumpets blow for him from the other side. As the Dean of St. Paul's concluded, the trumpeters of the Household Cavalry at one end of the nave blew the American taps, which is different from the British, and as those notes died away, the Household Cavalry trumpeters blew from the other end of the cathedral, blew the American reveille, which is also different from the British, and the congregation rose as one and sang the Battle Hymn of the Republic. I tell you, that was an experience that put the hairs up on the back of my neck.

It was one of the glorious experiences that I had in all my time abroad, although I had something somewhat similar the second time I was in Japan, many, many years later. Anyhow, I ended my London tour more than abruptly. I didn't realize but there had been long discussions going back and forth between London and Brussels and Washington. Walton Butterworth insisted that I was the man that he wanted for a couple of practical reasons and nobody else, and there was some dispute over my fair body as a result. The European Communities, as they then were, had moved to Brussels for the first time. The U.S. Mission was the executor of a very complicated and as I thought far too ambitious program for nuclear cooperation with the EURATOM Commission, in power reactor development. It was a strange business. The French opposed this strongly. They didn't oppose a program, but they did oppose the extent of this program. They did that for their own reasons, but in the end I came to think that the French were right, not for their reasons, but for our reasons. So I was not the most popular member of the U.S. Mission. At any rate I had one week's notice to get from London to Brussels, to be there by the first of August.

Now anybody who knows Europe knows that there is nothing going on the first of August! Almost everybody, almost all the senior representative officials, anyway, are off on their own holidays. But I was a personnel problem, because of the level at which this had been discussed and particularly because my revered Loy Henderson was involved and our Administrative Counselor, Mace was his name, wanted to avoid problems for him. So off I went and I said to the Administrative Counselor in my departure, "I will be consulting with the damn files!" and that is what I did, for that month. But we made it through. I paid more for the storage of my goods than the State Department did. This is why I have always had a reserved view about the administrative side of the State Department, but I leave that to one side. Brussels was a marvelous place to be at that time. I saw the city change from a provincial city to a vibrant, culturally, artistically, politically interesting place. I very much enjoyed meeting the people that I saw there. The extent to which, for example, the Germans sent the finest career people you could imagine, including people like descendants of the Von Moltkes, who had been hung up from meat hooks by the Nazis - that is a serious comment, it's not an idle description. The quality of the other delegations, particularly the French, who had simply superb people...

Q: Who was the American?

MEYERS: Walton Butterworth.

Q: Through your whole time there?

MEYERS: Yes. The collegiality, almost, of relationships between members of the European Communities delegations and the central representatives, that is to say central in the sense of not the missions of the countries, but the staff of the five, as they were then, European Community authorities, the collegiality between these groups and ourselves was very marked. Even when we disagreed, for example, with the French, and I had a couple of, to me, absolutely hilarious negotiations with the French - they could not see the forest in some instances because of the trees of their singular approach to the relationship between the European Communities and the United States, that being the forest and the trees being the basic interests - but there was a real sense of community, of collegiality, because it was so clear that the United States was, I think objectively,

the strongest supporter of the European Community concept of any state not a member of the Community.

I saw this from two sides, because the British were negotiating to join and they had a very distinguished team known as the Flying Knights, because they had all been knighted by the British government, as it does to recognize seniors who are professionals and distinguished. One of them was a very close friend of mine, so that we saw him regularly when he came over from London. We entertained him and he entertained us. Indeed I communicate even today with his daughter, who was my daughter's closest friend and who is the wife of the European Community representative to the United Nations' offices in Geneva. Time does pass. I think that my description of our relationships with the concept of the European Communities is an objectively fair one. I did think and unfortunately probably for me it was described in a few official communications, that the relatively small group in our State Department which was pushing ahead so strongly in support of the European Community was moving ahead too fast too hard, and they were wrong, simply wrong in thinking that the European Community would rather quickly become a United States of Europe. Since everybody knows who these people were and two of them I regarded as friends, I won't mention them.

I think this was a genuine failure to appreciate that, at that time, the European Community was simply an expanded customs union. The difficulties which exist today, in my view, of enabling an adequate balance of power between different sides, different groupings - grouping in this case means a government organizational grouping were not adequately comprehended. I had, not that long ago, a fascinating conversation with an unnamed Justice of our Supreme Court, who is very knowledgeable on the institutions of the European Union, as it is now known, on one aspect which was the ambit, or the reach of the European Court. This was a very recent conversation in the last month. I raised the same questions that I had raised officially and unofficially, with this group of important people in the State Department and expressed my concern that the jurisdictional ambit of the European Court was too broad to avoid running into conflict with the other European institutions and particularly the lack of real power in a European legislature, rather than those which existed, and found that this distinguished Justice with rather more recent experience than I, substantially agreed with me. That is the sort of thing that I was concerned with in an entirely different framework a couple of decades earlier, even though there has been much progress. But the United States was still the best supporter the European Community had outside of itself. Anyhow, that gets me to when I went back to Washington.

Q: That was in 1962?

MEYERS: It was the end of 1962. I ended up in a new institutional arrangement. There was no Bureau of Political Military Affairs; there was an office of Political Military Affairs. Without exaggeration, we did absolutely everything that the current bureau is doing but as an office we were, in effect, attached to the Secretary's office through the fact that our boss was Alexis Johnson, who I think can honestly be said to have succeeded the mantle of Bob Murphy in terms of the respect in which he was held and the reach of his office's influence. Just to show you how we did a lot with little: I was the coordinator for foreign military and security assistance in the State Department, as one of my jobs, only one, as the Deputy in that office for Operations. We did things differently. Regional bureaus had their own specialists. We would meet and try and

coordinate, that is to say we would try and figure out what we were really interested in. We just did it with less people. I don't know if we did it as well, but we did it.

ROCKWOOD H. FOSTER
Far East Affairs
London (1956-1960)

Mr. Foster was born and raised in Massachusetts, educated at Harvard University and served in the US Navy in World War II. Mr. Foster served as Political Officer in London. In his Washington assignments he dealt with Southeast Asian and West Indian Affairs. Following his retirement in 1963, Mr. Foster served as Commissioner of the District of Columbia. Mr. Foster was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: You were there from '56 to when?

FOSTER: To '60. And my world exploded again.

Q: I was going to ask because '56 was a major year. When did you arrive?

FOSTER: I arrived, I would say, [in April] of '56.

Q: So, you were in place by October.

FOSTER: Yes, and the world exploded.

Q: Prior to October '56, how were things working with the British as far as your getting information?

FOSTER: Very well, indeed. I had a permanent pass to the Foreign Office, for instance. You know, you'd just show it and walk in. [Anglo-American cooperation] was very close, indeed. And they were very glad of our interest. I think they shared most of the information about China with us, let alone Malaya and Burma.

Q: They had relations with China, but I take it they were not wandering around China.

FOSTER: Not much.

Q: The fact is that the British maintained relations, but the Chinese didn't really give them an inside track or anything else.

FOSTER: Except for the fact that they'd been there so long. They didn't tell us where and how they got their information, but they'd been there so long they tended to know what the [Chinese] were doing. At least, that was my opinion at the time. And they'd pull some interesting tricks on

you in the Foreign Office. Like you'd be sitting at the guy's desk and he'd get up and go out in the hall and they were watching to see whether you'd go through his papers, which I didn't, obviously. And who knows what they'd left there for me to see if I had gone through. This was a period of very close relations.

Q: We're talking about the Suez crisis in October of 1956 where relations at the upper level, more than anywhere else...

FOSTER: ...were very bad.

Q: Very bad.

FOSTER: The ambassador got sent home.

Q: [Prime Minister Eden] and Dulles detested each other and then he got this Suez thing which was a really rather stupid thing on the part of..

FOSTER: And they didn't like our ambassador at all, Winthrop Aldrich.

Q: No? What happened at your level and your relations?

FOSTER: At my level, the man in charge of the Middle East in the Embassy needed more help and so I began to help part time, particularly when we were forming the Suez Canal Users Association. One of our enormous problems was creating an organization whose initials didn't spell something dirty in somebody else's language. (Laughter) Like, do you remember during World War II, they tried to set up the Supreme Headquarters Italian Territory and they suddenly realized they couldn't do that.

Q: I'm told we had something called American for Government people who went into Civil Affairs. It was AMGOD, which meant in Turkish male/female sexual organs or something like that. (Laughter)

FOSTER: Exactly. So eventually, SCUA turned out to be all right.

Q: Could you explain what the Suez Canal Users group was and what was the genesis of that?

FOSTER: Basically, they wanted to get [management of the Canal] out of pure British hands [and] into the hands of the people who were using the Canal. There's a word for it, we now use in the environmental business, stakeholders or something. This was long before that's ever been invented. I frankly don't remember exactly who belonged to it, but it was essentially the people used the canal.

Q: The idea was to try to diffuse the Egyptian nationalization of the Canal.

FOSTER: Exactly. And have it internationally controlled. So the Egyptians, again, were just not- (end of tape)

The contrary happened. I was taken out several times by my contacts in the Foreign Office into the hall and they'd say, "I just want you to know, Adam, that I didn't know anything about it." They were ashamed because the Eden government hadn't released this information very far down... We saw the British government fall. We also saw Princess Margaret getting married, the Queen having a baby, and the U-2 Summit.

Q: In Paris, yes.

FOSTER: And I saw with my own eyes, Sputnik sailing through the skies from a balcony in London. What a period in history!

Q: Oh, yes. Well, we want to go back to the Suez time because I'm told there was a period, that at least at the higher level of the British government, there were orders from Eden basically cut off all communication with Americans.

FOSTER: Yes, that was true and that's why the British junior people were saying they hadn't held out on me. They just didn't know either. He held it, not just from us, but from his own people.

Q: This was where Eisenhower said eventually, "We're not going to stand by... This is a French, British, Israeli invasion of Egypt at that point and the United States took a very firm stand against it.

FOSTER: By the way, I was a junior officer in the Far East part of the Embassy. There were junior officers in the Middle East part of the Embassy. One of them was Dayton Mak. (Laughs) [London: April 1954-December 1956]

Q: Oh, yes. Who is working with us now and whom we've interviewed.

FOSTER: Yes. And I was brought in to give him a hand.

Q: Yes, to help. What were you picking up regarding the Far East besides China? Were you getting pretty good reports from Burma, Malaya, and Singapore?

FOSTER: What I was getting, probably most importantly, was the British desire in that period, to strengthen and preserve and continue the idea of Commonwealth, as distinct from Empire. The movement from Empire to Commonwealth. This was, I found, all over the place, not just at the senior levels. They realized that colonialism was going to be a thing of the past.

Q: Also, this was the time when the British were really pulling back in many places.

FOSTER: Economics were forcing it.

Q: Well, economics, their garrisons, and their areas were being reduced and they were getting ready to pull out of Africa essentially.

FOSTER: Where were the colonies to go when they pulled out, you see. This is the point. That's why the concept of Commonwealth.

Q: What was your impression of the British government during this '56 to '60 period living in Britain?

FOSTER: It caused me to ask myself a question, not just about the government, but in general, which I will ask you if you have an idea on this. This is a relatively small group, population of people in Great Britain. I'm talking about England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales. For centuries now, they've had the most extraordinary percentage of genius. Whether you're talking about art, whether you're talking about music, whether you're talking about literature, this really quite small percentage of people have constantly and are continuing even to this day to produce and be enormously creative. That doesn't mean that the Germans and the French and the Italians aren't, too, but their populations are so much bigger.

The question is, "Why?" What is it about Britain that continues even to this day? The most important scientific discovery of this day was invented in a garage in Britain. It's called DNA and the gene pool and all this. And my own answer to this is (which answers your question about the British government) their high toleration of eccentricity. As long as you don't scare the horses, you can do practically anything you want. And [the] line between eccentricity and genius is [terribly thin]. So, that's not the kind of answer you were looking for, but it's the toleration of eccentricity and basically letting people do what they think is right.

Q: What about the social divisions in England, Great Britain at that time? It all strikes me as when you read British literature, watch British movies that there's this very much "Us and Them" thing. It doesn't seem to be a very bridgeable gap. Was that apparent when you were there?

FOSTER: Yes. This, of course, was changing, but if one remembers the meaning of the word "cadet." It means "third son." What did the children of the British aristocrats do? They went into the Church, they went into the Foreign Service, and the Military, you see. And it had to do with education. I'm not talking entirely about learning either, because many of those aristocrats are pretty uneducated and stupid. However, there was a certain code of behavior, which I think, with all the immigrants that were pouring in, caused these divisions. We think we're coping with immigration. Imagine what the British, the Anglo-Saxons have coped with regarding immigration, which caused these class distinctions. I'm not sure I know anymore the definition or the meaning of the word "class," but that's what you're referring to.

Q: Yes. During this time, did you find in the Foreign Office that there was any sort of change during this '56-'60 period of relations the Embassy and the Foreign Office as far as sharing information?

FOSTER: Not that I'm aware of, but I would have only known it in a very narrow field. As you know, our ambassador was withdrawn and a new man was sent.

Q: Who was our ambassador when you arrived?

FOSTER: [Winthrop Aldrich. He'd been there since 1953.]

Q: And you were saying he didn't get along?

FOSTER: He wasn't very popular. I remember the British saying to me, "He came to England with a closed mind and an open fly."

Q: Chasing women and that sort of thing?

FOSTER: Yes, so he was pulled out after Suez and John Whitney was sent to be ambassador [in early 1957. The next year,] I went off on home leave. I'd been there two years. And when I came back, I discovered I had a new job. Whitney had lost his temper, which he very seldom did. He said, "This isn't fair. The British have the job divided between the Queen and the Prime Minister. And I've got to do both. So I want a young Foreign Service officer to handle my Prime Minister life and I want a young politician to handle my [royal responsibilities], you know, [protocol] at court and all of this kind of thing. And I was that young Foreign Service officer. I came back to discover I'd been moved to a new job called [staff aide] to the ambassador. And a young politician, still a friend of mine, had been brought in to handle his [royal responsibilities]. His name is James Symington. Jimmy Symington [arrived in London in 1958]. You may know he lives around here. Both of us very young, new babies and so on.

Q: What was your job?

FOSTER: Basically, everything that had to do with the Foreign Service side of his job being with the Foreign Office particularly with the Prime Minister. I was his private secretary for that.

Q: The Prime Minister, being during this '58 to '60 period?

FOSTER: Well, Eden was succeeded, you see.

Q: Was it Macmillan?

FOSTER: It was Macmillan, yes. I'm having a senior moment, at this point, I've sort of forgotten. But, essentially, dealing with his private secretary. [As staff aide, I also had the daily duty of screening the ambassador's cables after hours. So the embassy cable room would] call up in the middle of the night and say, "There's an eyes only message for the ambassador." They didn't wake him. They'd wake me.

Q: Oh, how nice! (Laughter)

FOSTER: And, I remember one night there was a message from the White House asking him to present America's condolences on the death of the Prime Minister of South Africa; and I could send a message back that night to the White House saying, "I regret I cannot follow instructions, because I am not accredited to the Queen of South Africa." (Laughter) Within three hours, there

was one saying, "London's absolutely right and I'm going to do it." And, you see, the White House staff didn't understand [that when South Africa declared itself a republic and left the British Commonwealth in May 1961, the Queen of England was no longer Queen of South Africa.]. (Laughter)

Q: Yes.

FOSTER: This is an incident just for the fun of it.

Q: How did your ambassador, John Whitney, operate?

FOSTER: He took the trouble to read just as much as he could. He took the trouble to ask his staff. He took the trouble to ask the British to explain things to him. He was an excellent man and a very pleasant person, too. He had an enormous amount of money, which was very hard to deal with, because he never carried any money in his pocket at all. So you'd get in a taxi with him and you'd have to pay for it. He always paid you back though. It's just habit on his part. He was a brilliant collector. His collection of art work in the Embassy was just extraordinary.

We were invited to his parties, not because we were what we were, but because he needed help [with the guests]. For instance, my wife and I would arrive at the party and I'd [introduce myself around], "I'm Adam Foster. How do you do?" We'd [separately] work our way [through the guests] and eventually we'd meet in the middle and I could ask how the baby was coming along and so forth. One day we were doing this in the middle of his house and this Brit propelled himself off the wall, came over and said, "My name is so and so," and turned absolutely purple with embarrassment. He said, "We've been watching and we thought it was such a good idea, but I thought I'd try it on you first." (Laughter) And what we discovered is if you say, "I'm Adam Foster," the British were afraid somebody would say, "So what!"

Q: Yes.

FOSTER: Nobody ever does but they are really very shy. And the change in the atmosphere when Whitney came was unbelievable and everything happened then. The first US president in office ever to visit Britain came to visit.

Q: This was Eisenhower.

FOSTER: Yes. And we, the staff, didn't know how long it was going to take to get from Heathrow in to the Ambassador's house. It took five hours! Everyone in Britain turned out on the streets. They loved Ike. And he wasn't going to drive right [past] them, so he was waving and all. It was very moving. We did, however, do something very shaky, diplomatically. Eisenhower wanted to play golf at St. Andrews. [Because] they didn't allow golf carts at St. Andrews, [none were available,] so we imported a golf cart through the diplomatic pouch.

Q: Well, Eisenhower, having suffered several heart attacks, needed it.

FOSTER: That's right, but we brought it in through the diplomatic pouch. The British knew it and they didn't pay attention to it. The first hole of St. Andrew's, it took him ten strokes to get the ball on the green. He was just surrounded by British watching him; and when he finally got it on the green they all clapped. (Laughter) It was just great! Again, I've gathered these moments which you like recorded, and they're just marvelous!

I would say this, that Jimmy Symington was handling the presentations at court and all that kind of thing. One of those presentations, that they'd always present the staff, and the ambassador presented this one guy whose name will be nameless. Prince Philip said, "And what so you do" and the guy said, "I'm the CIA." Philip said, "You weren't meant to say that," and moved on. (Laughter) Although, I'm sure they knew it.

LILLIAN ELENOR OSTERMEIER
Secretary to the Minister and Ambassadors
London (1956-1969)

Ms. Ostermeier was born and raised in Illinois. After graduating from Business College she worked as secretary and administrative assistant with a number of organizations in the private and government sectors. From 1956 to 1969, she was assigned to the United States Embassy in London as Secretary, first to Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission Walworth Barbour and subsequently to Ambassadors John Jay Whitney and David Bruce. Her final overseas assignment was as Secretary to Ambassador Adolph Schmidt in Ottawa. Ms. Ostermeier was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: Well, we'll come back to Paris. We'll move to London. Eleanor, you were in London for sometime, weren't you?

OSTERMEIER: Yes, 13 years.

Q: Thirteen; years, by God.

OSTERMEIER: I said I was assigned to London, but I didn't mention the particular job. I was definitely assigned to be secretary to the minister, who was Walworth Barbour. I was there for five years while he was there. He was made ambassador to Israel. I fully expected to be moved, because that was as long as anybody was allowed to stay at post. Of course, I was unhappy to move, but I didn't have anything to say about it. A couple people in the embassy and the departing ambassador, Ambassador John Hay Whitney, recommended that if Bruce wasn't bringing a secretary, there was one built-in in London. He wasn't bringing a secretary, and he chose to keep me there, which was a wonderful stroke of luck for me. He stayed for eight years.

Q: So, you were in London from when to when?

OSTERMEIER: 1956 to 1969. I was assigned then to the embassy in Ottawa, to be the ambassador's secretary there. I was there for a year. Ambassador Bruce was named to the Paris peace talks. I wrote to congratulate him. He wrote back and said, "Would you come to Paris?" So I went to Paris.

Q: Let's go back to, Walworth "Wally" Barbour. He became quite a fixture in Tel Aviv. He was a very well known ambassador there, but he was the Deputy Chief of Mission in London?

OSTERMEIER: Yes, DCM in London.

Q: What was he like to work for?

OSTERMEIER: We had a good friendly, personal relationship, but I thought he was reserved. He was very smart, intelligent. People consulted him about so many things. He was a real Foreign Service officer. He gave me lots of responsibility. He hadn't been happy with the previous secretary. It just grew into a very good minister-secretary relationship. I don't know what I was going to say about that, but he was great to work for.

Q: At that time, how would you describe the type of work you were doing? What were some of the issues, elements, you were dealing with?

OSTERMEIER: Well, when I first got to London, Harriet, you were talking about the Suez Canal problem.

Q: This caused quite a rift between the United States and Great Britain.

OSTERMEIER: Yes it did. I lived near the embassy. I guess because I was also secretary to the minister, I got called in two or three times in the middle of the night to assist in conferences. They were having conferences. It was very much the subject of the day, in those days. While Barbour was a real Foreign Service officer, he more or less ran the embassy. Both ambassadors were; well Whitney was, until Bruce came. Bruce didn't come until after Barbour left. He more or less ran the embassy. But, they had a very close working relationship. He was highly regarded by everybody.

Q: What were the other secretaries' backgrounds?

OSTERMEIER: Well, most of them, the junior secretaries, so to speak, were in the Foreign Service. I made lots of friends. But, I was unique in my experience. I was older than most of them. As I say, Whitney was there as ambassador. He and Mr. Barbour worked very closely together. Barbour was a professional and Whitney was a politically appointed ambassador. I became a close friend of Whitney's secretary, but the other secretaries were just Foreign Service secretaries. I keep in touch with a couple of them to this day.

Q: Well, when Bruce came, was there a change in how the embassy worked, that you saw, or how he used you?

OSTERMEIER: I suppose so. He was an old London hand, you see. He had been in London at various times.

Q: During the war?

OSTERMEIER: That's right. He had a great affiliation and feeling about London as a place to be. He was very glad to be back. He was really a professional in many ways. It used to be kind of a joke that Bruce would dictate a telegram, which a junior officer would normally dictate, but of course he was closely connected with the higher ranking British officers. They used to say the Foreign Service officers all over the country would bid to get a chance to read Bruce's telegrams. He was a great person to work for.

Q: How did you find the British you dealt with, outside the embassy, or with the staff, within the embassy? What was your impression of them?

OSTERMEIER: Well, I always had very good relationships with them. I knew people. There was an organization called Embassy Secretaries in London. We had a little club; secretary to the German ambassador, the secretary to the French ambassador, and also some secretaries in the foreign office. We would have little social gatherings. I knew quite a few of those people very well. As far as the embassy people were concerned; I met Harriet at the embassy.

Q: It must have been handy, and getting to know, in social terms, the other secretaries to the other ambassadors.

OSTERMEIER: Yes, it was.

Q: You can sort of call, and smooth things over.

OSTERMEIER: Well, we did a certain amount of that, but usually it was a young officer who did that sort of thing. But, it was a personal relationship. It was interesting to see how different countries, the secretaries' duties were different than mine might have been. This was actually started before Whitney left. His secretary was also in this group. I was included, probably, because I was the minister's secretary, but it then extended after I became the ambassador's secretary. I kept in touch with some of those ladies for years.

Q: Can you think of any examples that struck you as being somewhat different? How some of them were being used?

OSTERMEIER: Well, it's hard to remember now, but they definitely did have different duties. Some of them were very much involved, almost like a junior Foreign Service officer would be, and some of them were involved more on a social level, like a social secretary might be. It's hard to make a comparison.

Q: Obviously, Bruce and his wife had a very active social life, as part of his duties. Did you get involved in this much?

OSTERMEIER: Very little, because there was a social secretary to Mrs. Bruce at the embassy. I still keep in touch with her after many, many years. She stayed on and worked for Walter Annenberg. We had a good personal relationship, although our duties didn't cross very much. We had a very good personal relationship, and Harriet knew her, too.

WILLIAM C. BURDETT
Political Officer/Consul General
London (1957-1958)

William C. Burdett was born in Tennessee in 1920. He entered the Foreign Service in 1941 and served in the U.S. Marine Corps during World War II. His career in the Foreign Service included posts in Iraq, Israel, Turkey, Great Britain, and Malawi. Ambassador Burdett was interviewed by Richard Nethercut in 1988.

Q: After your service in the Bureau of Near Eastern and African Affairs, and following your work on the Richards Mission, I see that you went to Embassy London and served there for three years. Did you have some responsibilities with regard to Mid Eastern policy, and what was the effect of this assignment with regard to British-U.S. relations toward the Mid East?

BURDETT: I was assigned to London as the officer responsible for Middle Eastern and later also African affairs. Gratifyingly, British resentment at the U.S. role in the Suez matter did not interfere with a close working relationship with the Foreign Office. Our "special relationship" covered exchanges of information, intelligence assessments, and operational matters. Many in the Foreign Office had opposed the military attack on Egypt, and they were also pleased that the U.S. was taking a more active role in the Middle East. The British are extremely pragmatic people, and there was wide realization that the UK no longer had the power to play the dominant Western role in the Middle East.

EDWIN MCCAMMON MARTIN
Economic Minister
London (1957-1959)

Ambassador Edwin McCammon Martin was born in Ohio in 1908. He graduated from Northwestern University in 1929. He joined the Foreign Service in 1945, where his posts included France, England, Argentina, and Washington, DC. Ambassador Martin was interviewed by Melbourne Spector in 1990.

MARTIN: The Department . . . insisted that I must go to London as economic minister. I decided later on they were right. Nobody should be a DCM to a political ambassador who hasn't served in an embassy, and I never had.

Q: *I guess that's right. You hadn't, really.*

MARTIN: No, I had not. So I went to London. Actually, we were so sure the other was going to happen that our daughter took, as one could then, correspondence courses from the University of Nebraska to get high school credit, so that she would be ready to go to college when we left Paris. The kids had both gone through the American School in Paris, which was quite a good operation, learned French well. I had been on the board of the school for a year. Anyway, we went to London.

Q: *What year was this?*

MARTIN: This was '57. I had gone to Paris in the summer of '53, and my four years was up in the fall of '57. We came back, about October for home leave, and then went off to London later in the fall, after the home leave and briefing. So we went in the fall. We decided that our daughter could learn a lot in England, and she took stenography courses and helped Peggy with many things, and had a very interesting time not going off to college right away. England would be a more useful experience than going off to college young. Our son went to Westminster School in London and had a little trouble with the Latin, but managed.

We loved living in London. My wife thought Paris was much more exciting, but the British are so much more friendly than the French. It was great. Our first dinner party was given by one of my NATO annual review colleagues, Sir Eric Roll, who was then a rather important figure in the British Government.

Q: *He later went to the House of Lords, didn't he?*

MARTIN: Yes.

Q: *Lord Roll.*

MARTIN: Lord Roll. Ambassador [John Hay] Whitney was another first class political ambassador. He was always available if you had somebody that you needed to talk to in a favorable climate, whether you wanted to invite him to a dinner or a luncheon. He would get briefed to start the conversation so we could follow up, and he took briefings well and handled them well. He had great prestige. He and his wife had founded Bundles for Britain during World War II, for which he was well known. They had a horse racing stable, and the top class in Britain are into that. He was an art collector. He had a fabulous collection of Impressionist art in the residence. We had to know enough about it to show people around when visitors came, and one lady said, "I didn't know he was a painter," when we talked about "the Whitney paintings." The Tate Gallery had an exhibit of them after he left. They were absolutely tops, Renoirs and so forth, worth millions and millions of dollars. So he was a very good ambassador.

All this gave him access to U.K. decision makers. When we had a problem with someone, we would suggest a business lunch or a social invitation, brief him on the problem so he could start the conversation we sought, and then one of us could pursue it.

The residence had been built for the daughters of the men of Woolworth stores and pretty much donated as the Embassy residence. It was large and had extensive land around it and was located in a park. For our end Fourth of July reception about 4000 were invited and 3000 accepted. There were drinks, etc., and excellent orchestra music in the garden. All was paid for by him, of course. All the Embassy staff had assignments for 4 or 5 hours to help everyone have a good time. As a result of several cases shortly after the reception, we call Phlebitis a FSO customary ailment.

His DCM, which in London with its big staff is an important post, was Wally Barbour, who was very able. When I was there previously, Julius Holmes was there, and he was topnotch. But Wally Barbour was very good. He was not married. Whitney's wife was not well, so my wife was often the ranking woman that was available, and so she had a very busy life representing the embassy at the English speaking union, and all sorts of places, but enjoyed it thoroughly.

Whitney was a little unhappy, however, as I was not there a good bit of the time, and Evans was a very competent professional, but not high level.

Q: *Who is Evans?*

MARTIN: John Evans, my number two. First, I was brought back for four or five weeks on a selection board of Class I officers, and then I was brought back for six weeks to work with William Draper. Eisenhower had asked him to head a commission on our military assistance programs around the world, and he co-opted me to handle the European area, which was the biggest part of it because of NATO, which I knew from my NATO background. So I first went to Spain to talk to a U.S. general there who had worked more recently at NATO, but also about Spanish-Portuguese aid possibilities, and then to Washington, and I was there for most of the six weeks. So I had nearly three months that I was not available in London. As I say, he was not totally happy.

But there was a good economic staff. Joe Greenwald was there, who later on was ambassador to OECD and the Common Market. As I said, John Evans and Dan Margolies for a while.

Q: *Mr. Ambassador, this was your first position in a regular so-called diplomatic establishment.*

MARTIN: Yes.

Q: *How did you find it? What was the quality of the other officers laterally to you politically, administrative counselor, and so on?*

MARTIN: I think, on the whole, very good. The top political man was good, but not outstanding. All the rest were quite good, indeed. We had very good service, very good collaboration. I had only one really serious problem with the political staff. The Far East specialist was Edwin W. Martin, and I'm Edwin M. Martin. Every phone call had to be answered, "Do you want the Far East Ed Martin or the Economic Ed Martin?"

Q: *You are still referred to around Washington that way, you know.*

MARTIN: Yes, that's right. Actually, I guess I mentioned how much trouble I had when I first came in and offered a job to somebody in Chicago, and he sent me a telegram accepting, but I didn't get it; it was sent to Peking, where Edwin W. Martin, the only Edwin Martin the Department knew, was serving. Ever since, we've been reading each other's mail but they're a nice couple, and we have no problems with it. Recently, a few years ago, he and I both had a book published by the same publisher, he got the brochures for mine and I got the brochures for his. And it goes on and on. But in the same embassy, it was a really difficult situation.

I did one other thing of general interest, I think, while I was there. They took Dan Margolies while I was there and made him economic counselor at the embassy in Zaire. I wrote whoever was the Under Secretary for Administration at that point -- I don't remember who it was -- that I thought the job in Zaire was much more difficult than the job in London, and that ought to have the rank of minister, and mine could be a Class III officer. All I had to do was read the Financial Times, the Economist, and the reports of the Ministry of Finance, to report on the British economic situation. If there was any really important issue, it was usually handled by the Treasury in Washington or the State Department in Washington, not at my level in London. Finally the U.K. government thought, probably correctly, that they know better than we how to run their economy. So that neither the reporting nor the negotiating were of any significance. However, in Zaire Margolies would have to make up his reports as best he could with little help and he could be of important help to the government of Zaire in choosing its economic policies as a recently independent country with inexperienced officials. I got no response, as I recall it.

The only real issue that I did get involved in was the question of British membership in the Common Market, which was a very active subject at the time. The labor party was opposed. They thought they were the only country with an important labor party, and that the European members would force policies on Britain that were against their interests. I felt there were other reasons, too. The whole Commonwealth relationship was a very complex one to be dealt with in the Common Market framework at that time. See, this was before they had released all of the African group, particularly the African group. But this was something to be handled much more slowly and not pressed hard, as they were doing and as Washington was doing under Dulles' leadership.

My recollection is the head of the political section did a cable on why they were opposed, and it was sent to me by the ambassador, and I didn't think it was appropriate, and rewrote it. I think I got some kind of an award from the Foreign Service Association, for a good reporting telegram. I know Jack Reinstein, who was the economic minister in Paris at the time and had worked with me on the Austrian peace treaty, asked for a dozen copies to show around as the best explanation that there had been on the situation.

I did get called on, in view of my NATO background, and the fact that a man named Richard Powell that I had known in NATO matters was now the top civil servant in the Ministry of Defense, to negotiate the arrangements for the location of the Thor nuclear missiles in Britain. We put them in Britain and Italy and Turkey at this time, during this period. I handled those negotiations with the Minister of Defense, who was a difficult character -- "Drunk Dunk," some people called him. But his assistant, Powell, was very good; we worked well together.

My opposite number in the Foreign Office was Sir Paul Gore-Booth, later Lord Gore-Booth, who was in the embassy here later, and I had close connections with him, a very able fellow. We had tea last fall with his widow in London.

It was an easy group to work with, on the whole, in that way, although the Foreign Office didn't have as much control or knowledge about what people in the Ministry of Finance were doing and other places as we did. We also had a good contact with the top civil servant in the Ministry -- I guess they call it Treasury there. The top civil servant there is head of the whole civil service system there.

Q: *That's right.*

MARTIN: His name was Roger Makin and he was married to an American who was the daughter of Dwight Davis, who founded the Davis Cup of tennis. They lived just a couple of blocks from us, and we got to be good friends. He later was ambassador here in Washington.

So we had friends around, helped partly by our NATO friends. Actually, the person that was representing them at this time at the other economic integration organization based in Geneva, the European Free Trade Area, I think it was called, had been my opposite number on our NATO delegation in Paris, the number two at one point. So that things worked out very well on that side.

I don't think of a whole lot more that needs to be said about the London experience, except one other thing I could say. I did get invited to do a lot of speech making. There was a lot of interest around, apparently, in the U.S., and its policies, and so forth. We were going through a bit of a depression at that time with a foreign exchange deficit too, and that was affecting our ability to do things and our position. There was a lot of interest in our progress in dealing with the depression. So I think I must have made, at the time I was in London, a speech or two a month, one place or another, all around the country. That was fun, getting to know the country and know the people in different parts of the country. We enjoyed that very much.

Q: *The ability to deliver a speech is something that's required of a Foreign Service officer.*

MARTIN: It's very advantageous, I think. One of the stories I used in the first speech I made, which was to a of the leaders of all the Commonwealth oil companies, members of a petroleum trade association, several hundred people there, on the difficulties of communication. I said most had been told not to go to the theater for six months because you won't really understand English English, against American English. And I took with me told my favorite story of a movie we had gone to with our two kids on the Champs Elysées in Paris the first month after we got there, called "High Noon," which is famous, Gary Cooper and Grace Kelly, one of her first. French subtitles were provided. It ends, more or less, in a bar-room fight that Gary Cooper wins, but pretty messed up, and he staggers across the street -- it's a Western -- to another bar, and collapses on counter and says, "Give me a shot of red eye." And the French subtitle was "Un Dubonnet, s'il vous plaît." And nobody understood why four people in the center of the theater laughed out loud! (Laughs)

Later on, the retired general who had been head of our Defense staff in USRO saw it in Brussels, where they had moved when NATO did, and his wife sent the subtitle to the New Yorker, and they printed it and sent her \$25. (Laughs) But it was very useful to illustrate the problems of language.

I remembered, also, a negotiating crisis on a ministerial meeting communiqué. That was the most important part about a ministerial meeting of NATO, the communiqué. At midnight, we were still arguing over the French translation of a phrase between Paul Henri Spaak, a Belgian, and Herve Alphand, a Frenchman. French was the native language for both, but they couldn't agree on the French translation, and we had to change the English. It's tricky, very tricky business.

As I say, I think that's about enough for England. We came back for home leave in late '59, having enjoyed England thoroughly as a place to live, and I was told that the then Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Tom Mann, wanted to get back into Latin American affairs and get an embassy in Latin America, and I was wanted to replace him. I would come in first as his deputy, replacing the present deputy, who would be taking my place in London. Mann was ill, so I'd have to start as acting Assistant Secretary. It turned out he was asked to do special Latin American chores for several months, so while I wasn't officially in the job until September, I was acting for most of that 1960 period. We took a Christmas holiday in Puerto Rico first, though, to be with our daughter and husband as she had gotten married in London, another story.

We came back, and I came into the office about the third of January, a Thursday, and said, "I'd like to come in on Monday. We've got some unpacking and settling to do, moving back here."

"Oh, there's a meeting in the White House this afternoon with Clarence Randall, who is Eisenhower's Coordinator of Economic Policy, which you must go to." I found out also that Monday I had to chair a meeting of a commission of advisors on our problems with salmon fishing in the Pacific, on which we were having battles with the Japanese, and I had to get briefed. So I broke in kind of fast. (Laughs)

Q: Back to London for just a moment. What about your administrative support, your representation allowance? Did you have enough representation allowance? Did you find it a handicap?

MARTIN: I'm trying to think. I think it was reasonable at this time. I'd better talk to Peggy a little about that, but I think it was reasonable.

Q: You weren't getting funds, were you, from NATO or from anywhere else? It was strictly embassy?

MARTIN: Embassy entirely. I don't think that was a major problem. Where we lived, we could seat 12 people at the dining room.

Q: Was that house furnished you by the embassy?

MARTIN: Yes, it was an embassy house, 12 Hyde Park Crescent. The administrative officer lived in the next block, right there on the crescent.

Q: *Nice to have him close by.*

MARTIN: Yes. One of the attachés was around the corner. It was a wide street, very wide crescent, with a church across the way, so it was very convenient. I usually walked through Hyde Park to Grovesnor Square, which was handy, 20 minutes. I was a little depressed about some of the plans for the new building, which was under construction then. They made some serious mistakes on that one, no parking space to speak of, and they had an open area between the rooms in the political division, so you could hear what one person was saying in one room if your office was in the next room, which, for security, was impossible.

Q: *You mean they didn't have any ceiling?*

MARTIN: The walls didn't go clear to the ceiling. For better air conditioning. Then the entranceway had a huge fountain. What you need is more moisture in the atmosphere in London! But the parking problem was serious, I guess they didn't know that they were going to start charging for parking around the Square.

Q: *And you couldn't park very long.*

MARTIN: No.

Q: *Had to move your car all the time.*

MARTIN: That's right. Now I'd like to go to London, if I may, for some pickups. One name I couldn't remember, who was our neighbor and was the top man in the civil service in the Treasury, it was Sir Roger Makin. He was the top economic, as well as civil service, person in the British Government, and we saw a lot of him. We made a protocol mistake once at a luncheon, at which we had an important member of Parliament. We assumed that he would outrank a civil servant, but Roger Makin had an Order of the Bath or something like that, and that outranked everybody except the Lord. (Laughs) But they were all very nice about being placed wrong at the table.

Q: *"Americans -- what do they know?"*

MARTIN: "What do they know?" Right. Then I wanted to mention, also, a little problem I had there, a jurisdictional point with the Treasury attaché. Economic financial relations were important, and there was a Treasury attaché who was an able man, but I discovered that he was sending either cables or letters reporting on conversations with British officials on critical issues without showing them to anybody in the embassy. I went to the ambassador and said that I could agree that he could use private channels, but I had to know what he was saying. He agreed with me, and we worked it out. But a country team operation can be a little tricky, particularly the Treasury, tending to feel they're separate and equal and don't need to play within the framework.

It did seem to me that it was important that all the people dealing with these issues in practice, if not in form, operate under the economic minister or counselor at the embassy.

Q: I think this is a very important point as it's gone on over the years, is that coordination at the embassy. As you know later, as we'll get into, we tried to do that in Latin America.

MARTIN: Yes.

Q: So essentially what happened was that the ambassador used his authority, however that was spelled out at that time, to . . .

MARTIN: To say that this had to be done. Yes. Then I wanted to also mention, too, things that came to my attention there that added to my very negative view about economic forecasting. My first experience was as we closed down the occupation program in Japan and Korea and Germany and Austria, the conventional wisdom of everybody that dealt with the Japan-Korea situation was that their biggest problem for the future was going to be how to develop enough export income to pay for necessary food imports. Speaking as of '88, they seem to have surmounted that problem rather well.

Secondly, I noted, while I was in London, that one of their big problems was a surplus production of coal, and where do we stock it to meet future possible demands. During the early years of the Marshall Plan, the late Forties, we had to find very brief ways to keep the President informed of what progress we were making in the economy recovery of Europe from the wartime devastation. We picked, as a key measure that was critical to other things, their ability to increase their output of coal, both in England and in the Ruhr area -- Germany, Belgium, Northern France. That was one of the figures that every couple of weeks or month we sent to the President to measure our progress. By the end of the Fifties, coal was a drug on the market, so to speak.

The third thing was that while we were there, a very distinguished British economist in a research organization connected with Oxford University completed a number of years of work and published a long book whose principal point was that the U.S. surplus and the European deficit in its balance of payments was a permanent problem and they would have to maintain all the controls over their investments and trade and so forth, for the indefinite future. They must put them in place permanently to prevent this U.S. surplus from destroying their economies.

By the time it was published in '58, I believe, the U.S. was having such a balance of payments deficit, rather than surplus, that we were losing gold to pay for the imports and other expenses overseas. The author later became the principal economic advisor to Harold Wilson when he was the Labor Prime Minister of England, so that he was a man of distinction and reputation. But how long can one can be that? So I don't look much to the future on things with any confidence at all. If they're good, they may become bad. If they're bad, well, don't worry too much, they'll become good. But anyway, it was a lesson.

Two other things. One, I forgot to mention that we had a visit from Vice President Nixon. He visited several European countries in November of '58, just after the U.S. elections, with his wife

Pat. He did very well. He made an impressive record. He gave two speeches, one very important one organized by the Lord Mayor of London on Britain's role in the empire, how it could be handled better. It was an excellent job.

He also arranged something that I hadn't run across before and I haven't since. He asked the embassy to get together four different groups of people for two hour, off the record, no agenda discussions. One was conservative members of Parliament, another was labor members of Parliament, a third was newspapermen, a fourth was U.S. and British businessmen. I was responsible for the latter. It was a very open exchange, in which he showed himself knowledgeable and intelligent.

He had one exchange of future significance, I think. One of those present was the head of the biggest British trading company with China. He had, in fact, been born in China in the Thirties. By this time he was a Lord, and it was a very successful business. He asked Nixon, "How long can the U.S. pretend that 600 million people don't live on this globe?" In other words, the question of recognition diplomatically of China. Nixon's immediate reply was that of course we will have to recognize China and admit that those people are humans with us. The problem is that the American public blames the deaths of 50,000 Americans in the Korean War on China. Until our memory goes dim on that subject and we no longer have it in front of our minds, we cannot recognize, but of course we must. My impression is that Kissinger has been given a lot of credit for having persuaded Nixon to make this change in U.S. policy. But in '58, he already contemplated that it would be the appropriate thing in due course, which I thought was rather interesting.

I don't recall anything else that came up of that significance, but he did have a couple of other interesting incidents.

I have some anecdotes. My wife was escort officer for Pat Nixon on a schedule which was not every five or ten minutes after the hour, but seven and a half minutes after the hour, that tight. She thought she handled herself beautifully and was very impressed with the way she supported her husband. She said, "If you want to run for office, I've learned how to do it. You stop and shake hands with everybody you meet, and thank them." (Laughs) Nixon did that on his departure. He was a little late. He was on a TV program. We were at the airport at the special room for distinguished people, and we had to come up steps right after he got there to walk out to the plane that they were taking to their next stop. Suddenly, he deserted us and ran back down the steps. We couldn't understand what was happening. We were behind schedule. When he came back, somebody asked him. "Oh, I forgot to shake hands and thank the bartender." (Laughs)

Q: (Laughs) Good for him!

MARTIN: He went out to Oxford to speak to the Rhode Scholars, and one of them asked him, "In a speech in the campaign (which had just been finished) out in Idaho, you said that you were sure that the American people were not stupid enough to vote and elect a Congress of a different political party than the President. They did. Does that mean that you think the American people are stupid?"

His reply was, "I suspect, young man, that you have a political future. If you do, you will know the American people are never stupid." (Laughs)

We had two other little incidents. He was given a luncheon by the Queen, and then Ambassador Whitney had a dinner for her at the residence. The day of the dinner, her representative called up and said she was a little bored with all these white tie affairs; let's make this one black tie. It turned out that Pat hadn't packed his black tie suit. But he had brought with him as his press advisor a man from the Los Angeles Times who was almost exactly his size, so he loaned him his suit, and I happened to have a spare one that had sort of worn out, and I loaned that to the Los Angeles Times man.

We had another little accident, because it was foggy and the plane couldn't land at Heathrow, it had to land at the other airport, Gatwick, from which you can only get up to London by train. So we had to all change at the last minute and go to the train station, and there was a red carpet laid down, and each person had their place, a member of the Cabinet, of course, and various other distinguished representatives. The train came in and sailed right past us. Apparently, nobody had told the train driver where he was supposed to stop, and we had to all run about a block and then regroup to be opposite where he was getting off.

Q: And what happened to the red carpet?

MARTIN: It just got left. (Laughs) Little diplomatic snafus, of course.

We also had an Eisenhower visit, which was very much pro forma. The only really interesting thing to me was that I was able to sit in on a meeting he had with a group of distinguished Britishers, and sat right opposite Churchill, who was a quite old man by that point, but still in good control and spoke extremely well in asking questions and giving replies to Eisenhower's questions. He made a very good impression on all of us.

Q: Could you sense any of the relationship between Churchill and Eisenhower, how Churchill felt toward Eisenhower?

MARTIN: I think he felt very well. They did talk a little bit about past connections in a very nice way. No, I think it worked out very well from that standpoint.

Q: Was Churchill then prime minister?

MARTIN: No, no. This was long afterwards -- 1958 or '59.

Q: Even after his second term as prime minister.

MARTIN: That's right.

Then I'd like to say one thing about the Draper Commission. It was a very distinguished group, including John McCloy, whom I had to work with very closely because of the European aspects, like Germany, were very important, and he had been ambassador to Germany. It also included Al

Gruenther, a friend from NATO days. This led to a real argument when Draper wanted, with his usual expansive outlook to study in developing countries not only military assistance to them but also their economic ability to support their military. Through somebody's guidance he got into population growth as a factor in reducing their economic capacity, and wanted to recommend that the U.S. do something about this. He spoke informally to President Eisenhower, who was very sympathetic. But Al Gruenther, a very able man, was also a very devoted Roman Catholic. He just refused to go along, and it was a real battle. I believe it did not appear in the report, but Eisenhower was very definitely in favor, and later on, had talks with the whole National Security Council meeting to discuss this issue with people from particularly the aid agency of that time, and found them reluctant to do anything until James Riddleberger took over, and then they were much more willing. But by then, it was too late to take a new initiative.

Q: There was nothing in the Draper Report?

MARTIN: I don't think he managed to get it in. Gruenther was too stubborn on that.

One other thing that I picked up in London. I think I did talk about the problem of recruiting university graduates, and this being a major problem in British competitiveness. There was in the U.S. an Organization of Economic Cooperation Development study of this whole question. The British invented things, but they didn't have staff in their industries to convert them into products that were saleable. They invented the jet engine, they invented penicillin, and so forth. This was basically because anybody with any technical know how was considered a workman and not for a managerial job. Nobody recruited at the universities, but only looked for graduates of the "public schools," so called, really private secondary schools in U.S. terms.

I went out to Vickers, making airplanes very successfully, and we had lunch with the top staff, and I asked the vice president of personnel if they had any university graduates, and he thought a couple of minutes and said, "I don't think of any in the whole company." They had sent a few people to technical institutes that had joined them as apprentices or something like that, but they came back with no decision making status or role.

Later on, in dealing with the labor people at the top, I found the same thing in the union situation. They had won their basic battle for rights in representing employees, but able union workers tended to be more interested in being promoted to a foreman than in becoming president of a union or taking a union job, because they paid them practically nothing. They paid them a workman's wages. When I told them that the president of the Auto Worker's Union in Detroit, Walter Reuther, whom I had known a bit, probably got a \$50,000 a year salary, which in those days was a lot of money, they just couldn't believe it. There was no excitement of the fight, because they had won that and had their party, which was running the government for part of the time. But they didn't pay anything to anybody, any adequate money, and so nobody wanted to stay on and work for the unions. It was a very discouraging industrial scene from both standpoints at that point in time.

I think that's all I have to go back on. I think we ended last time with my coming to Washington with the prospect of replacing Tom Mann when he moved to an embassy, as he wanted to do, and with his illness and being taken over for some special Latin American jobs, I being acting

Assistant Secretary until July 29, 1960, when he was officially named as Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, instead of an embassy. Roy Rubottom, who had been the Assistant Secretary, went as ambassador to Argentina at the same time. I became officially the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. Also in 1960, I got promoted to being a career minister, having been five years a Class 1 officer from the Wriston process.

GRANT V. MCCLANAHAN
Near East, Political Officer
London (1957-1962)

Grant V. McClanahan was born in Egypt in 1919. He graduated from Muskingum College in 1941 and enlisted in the Navy in 1942. He began working for the Department of State in 1946 in INR until joining the Foreign Service in 1954. His overseas career included positions in the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Iraq. The interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy January 1997.

Q: When did you get to London?

MCCLANAHAN: I went to London in June of 1957. I left early in 1962. Then I went to Paris for six months to attend the NATO Defense College.

Q: What was your job during this period?

MCCLANAHAN: The embassy political section staff was about eight or nine officers, and the section chief was Brewster Morris. There was so much Anglo-American political business in the Middle East that we had two officers for that area. Evan Wilson was the senior one and I was the junior. The first year I was a class four. Then I was promoted to class three. Wilson finished his tour and went back to Washington. His replacement, Bill Burdett, came from NEA and there was a delay before his arrival in which I was the only one. There were a lot of interesting things going on, including a minor war in Oman. Morris always accompanied me on the important occasions. He was not an Arabist, but he was very helpful.

Q: You arrived there during a very difficult period after the British Suez crisis and in the middle of our growing involvement in Vietnam. Was this a very difficult time?

MCCLANAHAN: It was a difficult time. The Suez crisis had been a most difficult time in U.S.-British relations. By the time I had got there, Mr. Macmillan had taken over from Anthony Eden as prime minister. The foreign secretary, Lloyd Selwyn, had been an active spokesman for the Suez situation and not one to apologize for it at all. There was a lot of public feeling against America for not having backed the British more firmly. In fact, we had been critical of Britain and France in the United Nations at times. My two daughters, who went to British schools at that time, found that their fellow students were often anti-American.

There was an interesting meeting convened by Chatham House, the Royal Society of International Affairs. The topic was the Middle East and U.S.-British relations. The attendees were people from our embassy and the foreign office. There were also British academics and businessmen concerned with the area, a roomful of about 60 persons, all by invitation. I sensed that Chatham House was exploring the policy of the new Macmillan administration, which was, let's not allow U.S.-UK differences to affect other issues or even to go on further. The British had no post in Cairo and Cairo was a key area. Evan Wilson and I, under the direction of the State Department, were encouraged to share our information with the British. This type of consultation was appreciated by the British, and we actively reported their reactions and views on the area.

Q: Were you getting at the professional Foreign Service level a certain annoyance of the British Foreign Service about how the Suez issue was handled?

MCCLANAHAN: Some of the professionals who had thought that Eden's Suez policy was a mistake at the time of the military attack resented later having to deal with the consequences. They did not say that directly, but I learned that there were more than two or three that felt this way. At this Chatham House meeting, the tone was one of harmonization and reconciliation. At the end of it, during question time, one of the British attendees said something like, "Can we ask the American embassy to give the American position on the full support of Israel?" Ambassador Whitney turned to me and said that, "Our Middle Eastern officer is Mr. McClanahan." I sensed where that question had stemmed from. The questioner wanted an affirmation of an American policy of priority for the security of Israel. I responded that a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Arab nations was our aim. We recognized that the dispute was a very serious one and is one that is not only political and rhetorical. Israel in its history, attitudes, and culture was very different from the other Middle Eastern countries. I said that personally some years hence when I retired, the Arab conflict might still be one of the most serious problems in the world. The questioner replied that this sounded as though U.S. policy was bankrupt. The chairman turned to Harold Beeley, the senior foreign office official, an ex-ambassador. Sir Harold Beeley, to my relief (He was someone I had several times consulted), said that he found it difficult to disagree with the view of "my American colleague."

Q: Well, during this period you had some more serious things. The overthrow of the Hashemites.

MCCLANAHAN: That memorable day happened in Iraq July 14, 1958, when I had been in London for a year. The British interests at stake in Iraq were very great. Iraq had a great future for investment and influence in the region. It was a monarchy. Iraqi politics and society allowed Western countries to have many advantages. The military coup was very a total change of regime. By coincidence, the Baghdad Pact countries were scheduled to have a meeting on July 20th in London, right after the incident. In the embassy, we were making preparations for what we thought would be a routine conference meeting. Secretary Dulles was not planning to attend. Well, when the Iraqi revolution, led by General Kassim, happened, Dulles decided to come, and the whole meeting was upgraded. The embassy was under stress on that one for a while. Fortunately, Bill Burdett and I were there and we carried the burden of recording meetings and informing Dulles about British actions. One thing I did directly for the Secretary was to help relations between Dulles and the Jordanian officials. The Jordanian ambassador came alone to

call on the Secretary and I sat in and kept notes for them. I typed up a draft telegram while Mr. Dulles paced back and forth in the American ambassador's living room. Later, I asked him for one of the doodles that he did in one of the meetings, and someone on his staff gave me one. Until today, I have it with his initials.

Q: Did you notice in the administration, did you sense an American administration view on Israel in comparison with that of the UK? Was ours more driven by domestic politics as opposed to the British or not?

MCCLANAHAN: Yes, I think it probably was. The repercussions of a radical regime in Iraq for Israel would be given more weight by the Americans, whereas the British had their eye more on Jordan. Yes, there was a difference. The day of the revolution was a Monday, and my parents had come to visit me two days later, on the 16th. My wife, Pauli, with a friend, a member of Parliament, was supposed to take them to a tea party. That day, they sat in the gallery and they got to hear the discussion in the House of Commons about the revolution coming to Baghdad.

Q: What was the reaction of the British to our landing our troops in Lebanon?

MCCLANAHAN: I think that it was well accepted. It was recognized as a precaution, but one that was probably called for. The British sent reinforcements to Jordan and there was discussion of sending some troops that were Cyprus-based. Their first attempt at an overflight of Israel was turned back by the Israelis because they hadn't made a formal request to fly. They later did get their permission and then proceeded. The British ambassador to Lebanon was in London at the time, so he contacted our London embassy to see if we could get him back to London quickly. I think he did eventually travel on a U.S. military aircraft.

Q: Was there any concern after the Iraqi thing that the whole Middle East might turn over to the radicals?

MCCLANAHAN: That was an object of concern. Because it had been so sudden and unexpected, there was a feeling that General Kassim in Iraq might turn out to be a brother-in-arms with Nasser. If they took over Baghdad and Cairo, all the little countries would be bent in their direction. That did not happen. There soon appeared the traditional differences and rivalries between Iraq and Egypt. The ideologies were different. Iraqi nationalism had a narrower horizon. Egypt's was regional. There was a concern that the area would ban Western interests, but that is the nightmare that didn't happen.

Q: Was there any concern about Soviet interests, and what was happening?

MCCLANAHAN: Yes, I think there was. It was a situation where the Soviets could back a new leader and gain advantages. The new Iraqi regime did a reversal of Iraqi policy when it accepted military assistance from the Soviets.

Q: Did you get involved with the British when the Saudis were starting trouble in Oman in the Green mountains?

MCCLANAHAN: Yes there was a rebellion in that area. It was not an Arab nationalist movement. It was a local tribal rebellion by villagers and shepherders. It was a delicate time for the Sultan of Oman, so I used to report on what I could hear about this in the foreign office.

Q: Did Algeria fall within your area or was it out of your area?

MCCLANAHAN: That was a reporting responsibility for the Paris embassy, as Iraq was for London. We had really little to do with that. It was a smoldering crisis and a real problem for France.

Q: Did we share our views with the British or with Nasser?

MCCLANAHAN: I don't recall much about the Algerian issue at the time. The British, I think, felt even more strongly about Nasser than we did. Some conservative members of Parliament would say that "Nasser was not negotiable." They believed that he was a fundamentally anti-Western man, and we should have nothing to do with him. So, I guess there was that kind of sentiment in the Parliament and probably in the country. We weren't as interested in Nasser. I would try to let the Department know how the British foreign office was feeling about eventually reknitting relations with Egypt. The Department wished that we would be able to facilitate their steps. I also used to go to the colonial office, although that office was more reticent with us than the foreign office. When we would consult them on the problems in Africa or Aden, they would provide little more than a press release.

JOSEPH N. GREENE, JR.
Imperial Defense College
London (1958-1959)

Joseph N. Greene, Jr. was born in New York in 1920. He received his undergraduate degree from Yale in 1941 and immediately thereafter joined the Foreign Service. His overseas posts included Rome, London, Singapore, Ottawa, Montreal, Lagos and Cairo. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in March 1993.

Q: You went to the Imperial Defense College in 1958. What was the value of that for you?

GREENE: The value of that for me was exactly what the Commandant (a British diplomat, the first civilian commandant they had) said in his welcoming remarks. He said it was a year that all of us would be relieved of operational responsibility for anything. It would be a chance to explore intelligently and abstractly economic, political, and military issues worldwide. We would hear lectures by people still in the action. There would be some travel around the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. He called it a "sabbatical defensemanship." What is defensemanship? That is the art of winning without actually fighting. That made quite an impression on particularly the military members of the group. It was a good framework to keep in mind as we worked our way through all the problems of NATO and SEATO. There were four

Americans: Army, Navy, Air Force and Foreign Service. Out of 75 members of the class, maybe 50 were British from the three services and the British Foreign Service and the Secret Service. The rest were from the Commonwealth: Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Canada, Australia and Ghana.

We spent that year brainstorming issues one at a time around the world. Then in the summer tour in August, some went to Latin America, some went to Africa. I joined the India tour. We were in India, Pakistan and Kashmir, and Ceylon. At the end of December, school was over and my next assignment was DCM in Lagos.

WILLIAM D. MORGAN
Consular Officer
Birmingham (1958-1960)

William D. Morgan was born in 1925 in Rochester, New York. At age 18, during WW II, he entered the Army. He graduated from the University of Rochester with a degree in French literature in 1949. Mr. Morgan became interested in the Foreign Service after a visit to the State Department with an old Army friend. In addition to the United Kingdom, his overseas posts included France, the USSR, and Lebanon. He was interviewed by Lester Elliot Sadlow on June 23, 1995.

Q: After Paris you were transferred to the Consulate in Birmingham, England. How did the transfer come through and how did you hear about it? What was your reaction?

MORGAN: I guess it was normal, in the sense that this was the first time that I was ever transferred from one Foreign Service post to another. I think I had a telephone call from the Department ahead of time. We didn't have "bid lists" in those days. We weren't encumbered by that. As a matter of fact, it's kind of amusing to those who are interested in the subject. You arranged for a transfer by getting out the "Foreign Service List," which lists those assigned to all posts and the date of their expected transfer to another post. You went through it, looking for a date of transfer at the kind of post you wanted to go to. I did that and selected the Consulate in Birmingham, among others. I thought that I would like a nice place, and my wife thought that she would like to go to a post where they spoke English.

In looking through the "Foreign Service List" I came across the name of a fellow that I knew. We had worked together some time in the State Department. His name was Dave Ortwein. Dave was due to leave Birmingham, England, at the very time that I was due for a transfer from Paris, after allowing for home leave. So I telephoned him and said, "Dave, what is your replacement's name?" He said, "Oh, I don't have one. Hey, you'd love it, Bill. It's great here. As a matter of fact, you'd probably like it better. My wife thinks it's terrible." I said, "Look, how about my flying up there and seeing it?" He said, "Yeah, why don't you?" So, on my own, I paid my own way, flew up to Birmingham and looked the place over. Obviously, I had talked it over with my wife, who found the idea of Birmingham as our next assignment rather interesting. I told my personnel officer in the Department that I would be interested in an assignment there. So we left it to the

Consulate in Birmingham to put me in as a qualified replacement for Dave. You'll never guess what happened. I received orders in the mail, transferring me to Birmingham, England in 1958.

So, after we had home leave, we went by ship to Birmingham, England. I would call this manner of assignment rather "normal" for those days. You inquired into a place, asked a few questions, and put your name in the hopper. Now, of course, you have a process of "open bidding" for posts. You have a whole bunch of people applying for a job. You don't have to arrange things "independent" of the system. However, I think that the old way of handling assignments was better, and I suspect is a method still used in part.

Q: How much time did you have available? You said that you had home leave coming after your Paris assignment.

MORGAN: I think that I had two months of home leave.

Q: Where did you stay when you were on home leave?

MORGAN: That's always the problem when you go home. We stayed with our family. You discover very quickly that after people ask you a few questions, such as, "How was it in Paris?" - - some 30 seconds to one minute later, they're "turned off." They're no longer interested. We made a "Salade Nicoise," a delightful salad, for my father and mother. They admitted that they didn't like anchovies. They thought that hard boiled eggs and lettuce made no sense whatsoever. So that ended our recollections of life in Paris, because people weren't really interested.

More importantly, how do you "divide" the time of four people? There were my wife and I and our two children.

Q: We'll want to come back to this matter again. Let's get back to Birmingham. Tell us a little bit about the history of the Consulate and the state in which you found it in 1958, when you arrived.

MORGAN: Birmingham was a "traditional" Consulate. It was a small post, with two officers assigned. It had about five Foreign Service Nationals. It was a "constituent post," one of about six or seven under the Embassy in London. We had Consulates in Cardiff Wales, Southampton, Manchester, Birmingham, and Edinburgh Scotland, and Belfast, Northern Ireland.. However, in the "good old days" we had 20 or 30 Consulates in the U.K. As our readers know -- and you do, too -- consulates are opened for one or two basic reasons. One is to provide service to American citizens. The second reason is to protect American seamen and maritime commercial interests. That is in reverse order of importance. Our consulates were first opened in seaports. Then they grew into commercial and business oriented centers, supporting tourism, and so forth. Finally, after World War II, the issuance of and requirement for visas grew enormously. There were refugees and a general increase in non immigrant visas. Our consulates grew and grew to perform such consular functions. They supported embassies in providing political, commercial, and economic information services and so on.

The Consulate in Birmingham had been there since the middle of the 19th century, if not earlier in that century. Birmingham is the second largest city in Great Britain. It was the heart of the

"Midlands" of Great Britain, the heart of the commercial and industrial section of the country, which included Coventry, the automobile factories, and so on Real Charles Dickens stuff.

I would pause at this point and say that we "supported" the Embassy, but there was an understandable "competition" between the various Consulates and the Embassy. For example, reporting on automobiles -- there we were near Coventry. Why didn't the Embassy ask us for some of the information needed? The reason is that there was an enormous Economic Section in the Embassy and we in consulates would not dare "step on the toes" of the Economic Officers, who were trained in economics, whereas I was merely trained in the French language. So they tended to think that I couldn't begin to understand economic reporting. There was a sort of "competition" which I also noticed when I was Consul General in France between small Consulates and the Embassy. If an officer in a Consulate reported directly back to the Department without going through the Embassy, he would be in "trouble." Good Consulate Officers knew enough not to do that.

But what kind of political reporting was there for us to do in the consulates, such as Birmingham? Did the Embassy "care" what the Lord Mayor of Birmingham was thinking as a center of local "power?" However, not everything was in London. There are centers of industrial, economic, financial, and business power in places like Birmingham. Did the Embassy want to hear from us? Oh, they thought it would be very nice if we had something to report. So this left us in somewhat of a quandary as to what to report. However, I might get a question over the phone. The Economic Counselor or an officer from the Political Section might call you and say that they understand that this and that and so and so. Could you look into it? We had general guidelines from the State Department and the Embassy about subjects to "keep our eyes on."

I think I can give you one, marvelous, perhaps classic example. I would try out ideas on my first boss in Birmingham, but he spent most of his time preparing for his retirement. In fact, he dozed off at his desk for a good share of the day. He was a very nice man, but he seemed more interested in his social and home life. He left everything to me, which was agreeable to both of us. He said, "Yes" to almost everything that I suggested. I said to him one day, "You know, there is a series of articles in the local paper about social unrest in Birmingham. And in this area, traditionally the immigrants have over the decades come from poorer Ireland and often end up as bus drivers, cook and bottle washers, and do other 'staff' work. They are now being replaced by Jamaicans." I said that, not only are the Irish troubled by this, but they're losing jobs. And there is the "black-white" problem. As I came from a country which was a little more conversant with it than Great Britain, I sensed that there was something there to report on. My boss agreed.

So I went to see the Lord Mayor of Birmingham and did a lot of research on this. A number of social workers had done recent studies on it. I wrote a "masterful" airgram on this subject. In those days "Airgrams" were simply typed reports sent to the Department by diplomatic air pouch. This magnificent report went to the Department of State. It covered what I regarded as serious, social unrest in the Midlands of Great Britain. I cited sources and wasn't just making this up. I received a commendation back from the Department of State. You used to receive formal "evaluations" on your reports on a special form. A copy of this evaluation was placed in your personnel file. It said that this was one of the greatest reports -- well constructed and well researched. The conclusion of the evaluation, however, was that the report was irrelevant to the

Department of State. It stated that, "Since we are not involved in sociological studies, we have no use for your airgram at all." As a matter of fact, I have been thinking of going down to the National Archives in Washington to see if it is still on file there!

We also received some telegrams by commercial channels. One day we received a telegram from the Department through commercial channels which was encoded. The telegram said that we had just landed somewhere or someone had just invaded us -- something earthshaking like that. I spent hours decoding the damned telegram. By the time I finished this message, the newspapers on the street were announcing what the event was -- we'd landed in Lebanon!

So that is how you get into political and economic reporting. I did reports on Coventry, on the tire industry, on banking, and on a lot of different things, but almost all of them were not "volunteer" reports like the big Airgram I wrote. These other reports were done at the request of the Embassy. They were fun to do. I would go out, meet people, and collect information.

All of that probably took about one quarter of my time. I would say that about 50% of my time was spent on general management of the Consulate. As I said, my first boss tended to doze, so virtually all personnel issues and staff direction came to me. My second leader was a self proclaimed reporting officer who disliked consular and administrative work. He did write well. I went to him one day and said, "You know, this Consulate is in a terrible location." It was downtown, no parking and poor public access, crowded, and so on. We had a Foreign Service National doing commercial contact work. He had an office, my boss had an office, I had an office, and we had a big, well lit open space where all the other Consulate FSNs worked and the reception area was located..

My boss said, "Yes, we should do something about it." And the Department also said, "Yes." Back in those days you frequently got "Yes's" from the Department of State when you asked for something. We were authorized to arrange to build a new Consulate. So I got out the Foreign Service Manual to find out how you build a new Consulate. I really started from scratch. The Department said, "Go ahead and arrange for it. You'll find instructions in Section So and So of the Foreign Service Manual." And there the instructions were -- pages and pages of them. I followed the instructions, with no real direction from anyone but with the encouragement of the Administrative Counselor in the Embassy in London.

There was a new building under construction in Birmingham -- still on the drawing board. I learned about it from social contacts. The builder said that he would love to have the American Consulate in his new building. He said that he would give us this and that free. He asked us to give him an outline of what we wanted. So I literally did it -- my very first building. I've been doing it ever since. It was a lot of fun. Four years later, the Consulate was closed, as it was considered no longer to be of any use to the United States Government!

I should come back to an over all accounting for my time. That new consulate part was obviously part of the administrative segment -- 50% of the overall. It obviously, went on for months.

The consular work accounted for a lot of our time. As a land-locked district we didn't have any work related to American seamen. I touched on the one case involving a seaman in my previous

interview. We had a lot of visa work to do. In those days issuance of visitor's or student visas involved finger printing and detailed FBI examinations, etc. It was tedious, demeaning, and "by the book." It was under the previous, McCarthy era (McCarran-Walter Act of 1952], which was very restrictive. In the first place, any kind of "communist" association was grounds for refusal of the visa. Of course, there we were, in the "heartland" of communism in Great Britain. There were a lot of labor unions there and a lot of these "suspicious" socialist type persons. We had all kinds of investigative tools.

Q: Did you have a Lookout List?

MORGAN: Oh, yes, it was terribly dated and didn't include a lot of people that it should have. So our investigations were mostly based on the questionnaire and the application that the visa applicants filled out. We did not issue immigrant visas. This was all done at the Embassy in London. We had British help of the highest order. Nothing was handled by mail. Every applicant had to be seen in person. I had to see them and put questions to them.

Q: What was your rank when you arrived?

MORGAN: When I arrived in Birmingham, I was Vice Consul. My boss was the Consul and Principal Officer.

Q: For the record, who was your boss?

MORGAN: During the first year in Birmingham my boss was Harold Pease. I've called him a sleepy guy. Actually, he was a delightful person. His wife was equally charming and very helpful and supportive of my wife. Our families got along very well. Harold retired from the Foreign Service from Birmingham. He and his wife went back to California and he died shortly thereafter. They had one child, a daughter. This was a tragedy. She came into the Foreign Service as a secretary.. I got a phone call from the Pease's when we were back in Washington studying Russian. They said that their daughter was driving across the country and was killed in an automobile accident; she had planned to stay with us in the beginning. That was the end of their connection with the Foreign Service. I still keep in touch with Flora Pease. A true Foreign Service tale..

My other boss in Birmingham died recently. He was a more active person. His name Ken Atkinson. He was much more active. Before his arrival I was promoted to Consul. You asked at lunch today how we handle promotions, titles and ranks. There were the positions of Consul and Vice Consul -- and I was promoted to Consul. Harold Pease was replaced by another Consul. I was the "number two" person at the Consulate and still in the vice consul's position. But I had the title "Consul" on my visiting cards, once promoted by the State Department's Evaluation (Promotion) Panels. So, to confuse all our friends and officials , we had two "Consuls" at the Consulate.

Q: Your diplomatic rank was "Consul?"

MORGAN: No. If I had been in an Embassy, my diplomatic rank would have been Second Secretary. I was promoted to Consul while in Birmingham.

Q: And your position?

MORGAN: My position was that of vice consul.

Q: So your personal rank was Consul, but your functional position was that of vice consul.

MORGAN: Yes, because I was promoted to the rank of Consul. It was only of importance when you had your visiting cards printed!

Q: Could you tell me something about the people who were interested in coming to the United States?

MORGAN: During my two years in Birmingham there were only two visa applicants I really remember.. One of them simply made our Consulate staff fall apart. One of the young staff female employees came into my office, absolutely trembling. She said that Paul Anka, the singer, was outside. He was a Canadian. and needed a visa because he was overseas and going as a performer.

Q: The young women in the Consulate were all excited?

MORGAN: Yes. They were in their 20's and were all squeaking: Paul Anka! I didn't know who Paul Anka was, which was even worse! The other applicant was a very haughty industrial figure. He was very difficult to understand, given his heavy British accent. My secretary came in and whispered that he was absolutely impossible to deal with. He insisted talking to no one but me. I said, "Is he a commie or does he have something to tell me?" She said, "Oh, no, he just hates this." And he had gone on with my consular clerk about the 1956 crisis over Suez and all of that sort of thing. I looked at the visa application and tried to ask a few very polite questions. His name was French: Beaulieu, which I pronounced in French. He roared up from his chair, lividly red, and reddening, screaming "My name is 'Buelee' ever since 1066 and all that!" Clearly I had mispronounced his name and given the French pronunciation most inexcusably. I had visions of my namesake, William the Conqueror, roaring up to my defense.. The other visa applications were quite routine!

I don't think that we had more than 10 applicants per day, if that. Our applicants consisted of businessmen, students, and women who had married GI's (World War II soldiers). An awful lot of the GI's had married in Great Britain. I had served there for about two or three months before crossing over to Normandy, but I was too young to get amorously involved.

One of the most important social and semi official jobs that I had was that I was Honorary President of the Trans Atlantic Brides' Association. Once every six months my wife and I were invited to their dinner, and I was expected to make a speech. I'm not sure that everybody understands what consular work can involve, sometimes. You get very close to the people!

Q: What was the purpose of that association?

MORGAN: That's a very good question. I think that the mothers of these brides tended to feel that they had "lost" their daughters who were now living in the United States. The mothers traveled to the U. S. for visits, and children were born, but they wanted a closer contact with America and those families of the same situation.. It was a friendly kind of association. It definitely promoted Anglo American ties, in the very best sense of the word. The dinners were as "dull" as anything could possibly be. They put us up on shaky pedestal type seats. The room was filled with mothers -- and, perhaps, a few brides. There were children dancing in front of us in some sort of ballet in the middle of the room. My wife turned to me and said, "You couldn't wipe that silly grin off your face if you tried, could you?" And it was true. You had to keep a smile on your face all through the evening.

Q: That's a good lead in to your contacts with the British people. How were they, and what kind of relationships did you develop?

MORGAN: My wife always felt that Birmingham was one of the happiest posts she ever served in. We had wonderful relationships with local people. There was no separation between "official" and "family" friends. The home we lived in was a huge, Victorian mansion. We lived in half of it. A delightful British couple, landlords, with two children lived in the other half. Their children were about the same age as ours. He was the Honorary Thai Consul in Birmingham. I don't know how he got the appointment; he was a stockbroker. He was a marvelous and personal friend. This was the period after the Suez Crisis of 1956.

I remember that incredible, rude man who came for a visitor's visa, but most of the people were nothing like that. Remember that the Midlands of England is something like Quebec in Canada. The people are very friendly to Americans and appear to be very similar to us in terms of experience. They are hard working people -- industry and business oriented. They are not like the people of southern England who are very "British" and very conservative. In the Midlands, anyone who was "haughty" was cut down very quickly by the realities of working in that area. Remember, this is Dickens' country, with a lot of social and housing problems. An American consular officer serving in Birmingham is very close to local officialdom. You know all the presidents of the banks, company presidents, and so forth. You deal with these people all of the time. You know the Lord Mayor of the city, the Papal representative, and all of that. There was only one other Consul in Birmingham -- the French Consul. There were a number of honorary consuls, but the French Consul was the only other "career" consul.

Perhaps more importantly, from a personal standpoint, a lot of my official contacts were sources for things I wanted to know for political or economic reports I might want to "feed into the Embassy." I could get reactions to specific developments. I could say to one of my contacts, "What do you think about this or that?" Down at the level of my age group, I knew a number of lawyers. One of them was determined to be a Member of Parliament and still is today -- Tony Beaumont-Dark. He was about my age. Those people would talk to you. They would talk to you as friends -- special kinds of friends. They would also "pick my brains," if you will. It was a very warm and mutual relationship. Our children's school brought us into contact with another group

of people. Almost every night we would be doing something social -- and something that we liked and wanted to do.

Q: Like what, for example?

MORGAN: Dinners, receptions, cocktail parties, and picnics. I remember trying out a picnic on the Fourth of July. We had to cook inside, because that was the only place that we could build a fire. I think that the temperature was only 39 degrees (Fahrenheit)!. I think that it was close to what my wife and I had known in the United States. Relationships were certainly closer than they were in New York. Also, part of it came from our having "official" status. This was very satisfying, too. You got a lot of professional "feed back." You knew whether you were doing all right.

Q: And your contacts with the Embassy -- your promotion?

MORGAN: That was welcome, of course. It showed that I had done something right, I guess. But that was for my days in USRO.

Q: What were some of the drawbacks to serving in such a small Consulate?

MORGAN: None that come to mind. I say that in terms of our age and experience. It was our second assignment overseas. Our family was growing. We had the comfort of being in an English speaking country. We didn't have that added challenge, if you will -- or burden -- of taking on, in some cases, an incomprehensible language, or one which was incomprehensible to some of us.

Q: What did your wife do while you were there?

MORGAN: She raised our children. She did some volunteer work at the local hospital. She was involved in school, because the children were in fourth grade and kindergarten. She had calls from the kindergarten principal, because our son was having a terrible time in class. He was in a class of 10 or 12 British kids. They had all decided to speak with an American accent, and our son was supposed to learn to speak with a British accent! The teacher was fighting this young American's contagious accent on the class.. We had an Irish domestic servant to help us with the kids and housework.. She was more of a challenge than she was a help. That sounds like, "What do you do with the maids?"

My wife had a lot of friends. Among our friends were a Dutch couple. He was a director/owner of C & A, a big department store. There were a lot of friends like that. People liked to be friendly, talk about relations between countries. They liked Americans in this part of England.

Q: It sounds as if one of the most valuable things you got out of your experience there was the construction of the new Consulate. That was your introduction to the way the Department operates. Can you expand on that a bit more?

MORGAN: Yes. I think that there were two things, which don't exist any more. There was this sense of power and, yes, the construction of the Consulate. It was all new to me. There was that feeling that no one was getting in my way. There was no one from FBO [Foreign Building Operations] coming out from Washington. There was nobody from the Embassy, telling me what to do. I was given, I think, a financial limit in spending on the construction of the new Consulate.

Q: *None of that exists today.*

MORGAN: You can't do anything like that, and you have no real authority and limited decision making power -- the Ambassador included. I was only 33. Also, I learned. I talked to architects, construction people, and the staff of the Consulate. I had already been in Birmingham a year, so I knew pretty much what I needed to make a good layout. The staff might not always agree with me, but I always asked and explained...and they were a bit subservient in manner, as British staff could be then.

Q: *So, your two year tour was up in 1960. How did you decide where to go?*

MORGAN: Oh, I have to tell you that story. I received two notices. The diplomatic pouch arrived on a train, with a courier from the Embassy. He would get on the train in London once every three weeks. He had a pouch, containing both classified and unclassified material. We received open mail material directly through the open mails. However, the diplomatic pouch contained all of the official mail and all of the classified material. In between the pouches were these telegraphic messages in code. You had to get out your "One Time Pad" to decode them. That's a separate subject which I won't bore you with.

Anyhow, the courier arrived with the diplomatic pouch. The courier continued on to Manchester and Edinburgh. He made the "round." I had to go to the train station and meet that specific train, because he would hand the pouch out the window, and away he would go. I took the pouch to the Consulate and removed the classified material and put it in the safe. There was the official mail and then personal mail. I took the personal mail to my house.

There were two letters in the pouch for me -- one from John Stutesman, my old friend from USRO in Paris who had gone on to be Special Assistant to Loy Henderson, then the "Dean" of the Foreign Service. He was the first Under Secretary for Management -- the first person to hold that position. He was really a more important person than the Director General of the Foreign Service. Anyhow, John Stutesman had gotten himself a nice assignment. He sent me this letter, saying how happy he was that I had done so well that I had been chosen to be Consul General in Edinburgh! I was moving within the United Kingdom, if you will. I was delighted that I would be Consul General -- a promotion, indeed, in terms of responsibility. Edinburgh was a good sized post, with four or five officers. This definitely represented a step up. I was confident that I could handle the job.

There was another letter, addressed to William D. Morgan, Esquire. Maybe it said, "Esq." This was from the Director General and Director Personnel. It started out, "Mr. Morgan, we are very pleased to inform you that you have been chosen, under a very selective system, to go into Russian language training and to go to Moscow." I was beginning to learn more and more about

the Foreign Service and the State Department. When I told my wife, she said, "What do you want to do?" I said, "I don't see how I can get out of Russian language training and assignment to the Soviet Union." She said, "You'll probably be promoted faster. This will mean more money," and all of that. I said, "I guess I'll do that." So I telephoned John Stutesman in the Department of State the next day and told him about it. John was irate. He said, "This is impossible. I'll get back to you." His boss, Loy Henderson, was, in effect, the boss of the Foreign Service. Well, Loy Henderson wasn't the boss after all, and I got a call back from John saying, "No, Bill, you're going into Russian language training." That's how I was assigned to Russian and Moscow

JOSEPH A. GREENWALD
Assistant Commercial Officer
London (1958-1962)

Joseph A. Greenwald was born in Illinois in 1918. He received his bachelor's degree from the University of Chicago and went on to earn his law degree from Georgetown University in 1951. During World War II, he served in the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Merchant Marines. His Foreign Service posts included Geneva, London, Paris, and Brussels. He received a superior honor award in 1971. Mr. Greenwald was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert on May 16, 1989.

GREENWALD: Then I went to London in '58. Actually, I had a choice of Paris or London. I am happy to say in retrospect that rather than omniscience or anything, I decided on London probably for family reasons, schooling reasons. But it turned out to be the right decision from a career point of view and from interesting work.

I went in '58. And while I was nominally -- this indicated perhaps the titles and assignments in the Foreign Service don't always reflect the work that you are doing. I was, I think, a first secretary and assistant commercial attaché. I was in the economic section. In fact, what I did almost from the start of my tour in London was to follow European developments, particularly in the economic side, which was about all there was at that time.

In '57 you recall, the Treaty of Rome was negotiated, and we had the six countries establishing what was then called the European Common Market. The reaction of the British and the Scandinavians, Nordics, and Swiss, Austrians, the outsiders, was to organize a separate rival group called the European Free Trade Association.

Q: *EFTA*.

GREENWALD: The seven. EFTA. So at that point, we were -- the joke was Europe was at sixes and sevens. You had the six on the one hand and you had the seven. My job was to follow the developments and to report on them. I did some commercial work, but it was primarily . . . It involved the usual thing, talking to people in the Foreign Office, attending debates in the House of Commons, reporting on that. As you can see, it is very closely related, obviously, to the political office.

Q: *Yes. The same --*

GREENWALD: Sort of the same --

Q: *With an economic interest.*

GREENWALD: Yes, because it had an economic framework, but the politics were equally important. And it was a major political issue and has remained that way for Britain ever since. So that negotiation started in '59, I think, either '58 or '59, right after the Rome Treaty. That led to the establishment of the EFTA.

Anyway, that's what I spent my time working on from '58 to '63 in London. 1963 coincided with the end of my five years, which was about the tour of duty at that time, also with General de Gaulle's veto of Britain's first effort to try to join the Common Market, and also my selection to go to the National War College, which I wanted to do very much. I was interested in that, to come back to the career issue, because the conventional wisdom in the Department at that time -- maybe still is, I'm not sure -- was that an economic officer who was strictly an economic type, had less chance of getting to be chief of mission. And the way to break out, usually, was to go to the War College and then get a political assignment after that. I'll come back to that in a minute.

The main political event -- well, following Europe, let me go back. Following European affairs, I guess I became a Europeanist, maybe not like people who had been in it a lot longer like David Bruce or Bob Schaetzel but I pretty much believed in the European integration movement.

I guess the central event of my five years there in the European context was shortly after the change in administration in 1960 when President Kennedy came in, and George Ball became Under Secretary of State. He paid an early visit to London. He was a big Europeanist from his previous position as a partner in a law firm that represented the European Coal and Steel Community, which was one of the earlier forms of integration, before the Rome Treaty and the Common Market. So he is clearly a well known and vocal believer in European integration. So he came over in -- it must have been, let's see, the election was in '60 -- so he must have come to London some time in 1961.

At that time, Ted Heath was the Lord Privy Seal and dealing with the six and seven problem, the EFTA problem. He was supported by a permanent Secretary of the Treasury, a man named Sir Frank Lee. I was the note taker at this crucial meeting between Heath and Ball.

What happened at the meeting, and I don't know whether this was set up by Frank Lee or whether it happened spontaneously, but after we had spent a lot of time talking about the sixes and the sevens with George Ball complaining about how we didn't like the seven, and it was discriminatory and all that sort of thing, either Heath or Lee, I can't remember which, said to Ball, "All right, you have told me what you don't like about it. What do you want us to do?"

And Ball answered, "Join the Common Market."

Q: *[Laughter]* A little easily.

GREENWALD: Well, my pencil stopped at that moment because, as far as I knew, there was no U.S. policy to urge Britain to join the Common Market. So I took the notes and did the report. But as we were walking out, I said to George Ball, "Boy, I didn't know that was our policy."

And he gave the usual answer that you get from political appointees in the Department, "Well, it is now." And that's how our policy was made. George Ball has recorded this in a book he wrote about that period.

Anyway, that was the main thing. And sure enough, MacMillan -- the recommendation went to Prime Minister MacMillan, and the British applied for entry, and the negotiations started. And then, of course, my job became even more complicated and more active because there was not just the negotiations of the seven, but now one of the major developments in European policy and Britain's relationship with Europe was this effort to try to join the Common Market. And there were all kinds of Commonwealth problems. There were problems with us, the U.S., in how we were going to be affected because Britain had a lot of other obligations outside of Europe. It was much harder for Britain. They had a group they called the Flying Knights, a bunch of top civil servants who carried on the negotiations in Brussels.

This negotiation went on until the middle of 1963, when General De Gaulle cast his veto. What triggered the occasion that [Charles] De Gaulle used to veto was MacMillan's meeting with Kennedy. I think it was in Nassau. It had to do with nuclear weapons. I am a little fuzzy on this, but there was a deal done between MacMillan and Kennedy. I think the meeting was in Nassau. And it had to do with, I think, the sharing of weapons or production, I'm not sure which particular weapon it was, but it was nuclear weapons. General de Gaulle said, "See, that demonstrates that Britain is not ready to become a member, . . . It is really not European, and we better not have them." So that was the end of the first British application.

And I was very upset and very unhappy. I drafted a few cables suggesting policies. David Bruce by that time was ambassador, and I took them over to Bruce, and he said, "Just relax. This isn't the end of the story." He had a longer perspective on the whole European development because he had been in at the very start even before the Coal and Steel Community when he was working with Jean Monnet and the Marshall Plan in Europe. So he calmed me down, and, needless to say, none of the cables that I drafted were sent. But I was very unhappy about it.

As I said earlier, that coincided with going to the War College. So I was duly being processed for that. And just before I was supposed to go back and take up that assignment, Bruce called me in and said, "Joe, I just got a call from George Ball. You are not going to be able to go to the War College."

And I said, "Well, why did he call you? Why didn't he call me?"

And he says, "Because he knows you are going to be sore about it, and he wanted me to break the news to you."

Well, I was pretty unhappy, but there is obviously nothing I could do about it.

Q: This is because he wanted you to take the Office of International Trade.

GREENWALD: That's right. It was actually Blumenthal, who was then the Deputy Assistant Secretary, who had vetoed, canceled, whatever you want to call it, my assignment to the War College. He said I had to come back to head the Office of International Trade, which I did in '63. Because at that time, Blumenthal was moving from the State Department to the U.S. Trade Representative. Remember I said that USTR, what was then called STR, Special Trade Representative, was set up with Gov. Herter as the first Trade Representative in 1962.

Q: I had totally forgotten that he was the first one.

GREENWALD: Yes, he was the first one. He died shortly thereafter, and Bill Roth took over. But he was the first Special Trade Representative. He took Blumenthal, who had been Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Economic Affairs, over as his deputy along with Bill Roth. And Blumenthal's last act, I guess, in the State Department was to cancel my War College assignment and to put me into this office, as director of the Office of International Trade.

Well, to go back to the point about whether you could get to be chief of mission as an economic officer, he has frequently reminded me that it wasn't a terrible thing that he had done to me.

Personnel inflation caught up with me in the middle of the sixties, I guess, about '65 or '66. They used to have just one Deputy Assistant Secretary in each Bureau. There was then a proliferation and every bureau ended up with five or six Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and I was then elevated to Deputy Assistant Secretary. And finally in '69, just to finish the career side, I switched jobs with Phil Trezise in Paris, and I became ambassador to the OECD.

So as Blumenthal reminds me, he didn't do a terrible injustice. It was not all that bad.

Q: There is also something important about being really wanted for a job.

GREENWALD: Yes.

Q: It wasn't not making it. That's quite different.

GREENWALD: No. Well, it is pretty hard to turn down something like that.

Anyway, on the substantive side, in my tour in Washington, this time it was longer than usual. Before it had been three years, but I was five years in London, and then I ended up in Washington for six years, from '63 to '69, until I went to Paris at the OECD.

Well, I think the main thing worthy of comment during this period of '63 to '69 really didn't have anything to do with the GATT. It had to do with a U.N. organization, which had been set up in 1964, '63 or '64, called the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD.

JOHN F. CORRELL
Labor Attaché
London (1959-1964)

John F. Correll graduated from Kenyon College in the 1930s. He was very interested in the formation of labor unions and became a labor attaché with the State Department. His overseas posts included South Africa, Greece, Spain, Cuba, and England. Mr. Correll was interviewed by Morris Weisz in 1990.

Q: . . . You were assigned to another post where you quickly absorbed the language, namely London!.

CORRELL: All right, Morris. Now is the time when I came into full bloom as a Labor Attaché. I had served in several different countries and knew the field from several aspects. And London, of course, was another expression of what I believe was the Hand of Providence. Educated at Kenyon College, I had read everything from "Beowulf" right down to Thomas Hardy by that time, so when I got to London, I was well prepared with British history and literature as well as the background of the British trade union movement, which I had studied along the way and which I knew quite a bit about. And when I got to London, of course . . .

Q: This was the beginning of the 1960's?

CORRELL: Just the beginning.

Q: And whom did you succeed?

CORRELL: Joseph Godson. Now Joseph Godson was a man who was directly from the American trade union movement.

Q: Well, he wasn't of course. He was associated with unions through various organizations, political and economic organizations, but as I recall, his work with the trade unions was chiefly in political work and with the Jewish Labor Committee. Unfortunately, as you may not know, Joe died a couple of years ago.

CORRELL: No, I did not know that.

Q: So we won't be able to get his contribution. He had an interesting history himself, but. . .

CORRELL: Very interesting. My understanding was that he was very close to many of the leaders of American trade unions.

Q: Yes, very close, but as far as I know he was never himself an official of an American trade union.

CORRELL: No, he was not. But, in any case, Joe left his good marks in London. He had been pretty close to the British Trade Union Congress in some aspects. He looked upon it a little bit more politically than I did. I looked upon it as educational and economic and some politics, too.

Well, you can imagine going from a smaller Embassy to a place like London, and I think at that time there were something like 600 staff members at the Embassy in London. It was the old Embassy there on Grosvenor Place. I had a very nice office; we had a very nice Ambassador, John Hay Whitney, who understood a great deal about labor and was very sympathetic to labor. And so I had no trouble in England in getting started. I knew the role of a Labor Attaché, as did the British labor movement and the British Government, the Minister of Labor -- all knew my role.

As you know, Harold MacMillan came into power then; the Labor Party had just been voted out of power. So you had a different approach to labor relations and industry at that particular time. But I made my contacts immediately with the trade union people, the Trade and Labor Council, and I made many friends in British labor, especially Vic, whom you probably know.

Q: Vic Feather.

CORRELL: Vic Feather was known to everybody in the American trade union movement. (laughter) One of the aspects of my work in London was to be George Meany's escort officer when he would come through London on his way to the annual ILO Conference. So I got to know George Meany quite well, as well as Mrs. Meany, whom he usually brought with him; and we had some good times. I hosted a luncheon for George Meany at the Embassy and by that time David K.E. Bruce was the Ambassador. Of course, Morris, you know David Bruce was one of the best Ambassadors we've ever had. He understood labor very well. He was very supportive of the whole labor program. Our labor program there was primarily one of contacts and reporting. We were in touch with many of the unions there, especially the miners. We were very fond of the miners, and then Lord Cooper's union was a favorite. I always went to their conferences.

Q: Lord Cooper was with which union? Transport and General?

CORRELL: No, that was the biggest union at that particular time. No, it was a rather large union and it organized some transport people, but mostly workers in various kinds of fields. It was a general union. I wish I could give you more detail on that.

Q: That's all right.

CORRELL: I went to their conference. But always I had the unusual opportunity there to be with other Labor Attachés. There was the Swedish Labor Attaché, the French Labor Attaché, the German Attaché, and we had our luncheons once a month. We exchanged ideas and information; and we exchanged good fellowship. We all felt we were an unusual breed because we were dealing in a field which was somewhat new even at that particular time. The Labor Attaché program didn't get started really until after World War II as you know, Morris.

Q: One of the things we're going to be looking at is the problem the Labor Attaché had when there was a higher official in the Embassy who had a similar background. Now you were not there when Phil Kaiser was our Minister at the Embassy?.

CORRELL: No, I was not.

Q: We will be developing with other people the problems that a Labor Attaché has when the Ambassador or the DCM or somebody above him has his own trade union connections as you know Phil did. And Phil will be supplying some information on that. Who was the DCM when you were in London under Whitney?

CORRELL: It was an old line Foreign Service officer.

Q: I see. So you had none of those problems.

CORRELL: No problems at all.

Q: Was there an AID program still there?

CORRELL: No, there was no AID program there.

Q: But there was an information program?

CORRELL: There was an information program, and McHale was looking after that.

Q: Oh that's right!

CORRELL: And we got along famously as you know. Ed was my kind of a man and he worked with me on our "Labor Bulletin" and it turned out to be one of the best that was written. I don't know if you've ever see it.

Q: Oh, I used to get it regularly. And this was after Gausmann left as the Information Officer?

CORRELL: Yes, well Bill Gausmann was there when I was there, and we got along very well. We each had our beat. We each had our responsibilities, and we collaborated on many occasions and Bill Gausmann was a very good friend of mine. In Britain I became pretty well acquainted with the miners up in Durham and [went to] their annual gala. One time there were a hundred thousand miners at the gala in Durham. And Sam Watson, who became particularly close to the Americans and was a good friend of the Ambassador, was the great trade union leader then.

Q: Did you know that Sam's daughter married Joe Godson's son?

CORRELL: I wouldn't be surprised, wouldn't be surprised. Sam was a great man. I'd go up there on Sunday afternoon, and they were very religious people, as you know, Morris. The miners were religious and they held services. And they were eager for education. They had their educational conferences, and so on.

Q: They didn't have any desire to hide their relationships with the Americans. Some of the trade unions in my experience were a little bit worried about seeming to be too close to the Americans, but none of that existed with the miners as far as I could tell.

CORRELL: Oh no. Your experience varies from mine. Several of the unions came to me to ask me if I could get them in touch with their American fellow unionists. But, of course, they were old hands at the ILO, and each year they sent delegates to the ILO, and they always sent two delegates to the AFL-CIO conventions.

Q: Similarly the AFL sent delegates to the British TUC Congresses.

CORRELL: And there was that wonderful exchange. It was always my job to be on hand, to be of help to our delegates in any way I could, to arrange for them to have lodging if I could, and to do anything I could to facilitate their work by easing their path, even the housekeeping details.

My reporting there [in London] also was interesting. I had an assistant, and we scanned about twelve papers each day looking for labor news and finding out from those papers if there was anything going on up in Belfast or down in Wales or in other parts of Britain. Labor problems became accentuated there for a while when the Labor Party left, because the Labor Party acted a little paternalistically toward the unions, but they stood on their feet after they got used to Harold MacMillan, "Marvelous Mac," who was the author of The Winds of Change. Mac was not at all uninformed about labor unions, and he had very good Ministers of Labor. When I was there, I was close to one Minister of Labor who later got in trouble with a Hyde Park lady named Christine Keeler. It became, of course, a story all over the world. .

Q: Was he a Labor Minister?

CORRELL: Yes, he was the Labor Minister.

Q: Oh, my Lord.

CORRELL: That became quite a famous case (laughter) as you well know. I had four years in London and with my British schooling at the Episcopal School of Kenyon College, I had a great opportunity to do more than take care of my labor work, which kept me pretty busy. I knew the people; I knew the personalities; I knew the history of the British labor movement very well. My chief job was to interpret for the Embassy what was going on in the labor field. Now you would think that in an Embassy that large you would come into conflict with other people who had a marginal interest in labor. For instance, the Agricultural Attaché had an interest in labor because of the agricultural workers.

Q: Also the political officer who covered the Labor Party. Later on that became an issue as to who should cover the Labor Party as against the labor unions.

CORRELL: Well, it was no issue when I was there. My turf was the trade union movement. Now that impinged occasionally on the Labor Party, but I was strictly the man who went to the trade

union halls. But there was always that matter of the political officer who was interested in labor as an important factor in the political scene, and the Commercial Attaché who was interested in prices, exports and imports, and things of that kind.

JAMES T. PETTUS, JR.
Information Attaché and Press Officer
London (1959-1971)

James T. Pettus, Jr. was born in Missouri in 1919. During World War II, he first served as a lieutenant in the Royal Canadian Air Force and then as a colonel in the U.S. Air Force. Mr. Pettus entered the Foreign Service in 1954 and was posted in Manila, Wellington, Rangoon, London, and Canberra. He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on May 30, 1990.

Q: *What year was it that you went to London?*

PETTUS: I went to London in 1960, I guess it was, '60 or '61. I spent a long time there. It was my only diplomatic accomplishment. I spent 12 years there.

Q: *My word!*

PETTUS: (laughter) As people say, "What was your biggest diplomatic accomplishment?" I say, "My biggest diplomatic accomplishment was to spend 12 years in London."

Q: *What was your position there?*

PETTUS: I was the press attaché and the information officer and acting PAO for a while and so forth. I did just about all the jobs there were to do there. Ambassador Whitney was there when I went, and he was there for two or two and a half years. Then he left, and Ambassador David Bruce came, and he stayed for eight years. So after I'd been there three years, one day I was talking to Bruce about something, and I was casting about for another kind of a job that he thought would be good for me, that if he thought I'd be good in the job, he'd give me a good boost. He turned around and he said, "Why, don't you like it here?"

I said, "Oh, yes, sir, I like it fine, but you know, I've been here three years. You move on."

He said, "Well, as long as I'm here, you can stay here." So that settled that. (laughter) He was there for eight years.

Leonard Marks was director of the Agency about that time. Bill Clark was the PAO. But Leonard Marks was the director of the Agency, and I always felt that Marks was one of the underrated directors that we had. He may not have had the outstanding reputation with the press and with the public, but Leonard Marks understood one of the most important things that too many of our people, or too many people, didn't understand: he understood and care and feeding of Congress. I

think that he made a good contribution at a very difficult time for the Agency. Of course, the Agency had been separated by that time from State, I guess about eight years, eight, nine years.

Q: They were separated in August of '53.

PETTUS: This was '62. About nine or ten years. Mr. Marks was in London on a visit, and he paid his duty call on the ambassador. At the end of their conversation, why, Ambassador Bruce tells Leonard Marks, "By the way, Leonard, I want you to leave Jim Pettus here as long as I'm here." So with that, I was secure in London certainly until Bruce left. In fact, I stayed there until he left, and Ambassador Annenberg came in and took his place. I left soon after Annenberg got there.

I was able to spend a wonderful period of time in England at a very difficult time in some relations with the English and Americans.

Q: What were some of the particular problems?

PETTUS: They focused around foreign policy. Of course, Vietnam was growing in importance at that time, and Cuba. The communists could stir up an awful lot of trouble. The Laborites would -- I remember Grosvenor Square would get to be filled with tens of thousands of chanting demonstrators. "Hands off Cuba! Hands off Cuba!" And the police were around there with their horses. They were pretty worried that they might get into the embassy sometimes. In fact, we had barbed wire in the embassy at times. This was before the days that they had the armored doors. They were heavy, but they weren't the bulletproof glass. They broke windows all over the place. But Cuba was one. China was another. The demonstrations were not so much about China as they were always about Cuba and, then later, Vietnam.

Q: Was this the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis that this went on?

PETTUS: Oh, yes. On the afternoon of the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Potava was steaming towards Havana. Grosvenor Square was filled with 10,000 rioters. I was having my fortnightly lunch with my Russian counterpart down in Soho, and I had to get out of the back door of the embassy and go up towards Park Lane, finally get the underground to go down to Soho to meet this guy, a man named Vladimir Stennin. Stennin and I had lunch every two weeks, and we used to sit there and discuss the policies of the world. So when I got to this time, why, the demonstration, he more or less said, "You have a little problem, Jim."

I said, "Yes. We all have got problems, Vladimir. You know, Stennin, we're both pretty dumb about Cuba."

And he says, "Hey, Jim, what is this 'dumb'? Why do you say we're both dumb about Cuba?"

And I said, "Vladimir, the United States had the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and now you are going to send these missiles into Cuba. You've got just as much a problem as we've got with the Bay of Pigs."

So he began to think, and he said, "Yes, we got some trouble." So we had another drink. Then we had some more drinks. By the time I got back to the embassy at four o'clock in the afternoon, I couldn't hit the floor with my hat. But the Russians, I think, had a good idea that everybody had a big problem about Cuba.

Later, of course, the Potava turned back and the thing was over with. Stennin was a character whom I don't know whatever happened to him, but I don't think it was terribly -- you could talk to him. I was working on him to try and get them to jump, maybe.

When he was at last reassigned -- he was allegedly a TASS man.

Q: But he was undoubtedly a KGB.

PETTUS: Oh, no, I knew all about him. In fact, this afternoon, that same afternoon, I said, "Now, listen, Stennin," finally. I said, "Your name is not this. Your name is such and such. What's more, you're a lieutenant colonel in the KGB."

He said, "No, no, Jim, I'm not. I'm TASS man."

I said, "TASS man, my ass! You're not!" (laughter) So anyway, "Have another drink."

When Stennin left London to go back to Russia, not too long after that I was the only American invited to his going away party down in the bowels of where the Soviets have all their housing and so forth. Most of them were Eastern Europeans, Russians, and there were a few English correspondents, one whom I knew very well. Later I was talking to him and we owned up that both of us were working the same thing, and we both thought we could get them to jump. Later I found out that this man was not only a correspondent, but he worked for some of the intelligence people, or he contributed to them. We both felt the same way, that we were getting pretty close, and we felt that that's why he was sent home. I don't know what ever happened to him, but I doubt that it was anything very good.

Q: When it was finally revealed by [President John F.] Kennedy that missiles were definitely in place over there and proven beyond a question of a doubt, what was the reaction of the British generally, and what was the reaction of the Laborites who were conducting all these demonstrations in Grosvenor Square?

PETTUS: I wouldn't say, first of all, I don't think it was the Laborites that were -- they certainly aided and abetted in demonstrations, but they were not the formulators of them. The extreme left wing of the labor movement, I mean, as distinct from the labor government and the Labor Party, were the ones. And the Community Party, of course.

When we got the word that the films were coming, Ambassador Bruce went out to the airport with the people from the Agency, CIA, and I was not at the airport at that time. But he came back and we were all in the embassy, and he showed the pictures. In the meantime, CIA had given us the negatives and told us that we could reproduce, start to print, and we did. Of course, we had a very good photo lab and a good man who was sworn to secrecy. We started printing up

about 20 or 25 sets of these pictures. I've forgotten how many there were, probably 12, 14. Started printing them up, but, of course, there was an embargo on any release of them. But about five sets were for the ambassador to take over to give to the prime minister, who, I guess, was Harold Wilson at that time. Wilson or Callaghan, I'm not sure which. But anyway, Denis Healey was the defense minister, I know that, and one set was for him. There were Bruce's own set and a set for the political people. The other sets we had were all labeled for the various press organizations. Well, the demonstrators were still out in Grosvenor Square. They'd leave in the evening hours and come back at night, and the police were all around there, and we had buses all drawn up in front.

By and large, the main thing that the British, as I recall it, they were mainly apprehensive of any kind of a war which they felt would erupt into a nuclear war. Except for the extreme left, who was able to generate these demonstrations with very prominent people, all in support, by and large, I think the working class people and certainly the conservative party were not sympathetic towards the Russians, as they felt that this was an aggressive move. They did feel that perhaps after the Russians had pulled back, the Americans should have given a bit more quid pro quo, like taking the missiles out of Turkey, perhaps. Since they had taken them out of Cuba, he said, "Well, they didn't have any business to have them in Cuba, anyway."

But generally, the attitudes were apprehensive because of the fear of nuclear war. Politically, they were entirely separated purely by their own ideological bent. The left wing were saying that it was terrible that we should do anything like this and that they had a perfect right to put missiles in if they wanted to. The right wing was saying, no, they had nothing to do with it. But the reaction of the British Government was the one that was more interesting. It's been written and said, but I don't think it was ever seized upon or publicly disavowed or carried on. When Denis Healey, the Minister of Defense, saw the photographs, he more or less dismissed them as possibly fakes. After all, we had submitted some fake photos to the U.N. and gravely embarrassed Adlai Stevenson, and said these could very well have been.

The British Government and overwhelmingly the press were impressed. They believed the photographs. They were a bit disappointed in this thing of the detail of some of them, our vaunted ability to be able to read the brand of what kind of truck it was from the photographs didn't come out as well, but by and large, they were impressed. The foreign secretary at that time was Michael Stewart, and he certainly believed them.

There was a bit of a story about that, that we had these photographs and we had the release time from that other agency that says that after this and after their man and the other photographs had gone on to Paris, to Germany, and they'd all been around, the release time was set. So we had these photographs and it had all been known. Of course, they were circulating because they had come out on some of the wires. Well, we told the guys, "You can pick these things up," at a certain time. They came, and we passed these things out of the back door, and the motorcycles took them off, and the protestors, demonstrators were still out in the Square. All of a sudden, I got a call. I was up on the desk and I got a call from Washington saying, "Who said you could release those photographs?" (laughter) They had never told us of that extended embargo.

Well, it turned out all fine. In fact, later they all admitted it was a good thing it happened, because then we'd been further accused of trying to hide the evidence, which was already in the public domain because it had been shown on TV and photographed off of television and then passed on the wires, but this was before the days of satellite communication on television. So the pictures had very much poorer detail, and we would have been accused -- and were accused -- of hiding the same thing.

Well, we released them all and then somebody else took credit for it. I don't know who. (laughter)

Q: Inasmuch as you had the CIA clearance, they could hardly have fussed.

PETTUS: No, there was no question that we had acted in any unauthorized manner. It was a goof off which somebody else, instead of us getting the credit for doing the right thing, why, they said, well, it was okay that they didn't get chastised for withholding it as they were supposed to have done.

In Britain, of course, there were lots of major problems. I mean, when I first arrived there, the fact of Suez was still a terribly active thing. Here was a really bitter controversy, of which many people on both the left and the right, the conservatives were chastising us because of the fact that we had prevented the total victory. The labor people were chastising us because we hadn't gone far enough.

My own feeling was -- and I think there were a lot of people later who felt the same way -- was that there would have been no problem for the British to drive through the canal. They could have easily driven through to the end of the canal, but then where would they have been? They'd have been through the canal with maybe 125,000 actives in an area that they couldn't keep peace in three years before with 250,000 actives. And they would have been in a much worse military situation than they had been before. But it was way overextended. It was felt that we had stopped them and snatched victory from the jaws of defeat. Certainly it was true. They could have driven through the canal, but it was a very, very bitter, bitter feeling. I mean, I was really amazed. The British are very clannish in certain ways like this.

I remember one time I was wearing -- and I still wear it a lot -- a Royal Air Force tie at some function. Some chap comes up and says, "Do you know what tie is that you're wearing?"

I said, "Certainly I know what tie. I was a flight lieutenant and held the King's commission."

Then, oh, "Jolly good." That was the thing to do, and he shook hands. (laughter) "That's fine. Congratulations."

I said, "That was at a time when in the early days, a lot of us thought it was kind of foolish." In 1940, it was by no means assured who was going to win. In fact, when we went to Canada, we technologically lost our citizenship. But all of us kind of felt, well, if we won the war, it wouldn't make any difference. If it lost the war, it wouldn't make much difference, anyway.

Q: That's right. (laughter)

PETTUS: A lot of people, you'd talk to them and they'd say, "Oh, you went in 1940?" And they remember. This was during the Battle of Britain. I didn't get to England for the Battle of Britain.

Anyway, in England there were very major, major problems. Always in the background was the problem of China. The problems in the Commonwealth, Britain was granting independence as fast as they could go, to the Commonwealth, but hopefully the Commonwealth was going to support the United States in many ways, but many of them didn't even support the old country. It was a difficult time of how they were going to reconcile themselves to -- I've forgotten whose words they were -- the new role that Britain was going to have to play. I don't believe -- and I follow England pretty closely still -- that they still haven't fully accommodated to it. And how are they going to do it with the EEC? They haven't really accommodated to the EEC.

Q: With [Prime Minister Margaret] Thatcher in there flailing away, they haven't accommodated very well, although I think she has given some ground in the last month or so.

PETTUS: You know, the English used to tell the old joke that the difference between the continent and Britain, there's a terrible storm, one of these awful [English] Channel storms and damage and ships aground and everything like this and so forth, and the headline in the newspaper was "Continent Cut Off." (laughter) Britain is never cut off; the continent was.

That period of time was a wonderful period. After Ambassador Annenberg arrived, I felt that it was time for me to go, and I didn't want to even stay too much longer, in any event, and he wanted somebody else. So the Agency had no job for me, but they wanted me to come home. I had five children and I said, "To come home, I own my house in London," and it was cheaper to buy a house than it was to rent one at that time, so I decided that what I would do is take leave without pay and write a book. I wanted to write a book about the American Revolution more or less from the eyes of the British soldier, the poor old Red Coat.

I never got around to doing it, but after I'd been on leave a few months without pay, I got a call from Washington saying, "How would you like to go to Australia as PAO?" They said, "You can call us back if you want."

I said, "No, I don't have to call you back." My wife was there, and I asked her. She said, "By golly, let's go!"

DAVID D. NEWSOM
Middle East Issues
London (1960-1962)

Ambassador David D. Newsom was born in California in 1918. He received a bachelor's degree from the University of California in 1938 and a master's degree from the Columbia University in 1940. He served overseas in the U.S. Navy from 1942-1946 and entered the Foreign Service in 1947. Ambassador Newsom's

career included positions in Pakistan, Iraq, the United Kingdom, Libya, Indonesia, and the Philippines. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 17, 1991.

Q: You were in London from 1960 to 1962. What were your responsibilities?

NEWSOM: Ever since the end of World War II, we had a job in London to be filled by an officer with Middle East experience to deal with the British Foreign Office and other British Ministries on Middle East issues. Similarly, the British have a Middle East expert in their Embassy in Washington. My job was to follow events in that region, keep in touch with Foreign Office officials and report in their views. I arranged for briefings for American officials who were going to the area and who wanted to meet British officials. I kept in contact with some British journalists and academics who dealt with the Middle East. That gave me a sense how various segments of British society viewed events important to us and allowed me introduce interested Americans to those circles. As I mentioned, I traveled to the region with Admiral Smith, probably twice or three times during my tour.

Then by a curious set of circumstances, I also became involved in Africa. We did have an African expert in the Embassy, Fred Hutzel. The early '60s were very active years in US-British relations on African concerns because this was the period when African countries were beginning their journey to and of independence. The Rhodesian issue first arose during this period. Fred was detailed as Political adviser to a Naval Task Force which was making a series of good will visits on the West African coast. One day, a Portuguese ocean liner -- the *Santa Rosa* -- was hijacked. The ship to which Fred was assigned was detached from the flotilla to move as rapidly as possible to intercept the *Santa Rosa*. Then Fred was off-loaded in Recife, Brazil and was ill for several weeks. During that period, the Congo crisis erupted in which the British were very interested. So I was thrown into African affairs until Fred could return. I got to know G. Mennen "Soapy" Williams, the then Assistant Secretary for African Affairs and Wayne Fredericks, his deputy.

I was supposed to go to Cairo as DCM after my London tour. It was a job that I was very interested in. Governor Williams asked me if I would like to return to Washington to work in the African Bureau. I told him I would prefer Cairo. Of course, the next word from the Department was that I had been appointed as Deputy Director for the Office of North African Affairs.

Q: Before we move to that, I would like to hear you compare the British and American views of the Middle East in the early '60s.

NEWSOM: We are now discussing a period which was only four years after Suez. There was still considerable bitterness, particularly among Conservative MPs. I remember making a speech on US Middle East policy to the Chelsea Conservative Society. I was roundly heckled who had a very different view of what that policy should have been. In the Foreign Office, I encountered a very friendly and sympathetic attitude towards cooperation and towards our view of the Middle East. We did have somewhat different views on Nasser which became central to our discussions of Saudi Arabia. The British, which had broken relations with Saudi Arabia, were very suspicious of Faisal. We were encouraging them to take another look at that. The Foreign Office

and British military were very suspicious of our growing activities in the Gulf and particularly what we were doing in Muscat and Oman. That had been a British province. We struck some raw nerves when we began to discuss the sale of some military equipment to Gulf countries. The equipment meant military advisors, who then were also asked for views on large military contracts. The British saw these factors as threatening to their position in the area.

We were also at the beginning of the Kennedy administration and not all of the British were enthusiastic about the definite Kennedy tilt towards the new independence movements in Africa. During the early '60s, the Lancaster House negotiations on Kenya independence took place. We followed that closely. Within the Embassy, there was a generational split. The Political Counselor was Elim O'Shaughnessy. His view of the world stopped at Belgrade, where he had been DCM. South and East of there was of no consequence. Once, I took a long airgram to him which analyzed the British views of the future of Saudi Arabia. Elim looked at it and said: "David, does anybody give a damn about what happens in Saudi Arabia?" London was a great experience which made me much more aware why our conduct of foreign affairs is so much more complicated than the British process and that of other countries probably. They do not have to deal with the Parliament as we have to deal with the Congress. The government is part of Parliament, in effect. They do have a "Question hour" but for example no serious budgetary hearings, or no restrictions on the management of their assistance programs. When you consider what a desk officer in the Department has to take into account in pursuing an initiative and the number of people he has to negotiate with compared to an equivalent Foreign Office official, you can see the enormous difference. That in part explains why we need 80 people in and aid mission overseas while the British need only four or five. We have just so many more constituencies to satisfy.

Q: Was there similar split in Great Britain between the foreign affairs specialists and the political leadership as there was in the United States? The literature is replete with writings by and about the British Foreign Service's pro-Arab bias, particularly for the desert Arabs. Did you find that to be true and what were the Parliamentarians' views?

NEWSOM: The Suez crisis demonstrated the split between the British who had experience in the region and at least some of the politicians. That split was still visible in the early '60s. The authors of the often romantic stories and books about the Middle East were rarely promoted to policy making levels in the British Foreign Office. The British had some superb "Arabists" at the higher policy levels, but they were not parochial advocates. One of them was Donald Maitland, who was with us in Baghdad and later became the British Ambassador to the EC and later to UN and after that Under Secretary of the Department of Energy -- one of the rare Foreign Service officers to serve in a domestic Department in London. He had started as Consul in Al Amhara between Basra and Baghdad. He had the most superb knowledge of Iraqi society, the family linkages, etc. He spoke superb Arabic. He never lost his slightly caustic objectivity towards the people of the Middle East. The best in any professional service maintain a certain psychological distance from their the societies they have studied and know well.

Q: When the Kennedy administration took over, did you detect any change in our Middle East policy?

NEWSOM: The Kennedy administration seemed to be the only post-war administration that was not involved in a serious effort to resolve the Arab-Israel dispute. I should have mentioned, when talking about Secretary Dulles, the ALFA program, which was a secret effort sponsored by Dulles to see if a package of compensation for land lost, voluntary repatriation and adjustment of borders would not provide a base for Middle East peace. Dulles decided, on August 26, 1955, that his program was going anywhere; so he made his proposals public in a speech which brought the effort to an end. I don't recall Kennedy making any similar effort. The next major effort came out of the LBJ administration with Resolution 242. The Kennedy period was not very active.

One thing did happen although I was not directly involved. Until about 1960, the US was not a major supplier of arms to Israel or to any country in the area. The tripartite declaration was still theoretically in effect which limited France, Great Britain and the United States in their military assistance programs in the area. By the early 60, there were already transactions made that were perhaps not in the spirit of the agreement, although they were not a serious problem at the time.

JOHN S. SERVICE
Consul
Liverpool (1960-1962)

John Stuart Service was born in China of American parents. He attended school in China and graduated from Oberlin College. He was appointed as a clerk in Yunnanfu in 1933. He was the acting U.S. political advisor to the Supreme Commander, Allied Forces in 1945. In addition to posts in China, Mr. Service served in New Zealand, India and the United Kingdom. Mr. Service was interviewed in 1977 by Rosemary Levenson, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.

SERVICE: At this time the Department planned to send me as administrative officer to Bonn. I was told by [Loy] Henderson himself that the army objected to my assignment. Just why the army should object or why the army should have the right to veto administrative personnel in the embassy, I don't know. Anyway, that was the story.

But Ed Rice was in personnel in the Department at the time. And he has recently told me that it was the West German government which objected to the assignment. It was not due to any objection to me personally. But the Cohn & Schine circus had played most of their Foreign Service havoc and gotten much of their bad publicity in American offices in Germany. Then several American senior officers serving in Germany had been McCarthy targets (Charlie Thayer, Miles Reber, et al). And finally and most recently, the West German government had had the unhappy experience of all the publicity relating to the John Davies' firing--he was counselor in the embassy at Bonn. The West Germans were afraid that there would be more controversy involving me. They have the right to decline to accept diplomatic assignments, so said no on me.

All this makes a bit of a mystery about Loy Henderson's excuses. A cover story? Or did the U.S. Army also object?

So I was then assigned as consul to Liverpool. By this time I had already spent sixteen weeks very assiduously studying German. Anyway, while I was at the Foreign Service Institute I insisted on taking an examination in Chinese. There was a big hullabaloo at this time in the Department about language abilities and qualifications. There had been a lot of stuff in the press about people being sent to posts when they didn't have any knowledge of the language.

I announced, to the surprise of the people at the Institute, I wanted an oral language examination in Chinese. The exam was by a very pleasant Chinese who was one of the instructors. There was also an observer. I forget his name, but he was an American who had some training in Chinese. I suppose he was a faculty member at the Institute.

The Chinese and I got into talking about [chuckles] various things--about de Gaulle and the atomic bomb--atomic testing was an issue at that time--and then about my next assignment. The Chinese just made up a phonetic approximation for Liverpool. I understood him all right, but the man that was observing said afterward, well, he thought we did very well, but he lost us at one point. I got a decent grade.

Q: Had you had any opportunity to keep up your spoken Chinese?

SERVICE: No, none at all.

Q: What about your reading knowledge? Had you used Chinese material?

SERVICE: No. I had been completely away. I could still speak some Chinese. I got a 3+, which I think was a tough grade. I think I really deserved a 4, on a grading scale of 5. But, they gave me a 3+, which makes me "reasonably fluent" or something like that.

I'd had no contact with China.

We had collected all of our effects by this time. They'd been stored for years in attics of various people in Washington. We had lots and lots of books including a lot of books on China. We simply lined them up on the big front porch, lined all the books up on edge and let any friends come and help themselves. Passersby on the street would come up and say, "What's this?" Then we'd say, "Help yourself." We gave away nothing really valuable but a lot of books. Of course, I never thought I'd have any more connection with China at all at any time.

Q: How sad.

SERVICE: Then the house was rented after we left. The next tenant was a Norwegian officer. There were some bookcases in the house. They said, "Well, we have no books. Would you mind if we take the books just to have something on the shelves?" [chuckling] So, the leftovers were left for the Norwegians to put on their shelves.

Liverpool was a pleasant post. It had the advantage of a very nice house. We liked the idea of going to England. I went over early with Philip to get him into school because the English school year started rather early. Then Caroline came by ship.

The English school was very concerned about whether they would admit Philip. They wanted an interview. The main purpose of the interview apparently was that the headmaster wanted to be sure that I, being an ignorant American, understood that discipline in English schools included physical discipline. I said we understood that.

Q: Meaning canings?

SERVICE: Canings. Philip was never caned, but we agreed in advance that it was a condition of his being admitted. [laughter] It was a good school.

Q: What were your duties as U.S. consul in Liverpool?

SERVICE: Liverpool, basically, was a visa-issuing office for the north of England. London issued all the immigration visas for southern England, we issued them for northern England, and Glasgow issued them for Scotland.

The English quota is very large. It was always easy to get an immigration visa. So if anyone was coming to the States with the idea of staying for any length of time or might want to work, we usually issued an immigration rather than a tourist visa. It took away any impediments to working while they were here.

We issued a lot of immigration visas, which is a fairly complicated procedure, and also a great many temporary visitor visas. There were a number of Americans in the area. There had been an American bomber base in Burtonwood, not far away between Liverpool and Manchester. It had been a large base, but was practically closed down now. It was on stand-by basis, stores and warehouses, a supply base.

That had meant in the past there were a large number of Americans who needed passports. But this was practically all phased out when we were there, so that it was not a very exciting office. Political reporting and trade work were handled out of London.

We were occasionally asked to do something. At that time they were trying to blacklist firms that did business with Cuba. We did some foolishness about trying to report on companies that were trading with Cuba.

It was a job mainly of running a visa-mill office and representing the United States. There had always been an American consul-general before I was there. Local people invariably called me consul-general simply because they couldn't conceive of anyone except a consul-general occupying the post.

I was senior to most of or many of the people that had been there. My rank entitled me to the title of consul-general, but it would have required Senate confirmation which the State Department was not about to try to hassle with.

I got invited out to a lot of formal dinners. The Royal Society of Chartered Surveyors, the Royal Society of Auditors and Accountants, and so on, ad infinitum. All these organizations had their annual dinner, white tie. Some honored guests give toasts to the city and port of Liverpool, or this or that. Consuls were fair game for this sort of thing. I did a fair amount of that.

Q: Did you enjoy it?

SERVICE: No, I did not enjoy it very much. [laughter] I don't like giving speeches, but I had to do it.

There was a very active English Speaking Union. They were a lot of fun. We had a good deal of contact with them, turned over our house once a year for a big party.

Ginny came over and got married in Liverpool. We had a very small wedding for her. This was fairly early when we didn't know many people, but our inclinations anyway were to make it fairly small.

There was a large consular corps, about forty or forty-two consuls, but not all career consuls. A lot of them were honorary consuls, British businessmen or lawyers, insurance people, something like that, who for business or social reasons liked the position. There would be an honorary consul for the Dominican Republic or some country like that.

My predecessor had taken a very rigid view and refused to call on any of these people. I called on them all, which of course made staunch friends.

Q: Was there awareness, in the press or in your personal dealings, that you had been a very controversial figure in America?

SERVICE: Yes, some. I'm not sure in the general public, but the people in the English Speaking Union knew about it due to the fact they were told about it at a very early meeting.

I eventually became president of the consular corps and joined several clubs. It was a very clubby town. Some of the people in the London embassy were a little bit inclined to view club memberships as a barometer of success in the local community. At any rate, I joined more clubs than made sense, usually as an honorary member. You paid monthly dues but no initiation.

Q: What was the level of anti-American feeling?

SERVICE: There was a great deal of criticism, anti-American feeling, since we had started up nuclear testing in the atmosphere at that time. Ban-the-bomb marches and parades were the order of the day. A delegation came and called on me and had a sort of sit-down in the office.

The police were very cooperative and friendly. The Ban-the-bomb people always gave advance warnings. They didn't pop in on you. They wanted to have the press notified, for one thing. So we knew they were coming and the press and the police were there in the next office.

I asked them to leave, and they said they would not leave until I promised them that the petition that they handed me was going to be given personally to Kennedy. I said, "Well, you know I can't make that promise. All I can do is to send it to the embassy in London which I'm sure will send it on to Washington. But there's no way for me to make a promise that this will go into the hands of President Kennedy."

So, they said, "Well, we'll have to stay here until you give the promise." They'd all been smoking my cigarettes and having some tea. It had all been quite friendly. Then the police came in and formally, one-two-three, asked them to leave and when they refused they hauled them out.

At that time we had about eight posts, I guess, in the British Isles. There had been more. Now, they've been cut way, way down. Even Liverpool has been closed now. There was an officer in the London embassy serving as supervisory consul-general to keep in touch with these offices and make sure that they were handling their work properly. He was also in charge of the consular work in the embassy in London.

The man in that job was Don Smith who had been chief of personnel when I was in personnel in '49. He was due for home leave, and he recommended and it was approved that I go down to London to sit in his chair and hold the job while he was away, for about ten weeks I think it was.

That was very pleasant. I went down for a while and then Caroline came down. We lived in a little bed-and-breakfast hotel on Gloucester Place, not far from Grosvenor Square. My assignment was somewhat irregular since I wasn't the senior consular officer; but a lot of the people who were in charge of the offices in Great Britain had been brought into the Department under the Wristonization program which had recently consolidated the State Department civil service and the Foreign Service.

Q: Did you have any problems with the embassy people?

SERVICE: None at all. The first ambassador was John Hay Whitney, and he had made a visit to Liverpool for a speaking engagement very soon after we got there.

Later on it was David Bruce, and he also visited Liverpool. My relations with both the ambassadors were very good.

Whitney came there fairly soon after I came to Liverpool. There was a large reception given for him by the English Speaking Union. I had to introduce him. You know, when you take over a new post it's a race to learn everybody, get to know everybody as quickly as possible, sort of selling yourself in a new community. He was quite impressed, I think, by the fact that I knew as many people as I did within a few weeks.

Actually, I felt I was doing a good job. I was getting commended. We had an inspection in Liverpool with very favorable comments.

Q: How big a staff did you have?

SERVICE: We had four Americans outside myself, about twenty-two or so local staff.

I heard various reports, rumors, that I'd been recommended for promotion by the selection boards, which were meeting each year. I began to wonder what really was the score. I wrote in each year. You could write to the Department and say, "How did I stand?" They would give you a general reply.

It was always the top half but not quite in the promotion zone. This got to be a frustration, and I think contributed to a period of depression I had in Liverpool. The doctor told me I better take up a hobby.

I went back to postage stamp collecting which I had given up when I was about eleven or twelve in boarding school in Shanghai. I still had my old collection, so I resuscitated that and started buying stamps at auctions and from dealers, joining a stamp society in Liverpool. It was a good idea. There were some very good auctions in London, still are. It's a very good center for stamps. I only collect Chinese stamps.

Q: Do you still keep it up?

SERVICE: Well, I'm not active. I just don't have the time for it. After I came back to the States and got involved in being a graduate student I sort of tapered off. I've got a collection. I still go to stamp society meetings. The China Stamp Society has a chapter here in the [San Francisco] Bay Area. We meet once a month. But it doesn't quite have the fascination for me now that it did in Liverpool days.

Meanwhile, I had come on home leave in October of '61. I'd been two years in Liverpool, and so I came home in October and tried to find out where I stood. The Kennedy administration had been in now since the beginning of '61.

Q: As I recall, there were serious efforts made at that point to influence a change in American China policy?

SERVICE: There were some, but they proved abortive. [Dean] Rusk apparently was very much against it. The man running F[ar] E[ast]--Roger Hilsman--tried to do something about it, and so did James C. Thomson who then was on the National Security Council staff. Anyway, that proved abortive.

Rusk had talked, when he came in as Secretary of State, about rectifying wrongs. There had been high hopes that Kennedy himself would be more active, more willing to do something about victims of the McCarthy period.

Anyway, I came back to Washington on home leave and talked to personnel. I had an interview with the man who had what was the equivalent of my old job, "The Wailing Wall." Now it was called Career Management and had become a regular section, with several people.

I found out that a summary had been written for the record saying that because of all I had gone through, it could be assumed or expected that I would be unwilling to take responsibilities and make decisions. Obviously, this had been put in to really prevent, to forestall, any board that wanted to promote me.

Q: Do you have any intuitions or ideas as to who did that?

SERVICE: No. I have to assume that it was done with the knowledge or at the instigation or direction of Loy Henderson.

I thought it was a bit unfair, because as soon as I got to Liverpool, I had to make a decision on a very ticklish visa case. One of the younger leaders of the Labor Party wanted a visa to the United States, and our visa office turned him down on the basis that he was left wing and perhaps a Communist. I forget the man's name but it's been in the news quite a bit. I had to explain to the visa officer that there were some very serious differences of opinion between the Labor Party and the Communists. I instructed him to issue the visa.

It seemed to me that I hadn't shown myself as being unwilling or unable to take responsibilities in the running of the Liverpool office. There had been some reorganization, and I had had some personnel problems. I'd been selected to go down to London and so on. So the comment that I was unwilling to take responsibility obviously was on instruction. The effect was an instruction to the selection boards not to promote me.

On the other hand, I have to admit that in my own letter to Satterthwaite, I had suggested I was resigned to the idea or accepted the idea of early retirement.

Q: What went on inside you at that point? Quite evidently by your early career and your subsequent performance you were entitled to expect a chance at the top.

SERVICE: I think this was the most anger I ever felt at the Department.

Q: Did you vent it at all?

SERVICE: No. I didn't think there was any point in making an issue of it. This was somebody's subjective analysis or judgment. What was more important, I felt, was trying to find out what the attitude was on assignment, transfer, and promotion. We had to do that pretty much at the White House level.

Roger Jones was at that time the administrative head of the State Department. I'd had some slight acquaintance through Bun Gladioux. Jones was not a State Department man, or a Foreign Service man, but a career civil service man in Washington who'd held various administrative jobs. He was very sympathetic and was very encouraging.

In fact he did, I think, push through what amounted to the rehabilitation of some people like Tony Freeman, who got an ambassadorship to Colombia and then later on Mexico. Jones kept urging me to hang in there and be patient.

[Interview 13: November 7, 1977]

SERVICE: By this time they had had to put in a special regulation. The Foreign Service regulations had specified that you could only stay in class II for ten years. If you were not promoted in that time you were automatically retired. "Selected out" was the term.

My promotion to class II had been in 1948, so I was already reaching fourteen years. They had passed a special regulation, which really was just the "Service regulation," since it applied to no case except my own, saying that if you had been suspended or fired, removed from the service and then later reinstated, that the time out would not apply for selection out. This was a sort of an unwelcome embarrassment, shall we say--

Q: To the Department?

SERVICE: No, to me. I had always been at the top of my class, and now had to have a special regulation to avoid selection out. I had fallen way behind all the rest of my class members. All the people that came into the service when I did, into class II when I did, had gone way ahead of me.

Q: Except for the other China Hands, who had been fired or resigned in the McCarthy period.

SERVICE: Oh yes, there had been some of them who had been fired and some had retired. But even the ones that had stayed in the service, although their promotions had been held up by Scott McCleod--people like Tony Freeman--even those people now had moved ahead.

Q: Right.

SERVICE: By the spring of 1962, we could get no good news. Things, I think, were looking more gloomy from the Washington end.

My brother, Dick, had become acquainted with Dean Acheson, the former secretary, the man who had fired me. As I recall, Acheson had volunteered to try to do some exploration of the situation. I don't think I even knew about it at the time, or if I did I said nothing would come of it.

But at any rate, Acheson wrote a letter to Dick dated April 20, in which he says, "After talking once with the Secretary of State," with Dean Rusk, "and twice again with Roger Jones, I agree with your conclusion that, 'The retirement should go through.' The secretary was understanding and well-disposed but seemed overconscious of all the difficulties in the way of promotion."

I had already made up my mind anyway that it was a fruitless business. I had been told off the record, informally, that the Department was willing for me to stay in Liverpool, but that I could not expect any substantive job, any policy making or responsible job, and that I should not expect a promotion, and that they would undertake that I would not be retired or selected out. In other words, they would have to keep changing the regulation so that I was not forced out by being forcibly retired.

This seemed to me an untenable situation. I think Caroline might have been willing to stay on. I could have become a sort of an old man of Liverpool. But, as a post it was far less interesting, far less important than the post I'd held in New Zealand fifteen years before. At any rate, I put in for retirement.

I had come back to the Foreign Service in '57 with a good deal of realism, I think, about my situation and prospects. Then I had fallen away from that sort of stern and sensible attitude. I think I'd been deluded by the fact that I had gotten many, many commendations of one sort or another. I'm not trying to stuff the record here with various things.

I'd done well in the Department. A new administration had come in. So, the result was that I felt frustrated and a sense of failure in going out--

Q: Was this more acute than your distress in the '50's?

SERVICE: It was a very great disappointment. Yes, very much of a disappointment, I think. This was more of a personal failure, I felt. But again, it was also somewhat like the first one, in that it was something that was really out of my hands, out of the State Department's hands. It was something decided, in an impersonal, distant kind of way by White House policy.

The White House was obviously worried about another long hassle with the Internal Security Subcommittee. They were already heavily engaged over Otepka, because State had fired Otto Otepka, who had been the big leak from the State Department to the [Internal Security Subcommittee] committee. I think they simply didn't want to complicate that issue by getting embroiled in my case again.

I'd been investigated and investigated and investigated. I didn't particularly fear any more investigations. I was quite resigned to go through with it. But the White House, I think, just didn't want to do it.

At any rate, I decided to retire. There's a rather nice letter here from Dean Rusk, which he might just possibly have written himself. After all he did know me, had known me.

MARK C. LISSFELT
Visitors Bureau and Administrative Officer
London (1960-1964)

Mark C. Lissfelt was born in Pennsylvania in 1932. He received his BA from Haverford College and his MALD from Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1959. He served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1954 to 1956. His foreign posts included London, Tel Aviv, Bamako, Brussels, Bonn, Berlin and Paris. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 22, 1998

LISSFELT: But it was quite an eye-opening experience to go to your first Foreign Service post and have it be the new embassy in London, opened in 1960 or so, with a big eagle over the front door, which was a wonderful place physically, which has since, if you've visited it recently, been altered inside, e.g., the corridors are all divided by security doors. You have to punch buttons to go from one section to another. It's really kind of sad.

Q: Did you have much opportunity to work with the British on this?

LISSFELT: Not a lot, except the British who worked for us in the embassy. It was not my job to have much to do with the Foreign Office, and I seldom went there. As a matter of fact, I probably went there in my total time half a dozen times, but that would usually have been to escort somebody. But as soon as we got there they soon learned that I didn't know my way around the Foreign Office very much. So that was kind of a warped experience, if you will, but it was very eye-opening. Findley Burns was one of the masters of the whole personnel process at the Department of State and went on from there to be ambassador to Jordan and then also to Ecuador later. David Bruce obviously thought a lot of Burns and saw to it that he got his assignment from there as ambassador in Jordan.

Q: Were there any times when any of the people who were visitors - you had visitors who weren't congressional types too, didn't you?

LISSFELT: Well you had half the Executive Branch who found a reason to travel to London for "important consultations with our closest ally," you had state organizations that came, and you had private citizens, of course, who came and wanted to tour the embassy, for example. We did a certain amount of showing private citizens around the embassy, which was essentially a rather open institution and known as one of the great buildings - built in the 1950s era of embassy construction. You could walk in there and you could practically go right downstairs and use the cafeteria if you wished. I don't think I could get in the embassy today as a retired Foreign Service officer. I don't think I could get through the door, security has become such a major preoccupation.

Q: Were there any problems that you can think of? Were there any cases where you had to get somebody out of trouble or anything like that?

LISSFELT: I don't recall anything. You know we had plenty of visits from Kennedy family members, too, by the way. Jacqueline Kennedy's sister, Radziwill, had a house in London and there were frequent visitors from the family. And we were obviously very solicitous of their needs. But things worked very well. There was a funny story - I think it was after my time in London - about one of the VIP airplanes landing at the wrong airport in London. There was an airport called Northolt, which was an RAF base quite near. Apparently the runways are almost

parallel to the then existing runway at Heathrow, the commercial airport, and we had planes going down at the wrong place, things like that. But we had such excellent permanent British and other national staff who knew how to cope with all these things, drivers and everything, who made our work easier. You know what it's like--the local staffs of any embassy can be the key to its success.

Q: What was the reaction in the embassy in London on the assassination of President Kennedy?

LISSFELT: Well, everybody was devastated, just devastated is the word. I remember we organized signing books in the lobby of the embassy. We started with one or two, and we ended up with 10 or 15 of these green volumes. People would come in, and we'd have people sitting for half an hour writing their thoughts. It was just heart-rending. People were distraught. And all the Americans in London, and the British, of course, had great admiration for Kennedy. One couldn't believe it. We were so ashamed, too, that this could happen to a President of the United States. By the way this was the time, too, of the huge British scandal involving Christine Keeler and their equivalent of the Secretary of Defense, Profumo. The Profumo Affair is what it was known as, and that was really a shocking thing. The British were in shock. This was before the assassination of Kennedy. But you asked me the highlights of my stay in London, and I could probably start with those two things, the assassination of Kennedy and the Profumo Affair, and the succession of prime ministers--you know, how they passed it on when Macmillan was succeeded by Sir Alec Douglas Home (spelled h-o-m-e but pronounced *Hume*), this taciturn Scotsman who looked absolutely skeletal, such a thin man. I'll never forget his face. His face looked like a skull, very tough, very smart. How they just passed it on, in the Conservative Party, sort of over drinks. Rab Butler, then the Conservative Party leader, and MacMillan virtually on their own decided on the successor, Home.

Q: Rab Butler, yes.

LISSFELT: Quite an eye-opener.

JAMES L. TULL
Staff Assistant to the Ambassador
London (1960-1965)

James L. Tull was born in Iowa. After serving in the US Navy from 1951-1955 he received his bachelor's degree and his master's degree at the University of Colorado. His career included positions in Colombia, England, Uruguay, Dominican Republic, Cyprus, and Costa Rica. Mr. Tull was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in May 2001.

TULL: No, except the work I did for Henry Dearborn prior to the Kennedy visit got me my next job in London.

Q: How did that happen?

TULL: Shortly before the end of my tour, a representative from personnel in the Department visited Bogota. Among the things he mentioned to Henry was that he was looking for some officer with staff experience to replace Jackson Smith as staff aide, the junior of two such jobs, in the ambassador's office. Smith wanted the junior political position then vacant to Bogota, but London would not let him go until PER (Personnel) could find a replacement. Dearborn replied that by coincidence, he happened to know of such an officer ready to go in Cali, and that's how my transfer happened.

Q: Colombia to London. So you became a staff assistant to Ambassador David Bruce, already by that time a highly respected and strong figure in American diplomacy.

TULL: And one of the most interesting persons I have ever known. He had this long period of both private and public service in Great Britain that went back many years and a host of close friendships from that service. Prior to World War II, he had headed the Red Cross for western Europe; during the war he was in charge of OSS (Office of Strategic Services) operations in western Europe; he knew the royal family and the Queen from the time she was a young girl; then-Prime Minister MacMillan had been a war-time colleague- it had been "Major MacMillan and Colonel Bruce"- and many other acquaintanceships at the top and bottom of British society which gave him an unusual entre into it. For the USG (United States Government), he had already served as a Marshall Plan representative and ambassador to France, West Germany, and Italy.

Q: You worked directly for him the whole time you were in London?

TULL: No, Al Wells was the senior of the two staffers- he had already worked for the ambassador in both Bonn and Paris. He worked full time for Ambassador Bruce while I split my time between him and the DCM, first Lewis Jones and then Phil Kaiser.

Q: Al Wells is the husband of Melissa Wells, several times an ambassador. At that time, was she an economic-commercial officer in London?

TULL: No, she was in Port of Spain as I recall. Later she was transferred to Paris in the economic section and after Al retired, to London.

Q: Why don't you discuss some of the policy issues you saw in London?

TULL: I made a note about "Skybolt" as that was the main problem and policy issue we had with the British when I arrived in February 1963. Skybolt was an air-to-air missile we were developing with the British. They were enthusiastic about it as it promised to add years to the operational life of some of their aging U.S.-built air fleet, plus be a major weapons system on a new, all-British first line fighter-bomber, the TSR-2, then on the drawing board. Our enthusiasm, however, was on the wane as development costs climbed higher while problems continued to mount with the weapon's guidance system. Finally, Secretary of Defense McNamara and his Whiz Kids team announced that Skybolt development was canceled. The British were devastated. Not only were their hopes dashed, but they felt they had not been consulted on a project in which

they had been partners. Later on, they also felt forced to cancel their TSR-2 plans and believed we had unilaterally left them high and dry. This caused a tremendous dustup in the UK (United Kingdom.) And President Kennedy was also upset, this coming soon after the strong criticism he suffered following the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba.

Q: What was finally done about it?

TULL: There was a lot of hand holding and quiet apologizing. The president invited the prime minister and his cabinet to a summit meeting in Bermuda where joint defense policy and how to manage it was the main topic. For my first six months or so, the ambassador was fully engaged in calming things down and soothing bruised feelings- tasks at which he was superb. But then Kennedy was killed- a stunning blow for the British as well as ourselves. We were much involved in all of the ceremonies of remembrance and mourning that were held there.

Q: They felt very close to President Kennedy. Was this partly because of his father or more for what the president represented?

TULL: His father was never popular there because as ambassador in 1940-41, he had been very skeptical of the British ability to survive Hitler's onslaught. I think the president was attractive to them for many of the same reasons he was to us: superbly intelligent and prepared as a leader, personally attractive, witty, quick on his feet and personable. Their sense of loss was nearly as deep as our own. But all in all, it was an exciting time to be in London: economically, things were excellent with Prime Minister MacMillan, called "SuperMac" by a grateful public; his Conservative Party appeared firmly in control of the government; in the pop music world, the Beatles and the Rolling Stones arrived on the scene; Mary Quant ruled British fashions while in the cultural area, John Osborne was leading a new wave of writers and playwrights. Unfortunately, however, a new, major sex scandal also arrived, headed by HMG's (Her Majesty's Government) minister for the army, John Profumo, who then committed the truly unforgivable sin of lying about it to the House of Commons. MacMillan and his cabinet soon resigned and although replaced by another Conservative regime, national elections were shortly called and the Labour Party of Harold Wilson won a substantial majority. All of this in the space of less than two short years.

Q: Was David Bruce on good terms with the Labour government?

TULL: Unsurprisingly, yes. As a matter of fact, before the election when Wilson was shadow prime minister, he occasionally lunched privately with the ambassador at the embassy. Also, our newly-arrived DCM, Phil Kaiser, found that he had been college mates at Oxford with Wilson's new minister of defense, Denis Healey, Foreign Secretary George Brown, and several other key Labor officials. So we did not lose a beat in the contact area- to be expected, I guess, given the ambassador's span on acquaintances across political, economic, clerical, and press and broadcast lines. However, the Labor government became increasingly critical of our role in Vietnam and its relationship with Lyndon Johnson, which was cool at best. At one point early in 1965 Wilson was returning from a visit to the far east and we picked up that he planned a very critical speech upon his arrival. The foreign secretary by coincidence was due for an official visit to Washington a few days later. I was awakened in the middle of the night with a personal message from the

secretary telling Foreign Secretary Brown that if the prime minister made that speech, the secretary would definitely not find it “convenient” to receive Brown as planned. Wilson thought better of those remarks.

Q: Did you have a visitors office at the embassy or did you have to do all of that?

TULL: Fortunately for me, we had probably the best organized and most efficient person I have ever had the pleasure of working with in the person of Miss Joan Auten to run our busy visitors operation. She ran it with precision and a level of contacts probably no one outside the ambassador possessed. For instance, she had “holds” on a half a dozen seats on every U.S. carrier flight out of London which she kept until about forty-five minutes before flight time. Ohio Congressman Wayne Hays was the scourge of Foreign Service administrative sections around the world, but he always gave Joan plenty of advance notice prior to arriving and stepped very lightly around her while visiting.

Q: Winston Churchill also died while you were in London, didn't he?

TULL: Yes, in 1965 as I recall. He was by that time quite old and afflicted almost permanently with a depression he had suffered from for much of his life that he called his “black dog.” He did, however, get a brief lift when Congress voted to declare him an American citizen and Ambassador Bruce delivered to him “Honorary United States Passport No. 1.” But a short time later he passed away, quietly in his sleep.

Nevertheless, even death could not catch Sir Winston off guard. A number of years before, Churchill had planned his own funeral in meticulous detail and named it “Operation Hope Not.” When the time arrived, all was in readiness. The ceremonies involved everyone from the Queen down and lasted all day. At last a caisson towed by Royal Navy enlisted men arrived with his casket at the Tower of London, to be transferred across the Thames and then by train to Blenheim Castle for his burial. As his body was being carried to a waiting river launch, pipers ringing the battlements of the White Tower struck up the Scottish lament, “Will Ye No Come Here Again?” A heart-stopping moment the like of which I’ve not seen since.

RAYMOND F. COURTNEY
Political/Military Officer
London (1961-1963)

Raymond F. Courtney was born in Illinois in 1908. He received both his undergraduate and graduate degrees from Harvard and attended the University of Paris. During World War II, he served overseas as a commander in the U.S. Navy. His posts with the Foreign Service included Sofia, Nicosia, and London. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: Then you went back to London where you were from 1961-63. What were you doing there?

COURTNEY: Well, I was carrying on as a consequence of my work in the Department. I was, in fact, a political/military officer on the staff. That phrase was just be established. It was a matter of exchanging defense information and working in cooperation with the Foreign Office on these defense problems.

Q: You were there during Skybolt?

COURTNEY: Yes, that is the particular incident I remember most colorfully.

Q: Could you give some background for somebody who is reading this about what Skybolt was?

COURTNEY: Well, Skybolt was an air launched cruise missile that we were developing. The British very much wanted to obtain it for their air force, also. There was a particular meeting where McNamara came over met with Thornycroft, the British Minister of Defense. Thornycroft made an impassioned, eloquent plea for Skybolt. He said that the effectiveness of the British Air Force in the future depended on them having this weapon too. Well, we didn't give it too them. I don't know the full reasons. One was I think that we were not entirely satisfied as to its merit and I don't think it figured eventually very largely in the Air Force arsenal.

Q: But it had quite an impact on the British political scene, didn't it?

COURTNEY: Not that much, I think. Not so much as Thornycroft declared. He said that the survival of that government depended on their success. Well, that was an over statement in my recollection.

Q: How were political/military relations with the British during this time?

COURTNEY: I would say, again, very satisfactory. To go back just a bit, when I was in the Department I sat in on a meeting when our Atomic Energy Commission reached the decision to share our knowledge of the hydrogen bomb with the British delegation. And so far as I am aware, that kind of relationship continued during my time in London.

Q: David Bruce was your Ambassador most of the time. What was your impression of him and how he operated?

COURTNEY: He was great. He was a splendid ambassador. A fine man and a very good ambassador.

Q: Did he take much interest in this political/military relationship with the British?

COURTNEY: Yes, he did as a matter of fact. He kept in very close touch with them.

Q: So you found yourself briefing him fairly often on such matters?

COURTNEY: Yes, I did.

Q: Were there any great problems with the Kennedy/Macmillan relationship?

COURTNEY: Not that I am aware of.

Q: Then you came back to Washington in 1963 where you served until 1965 as public relations advisor for European Affairs.

SELWA S. ROOSEVELT
Spouse of CIA Officer
London (1961-1967)

Selwa S. Roosevelt was born in Tennessee and was educated at Vassar College. She married Foreign Service officer, Archie Roosevelt, and went with him when he served on a variety of posts. These posts included Turkey, Spain and England. She was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

Q: You were in London from

ROOSEVELT: Five years, in the sixties, from '61 or '62 to '66 or '67. That was wonderful.

Q: There I assume your husband was a declared person.

ROOSEVELT: In the embassy roster, he was still assistant to the Ambassador, but everybody knew who he was, of course. And certainly he worked hand-in-glove with the British Government all the time. This was a very exciting time; it was the Profumo scandal and Philby and Burgess and McLain. All of that happened while we were there.

Q: Had your husband known Burgess and McLain and Kim Philby?

ROOSEVELT: He knew Philby.

Q: They were both Middle East hands.

ROOSEVELT: He knew Philby's ex-wife who one day came to our door in London. Suddenly Archie looked up and said, "Oh, my God, that's Eleanor Philby." So he met her at the door. She'd come apparently trying to get Archie's help because Mrs. McLain was having an affair with Philby or something like that. It was very murky. She wanted Archie to intervene. I don't know how he could intervene. How she knew where Archie was, I don't know.

Q: When the news came out about Philby, it must've been like a bombshell in your social circle.

ROOSEVELT: Not really. I think my husband never quite trusted him. It may have been a bombshell for some people, but Archie was pretty perceptive about people. In the first place, all these people drank so much. It didn't seem very professional.

Q: I think eventually Philby died of drink.

ROOSEVELT: He certainly was a very heavy drinker.

Q: How about drinking? Did you find in the circles where you were, did one sort of keep away from the taint of too much alcohol or was it typical?

ROOSEVELT: Oh, yes. I never drank, so I'm not one to talk to. My husband found that in London he perhaps drank more than he ever had. They go out to lunch, and the British idea of lunch is wine and port and all that. He wasn't used to that. He certainly was exposed to a lot of drinking in London.

Q: Did you find you socially had assignments to make contacts with people?

ROOSEVELT: We were really just like the State Department people. One didn't run operations in London, and if they did I was unaware of it. Archie and I had an understanding that he wouldn't tell me things that I didn't need to know. Especially being a journalist, I didn't want to know. Most of the time Archie's job was liaison with MI5 and MI6. At that time everybody was suspicious of everybody. I mean all these people in MI6 (Is it MI6 that is equivalent to the FBI?) Anyway one is the FBI and one is the CIA. I can never remember which. I remember that the head of it was I thought very suspicious from the word go. I always thought he was a Soviet agent. Apparently, so did a lot of people in England. There was a secret investigation in which Margaret Thatcher announced that he had been cleared, but I never believed it. Something about him was very arrogant and he seemed sure that he was fooling all of us stupid people.

Q: What about the atmosphere at the time? Did you find that there was a certain tension between the Americans and the British?

ROOSEVELT: No, not at all. I found that was a very good time to be in London. But there was a certain amount of tension, if you want to call it that about this whole spy thing because a lot of people in our intelligence service I gather were a little dubious about entrusting secrets to the British when they were going to go right back to the Soviets. There was a lot of that. On the social level it couldn't have been nicer. We had five absolutely lovely years. We had a beautiful house, and we lived the most pleasant life. I think that was the highlight of our overseas experience. We went to the opera and to the ballet and to the theatre. This was the time of Margot Fontaine and Nureyev. At this time Marie Callas was at the end of her career, but then we had Joan Sutherland, and Pavarotti was beginning his career. And the theater every week it was Laurence Olivier, Michael Redgrave, all the great actors that you know. All of them were performing. I guess I got the best education, because I had not had a chance to see much theater until then nor had I had a chance to see much opera. For me, London was just thrilling. We didn't go away on weekends the way most people do. We thought English country weekends were for the birds.

Q: They sound dull.

ROOSEVELT: They're dull as can be and there's absolutely a pattern, you know. You arrive and then you hang up your clothes, if it's a very swell house they hang them up for you, and then you'd have one huge meal after another. They eat very well in England, contrary to what people say, and the wine is always superb. But then you have to go for long walks which I don't like, and then you have to freeze to death which I hated. There was never any central heating. I said, "Archie, we don't have to go on these country weekends. Let's not go." So we stayed in London every weekend practically, and we went to the theater and to the opera and things like that.

Q: Were you able to do any of your newspaper work?

ROOSEVELT: No. I did not write while I was in London. I started writing again when I came home. You're so busy and I had a lot to do and Archie had a very big station. I had to look after these people, and I was like the den mother. Being still quite young, it was a big responsibility and I took it seriously. Most of the people I looked after were much older than I was.

WILLIS C. ARMSTRONG
Britain/Canada Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1962-1963)

Willis C. Armstrong was born in New York in 1912. He earned his undergraduate degree at Swarthmore College and his master's degree at Columbia University in New York. His career in public service began as a translator for the State Department in 1939 and lasted until the United States entry into World War II. Shortly after, he joined the Lend Lease Administration in 1941. His positions in the State Department dealt mainly with economic issues. His overseas assignments were in Ottawa and, London. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 29, 1988.

Q: When you had the desk, did you also have the British desk?

ARMSTRONG: Yes, I had the British desk. I wasn't very familiar with British relations, but I learned fast because that was the point at which there was a discussion about Skybolt.

Q: Skybolt seems to dominate that period. Could you explain for the record what Skybolt was?

ARMSTRONG: Skybolt was, in concept, not unlike what we now call an air launched cruise missile. The concept was an extension of a bomber or of an airplane which would be remote controlled and which would fly on its own over enemy territory and, on instruction, dive downwards as a missile and hit a target. The RAF in Britain had staked a great deal of its cash and future on the use of Skybolt, which was being developed by the USAF, as an extension of the RAF bomber force and thereby as a process for keeping Britain's nuclear deterrent still in being. Psychologically, an independent nuclear deterrent is extremely important to the British and has been for a long time.

In the autumn of 1962, there was some talk about the idea of the U.S. Air Force dropping any further work on Skybolt. It was in the developmental stage. I think they probably had a perfectly good point, that the engineering was not up to the concept then, though obviously it is up to the concept now because we and the Russians both have air launched cruise missiles. Essentially it's that sort of thing.

Our British desk was very concerned about the fate of Skybolt. What we were particularly afraid of was that this would be treated by the U.S. as a simple choice of weapon on practical and financial grounds, and it would not be recognized that the matter was of major political and psychological importance to the British government. We wrote a memorandum to that effect, saying, "Please pay attention. This is a major psychological political issue for the British government."

Q: To get a little idea of the working, this was coming to you from our embassy?

ARMSTRONG: It came to the State Department from the Air Force here, as well as from the embassy in London.

Q: Our embassy in London was saying, "Look, this is a big issue," and telling you, and then you were telling the White House?

ARMSTRONG: The embassy in London knew about it, but we acted on information from the Pentagon. After all, the State Department has a Bureau of Political and Military Affairs. We kept track of what went on with Britain and Canada. My Pentagon contacts included being the American member of the Joint Board on Defense, which is a Canadian-U.S. institution. But in general, it was the State Department's Pentagon contacts that brought us the intelligence that this was liable to be scrubbed.

Q: The idea that, "Look, we better take care because it's such an important political issue," was coming from our embassy?

ARMSTRONG: They didn't need to tell us that. We knew that. They said the right thing. They said the same things we did, but we didn't need them to tell us that. We knew it. So we banged off a memorandum, which had my name on it to Secretary Rusk. But nobody paid any attention, and the decision was made on the usual basis of money and practicality. Then the British blew up privately.

Q: Looking at the State Department in the 1960s, I've talked to a number of people who dealt with it during that period, and while they have very nice things to say about Dean Rusk, they often said that Europe was not high on Dean Rusk's agenda. It was delegated to George Ball or somebody else, whereas the Far East absorbed his attention. Did you have this feeling that the Secretary of State wasn't the person who was going to take a commanding position on something such as this?

ARMSTRONG: I think that was a factor, but he was also a Rhodes scholar and quite pro-British. His regional interests was primarily Asia, yes, because he had been assistant secretary for that.

But he was perfectly responsive on Canadian matters, and I backstopped a trip for him to Ottawa just after I came back. He was just going up to play golf in Montebello, was going to stop in Ottawa and see the embassy and go see Lester Pearson, his old friend. I said, "You can't do that. You've got to go call on Mr. Green. He's the foreign minister."

He said, "Why do I have to do that?"

I said, "Because he's the foreign minister."

I said, "If you call on any of the opposition after you've seen the minister, that's all right. Then get off to the golf course." I liked Dean Rusk very much. But in the Skybolt case, he was not a man to argue with the military. As I saw it in retrospect, he would see this as a case of, "The military makes its own decision on hardware. There's no reason for us to interfere with that." And he was not an Anglophile in that sense. We've had people like Lovett and a lot of other major diplomats who are Anglophiles, so they spent a lot of time there. Dean Rusk wasn't that kind of man. He didn't go with the British aristocracy in style. He's a plain man.

McNamara was a very strong Secretary of Defense and he made the decision. Kennedy supported McNamara. There you were. The British, of course, reacted, and there was enormous consternation in the British government over this decision. It put in question the whole U.S.-U.K. relationship. This is why you had to go to Rambouillet and then to Nassau. The British went to Rambouillet and talked to De Gaulle, and there was a lot of talk. We fetched up with the Nassau agreement.

Q: This is where Kennedy and Macmillan met.

ARMSTRONG: Kennedy gave Macmillan the guidance system for Trident missile submarines.

Q: Or Poseidon in those days.

ARMSTRONG: I guess they called it Poseidon. They had a nuclear submarine. Their guidance system was not as good as ours. Giving them the guidance system, as I understand it, made all the difference in the world between a good functioning weapon system and one that was only middling. To get the U.S. Navy to go along with this was very hard work. The U.S. Navy does not believe in giving any other navy anything except the back of its hand. They had to be dragged, kicking and screaming, into this.

Q: Were you involved in this?

ARMSTRONG: I was involved in a political sense in the Department, because before Nassau, we had to do the buildup: "This is what the British are going to ask for." We'd write briefing memoranda. Then afterwards, how do you implement the agreement? How do you keep the Navy from sabotaging the whole thing, which a lot of people suspected they would try to do? So we were involved as briefers and not as negotiators. We had to run against an undercurrent in the State Department and other places in the government which saw this as an absolutely beautiful opportunity to eliminate the British independent nuclear deterrent. A lot of people thought the

British shouldn't be allowed to have one any more than the French should be allowed to have one; only we should have one.

Q: Since we couldn't do much about the French, at least we could get to the British.

ARMSTRONG: Yes, that's right.

Q: Where did this come from within the military and State Department?

ARMSTRONG: Some of it came from the Europeanists in the State Department.

Q: The George Ball group?

ARMSTRONG: George Ball, Bob Schaetzel, Henry Owen. But some of it was more Henry Owen, who was in Policy Planning. It was more that than George Ball, because George Ball, in the end, would be an Anglophile. when you got down to cases. And Schaetzel wouldn't block a British independent deterrent, although he didn't like it. I may be misquoting him; that's my impression. But we had a very rough time. I wasn't involved, except in making sure that the flow of paper from the European bureau said the right thing. By and large, it did.

There was a funny Canadian connection with Nassau, because Diefenbaker thought he'd come down to see Macmillan, since he was nearby. We heard the President talk about this later in a briefing session. The President said, "Well, Macmillan and I hadn't quite finished our business, and Diefenbaker's plane landed, and there was nothing for it except for the three of us to have lunch." Macmillan didn't like Diefenbaker very much either, you know. Kennedy said, "We sat there much like three whores at a christening." A wonderful Boston Irish remark, you know.

That takes me back to one other point about the Canadian election, because this was before the Canadian election. In the election, Diefenbaker kept saying that he had a piece of paper that showed how the United States had tried to dominate Canada. He used the "push" word. This is the piece of paper that he told Livy about. And he implied that it had written on it, in Kennedy's handwriting, "What do we do with this SOB?"

We asked the President, "Did you write anything on that piece of paper?"

"Oh, no, I didn't. I couldn't have written that because I didn't think that of him at the time." The President was very open about that.

So we get into the Canadian election, which was won by Pearson. Then there was a great business of preparing Kennedy to meet Pearson at Hyannis Port. I was involved in the briefing for that. One thing Kennedy had to learn was that even though Diefenbaker wasn't there anymore, the Canadians were still going to be difficult to deal with on a lot of subjects, because they're Canadians. Pearson, of course, was all over the countryside in terms of most issues. A nice guy, but kind of a screwball. Kennedy and he got on reasonably well. Of course, Pearson and Johnson -- this was after I was off the Canadian scene -- had kind of a hard time getting along.

I'd say the Skybolt was the major British event, Skybolt and Polaris, during the time I was in that job. The other concern was Britain and the Common Market, because the first turn down of the British by De Gaulle came during that particular period. He vetoed the British application. Our Atlanticists in the group, Schaetzel and company, could not believe that this had happened or was real. I'd been in London and Paris just before that, and I'd talked to the embassies in both places. Neither of our embassies expected the British to get in. Our economic minister in Paris, Jacques Reinstein, an old friend, said, "Of course they're not going to get in."

I said, "Have you told anybody in Washington?"

He said, "They wouldn't believe me, so I didn't tell them." I had the same experience in Canada when I was trying to explain to Schaetzel that the Canadians didn't like the idea of the British going in, for fear of losing Commonwealth preferences and other special U.S.-Canadian arrangements. He never paid any attention to my view on this, because he said, "Well, the Canadians are just wrong, that's all." Schaetzel always knew what was right and what was wrong. Many times he was right. He was a great public servant, but he didn't like to pay much attention to what the Foreign Service really had to say until he got to be ambassador in Brussels, and then he found out. He was very good, a very competent guy.

I'd say the British effort at joining the EC was a major event then, and then became, the second time around, the major event when I was in the embassy in London, where for a while they weren't doing anything about it, then they shaped up to it. It was a major issue on the front burner when I left.

OSCAR VANCE ARMSTRONG
Political Officer
London (1962-1964)

Oscar Vance Armstrong was born in China to American Parents in 1918. He received his bachelor of science degree from Davidson College in 1939. Subsequently, he served in the U.S. Army during World War II. His Foreign Service posts included Canton, Peiping, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, London, and Taipei. He was interviewed by Willis Armstrong in March 1991.

ARMSTRONG: So, I had an academic year [at the Imperial Defence College]. It was a very pleasant one. I don't know if it has changed, but you don't have to work too hard. It is meant to be an "open your mind" type of experience.

Then I ended up, as you did, in London. Went to London in the FE position. The political section had three or four of those regional slots. They had an European fellow, Middle East, Africa and Far East. They didn't know what to do with Latin America and the Caribbean so they threw that into the Far East.

Q: *So you could become a Cuban expert.*

ARMSTRONG: Not quite. I kept telling them that I needed an orientation tour to my area, particularly the Caribbean. Actually I put a good deal of time on that. One of the issues back then was whether or not British Guiana was going to get its independence and go communist.

Q: *I had the British Desk from '62-'64.*

ARMSTRONG: Okay, so you are very much involved.

Q: *And remember that one very well.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, indeed.

Q: *I went down to Guyana in 1963 and spent some time with Cheddi Jagan and also with the guy we were paying.*

ARMSTRONG: As I recall it was Jagan's wife who was....

Q: *I didn't meet her, but she was an American woman from Chicago and was a real organizer and a dedicated communist. Cheddi Jagan was a wandering Indian intellectual who could see good in a variety of things. He was a nice fellow. A very bright man. I enjoyed my conversation with him. Much more than I did the guy we were supporting.*

ARMSTRONG: I have forgotten his name.

Q: *I have forgotten it too. My good friend Bill Carlson was then Canadian Desk officer with me in B&A. He went down there as ambassador. First as consul general and then as an ambassador. He said that all his job was to keep that guy doing what we wanted him to do, including voting the right way in the UN. He succeeded.*

ARMSTRONG: [unintelligible sentence]

Q: *And quite a bit on the covert side.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, indeed. I was in touch with my Colonial Office counterparts on this sort of thing. I suspect the main activity was through CIA channels.

Q: *We kept a close eye on it from the European Bureau standpoint. We really didn't give the Agency a free run.*

ARMSTRONG: I was trying to think back to the Far East issue that was most active at that time. It was not China, but Laos. The whole Laos issue. The British were involved there as co-chairs of the International Control Commission.

Q: *The Canadians were members of it.*

ARMSTRONG: The Canadians and the Poles. That led to one communist, and one leaning that way, and us. The Canadians were a great help out there. The guys out there did far more than the Department of External Affairs wanted them to do.

The other major development while I was there that I can now recall was the Sino-Indian Border War.

Q: *Oh, yes. I was on the British Desk and used to read all the telegrams about it. Turner Cameron was running the India Desk and he would come down and sit in my office as a refugee from more telegrams from Galbraith. You remember the Galbraith telegrams?*

ARMSTRONG: Yes. Galbraith was interestingly enough in London at the invitation of the BBC to give some lectures, not about his diplomatic activities, but his economic theories.

Thus he was in London when word came that the Chinese communists had launched an attack on the border. I was the control officer and got called down for a NIACT message for the embassy about 2:00 in the morning. It was a message to Galbraith saying, "The President thinks that perhaps you should get back to your post." I decided there was no point in waking him at 2:00 in the morning to tell him this so I looked up the best airline possibilities and woke him up at six or seven and said, "Sir, here is a message that..."

Q: *He didn't give the lecture?*

ARMSTRONG: No, he didn't. He did give me a text of what he was going to do.

Q: *Those were the Reith(?) lectures.*

ARMSTRONG: Were they?

Q: *He came later when we were in London and gave the Reith lectures. I had to be host at the ambassador's house for a party for him and the guy who wrote the Kennedy books about the elections, Ted White, and some other fairly important American. We had a large collection of British people, about 50 people. The ambassador had to be away so he asked Louise and me to be host. It was a lot of fun to watch them -- these three guys all with big egos. After dinner there were three clusters in the drawing room. They kept looking over to see how the competition was doing. Louise went to the Reith lectures and said the first one was good but he had material only for the first one and the rest of it he improvised.*

ARMSTRONG: As I recall he gave me the text of the lectures. He looked at the telegram and said, "I guess I have no choice." I said, "No sir." So he gave me the text which was essentially that economists should start talking to people rather than to each other. That was his message. And, as you know, he could be very amusing.

Q: *He was a fascinating guy.*

ARMSTRONG: But you recall there was some interesting byplay. We and the British decided that this might be an opportunity to solve the India-Pakistan problem. A lot of effort was put into that. Didn't we send Harriman out?

Q: *Sandys and Harriman went out and I can't think of two people more likely to screw a situation up. Which I think they did. Of course, the Indians didn't need any help in screwing it up as they already had. That was the time the Paks and Indians got clustered together under Soviet auspices eventually.*

ARMSTRONG: I had forgotten that.

Q: *The prime ministers went to Moscow and were given a house which was totally bugged by the Russians on both sides. The Russians would give some of the information about the Paks to the Indians but not vice versa. Then the Indian prime minister died and the Russians knew he died because they had the microphones in his room, but they didn't dare tell the Indian delegation that he died because that would have admitted that they had done the bugging. That was in the press the other day.*

ARMSTRONG: Did it work, the attempt to get the Paks and Indians to settle all their problems?

Q: *No.*

ARMSTRONG: One of the various efforts that we and others had made to solve the Kishmir problem. I am trying to remember the name of the Colonial Office fellow for whom I had great admiration. Picard.

Q: *Yes, I remember that name.*

ARMSTRONG: A big husky fellow. A very good officer who was involved in the subcontinent, the Pakistan and Indian aspect of that whole thing.

So we had a very enjoyable and interesting two years. I was lucky to serve with David Bruce, one of our great ambassadors. He was a great guy. I went in to pay my final goodbye and uttered the usual platitude, "It has been a pleasure to work with you, sir." He said, "The thing I have appreciated is that you haven't worked with me very much." He said, "As you know I don't like to get too involved in a lot of things and I am glad you didn't get me involved in too many things."

Q: *I have a Bruce story that I have always cherished. He used to get very worried about the extent of British financial reserves. We had to send a telegram every week from the Treasury attaché to the Treasury telling the exact status of the reserves. He called me in one time and told me how worried he was. I said, "I am sorry sir, but those figures don't mean anything because they don't tell you the picture." "Well," he said, "I got so upset about this that I sent a telegram. I guess I didn't show it to you." He fished out the telegram and showed it to me. He said, "You know, after I sent this, John Leddy, who was the Assistant Secretary, called me up in the middle of the night. George Ball called me in the middle of the night." I read the telegram and he is*

talking about England going down the drain. I said, "Excuse me, but there isn't any drain for them to go down. They have 60 million people and a going concern. They can go bankrupt but then they will build themselves up again because they continue living here, etc. There isn't any tube for them to go down." "Well," he said, "I guess I should have showed you that telegram before I sent it."

ARMSTRONG: I think you were the one, maybe on one of your visits to London, who commented after you had taken over the B&A Desk, that you couldn't quite figure out the embassy for a while until you realized there were two embassies operating there. There was David Bruce and then there was the rest of the embassy and the two didn't necessarily coordinate all the time.

Q: *Yes, that is right. I knew it before I got there so I wasn't surprised on this occasion. All the telegrams were signed Bruce but the ones that were really from him said "from Bruce" and then were signed Bruce. He was a wonderful character. We were up at Princeton when they dedicated the Bruce Chair three or four years ago. George McGhee turned up, Lord Sherfield came over from London.*

HERMANN FREDERICK EILTS
Political Officer
London (1962-1964)

Hermann Frederick Eilts was born in Germany in 1922. He received his undergraduate degree in 1943 from Ursinus College and later completed his graduate degree at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in 1947. In the same year, he joined the Foreign Service, where his overseas posts included Tehran, Jeddah, Aden, Baghdad, and London. He was interviewed by Ambassador William D. Brewer on August 12, 1988.

Q: *After your period in the Department, which ended I guess in 1961, you had a year at the National War College and then you were assigned to London and I think you told me that in the first part of your assignment, which was to the Near Eastern desk in London, you spent a lot of time working on Yemen again. How did that happen?*

EILTS: About a month after I arrived in London (I arrived in London in August of '62), i.e. in September of '62 the Imam Ahmad died. His son, Mohamed al Badr, took over. About three weeks later there was a revolution conducted by Yemen military officers against him. The palace in Sanaa, where he was staying, was shot up, and it was believed he was dead. It turned out that he managed to escape into northern Yemen, and he reappeared with the Zaidi tribes of that area. Very quickly, out of this developed a Yemeni civil war between Yemeni republicans and royalists. The royalists were those who continued to support the Imam Badr, the republicans were the army officers who conducted the coup.

The Egyptians supported the republicans, the Saudis supported the royalists. It was a period when Nasser was still describing Arab monarchs generally as reactionaries. So the Saudis took very seriously, not only the revolution that overthrew the monarchy in Yemen, but the fact that it should be supported by Nasser. Within six months after the civil war began, the United States recognized the Yemeni Arab Republic. The British government continued to recognize the royalists. So in my job, as a Middle East officer in London, I was caught in the middle with the British acting to support the royalists, perhaps not so much officially, although certain members of Parliament were very active in urging support for the royalists and pressing us not to go too far with the republicans because they didn't occupy most of the country. If the Egyptians pulled out, the British contended, the whole thing would collapse. And we taking the position that the Imam Badr was something archaic who should have been gotten rid of, and that there was indeed much more support for a Republic. The British and we were on different wickets and it affected our and their views on Egypt. They, of course, had had problems with Nasser before, and it affected their and our views on Saudi Arabia. So we had the question of being on opposite sides at a time when we were in general trying to get some kind of harmonization of British policy and American policy toward the Middle East, something that had already been disrupted in the '56 war, the Arab-Israeli war, and had then improved somewhat. Now again, e.g. this issue of the role of the Egyptians in Yemen and the Yemeni civil war that harmony had been disrupted. That was the principal issue.

Now I must say this. The British were much smarter than we were, not on the issue I'm talking about but on their operational method. The British would always involve their man in Washington, my opposite number, and first give him whatever information, whatever they wanted him to say to the Department of State. They knew that in order to get information you have to give information. And only afterwards when I, from the American Embassy, came would they speak to me about it. They always used their man first. This was not a question of lack of confidence in me because they asked me all kinds of things. I knew more about Yemen and more about Saudi Arabia than most of them. Factual questions of all sorts were constantly put to me by the British, but the method of using their officers was always using their man in Washington first and only then confiding in me. And we, we never did it that way. We never did put our man out in front, we somehow didn't seem to realize, or at least place that much weight on the idea, that to get information you have to give it.

Q: That's a very good point and I certainly agree. Then after the Yemen thing subsided I believe you said that your second preoccupation turned out to be Cyprus. How did that...

EILTS: The Yemeni thing never really subsided. When I went subsequently as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, the Yemen problem was still underway. But by that time the British had become accustomed to our views and we had become accustomed to theirs. But then Cyprus came up. Cyprus came up a few days before Christmas in 1963 when the Archbishop Makarios, who was the president of Cyprus, unilaterally abolished the Turkish provincial councils, which had been established under the Cypriot constitution. The Turks were upset about this unilateral Greek Cypriot violation of the constitution. The Cyprus problem was handled in the British government not by the Foreign Office but by the Commonwealth Relations Office. Later the two were combined, but at the time they were separate. The Commonwealth Relations Office had nobody in Washington. It didn't trust the British Embassy in Washington. Therefore the officer in the

American Embassy, who was handling Middle East affairs, became the point of contact with the Americans on the Cyprus issue. It turned out to be a rather nasty affair. When the British found that they were unable to persuade Archbishop Makarios to do anything about this whole situation, i.e. to revert to the original constitutional arrangement, the United States got into it for no good reason other than that we were concerned that the Turks and the Greeks, both members of NATO, might get to slugging it out if this extra NATO wasn't resolved. So we decided to get into it.

President Johnson first sent out George Ball, who was Under Secretary at the time. He came through London, so I was the man detailed for that mission and went out and we talked -- we all talked to -- the leaders of Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece. But as a matter of fact, Ball was authorized by the Prime Minister of England -- at the time Lord Hume -- to speak not only for the American government but also for the British government. The only thing that Hume seems to have forgotten was to tell his Minister for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, about this. So when the latter received messages that George Ball was speaking for the British government, he blew his stack, as you might imagine. Well, Ball's mission didn't succeed but it did mean the U.S. was involved. Some four or five months later, maybe slightly less, Dean Acheson was sent out to visit Greece, Turkey and Cyprus and again I was involved in that issue.

So that's how that came about, my involvement of the Cyprus dispute, the U.S. involvement flowed from concern over the negative effect of a continuation of the Greek-Turkish dispute on the southeastern flank of NATO.

Q: Well, you were closely associated then with two very distinguished American leaders in international affairs. I wonder if you have any personal thoughts as to their operating styles, that is, Secretary Acheson or Secretary Ball?

EILTS: Ball was an official of the U.S. Government. I had seen Ball from time to time before, but had never worked very closely with him. I became tremendously impressed with Ball's operating style. He had a way of operating. He could articulate his ideas well. No matter how depressing the responses we received might be, he always kept up his optimism. He was a tremendous leader. It always interested me that in dealing with leaders, be it the Prime Minister of Britain alone, or Duncan Sandys, the very tough Minister of Commonwealth Relations, or whoever it might be; Makarios; the Turkish leadership; the Greek leadership, Ball dominated the conversation but he didn't dominate it by bluster. He is a large man, of course, a broad man -- broad shouldered -- he just dominated the whole proceedings by his way of putting things; by his method of argument; by his ability and willingness to understand the others' point of view; and by his ability as a good lawyer -- he too has a legal background -- to try to find ways and means of reconciling the positions of the different parties. I developed a great admiration for George Ball. He was a real statesman.

Dean Acheson was already out of office. He had been Secretary of State. I had seen him, I guess, occasionally, but I could hardly claim to have worked with him. I thought Acheson, by the time he was on this Cyprus mission, was past his prime. I guess he had been called in as an elder statesman and one who had had something to do with the organization of NATO. But when I compare the two missions, the Ball mission and the Acheson mission, Acheson's doesn't stand out as having been as effective. Now, in fairness though, Acheson got from Papandreu senior,

the then Prime Minister of Greece, the father of the present Prime Minister, a commitment that the Greek government would agree to something called taksim, that is, a division of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. Where you divided it had to be worked out, but a division was agreed on. This is what the Turks had always wanted. The Greeks had always wanted enosis...the inclusion of the entire island in Greece. But the following day, by which time he'd gone to Geneva, young Papandreou, the present Prime Minister, showed up in Geneva and had obviously persuaded his father the previous evening to ditch the taksim. And young Papandreou informed Acheson and the American party that there could be no taksim. So the Acheson mission was a failure. It came closer to a settlement in the context of the senior Papandreou's agreement, the taksim, for a brief period at least, than Ball's mission did. But in terms of the conduct of the mission, Ball was far more impressive. Acheson projected a certain degree of arrogance. His method of speech was clipped. It didn't go over well with the Turkish, and the Greek, and the Cypriot leaders. Ball, although he told them some very, very tough things, put it across in a fashion where, even when they were unhappy about what Ball said, they liked him.

Q: That's a very interesting contrast. I think your Ambassador there in London at that time was Bruce. Is that right?

EILTS: David Bruce.

Q: Do you have any comments on him as a Chief of Mission? He was a non-career man but with extensive experience.

EILTS: Oh, David Bruce, I think, is one of the outstanding persons for whom I've ever worked. He had a sense of balance. He was interested in everything that went on in the Embassy. He delegated authority, but at the same time when you needed the Ambassador's help on anything, you could go to him and he would immediately respond.

JOHN N. HUTCHINSON
Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS
London (1962-1966)

John N. Hutchinson was born in Iowa and educated at the University of Fayetteville. He served posts in England, the Philippines and New Zealand. He was interviewed by G. Lewis Smith in 1988.

HUTCHISON: Yes. Brumberg caused me a lot to trouble.

Anyway, the upshot of this was that I was offered the choice of going to Tokyo, Paris, or London. I believe in each case as deputy PAO, subject to acceptance by the current PAO. I picked London. I knew Bill, not well, but I knew him and had worked with him some. Joe Phillips was area director for Europe, and Joe and I knew each other well. (I should have explained earlier that back during World War II, I was Joe Phillip's executive office when Joe

was public relations officer for Eisenhower in Algiers. I didn't see him again until we both wound up in USIA at some later period.)

So I went off to London as deputy to Bill Clark. I had four years in London without home leave, not that that's a privation; but it's a little unusual. And wound up as acting PAO when Bill Clark was brought back to Washington and became the deputy commissioner for that Canadian, Montreal World's Fair.

I was in London in an interesting time. There was, of course, tremendous agitation in Britain from the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament. We had big demonstrations in front of the embassy periodically and some quite serious ones. I remember one time four ranks of British bobbies, clear across the steps of the embassy there in Grosvenor Square, with their arms locked together as a barrier to several thousands of really violent demonstrators trying to break through. They had to use horses to break them up.

I was there when John Glenn came over to London, ostensibly on a private tour. We had already had the capsule over there on exhibition, had a tremendous success with parading it through London and exhibiting it at the embassy, the capsule in which Glenn rode. Glenn came over some time later, and I remember introducing him to an audience of scientists in our little embassy auditorium. I think it was the British Astronomical Society or something like that. Glenn had brought along his model of the upcoming moon shot, and he took it apart. He showed how the booster would fall off the rocket and then the whole thing would go on to the moon, other pieces would fall away, it would land, then they would take off again, and the booster would drop off. He took these pieces apart as a demonstration as he was lecturing, and I remember I was supposed to make some kind of remarks at the end of the thing, thank the people for coming or whatever. I remember doing it by just saying to John Glenn, "I don't believe a word you say." (Laughs) Which got a good hand.

I was there during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which was probably the most interesting diplomatic event of the time, as nearly as I can recall. Intelligence officers brought over the pictures that had been taken of the missile sites in Cuba, these big enlargements of aerial photos, to show to the British, to the prime minister, who was then MacMillan, as I recall, to Lord Hume, who was foreign minister, later became prime minister, and all the intelligence community in Britain. When Bill Clark and Jim Pettis, the press attaché there, and I saw these pictures, they were all very highly classified, of course, absolutely top classification. Bill said immediately, "We're got to get these unclassified and get them published here in Britain right as fast as we can." There was a terrible uproar about this.

Finally, the senior officer, who had brought them over -- I don't remember at the moment who he was -- he was undoubtedly CIA, but I don't know who he was or what his position was, but a very senior officer had brought them over with some other members of his staff. Finally, he took it upon himself to authorize a declassification of these pictures.

Q: On the spot?

HUTCHISON: On the spot. We turned them loose, and, of course, they were a sensation in the British press, and they did exactly what the United States wanted to have happen. It gave them unmistakable evidence that the Russians really were in Cuba, which there had been a great deal of suspicion that we were exaggerating this up until that time. Very hard to sell this idea to the British, but that did it. Hume himself came on television with blow-ups of these pictures and a pointer. (Laughs) And went on BBC with these things. So we had absolute saturation coverage of the evidence of these missiles.

We got a rocket out of Washington almost within minutes of the publication of these things. (Laughs) Woke our press attaché up in the middle of the night, said, "Who the hell gave you permission to turn those pictures loose?" Jim just said, "The guy that brought 'em." "Oh." And that was the end of that. (Laughs)

Q: I wonder if he had cleared it back with his people?

HUTCHISON: I don't think he did. He gave them the authority right there on the spot. Maybe he didn't even let them know afterwards. I don't know the background on that, but it was a great little hour for Jim Pettis, because he was feeling like he was kind of on the hot seat. He had actually delivered the pictures to the press, to television, to everybody.

After Bill Clark left and I was acting PAO, Bernie Anderson came over with the news that President Johnson was raising the ante in Vietnam, and gave us the figures. I think the final troop total reached something like 485,000. But Bernie was informing the intelligence people on the information side of the foreign office of what was going to happen. Bernie and I went there and met with them. That was kind of the peak, of course, of our participation in troop strength, at least, in Vietnam.

Q: What year was that? It must have been about '65 or '66.

HUTCHISON: Must have been.

The job in London was interesting. Bill Clark was very skilled in dealing with the British press, and we had a good information staff. I think probably Bill's major contribution in London was in briefing the diplomatic and defense correspondents with tremendous assistance from Jim Pettis, the press attaché.

My job was essentially to keep the office operating. I was more the operating person, but I did have some interesting assignments. If you're a deputy PAO, as you know, it's pretty hard for you to get into the program substance in the country you're in because there are other people on the staff who are expressly assigned for that purpose. So your function is auxiliary. Important as it may be, it tends to be auxiliary. It's to assist the other members of the staff, your PAO and the people under him, to get the job done.

But one of the interesting jobs I had was liaison with the British-American Parliamentary Group. This was essentially an organization intended to give hospitality and substantive assistance and information to visiting U. S. congressmen and senators in Parliament. I was the embassy's liaison

with the organization that handled it for Parliament. It gave me many opportunities to meet Parliamentarians, to tour the Parliament over and over again, and to attend various functions held for visiting American politicians.

Occasionally some funny things would happen. Jesse Unruh, who was at that time the speaker in the California State Assembly, and George Miller, president pro-tem of the California Senate, came over and they were given the same courtesies as if they had been members of Congress. I was helping them. I took them up to the House, and they were met by Lord Henderson, a salty old boy who was liked very much, who undertook to guide them through the House of Lords himself. So I went tagging along. They're standing around admiring this extremely handsome room and all its beautiful red and gold, and I heard Jesse Unruh say to George Miller, "We ought to fix our joint up like this." (Laughs)

And a couple of years ago, I was in Sacramento, where they have in recent years restored the fine old capital building and re-done all the rooms. And sure enough, the Senate (the Upper House) was in red and gold! (Laughs) Jesse Unruh, by that time, was state treasurer. He was still a powerful man behind the scenes. I'm certain that when they started to refurbish that chamber, that Jesse had a hand in "fixing up the joint."

I was also the USIS and, in several bodies, the ambassador's representative to various organizations. Anyone who has been a DPAO knows how such assignments are acquired; USIS officers with more specific duties dodge them on the grounds that the job description doesn't prescribe them, and the DPAO's perceived generalist function makes him vulnerable.

There were three quasi-governmental and private NATO-support organizations, a Foreign Office American Section, the English Speaking Union, a semi-official British-American teachers exchange project, a private student exchange organization, and numerous other societies, groups and boards in which I either represented USIS or Ambassador Bruce. I was also probably the most called-upon USIS officer for public speaking, usually to school, college or educator groups, sometimes to civic or foreign study groups.

Clark studiously avoided USIS administration, handing that entire responsibility to me. This is a proper function for a DPAO; the PAO should not have to tussle with budget, personnel and office management. I was fortunate to have excellent British staff in this area. All in all, the London job was both demanding and rewarding.

Q: Before we leave your assignment to London, I'd like to ask a couple of questions, because this was one of the two times when all the rage was to create a country plan with specific objectives, and you were supposed to report your accomplishment with regard to your advance toward the accomplishment of objectives. I'd like to know whether you even attempted to handle your program in that way, or whether you were mainly reacting to the principal problems that came up, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, and things of that nature.

HUTCHISON: Maybe the country plan method had its uses. I suppose everybody ought to be compelled to sit down and examine what they're doing.

Q: I agree.

HUTCHISON: I had to write the country plan in London. Bill Clark had no interest in it; thought it unnecessary. I must have rewritten it four or five times, trying to satisfy Bob Lincoln, who would then reiterate what he thought the country plan ought to be, although he'd never served in Britain. You finally get to the point that all you're trying to do is satisfy Washington, and get on with what you see as really important. The country plan gets to be a terrible nuisance, it's a very time-consuming thing, you spend hours, days, months, trying to satisfy preconceptions of Washington. Now, this may not be true in many instances, but it seems to me that's the way it affected me in London, where, as they do in any important post, politics and international affairs are changing constantly. It seems to me that the country plan system is therefore often a failure, not for any particular inabilities of the people who are trying to devise it, but because it just becomes an attempt to produce the right string of words to satisfy somebody else.

Certainly every USIS post should address assiduously to what it should be doing to maintain and advance the interests of the United States, hopefully under the guidance of intelligent and informed Washington leadership. But I was never comfortable with country planning which went beyond thoughtful examination of the host country's basic attitudes toward the U.S. and the structural application of USIA's resources to nudge those attitudes toward favor for long-range American objectives. We too often pursued short-range objectives with pushy, campaign-like efforts.

Two notable characteristics have flawed the leadership of the agency and contributed to this penchant. Hardly any agency director, from Compton to Wick, (Ed Murrow excepted.) came in to the job after having spent significant time abroad. It is unlikely that anyone who has not had extended residence in a foreign country can head USIA with understanding of its mission and its capabilities and limitations. Secondly, it is virtually impossible to plan, and to measure dependably, the enduring success, if any, of USIS programs. Only with the greatest sense of reality should any USIS practitioner set out to alter host country attitudes with the expectation of being, at best, more than a small element in the tangle of influences.

Some proclamations of goals have been ludicrous: the announcement of Doctor "Bloodshot" that the agency should make every human being on earth a card-carrying Christian was a nutty extension of such nonsense.

Often a false fervor has been encouraged by USIA leaders, cranking up spurious activity by executives who felt pressed to show progress toward solving the insoluble and convincing the unconvincible. Country plans have tended in some instances to be documents prepared mainly to satisfy the need in Washington to demonstrate that USIA was shrewdly identifying our objectives, and, with equal shrewdness, moving to achieve them. Too often, that was eyewash.

I don't know whether country plans are still used, but there must be some process that would do this better. One of the problems with satisfying the overall objectives of an agency like USIA is the constant change of country circumstances. Situations change more rapidly and more frequently than in almost any other civilian agency of government, except for the State

Department itself. I think this makes it very difficult to try to set down in concrete some kind of plan that's supposed to last you a year or two years or something.

Later I spent two and a half years in Manila as head of RSC, and I've left out that portion of this thing, which probably is worth examining. There I was not a part of USIS Manila. I was reporting directly to Washington, and I wasn't concerned with country plans. I was welcome; I always attended the USIS and the ambassador's staff meetings every week in the embassy, and got on well. We had quite an integrated operation, I guess, with Manila, but I was no more responsible to them than I was to the embassy in Bangkok or Rangoon or Singapore, wherever.

In New Zealand, I don't recall that we were pressed to wrestle with the country plan the way we were in London.

Q: I think part of the problem in London, as it was not only with London, but with all of Western Europe, was the fact that your time in London happened to coincide with a time when Tom Sorensen felt that Western Europe was greatly over-funded, it was headed by a bunch of effete thinkers who had previously been riding a gravy train left over from the days of OMGUS, HICOG, and the Marshall Plan. All European types, in his estimation, should be transferred elsewhere, and Washington should virtually dismantle the European Program.

HUTCHISON: They almost did.

Q: He felt it was just superfluous, and that USIA was just feeding the ego's of a bunch of people who had been exchanging posts in Europe. I had headed a team in early 1963, which was sent over to try to reduce the European program. It was made very clear to me by Tom that they wanted to practically dismantle it. I went over, and we made a very intensive study, and we came back with a program which all four of us who were members of that party agreed was a fairly substantial reduction in the European program, but one that would not cripple the program. Sorensen was completely unsatisfied with that, and told me that we didn't do half the job. Later he made Bob Lincoln head of the European area, with the express purpose of cutting down to the point where he thought it ought to be. I think that's why you had so much trouble with the country plan, more than anything else, in all probability.

HUTCHISON: As a matter of fact, Bill Clark had left, gone back to Washington. I was acting PAO when suddenly, with very little -- we knew the philosophy that was going on, and we knew the attitude that was pressing on Europe. That had been clear for a long time. But suddenly in August, I was given a sharply reduced budget right then. Bang! We weren't waiting for next year. Funds were cut off. I had to call the local staff together and tell them that a lot of them were going to lose their jobs. I told them what the pressure was on this thing, and I said, "If any of you have been contemplating retirement or any shifts of position, please do it now and save somebody else who's going to get the sack if you hang on just a short time more." I talked this over very candidly with the whole staff, exactly what we were up against, how much we had to cut, and I think I had to fire something like 14 people out of a total staff of 38. I'm not sure those figures are right. It was in that range. They had to be off the payroll almost immediately, because my budget year was coming to an end. If they didn't get off, it would start kind of an automatic triggering, you see. It would liquidate us.

There were two other factors involved in this operation. Bob Lincoln was one, who seemed utterly unsympathetic on this score. The ambassador contributed to it -- David Bruce -- because the ambassador had the old-fashioned idea, although he and Bill Clark always got on very well, that there were a lot of unnecessary functions, you know. He had the old idea of kind of a Jeffersonian attitude toward diplomacy. He supported the idea of cutting USIA, without consulting us.

He went off on leave down in the south of France somewhere, just on a holiday for a week or something or other, when this word came through to cut. Phil Kaiser, who was then deputy chief of mission, acceded to the thing in a message back to Washington, without consulting me. I was roaring mad about it. I had known Phil from an earlier day when he was Assistant Secretary of Labor, way back under Maurice Tobin. I was in a rage about it because he had made the decision in Bruce's absence, and without consulting me. I didn't even see the incoming message. I turned around and wrote my own roaring mad message back to Washington, saying how outrageous this thing was, at least in the way it was being handled, and that we hadn't been consulted on it at all, it had just been done summarily between Lincoln's office and the ambassador's office. That was a hell of a way to operate. But we had to do it, and we had to cut the staff. We had to fire some of the best people, locals, in USIS London. It was really savage. But we did it.

I learned later on -- well, forget that, because people are still around. But I learned some interesting background in that thing that concerned the attitudes before and after this happened. I think there were some regrets on it, probably.

I guess we ought to say something about RSC Manila, because it's an important thing.

DAVID G. NES
Imperial Defense College
London (1963-1964)

David G. Nes was born in Pennsylvania in 1917. He received his undergraduate degree from Princeton University and his master's degree from Harvard. During World War II, he served in the U.S. Army overseas. His tours of duty in the Foreign Service included Glasgow, Paris, Tripoli, Rabat, London, and Cairo. Mr. Nes was interviewed by Dayton Mak on April 28, 1992.

Q: Then I see that in 1963 you went to London as US diplomatic representative at the Imperial Defense College. Would you tell us a bit about the Imperial Defense College and how you enjoyed being there?

NES: That was certainly a plum assignment as those of my colleagues who had that chance will confirm. The Defense College is a little bit like our National War College except at a slightly more senior rank and a little more general in its approach to the education of senior officers. The level of officers was Brigadier or above in the Army and Air Marshal in the Air Force, the age

40-50. The British Government -- I think, with an arrangement with President Eisenhower -- asked that we provide a representative from our Foreign Service, the Army, Navy and the Air Force. And so we did. We were four Americans each year in a class of about 65.

These 65 were drawn from the Commonwealth, from the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Nigeria and Pakistan. It is rather sad to note that the two Nigerian officers there later lost their lives in the civil war in their country. It was a very stimulating, exciting group of men to work with. There were no ladies in the class at that time, I am sorry to say. As one of the Americans, we were treated very royally, given access to every sporting and social event that you could imagine in London.

The daily routine was very sophisticated and very attuned to the British way of doing things. You met at 9:00 for coffee and at 9:30 you had a speaker drawn from the top echelons of European or British government or from the NATO headquarters. You worked with him, talked with him, he spoke with you through lunch. In the afternoon you broke up into what was known as syndicates, which are little groups, to work on papers that were assigned to you. There was tea at 4:00 and sherry at 6:00. You all wandered home alone about 7:00 in time for cocktails!

Q: Sounds like a very strenuous life! What particular subject were you involved in?

NES: Of course, everybody was very interested in the United States involvement in Vietnam; but at the end, I was in a group assigned to the preparation of a British defense budget for the next three years.

RICHARD A. ERICSON
Political Officer
London (1963-1965)

Ambassador Richard A. Ericson, Jr. was born in 1923. He enrolled in Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service in 1941, but did not graduate until 1945, due in part to being drafted in the U.S. Army in 1945. In addition to his service in Japan, Ambassador Ericson also served in England, Iceland, and Korea. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 27, 1995.

Q: Today is April 19, 1995. Dick, we are at London. You served there from 1963-65. Can we talk about what you did in London?

ERICSON: Well, in those days and probably even today, the embassy had three or four officers in the political section whose function it was to cover US-British interests in places outside the UK. We had an African man, a Near Eastern man and while I was there we had two Asian types. We didn't have any Latin Americans because there apparently wasn't much conflict at the time. The two Asian types divided Latin America. When I got there, Oscar Armstrong had been there for a year or so and was senior to me, so he and I formed the extraneous Asian-cum-Latin American division. We divided the work up pretty much. Oscar was a China specialist, of

course, and he took everything pertaining to China and Southeast Asia and I covered Japan, South Asia and Latin America, the Caribbean and Antarctica. There was also, of course, a European specialist. Hermann Eilts was the Near Eastern man. Bill Eagleton was the Africanist. We worked under the loose supervision of the political counselor, Elim O'Shaughnessy, and when I say loose supervision I mean very loose. Elim was an old, old line Foreign Service officer who maintained a nine-to-five day. If you did anything from nine-to-five you had to do it with Elim's prior knowledge and detailed consent for everything that happened, but after five, everything went. Which is to say that if you were drafting a telegram and didn't get it ready by five, well you sent it out yourself because certainly the DCM didn't want to see it and we all soon learned never, never submit a telegram before five in the afternoon. As a matter of fact much of the business that the external political types did was unfortunately by telephone. On South Asian matters, I would talk to the South Asian division or the India/Pakistan people in Washington directly by telephone.

Q: This should be an interesting note for those people who are plowing the papers because in later years because when you look at this one doesn't think of the early 1960s as being particularly telephone time, but it was at a large post.

ERICSON: This points out one of the great dilemmas for historians who take a piece of paper out of the files of the State Department, an action telegram from x post to the Department of State, and say this reflects the situation as it was. Well, it probably doesn't because there was a lot of preparatory work that went into it and not everything is illustrated in there. Decisions may well have been made before the telegram was sent and it becomes simply a confirmatory thing or something of that kind. There was an awful lot of that carefully disguised for security reasons telephone conversations. It was dangerous business re security, but everybody was doing it. As a matter of fact just as a sidelight to this, I was asked to do a report for the Department in later years on the efficacy of reporting from the posts in order to satisfy various congressional demands that there be such an assessment. They put a lot of money into it and I think it was largely a wasted effort. But the only agency, when I was doing this--I started on the UK as a matter of fact because I had had that experience--that denied excessive frequent use of the telephone was the CIA. They all professed sensitivity to the possibility of polygraphs to which nobody else was subjected to, but everybody else in Commerce and all through the State Department, Agriculture talked to their counterparts as much as they sent paper.

Q: What were the issues in 1963-65 that concerned you? Let's divide it up. Was Cuba part of your bailiwick or was that taken out?

ERICSON: It was part of my bailiwick but it never got terribly active. Remember, I got into it only when the Brits were into it. The Brits were not into Cuba very much. In the UN they were fussing around some but that was handled by our people at the UN Mission and didn't require any local action.

I want to add one thing. Oscar Armstrong left after a year and he was succeeded by Ben Wood. Now the Department had told me that Wood was a War College graduate and all that sort of nonsense. The Department had sent me to London with the idea that I would be the senior one in the East Asia section after Oscar and they reneged on that. They sent Ben, I don't know why. He

was a Southeast specialist, he had been in Vietnam. By the time he got there the Vietnam War and the British reaction to it was heating up enormously and so were our activities in Vietnam. For that last year after a bit of sparing initially, Ben and I divided up the world. He took the Vietnam War and I had everything else from Japan to the Antarctic by way of South Asia and Latin America. But he was kept quite busy doing nothing but Vietnam.

My first assignment in London told me why Lyndon Johnson drank nothing but Cutty Sark whisky. It was because the Texas Society of London had scraped up some money to put a commemorative plaque on site of the Texas Legation. My first assignment there was to take the former governor of Texas, a fellow by the name of Price Daniel, to the site of the plaque and he would dedicate it on behalf of Texans and their hands across the sea relationship with the Texas Society of London. I picked up Mr. Daniel at his hotel and we proceeded to St. James Square. In a little entry way off the street across from St. James Palace, fixed to the wall in such a place where you couldn't possibly see it unless you went into the entryway, which was very dark, next to a door that led to the second story of the building was this plaque commemorating the location there of the Texas Legation from the early 1830s. We duly dedicated it. I made note of the place, of course. If you want to see it it is still there but you have to look for it.

I found out that it was on the wall of the headquarters building of a wine merchant by the name of Berry Brothers and Rudd. They have been there from time immemorial. During the 1830s they had apparently fallen on hard times and rented out office space. If you look on the Cutty Sark label you will see Berry Brothers and Rudd is the exporter and bottler of the scotch whisky known as Cutty Sark. Incidentally a replica of the Cutty Sark is moored not too far from that place. It was a very famous British China trader clipper ship. It held the record from China to England at one point. A very graceful and lovely ship. It was this affiliation with the Texas Legation that made Lyndon Johnson an adjunct of Cutty Sark whisky. I later asked Liz Carpenter if this were true and she said, 'Yes, it was true. He doesn't know one scotch from another but he treasures this Texas tie in.'

The other things that concerned me while I was there were...one of the great pleasures, I might add, of working in London was the fact that I was largely independent and had no supervision at all from within the embassy itself, except when Mr. O'Shaughnessy interfered from time to time. I reported back to the various desks in my areas in the Department and it was fun, kind of freewheeling. One of the things that was interesting was covering South Asia, for example. I never had any experience in South Asia.

Q: Talking about South Asia in this context means India and Pakistan?

ERICSON: Yes, primarily. It wasn't too long since separation and a lot of things were unsettled. I had the great, great privilege of working with an Englishman by the name of Cyril Pickard, who was the Under Secretary of the Commonwealth Relations. This was in the days when they had a Foreign Office and a Commonwealth Relations Office and a Colonial Office. Cyril was an under secretary in the Commonwealth Relations Office responsible for India and Pakistan and was a walking encyclopedia of knowledge of the subcontinent. I found it rather strange, as a matter of fact, working with Cyril to see such depth of knowledge and experience and wisdom at

the very top of that office and then underneath him the competence tailed off remarkably to the extent that if Cyril wasn't present in the office, no decisions got made.

Q: Was this part of the Foreign Office?

ERICSON: No it was the Commonwealth Relations Office, a totally separate thing and it dealt with UK relations with members of the Commonwealth. It has now been pulled in with the Foreign Office which is now called the Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Office.

Q: It sounds like it wasn't a very good career track for people.

ERICSON: Of the three, obviously the Foreign Office was the elite service and Commonwealth was probably next and then people who couldn't do elsewhere probably ended up in the Colonial Office, although I had some very good experiences with Colonial Office people.

Anyway, during this period, for example, the Indians and Pakistanis went to war in a little squabble that is generally forgotten but over the Rann of Kutch. The Rann of Kutch is down at the southern end of what was then West Pakistan bordering India and the Arabian Sea. It is largely desert. Nobody lives there except nomadic people and they apparently crossed the border fairly freely. I don't remember who first sent tanks into the area, it was probably the Indians. At any rate they threatened a full scale conflict and they actually did have minor tank battles. Both called on their good friends in the United States and the UK. We had the problem of determining how each government would behave and preferably in concert. We thought it was primarily a British problem, but as anything in that part of the world we had major interests and appreciated the opportunity to consult with the British about the solution. When the fighting broke out and the Brits were starting to get engaged, Cyril was in Scotland on holiday...anyone who has served in the UK knows how sacrosanct a man's holiday is. So we couldn't get any action out of the Commonwealth Relations Office, either above or below him, until Cyril, the fount of all wisdom on the subcontinent returned. They were very reluctant to disturb him. He was off in the wilds somewhere and presumably out of touch and as badly as they needed him they were going to let him finish his holiday. But they did in the end send somebody up to haul him off a trout stream and bring him back down.

He was extraordinary good on these things, very decisive. He is one of the finest public servants I have ever met anywhere just in terms of all around competence and ability. I remember one incident when we had a very loquacious deputy secretary in IAS in the Pentagon who came in to see Cyril between planes. He didn't take me with him. After he departed Cyril called me over and dressed me down for not having accompanied this fellow. I said that I was told my presence would not be necessary. Cyril said, 'Here is a pencil and paper, take down what I have to say to you.' He dictated a telegram to me and then said, 'Now you go back to your embassy and you send this telegram and you say that this is what Mr. Pickard would have said in response to this fellow's presentation with which he disagreed entirely if he had been given a chance to get a word in edgeways.' So I sent the message off which caused a stir at that time. But it was typical of the way Cyril operated.

Q: On the Indian-Pakistan war, from your level what kind of role were we doing? I believe at some point the Chinese were making ominous noises.

ERICSON: This was pretty far removed from direct Chinese involvement, but Chinese support for one or the other of the contestants could have been decisive.

Q: If I recall I think the Pakistanis at that point were looking to the Chinese for support and we made noises that we wouldn't stand for this or something.

ERICSON: They were very unhappy, of course. They expected us to support them vis-a-vis India. The Indians and the Chinese were having their own strain at the time, so the Chinese saw an opportunity and began to make noises about offering aid, as I recall it, to the Pakistanis in terms of military assistance of one kind or another and the Pakistanis were being fairly receptive. So the problem became one of defusing that situation while you all are trying to settle a dispute between India and Pakistan which is like going into a bottle with a couple of scorpions and they are not apt to listen to reason. It took quite a while but I think in the end they both realized that this was a fruitless kind of endeavor. Neither of them had the kind of resources to devote to a major war, that we were not going to permit a major war, and in the end they backed off and settled it more or less as it has been in the beginning. But it was dicey for a while. People today don't even remember the incident, but it was one of those India-Pakistan things that threatened...

Q: Again I go to it from your perspective at that time as far as what you were relaying and talking about, were the British and the Americans pretty much in accord of how we wanted things?

ERICSON: Yes, pretty much. The British at that point in terms of projecting their power were at full retreat. They were turning over colony after colony after colony and there were all kinds of demands on the Treasury for assistance by these newly independent countries who needed something to start themselves off with. So the demands on them were very, very heavy and it was pretty clear that any major input into a dispute such as the Rann of Kutch would have to involve American financing and not British. The Brits had very little to offer along those lines, although I must say for a country in that position they took some pretty firm stands. We, of course, were in our expansion mode if you will. But there was never any major difference between us about the overall picture. We had very similar objectives and we worked very well in concert.

As an example of that, another issue that came up during the time was the establishment of a military base area somewhere from which force could be applied in the event of a Middle Eastern crisis. That was basically Hermann Eilts baby as the Middle East guy, however the location was going to be in my area in South Asia. We had a series of conferences with the Brits which involved travel to Washington by various delegations of the Pentagon and State Department people to explore with the Brits where we could put a base in the India Ocean. Of course, it ended up being in Diego Garcia. But we explored and had a number of meetings at which the CRO and the Colonial Office came up with various suggestions. They were very cooperative about it. We had one ideal base on the western side of the Indian Ocean, near the coast of Africa which looked like it was perfect for the purpose except one problem, and that was

it was the major breeding place for a sea going turtle of some sort. The ecologists were up in arms in England about the disturbance it would cause and actually forced the British government to drop the consideration. We ended up over at the Seychelles because it was manageable, politically and every other way. The island Diego Garcia was privately owned and could be purchased actually. The only economic activity on the island was a rundown coconut operation, although in later days all sorts of claims were made. In truth it was very sparsely inhabited, very well located and quite suitable for the purpose. The point I am trying to make is that the British were very forthcoming in these negotiations. They wanted our military presence in that area very badly and were willing to run some political and financial risks in order to get us there.

I will never forget the Colonial Office's background paper on Diego Garcia, however, that they presented at the very first meeting, that started out saying, 'Diego Garcia is overrun with rhinoceros.' That sort of landed on the table with a thud. But they forgot the word 'beetles' whoever typed it. Apparently rhinoceros beetles and copra go together.

Anyway, the agreement was made while I was in London and I believe construction of the base started about that time too. That was one incident that occupied a good deal of my time.

Another thing that I got deeply involved in which I will be a little bit careful about. One of the colonies that was being given its independence at that time was British Guinea. It had a very interesting political makeup at the time. There was a communist party there, although I don't recall whether it was labeled as such, but it certainly waddled like one and it was headed by Cheddi Jagan, who was an Indian. The population was more diverse than you would expect. There was a heavy presence of Indians from India, people from the other Caribbean areas and there weren't all that many native Guyanese. Jagan was threatening to win the first post-independence election and it looked very much as if the party he headed would win it. He was a bit of an embarrassment to us because he was married to a woman from Chicago who was a flaming left wing...

Q: Marxist of the first order.

ERICSON: Yes, she certainly was and she was not beyond spouting her views into the public press at every conceivable opportunity. He was a very difficult person to handle for us. The combination of that couple spelled, we thought, a great deal of trouble. Of course, we had a base then in northern Guyana. It was more of an emergency base than anything else, so we would have liked to have kept it. An air base for transit to Africa and on into South America. We wouldn't need it today. The mainstream party, if you will, was led by a man Forbes Burnham, who was black and while probably more socialist than the British would have liked, was acceptable. He would represent the kind of elements the British wanted to see remain in charge. Our policy there was to keep communism out of the area, Cuba's Castro was enough. And the thought there was that Castro would be supporting Jagan rather enthusiastically. The problem was now do you insure that when you establish this fine thriving democracy on the shores of the Caribbean that it will be governed by the right kind of government.

Our intelligence people and the British intelligence people worked very, very closely together. I wish I could remember the name of the station member who did it for our side because he was a

hell of a man. His British counterparts were also obviously quite effective. I did the more overt side of all this in concert with a man named Peter Piper who was the Caribbean Division Chief in the Colonial Office. Again he was sort of a Colonial Officer counterpart of Cyril Pickard. He was a merry little fellow. He suit his name perfectly. He was a little short, pink cheeked, very sweet natured man. He was a delight to work with. Very, very knowledge and very firm in his dealings with people despite his rather beguiling nature.

In the end we studied 67, I think, different kinds of proportional representation models to determine which would be best for British Guinea, i.e., which would insure the kind of government that we wanted. I can't for the life of me today give you the details of whatever form was finally decided upon, but we did go for a proportional representation type of government which would insure that Burnham's forces plus a third element on the political scene, whatever it was, in combination could out vote Jagan and his communists and that is the way it happened. We had a Burnham government for a number of years afterwards. We kept our base probably as long as we needed it. When jets came in it became less and less important. We kept communist off the mainland of South America, or the system did. Of course, Burnham turned out to be perfectly ghastly, I think, but he lasted long enough. Is Jagan the head of the place now?

Q: I think so.

ERICSON: He must be an old, old man by now. He hasn't turned out to be as ferocious as we thought he was, but he was a real bogeyman in those days. That was an interesting project.

Nothing terribly important, I think, transpired with Japan or China during that period except our mutual concern about keeping Japan in the community of free nations and consulting very closely on China affairs for UN representation business and all that sort of thing. The British were very supportive. There were no major disputes.

Q: Did you run across an element of Japan hating within the British community? Whereas we fought Japan we did not have the real humiliation that the British had.

ERICSON: We won our war and they lost theirs. There was a great, great deal of that. Of course, the funny thing about the UK for me in terms of their looking back at their recent history and deciding who their friends were was the enormous fixation in England on World War I as opposed to World War II. Now, there was a lot of the kind of feeling about Japan that you mention...the treatment of the British prisoners of war in Southeast Asia, the barbarous acts in China and all the rest of it, the surrender of Singapore and Hong Kong and the loss of the Prince of Wales...of course they were fond of telling little stories of how they foxed the Japanese here and there. You no doubt have heard the story of what the British intelligence pulled just before the attack on Singapore in an effort to try to persuade the Japanese that they had better not mess with the British garrison they planted large supplies of oversized condoms up and down the peninsula for issue to the British troops to make the Japanese feel small, I suppose.

Anyway, those ignominious losses rankled the British a great deal and a large part of the British population was adamantly opposed to doing anything that smacked of being helpful to the Japanese or bringing the Japanese closer or cooperating with the Japanese. But then the British

didn't have all that much to say about the Japanese. They were by that time a very small part of Japan's trade, a very small part of Japan's activities. So, while the thing was there and palpable when it did arise it didn't arise all that often.

Q: The British had recognized China. Did this cause any problems in dealing with them on UN recognition which we were violently opposed to?

ERICSON: Here again the scene of action shifted primarily to the UN headquarters personnel. If a lot of it was done, it was done either in Washington or at the UN. It was not a prominent part of my landscape in London.

Q: Were you getting much out of the Brits about what was happening in China? One of the stated reasons for diplomatic recognition by the Brits was so they could find out more about what was going on in China.

ERICSON: From time to time, yes. But, the nature of my assignment kept me more often at the Colonial Office and the CRO than it did the Foreign Office. But I did see a great deal of the East Asian people in Foreign Office and they did keep us informed by and large. It was really a special relation. We had a very close relationship with the Brits. And I would think virtually anything we wanted to get if they had it we could get it.

Indonesia for example. Sukarno and company were acting up, the whole Malaya problem. Sukarno's ambitions in Southeast Asia came into conflict with the Brits and their positions. You may recall that sometime during that period, 1964, the Indonesians sacked the British embassy in Jakarta.

Q: Oh yes, while a piper stood on the wall and played in defiance.

ERICSON: He was later ambassador in Iceland, incidentally, and presided in somewhat the same circumstances over the cod war. I think the most vicious demonstration ever seen in Iceland was the one where some rocks were thrown at the British embassy.

Anyway, he did lose his embassy and some of them took refuge in the American compound as I recall. David Bruce, our ambassador, hastened over and told the British foreign minister that we would be happy to handle all their communications. Their communications were out and had no means of communicating with their embassy except by open wire, if they could do that. Anyway we offered the services of our embassy. Bruce said we would put two officers on duty night and day to make sure that anything that comes into our message center from your ambassador or his people gets over to you promptly. So Oscar Armstrong and I were detailed to be these two officers. That meant sleeping in the damn embassy, of course. I drew the first night and lo and behold in comes a British equivalent NIACT telegram.

Q: Night Action telegram. You wake people up.

ERICSON: Yes. It was about two in the morning when I got the damn text. I trotted over to the Foreign Office and bludgeoned my way past the security people and got to the head of the

security section who said, I shall have to awaken the night clerk. They called him and he came down. He was a fairly senior officer in the British Foreign Service and not feeling very happy about having to stay in the building either. He looked at it and said, 'In future, let these wait until morning.' So we ceased our night watch after one or two more nights. Oscar and I pleaded our case. They soon got back on line. But it was an interesting example of the kind of cooperation that we did have with the Brits.

On Bruce, I have to say a word about him.

Q: *This is David Bruce.*

ERICSON: David Bruce who is one of our great ambassadors. He had been in the Foreign Service as a very young man and had left the Service to go into business. He had been an ambassador to other places.

Q: *Germany, England, France, China.*

ERICSON: Yes, many of the big posts. He was practically regarded as being career. He had made a career of being an ambassador, which was kind of nice, I guess. He was fairly wealthy. His wife, Evangiline, had a fair amount of money of her own, of course.

Q: *I think she was a Mellon.*

ERICSON: Yes, she was a Mellon. They lived in Betty Hutton's house in the middle of a big park and it was quite an establishment. He was a man of great, great distinction. At one point while I was there the Senate was looking into the way the Department ran its affairs and invited David Bruce back to address the Foreign Affairs Committee on how you ran an embassy because he was a diplomat of such distinction. He gave them what the Department said was a letter perfect description of how an embassy should be run. At this time the country team concept was about to evolve and I think Ambassador Bruce was the first one to enunciate it. The Department took his text and published it and distributed it around the world as an example of how other ambassadors might consider running their embassies.

The problem was that his description of how an embassy should be run and how he ran his embassy were at opposite poles. Working for Bruce is like being part of a catamaran...one hole was here and one hole was off there and never the twain would meet. He was very difficult to see, very busy. Certainly the man had access to them any time, any place to the top levels of British diplomacy or society or anything else in the town of London. The top 3 or 4 percent of anything was David Bruce's to attend to. The consensus among those of us who were working in external affairs was that David Bruce never saw a damn thing that went out of that embassy before it went out except the stuff that he wrote himself. It was not unusual for him to write a telegram that nobody else ever saw in the embassy because he classified them so...he had a direct line to the President and the Secretary...which begin by saying I disagree with embassy so-and-so. Well, embassy so-and-so had been sent out over his signature and it must have puzzled people back in Washington a little bit. Needless to say, however the two telegrams differed, they accepted Bruce's. I had little to do with Bruce. I attended his weekly staff meetings when he

would come in and sit down at the head of the table and look around the table and say, 'Are all my 43 agencies represented here this morning?' And then we would all sound off and tell the ambassador what we were doing and then he would thank us very politely and gentlemanly and disappear. He had an absolute rule that he would never go to the airport to meet anybody except possibly the President of the United States. David Bruce never stirred out of the heart of London. If somebody wanted to see him they could ask for an appointment and he would give it to them.

He accepted my expertise on matters Asian and made it known on several occasions. It all stemmed from an incident where he called me into his office one day and I found him sitting there with an art dealer who had a series of Chinese prints of some sort. They depicted military campaigns of the Han people or something. He was about to buy them but the dealer couldn't figure out what order the prints should be in. Of course they were numbered in the Chinese numbering system and I was able to put them in order from 1 to 15 and he considered that a very impressive performance. From then on I was accepted as a real expert.

Q: *Oh yes. Many a career has prospered by this sort of thing.*

ERICSON: Exactly so.

He did not entertain staff very much. I think I was at several Fourth of July receptions and maybe one or two other receptions.

But it was an interesting experience watching this really great man and great, great ambassador. For all I wanted to deride him a little bit for some of his habits, but if the word ambassador means anything he had the kind of access an ambassador really ought to have. And he had his deputies, of course. The first year I was there it was Lewis Jones, who was very experienced and long time European careerist. He was replaced by Phil Kaiser for my last year there, who brought in a political counselor, Brubeck, who had been on the White House staff. Brubeck, of course, replaced Elim O'Shaughnessy. To Brubeck's credit he acknowledged that he had no diplomatic experience. He was brought to London right out of the White House as a political appointee. But he was a sensible man and to his credit he made as few waves as possible and was generally a nice person to have around. Bruce's deputies were certainly adequate to the task. I played bridge with Phil Kaiser the other night, as a matter of fact, and he still talks about his experience with Bruce.

Speaking about Bruce being hard to get in contact with, Kaiser did not have free access to him. He had to make appointments like everybody else unless it was a real crisis. I can recall one time, I can't recall what the situation was, when he and I wanted to talk very badly with the ambassador and we made our appointment for 12 noon and got there and found he had left for lunch, which left his DCM and First Secretary standing there and wondering when the next opportunity would arise.

I also had too interesting assignments as so-called control officer type. They both involved Kennedys, Bobby and Teddy. And I was going to be the control officer for the visit of Lyndon Johnson to attend Churchill's funeral which was one of the more hysterical exhibitions by Lyndon. He did not come in the end, he had a cold.

Q: The fact that he didn't show up became quite a case...

ERICSON: He was invited, of course, to come, but he had a serious cold and he didn't really want to come. I think the British put Lyndon off a little bit. But nonetheless the orders came out that he was coming and to make the preparations. So we took over the London Hilton practically. Took over the top two stories and knocked out walls; evicted wealthy Saudi long term occupants who were not very happy about being evicted; and we had all the preparations entrain for his arrival. While back in Washington he was in bed and apparently in a very dramatic episode he called in a bunch of reporters into his bedroom, sat in bed with a hood over his head absorbing steam and telling them how sorry he was that he wasn't going to be able to go to London. And that is the way we found out he wasn't coming, of course. Finally they told us officially that he wasn't coming but that he would send the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and the Chief Justice of the United States, Earl Warren to represent him. And, of course, Earl Warren was the senior ranking member of the delegation, but of course the British press would focus on Dean Rusk instead. One of the two of them got ill while in London and didn't attend the funeral. I think it was Warren who stayed in the hotel during the funeral. I had to buy a new coat so that I could go sit in the cathedral there, it was cold.

But the main visitor, of course, from the United States was Eisenhower who was not made a member of the American delegation and who made it very plain that this displeased him mightily. He thought if Lyndon wasn't going to come than he should. I talked to General Eisenhower as I was control officer, but it was very obvious from his comments and from everything that appeared in the press that he felt he should have been named if the President couldn't come. He said in a BBC television room, in the bowels of the cathedral, watching the parade and making appropriate comments, which included remarks about the nature of the American delegation and how happy he would have been to have served in such a capacity as the real American friend of the British people dating back to World War II. Ike made it very clear that he was very unhappy and, of course, the British press had a field day with the American government on this particular issue.

A very moving parade, I might add and moving, moving ceremony.

Q: Talk about the Kennedy visits.

ERICSON: The Kennedy visits were not political in nature nor official, they stemmed from rather unusual circumstances, but nevertheless being who they were they rated control officers and it fell to my lot to be named control officer for Bobby. I don't know why David Bruce assigned me this particular job, or whoever did it. Possibly because he had come out of the Far East. It was early 1964, not too long after President Kennedy's death and he was still attorney general and had made a trip down to Indonesia and had finished by coming around the world and ending up in London before going back to the United States. He had an appointment with the foreign minister, who was polite enough to receive him, although he really had no particular business. I mentioned it primarily because I think historians should have some confirmation of the fact that Mr. Kennedy was an extraordinarily disagreeable man and very, very difficult to handle personally to people who were subordinate and with whom he had no ties. They were

there to serve him. Quite different from his public image and it was a very disillusioning experience for me.

He was only going to be there two nights. He arrived one afternoon, had the next day and was going to spend that night and leave the following day. It was to be a little rest stop basically. But en route, for example, there were telegrams discussing what kind of program he wanted. One of the messages, I forget whether I got it by telephone or by telegram, said that he wanted above all things to visit the school that he and his brothers had attended in London as children when their father was ambassador there. On receiving this word I fitted it into his schedule. I called the head master and explained to him that the attorney general would like to visit the school and the head master said, 'Well, that is very kind of him. Ordinarily we would be delighted but it is spring hols and there won't be anybody on the campus. Further more he must realize that it is not the actual school that he attended which was bombed out during the war and moved. There really aren't that many people here who would remember him.' In his polite British way he was saying that they would be greatly honored to have the attorney general if he were coming during normal hours he should not expect a rousing reception because it was his visit and not the kids, who didn't know him very well, and it wasn't the same place. He would be welcome but it was spring hols and it wouldn't be much purpose of doing it, is what he was saying. It was a very polite turn down.

Well, I went back and got an answer saying, 'I want to do it.' So I went back to the head master and said, 'Even though it is spring hols, the attorney general does really badly want to pay his respects to the school. Aren't there some people who live in the area who might be assembled, a few of the masters and a few of the young men?' The head master sort of signed and said, 'Yes, that could be done.' And so we put it on the schedule and confirmed that it was on the schedule and it was on the schedule when I handed it to Mr. Kennedy when he arrived at the airport. He was supposed to visit there the afternoon of the second day. Just before that he had an appointment with the ambassador in his office. I had had an unfortunate experience with him that morning, but nonetheless I was there picking him up and took him to Ambassador Bruce's office and they were having their discussion. When it came time for them to leave for the school, knowing the distance that had to be traveled, it would take 15 or 20 minutes, I was sitting in Bruce's outer office and I asked his secretary to buzz in and tell him it was time to depart. She did and I was asked to come into the ambassador's office where they were having their discussion. He said, 'What is this all about?' I said, 'It is time to leave for the school for your visit with the head master and the assembled students, etc..' 'What school visit?' says he. I said, 'They assembled a few people to greet you at the school you said you wanted to visit, the one you attended when you were here as a child.' He said, 'I'm not going to see any school, I got to go see my tailor.' At which point he got up and walked out of the office and went off to see his tailor, leaving me to explain to the school that he wasn't coming.

Q: What was the other thing that had happened in the morning?

ERICSON: Well, he had an appointment with the foreign minister at 9:30 or 10:00 and I went to...he was staying in the London townhouse that was owned by Princess Radziwill, Jackie Kennedy's sister and her husband. They had a very nice, very eloquent little townhouse in London which was staffed by one maid. She was the only one on the premises when I got there. I got there deliberately a half hour before we were due at the foreign ministry although it was only

ten minutes away because I thought I might have some difficulty. Well, when I got there the maid said that they were not up. I said, 'Well, you know we have an appointment with the foreign minister very shortly, shouldn't you awaken them?' 'Well, no.' Her orders were not to disturb them. Ethel Kennedy was along on the trip. Anyway, I had to go up and knock on the door and he had just gotten up, but he was stomping around the room in a vile temper making all sorts of comments about people who schedule him to do things at ungodly hours and he had had an exhausting trip, etc. etc. He couldn't find his glasses. Of course, nobody in the world knew that he wore glasses at that point, but he wore half glasses, reading glasses. He had misplaced them and was stomping around in the bedroom screaming at his wife where the hell had he put his glasses, making things very, very difficult and very nasty.

We got going and on the way to the foreign office Mrs. Kennedy was going to attend this thing too and she was a little embarrassed, I think. After the meeting with the foreign minister, which lasted 30 minutes or so. I did not attend the meeting, just the two of them did. I sat in an ante room with some Foreign Office functionaries while we talked to Mrs. Kennedy. We went back to the embassy for something. I guess he was going to see Kaiser or something. He had to go up to the ambassador's floor where the rogue's gallery is kept of prior ambassadors. As we left the elevator, I turned to the right to go to the office where he had his appointment, and he on his own turned left and started going down the hall. I said, 'Mr. Attorney General, your appointment is in this direction,' and he snarled at me. He said, 'Well, I want to see the portrait of my father.' I said, 'Well, your father's portrait is down this way also.'

It had been very nerve racking. The incident of the school is just part of it. He had been very unpleasant all the time and I was ready at that point to go back to my office and say, 'Buddy, you can get yourself to the airport and the rest of your appointments on your own. I quit.' There was a churlishness to his behavior. It wasn't a some time thing, it was a constant thread through everything we did on that visit. Maybe he didn't like being shepherded by a control officer.

Q: But, you know, it comes through again and again. I always felt he was a nasty person. In fact, I swore I would never vote for him even if it meant Richard Nixon or not. Actually I voted for Nixon because McCarthy was a nice guy but inept. No, I found the sort of deification of Robert Kennedy as being a gentle soul one of the most peculiar things that I can think of, because here was a really nasty piece of goods.

ERICSON: In contrast, I might say, to his brother, Teddy, who arrived somewhat later in the year on a mission to thank overseas personnel, including embassy personnel, who had contributed to the Kennedy memorial. Remember there had been quite a campaign to raise money and the embassy personnel had done quite nicely and so had a number of Brits. But we had the embassy staff assembled in the auditorium in London, I was control officer again, and he was to make a speech. But it struck me at that point that here was a man who was over his head. He really didn't know what he was doing. He had no political instincts at that time it seemed to me. He had to be led by the hand to the dais and to his seat and all that sort of thing and cued in very carefully as to what he was going to say. After it was over he turned to me and said, 'What will I do now?' I was sitting up on the stage with him and I said, 'Why don't you go down and shake some hands.' So he went down and shook hands. But he was obviously looking for further

directions, he turned around and looked with an expression saying 'Have I done it long enough?' He seemed to be bewildered.

Q: He was a very young Senator and was sort of considered not the brightest of the clan. And there was talk that he had cheated in college, someone took his exams for him, etc. He was sort of the dumb bunny. He really grew into the job.

ERICSON: Yes, he grew into the job. I think he was basically intelligent enough but he just hadn't had the experience up to that point. But of all the politicians that I have ever escorted around various places, he was the least instinctive about things.

The other incident that I got involved in that strikes me with particular force was...we had five little children at the time. Findley Burns was the administrative officer at that time and when I went on my War College trip and popped into London, I dropped by his office. He was an old friend of mine and said, 'Dick we are saving this house for you. You have so damn many kids and you ordinarily wouldn't get an embassy house, but we have this one for you because it has enough bedrooms for you. But we are not going to do anything with it because after you go we are going to sell it. It is an old place and it has been painted recently and I bought you a new vacuum cleaner.' Well, what we ended up in was a marvelous old place on Moor Street in London in the Chelsea, Kensington area very near Harrods and Old Brompton Road. I used to walk with Hermann Eilts every morning to the embassy together. That was kind of nice.

But the house, itself, had been built in the 1830s or 1840s some time and was a six story house but I called it a 12 story vertical rambler because there was a front and back arrangement and the staircase went up in the middle of the house and at every landing there was a room. So you had twelve landings, 12 levels, 12 sets of rooms. Only on the ground floor was there any depth to the place. We had a living room, a study and dining room on the first floor. The kitchen was in the basement served by a dump waiter. The wiring was all exposed and painted over with 50 years of paint accumulation. Everything in the damn house was fused to prevent fires, but if any fuse went out you had to look at the fuse in the appliance, the fuse in the fuse box that covered those two floors and then the large fuse center halfway down and the big fuse box in the basement to find out which fuse governing this particular circuit had blown. It had its joys. It was a house with lots of character and no convenience. And of course the vacuum cleaner that Findley had bought for us was the largest and heaviest Hoover known to man which I used to carry up to the top floor on the weekend and my wife and our housekeeper hoovered it down over the week so I could carry it back up again.

Anyway, personally it was a good living situation. Who wouldn't give their shirt to live in the heart of London. We had no yard, of course, whatsoever. But the kids made out all right. They attended British schools and did quite well. I am very grateful for that educational experience for them. And, of course, we lived within walking distance of the Royal Court Theater and not far from the theater district and halfway between Harrods and Peter Jones, the Royal Albert Hall, etc.

Anyway, in the summer of 1964 we rented a place for a month down in Dartmoor, on the edges of Dartmoor. One of the great, great experiences of our lives was living a perfectly gorgeous

month, it rained once to show you what Dartmoor could really be like, but the rest of those days was absolutely glorious. I only had two weeks of it and went down on weekends. My mother and dad came over and they stayed there. I think this was really the great experience. But we didn't get to play the amount of golf we wanted to play, and we didn't get up to Scotland to do it. During the last week we were there we had reservations at Glen Eagles and finally I was going to get to play the great Scottish golf course and then the Vietnam War heated up. I don't know where Ben Wood was at the time, but it fell to me to escort Henry Cabot Lodge to make a speech before the Oxford Union. This was my last experience in London and one I will never forget. There was a lot of domestic opposition to the Vietnam War and to the UK's support of the US cause. It had reached such a point in England, we were having our own troubles back in the United States, that Michael Stewart, the Foreign Minister in the Wilson government and who was a very admirable character I might add.

Q: This was Harold Wilson, head of the Labour Party.

ERICSON: Yes, he came into office in 1964 and who was in office most of the time we were working on that Guyana business. He connived in this. He had a rather difficult farther left member of his party as Colonial Minister. All of these discussions about Guyana were held without the knowledge or consent of his minister, but with the knowledge and consent of the Prime Minister, which made it all a bit dicey for all concerned. If the Colonial Minister had ever blown the gaff on these arrangements we would have been in very deep trouble. But Wilson was very good about things like that.

But he had Michael Stewart as his foreign minister and things on the Vietnam front had gotten so dicey in England, that the British government, Michael Stewart in particular, decided that somebody from the United States should go to some place where there would be a lot of publicity and make a reason in defense of the American position, and not leave it all up to the British to carry because they were having a lot of trouble with it. After all they were socialists and it was beginning to be embarrassing for them politically. So Ambassador Bruce said in effect that he didn't want any part in making any speech at the Oxford Union. He knew what the Oxford Union was all about and didn't want any part of giving a speech before them. But the United States government was prevailed upon to send Henry Cabot Lodge who had been and was going to be again ambassador to Vietnam.

Henry Cabot Lodge, a great American name resonated well in England. He arrived in London one morning and was to make the speech that evening. David Bruce gave him lunch, which was extraordinary for David Bruce to give any ambassador a lunch. Not a big lunch, just him, me, as control officer, and the DCM and political counselor and Ambassador Lodge. That was when we got our first look at the speech he was going to make. It turned out that the speech he was going to make was one he had literally given for a major rotary club meeting the previous week in Boston. Its intellectual content was fairly low. The Oxford Union contains the greatest young minds in England and the most skeptical and most penetrating. He was certain to have a rough time and he had better go up there with a pretty tough minded, factually based, certain of his position kind of thing. But this speech was just full of overblown phrases about the beauties that would emerge in Southeast Asia if only the communists wake up and realize that they were fighting a foolish war. And it had a very definite rotary club flavor to it.

After Ambassador Bruce had read it he said that he didn't think this would do at all. Lodge got very unhappy about that and said in effect, 'Well the President has seen it and thinks it is just fine and I got a great ovation when I gave it in Boston last week. What do you mean it won't do?' Bruce didn't really prepare him terribly well. He just said, 'Well, you are going to be in for a very hard time up there.' Well, he did not accept the advice and try to improve it, he was going to give it as written. As a matter of fact the main problem that emerged was that he couldn't read it as typed and he didn't want to wear his glasses so he wanted to have it typed in big type. So we scoured London because we didn't have a speech typewriter in the embassy looking for a typewriter. And then because he was getting very testy having thought over the content of this text at noon...and the speech wasn't going to be ready unless we typed it on route so we assigned the most beautiful secretary in the embassy to go with us. Henry was not adverse to being around beautiful women. She was a secretary in the political section who later married Eagleton. She had been a Powers Model and really was a beautiful girl and a good worker. She sat on that train going up to Oxford typing the speech which was just about finished at the time we pulled into Oxford station.

Meanwhile he is fussing at me about all of the arrangements that he didn't like and he didn't like any of them. He got into the hall and faced this audience, which was not just Oxford Union members, but apparently had some very nasty ringers in it. Anyway, he was into his speech for about five minutes when the feet shuffling began and cat calls and other signs of disapprobation. It wasn't a very long speech, about 20 minutes or so. By the time he finished with it he was just seething and he got some extremely hostile questions and not questions. He once told one member to sit down, he said, 'If you are going to ask a question, ask a question but don't make a speech at me.'

Because all America's errors and sins were being displayed for the world to see, this prompted Michael Stewart, who had been president of the Oxford Union and who had preceded us up there, to get up and give extemporaneously one of the finest offenses of American policy in Southeast Asia that I think was probably ever made during that period. I wish I had a copy of it. Of course, Michael Stewart had the extraordinary advantage of being president of the Oxford Union, which is a debating society, and of course he had been in the House of Commons and was used to this sort of thing. But to get up before that audience that had Cabot Lodge on the run and stop them...they didn't shuffle their feet while he was speaking...and to pull Henry Cabot Lodge's irons out of the fire the way he did was to me a marvelous example of what that kind of training can do for you if you have the intellect behind it. He was just great.

The problem for me on the way back was Henry Cabot Lodge knew that he had had to be rescued and he was absolutely furious at everything. He was mad at me, he was mad at Bruce, he was mad at Stewart, he was mad at the world, mad at Johnson for sending him, but mostly, 'Why the hell didn't somebody tell me it was going to be like this?' Of course, we had tried to tell him but he wasn't listening. To do him credit, I will say that he sent me a very nice letter of appreciation for all that I had done during his London visit...whether he had drafted it or somebody else, I don't know, but he had done the proper thing.

That was the last thing I did before we left London. It was in all respects a great tour because I was able to work more or less independently on major projects and in a city like London why...

Q: Why was it so short, because you were an outside expert? If you were concentrating on Britain itself, you would have stayed for four?

ERICSON: Oh, yes, you would have had two two-year tours. It was a clear understanding that as an area specialist you got two years and then get back into your own area. My wife never forgave me for not staying a third and fourth year. We had five small kids so it was kind of restraining on her and she didn't get to do half of what she really wanted to do.

ARTHUR A. HARTMAN
Head of Economic Section
London (1963-1967)

Arthur A. Hartman was born in New York in 1926. He received his undergraduate education at Harvard and then served in the U.S. Army from 1944 to 1946. During his career as a Foreign Service officer, he served in Saigon, London, Brussels, Moscow, and Washington, DC. He received a distinguished honor award in 1972 for his exemplary public service. Mr. Hartman was interviewed by William Miller in 1987.

Q: After being Special Assistant to George Ball at the top reaches of the Department's seventh floor, you went to London. Now when did that occur? Was that after the assassination, or before the assassination?

HARTMAN: No before. I was in London at the time of the assassination, I was Head of the Economic section in London.

Q: Who was the Ambassador?

HARTMAN: The Ambassador was David Bruce oddly enough.

Q: Had he asked for you?

HARTMAN: Not really, that was an assignment by the Foreign Service that made sense for everyone. It was in the line of the experience I had. I was not the Economic Minister, I was head of the economic section under the Minister. The Minister was Bill Armstrong and it was fascinating because I had under me the people dealing with the various commodity agreements in London, the Coffee agreement that was being negotiated, and rubber, tin and these other things. The debate in Britain, which is why I think people thought of sending me to London on Britain's entry into the Common Market which was defeated at first. I can remember when I was working for George Ball, Harold MacMillan sent a message saying that he had made up his mind, he was going to take Britain into the Common Market and he wanted us to know that this was true. Then

he and Kennedy met, I think in Bermuda, and had long talks about it then and George Ball sent me to Europe to make sure that his friends; that is the people on the continent, knew that this was the information that we were given and would understand that as far as John Kennedy was concerned and the Administration, they believed MacMillan and believed in his sincerity and believed that we would work with them to try and bring this about. Of course there were many skeptics on the continent beginning with the French. I did my little tour and I went to Brussels and I remember our Ambassador there at the time was Walt Butterworth-very skeptical, and wondering "Why was this young whipper snapper being sent around Europe to talk to these people?"

Q: He was an old style ambassador?

HARTMAN: Old style, but new style in the sense that he was head of our mission to the European communities and he was a thorough devotee of the policy. He really believed in it and operated it in a remarkable way, he looked old style, he talked old style, but if you look at his early history in the war he was doing preemptive buying in Spain and he was an operator. He was a character and I think one of the men that I liked the most in my whole career as a Foreign Service Officer. Anyway, Walt insisted on coming to Paris with me because I was going to see Monnet there and Jack Tuthill was at that time our representative to, I guess that he was the Economic Minister; anyway he was in Paris and we all went to see Monnet to tell him about this. Monnet immediately saw that this was something that he should take a hand in and try and bring about; that if the top of the British government had made this kind of historic decision, that he should help overcome the fears and skepticism of the French government. Then I went to see the number three man in the Foreign Office who later became their Foreign Minister and Ambassador in Russia and in Germany. He was sort of, I don't recall his name right now, always a very tough negotiator and a through Frenchman. Hidden under him was a kind of Anglophilia, we never really knew because he seemed to be so tough. I remember after I went through my whole explanation to him of the meeting that had taken place, and the message that we had gotten, and the decision of our government that we would support this; he just shook his head and he said, "You know the trouble with you and the British is that you think you speak the same language." Of course he spoke perfect English, and for him to tell us this, I wish I could remember his name. He was Governor of the Bank of France later on too. So, going to England was kind of a natural thing and what I did was to encourage some of my friends on the continent to come on over to London to talk at Chatham House; to talk to some of the British who were beginning to be Pro-European. There were a few of them, there were allot of them, there was allot of opposition; of course it failed in that initial stage. It was earlier than that because actually George Ball and I were in Bonn having lunch with Adenauer when they got word of De Villes Vito; his press conferences in which he said, "Under no circumstances would he allow the British in." So I went there for the second run at the British entry and it was good fun. I met a lot of people, who were still very powerful. Denis Healey is an old friend now, and others who are in the banking area, as I was heavily into Economic Affairs. Our oldest friends, he was the editor of the Financial Times, he's now in a bank, we still see each other and children have gotten together and that sort of thing. But London was a wonderful experience for me and I had four years in that capital and it was just terrific.

Q: And your children went to school there?

HARTMAN: Yes, the girls went to a very special girls school which did a lot for them, and the boys went to a Quaker school, a boarding school and [they] enjoyed that to an extent. I don't know what it did for them, broadened their horizons.

THOMAS L. HUGHES
Director, Intelligence & Research
Washington, DC (1963-1969)

Mr. Hughes was born and raised in Minnesota and was educated at Carleton College, Oxford University and Yale University. After service with the US Air Force he worked on Capitol Hill and became active in Democratic Party politics. He later joined the Department of State, first as Assistant to Under Secretary Chester Bowles and subsequently as Deputy Director, then as Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, where he served during the event filled period 1961 to 1969. His assignments brought him in close contact with the major political figures of that era. His final government assignment was to Embassy London as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mr. Hughes was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: Was there concern on the part of the State Department about the purchasing of intelligence? This is a two edged sword. Particularly if you go after officials. This is dangerous because intelligence becomes sort of suspect that you get and the knowledge thereof, and it may have long term effects. Were we getting any reports from the field saying "I understand that some CIA officers are sent out and they have to recruit X number of people and they really want to hire agents." Was this an issue?

HUGHES: London was another favorite spot where the door was open for the CIA to develop contacts that in a democratic society should have been perfectly normal diplomatic contacts. Again we are talking about the advantage of numbers. The CIA agents resident in London were not working against British targets. They were working against targets in Italy or Czechoslovakia, but out of London, because they liked to live in London. British society was left to speculate on what all these CIA people were doing in their midst. They were under light official cover, and so they were just as free as genuine American foreign service officers to gossip with the British about any subject they wished from Russia to China to what the US administration really had in mind.

Presidential letters to ambassadors could never control that behavior. Again it was a function of numbers. There was no way an American ambassador in London was going to tell a hundred Americans, who in the daytime claimed to be assigned to the BBC or whatever, that they couldn't dine with and talk to whomever they wished.

ARNOLD DENYS

Communicator
London (1964-1966)

Arnold Denys was born in Belgium. He came to the United States to study at Gonzaga University in Washington, DC, then transferring to Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. In 1955, he became a naturalized U.S. citizen. After graduating from Georgetown in 1956, he was drafted into the U.S. Army. His Foreign Service career included posts in Panama, Egypt, Athens, Mexico, Canada, Belgium, and Mexico. This is an excerpt from his memoirs, Son of Flanders.

DENYS: In Panama, when I first learned of my assignment to London, many of my colleagues told me of their envy that they would have accepted this post under any circumstances because of the educational advantages it offers. On this positive note I left Pittsburgh on September 24, 1964. The following day, Pat Sheridan, with whom I had worked in Panama, met me at Heathrow Airport. The airport is about one hour's drive from the center of London. I had a good look at the hectic traffic jams that would be a daily occurrence for the next two years. On the drive to downtown I could not help but think that my life would be totally different from the way it was in Panama City. I had really never worked in a big metropolis.

The Embassy put me up in the Court Mansion apartment on West End Lane, a forty five minute bus ride by bus from the Embassy. These were temporary living quarters, with two bedrooms and a kitchen, which I shared with Don Ivanich, another Embassy communications employee from Chicago. Since we were both new to this city, together we explored the many historic sites.

Shortly after my arrival I spent a few hours briefing and meeting communications and security colleagues at the embassy. I had to sign the Ambassador's guest book. The Embassy is an impressive modern Georgian complex located on Grosvenor Square, and is one of our largest embassies. It is like a miniature of the State Department in Washington. In Grosvenor Square one feels a sense of the past. On one corner stands a building which General Dwight D. Eisenhower used as his headquarters during World War II. The High Commission of Canada and the Embassy of Indonesia had their Chanceries there. Also in the Square, Benjamin Franklin's statue provides a powerful presence of the United States' first ambassador to Paris.

I would often spend my lunch hour in Grosvenor Square, relaxing after the hustle and bustle of the day. I spent about two hours going back and forth to work each day, and got used to the traffic jams and crowded streets. After a few weeks I did not mind it, but it took me awhile to get used to the subway (or the "tube" as they call it in London) and buses. Since I decided not to have a car in London, I had to learn to depend on the intricate public transport system. Subways stopped running past midnight, as they were being checked then for maintenance and repair.

I was assigned to Communications, where I would be part of a four man team to handle diplomatic courier mail for the Embassy and dependent US Consulates in Great Britain. I would also be responsible for diplomatic courier trips to US Consulates in England, Ireland and Scotland. I worked with experienced communications personnel: Ed and Bill Moody, and Joe Forry. We also had a very loyal British staff of about five persons. We would take turns going to

Liverpool, Southampton, and Birmingham. From time to time, our families would get together for dinner.

Living in London proved to be quite expensive. I didn't mind it that much since there was always something interesting to do or to visit. It is a city that offers much to feed the intelligence. Embassy personnel had commissary privileges, and we took advantage of this. Ed Moody took me to the Air Force Commissary at Ruislip, about an hour by subway from London. Ed had served in Tokyo and Rangoon, and shared his experiences with us. His wife, Dorothy, was born in England and became a good friend of Maïté.

Don and I took a boat ride on the Thames, from Trafalgar Square to the Tower of London. The Trafalgar monument honors the British forces under Admiral Nelson, who defeated the French and Spanish fleets in 1805. The monument has Egyptian architectural characteristics.

I quickly learned that going to the movies in London was a fine pastime. I often went to such classical theaters as the Plaza Theater, on Regent Street, and the Empire Theater, on Leicester Square. English movie theaters have richly decorated antique furnishings inside. These theaters reminded me of the old movie house *Vieux Bruges* (old Bruges), where my mother took me as a child. In some areas of British theaters people can smoke. There were different seat prices. In some theaters in Bruges, I remember, they served coffee.

Whenever I could get away from my job I visited the National Gallery on Trafalgar Square. It is a marvelous place to savor various European paintings. It was not possible to absorb all the details in one visit.

On October 7, 1964, I joined the new staff members for orientation in the Embassy auditorium. Veteran Ambassador David Bruce welcomed us. He had wide expertise at large embassies, having been the ambassador in Paris and Bonn, as well as Under Secretary of State. He referred to the huge apparatus of modern diplomacy and compared our embassy in London to "the little State Department." He explained US foreign policy goals in Great Britain, and warned us not to be "overenthusiastic, nor overcritical."

Public Affairs Officer William Clark, and Findley Burns, Counselor for Administration, echoed his remarks. They left us with the impression that we should try to emulate the British, "who never criticize their government's policies overseas."

As a practical, administrative matter, Mr. Burns told us that embassy personnel were on the Sheriff's list in London, which entitled us to many diplomatic privileges, but he warned us not to abuse these benefits because the Ambassador has the right "to withdraw them as he saw fit."

Early on in my London assignment we had general elections. Compared to voting in Panama the previous May, the election on October 16, 1964 was orderly and had a heavy turnout. The British voters reflect the serenity of their democratic political process. The Labor party scored a narrow victory over the Conservatives (Tory party), which had ruled the country for the past thirteen years.

An article in *Stars and Stripes*, the US Army daily, published in West Germany, in the issue dated October 31, 1964, referred to “the parliamentary procedures of Great Britain [as] being exacting, historic, and democratic.” This was Queen Elizabeth’s first socialist parliament of her reign.

In the early 1960s Western Europe had emerged as a strong economic and industrial power. Trade between France and other European nations, on one hand, and with the Soviet Union on the other, spurred this growth. This did not quickly result in a European political union. Economic rivalries and age old jealousies prevented such political harmony. This was also true about foreign policy issues affecting the Atlantic Alliance. The European Economic Market (EEC) was signed in Rome on March 25, 1957. Signs of opposition to it were felt in the fall and winter of 1964. Great Britain was not in the EEC, but had joined another organization, the Countries of the Outer Seven (EFTA), of which England was the leader. France’s difficulties with West Germany over agricultural subsidization policies lay at the root of the problem. The EEC later became the European Community (EC).

At the Embassy we did not worry that the Labor Party’s victory would affect US-British foreign policy relations. Historically, Great Britain and the United States have been close allies. Since World War II this bond has grown more deeply. While these political events took place in London along with Harold Wilson’s ascent as prime minister, Chairman Nikita Khrushchev was mysteriously removed from power in Moscow. This was a new challenge for Russian experts in Washington and NATO, trying to understand how this would affect our relations with the Soviets. When Stalin died in 1953 there was also a reshuffling of top leaders.

Our own presidential elections, on November 4, 1964, gave the expected landslide to President Johnson. The President had been the favorite at Whitehall and with the British public. I listened to Senator Robert Kennedy deliver a campaign victory speech over the Armed Forces Radio broadcast from Frankfurt.

That same day I took my first diplomatic courier trip to Southampton and Birmingham. These trips would become a monthly routine. The Embassy driver took us to Waterloo station, and we traveled in first class for security reasons. The three hour train ride gave us a chance to see the beautiful English countryside.

In Southampton I was met by the US Vice Consul. We had some coffee in the restaurant, where we had a little time to talk and transact courier business. After our meeting I continued on to Birmingham, where a Consulate car waited for me. Our Consulate was located in the Chamber of Commerce Building. There I met Consuls Alice T. Curran and Marguerite Whitehead, longtime foreign service officers.

In early November I volunteered for other important diplomatic courier assignments in London. On one occasion, I delivered a confidential letter from Ambassador Bruce to the Prime Minister’s office on 10 Downing Street. I entered the main red carpeted hall and was immediately ushered in by three assistants who receive diplomatic mail. The same trip included a visit to the Ministry of Transport.

When I returned to Birmingham on December 1, 1964, I visited the Arcade Shopping Center near Snowhill Station and the municipal art gallery, which has many Italian, English and Spanish paintings. The Gainsborough School is of special interest to me. I learned that Birmingham was a pioneer in the organization of this municipal art gallery.

Our Embassy in London was a frequent stopover for US politicians and Congressmen, which increased our workload. They often had to be picked up at the airport and then taken to various points of interest. It was a common joke at the Embassy that these missions were “shopping trips.” London was often the first stopover for State Department officials, who needed to consult with their British counterparts before negotiating with the Soviets.

In late November, 1964, Under Secretary of State George Ball arrived in London for talks with members of the newly elected Wilson government. There was also a scheduled meeting with French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. As on other occasions, the Ambassador’s residence was the site where the Bruces played host to the Ball party. The main foreign policy challenge of President Johnson was our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union following the Cuban crisis and the Khrushchev exit.

I was able to find a place to live before Christmas, and moved to an apartment on Hollycroft Avenue in Hampstead. It was an upstairs (near the attic) apartment and the ceilings gave an embracing charm to the living quarters. (I was married in London, to Jeanne Marie Therese “Maîté” Poirier of Le Verdon sur Mer, and our daughter Rebecca was also born there.) Mr. and Mrs. David Sacker were our landlords. David was an attorney and Mrs. Sacker was a charming Indian born lady. From the beginning they made us feel at home. It was a tranquil area of the London suburbs, within walking distance to the Heath, a park where we used to take our daughter to get some fresh air.

London is a psychologically warm city to be in. People are particularly courteous and helpful to foreigners. In early December, merchants on Oxford and Regent streets, and at Piccadilly Circus, put up Christmas decorations. On weekends, we explored the English countryside by train.

Our USIS Library at the Embassy was also showing historical documents of the signing of the Treaty of Ghent (1814), which had brought an end to the 1812 war between Great Britain and the United States. The British public at large was enthusiastic about our library, and since they were avid readers, were well informed about American public policies and cultural events.

London is like a crossroad to the world. I met new friends and visited with those of years before. I had luncheon with Jacques Berthoud, who had lived in London for many years. He was a cousin of a Flemish former classmate. Jacques had been teaching French and was a theater correspondent for *La Tribune de Genève*. I used to read his articles when I lived in Geneva.

On December 5, 1964, I was the guest of Miss Eva Fenton at her apartment in Chelsea (which was once the fashionable district of London). I had been introduced to her through a Foreign Service friend in Jamaica. Miss Fenton was very knowledgeable about British government affairs and was a friend of Sir Winston Churchill and the Queen Mother. As a chemist, she had worked in the Department of War, of which Mr. Churchill was then the head. In 1917, during

World War I, she was sent to America to plead the English case for US intervention in the war against Germany. She toured the United States for many months, giving propaganda lectures everywhere. She recalled that she visited many US factories to explain matters relating to the use of gas and explosives. "America did not have experience in this sort of thing, then, in World War I," she said.

Her life story was fascinating and full of coincidences. She had been a personal guest of President Woodrow Wilson at the White House, and of Mrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt. She had dined several times at the home of Henry Clay Frick, on Fifth Avenue, and had met Miss Helen Frick and her brother, Childs.

I made another new friend, Father Victor, Superior of the Carmelite Convent, on Kensington Church Street. He was introduced by Father Cyriel Bernard, my family's friend, who lived at the Mother House of the Carmelite Order, on Piazza Pancrazio, in Rome. Father Victor showed me every corner of the cloister, including the kitchen. During our long talk he shared his knowledge of British psychology and Catholic Church history. He was proud to say that the Carmelite Priory in London had a public church which was involved in parish work. He explained the two Carmelite Orders: his Order belongs to the Reformed one founded by St. Theresa of Avila; the other is of St. John of the Cross, co-partner in the propagation of the Faith with "deep attachment to the original rule." The Carmelite order is under the authority of the Bishop as far as church work is concerned in the diocese, as are other orders. But, he was quick to add, the Carmelite superiors have independence to manage the internal affairs of their monasteries.

London is famous for its exquisite French and foreign restaurants. I used to go to La Récolte, on Duke Street. Since it was located near the Embassy, it was a good place to meet friends for lunch.

I met Phan Wannemether, First Secretary of the Royal Thai Embassy, in London, on December 21. We had a mutual friend, Chuay Kannawat, with whom I went to school in Puerto Rico. Phan was busy preparing for a pending visit of the Thai Foreign Minister, who would stop in London after some business at the U.N. We talked about Thailand and Vietnam. Phan shared my concern over the bombings of USIS installations in many sensitive posts in the world. He tried to reassure me that, "The United States was going through a change in its history and the attacks on our Foreign Service posts have to be taken in that context."

In retrospect I am aware that my active social life in London was a result of a wide range of contacts I had made in Panama and elsewhere before joining the Foreign Service. I became convinced that meeting leaders in political, religious and cultural life enhanced my education and learning process. A Foreign Service officer will always be a student and educator in public policy.

Ambassador Bruce had left the Embassy for the holidays, and Minister Philip Kaiser was chargé d'affaires ad interim. From time to time he would come in to chat with us in the office of Communications and he also attended our Embassy Staff Christmas Party. I spent my first Christmas in London with Mr. and Mrs. Sacker and their two daughters. It was a privilege to be invited to a traditional turkey dinner and become a part of an English family's celebration, as it brought back many memories of Christmases spent with my own parents.

The day after Christmas is “Boxing Day” in Great Britain and is a national holiday. It is a custom to give gifts to service personnel, household help, postmen, and people who have rendered services during the year. The traditional giving is observed from the royal family down to the average English household. New Year’s Day is not a holiday in England. All shops are open and everyone goes to work. Scotland is an exception, where the New Year is celebrated with a bang.

During the holidays we visited Charles and Eileen Chiddick, who became wonderful friends. We often came together in their home or our apartment. It was a coincidence that Charles and Eileen had been friends of Father Cyril Bernard in Rome. Charles had been a successful insurance agent and they traveled every summer to the south of France, as do many English families.

Since we had a well organized work team at the Embassy, with less overtime and weekend duty as at most small foreign service posts, I was able to do more visiting and sightseeing in London. On January 2, 1965, I was invited for tea by John Carmel Heenan, Archbishop of the Catholic Diocese of Westminster. My friend, Marcos McGrath, of Panama, had introduced me to him. He spent more than an hour with me.

I was met at the Archbishop’s palace by his secretary, Monsignor Kent, who escorted me to the second floor reception room. As I walked through this richly decorated Chancery I was impressed by the many pictures of known church leaders. I was impressed to have met this aesthetic church leader who showed me extraordinary kindness. We first had some small talk and, since he knew I had been brought up in Bruges, said that Monsignor Emile De Smedt, of Bruges, had come to his enthronement. He was proud to say that his niece was married to a Belgian citizen.

His comments on the substance of the Catholic Church’s policy was revealing. He was an outspoken critic of the hurried stand taken on liberalization in the Church’s birth control policies. He told me that the Pope was searching through channels of qualified doctors and scientists to find an answer to many queries coming from all parts of the Catholic world. He thought that the church might possibly approve the use of pills which could regulate the existing “rhythm” system of contraception. He remarked that Cardinal Suenens of Belgium had made some very progressive statements on birth control which the Pope made him retract. On other Vatican II reforms, Heenan referred to the use of new uniforms for religious Sisters. He did not think such outward details were a serious concern for the Church and that Sisters should be allowed to wear old fashioned or contemporary clothes. He was much in favor of allowing Sisters to visit their families.

When I asked Archbishop Heenan what all the changes meant, he said that the liberalism prevalent in Holland, Belgium, France, and West Germany, resulted from moral suffering and oppression under Hitler’s occupation. He added that the Resistance movements during World War II had made people lie, cheat, murder, and conceal. “Generations of these countries have changed their values,” he opined. He was concerned that confusion had swayed the minds of the young. He dispelled clichés of conservatives and liberals, and felt that the Church needed to weigh every moral issue on its own merits.

On January 24, 1963, Prime Minister Winston Churchill died. All flags were put at half mast by order of the Queen. Arrangements were underway for a State funeral. Our Embassy prepared itself in the event President Johnson would attend. It so happened that Secretary of State Dean Rusk led the official US delegation. Former President Eisenhower and Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren also attended. Our Communications Center had its hands full serving messages to the Hilton, where Secretary Rusk stayed, and to the Dorchester, where General Eisenhower was lodged.

The funeral rites at St. Paul's Cathedral were watched by millions on T.V. The funeral cortege and church services represented British protocol, splendor, and efficiency. These state occasions are intrinsically linked with the British crown and people, and are part of the historic fabric of this nation. The playing of The Battle Hymn of the Republic in St. Paul's was a poignant moment to honor Sir Winston Churchill's Honorary American citizenship.

It was while I served in London that attacks on our Embassies and Consulates became the order of the day. It seemed evident that it would become more dangerous to do our job overseas. We experienced several demonstrations in front of our own Embassy, which reflected the political mood at home. President Johnson's leadership suffered setbacks by the domestic political opposition to the war in Vietnam. The Soviet Union used every propaganda tool abroad to deflect US policies in Southeast Asia. The war in Vietnam was also causing a huge deficit in our balance of payments situation. Some financial experts asserted that the "gold backing" of the US dollar was not tenable, given the fact that we had so much money invested in foreign aid and military expenditures. It was also exacerbating our rate of inflation.

London is a storehouse of culture and history. This again became evident to me when I walked into the Tate Art Gallery, in Millbank, which has many English paintings by Turner, Constable, Reynolds, and Gainsborough. The Rodin sculptures made all the other art work look richer. We also went to Brighton, Sussex, to see the Royal Pavilion, a unique royal castle in the downtown area, built by English architect John Nash. Nothing in England is more representative of the Regency period in architecture (1785-1830). We were told that it had been one of the most creative chapters in English history, with the romantic influences of the East being strong elements in that era. The English romantic movement was felt in painting and literature as well. However, if the Royal Pavilion is a monument of architectural excellence, the Wallace Collection, in London, is a treasure house of classical art.

We had lunch with Gerald Cole, a retired engineer, at his apartment in Hove, a suburb of Brighton. He reminisced about his visits in La Sarraz, Switzerland, with Maryke Ogiz, who had been the governess of Miss Frick.

On March 10, 1965, after a six month waiting period, I met Leon Cowles, Counselor for Consular Affairs at the Embassy. He had been a former colleague of Ambassador Scott McLeod in Dublin. He knew of my interest in becoming a Consular Officer. We had a long talk in which he switched from French to Spanish in a way that tested my impromptu skill in those languages. A strong point going for me was that I had completed all the Consular courses at the Foreign Service Institute. He promised he would keep me in mind if and when a vacancy occurred in the Consular field.

Ever since I joined the foreign service in 1961, I never lost my determination to reach that consular goal. At times there were setbacks, but I never deviated from my ultimate goal. I let people, such as Leon Cowles and other area personnel officers in the consular field in Washington, know that I would contribute much in the Consular field.

At the end of April, 1965, President Johnson faced his second foreign policy crisis in the Dominican Republic. A *coup d'état* had destabilized the Caribbean country and American citizens were in danger. The President dispatched over one thousand Marines to secure the safe evacuation of American nationals. It was not smooth sailing for the Administration. There were anti- American protests, but many countries felt that President Johnson made a justifiable move to avoid a Communist takeover in that strategic part of the hemisphere.

That was not the only matter on the President's mind at that time. Ever since North Vietnamese planes had bombed our Embassy in Saigon, the United States became more deeply involved in the Southeast Asian conflict. We could feel the cable traffic rising in our Embassy's communication center. One day I was asked to go to the British Foreign Office with classified material for Sir Harold Cassia, who was in charge of the American Desk there. I also went to the House of Commons with a confidential dispatch from Ambassador Bruce to Sir Alex Douglas Home, who was Prime Minister Wilson's predecessor and leader of the opposition.

As I walked into the House of Commons I could sense the historic importance of this building B the hall of parliamentary democracy that was the precursor of our House of Representatives. In this historic hall, I met Sir Douglas Home's private secretary. On the same trip I went to the Embassy of South Africa with a diplomatic note for Ambassador Dr. De Wet.

Hyde and Regent Parks in April are a delight, full of daffodils, crocus and tulips. Many mothers and nannies take their babies to the parks to get some fresh air. It is a place to enjoy nature and serenity.

In early April I was a guest of Charles Chiddick at the Anglo-Belgian Club, a fashionable club in Belgrave Square, of which he was a member. He said it was a good place to meet his clients. There is a library on the ground floor with many interesting historical and literary Belgian works.

On Easter Sunday, April 19, 1965, we took a train for Bath, a historic city in a picturesque setting. The Roman ruins and hot springs were worth visiting. The fifteenth century Abbey of Bath contains tombs of benefactors. The Royal Crescent and the sunken gardens add to the esthetic flavor of the city.

After lunch at the Fernley Hotel we took a bus to the Downside Catholic Abbey at Stratton on Fosse where we visited with the Reverend Abbot Butler of the Benedictine Monastery. The Abbey has a beautiful church and a school that accommodated 550 students.

In the early 1960s, when I was serving in London, American spouses led a traditional diplomatic life of attending social and charitable affairs. To this end, Maïté was often included at receptions at the US Embassy residence by Mrs. Evangeline Bruce, where notable figures such as the

Director of the American Museum in Bath were guest lecturers. Foreign service wives played a role in assisting senior officers' wives by greeting and mixing with foreign guests. It was only in the 1970s that State Department policies changed, allowing American spouses to seek employment overseas. Many worked at other government agencies or military installations. In the late 1970s Maïté worked in the Consular section of the US Embassy in Brussels, and for NATO support offices.

On May 14, 1965, I experienced one of those rare opportunities in my career. I was assigned as Embassy Aide to Senator Robert Kennedy and his family at the Ambassador's residence, where they stayed. Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy had arrived in London to attend the inauguration ceremony, conducted by Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip, of the National Kennedy Memorial for the late President John F. Kennedy, at Runnymede, which is the historic site of the signing of the Magna Carta, in 1215, by King John. The Queen had invited Mrs. Kennedy and her children, John and Caroline, for tea after the ceremony at Windsor Castle, also near Runnymede. My duties were to answer all incoming calls for Senator Kennedy and his party.

I occupied a small office near the reception hall on the ground floor of the richly decorated mansion, which heiress Barbara Hutton had given to the US government. During my two day assignment at the Ambassador's residence, I had the opportunity to talk with Senator Kennedy, who asked me about my job in the Foreign Service. He often dropped into my office and I, in turn, had to page him in the residence if there was a telephone call for him. He was a very intense man, with striking, penetrating eyes. He had all the qualities needed to be a national leader. He was very courteous and down to earth. I talked only briefly with Senator Edward Kennedy and his wife, Joan. I also became acquainted with Mrs. Peter Lawford and Mrs. Steven Smith, sisters of the late President. Ambassador Bruce's wife supervised the Kennedy visit. I spoke to Prince Radziwill on the telephone, who wanted to get in touch with Lee Bouvier, sister of Jacqueline Kennedy. I also had a call for Senator Robert Kennedy from Mrs. Wilson, wife of the Prime Minister.

At that time, Senator Kennedy's name was very much in the forefront of the British press, and had been mentioned as a possible presidential candidate in 1968 or 1972. Political pundits predicted that President Johnson's drop in popularity polls would make a resurgence of Robert Kennedy to oppose Johnson in 1968 B which proved to be true until his assassination in Los Angeles, in 1968. The English papers described him as a formidable and charismatic leader.

London proved to be a special Foreign Service assignment in terms of the possibilities to travel to the continent and the historic sites of England. The Communications Center at our Embassy was adequately staffed at all times for the crises at hand, and American personnel managers encouraged us to take time off, work permitting, to travel. I could never deny myself the educational pleasure of visiting the many art galleries, such as the Wellington Museum. A silver centerpiece drew my special attention. It was a gift by the Portuguese Regent to the Duke of Wellington. It was at the Victoria and Albert Museum, on Brompton, that I discovered an exquisite collection of silver which dates back to the Middle Ages. At the end of May we also visited the Royal Castle of Windsor, where we saw the burial places of former British monarchs. On the same trip we saw the lovely gardens of the former residence of King Henry VIII at Hampton Court.

On the British political home front, Prime Minister Wilson issued a white (policy) paper in May, which was a proposal to renationalize the British steel industry. It was a highly controversial bill that was opposed by the Tories in Parliament. If he failed to win a confidence vote on this issue he would have a rough time keeping his party in power, unlike our Congressional procedure. British political reality is that, when a political party in power fails a parliamentary vote of confidence on a piece of legislation, the Prime Minister can be under pressure to resign or followed by a general election.

In June, 1965, the State Department announced a reorganization of its personnel management program. Over the years, there had been concern that agencies such as USIS, the Agency for International Development (AID), and the Peace Corps, had been excluded from benefits such as uniform retirement benefits, traditionally offered to State Department personnel. The new policy would remedy this.

June 23, I took my first diplomatic courier trip to Liverpool, an important port city of one million inhabitants, with many industrial plants, such as the Ford Motor Company, set up nearby. Many people this century have emigrated to the United States from Liverpool. When our Consulate in Manchester was closed, much of the Visa load was shifted to Liverpool. The Consulate was located in the Cunard Shipping Line, near the pier, giving it a scenic view of the Irish Sea.

After a long talk with Consul General Littsey and Vice Consul Hughes, the Consulate driver took me to the Walker Fine Arts Gallery, where I saw a fine collection of 17th and 18th century European masters. Our Consulates in Southampton and Birmingham were earmarked for closure at the end of 1965, which would leave us with one out of town courier trip to Liverpool.

On September 9, Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler arrived at our Embassy to wind up his European talks relating to the reform of the complex international monetary crisis, and our big deficit in balance of payments. Both US political parties wanted to see an improvement. The Republicans, however, favored a substantial withdrawal of American troops from Western Europe. They claimed that such cuts would save millions of dollars for US taxpayers. Leading editors in the United States also advocated such a move. They felt that the time had come for Western Europe to build up their own military defense against the USSR. President de Gaulle's "Force de Frappe," a French go it alone military program, outside of NATO, was in France's own interest, but many knowledgeable European military policy makers knew that without a strong US backup NATO would not remain a viable option for the security of Europe.

The feud and subsequent cease fire agreement between India and Pakistan and the territory of Kashmir was resolved. My friends Ed and Dorothy Moody were preparing to leave for Karachi. Many foreign service employees would now forego a "plush" job in Western Europe to volunteer in Third World countries in Asia and Africa. In the early 1960s, democracy began to take hold in these areas. Many young governments and vigorous political leaders were seeking improvements for their people. England was experiencing immigration problems of its own. There was a constant flux of people from the British Commonwealth seeking jobs in cities such as London, Birmingham and Liverpool. The Wilson government tried to regulate emigration into Great Britain, but without much success. Although there was a need for service jobs in London, the

huge influx of people from other countries created some social instability. This had a domino effect on the Consulate's visa department.

One of the Commonwealth countries which caused a lot of uproar during my tour in London was Rhodesia. Their announcement of a unilateral Declaration of Independence triggered a snowballing effect in the rest of the African countries. The former European colonies all desired democracy and independence.

Although I had to work on Thanksgiving Day, 1965, we were invited to the home of our friends, Joe and Lois Forry, at Carlton Mansion. They had included two American students from California and Arkansas. It gave us a sense of family togetherness. I always felt that Foreign Service families were our "extended family" overseas.

On December 7, 1965, Ambassador and Mrs. David Bruce gave a Christmas reception for 600 people at their residence. It was a formal event for all American Embassy employees and their wives. After shaking hands with Ambassador and Mrs. Bruce, our names were called as we entered the ballroom. Another party, on New Year's Eve, was hosted by our new Communications Supervisor, Louis Corrieri, who had replaced Eric Baxter.

President Johnson's State of the Union message, in January, 1966, warned Americans that intensification of the Vietnam war effort would result in higher inflation, but that South Vietnam had to be saved from Communism. The President's other priority was his "war on poverty" program. He stated, "In a land of progress and plenty there should be no one ill fed, ill housed, illiterate."

January 30, 1966, a by-election in the city of Hull resulted in a big victory for Labor and an opportunity for Prime Minister Harold Wilson to call a general election earlier, if he wanted, to secure a larger majority in the House of Commons. Wilson needed this victory because England continued to be plagued with labor strikes in public transport, including the National Railroad.

On the continent, the six Common Market countries worked on a common solution to tariff issues related to European and transatlantic trade. Each member country made some adjustment. For instance, Belgium made some changes in its national medical plan, and also worried about its high rate of inflation. One strong point in Belgium's favor was that Brussels was now the center of the EEC. It attracted huge investments from US companies, such as Ford Motors. This period was the "Golden 60s" in Belgium. The country was a good outlet for American products, but because of the country's limited natural resources, and Zaire's (formerly known as the Belgian Congo) independence, it struggled to stay afloat in world markets. Belgian investments, formerly in Zaire, were reverted elsewhere.

One day I received a call from Dewey Clark, a friend from Pittsburgh, who gave me details of his work with an American insurance company in Brussels.

On March 26, 1966, I had become the proud father of a lovely girl: Rebecca Marie. It was a Saturday morning and it snowed heavily in London. Maïté experienced pre-labor pains the night before. Mrs. Sacker, our landlady, offered to drive us to St. Andrew's Hospital. The doctors

asked me to join them for the delivery. At 11:15 in the morning, the happiest moment in my life, Rebecca, our daughter, was born, a beautiful, dark haired infant, weighing six pounds.

On April 17, 1966, Rebecca was baptized at the French Church of Notre Dame, near Leicester Square. Besides Maïté's parents, our friends, Joe and Lois Forry, attended the ceremony.

Following Rebecca's birth we received assistance from English welfare clinics. On occasions, a public health nurse came to our home to check on both mother and child. The birth of my daughter filled our home with joy. After a long day at the Embassy I took care of our baby and played an active role as father on weekends.

Counselor for Administration, Findley Burns, was appointed as Ambassador to Jordan. By now Mrs. Burns and Maïté knew each other well. She sent a little gift for Rebecca. They always took a personal interest in the families of their staff.

In early May, 1966, I received a letter from the Director of Staff Corps Personnel that I had been selected for a consular assignment. This dramatically changed my foreign service career in that I would now be integrated in the foreign service officer corps and assume greater responsibilities. During my last months in London, I also tutored an English lawyer in French. From him I learned the difference between a solicitor and barrister. A solicitor, he said, is a person who prepares legal dossiers, but is never able to speak in court. A barrister appears in court and gets involved in debate.

Joaquin Balaguer's election as President of the Dominican Republic restored political stability and some democratic institutions in that Caribbean nation.

In May, 1966, there was another chain of events in NATO. NATO's military organization headquarters moved from Paris to Wavre, near Brussels. This move enhanced Brussels' position as the center of the EEC (presently the EC) and NATO.

On July 23, 1966, I returned to St. Paul's Cathedral to visit the American chapel, which had been dedicated in 1958 by Queen Elizabeth II and Vice President Richard Nixon to British and American soldiers of World War II. In this church I also saw the tombs of Wellington and Admiral Collingwood.

In early August I was on vacation with Maïté's family in Le Verdon, France. There I received a telegram from the Embassy in London. It read: "Although your present assignment was made by Panel B (mid career officer panel), I am happy to be able to tell you that you have been assigned to Alexandria, United Arab Republic, as Vice Consul."

When I returned to London I also found a note on my desk from Minister Philip M. Kaiser: "Congratulations on your recent promotion. I know it is a well deserved recognition of your work for, and loyalty to, the Foreign Service."

I sent the customary letters to the Consul General and administrative officer in Alexandria.

ELLEN M. JOHNSON
Secretary to Labor Attaché
London (1964-1966)

Ellen M. Johnson was born in New Jersey in 1934. Her career with the State Department began in 1957 as a clerk and stenographer soon after earning her master's degree from the University of Colorado. After being promoted to an intelligence research specialist position, she served in Kobe/ Osaka, Warsaw, London, and Prague. Ms. Johnson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in April 1994.

Q: Then you took off for another two years in quite a different locale and job.

JOHNSON: Yes, I went to London. This was a thrill because, as I mentioned earlier, I had been an Anglophile ever since my early teens when I discovered "The London Illustrated News."

Q: You were there from 1964 to 1966.

JOHNSON: I worked for the Labor Attaché, which doesn't sound particularly exciting, but the Labor Party came into power while I was there and caught the political officers flatfooted. They hadn't deemed it worthwhile getting to know the leaders of the Labor Party feeling the Conservatives and Liberals were the ones to know. However, Thomas Byrne, my boss, who later became an ambassador, had gotten to know these leaders very well and was the only one in the embassy who did know them when they came to power. Suddenly my job became more and more interesting. Tom began to spend more time at the Ambassador's right hand because he was the only one who knew some of these new leaders of government.

Q: It is an interesting thing because during World War II sort of the same thing happened. Sam Burger was the Labor Attaché and he knew Attlee and company. The rest of the embassy got infatuated with the Tories. I think there is a tendency to associate with them or something. That Labor is a little more unwashed or something like that. So Sam Burger was the only person who knew who these people were in a way. I guess it is the nature course of things, that the embassy tends to pick up the feeling from the society or from the Ambassador who if a political appointee may be more interested in the social side of the position.

JOHNSON: Well, David Bruce was the Ambassador at that time. But I was amazed that nobody else had spent any time getting to know these people.

There was another reason why I liked the job. This had to do with the way Tom Byrne worked. Tom would come in early in the morning as did I. He would call me in and we would go over the financial page of the newspapers and then discuss what was going to happen during the day. Throughout the day he would feed me a constant flow of work. By 6:00 he was ready to go home to his family and I had finished all the planned work.

Although I enjoyed this way of working, it didn't help the morale of the other secretaries in the political section (we all sat in one long room) who were still busy at the typewriter getting out telegrams that just HAD to go out that night, as I closed up and went home. The problem was that they had sat around all morning waiting for their bosses to give them some work. However, they seldom started work, collecting of information, etc., until around lunch time and then would come rushing back and start dictating around 4:00 and the secretaries seldom got away before 7:00 or 7:30 on a regular basis. I felt I had the best job in the political section.

Q: This is one of the things I have noted again and again. I come from the consular background where you kind of have your day's work and you do it, work hard, and then when it is over, it is over and you go. But there is a tendency for political officers to sort of get moving very, very slowly, to go out and have a working lunch and come back and be a little slowed down from a heavy lunch an all, and then around 5:00 they start cranking up to turn out the day's work.

JOHNSON: And most of the work could have been saved until the next morning so the secretary could be busy in the morning and then be ready for whatever went on in the afternoon. Their excuse was that the government offices didn't open until 10:00, which was true, so there was nothing for them to do until then. That way of operating was very unfortunate because it made for an unnecessarily long day on a regular basis for many secretaries, and we didn't get paid overtime in those days.

Q: What was life like in London?

JOHNSON: I was very fortunate because I had made two very close British friends at the British embassy in Warsaw who had been reassigned to London. So I had built in friends upon arrival. Fortunately, there wasn't room for me in the limited government housing at that time, so I had to go out and find my own housing. I found an apartment two blocks from where my friends were living. Consequently, I did very little socializing with Americans at the embassy. If I hadn't had the British friends already, it would have been a little more difficult enjoying many of the "greats" of the British Isles because the embassy is very large and staff tends to get lost in large embassies. Only at very large functions would junior and middle ranked officers be invited to the Ambassador's functions at the Residence, never staff personnel.

Staff generally were on their own socially. If you thought you were going to be as a staff member in the mainstream of society there, you were wrong. Large posts can be lonely for somebody who doesn't find outside friendships. You wouldn't be invited to the Fourth of July party, for example. At small posts you are invited to everything so you do feel part of the diplomatic family. This is why I have always preferred smaller posts to larger ones -- except for London, where I would be happy regardless.

Life outside the diplomatic world was fantastic in London. There was so much theater that you found yourself going once or twice a week. It was relatively inexpensive and you couldn't afford not to go. After travel limitations in Poland, it was a joy to be able to get into a car and go any where in the country, which I did. I traveled from John O'Groat's in the north to Land's End in the south. I saw a lot of the places I had seen pictured in "The London Illustrated News" during my teens. It was easy and wonderful living.

I went on a three week TDY to Warsaw over Christmas of 1965. John Gronouski, the Postmaster General, was appointed the new Ambassador to Poland and arrived in mid December. However, his secretary didn't want to come until after Christmas. Albert Sherer was still DCM in Warsaw and suggested that I return to Warsaw until the new secretary appeared. I wasn't very happy about the TDY because I had already made Christmas plans, but the needs of the Service, and all that, and I went.

It was quite an experience, my first encounter with a political appointee as Ambassador. He was still the politician and couldn't understand why people got so upset with him when he would take off and start shaking hands with the man in the street. The Polish officials were not very happy with this and we had to try to impress upon him that it wasn't something you did in Poland. I can also remembering asking him about the zip code program which he had initiated a year or so earlier while Postmaster General. I asked if he thought it would really work. He said that it had better work because his political career depended on it. I don't know what happened to his political career, but the zip code certainly has become an institution. However, then it was difficult for secretaries to figure out exactly where and how to place it in the address.

I appreciated London even more after my return from Warsaw because the door really had slammed shut for the Poles and their relationship with foreigners and living in Warsaw had become much more uncomfortable and restrictive.

I was in London when Churchill died in 1965. I stood in line for hours waiting to file pass the casket. His funeral was a tribute to the British ability to stage outstanding and tasteful pageantry. Nobody does it better.

Q: Was there a change when the Labor Party came in as far as what the Labor Attaché was doing?

JOHNSON: There was a change in that Tom was called often to the Ambassador's or DCM's office for discussions about various Labor Party leaders. Previously that had seldom happened as it was usually a political officer who did most of the briefing of the principals. Tom did more political reporting, telegrams, memorandum of conversation, biographical sketches, etc.

Q: What were your impressions from these conversations and things that you were doing of the Labor Party at that time? How did we view the Labor Party?

JOHNSON: I got the impression that the officers would have preferred that Labor hadn't gotten in. They weren't very happy with the nationalization that took place and tended to look upon the Party as being very close to following the communist line. There was, of course, a group within the Party which was very far to the left, but it hadn't the power within the Party then as it did in later years under Neil Kinnock. Certainly Harold Wilson was not as far left as Neil Kinnock. I think it took the embassy time getting used to Harold Wilson after the aristocratic Macmillan and Douglas-Hume.

J. PHILLIP MCLEAN
Consular Officer
Edinburgh, Scotland (1964-1966)

Mr. McLean was born and raised in Seattle, Washington and was educated at Seattle University and the University of Indiana. He entered the Foreign Service in 1962. A Latin American specialist, his service in the State Department in Washington and abroad, primarily concerned Latin American Affairs. His foreign posts were Brasilia, Edinburgh, Panama City, La Paz, Milan and Bogota, where he was Deputy Chief of Mission. In Washington Mr. McLean held positions dealing with Latin American Affairs, including that of Deputy Assistant Secretary for South America. Mr. McLean was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: Today is the 25th of January 1999. Phil, so you're off to where, Edinburgh?

McLEAN: That's right. After all the sun and brightness of Brasilia, we found ourselves in the middle of winter in Edinburgh: quite a physical and psychological change.

Q: You were there from what, 1960?

McLEAN: From November of 1964 to November of 1966.

Q: November must have been a nice time, a good introduction to Edinburgh, wasn't it?

McLEAN: Nothing happened in Edinburgh in November. It was so dark and depressed, and very few visitors, though I do remember we right away had some cases of students going a little nutty, one believing he was Jesus Christ. He would only get over that delusion when it brightened up a little bit, and then as soon as it got dark again he was back in the asylum. But the consulate at that time was basically a visa operation, and there were no visas to give at that point. But in February it just picked up amazingly, and we worked very hard.

Q: Well, I'm wondering. I'm an ex-counselor officer myself. With the visa business, what was the problem there? I would have thought a good stamp could get a visa at will.

McLEAN: Well, not if there was a problem. It was actually very much of a pro forma type of operation. I gave, I think, 10,000 visas the first year. In those days we actually signed them individually. And I gave 24,000 in the second year, because they closed Glasgow. My signature was totally different from before and after that period, much stronger, but I think I refused three. But it was that plus lots of notaries and notarizations. We did a lot of work for the distilleries. The MacKinnon's were beginning to send Drambuie to the United States for the first time and had to register one state at a time, and we did all the paperwork on that. It wasn't a busy place really. When I got there, there were only two persons.

Q: Who was the consul general?

McLEAN: The consul general when I first got there was Elias McQuaid, a person who came in through the Wriston Program. He had been a speech writer for Dulles. He went back. He was also a press attaché in Paris after the war, but his family is related to the Manchester Union Leader of New Hampshire, and he'd been an award-winning journalist up there, interesting man. And then it was Paul Du Vivier the second year I was. Paul was someone who had long experience in Europe, and he'd been interned. I think he was one of the few people who actually was interned by the Germans, because he was the vice consul left in Marseilles.

Q: I have an interview with Paul.

McLEAN: Oh, you do? God bless his soul.

Q: Yes. Well, did you find yourself involved in the political life up there?

McLEAN: That's an interesting point, because at that time we were not coned professionally as we came into the Foreign Service, and here I had a consular assignment and something I wanted to do and do well, but I knew if I was going to go in a certain career direction I should try to develop my skills in other areas and in the political area, which was my main interest, so I in that period went out and tried to do some political work. And I guess I went out and I was one at that particular period that rediscovered the Scottish Nationalist Party. I imagine that the people back in Washington who were reading the stuff I did thought that I'd gone a little bit nutty out there because my name was McLean, a Scottish name, but, no, I did in fact find this party that was not getting a lot of attention in the country at that time, had no representation at any important level in Britain or in Scotland even, but I tapped into what became identified as a very strong feeling and a movement that had a lot of momentum. Shortly after I left Scotland, they elected their first people in certainly a generation or two to the parliament, and they've been represented ever since. Many of those people that I got to know at that time did rise to some prominence in the Scottish Nationalist Party. One of the more interesting things I did was I developed a contact with a man who had been the head of the Scottish courts, Lord Sabrandin, and he gave me some very surprising sense of how Scots really feel about independence. Not that he was advocating it himself, but he was expressing the very strongly held point of view that turned out later. Within the decade, I remember, there was a Clint Brandon Commission, which he was the head of, and if anybody had looked up in the biographic files, they would have found one of my memos that pretty much traced out what he believed.

Q: The thing that really seemed to give the spirit to the Scottish Nationalist Movement was the discovery of oil in the North Sea, wasn't it? I mean the sentiment might have been there, but there was almost no economic basis for doing it on their own.

McLEAN: I don't think that's right, and I think quite the contrary. Maybe oil in fact distracted them. There was a very strong movement ahead of time, and there was a sense among Scots already at that time, before oil because this was 1964-1966 and they were only doing some minor work in the North Sea at that point. They would cite statistics at that time that Scotland exported more and was contributing more to the economy of Britain per capita than the English were.

Q: Did you have any feel for the labor movement? I know for much of this period, up certainly through most of the '70s and all, the labor movement was looked upon by many in the United States as being the thing that was holding Britain back. I mean strikes and us versus them and all. How did we look at it?

McLEAN: That was something I noticed perhaps not so much in the labor union contacts, because I did not in fact do labor reporting at that time in my career. I didn't go out and make contact with them, but what I did find was this enormous psychological depression that the Scots felt, and maybe Brits felt in general at that time, that their country wasn't going anywhere, that things were stopped, that there was very little real initiative going. There was a little bit of the technology industry just getting started. I had some contact with them. I did some export control checks. But generally Scots would talk about immigrating out. One of the things I did when I was there was I did a lot of speechmaking. About every two weeks I'd go out and give my speech. I remember going to a high school in a semi-rural area, and the principal, in order to get control of the group I was speaking to, was saying, "Now listen, a good third of you will be immigrating to the United States, so please pay attention to this man," which I thought was very depressing. It was not the view that I was taking. Scotland at that time was full of this public housing. I was told that 97 percent of all the housing built after World War II was public housing. Most of it were just tall, depressing housing parks that didn't give much stimulus to anyone. So it was a down period for Britain in that sense, and Britain had also turned away from the European Community. There was a lot of nostalgia for the glory days of empire, but there wasn't a new focus on where Britain was going. At one of the groups I spoke to, I remember one time they asked me rather aggressively did I not think that blood was thicker than water and that, therefore, Britain should be part of the United States rather than part of Europe. It was that type of sentiment that they didn't let go.

Q: How did you answer that?

McLEAN: Well, I think, playing off my Scottish heritage, I said, no, I didn't think so, that wasn't practical, because in fact I frankly recognized that Britain was more European in its traditionalism than they would be in the United States. But it was an interesting period. You mentioned the sense of us against them, and...

Q: Talking about the class system.

McLEAN: It wasn't just the unions, it was right across the board. That for me was a little bit hard. I had come up from, as I mentioned before, a labor union family, a family that was moving ahead, as we thought, and that was a big difference. With the Scots, many of them did not think of moving ahead. They wanted more security in their particular situation.

Q: This is Tape 2 Side 1 with Phil McLean. Phil, if I recall, more from my movie memory and from my kids and all, '64 to '66, was this the beginning of the time when at least there was this.... Britain was swinging and the Beatles were beginning to come on the scene and there was a lot of mod stuff coming out of London, Mary Quant fashions and all that. One, is my timing right? and two, was there any reflection of that up in Edinburgh?

McLEAN: It was the time. When I lived in Scotland and then went down to London--and I didn't know London well before then--I was stunned. In fact, I became a little bit of a Scottish Nationalist myself, because you would see that at least the London area was richer. Once I was invited down to go to Ditchley Park outside of Oxford, and we went down to London and drove back up, and even in the countryside you could see a richer, more prosperous area than you did in Scotland. You didn't get much of that flavor in Edinburgh itself. Edinburgh, of course, is a university city, and of course I went over to St. Andrews, but, no, Scotland was a little bit more uptight and less modern. To the degree that there was a class system, it seemed like you could feel it more in Scotland than you could in the south, and it was certainly not.... Well, you take something like rock music. There was very little rock music on the radio stations. There was a poor old Radio Scotland on a bouncing ship out in the middle of the North Sea that you could hear sometimes at night, but it was comical because you could actually hear the crashing of the vibrations going on inside the ship that was bumping up and down. Those were illegal pirate radio stations, but the three radio stations you could hear in Scotland, during the day anyway, carried very limited amounts and often not the Beatles. I'm sure that my colleagues in the States heard more Beatles music than I did up in Scotland. So, it was being set upon. I can remember one time driving home for lunch and coming back, and the three radio stations, all three, in the middle of the day had programs that were nostalgic about Empire, and it was an enormously boring situation that that's what they wanted to talk about. Some lady was recalling her days in Africa, and another somebody was in India, and something about the Queen. It just was a strange, somewhat quaint atmosphere obviously. I was invited to the Queen's garden party, and got all dressed up. At that time I rented morning attire so often that I could have actually purchased it at a profit. But obviously on the other side of it there were a lot of really wonderful things, fun things about it, because Edinburgh, being a fairly small town, did have an extraordinarily rich cultural life. What we did feel was this enormous enthusiasm around the time of the festival, and it was a great learning experience for me, the opera and the music, the theater. For several weeks Edinburgh became a center of European culture, but not so much the swinging culture. There was something called the fringe of the festival, and there was the Travis Theater, which were rather advanced and modern, but it wasn't such an atmospheric impact on the city.

Q: What about the universities? The University of Edinburgh is one of the oldest in the world. Did that play much of a life, or was it sort of off to one side?

McLEAN: No, it was central. It was a very important institution, not only the university but the institutions around the university, the colleges, the professional colleges. I got into it a bit. At one point--it seems amazing to me now that I did--I accepted an invitation to speak at the Edinburgh Union, the great debating institution of British universities, and I accepted the invitation on the proposition that apparently had been put forth by George Bernard Shaw that the United States is the only country that had gone from a state of barbarism to a state of decadence without the intervening stage of civilization. We won the debate, but I think because of the friendliness of the people. It was quite interesting, but that was one of the wonderful aspects of the university. Of course, the university wasn't only just the liberal sciences; it was also a religious university, and many of the American students who were there were studying, doing religious studies, both there and at St. Andrews.

Q: What about medical?

McLEAN: There was a medical school, and one of the interesting things that occurred to me there was that it had become an issue about people going through British schooling, getting a medical education, and then emigrating to the United States. Every year there was administered in the town something called an ECFMG, Educational Council for Foreign Medical Graduates, and that had become a big issue, such that at the last minute the university, which had been administering it, was used to administering it, dropped it on us, and I administered that in a very stormy situation. The press was outside badgering the students as they went in, the examinees, and I gave the examination, and all went well except the English part of the examination where the English and Scottish exam takers couldn't understand my accent. The colonials all accepted it. But it was a real issue, because it appeared in the officer's letter and there was press attention.

Q: How'd you find the press? One thinks of the British press as terribly sensational, much more so than the American press. Was that just the London manifestation, or what about where you were?

McLEAN: One thing that's amazing is how many newspapers they had for the population. It indicates they actually read. The Scotsman was an enormously wonderful paper to read. Of course, all the papers from London came up. Other than The Scotsman and Glasgow Herald, the papers dropped off in quality rather sharply, but they were controversial and it's clear that they were part of what people talked about. They were somewhat conservative. I mean they were conservative in presentation not in political line.

Q: We were going through a real earth-shaking or revolutionary change in the United States with civil rights at this time, right in the middle of it really. How did that play as far as being the American representatives there?

McLEAN: Well, there was just an assumption that this was those terrible Americans. They're just racist. To me it was an extraordinary point of view, because I didn't think we were that. In these speeches that I gave around the country, around the consular district, I often talked on that subject, not that I knew the American Southland a great deal but I used the material was given to me by USIA, and in the end it seemed to work out. I remember one young couple, American couple I had known at the university. They were there on Marshall scholarships, and they were from the Deep South, and it was so strange that some of my Scottish friends would talk down about the American South, and yet when they met these people, they felt they were more like them perhaps than I was, because there was a certain formality about Southern living that fit well with a Scot's view of how you should conduct yourself socially. But it was an issue. The other issue, of course, was beginning to grow at that time with Vietnam, and I was directed by my consul general that I should stay away from that subject. I think I only gave one presentation on that subject and then was steered away from it, because they didn't want controversy. We had some violence against the consulate, a window broken in. It was clearly an anti-Vietnam sense of what was behind it. And it was a good time to get out and explain ourselves and try to be showing who we are. I, of course, thought this was very strange, that they would be accusing us of racism when around me I thought the Scots, part of their social conservatism was that they were not very open to other races and other groups. I remember I went to court once because an American citizen had been arrested and was to be tried, and I watched the other cases that were

on the docket that day, and I was stunned by the fact that they were in some cases Indians or Pakistanis who were being accused of things that just on the face of it didn't sound to me like they were getting a very clear, open hearing. I don't want to be too strong against my Scots, but as I say, it was a socially conservative place.

Q: I would think that this getting out and talking, it was a certain amount of training by fire in a way, isn't it? I mean just by having to get out and articulate and all really what you're about and done in a fairly good place. I mean same language, different accent and all, and also people who would be polite to a point but challenging to a point.

McLEAN: It was a terrific experience. I had done public speaking before, working in politics in college, but this was my first opportunity to get out and defend the United States through thick and thin, and how you put an intellectually honest argument on something. I wasn't comfortable necessarily with Vietnam or what was going on in the South, but I learned to describe it in a way that was consistent with American interests and yet faithful to my own beliefs on things, and that was good for me.

WILLIS C. ARMSTRONG
Minister for Economic Affairs
London (1964-1967)

Willis C. Armstrong was born in New York in 1912. He earned his undergraduate degree at Swarthmore College and his master's degree at Columbia University in New York. His career in public service began as a translator for the State Department in 1939 and lasted until the United States entry into World War II. Shortly after, he joined the Lend Lease Administration in 1941. His positions in the State Department dealt mainly with economic issues. His overseas assignments were in Ottawa and, London. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 29, 1988.

Q: You were Minister for Economic Affairs in London from 1964 to 1967. What were your main tasks at that point?

ARMSTRONG: The only bilateral problems of any real consequence involved shipping. The administration of U.S. shipping laws, as related to shipping conferences on rate setting, a semi-technical issue, made for a major philosophical difference between the British and us, because the British believed in letting shipping conferences regulate themselves. We, with our anti-trust views, were opposed to shipping conferences because they set rates. I became involved in a fairly significant way in that on occasion, when there was a fight. We were also setting up at that time the International Maritime Consultative Organization, IMCO, with headquarters in London. Because of that particular multilateral aspects of things, shipping was again something we spent a lot of time on.

We had air negotiations sporadically, quite a lively time with the British on fourth freedoms, fifth freedoms, but I'd had a certain amount of experience on air negotiations with the Canadians, so that came fairly easily.

Our major concern in those days was the problem of the British economy, which was in very wobbly shape.

Q: It was really called the "sick man of Europe."

ARMSTRONG: Yes. Harold Wilson was the prime minister. He was Labor. The Conservatives were in when I went there, and then Labor won the two elections while I was there. I knew Harold Wilson. He came over to Washington when he became head of the Labor Party. I had the British desk, and I thought I'd get acquainted with this guy, so I became his escort officer. I'd met him once before when he was president of the Board of Trade. We got along fine until he found out, from asking questions, that I was older than he was. The next time we passed a mirror in somebody's outer office, I could see him look at his profile and mine, and mine was better then than it is now, and his was a lot worse than mine. He also was very gray and I wasn't. It kind of put a cooler on it, you know. I saw him a few times when I was in the embassy. I liked Callaghan. I got along fine with Callaghan, who was chancellor of the Exchequer.

We all worried about the British economy. People would come over from the Bureau of the Budget or from the Brookings Institution, and we had economists steadily coming over to look at "the sick man."

Q: It's fine we worry about it, but why were we concerned, and what could we do about it? And was it our business?

ARMSTRONG: We were concerned because Britain is a major ally. You don't want your ally to be poor. It's a major trading partner. You want to be able to sell your stuff. It's a major financial center in terms of the world's financial situation. You don't want that financial center to lose its grip. It's just important to the world economy that there be a vigorous British economy, and it was also out of the Common Market. We thought it would be better if it were in the Common Market. We thought that really the best answer for it would be to be in the Common Market, where they'd have to compete with other Europeans.

I remember Averell Harriman came over one time. I was asked, "Would you come in to brief Mr. Harriman on the British economy? He's got only two minutes."

He said, "What's the trouble with the British economy?"

I said, "Well, to put it the shortest way I can, there are too many people employed and not enough of them working."

He said, "All right. I got it."

I tried that out later on Harold Wilson's minister later, and he said, "You're absolutely right." He said, "That's the best diagnosis I have." The unions were just ruining the economy with work to rule and all kinds of seniority, and nobody could do anything that wasn't his job and all that. [Prime Minister Margaret] Thatcher was the best thing that ever happened to the British economy in two generations.

Q: This is Margaret Thatcher, the present conservative Prime Minister of England.

ARMSTRONG: She's the best thing that ever happened to them in economic terms.

Q: By attacking the union rule.

ARMSTRONG: Yes. The union rules were stifling the British economy. Another thing I noticed was that they were awfully slow at picking up new technology in British business. Another thing I observed was that senior British businessmen, of whom I met a good many socially, mostly did not have a university education. They were public school boys. The labor unions had almost nobody with a university education, or any kind of a secretariat the way we have in the AFL-CIO. I don't think much of the AFL-CIO, but at least they have some educated brains down there.

I went to a couple of the British labor gatherings. I went to Blackpool once for a major Trade Unions Congress, and I met a lot of these fellows. They're very nice fellows. I enjoyed them. Good fellows to have a beer with, but they didn't know anything about economics or business. There was too much nationalized industry, mostly financial failures. It was just plain depressing to look at the British economic performance while I was there. In terms of one's own living, the exchange rate was fine, your money went a fair distance, it was socially a wonderful place to live, culturally wonderful. Most of my contact with the British government was really in terms of talking about global economic matters, the GATT or the Common Market or "What about the Japanese?" or whatever, or developing economies, that sort of thing, more than dealing bilaterally with the British.

Q: Really trying to bring the British to act in partnership with the United States.

ARMSTRONG: Keep them informed of what we were doing and how we looked at things, and find out how they looked at things. That was very agreeable. I did a lot of business with the Treasury. There was a very fine under secretary named Sir William Armstrong, with whom I did business. There were people in the Foreign Office with whom I enjoyed; a lot of good intellectual contact. Then there were the occasional COCOM problems, mostly involving Cuba, because we had special rules on Cuba. People were buying American goods, shipping them to Britain, and then reshipping them to Cuba to evade this. We got into nonsensical arguments in the course of that time. But it was an agreeable experience, and I particularly enjoyed associating with David Bruce.

Q: David Bruce was the ambassador when you were there. Could you describe his operating style? How was he as ambassador?

ARMSTRONG: Detached. (Laughs) But observant. I remember one particular event which probably ought to be recorded. We used to send a telegram every couple of weeks or month, giving the status of British official monetary reserves. It was a very routine thing, and obviously it was not seen by very many people. They didn't have any reserves to amount to anything at that point. If they did, they owed them to somebody. So it was a purely nonsensical piece of data, an irrelevant piece of data.

David was not very experienced in economic matters. He always got worried about this, that they didn't have any reserves. He was a good man at handling his own money, always knew where it was. He'd call me in every so often, and he would be worried about the reserves. I would say, "Look, it doesn't mean anything. The reserves are neither here nor there. They can be gone in five seconds if somebody flipped the wrong switch or the right switch. What is important is the way in which the central banks in other countries and the IMF regard the British economy. That's the problem. If the economy gets better, you don't need to worry about the reserves. If the balance of payments gets better, you don't need to worry."

He'd say, "All right, I get it."

One time, though, I was giving him this rationalization. "Well," he said, "I was particularly disturbed by the last telegram last week. I sent a telegram to George Ball and John Leddy." John Leddy was Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. "God," he said, "you know, they both called me up in the middle of the night, all excited. I guess I didn't show you that telegram."

I said, "No."

He said, "I guess maybe I'd better." So he fished it out and showed it to me. He said, "I guess maybe I should have shown you that telegram."

Having read it, I said, "Yes, you should." It was hysteria about the British economy, talking about Britain going "down the tube." I said, "Look, Mr. Ambassador, there isn't any tube big enough for an economy the size of British to go down. It either gets worse to the point it can't pay its bills, and then it has to shape up, or it gets better. It won't go away. There isn't any place for it to disappear to."

He said, "I guess you're right." Anyway, I could see why George Ball called him up in the middle of the night.

Just incidentally, this past Monday I was in Princeton, where they dedicated a chair for David Bruce at the Woodrow Wilson School. George Ball gave the appreciation. It was mostly about David's career in the OSS. The OSS is not a good place to learn economics either.

Q: No. There you try to destroy it rather than to help it along.

ARMSTRONG: Yes. It's, "Cut those power lines. Cut off the oil." But David's political judgment on Europe, where people were going in Europe, and on security matters was absolutely superior. He frequently would cool everybody in the circuit off with a nice lucid telegram that said, "This

is the way things look, and let's not get so excited. Things are shaping up." I knew him also when he was in China, because I was Assistant Secretary when he went out to China as Ambassador. He called on me once when he was back, and called on me before he went. He was always so wonderfully witty and entertaining, a marvelous guy. He distilled wisdom all the time for people. He's one of the great men who has been involved in our diplomatic business. William Casey worked with him during the war.

Q: This is William Casey, who, until recently, until his death, was the head of the CIA under President Reagan.

ARMSTRONG: Who, don't forget, was also Under Secretary for Economic Affairs under President Nixon. I was assistant secretary at the time, and Mr. Casey and I were a team in many ways.

PHILIP M. KAISER
Deputy Chief of Mission
London (1964-1969)

Philip M. Kaiser was born in New York City in 1913. He received his bachelor's degree in 1935 and then went on to study as a Rhodes Scholar at Balliol College at Oxford University. In Washington D.C. he served many positions in the State department and also served as the Special Assistant to the Governor of New York, Averill Harriman. He has had ambassadorships to Senegal and Mauritania, Hungary, and Austria, as well as different positions in London. Ambassador Kaiser was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in May 2005.

KAISER: Bruce wanted a new DCM, a new minister, and he recommended me. So, that's how I got to London.

Q: You were there from when to when?

KAISER: '64 to '69.

Q: Five years.

KAISER: Great years. Bruce was a delightful character and he was getting on and how shall I say this immodestly? He really let me run the day to day administration of the embassy.

Q: Well, that's what a good ambassador should do.

KAISER: Every now and then I would take in a cable for him to approve. I initialed off the substantive cables. We would have a talk every morning after the traffic came in, after he had a chance to read the traffic of the day, and we developed a very satisfactory relationship. The best way to summarize it was, we had a common bathroom. We did not have a common outer office.

We had separate outer offices that were next to each other and in-between our two offices in the back was a corridor which led to the back doors of both offices, so that we would see each other if we didn't want to go through. But also, we had this common john to use. About a week before he left - I stayed on for a few more months - we both opened the door to go to the john together and he said to me, "After you, Mr. Minister." And I said to him, "After you, Mr. Ambassador." I let him use it and I went back to the office. When he got through he opened up my door and he said to me, "Phil, I just realized that in the five years that you've been here this is the first conflict we've had."

Q: Well, tell me, what was the political situation in Great Britain when you arrived there in or '64? What were the issues?

KAISER: Well, the issues were big. It was the first labor government since '51. The first labor government in 13 years.

Q: Was this Wilson ?

KAISER: Wilson. Tragically, Hugh Gaitskell had died. I knew Wilson slightly. I knew Gaitskell much better. Gaitskell was a very good friend. It was a matter of the petering out of the Labor hierarchy beginning with Winston Churchill. Eden came a cropper in the Suez crisis and Harold Macmillan. He was in for seven or eight years, a long period. Wilson won the election with a majority of four. The relationship at that time was very close. We kept intimate contact on all the great issues of the day mainly relating to the Cold War.

Q: The Labor Party at that time had this extreme left, almost a communist element, anti-nuclear, anti-U.S.?

KAISER: The most immediate thing was, anti-Vietnam. There was a civilized left, moderate left, there were a few maybe five or six, ten at the most I would guess, who were extreme left. Wilson carried water on both shoulders very effectively. He was himself before he became prime minister more in the left than the other groups. Gaitskell was really more moderate than Wilson and Wilson carried water on both shoulders pretty effectively. We kept in very close touch although LBJ really didn't like Wilson. Wilson was too smart, too intellectual for him. The best way I can describe in one story the intimacy of the relationship - I can give you many examples - was when Wilson visited Johnson, he would come back and prepare a memorandum for his cabinet on what took place at the visit. He would send copies of that memorandum to us, to Bruce. Often we heard nothing from Washington on what took place. I think that's the best way to describe how close we were. Wilson would ask Bruce for advice on some of his own problems. But anything to do with America, he wouldn't move without talking to Bruce about it.

Q: Were we concerned at the time with something that was known at one point as the English or British sickness. In other words the Labor ability to -

KAISER: Solve their economic problems.

Q: To make Britain a rather ineffective industrial state.

KAISER: We were concerned about the status of the pound. Wilson devalued the pound in that period. That was a matter of deep concern, but we rallied behind him on that occasion and showed ourselves to be true allies. Rusk was very proud of that fact. He drafted the cable himself that Johnson sent to Wilson after Wilson devalued. We didn't like the idea of the devaluation because we feared its impact would be negative on our economy, but we were very good allies. We tried to the extent possible to help them improve their economy, and it took a little doing because you had a Labor government and we had a Democratic regime here, but there was enough in common to maintain a special relationship in that period.

For example, when war broke out between India and Pakistan, I got a phone call from Rusk at midnight I guess it was, our time; it was 7:00 Washington. He didn't realize that. Bruce was away, I was chargé. He said, "We've just made the following statement about the war. Can you get Wilson to do the same?" I said, "Dean, it's 12:00 here. I'll see what I can do." He said, "Well, there's a war going on and you see if you -." One of the private secretaries to the foreign minister was a classmate of mine from Oxford, Murray MacLehose, was an expert on China and Hong Kong. Fortunately he didn't mind my bothering him at midnight. And he said, "Don't your people realize that it's midnight? The prime minister will make a statement the first thing tomorrow morning." Which is an example of the intimacy of the relationship.

Q: Did you get any feel about the relationship between Wilson and LBJ?

KAISER: Not very good. Wilson wanted desperately to develop an intimate relationship with LBJ. They just didn't mix. He never came to London. LBJ never did. After there'd been something that had led to a deterioration is too strong a word, led to a cooling off, I don't remember what the incident was, in the relationship between LBJ and Wilson, and the provocateur was really LBJ, and he came to realize it. So, to make up for it, he invited Wilson to visit Washington and gave him a big dinner, I don't think it was at the White House, and made a speech that I became aware of at 12:00 at night. It just so happened we were up that night sitting in the second floor reading or something when the phone rang, my phone. to be used only on official calls. It was my old classmate Ted Heath, the leader of the opposition, full of anger. He was leader of the opposition then. He said, "Phil, I'm going to blast your president tomorrow morning." I said, "Ted, what are you talking about?" He said, "I just learned that he made a speech at the dinner he gave to Wilson so praising that he compared Wilson favorably with Winston Churchill. That's a little too much." I said, "Look, Ted, hold your guns, let's get the text of the speech and then we'll go from there." I tried to get Rusk, I couldn't get him, so I got George Ball.

Q: The Undersecretary at the time.

KAISER: I told him what was going on. He said, "Stop them from blasting him." I said, "Look, we'll do the best we can, but send the text of the speech." The following morning the text came; it wasn't quite as bad, but [laughs] it was pretty bad. I had to send it to Heath. When he read it he called me up and he said, "See what I mean?" I said, "Look, Ted, let me talk to you as an old friend, unofficially just on an old friend basis. You're probably going to be prime minister while LBJ is president. Compared to LBJ, elephants suffer from amnesia. When Alec Hume was prime

minister he visited Washington and we were having a disagreement, you were exporting buses or trucks to Cuba and we objected, but you continued to do so. While he was in the White House after he had visited LBJ. he was talking to the press Alec Hume criticized us, the U.S. for its narrow attitude. LBJ never again communicated with Alec Hume. If you criticize him, you will never be able to develop a relationship.” The next morning, the Sunday press, this was Saturday night, said some leaders of the Tory party were unhappy with some of the things LBJ said in his speech. There was no personal attack. It was a wonderful example of where a personal friendship paid off.

Q: Also, people directly under leaders. or potential leaders. can cut out some of the stuff that can later, smooth things over because much of this the problem can be because of pique and has nothing to do with substance.

KAISER: MacLehose reminds me of another time. We used each other’s experts. There was nobody in our government, and we appreciated it, that was a expert on China and Hong Kong than Murray. He later became governor of Hong Kong. He was a dour Scotsman. I was the only guy who had a rapport with him, because we were classmates at Oxford. I would from time to time get a cable from Washington, this was an example, saying, “Would you get MacLehose’s view on A, B, C, D?” This is what you call a special relationship. It wasn’t only MacLehose, but that was a dramatic example.

He did not come. LBJ wanted to come to Churchill’s funeral but, you remember, he had an emergency operation and he didn’t send - SOB - he didn’t send Hubert Humphrey, he sent Chief Justice Earl Warren. Everybody in England wanted to know, “Who is Earl Warren?” Humphrey was very popular with the labor government. Very popular.

Q: Eisenhower went, but he went on his own.

KAISER: I don’t think Eisenhower ever visited. He came for the funeral.

Q: You were saying something about Dean Rusk and LBJ about coming from modest homes?

KAISER: On one of those Dean Rusk visits to London, this is typical David Bruce, knowing about my relationship he’d send me out because he knew that Rusk would appreciate it instead of going himself to meet Rusk. He had a little cold, too. Rusk’s first question was, “When was the last time you’ve been to visit at Oxford?” Fortunately I had been invited to dinner at All Souls, and he began to reminisce about his days at Oxford. He went to Davidson College. He said, “I’ve had a continuing argument with the president about who came from a more modest background.” So very smartly I said, “Well, this is how to settle it. Visit where you were born, and visit where he was born.” He said, “Impractical advice, Phil; the cottage in which I was born has long since been torn down.” Interesting that he should tell me about the fact.

Q: They kept him on which was sort of surprising during the Vietnam War. Did you and David Bruce have concerns about the Vietnam War?

KAISER: Oh, yeah.

Q: You're throwing your eyes up in the air.

KAISER: The American government sent a special envoy to England to tell the British government that we were about to expand our military activity in Vietnam dramatically.

Q: Around '64 or '65.

KAISER: Who was this guy from the CIA? He was in the State Department, too. I can't remember his name. It will come to me. He brought with him a chart in which he had outlined in red the parts of the country which were in the hands of the enemy. And he produced that chart, when Bruce and I went over to the foreign office to make the presentation to the foreign secretary and my friend Dennis Healey, the minister of defense, my classmate. They did a pretty good job. When he left, Bruce and I almost said simultaneously to each other, "Did you notice how much red there was on that map?" Large chunks. Then we had a visit of somebody who had been deputy, had a top role in Vietnam, and was assigned to Algeria or Morocco, I can't remember his name, a Foreign Service guy.

Q: It wasn't Henry Task?

KAISER: It was a good Anglo-Saxon name. En route he stopped off in London and briefed us. He tried to convey the impression that things were improving, but unbelievably, I guess, he threw out the phrase, "It's become unsafe to walk at night in certain areas, but we think we're controlling it in Vietnam." I remember.

Wilson was very loyal to LBJ on Vietnam at some political expense to him. Because if you took a vote in the Labor Party, a majority would be opposed to our policy. On one occasion, this is the immodest Phil Kaiser, when Kosygin, was visiting London and Wilson told Washington to use that occasion to see what he could do about Vietnam. We gave him some statement on what our position, what we would be prepared to negotiate an agreement with Saigon, what our position was. We changed it in the middle of Kosygin's visit. It was a friendly visit. He stayed for about 10 days. We changed our position in the middle of the week; we made it tougher. The British told us - they were tapping his phone at Claridges Hotel - at one stage he said, "The American proposal has some merit to it, pass it on to Saigon." Well, the fact of the matter is that Kosygin knew that he was being tapped. So the value of the tap - people forget that - is thereby diminished.

Q: It can be used for your own purposes. I was in Yugoslavia for five years and we used to play this game, get messages out.

KAISER: I always thought when you go to these countries you should be briefed on how to use a phone that you know is being tapped.

Well, the negotiation ended without a conclusion to the frustration of all. This was something Bruce handled all himself. It was very interesting. He got an account at the end of every day and then he would send a long cable. The only one who saw the cable was myself. He headed off on

a holiday after the official. Kosygin stayed on for a while. We had this crisis about Kosygin. It was during the Tet truce, we weren't bombing and we were going to resume bombing while he was still in London. So, with all due immodesty, I went to Bruce. I said, "Look, this is ridiculous. This guy has negated in good faith, he's going back Monday, why can't they resume bombing on Tuesday?" We had trouble; we had bombed Hanoi when he was in Hanoi. We went to work on that, that's another story. We called up people, I called a few and he called a few, I said, "Why don't you send one of your cables attention to the president," and he did, and that did the trick. That's the whole story, or part of the story.

We finally agreed not to bomb after his cable went out. We felt pretty good about that. He went off on a holiday and Kosygin left. He landed in Moscow at noon and bombing was resumed at 2:00 in the afternoon. Wilson made a statement about the visit and it was a very decent statement, very fair. Washington didn't like the statement. I got a blistering telegram, drafted no doubt by my old contemporary Walt Rostow. We had adjoining rooms in Oxford. "Go in, tell the prime minister, blah, blah, that he shouldn't have made the statement, so on and so forth." I said, "Phooey," I just decided not to do anything about it. Fortunately (laughs) he left the following day for a trip to Germany so I had an excuse. I had no intention.

Q: Yes, well, this is a problem sometimes we have in foreign policy if people, one or two steps down, want to get tough and show, let's put it diplomatically, they've got balls. It doesn't help. Diplomats are there to take care of these matters.

KAISER: I was chargé. I got a cable from Washington saying that Ne Win, the top man in Burma, was in London. During the old imperial days. They used to go to London to get a physical checkup and have a holiday. We and Peking, the Chinese, were wooing assiduously, vigorously, Burma. I get this cable, which says the following: "Ne Win is now in London. Seek him out and tell him his mortal enemy who has threatened to kill him has succeeded in emigrating to Washington, to the United States." In spite of general instructions we all got to the contrary not to give him a visa, the embassy in Paris did. "Go seek out Ne Win." That's the instruction to me. "Tell him that his mortal enemy by mistake has reached the United States, but tell him," - he'd been invited, he was on his way to Washington, "tell him we're going to find him and isolate him and there will be no threat to him. But also explain to him that under American law we can't immediately deport him."

So, I call up the ambassador and I take along our expert, he later became ambassador to Burma. I tell the story and the ambassador says, "Oh, come on, you don't expect us to believe that Paris did this by mistake, do you?" The prime minister says, "Anything can happen in Paris." Just like that. He turns to me and he says, "How would you like some Burmese tea?" I said, "I'd love some." He gives me a dissertation on the medicinal values of Burmese tea. Everything is hunky dory, and he says he'd be glad to accept the invitation. I said, "Tell him that I look forward to seeing him and explain to him that the president is going to give a dinner for him and he needs to wear formal clothes." I passed this on, and the ambassador comes back to me and he says, "The prime minister will not wear formal clothes. He will wear his regular clothes when he comes to Washington." I went back to Washington, I didn't mess around, I said in my cable, "You have a choice to make: you can't have him in formal clothes, but you can have him in whatever he

wants to wear.” Period. So, they said “Okay, let him come.” There was no formal dinner. There was a stag dinner, a dozen people and LBJ loved it, loved the stag dinner. I decided not -

Q: Some battles are just not worth fighting.

KAISER: It was the responsibility of people on the spot to have the courage to do that.

Q: Today is the 26th of August, 2005. The Humphrey visit: what would you like to talk about there?

KAISER: The Humphrey visit was long overdue.

Q: He was vice president at that point.

KAISER: He was vice president. I don’t know whether I mentioned earlier that at the Winston Churchill, LBJ wanted to come, see, but he had that emergency operation. It was right after his inauguration. In that mean-spirited way of his, he didn’t send Hubert who was Vice President, the logical guy to go was Hubert. But he didn’t want Hubert to get all that play and he may also have been aware of the fact that Hubert was very popular with the British government. Because it was a Labor government and the Labor people were great admirers of Hubert. So, for all those good reasons (laughs) he didn’t send Hubert. Instead, Stu, I don’t know whether you know this, but it apparently turned out that protocol-wise the vice president is not number two in Washington. The chief justice of the United States Supreme Court. He sent the former governor of California, Earl Warren, and when that was announced the British people said to me, “Who is Earl Warren?” All my friends and people kept saying, “Who is Earl Warren?” This is now several years later, Hubert finally comes as vice president.

I must be very frank with you, we were very old friends, and he was coming into very favorable territory. But he was very strung up, very tense, nervous and so on, until we got to one of the main events of the visit. He was going to be in the House of Commons during the famous question period when the prime minister has to spend an hour answering provocative questions from different members. After an hour of that, we adjourned to the biggest conference room in the House of Commons where Hubert spoke to the members of parliament. It was chaired by the lord chancellor which was protocol-wise the appropriate person because the lord chancellor was the chairman of the House of Lords, just like the vice president is chairman of the United States Senate. It’s a five-minute walk from the actual house where they meet to the committee room. Hubert says to me, I’m walking with him, he says, “Phil, what should I tell these people?” I said, “You mean you don’t have a prepared speech?” He said, “No, I have no prepared speech.” So I said, “Why don’t you tell him what the Johnson-Humphrey administration has done domestically for the American people. They don’t know about this. The only thing they know about is Vietnam.” He says, “Well that’s a pretty good idea.” He gets up and gives a perfect, unbelievably perfect, speech without a second’s hesitation. Superbly delivered and articulated. And, not too long.

Q: He was renowned for running off at the mouth.

KAISER: His wife was reported to have said to him, it's very famous, "Hubert, for a speech to be immortal, it doesn't have to be eternal." Then came the question period. He was superb, very very good. He was very bright.

Q: One of the brightest stars around.

KAISER: We then come to the last question, the chairman says, one more question. There's still other people, so in typical Hubert fashion he says, "Well, I'll answer an additional question." The next character gets up is a little left wing son of a gun, and I knew we were in for a little rough ride. He raises the question of Vietnam. And Hubert mistakenly, my fault, I hadn't briefed him about it, compares the situation to Munich, and he's barracked by the audience. The idea of comparing Vietnam. Fortunately it didn't really spoil the total impact of the speech. And I must confess, Tony Lewis who at that time was the New York Times bureau chief in London -

Q: Anthony Lewis, yes.

KAISER: - called me up about it and I told him about the big success. I didn't mention the other thing, which shows you how everything that's in the newspaper, the New York Times covers everything that happens. I didn't tell him about Hubert being barracked, I sort of protected him. Well, the meetings all together went very well and the last meeting was in 10 Downing Street. We saw the prime minister, but this was sort of the wrap up meeting with the prime minister and there were six of us. There was the prime minister, the foreign minister and Dennis Healey, the defense minister, and there was Hubert, David Bruce and myself. It was lunch at 10 Downing Street. Business had been covered quite adequately in the preceding two months, so this became a kind of a social gathering. We gossiped and so on, and at one point the question of corruption in government came up. We were comparing corruption between England, between local government in both countries, and I come up forgetting for the moment that Wilson the prime minister was a Liverpudlian, somebody who comes from Liverpool. I said that Dennis Brogan, who was the great American historian and was a good friend, I tell him how when I was a student at our little meeting with Dennis some English student had just returned from a visit to America. He wanted to impress Brogan by all the things he saw. His impressions were very favorable except, for the local corruption in a fair number of cities in America. So, Dennis said, "If you want to see what urban corruption is really like, let me take you to Glasgow or Liverpool some weekend." Wilson, who was a very nice guy, said, "Well, you know, Dennis was right." So we got to comparing corruption between Minneapolis and Liverpool. A little game between Humphrey and Wilson. Interestingly I remember the two main stories of quintessential corruption in Minneapolis when he became mayor. The police department was completely corrupt. That was one of the issues in his campaign. He said, "I called up Hoover and I said -

Q: The head of the FBI.

KAISER: - I said Mr. Hoover, I've just been elected mayor. As you know my police department is corrupt. Would you do me a favor of telling me which officers in that department are honorable and moral so I can pick from them a new chief of police. Hoover said, 'Let me have a day or two.' Two days later he called back and he said to me, 'Mr. Mayor, O'Reilly in your police department is the only one that's not corrupt.'" This was Hubert's story. Wilson's story:

during the war in 1941 when everything from a toothpick, everything was presumably being converted to arms for the battle for war. He recalled some guy not only getting his certificate to build a new public house, but also having no trouble getting the material to build it in 1941. They loved him. The Labor people loved him. And I suppose, I don't know, I should tell you this story. I walked with him, to the plane when he left and I said to him, "Hubert, you did a great job and everybody was pleased, and heard comments from your Labor friends, from Wilson," and so on and so forth. He said, "Well, I'm very grateful, but will you tell the ambassador that I would appreciate it very much if he would tell the president what you just told me?" Pretty sad.

Q: It really is.

KAISER: He treated him terribly, and I'll tell you a story, too about that. I did, I went to Bruce and Bruce said, "I've already taken care of that." I'm sure it was true. That's the kind of guy Bruce was. A kind of a postscript. That night I was invited to dinner in the House of Commons by a Labor MP, a friend of mine. I don't remember who it was, it could have been Heath, one of my friends anyhow, and on the way in I ran into one of Wilson's cabinet members, I can't remember the name, a very nice guy and he stopped me very warmly. He was of course present at some of these events with Hubert and we got to talking about nice guys. So, I said, "Let me tell you a Humphrey nice guy story."

I told him the story of my going up to the Hill and having lunch with Humphrey when he was a senator in the height of the McCarthy period. As we're walking into the senate dining room McCarthy walks out. They almost fall on each other's shoulders. "Hello, Hubert, Hello, Joe" like two lost brothers meeting each other after a long absence. I give Hubert a dirty look and he says quick as a flash, "Phil, the sons of bitches you have to be nice to when you go belong to this club." At that moment Ian Paisley walked by (laughs) and he my host greeted each other very warmly. So, he says to me, "You see Phil, that's the way it is in the House of Commons, too. Just like in the United States Senate." Well, I think I can tell you another sad story. I saw Hubert after he retired from office and was in London. I was talking about Lyndon and I said to him, "Hubert, when you and Johnson were in the senate did you call yourselves by first name?" "Oh, of course," he said, "I called him Lyndon and he called me Hubert, of course." I said, "When you were vice president and he was president, did you call him Lyndon?" He said, "Are you out of your mind Phil? I called him Mr. President." Kind of sad.

Q: Well, a fine man.

KAISER: I told you he wrote me a letter the day before he died. Apologizing for two reasons and he listed two reasons. He asked me to do him a favor and I did it, and interestingly enough, "I never congratulated you for the job you did in getting the crown returned to the Hungarians." This was written the day before he died.

Q: Oh my God. Well, what was your impression particularly of the British French relationship while you were in London?

KAISER: Well, Wilson decided to apply for membership in the EU.

Q: It was then I guess the European Community.

KAISER: As part of his idea how of to stimulate the British economy. De Gaulle turned him down, vetoed him. I saw Wilson the day after, for some reason I was over there, and he was trying hard to, he had the official turndown and he extracted one or two sentences from it to suggest that the situation was not hopeless. He was just deluding himself. There was no great feeling between De Gaulle and Wilson. The relationship was, I wouldn't say cool, but it wasn't warm, it was proper. It was a proper relationship and the turndown, rejection, did not enhance the relationship. Heath had tried to negotiate to join the European Community when he was a minister in Macmillan's government, and he was turned down, just absolutely turned down. And, my friend Ted Heath, very complicated, some very good obits about him, I visited on R&R London just at that time and I was in the embassy staff meeting with Bruce the day after he returned from the failed negotiation. He was back in London, Heath was, and everybody wanted to see him, including Bruce, to get the story of what had happened.

While I was in that meeting, Bruce's secretary came in and said, "Ambassador Kaiser, Mr. Heath just called and asked if you could come over and have tea with him in his offices." I didn't show my feelings openly, I don't think my feelings of gratitude at that particular moment, but it obviously made an enormous impression. He was not a particularly warm person, Heath, interestingly, but we were friends and always had been friends. I had pretty good relations with the French ambassador and his minister. The deputy foreign minister, a very close friend, after going to a meeting in Paris of the Western European Union or whatever it was called, came back. We had lunch and at the time there was some book about the assassination of Kennedy. He said, "I had lunch with my French colleague," my British friend said to me, "and he said to me, 'Isn't it extraordinary how Johnson organized the assassination of Kennedy so he could become president?' So, I said to this fellow, 'You don't believe this do you?' " He said, "Well, the result of my being skeptical about this was his feeling that I was an innocent, that I didn't know how things happened in the real world." Oh, he also told me - I held back for 24 hours on a really very important piece of information - that de Gaulle was going to stand with the Ibos in the civil war in Nigeria. I thought this was absolutely incredible, but it turned out to be true.

Q: They were sending in supplies in from Dakar.

KAISER: I reported in the cable, I said, "Thompson told me that."

Q: You know, in a way its forgotten, but de Gaulle was almost playing the part of Omar Qadhafi in stirring up trouble.

KAISER: Remember, he came to Montreal?

Q: Oh, yes, "viva Quebec libre."

KAISER: He was a mixed bag. He was very important during the war and after. He did some great things in the community and his rapprochement with Germany and Adenauer was extraordinary.

Q: I mean it was basically laying the foundation on which essentially our foreign policy rested and has rested until practically this president.

KAISER: Until this administration.

Q: Yes.

KAISER: Did you read Gary Hart's piece yesterday?

Q: No, I didn't.

KAISER: Oh, you ought to read it. Is it yesterday's or the day before, it's the lead column. Be sure you read it. Particularly in light of what you just said.

Q: Well, let's talk a bit about the '67 War between Israel, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. You were there at the time.

KAISER: I'm trying to remember, was Heath prime minister then? I think so.

Q: The Suez Canal was blocked in the '67 War and that caused a lot of consternation and problems.

KAISER: Wilson was quite friendly to Israel. In fact he had a son who spent six months there as a student. What I remember in particular, Stu, were the cables that were being sent from our embassies in the Arab countries and from what's Wally Barber in Israel. A very strange character who was there as long as Sam Lewis.

Q: These were two men who pretty well covered the period.

KAISER: Truth compels me to tell the story, I think I've told you the wonderful quote of Aristotle the first time he criticized Plato. I can almost tell it in Greek. He said, "I hesitate to criticize my master. But one must honor the truth." Our ambassadors in the Arab countries almost all predicted there was going to be a disaster for Israel as an analysis. Wally Barber sent a cable to Washington. I think it was one paragraph, two at the most, sort of no nonsense, "The Israelis are going to win this war handsomely." That was the substance of his message. There was a lot of activity. We reported on what the British were doing or not doing.

Other than that, there was of course a lot of great curiosity, great anxiety, but the general feeling was that the Israelis would get an awful licking. They never cashed in. The real tragedy, the number one tragedy in the Middle East; the Israel Palestine thing in my view, is that they never cashed in on that victory. They didn't follow the advice of Ben Gurion who was in retirement who said give back the land for peace. The story was, the little king wanted to negotiate immediately and the Israeli government, who was the prime minister, was it Golda? I don't think it was Golda, and the Israelis said we're not interested. We want word from Egypt from Nasser not from Hussein.

Q: King Hussein of Jordan.

KAISER: There was no Palestine and there was no West Bank which was part of Jordan and that could easily have become, they could have handled it in such a way that the PLO would never have arisen.

HARRIET CURRY
Secretary to the Deputy Chief of Mission, Philip Kaiser
London (1964-1969)

Ms. Curry was born in Annapolis, Maryland, daughter of a Marine Corp family. She was raised at military posts throughout the United States. She was educated at The George Washington University, after which she worked with a number of non-governmental organizations. After joining the State Department she served as Secretary and Assistant to United States Ambassadors in Brazil, Senegal, Israel, Jamaica, Ireland, Hungary, Austria, Syria and Pakistan. She also had several assignments in Washington. Ms. Curry was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: You were in London from when to when?

CURRY: From 1964 to 1969. Eleanor and I left at about the same time.

Q: How did Phil Kaiser work in the embassy? I would have thought there would have been a problem with a possible leak because he had so many connections, particularly as a Rhodes Scholar. This can make for a difficult relationship with ambassadors.

CURRY: I think because the relationship with the ambassador was a good relationship. I'm going to tell you something that always amazed me. They had offices connected by a bathroom used by both Ambassador Bruce and Ambassador Kaiser. It was always a polite thing. They knocked on the door, but Ambassador Annenberg had that door locked so he alone used it. I thought this was an example of how things might have changed.

Q: What sort of things were you doing for Phil Kaiser?

CURRY: He did reporting of meetings. It was interesting work, the dictation.

Q: How did you find life for yourself in London?

CURRY: I loved it, I really did. I thought it was fine. I had Ruth Merrell who was sharing an office with me for a couple of years, and Eleanor.

Q: What was her title?

CURRY: She was a protocol adviser, sort of, how to seat people and all that. Not just that, but sending out invitations. I had horrible handwriting. She took over writing invitations. Ruth and Eleanor were very good to me as far as things to do, and fun to have. I had a life of my own, but I also had a good time with them.

Q: Did Phil Kaiser get around much in England?

CURRY: I think he did, but not as much as I did, possible. He was invited out for weekends, and I know he went to Ireland. He had friends there. I would go off on my own quite often.

Q: What sort of things occupied you when you had some free time?

CURRY: I would go to the theater as much as I could. I took in a lot of theater. For example, I would drive to Stratford and see three plays in a weekend, an evening performance, and the next day a matinee and another evening performance. I would go alone or with Eleanor and, or other friends.

MICHAEL PISTOR
Student Affairs Officer, USIS
London (1964-1969)

Mr. Pistor was born in Oregon and raised in Arizona. After graduating from the University of Arizona and serving with the US Army, in 1959 he joined the United States Information Agency. He served as Public Affairs Officer in Teheran, Kampala, Douala, London and New Delhi. He also held senior positions at USIA headquarters in Washington before being appointed Ambassador to Malawi in 1991. Ambassador Pistor was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: So you went to London when?

PISTOR: I went to London in 1964.

Q: And you were there until when?

PISTOR: Well, this is kind of a secret. It used to have to be a secret because people would kill me. I got there in 1964 and I left in 1969. Then I went back in 1973 and lasted until 1977.

Q: Well, let's talk about the five years you were first there.

PISTOR: It was a wonderful job.

Q: What was your job?

PISTOR: It was called Student Affairs Officer, with an office in USIS separate from the regular USIS program in the U.K. The program was directed at African, Asian and Middle Eastern students getting their degrees and further education courses in the UK, at universities and institutions there. It meant that my first contacts were with the National Union of Students and with the student unions of the universities and with the student organizations of African and South Asian, Middle Eastern and a few Latin American organizations, some of them very radical, as you can imagine. Many of them were affiliated with African political parties and rival independence movements, like ZAPU and ZANU in Rhodesia. There was a place in London called Africa Unity House, funded by the Russians and the Egyptians and run by the Ghanaians and the Egyptians, where every (figurative) bomb-throwing, government upending, freedom fighting foreign -student organization in London had a telephone and a desk. So it was pretty interesting stuff, adding the fact that both Vietnam and U.S. race relations were on the boil. Plenty to talk about, if anybody wanted to listen.

It turned out that we were able to develop some relationships over the five years I was in the job that proved useful and even instructive for a number of the students, teachers, journalists and British politicians, with whom we worked. Not only did we have the Vietnam War going on, which made things difficult and dicey in some ways, especially with the student population, but we had a civil rights revolution going on in the United States, an almost gleeful radicalism burgeoning on our campuses, and challenges to traditional authority busting out all over, so my little office was able to do a lot of facilitating. We arranged seminars and speakers, and developed visitor programs for student leaders from the developing world studying in Britain, sending them to the U.S. to see for themselves what was going on.

I had a big break when I first got to London, because we arrived in September and in November I learned that Martin Luther King, who was on his way to Stockholm to accept his Nobel Prize, had been invited by the Dean of St. Paul's to read the lesson or give a sermon in the Cathedral, which no foreigner had ever done. So I called USIA and said, "If Dr. King is coming here, is there any chance of our getting him to meet African students?" They said, "Well, we can't do anything about it. Why don't you call the Southern Christian Leadership people down in Atlanta?" They gave me permission to jump over the government, and we got an agreement from Dr. King and his people. He had a very tight schedule. He was going to stay at the Hilton, and he wouldn't have any time except the morning after his arrival, and any meeting would have to be in the hotel. So I hired the ballroom of the Hilton and got a lot of little gold chairs and went through the National Union of Students and the African Student Union and got the president and the secretary of every African student organization in Britain that I could find, a couple of hundred people. They packed the room for Dr. King to come in and see them.

Dr. King's organization was not tightly run, and it was hard to find a way to get him down to the ballroom. His traveling companions were up in a room, in a suite, trying to phone back to Atlanta for something and he was tied up, but I was up there in the corridor trying to see when he would come down to see my restive 200 people. There was Dr. King, there was Dr. King's father, there was Mrs. King, there was a whole host of people, and there was one young guy who said to me, "I know you've got a problem, so I'll come down and I'll warm up the crowd a little bit." I said, "Thank you very much." He walked downstairs, went to the ballroom. We had a table set up for Dr. King to sit behind. This man came and sat on the front of the table and talked a little bit

about the history of Dr. King and the movement, and he was absolutely superb. I've never heard anybody better than this young man was, just so relaxed and talking confidentially to these people. Then Dr. King came in and gave kind of a version of "I Had a Dream," a wonderful rip-roaring thing but very different from the informal approach of the "crowd warmer," who, it turns out, was Andrew Young. He gave a marvelous start my tour as Student Affairs Officer, and I've never forgotten it.

I also had the chance to see Malcolm X before he died. He had made a trip to the Near East and he had been particularly struck by what he had seen in Egypt, with the erasure of the black-white divide, which shook his "white devil" approach to race, and it was said that was changing his mind a little about how to wage the struggle in America.

Q: Yes, he was going through sort of a metamorphosis.

PISTOR: I had a very good friend, a South African student leader, who thought he could never go back to South Africa. He said, "Would you like to meet Malcolm X?" I said, "Sure, but I'm not certain Malcolm X would want to meet me." He said, "Oh, no, it's going to be fine. Come on. I'll meet you in the pub across the street from this house," kind of a nationalist Africa organization house, and he said, "I'll meet you there and then we'll go over across the street." I said, "Fine," so I met him and he'd been drinking. So we walked across the street and went in and Malcolm X was there and I've never had a more glacial greeting, because he sized it up right away. Here was this white guy from the American embassy and his African friend he's obviously gotten drunk. But still you don't get a chance to meet Malcolm X, whatever the circumstance, on or off his own turf.

That's the kind of job student affairs was at the beginning. As I said, it got better because we got more and more people involved. The King-Young '64 beginning was bracketed at the end in '69 by a Nixon-Kissinger visit. Just as he came into office, President Nixon made a trip to eight countries in Europe and he had with him Dr. Kissinger and some others, Kissinger being the one who was really important. They came to the embassy. The telegrams in advance had wanted kind of a "one of each" meeting: a conservative politician, a labor politician, a business man, a labor leader, a youth leader, and a leader from the ethnic minority groups in Britain. Well, my office had the youth and the minority, and we had good contacts on the labor side, so I was able to get into this group three people of my acquaintance who got to talk with incoming President Nixon and the as yet not terribly well known Henry Kissinger. That was just before I finished my tour.

Q: What was your impression of how the British educational system was dealing with both foreign and domestic minorities, particularly the blacks?

PISTOR: At the university level they were doing very well. Education was free -- I can't remember; you didn't have to be there very long before you could get a council grant to go to a university or a college -- so a great number of African and American and other foreign students were able to take advantage of this, and they brought with them the money from the council grants for the educational institutions, and they were pretty well integrated. There was a large student Left in Britain, and so the minority students were largely welcome. There were lots who didn't think one way or another politically, and they were comfortable there, too.

But at the level below that, very often in Britain class trumps race. The things we noted very much, not so much in the student population but in the population at large, was the absolute denial that there was any race problem at all. "You have problems; we don't." And, of course, they had terrible problems festering. Happily, there were some, young politicians particularly, who knew and were quite interested and concerned about how we were facing the problems, our mistakes and some of our successes. So it was a real two-way highway.

Q: How did our Civil Rights Movement, including the assassination of Dr. King and other things, play while you were there. Were you spending an awful lot of time explaining...?

PISTOR: Yes, an awful lot of time, very often explaining to deaf ears too. It was more a British problem than it was an African student problem. It was just agony. Neither Johnson nor Nixon traveled well; that is to say, their personas on television and elsewhere just didn't work in Britain, especially Johnson. He couldn't get a break. The only time we were ever successful marketing, if you can say it, Johnson was just to remind them that he was as tough as he said he was. But the Nixon thing didn't happen until my second time in England.

Q: Well, we won't touch that.

PISTOR: You know, Dr. King's assassin was apprehended in London when he escaped, and I think the British in an odd sense we shared the shock of murder with the British. It was an awful thing for everybody. I had African students and especially South Asian students to whom I talked, who instantly believed the conspiracy theories all set up for King and then, of course, for Robert Kennedy. It was a very difficult time for us, and nobody believed anything we said about these assassinations. At the same time the war in Vietnam was heating up. There were all kinds of things going on in the Anglo-American relationship, with plenty to talk about, including the cultural programs that we did. When I had the student-exchange programs, we sent as many as 45 African students a year to the United States on three-week tours of the United States.

Q: I thought this might be a good place to stop. Before we leave your time in London, which was '64 to '69, we'll talk about the cultural program and also - I'm putting this at the end so we'll pick it up - whether you got entangled in defending the Vietnam War and all that sort of stuff.

PISTOR: I can talk about that. I did, and it was very uncomfortable, because you didn't want that to swallow up the rest of the dialogue we were pursuing—civil rights, for example. I tried to use surrogates to help handle the Vietnam defense, such as it was.

Q: Okay, we'll talk about that.

PISTOR: I'd get State Department and USIA officers who had served in our Saigon Embassy to talk to the student and faculty groups who requested speakers from the Embassy, but who really wanted only a whipping boy. In order to remain credible on other subjects, I tried to stay out of the Vietnam line of fire myself, with only partial success.

Q: Are there any other major things we might talk about on this London thing before we move on?

PISTOR: I'll think about it a little bit.

Q: Also, how did you find dealing with sort of the standard Brits, too, whether this was a problem or not.

PISTOR: They were kind of special Brits really. They were people concerned about African independence movements, and others who were supporters of our efforts in civil rights. Some were senior politicians, generally labor and leftist Tory politicians (if there was such a thing, and there was), and also our Foreign Office contacts. They're very close to being, not a brotherhood exactly, but you know, there are a lot of connections around in the British elites. Some of them are family, some are institutional, some of them are school. So you never know exactly what the relationships are between public and private, and who has nominal power, and who has the real thing. You could call our student-affairs partnerships cozy, friendly and rewarding. On the British side, there was almost always reserve behind the charm. .

Q: Okay. So we'll pick this up the next time. We'll talk about the London time cultural program and how you dealt with Vietnam from that point of view, and then we'll move on.

This is June 2001. You were saying there were two major subjects.

PISTOR: Two major subjects for these youth programs— some of the youths were not all that youthful, as with most programs of this kind. As I have said, there were MP's, other politicians, journalists, British and American students, teachers at universities and elsewhere who participated in these programs as well as the students from other countries, particularly from Africa. We got money for the program from USIA's geographic offices. The two subjects, as I said, were Vietnam, which increased in intensity- - it started in '64 when we arrived, and by the time we left London in '69 it was a raging fire. British universities were modeling themselves on ours, with teach-ins, protest marches and building occupations. No chance whatever for rational discourse.

But our other subject, which went extremely well with even the most radical student groups, was the civil rights revolution going on in the United States at the time. There were lots of successes our target audiences didn't know about, and lots of lessons to be learned from things we were doing wrong, as well as lots of things we were doing right. We were lucky enough to have the right people travel to the UK to talk about the issue. You found some curious anomalies like when Roy Wilkins, real civil rights leader, was jeered at the London School of Economics by white Americans students , who were avoiding service in Vietnam in a sense and were so righteous in their indignation and their condemnation of the United States that they would take on a genuine civil rights hero. There were some absurdities, but mostly the lessons were interesting. The young leaders I started to talk about, the African students whom we sent to the United States on 45-day visits, found that nothing they wanted to learn about was denied them.

They could go to a Black Panther house in Chicago. They could go just about anywhere that they wanted to go. We had one student who came back, one group of four, said their escort was white and they were invited to a kind of black nationalist house in Chicago, got to the door, and a guy came to the door and said, "You can't come in," to the white guy, and the students said, "If he doesn't come in, we don't go in." There was then a conference and he went in. So they had real experiences in the United States.

Q: The American civil rights problem, I would think, would be considerably different from that concerned with African students. They're trying to build up an infrastructure and all this. Did they seem to relate to this, or was this just sort of an interesting, peculiar manifestation of the United States?

PISTOR: I think they related to the revolutionary aspects, the excitement of it and, just as British students or any students reading about the United States, were tempted to either dismiss or to decry what the United States was doing, not believing that there had been serious legislation, serious attempts, and these African students picked that up right away and did it very well. Also, they confronted, by virtue of the color of their skins, some of the questions that they had been thinking about. One group was stopped as they were walking down the street in San Francisco and slammed up against the police car and frisked. When the policeman discovered that they were students from Africa, he was very apologetic, but obviously because they were four black young men walking together, this guy jumped them almost automatically. An Indian friend of mine was interested in police matters, and in Chicago in 1968 at the time of the Democratic Convention, he spent the morning with those in the Police Department concerned with minorities and minority rights, and then in the afternoon he was hit over the head by a policeman whose badge had tape over it so he wouldn't see the number. There were excitements, there were lessons. A major lesson learned, and one that we taught extremely well, was the openness (and the risk taking) with which we put together these 45-day trips across the US. We made it clear that we didn't guide people to only the "nicer" places.. We didn't push them into the bad places, but we were open and we followed their suggestions as well as we could. It made an enormous positive impression on these students and on the people they talked to.

Q: Were these coming back through Great Britain and staying in Great Britain for a while or...?

PISTOR: Indeed they were. We chose them from British universities, and we chose them partly through their own student organizations, partly through their professors and their colleges. These were top-flight students. The ones we interviewed and then selected were people who were doing postgraduate work often or degrees at British universities, students with excellent records and political savvy as well.

Q: Did you get any feel for what happened when they came back to the universities? Were they saying, you know, "The TV and the newspapers - I've been on the ground and I've seen what they're trying to do," or did you get much feedback?

PISTOR: I got feedback about the second time I talked to them after their return, and that would be when we were in a pub at the university or something and people were starting to tell the stories. Rather than tell what lessons had been learned, they told the stories or described the

personalities they had met. I got the feeling that it had been-- I wouldn't say life changing-- but certainly idea changing and eye opening for these people, and I think they did spread word of their experiences and their more informed view of the US when they returned to their universities. The question was would they retain the same positive views when they got home, and were there lessons learned for Ghanaians returning to Ghana, Nigerians returned to Nigeria, and so forth. There we got some evidence from people we had seen later, but not a lot.

Q: Of course, too, these are seeds that are planted that may not bud for years.

PISTOR: That's right, and just the fact of having an experience in your youth that exciting and that interesting is bound to affect something in your attitudes. The other influences I think we had, because of American openness and the interest of American professionals with whom we worked - I'm talking about Congressmen and staff people, members of the government of Lyndon Johnson's administration, journalists, American experts traveling abroad. They were all so open and all so concerned and interested in all these problems that those we could tap for dinner discussions, three-day seminars, however you get people together, had a real effect on significant numbers of influential young Britons.

As I think I said earlier in this tape, when we had Martin Luther King address the African students on our dollar, he then kept that ballroom for another meeting, which launched the Council Against Racial Discrimination in Britain, which became the UK's largest race relations organization. I had some quite good friends who came to the United States on grants at one time or another. They drafted the first civil rights legislation in Britain, and I think our program helped stimulate and helped guide what they were doing

Q: Did you get any feeling that there were those in the British government or press or something who felt that we were creating a bunch of agitators who were going to come and stir things up?

PISTOR: There were always those. But the government officials with whom we worked were happy with what we were doing and cooperated with us in several projects. What we were doing was open, and there were people, of course, who objected to what they saw. I found a few of them on university faculties, but not in the Foreign Office or the British Council. These people objected to so much about the United States anyway, that it didn't make a hell of a lot of difference; it was just another harrumph. I don't want to dismiss this disapproval, but it wasn't serious and it didn't build up in things like the Daily Mail or anything.

The only time we got real publicity was in a publication called The Black Dwarf, edited by an all-round radical, Tariq Ali, who's still on stage in Britain as an international radical; and he gave us the compliment of saying that we were able to bring Nigerians together who were at each other's throats in the Biafra War. Of course he thought we were CIA, and you just had to accept in the beginning that people would say that, and then be as open as possible to show that it isn't so.

Q: Did you ever, while you were doing this, tap into and monitor what was going on at the, was it, English-speaking union, was it the Oxford Debating Society?

PISTOR: Yes, the Oxford Union. And indeed toward the end of my time as student affairs officer, Henry Cabot Lodge who had been ambassador to Vietnam and then-- remember, there was a time when he was a kind of an advisor and not doing much -- Johnson was nervous about him and didn't know what to do with him, and the Oxford Union asked him to come and debate the Vietnam question. He did, and he made a ghastly speech. I didn't accompany him in the car to Oxford; our press attaché did. We don't have the tradition of debating that the British do, and along with Lodge on our side of the debate was the Foreign Secretary in the Labor government, who had been an Oxford debater in addition to having been a veteran of many years of House of Commons rough and tumble.

Henry Cabot Lodge started with one of the shoulder-to-shoulder stories about Winston Churchill -- you don't do that at Oxford -- he said something Churchillian about US-UK solidarity and the whole audience went, "O-o-o-o-h!" and started after him from the very beginning, and he froze to his script and he said something about, "The war will be over when the Viet Cong soldier, instead of reaching for his rifle, would reach for a coconut instead." Well, the Foreign Secretary, who spoke later, mopped the floor with the Opposition and did a brilliant job of defending us. But the thing is, Cabot Lodge was so unnerved because he wasn't used to this kind of thing. In those days, in the '70s, we started heckling our own politicians; but before that our politicians generally spoke to the convinced; they didn't have any experience of boos and catcalls, and of course in Britain all politicians get that. So he was terribly shaken getting into the car, and my friend Jim Pettus, who was press attaché at the time, said that at the beginning of the drive back to London, Lodge was kind of trembling and then as he got farther and farther away from Oxford and closer and closer to London, he began to think that he had done a fairly good job, and by the end of the trip he said, "I think we did that very well."

I didn't speak, except once or twice, to college audiences on the subject of Vietnam, not because I was afraid of it but because it wouldn't do much. I must say that USIA Washington sent us some zealous partisans, who did an awful job because they got so furious at the first hint of disagreement, and of course the disagreement was violent, and also youthful, which kind of guaranteed disastrous results. So we tried as hard as we could to maintain serious conversations among journalists, university lecturers and people in the British government who were really concerned and had come back from and would be able to talk rationally about the problem. I felt during my time there that our only gain in explaining the Vietnam War would be to convince people-- if you could get that far-- that the United States was not a malign power. They might feel that we were completely wrong, that we had gotten off on the wrong foot and didn't know how to get out; that all of those things might well be true but that we were not in Vietnam to grab the resources of the Vietnamese and grind our heel in their faces. It was a hard sell in the United States at that time among the youth and a hard sell in the UK, but it's the closest we could come to convincing anybody of much else.

We had a USIS officer in London who had served in Vietnam and who was our designated Vietnam speaker, and we sent him to speak at a teach-in at the University of Sussex, in Brighton. Just by chance I was the press duty officer at the embassy on that Sunday when my friend went down to Brighton, and he took his teenage daughter with him because it's a lovely spot and was a beautiful time of the year in the spring. His name was Bob Beers; gone now, but he was a wonderful guy. When Bob and his daughter got to Sussex University, it turned out to be real

trouble. The teach-in was going on in one building, Bob was in an adjacent building awaiting his time to speak and there were students and a few newsmen lining the path between the two. The press was out there because they were pretty excited about what might happen, and it was a bigger event than we had planned on. Bob sized up the situation, and he decided to leave his daughter in the first building – he didn't want her to have to run this gauntlet - and he dashed with a group of students and professors to the other building, and some kid had a can of red paint and sloshed it on Bob. At the embassy I had a call from one of the tabloids describing what had happened, and asking for a comment. I said, "Bob Beers is not as bad as he's painted." It didn't make the paper.

Poor Bob took away from the incident more than a ruined suit; he rightly decided not to participate in any further emotion-charged runaway meetings. So after that experience we didn't do a lot of confrontational things. As I say though, when people saw that the United States did have social programs, was engaged in a struggle for civil rights among all our citizens, did have political winds blowing that people elsewhere hadn't known about, we almost always got a respectful hearing and positive interest in the societal changes taking place in America. We had other staples to talk about as well. The federal system, for example, which people don't understand, not only African students but British professors, who had a lot of harsh things to say about what was going on in the United States then, and I think we provided a valuable corrective. It was a fascinating five years. I wouldn't trade it for anything.

One more anecdote about my years as Student Affairs Officer. We programmed a number of civil rights figures, and one day Langston Hughes turned up– a hero of mine.

Q: The Harlem poet.

PISTOR: ...the Harlem poet and playwright and short story writer, and nurturer of talent. He was in the UK with a protégé of his, a young novelist named Paula Marshall-- she's since become very successful. Hughes was a kindly, gentle, quiet person who'd seen it all, but he hadn't become embittered. We booked him at Africa Unity House, and he drew a large and radical audience, young Africans, Asians and British. The British ranged from communists to just agitators of no particular stripe, but they didn't like us much. Hughes described the work he had done over the years and tried to talk about the history of the civil rights movement, but the restive crowd was really not interested because he was too mild and too polite.

Paula Marshall, who on the book jacket for her first novel, *Brown Girl, Brown Stones*, had a kind of page-boy bob, but by the time she got to London she was wearing a full afro. This change of hair style, it turned out, summed up her political attitudes. She was sitting next to her mentor and she said, "We've been sent here by the United States government. There's a government representative right out there" - and she pointed at my wife and me. Then she said, "It's a funny thing. The United States government doesn't care what you *say*, just as long as you don't *do* anything." She brought the house down. But it wasn't very fair to Langston Hughes, and I think the Langston Hughes's and the Roy Wilkins's and the real workhorses and pioneers in these movements got entirely undeserved rough treatment from "revolutionary" youth in those days, and we were scalded by the increasingly heated Vietnam issue that season, as it began to affect all our relationships.

So that was it. In early 1969, at the end of my time as student affairs officer— I think told you earlier— I was asked to provide one youth leader, one “minority activist” and one British MP involved with race relations, for a kind of one-of-each meeting in London with incoming President, Richard Nixon, and his recently appointed Foreign Policy Advisor, Dr. Kissinger. It was an interesting way to wind up my assignment.

At the same time, Walter Annenberg, our new ambassador, chose as the subject of his first public speech, student violence in the United States, because just as he arrived in Britain there were headlines in all the papers about a situation at the London School of Economics. The Director of the LSE had put his foot down; well, he put his foot down for about 13 minutes and then his foot was pulled out from under him and the poor man lost control of the institution. But at that point Annenberg thought he had won the day and wanted to compliment him on his firmness and resolve.

The Ambassador’s personal assistant came to see me, knowing that I was the student man. When he showed me the transcript of the speech, and I said, “I think he’s making a terrible mistake about this subject at this time, because Britain is nervous about its own student problems, and it would look like interfering.” One of the things the speech said was that Governor Reagan, confronted with riots at the University of California, had sent helicopters to tear gas the mob— resolutely imposing a final solution that ended student unrest on the campus. At first I tried to argue the assistant out of the speech altogether, with no luck at all. Then I said, “Well, at least you’ve got to take out ‘final solution.’” He said, “Why? The ambassador wrote that himself.” I said, “Here ‘final solution’ means only one thing.” He said, “Oh, my God.” Our only success was that they took out that phrase. The Ambassador got a little cuffing from The Guardian and a couple of other papers about that speech, but it didn’t stir up much criticism. I must say, Mr. Annenberg did a very good job as ambassador from then on. So that was the end of that.

Q: Did you get any feel - I can’t remember if we covered this before - because this was the time when these groups were emerging; I’m thinking about the two groups, minorities, coming up; one would be the people coming from the Caribbean, and the other would be Pakistanis and Indians but particularly Pakistanis because I think they were a little lower down on the socioeconomic...

PISTOR: You’re talking about in Britain?

Q: In Britain, yes.

PISTOR: The Indians and the Pakistanis (who had originally been Indians) had from the 1920s on been pretty well organized in Britain as radical kind of semi-revolutionary people, and they had friends in the Parliament and in the radical press and had been organized for years. I did quite a bit of work among Indian students; the Pakistani students were at sixes and sevens. They wanted to be a radical anti-government force, but their fight with India kept getting in the way, and Islamic pulls were coming even as early as the ‘60s. Of course, the Pakistani students I knew were not Islamist by any means; they were red radicals and proud of it. But, yes, we worked with them.

Some of the most vociferous civil rights voices in Britain were West Indian. The West Indians could be divided into two sets of community representatives, one very good, practical, pragmatic politicians, and other made up of verbal bomb throwers-- the same thing you'd find here-- but there was also a strain of Black Nationalism, which wanted to identify as brothers with the African students and African revolutionaries, and some of these guys could be very nasty, intimidating and even shooting people. They were disowned by most of the West Indian community, but they were part of the mix.

Q: Did we shout at all to these groups?

PISTOR: Generally my office did more of this than anybody else in the embassy, because these groups gravitated toward the programs we were doing. So, yes, I'm quite proud of the work that we were doing.

JONATHAN B. RICKERT
Consular Officer
London (1965-1966)

Jonathan Rickert was born and raised in Washington, DC and educated at Princeton and Yale Universities. After service in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service in 1963, serving tours in both Washington and abroad. His foreign posts include London, Moscow, Port au Spain, Sofia and Bucharest, where he served as Deputy Chief of Mission. In his Washington assignments Mr. Rickert dealt primarily with Eastern and Central European Affairs. Mr. Rickert was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

RICKERT: In October '65, I went on my first assignment to London. In those days, you'd express interest in a geographic area, and then the system in its wisdom, decided where to send you. I had put down as my geographic areas, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Africa. I had not mentioned the Soviet Union which was a separate geographic area because I was single and I'd never been abroad. Those were two strikes -- actually, that was three strikes -- for an assignment for the Soviet Union at that time for security reasons.

So I was assigned. Actually, they asked me if I like to go to Moscow as staff aide to the Ambassador. I replied, of course, that I'd be delighted to do so and they said, "Fine." Flec Horn selected me for that job based on files. He never interviewed me but I guess he was given a bunch of files and my history and my Russian or something, and selected me.

Q: Well the other thing, of course, was that you had seventh floor, op-center experience. You had certainly learned about the State Department, but also about the way the government and the national security system was operating in those days.

RICKERT: I hadn't thought of that, but it probably was a factor. But what they did was they sent me on a two year assignment to London as a consular officer with the understanding that after

the first year, if – well, there was probably going to be a change in ambassadors and then the new ambassador could say whether you or me or someone else who was a staff aide –

Q: In Moscow.

RICKERT: – in Moscow. If he had wanted someone else, then I would have stayed on in London and finished the two year consular assignment. In the event I ended up going to Moscow after a year. But I did spend a year doing consular work, mostly consular work in London. David Kirkpatrick Bruce was the ambassador and Phil Kaiser was the DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission]. Stanley Burns was the admin counselor. I worked for about three months in a unit there that was called A-vis. It was a visitor's unit setup under the admin counselor.

I might mention the living arrangements I had in London. Because I expected to be there for a year, I was told that I could go out on the economy and find an apartment and that I had to rent from insured and so forth and so on. For a year, it didn't seem like a very appetizing prospect. Stanley had another aide named Tom Tracy who was also single. There was a new apartment building that the embassy just rented. Stanley had actually rented it at what was considered at Washington the exorbitant rent. But he had straight-lined the rent for ten years. So the embassy was paying a lot for the first couple of years but for the last eight years, it made out like a bandit.

Anyway, Tom and I were offered a 3 bedroom apartment and it saved the embassy two housing allowances in this new building and it worked out very well. Unusual in the modern Foreign Service, where FSOs would be sharing space in any place other than places like Moscow, the Middle-East or some other very difficult places, but it was an arrangement that worked very nicely and was advantageous for both of us.

Q: Of course, a lot of people did that in Washington and Georgetown, Arlington.

RICKERT: Right, but overseas it was unusual, certainly. It was a very interesting experience for me because I've never been abroad before going. I chose deliberately to travel from the United States in second class although we were entitled to first class in those days because I thought I'd meet more interesting people. The anticipation of crossing the Atlantic – it was a five day trip – and getting closer everyday was something that made it that much more enjoyable because it wasn't just getting on a plane and then arriving and getting off the plane and ...

Q: ... going to work

RICKERT: Going to work! [laugh] Then I was in a temporary apartment for a while and that's when I was with Tom in the embassy apartment and then we shared this apartment on Abbey Road.

Q: You mentioned that you had worked for a period of time in the visitor's unit. How long was that?

RICKERT: I don't recall exactly, I think it was about three months. Then I think it was decided that since I've been assigned as a consular officer, I ought to do some consular work. I recall

Stanley saying, if I really wanted to stay I could do so but, frankly, I wanted to do consular work. I thought that it was something that every FSO should do and I didn't necessarily want to do it for a career but I wanted to have a good introduction to it which I did there in London.

Q: Mostly visas?

RICKERT: Mostly visas. I did some IVs [Immigration Visa] and a number of NIVs [Non-Immigration Visa]. I remember at that time Glasgow had closed and a lot of consulates were closing during that time. And Edinburgh was still open but did not issue IVs so Scots who wanted IVs had to come to London. At that time, young women who were going to the States, those nannies, had to get IVs. There weren't other non-immigrant alternatives for them. I remember one Glaswegian who must have been about 18 who came in for an interview. I don't think she'd ever been out of Scotland before; was obviously terrified. I met a number of Scots, educated Scots before and actually quite liked the accent. I asked her questions which she understood, but I couldn't understand a word of what she said back. It was such a Glaswegian dialect or accent that it was incomprehensible so she may have well been a super spy; I finally, in frustration, just gave her the visa. The more I asked her to repeat herself, the more frustrated and ill at ease and nervous she became and obviously it wasn't getting anywhere. I didn't think she was likely to have been a super spy. So I gave her a visa.

Q: Let me just get back to the visitor's unit for a moment. When I went to London in the late '70s, there was a Foreign Service national deployed running that unit. I think, certainly by then it was an institution and pretty much, as I recall, running it by herself. I'm not sure there were any Americans ...

RICKERT: Joan Walton?

Q: Joan Auton.

RICKERT: Auton. Joan Auton. She was there. There was another woman, a British woman, I don't remember her last name. But Joan was already an institution in the early '60s. Indeed, she was what made the visitor's unit work. Many congressmen would come to town and weren't in hotels, and she would arrange their hotels and everything that they needed that would make their stay pleasant. She was widely known on the Hill for her ability to get people into hotels and the theater and other events that supposedly had no seats. It was legendary. And she was a very nice and charming person as well.

Q: Okay, anything else further about your serve in London? Did it turn out being longer than a year?

RICKERT: No, it ended up being a year. There are a couple of other things that might be worth mentioning. One of the things that the embassy did for me, which was very helpful and much appreciated, was they paid for me to have a Russian tutor a couple of times a week in anticipation of going to Moscow. The woman's name was Lydia North. She was a fascinating woman. She was from St. Petersburg, which became Leningrad, and had married a Russian officer in what was, more or less, an arranged marriage. She was from a well-to-do family and

her parents had told her that they had decided that she should marry this Russian officer. It was already the Soviet period then, but, as you know, the Soviet army kept a lot of the officer corps for a time after the revolution – she met him. She wasn't forced to marry this guy but she met him and was told that if she didn't want to she didn't have to, but she agreed, and she said that she had only one condition. And that was that the wedding would take place in church. The officer said, "That's fine. I can agree to that. But the ceremony has to be at a time and a place of my choosing." Because, as a Soviet officer, he was not free to walk in to the nearest parish church and have a church wedding.

Sometime thereafter one night, he came in the winter to her parents' home and said, "Please get into the sleigh. We're getting married." She got in. It was a horse-drawn sleigh, and he covered her eyes with a scarf once they got down to the city limits and went some place in to a forest and there was a wooden chapel in the forest, a priest and a witness and they did the ceremony. She then had her eyes covered again and was taken out, so that even if she were tortured, she could not say where she'd been or who was there or anything of that sort. She was happily married to this officer until he was purged in the '30s and then Lydia herself was sent to prison. She had scars on her arms from cigarette burns that had been put to her as part of her interrogation. When things looked very bad during WWII and all hands were needed, she was a nurse by training and she was sent to the front, captured by Germans, and sent to Germany and never went back. But – a very understandably anti-communist person. She told me before I left for Moscow and she said that she was suffering from some illness and she didn't think she had that long to live, but she said, "Jonathan, please bring me some soil from Russia when you come back next time so that it can be put in my coffin."

The first time I went to London, I did take some soil and gave it to her in the hospital and she died a few months after that. But she was a very, very interesting person.

Q: And she helped you keep your Russian up there.

RICKERT: She was very helpful for that because I studied, but I had never really used it. I'd only been trained. And, as we all know from language training, if you don't get into a situation where you start using it right away, you'll lose it very quickly.

Q: Let me just back up on that topic for a second. How long were you in Monterrey for Russian language training?

RICKERT: It was ten and a half months or something like that.

Q: So a full course.

RICKERT: It is a full course and then a month of leave. They called it an academic year.

Q: And had you had some Russian at Princeton?

RICKERT: No. I had a little German in high school and college and a little Latin but I had not had any Slovak language before.

Q: And you definitely not had any chance to use the Russian then until you finally went to Moscow.

RICKERT: So it was lying dormant, but Lydia helped keep it alive.

A couple of other things I mentioned about London: the World Cup took place in 1966, which England won. I had not been a fan of soccer before, but one of my colleagues in the embassy, who grew up in Latin America, was a great fan of soccer and educated me and we saw one of the matches. It was great excitement for England to win at that time.

I traveled a lot in England; on the weekends I'd go to places and see things. My mother actually had been to school in England for about three years, and two of her old school friends were married to people who were high up in their different fields. They were very kind to receive me and looked after me. In one case, one of them was married to the Bishop of Saint Albans, which was north of London. He had the position of Lord High Almoner, which meant that he was responsible for the Maundy (or Holy) Thursday service at Westminster Abbey the year I was there. The Queen attended, where she washed the feet of parishioners and gave out what's called "Maundy money;" small purses of silver coins, very small silver coins that are minted especially for this occasion. The Brits are nothing but wedded to their traditions and Bishop Jones gave me a couple of the coins that he got as part of his cut for being the master of ceremonies for this occasion.

I was control officer – that's a misnomer if there ever was one – for a visit by Ted Kennedy, and also one by John Tunney, the senator from California who borrowed money from me to pay for a black tie outfit that he needed. He did pay it back. Kennedy was there for the week. I was responsible for keeping him in cars, and I had to sign the time sheets for the drivers. [End tape 1, side A]

Q: Okay. You were talking about some of the visitors to London and such things.

RICKERT: Yeah. Another one: I was sent out to the airport to meet John Kenneth Galbraith, who was passing through on his way back to Boston. He was no longer Ambassador to India by that time, but he had been sent when Prime Minister Shastri died unexpectedly. Galbraith headed the American delegation. He had a stack of exams with him that he had been grading and he left them with me to pouch back because – I don't remember why – but he couldn't take them with him. That was the easiest meet and greet I've ever done because he's about 6'10 ...

Q: No trouble finding him.

RICKERT: The plane from India—these people got off, a lot of them were medium sized or less and he stuck out. It was not a problem to pick him up at the airport. A lot of us tend to complain from time to time about our salaries. My salary when I came in to the foreign service was \$6,000 American dollars and I was making about \$7,000 when I was in London. I recall reading in a parish newspaper that they broke out the salary structure for Brits at that time. My seven thousand a year put me in the top five percent of the British wages. I didn't take into account free

housing and other benefits. So we had it pretty good, considering everything people can find reasons to complain wherever they are. I say that some people, if they ever get to have any more fun, somebody would complain about it. But even as a very junior officer, I was much better paid than the vast majority of British wages.

Q: Okay, anything else about London then?

RICKERT: The consular work was interesting. Most of what we did was on British subjects. Although there was no visa waiver program at that point, a lot of the British people to be issued without review; they were done through travel agencies and other ways. I recall the very first interview I had, which was with a single, unemployed, young Englishman who was going to the United States for an indefinite stay on a visit to stay with a New York antiques dealer, male. I refused, but was later overruled by my boss. There were others. A man who was involved in the Profumo scandal at that time was married to an Israeli El Al pilot. She came in for a visa; I had to get it waived. I didn't handle the case, but I saw her sitting there. What was her name? She's a famous woman mystery writer ... Agatha Christie's husband came in for a visa, I remember seeing him. Sir Alec Douglas-Hume came in. I didn't do these visas but I saw these people as they came into the embassy. I was always amused at the British passports; at least at that time they had "profession." He still had his passport from the time he had been prime minister and under "profession" it said, "Her Majesty's first minister." Because the Brits didn't have diplomatic passports at that time.

I did travel to the Continent, which I never visited before, visiting friends—twice to Paris and twice to Geneva and once to Sweden where a friend of mine was serving in the embassy. Oh, another thing I should mention. As a former Washington Cathedral choir boy, the Washington Cathedral choir came and performed at Westminster Abbey while I was there, and I had the great pleasure to see people I knew and attend the service and hear them sing and they did very well. They were up to the proper standard.

Q: They didn't ask you to sit in?

RICKERT: No, they didn't. [chuckle] I had been a soprano and was no longer a soprano. So I think those are the ...

Q: Well you had mentioned before that Ambassador Foy Kohler had selected you to be staff aide in Moscow in the Department. The assumption was that he would still be there. Was he there when you finished your tour in London and did you go to that position or did you do something else in Moscow?

RICKERT: He was still there but his departure was already scheduled. So in October of '66. I transferred to Moscow and I had about two weeks with the Kohlers and my predecessor, Richard McCormick and then there was a fairly brief interregnum – a couple of months, six weeks or so – over the Christmas holidays and then Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson came in January of '67.

PAUL F. DU VIVIER
Consul
Edinburgh, Scotland (1965-1968)

Paul F. DuVivier was born in New York in 1915 and was educated at the University of Munich and then Princeton University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1942 and was posted in Ottawa, Marseille, Stockholm, Berlin, Paris, Bordeaux, Nice, and Edinburgh. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: When you did drive from Nice to Edinburgh what did you find there and what were our interests?

DU VIVIER: Right, and then we had a lot of soccer football players who came over, and unemployed doctors. Soccer was having a boom at that time. They all came from Scotland. Immigration was referred to London. My predecessor had run into some difficulty with his children who were running a little footloose and fancy free around town so I had to impose tighter office discipline. I had but one vice consul at first with four clerks, but it grew to a consul, two vice consuls and about ten clerks. We were allowed to buy the townhouse next door which the Royal High School had vacated so that everything was doubled.

After six weeks of warnings and preparations our office was officially inspected for one week of personnel interviews, verification of office accounts and scrutiny of work performances of all twelve of us on the staff. Inspector Robert J. McClintock had been ambassador to three countries previously and was known as one of the most charming and successful men in the Foreign Service for the past 28 years. As dean of the consular corps, I invited him to the residence to meet six other foreign consuls general and Elemita, his Chilean born wife was delighted with the attention she received.

The next morning Rob told me that he would recommend my post should be elevated from a consulate, as it had been since 1798, to a consulate general, but only if I could show him the Loch Ness monster. In such a dilemma, I telephoned one of my few friends who steadfastly insisted that "Nessie" really did exist. After five hours the Chamber of Commerce in Glasgow did call back and announced "Ambassador McClintock" would be welcome aboard the lake steamer taking a BBC crew on the morrow to film if they could, the legendary underwater dragon that had terrified the owners of Castle Urquart for 462 years. My inspector was delighted but just before he was driven to Loch Ness, without me, the head of the BBC team telephoned from London to challenge the credentials of my distinguished visitor. "How can the Honorable McClintock be your ambassador" We know in London that the ambassador is David E. K. Bruce." "Oh quite so," I replied impulsively, "but Mr. Bruce is the ambassador to England. I am referring to our ambassador in Scotland!"

With this deception Rob had a free boat ride all day with several reporters and cameramen. At sundown by some miracle the westerly cross wind aroused a series of ripples around the crags of Castle Urquart. Everyone shouted, "there he is" and all but the head and tail of the sixty foot monster was seen, photographed and copiously toasted in Glen Livet single malt whiskey. The

next day the inspector pronounced my management "simply superb" and the office was reclassified with suitable publicity, new stationery seals and several well merited promotions. Rob McClintock became a close friend of mine until he was killed in a car crash in Burgundy in 1972, debonaire to the end.

Raising the post, well publicized, gave us a renewed standing, and the time was well spent with bankers and the eternal whiskey distillers. There was a certain amount of curiosity on the part of the Embassy in London who were glad to get away and would pick on us for distraction. Willis C. Armstrong, who became a fast friend, would call me up from his Economic Minister's office in London and say, "Louise doesn't want to come up, but can't you find something for me to inspect?" And I would hustle around and, pronto, we made a trip, to see how Harris Tweed was made. That's where I was given this jacket, and we also inspected some of the islands in the far northern areas of the Highlands. To report on what chance they had of developing cottage industries into some viable economy. And Willis would give a lively pep talk to the bankers and the Chambers of Commerce in Glasgow and we had good fun. But Louise never came up. And I know my wife did a great deal through the English Speaking Union. She'd have sewing bees and cooking parties and things of that kind. We had a group of about twelve couples, each one from a different profession -- there was a lawyer and a stockbroker and a doctor and so forth -- and these wives would take turns in entertaining the Group, as we'd called ourselves, and trying to serve the most elaborate French cuisine we could think of. Each one trying to outdo the last one.

The Navy had three secret installations there including Holy Loch where nuclear submarines are based.

Once with Arleigh Burke (by that time I think he'd become a vice president of Chrysler), we were entertained till midnight. And then there was Edzell, a large telecommunications base on the northeast coast, and another at Thurso, a smaller base on the very tip of Scotland: terrible climate. They had about eighty men there who were going crazy because there were no women, and there wasn't anything to do or look at. So they drank too much and drove a fast car, a Jaguar if they could. And then, finally, there was Kirknewton, an Air Force base near Edinburgh which was closed while I was there. So we had, in effect, four military bases. And I would go down to London, usually by train, and get briefed or debriefed and come back with a case of whiskey because the whiskey in Scotland was taxable to us. I had to pay the local excise which was prohibitive. But if I could get my rations through the commissary at the embassy I could live very comfortably in my 17 room government residence. And that's the way it went. We loved it. We went back ten years later for a week of farewells.

SHELDON D. KRYs
Special Assistant to the Ambassador
London (1965-1969)

Ambassador Sheldon D. Krys was born in New York City and was educated at the University of Maryland. He entered the Foreign Service in 1965 and has held posts in England, Yugoslavia and an ambassadorship to Trinidad and Tobago. In

Washington, he held many positions including ones in the Inspection Corps and Administration and Information Management. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1994.

KRYS: I was to go out to do that if I were to accept the offer of going out at all, but it was a rather unstructured approach. I was to go to London, which of course was quite a bit of bait, to be the embassy's management officer without line responsibilities and look at how a very complex mission operates, try to see where there was duplication and where there were ways of doing things better but working within the existing structure without the authority of being a supervisor. Part of that plan in the back of Tom's mind was that he would come to London as the administrative counselor and we would then work together. That didn't happen. He went off to Bonn instead.

Q: *When did you go?*

KRYS: I went to London in January of 1965.

Q: *And you stayed there until '69?*

KRYS: Until the end of '69. I stayed there for three months short of five years. There was a reason for that. After a year, I was asked by David Bruce if I would be his special assistant. He was the ambassador, and he was the one who fought very hard for me to join the Foreign Service. He urged me to go back and take the examination. The first time I took the examination, I was not accepted. I took it a second time maybe two years later and was. The system was not too keen on bringing people in from the outside. At that time I was an R-4. I wasn't coming in at some exalted level and clearly money was not the issue. That really began a very different chapter in my life.

Q: *When you went out to London, I think you would be as welcome as an outbreak of smallpox or something like that because there is nothing worse than somebody who comes in and isn't going to take any work off anybody's shoulders. You are going to create more work for them just to support you, and then you are nosing around, asking, "Why are you doing this?" Was there any preparation before you went out? What were you going to be doing? Did you have any thoughts in mind or any instructions? How did it work out?*

KRYS: Some of this is, I guess, lost in time but I think part of my approach may have spared me. Whether I was smarter than I believe I was or whether it was an instinct, I don't know. First by way of preparation, I took what was then called the administrative officers course and the budget and fiscal course. I qualified as a budget and fiscal officer because what I looked into was what that is all about. For me not to have had the basics would have put me at the mercy of everyone. When I went out, there was someone who could probably draw more fire for this incursion than I. A first tour Foreign Service officer was named the CCPS coordinator and was placed in the executive suite. He knew more than anyone at that embassy according to him so when he tried to impose CCPS and sat David Bruce down to tell him the right way to run his bloody mission, I think I was home free.

Q: I was offered the job in Belgrade at that time. I took one look at the thing and said, "That sounds very interesting, but I think somebody else might want to do it."

KRYS: I was very lucky. Findlay Burns was the administrative counselor and Findlay was an extraordinary mentor. He's Findlay Burns. There are all sorts of ways of approaching things, and Findlay had his own distinct way of approaching them. For me he was a very quiet mentor who gave me an enormous amount of responsibility even though I didn't have line responsibility.

I'll give you an example or two. Housing was at a premium, and he said I want you to go out and find apartments. It wasn't that long after austerity in London, and there were very few buildings that we Americans thought were suitable. A prerequisite was central heating, and that was not necessarily something you were going to find. I ended up leasing, and I think we've ultimately bought the building on a road called Abbey Road which was next door to the Beatles' studio. I found this new apartment building and he was behind me but I was doing the negotiations. I learned a good deal.

When I got out there I did something else, too. Rather than sitting next door to the head of the section, the administrative counselor, I asked if I could work in each of the segments of administration and consular work. I placed myself under the wing, if there was a wing, of the senior local employee in each of those sections rather than the American. If you have an embassy with people as gifted as the Foreign Service nationals were in London, almost every one of whom started at age 15, you have a great deal to learn from them and that was the relationship. It was quite fortunate that I did that. I learned so much and I wasn't going in there to tell them anything, I was going in there to have them tell me. That worked extremely well.

I did a very few months as the embassy's budget and fiscal officer because Harry McKeem moved up to be sort of a deputy to Findlay Burns, and then I was asked to work for David Bruce as one of his two special assistants.

Q: Back to this management thing. Did you see anything endemically good or ill in it? This was your first look at this because you were only there for a year or so and here was a large embassy. Did you see any major problems with how it was run or maybe how the Foreign Service runs missions?

KRYS: I probably took a businessman's approach to what I was doing. If you have five people selling the product and you only have one customer for the product, you either change some aspects of what you are doing or you start eliminating the number of organizations. I'll give you an example. We had three libraries in the embassy in London which I combined into one library. You had the USIA library, the Commercial library and the embassy's library. There was only a limited amount of space ultimately even in this new and rather controversial building that Eero Saarinen had designed for us on Grosvenor Square. It met enormous resistance, but the idea of having three non-co-located libraries made no sense to anyone, so we had one library which had a Commercial portion to it, and a USIA portion to it, and it all fit into one space. Obviously that is something you look at very carefully.

In the consular section (when I got there, I had already been in London seven, eight, or nine months and still had an idea of how the embassy ran) there was no communication within the section. People were so partitioned off from one another that it was an endless grind to move paper along. By moving people in a non-threatening way because they weren't going to lose their jobs, they were going to be able to talk to each other without getting up and walking across a large room just to move a piece of paper, that too worked.

I wasn't sophisticated enough really to say "this is how the new embassy should look" and that really wasn't my idea. If you could do portions of an embassy and make them work a bit better, ultimately the embassy itself was going to be a better organization. But I didn't reach for the divine, to determine how well the front office communicates with the consular section. The truth of the matter was, the front office didn't communicate and felt no particular need to. You had people of good quality with responsibility given to them. Only in the absence of performance, so that something was very wrong, [was there a need to communicate]. That is not a bad approach as you and I know.

Q: As a professional consular officer, the less communication you have, the better. What is the point of troubling them? Besides, it gives you more responsibility, which is better. You don't want to load people down with your problems.

KRYS: It is interesting [in terms of] the development of young officers; these were crucibles for these people and you saw it happen. You saw good supervisors and you saw supervisors who weren't nearly as good. From what I was doing, that wasn't going to change. All I could do was observe that.

Q: You were sent out as an experiment. Did you have any feel how this thing worked with Crockett? Tom Stern did a long interview with Bill Crockett, but one of the things that I gather from him was that he was full of ideas and these ideas would bubble up and then he would go on to other things. There wasn't a lot of follow-through, mainly because there were so many ideas. Some were good, some were bad. They were tested out, but the follow-through was a major problem.

KRYS: I think the idea of management interns or any sort of interns is a very good idea. It doesn't work in our Foreign Service, sadly. If I may skip a number of years, when I was working in MMO as the principal deputy in management operations, we managed, Bill DuPree mostly and I to a lesser degree, to get FTE (full-time equivalents) in some substantial quantity when the trend was going in the other direction. We had Secretary Shultz's support. After we got these positions, we couldn't give embassies political and economic officers and labor officers on central complement. They would rather have a GSO who was going to do a little more of the polishing and the administrative work. Maybe they needed both but many of the embassies, many of the ambassadors, were not thinking about the future of the Foreign Service and to a sad degree I don't think we can recapture that opportunity the way things are today. [But] let's not jump that far ahead. In this particular time frame, I think that Bill Crockett had extraordinarily good ideas. He had too many of them, I agree. I think where he suffered was, he had the wrong vehicle. The comprehensive country programming system dealt in the abstract. For example, in one of the consulates in England, you had a non-career consul general who claimed to be

working 90 hours a week because any time he picked up a magazine, that was considered professional study time. We both know that wasn't happening. So when these charts were created as to what people were doing, we put them to rest in London but at a cost because we also took cuts on an experimental basis in a follow-on experiment called EROP, the executive review of programs. Incidentally, I may be the granddaddy of all of the acronyms having to do with policy and programming experiments.

But CCPS really wasn't for the State Department. It was much too elaborate and, like too many of the programs, it was applied across the board to all embassies and that is foolish. You really want to go after places that have resources that might be saved. As you know, in small places, at best, it would be a limited return. CCPS was so elaborate that it didn't work. Crockett gave it up. He went to PPBS, which was then being used by the Defense Department. Chris Argess wrote a book about CCPS, the experiment in [the] State Department.

You need the dynamism of a Bill Crockett and a Bill Macomber and a few others. You also need the good will that they had for the Foreign Service. There was no meanspiritedness in what they were doing. Crockett came from within the Service, Macomber had experience within the service. Both of them really I think strove to build upon what existed rather than an attitude which said that much more (or at least as much) can be done with much less. [They did] not force the Service to define its mission, which really does take us to today, and if there is an opportunity, we'll talk about that later.

Q: Could you talk a little about Findlay Burns' operation? He was somebody who was around quite a bit and, as you said, he had his own way of doing things. This is your first overseas experience. How did he run things?

KRYS: May I start with an anecdote about Findlay?

Q: Sure.

KRYS: Findlay and Martha lived in an elegant house, the administrative counselor's house, in London. My wife and I arrived in London in January of '65. My wife at that time was expecting twins, although she had been told by every physician it was one child but she was fairly certain on this point. We were invited by Findlay's secretary to come to a reception, our first social occasion in London. We turned up at the door and it was rather quiet. We rang the doorbell and the door was answered. Findlay and Martha were dressing [for] dinner because the date had been switched to the next night and we had not been advised by Findlay's secretary. I guess we were somewhere further down on the list. Findlay and Martha could not have been more gracious. I sent flowers the next day - Martha has never forgotten that - but more importantly, we were mortified. Martha called and asked Doris "After everyone leaves tonight, why don't you stay for supper so we'll have an opportunity to get acquainted?"

There's an enormous lesson which is so infrequently taught within the Foreign Service. Diplomacy as a skill can also be practiced within the Service and not necessarily [just] on host country nationals or non-Americans. They put us at ease and made us understand that, yes, a mistake had been made. It wasn't your mistake and even if it was your mistake, it doesn't matter;

come and stay and have dinner. He was a very, very senior officer. As you know, he went on to become ambassador to Jordan from that position in London, and was taking a very young officer and showing a different side from what goes on in the office.

Findlay had enormous style and it was very much the old school of the Foreign Service: precise language and a high level of expectation of his officers, but also a high level of expectation of the personal and professional conduct of the people at a mission. He chose young officers and gave them responsibility very early on and sat back. [His] style was to be the supreme director rather than the hands-on everyday manager. Having said that, no detail went unnoticed, but look at the individuals he had around him. Among them when I was there [were] Tom Tracey; Joe Meresman, who is no longer alive; and David Passage. There were five or six young officers, and I'll count myself in that group [whom] Findlay taught things to. He taught you by letting you explain what the situation was, what you felt was the best solution, and then he would comment on that. I must tell you [I didn't have] the style that Findlay had. When I have mentored young officers either working for me or those who have come to talk to me, the first thing I have done is listen to them because they do have to tell you a little bit about their approach and then you make your judgment as to their ability, their intellectual capacity, and how they see themselves within the Service.

Q: You moved to David Bruce as special assistant.

KRYS: I became an IROG, international relations officer general, which is a political officer.

Q: What did David Bruce's special assistant do?

KRYS: He had two special assistants. You were the miniature version, a mini, mini version of a national security council staff. What you saw, too, was that the front office, the ambassador and the DCM saw the papers that they should see, [that you] became involved in things that they may not otherwise have become involved with, [that their] schedules were kept. You have to remember that London at that time probably was [our] largest mission. The rivalry may have been between [it] and Bonn at that time. It was a very large mission with an unheard of number of attached agencies. Today of course twice the number would not be unheard of but there were almost 30 attached agencies. There was an extraordinary calendar for the ambassador, for the ambassador's wife, the DCM and the DCM's wife.

Q: Who was the DCM at that time?

KRYS: A very interesting man, Phil Kaiser. Phil was a rarity as well in that he didn't come from the professional service. He came from the Department of Labor where he had been at age 32 an Assistant Secretary for International Affairs. He was a college professor, a Rhodes scholar, and just prior to coming to London, was ambassador to Senegal and Mauritania. He wanted to come to London because at that time the Wilson government was in power and, although he had known both sides of the aisle, he had gone to Oxford with most of the leadership. Again he was a very substantive type of DCM. Findlay really ran the management side of the operation.

Al Wells was just leaving as I was coming in and Bob Skiff and I were in the front office. With David Bruce you became involved with things that were highly sensitive, requiring discretion. He managed to have you do things without asking you to do them. You just wanted to do things to ensure that the office ran smoothly. He was an individual who did not demand and therefore it would have been unthinkable for special assistants to usurp the power of the staff. He wouldn't have stood for it and you wouldn't have thought of doing it. So if your political counselor wanted to do something, it was really between the political counselor and the ambassador. You might have your [own] views and if they were solicited, you might express them, or if you felt strongly he would want to hear them, but you did not become the super-political counselor.

Q: Sometimes this happens, often with a political ambassador who develops a coterie around him who almost cuts out the line officers. It can happen.

KRYS: Not with David Bruce. David Bruce was a remarkable man both in style and in substance. He had the ear of the President and he knew when to use it. He was sought out by the White House rather than the other way around. I came to know him fairly late in life. I don't know if you know that David Bruce started as a Foreign Service officer back in 1926.

Q: Yes.

KRYS: And then he married Ailsa Mellon and went to London in the job that I was in through his father-in-law as private secretary to Andrew Mellon. So he had a soft spot and I believe he had a level of expectation that you better live up to.

Q: We're jumping around a bit here, but there have been times when you've had a DCM who's extremely well connected or a political counselor who has these connections such as Philip Kaiser had, particularly on the labor side. There is this sort of labor mafia that the American and British labor movement had. Many coming out of the American labor movement had this close relationship, Sam Berger was an example. Did this cause any problem between Philip Kaiser and David Bruce?

KRYS: No. I think that they knew where the boundaries were for one another. Witness the fact that Phil Kaiser was there over five years and David Bruce was there eight years, the longest tenure as far as I know. I don't think that would have lasted [otherwise]. I think Phil was quite aware that there were some things that were really the ambassador's, and there were things that the ambassador would look to him to do. You also had to think about that entire mission. There were very few people there at a senior level who weren't connected with some large body. Armstrong was the minister for economic affairs. Bill Brewbeck was the political counselor and he was very well connected to the Kennedy administration, and so on. Phil Kaiser has written his autobiography and I think one of the things he cited was the number of people with whom he served at that time who went on to become ambassadors and it was practically the roster of the embassy in London. Maybe that is wrong for the Foreign Service. Maybe the good people should really be distributed, if you can recognize them, with a greater view to where they are needed but in truth I think the system operates about the same way today.

Q: How were relations with the British at that time and with the Wilson government?

KRYS: Vietnam was clearly a cloud throughout that period. David Bruce was quite involved. I had considered that this had never been declassified, but it has been. There was a very special operation which involved attempting to have the bombing stopped in the North and a deal was going to be struck at a time that the Russian leaders were in London. The British were going to be part of this, and it came apart.

Clearly the British public on the left was opposed to what we were doing. The embassy was pretty well stormed one night when we were there. The relationship though was still viewed as *the* special relationship. Harold Wilson in those years I think tried to seek a different course for us with regard to Vietnam still, but there was not a strain that you would find in a nation where the leadership would overtly display to the United States its feelings in ways that resulted in diplomats not having access. That was never a question of that.

In the operation that involved the cease fire, it was one of the most restricted bits of communication between Washington and the embassy. When I talk about David Bruce giving young people responsibilities, I would be the one who would come in at three in the morning because only three of us in the embassy, the head of the communications section, the ambassador, and myself, could see some of the things. Three in the morning of course was the usual time for Washington to dispatch something to the prime minister for immediate delivery. I will long remember my knees absolutely shaking. I called the ambassador at home, and he said why don't you do a summary of it and deliver that to the prime minister. We'll give him the full text tomorrow, but you get him the summary. I sat down and did the summary and literally thought my god if I mess this up, democracy as we know it will have ended. At this point (this must have been about 1967), he felt that he had sufficient confidence in me to do this, more confidence than I had in myself at this particular moment. This was something called Operation Marigold.

Q: Obviously this wasn't your direct responsibility, but you were certainly seeing how the ambassador and others were dealing with it. The Labour government had this left-wing group that seemed to spend all of its time linking hands and singing the Red Banner Forever, the Red Flag Forever. They were doctrinaire socialists who by any standard were basically almost communists - at least from the outside it seemed like that. What was the feeling about the Labour Party and particularly the left wing of the Labour Party?

KRYS: I suspect, to put this in context, the Labour Party as a governing body had as much difficulty with that left wing as the United States possibly could have and because Wilson's majority was so slim, they were kept in line for fear of losing control of the government and probably compromised far more than they wanted to. Nonetheless we had violent demonstrations. There was very strong sentiment against the United States but in the everyday dealings you were dealing much more with the center of the Labour Party than with the left wing. A better person to talk to would be someone like Tom Burn who was the labor attaché during those years, and maybe Mike Pister who was the youth officer because they saw much more of that element. Ours was more of an idyllic relationship because we were dealing with people who had a responsibility for governing.

We talk about security. I'll tell you how different life was [then]. I had a pass to the Foreign Office because of my position. You had night clerks, young Foreign Service officers, who lived upstairs, and those were the people that I would, of course, bring these notes to. I would then sit and we would sweat together to see how we were going to make sure that it got through the permanent secretary and so on, to the prime minister, at the right time... when to wake him up at 3:00 in the morning and when to wait until 8:00 in the morning. I remember going into what would be the Operations Center with all of these communications coming in worldwide and it meant nothing [that I was] an American; I had the same pass as a Foreign Office official. Can you imagine someone walking into [our] Operations Center? It was very, very different in those days.

Q: How did we view the demonstrations against the embassy? I might add for the historical record that the present President of the United States, William Clinton, took part in some of those.

KRYS: One really was violent and it was on a Sunday night. As you know you have to ask permission to demonstrate in England; even the baddies have to do that. The only time that we had anything occur against the embassy was to the windows along the consular side of the embassy, which was on Upper Grosvenor Street; [they] were shot out by some Basque terrorists one night. This led me to become inappropriately heroic several days later when there was a CODEL in my office en route to the Paris Air Show. My office window was just above the entrance to the consular section and a car went up Upper Grosvenor Street and backfired and I threw all of them to the floor. I'm trying to remember this one poor congressman from Chicago who was about as round as he was high and I just knocked him over like a bowling pin. They said "It's all right, Son. It's all right. We understand you're trying to protect us." I knocked them flat.

One night there was a very violent demonstration and the ambassador and I came into the embassy. We were on an upper floor and we watched the demonstration. It was serious. Obviously we carried out our policy. We felt very strongly about it, but I don't think there were any Americans who didn't want to see it end. This particular one got out of hand, and a policeman was killed, I think. He was kicked in the head, and there was a photograph taken just at that moment, as a matter of fact. But in England when things are even at their most violent, there is a certain civility about it. The people didn't come armed with weapons. The real danger was to the horses because they would drive the pickets into the horses. There were many [times] during working [hours] when we would have part of the mounted police behind the embassy and a busload or two of protesters. You're right, you had a lot of American students there at the London School of Economics at that time. There were a number of places that would have been called hotbeds of anti-Vietnam sentiment.

Q: Did you find Vietnam in the social life there much of a problem?

KRYS: I think perhaps I was naive. I really didn't see it on the part of the British.

Q: They weren't coming at you about Vietnam all the time?

KRYS: No, because I think what we probably had by way of friends and contacts in those years were people who were more conservative. You know there is such a difference there. There is certainly a recognition of economic and [social] class in England that doesn't exist here, so we were not in the coal mines where you might have one view, [different than that of] someone in a different strata. It isn't a matter of snobbism; it's just the way it was. You didn't meet people who were [lower class], or you just didn't socialize or come in contact with them.

Q: *Vietnam was a major thing. Were there any other issues that were absorbing the ambassador and in which you got involved?*

KRYS: East of Suez towards the end.

Q: *Which means what?*

KRYS: There was a declaration that beyond a certain date, in effect, England would begin to withdraw from traditional places where they [had] felt a strategic interest - i.e., Yemen.

Q: *Malaysia.*

KRYS: Yes, but particularly within the Middle East domain. You began to see an immediate change in how the British were treated; they wanted to drive them out and to make sure that they accelerated or at least stayed on the schedule. The question was what sort of vacuum would that [create] for the West. Again, it was always the East-West dynamic. When you say involved, again I was not a line officer.

Q: *Yes, I understand, but you were the fly on the wall.*

KRYS: That's right, from the perspective of seeing everything that left the embassy of major importance. Clearly there was a real shift of attention to what will [happen] in that part of the world if England isn't flying its flag there. Not necessarily an imperial flag but a flag that dealt with the military strength of a Western nation that we considered correctly, our closest ally, and what did it mean for us. There were certain areas, again in the Middle East, where even if we had chosen, it was seen to be the domain of Great Britain militarily and some of that still remains, for instance, in Cyprus. Once the announcement was made that there were going to be substantial slashes in defense and in presence, we began to think about what our role would be.

Q: *Were you getting from the British any feeling that if they got out, all of a sudden we were going to have to assume more of a responsibility in, say, the Persian Gulf? Was there either resentment or saying "Hey, fellows, it's your problem now, not ours?"*

KRYS: It was not as boldly put as that, but I think a very strong argument could be made that clearly the conservative leadership felt that this was a serious mistake. Our role was to report, and the reports clearly were that there was a dynamic shift in the political-military aspect of our presence in that area where England would no longer be. I think it was reflected in how we (and here I don't have proof at hand) began to look at our military bases in a place like Libya differently. I would suspect that the relationship with Saudi Arabia took on a different aspect as

well. There were lots of things that played out. This was done, not because there was necessarily an anti-military wave sweeping the country, but on the basis of finance, on economic need. The consequences were much more direct than you might see from a similar declaration by the United States.

Q: Were you there essentially during the Johnson administration?

KRYS: No. I had agreed to stay on six months into Walter Annenberg's tenure so I was his special assistant for six months.

Q: Here is quite a different man, very much a self-made man, quite different from David Bruce and with a somewhat cloudy reputation. How did he come to be there?

KRYS: Let me leave his reputation to the side because having been a special assistant, as I would speak of David Bruce only in a certain context, I would do the same thing with Walter Annenberg. Walter Annenberg came there under very difficult circumstances and of course it had much more to do with what occurred here in the United States than anything to do with Walter Annenberg himself. His counterpart, the British ambassador here, prior to Richard Nixon's election had somehow become involved in our politics as you may remember. I think he had been the editor and chief of a leftist magazine. I can't remember if it was the *Spectator* and the *New Statesman*. I should remember that but I don't. At any rate, he was hardly welcomed in Washington when Nixon went into office. Walter Annenberg may have been the single largest constant support of Richard Nixon and so he was named ambassador.

There was a tremendous amount of press. There were interviews with Mrs. Annenberg and some quotes that were carried in the London press which dealt with such things as the short comings within the residence, neglect and so on. All the things that in an ambassadorial seminar today we tell new ambassadors to remember: that there is someone out there [listening] and even if you think you are dealing with people who are going to quote you accurately, just don't get involved in this sort of thing. I think there was a little touch of anti-Semitism involved in all of this. Walter Annenberg just came into a hail storm of critical press coverage for the first six months, the months that I was there, and it was not very much fun. He was cast in a very dubious light.

You should know that Walter Annenberg does have a speech impediment, he has a stammer, and one of the most memorable and unhappy moments in the early tenure of Walter Annenberg involved a film [called] "The Year in the Life of the Queen." To be included in that was Walter Annenberg's presentation of credentials; that had never been filmed before. Annenberg and I went to Buckingham Palace without the Queen being present. There was a walk-through as to how it was going to be done, and he did everything the way he was supposed to. However, the film used a clip which dealt with something that I suspect he had memorized, and it was [in] very stilted language, dealing with the house being redone in response to something that the queen had asked and it was found to be very amusing. It was splashed [everywhere]; BBC carried this, too.

They also juxtapositioned [it against] a reception at Buckingham Palace. They showed the presentation of credentials and then they showed the queen and Prince Philip at the annual

reception in Buckingham Palace looking through the doors where all of the embassies are lined up and the Queen says "He's not there." Philip says, "Who's not there" and she says, "The American ambassador." Actually, it was David Bruce and it was very near the end of his stay in London. Since he had been in London for eight years, the American embassy was about the third in precedence so you had to walk all the way through Buckingham Palace, which was filled with diplomatic entities. He had been having a farewell dinner with the chief of protocol, the Duke of Norfolk, and he couldn't get through in time so there you had the Queen saying, "He's not there. He's late" but they showed it after the presentation and they never showed that it was really David Bruce rather than Annenberg.

They played these little games and it was a very, very difficult time for him. He had a very different style. The embassy residence was changed dramatically. David Bruce had been in London essentially off and on since 1941. He had been head of the OSS for Europe and so his style was just very, very different. Regents Park [the residence] looked very different. The Annenbergs came in and spent an enormous amount of their own money and made it into a showcase, a showcase in their style. The government benefited by having a building redone and redecorated, but it was totally different in style and the contrast was pointed out as something [at which] the British looked down their noses at that particular time. He was there a very long time. He ended up giving an enormous amount to the country and was knighted at the end and left with great prestige and dignity, but it took a very long time. I was there at the worst possible time, six of the months of greatest unhappiness.

Q: One of the things that is always difficult is the British media, TV and all. One, there is a leftward bias to the bright young things who are doing it, plus the fact, as you say, they may be anti-Semitic, but even more, they enjoy tweaking Uncle Sam's tail.

KRYS: It was great sport. That's exactly right and it was a nasty piece of business.

Q: Nasty is the right word.

KRYS: Yes, it was.

Q: Obviously Annenberg lasted this out and sort of won them over.

KRYS: As I said, it was a very unhappy period.

Q: Were the special assistants there acting as a buffer and explaining that this, too, shall pass, or could you look at it that way in those days?

KRYS: It was very hard to look at it that way. I think I became part of [the] old group and when you do change, the lesson for the special assistant is, really don't stay on, move on, because you are part of something that [is past]. It was a very hard transition for me, and it was time for me to leave. I know he felt that, and I know I felt it. There is no explaining [it], and I certainly didn't try to make those kinds of excuses, but I was clearly very much identified with the previous administration even in his eyes, not at the outset and far less so with Mrs. Annenberg. Of course they were there a long time, and it did work out for them.

Q: Obviously, Bruce had been around a long time and had become one of the grand old men of the Foreign Service and then to have a new man with a lot of money coming in, although it has to be expected, did you find that the embassy was a little bit hostile or not? How did they respond to it?

KRYS: I think most of the transition took place after I left six months [later]. There was a change of two DCMs [during] my [tour]. I think there was much more front office direction. One or two of our colleagues in the Foreign Service saw there was a golden ring and sought to grasp it. It was just a very different style and I'm really not the best one to comment. I was part of the old style, and there is a lesson.

Q: Really, in a way, it's to move on.

KRYS: Absolutely. I had agreed and both ambassadors asked if I would stay six months and I stayed six months literally to the day. He had brought a special assistant with him, a socialite from Philadelphia, who was not to have a substantive role but that increasingly changed as you can imagine.

Q: Were you able to see on the substantive side any difference in style in dealing with the British between the late Johnson and very early Nixon administrations?

KRYS: No. I think it took place in a more gradual manner between the two countries than within the leadership of the mission. You have to go back to the fact that there were really very few major outstanding issues between the two countries. When Richard Nixon came in, he talked about having come in with a plan. The plan was to erase what would have been the most serious irritants in the relationship, but between the two countries, there were very few. To this day there are very few outstanding issues.

Q: Outside of the basic blip of Suez in '56.

KRYS: That's right and now at this point we were into the end of '69 so it was 13 years later. While there may have been a burr under their saddle, it was a well worn burr.

ROBERT E. HUNTER
Student and Lecturer, London School of Economics
London (1965-1968)

Teacher/Lecturer, London School of Economics
London (1968-1970)

Ambassador Hunter was born in Massachusetts and raised in Virginia and New Jersey. He earned degrees from Wesleyan University (Connecticut) and the London School of Economics, where he also was Lecturer. He served in the White

House on the National Security Council and on Capitol Hill in the office of Senator Edward Kennedy. After serving with several private organizations, the Ambassador was Campaign Manager for William Clinton in his 1992 Presidential Campaign. In 1993 he was appointed US Ambassador to the European Union and served there until 1998. Ambassador Hunter was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: You got a Fulbright, and you went where?

HUNTER: I was supposed to go to the University of Manchester. I'd applied for Oxford. Somebody said be careful what you wish for, you may get it. The opposite as well. I've always believed if you have lemons, make lemonade. Some younger people ask me how I was so successful. I say, first, you're begging the question of whether I'm successful or not. I don't really look at it that way. Then I say, nobody can ever tell you how to follow a pattern. Work hard, do your best, be interested. I say I'm kind of a bumper car. I'll go along and I'll bump into an obstacle and then I bounce off and I go somewhere else. That's why I'm kind of a dilettante in some ways. I bump into lots of obstacles and get up and go somewhere else. What happened, we were in England, and they had a marvelous orientation program for the new Fulbright Scholars. The British took it very seriously on their side. We were still in the era of remembering Marshall Aid and Lease-Lend, as they called it. The "special relationship." It was still at a time before you had the great onslaught of people traveling all the time, travel was by ship, mostly. My first two years in England, I didn't go home at all. Making a phone call was something you did every other year. Telegrams, 22 words in a telegram. I remember some friends of mine back here got married, and I sent them a telegram that said, "There's ringing of bells and singing of birds, what else can I say in twenty-two words?" That's 22 words long, plus the address, and letters you would write on these little flimsy foldover papers if you didn't have much money.

One of the Fulbright orientation meetings we had was a lecture someplace in London on the Common Market. I had gone over to England to be a political economist. I saw that this was a coming field, coming out of my education, to bridge the two disciplines. I said, "That's where we need to be going, what we need to do in the world and do at home." Transformations. In that sense, I had come to Washington for those two summers and, yes, the Kennedy thing in that sense caught me up. Internships, I don't know what they're like today, it was a big deal back then. Kennedy took it very seriously. In fact, I remember that summer of '61, there were all kinds of common intern programs, lots of little meetings all over town. Kennedy instructed every presidential appointee to get involved with the interns. I remember it was either that summer or the next, being in one meeting, where the speaker was Averell Harriman, who was the Assistant Secretary of State for Far East affairs. Even though he had been a governor and a senior ambassador, he decided he would be prepared to be an assistant secretary of state, if that's all he could get, in order to be of service. So he was speaking, and some student got up, I remember this vividly. I'm a great admirer of Harriman. Throughout my education and government experience, I kept running into him, historically. Everything I ever discovered that was important in the development of Atlantic relations and Europe, it was Harriman doing something. Pamela, of course, was a good friend by the end. She was a super ambassador to Paris. I remember Harriman that evening, some kid says, "Tell me governor, why do they call you the crocodile?" A silence fell over the room. Harriman said, "Because young man, I am as mean as you are

rude.” It was a wonderful comeback. That was the kind of thing, it was exciting. Something new was happening. You are of that generation, close enough, to know what it was like, and this was when the Peace Corps started, all kinds of things. It was service to one’s country and one’s government. Things that you could do in society. It was coming out of the post-war world in which we’d gotten a certain amount of prosperity, and then people started looking around for things to do in terms of the larger society. It’s kind of hard to explain this to other generations later on. I sometimes think that the tragedy of the inflation and the other economic problems that happened under Jimmy Carter -- at my own university, 85% of my class went to graduate school, went into public professions of one kind or another. But after that inflation hit and the economic fears, all of a sudden undergraduates were doing pre-med, pre-law, and other subjects that would make money. I am pleased to say that, at Wesleyan, students have gone back again to the great Little Three tradition, all three of them, of service. Coming out of the religious foundations and similar backgrounds. The kind of nonconformist foundations of the Wesleyan Methodist tradition, also Amherst and Williams. I’m reading a book now on Oliver Wendell Holmes, about Unitarians at Harvard and other places.

Anyway, so I was in this Fulbright session in London, and it was on the Common Market, and I was fascinated. They had a couple of the really very top people. I went up afterwards, and there was a speaker named Bill Pickles, from the London School of Economics, who really fascinated me. I said “I’m over here, I’m going to Manchester doing political economy, I’m fascinated by this.” I talked with him for a few minutes. He says, “Why don’t you come to LSE and be my student?” I said, “Well, I can’t, I’m going to Manchester.” He said, “I’ll take care of it.” So he went to a truly remarkable woman named Anne Bohm, running the LSE graduate school, and she organized it, and they went to the Fulbright Commission and, by God, I got switched to go to the London School of Economics. It was wonderful, being a Fulbright, when they took it very seriously there. One of the good things, it’s right smack in the center of London, the London School of Economics. It’s right off the Aldwych, it’s this set of gray stone buildings. It’s right down by the Aldwych Theatre and across from Bush House, home of the BBC World Service, right at the bottom of Kingsway. I had a student friend from Malaysia who said that, before he came to LSE, he had imagined it was like St. John’s College in Oxford, and he said he came and he saw these gray stone little buildings on this back street and he said to himself, “This is it?” No campus, not a blade of grass. Anyway, I also got discovered then through this process, since I got involved at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, by a man named Andrew Shonfield, who was the Director of Studies, later head of Chatham House, later head of the European College in Florence. One of the great men of British academic public life. It was kind of a struggle for my soul between him, he was pro-Common Market, and Bill Pickles, who was deeply Laborite-skeptical. That was right at the time of the British application to join the European Economic Community, and then the veto by de Gaulle. So they struggled for my soul. Shonfield won on the Common Market. I recall right off the bat, sitting in the LSE library and going through the Treaty of Rome, line by line, marking it up so I could try to understand it. That’s an old habit: to read official documents stem to stern, not just to accept someone else’s summary. You’d be surprised what you learn that way! Also, one of the great things about being an American, I’m sure probably happens to Rhodes Scholars, too, but certainly it’s Fulbrights who have it, we were treated as being outside of the British class system. We could go anywhere, we were taken seriously, whether we deserved it or not. We had access to institutions, access to

the smartest people, all kind of things, from a tender age. So I spent an extraordinary period of time there.

Q: You were there what, two years?

HUNTER: Seven years.

Q: Good heavens.

HUNTER: I set the all-time record for getting a PhD. I just couldn't get my thesis written. I wrote up an op-ed article yesterday in about 45 minutes, I spent another half an hour fixing it. It is almost impossible for me to write books. My wife, Shireen, writes books at about the pace that I am writing op-ed articles! Different temperament. But I was at LSE seven years and two months. I set the all-time record at that point. It's since been broken, getting a doctorate. There are no requirements, except writing a thesis and living there for two years, so it was again being in the deep end, but I got one hell of an education. Integrated studies without calling it integrated studies. Across the lot, learning to think, bringing all the aspects of the discipline together in a way that I don't think there's any place in the United States where it's taught like that. It doesn't exist. It's one reason I think we have a fairly limited range of people who are able to think that way in foreign affairs in this country.

Q: Was there a London School of Economics influence, I keep thinking of Africa and maybe India and some other places, where there seems to be a line there of socialist control, which I think has been a disaster.

HUNTER: It's one of these things where people don't pay attention. A single person defined LSE that way and that was Harold Laski. Obviously, it was founded by the Fabians, George Bernard Shaw and the Webbs, Sidney and Beatrice, in 1896. But at the time I was there, it was not left-wing. Economics was probably center or right of center. Development strategy, Lord Bauer as he's now called, was a conservative development specialist. International relations was conservative. Yes, this was the time of the so-called "troubles" at LSE in 1967, '68, when I was there. That was as much as anything people in the sociology and the law departments running experiments, and there was a great deal of jealousy about student protests in America: "If America's got it, we can have it." But most of the School wasn't involved in the demonstrations. It was one of these things where it had a reputation it simply doesn't deserve. It's staggering. Yes, LSE had a lot of people come from various other countries. Some were socialist, a lot of them weren't. Some got an education and went back, but it was not because of the university they took particular views. It's become a kind of a joke. There was one play I remember in London, in which people were captured by this African revolutionary leader, and they were paraded in front of him in the deepest jungle, and one line is, "So how do you speak such good English?" He says, "Well, of course, I studied at the LSE." Left-wing reputation not deserved. Fantastically high quality. I was fortunate, the people in International Relations in those days were as good as anybody in the world. Some names you would have heard of, some names you wouldn't have heard of.

Q: What were you looking at as far as for your dissertation pieces?

HUNTER: The first year I was just a Research Student and was doing European Economic Community and nuclear strategy. I'd written an undergraduate paper on NATO and looked a little bit at NATO, but mostly the EEC. I started out, as I say, to be a political economist. They took me under their wing. Christmas time, the first time ever going to the Continent, and Bill Pickles arranged when I was in Paris to meet this pal of his whose name was Raymond Aron, who spent three hours with me. You were a 22-year old kid and you're having a chance to be exposed, one-on-one, to one of the giants. I was fortunate as a senior at Wesleyan, doing all kinds of things. Had a small course with a visiting professor who was writing an important book. Her name was Hannah Arendt. It was right at the time of the Eichmann trial and that was a fascinating experience, having a chance to be pounded on in terms of ideas by Hannah Arendt. It was intellectually a door-opening experience. Of course, within the Jewish tradition, she was irascible. Of course, the Jewish tradition in general, in being irascible, is cutting across intellectual and cultural and political boundaries, something I greatly value, interaction with an intellectual tradition that is not just run by rote.

So here I was in LSE, and I got involved with other things. Bush House, BBC World Service, was across the way and I used to... starting when I was about 23, I paid my way through graduate school after the Fulbright ran out, by broadcasting for the BBC, and doing television.

Q: What were you broadcasting?

HUNTER: Foreign affairs, whatever they wanted. A friend of mine, Philip Windsor, who is the greatest teacher I have ever met, and probably the finest person in this business I ever met, said "Never, never, never say 'No' to the BBC." He later claimed he never said it. It was a pound-a-minute (\$2.80) in those days. A stunning amount of money. I got involved at Chatham House. And involved at a relatively new institution called the Institute for Strategic Studies, run by another one of the great men of this business, Alistair Buchan, who founded it along with Michael Howard and Denis Healey. Sir Michael Howard, one of the outstanding military historians. At the end of the first year, having gone through this, first time abroad and all the things that happen to you, etcetera, etcetera – an insular American kid dumped in a foreign country and learning about one's own country more than you can possibly learn at home -- I decided, having postponed law school long enough, that I would, having done quite well on the Law School Boards, that I would pick that up again. Got accepted at Harvard Law, paid my registration fee, and then it was about the end of June and Dr. Anne Bohm called me and she said, "We have a new scholarship here. Financed by a trust called the Noel Buxton Trust. It's a three-year thing, it's to study international relations, and I want you to have it." Well, I was kind of feeling intimidated about going to law school. I've always felt that I'm never going to make it at the next level I have to go into. Taking that next step... so I accepted that in lieu of going to Harvard Law School. And, as they say, I never looked back. It was the wrong decision in terms of building the kinds of contacts one needs in a square-corners career, financially, certainly. In terms of learning and being able potentially to make a greater contribution to society, I made the right decision. Noel Buxton came out of the First World War. His family was Truman's Beers. He became a pacifist, some people said he felt so guilty about the origin of his money, he went for temperance, that he endowed this trust. The trustees decided in this particular year that they would found a bursary for international relations. I held it the first time. The second person who

held it was a close friend of mine, Adam Roberts, later had a named-chair at Oxford and just got his knighthood last year. Fine human being. Adam came out of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), a unilateral disarmer, but he decided that, if you're going to do something about these nuclear weapons you're going against, you'd better learn something about them. So he got himself educated and went in a different direction. He's one of the outstanding people in this business. Anne Bohm was an extraordinary woman. She was a Jewish refugee from Germany in the '30s. Through a sequence of events, she ended up at the LSE and went with it when it was moved to Cambridge for the war, and she got involved with some of the real greats, including the man who was both a University of Chicago economist and LSE teacher, one of the world's leading economists. He was probably there when you were there, Lionel Robbins. He was later chairman of the *Financial Times*. Anne ran the graduate school at LSE virtually by herself, with one assistant. She was one of the highest energy, most active minds, most effective people I've ever met. As I say, she took me under her wing, and she is 91 years old now [at the time of the interview] and we continue to be fast friends. She was one of these people who got people out of Germany, got them jobs, rescued a lot of people. Not just helping German Jews get out, but also others, and also got people jobs so they could be productive in their new lives. I'm a student of the Second World War. These experiences have shaped my life in terms of "never again."

Q: This is of course the cornerstone of what we did with the Marshall Plan and everything, basically to keep the fractioned Germans from going at each other.

HUNTER: People don't understand. The European Union as it's now called was created in order to prevent Germany from going to war again.

Q: I get a little disturbed when I see some of our present foreign policy.

HUNTER: My whole career has been based upon doing the things that will prevent having another Second World War or anything like that. Being a student of it, starting off as a child during the war -- greatly removed, obviously, as an American -- but there was a munitions plant, my father worked on this thing called a "war." I remember being told about the bomb being dropped, I remember V-E Day, I remember V-J Day, and later being told about the killing of this man Gandhi, my mother told me about it, and how it was a great tragedy.

Q: I'm trying to do this in segments. I was wondering, you took this next scholarship and this lasted until when at the LSE?

HUNTER: It was good for three years -- two years and renewable for a third -- and then I went "on the economy." That was after a break of nearly a year when I was back here. I taught at LSE for two years at the end, but in between I lived hand-to-mouth on what little I could earn from lecturing and broadcasting. I did an awful lot of public speaking at miniscule fees, here and there all over the United Kingdom, and a couple of times in Ireland. I found that I could live without structure and could live without a job. There were times I would go have breakfast someplace, John's "Cafe" on Lamb's Conduit Street, and have to think about whether I could spend the extra sixpence for a second cup of tea, that kind of thing. I was always right on the edge. I did a lot of other things, too, in my London years. In the summer of '63, I worked for the Polaris Project

again in London. We'd had the Nassau Agreement in which the US agreed to sell Polaris missiles to Britain, and they created a small US Navy office in the Admiralty. If you turn around, you'll look right there, there's a photograph of the office in the Admiralty. There's a statue of Captain Cook in front of it, right by Admiralty Arch, just where that white van is. We had a little four-person office, it was a Navy captain, a gruff Supply Corps officer named Phil Rollins, as fine an officer as you will ever meet, and me and a secretary and a civil servant, teaching the Brits about this system they were getting, so I spent that summer with the Royal Navy. It was fantastic. I got a US civil servant's salary and access to the PX, so I was living a wonderful life.

Then, the next year, '64, I decided I would like to work again for the Polaris Project with the US Navy at the Admiralty, but they didn't have room. I said to myself, "Well, maybe I can go back and work in the Pentagon or something like that." I tried that, and got turned down for an internship at the Pentagon, so I said, "What the hell, I'll go home anyway, and spend a summer and see what I can find." I came back and roomed with a couple of friends of mine here, because I hadn't been back for two years, time to renew one's roots. One of the things -- you've lived abroad as a Foreign Service Officer, so you understand that -- when you get immersed in another culture, you've got to keep coming back home, and you've got to keep relating the two cultures to one another, because one thing about other cultures is that, for most people, they are very compelling. That's why they're cultures. If you live in the culture as I did in England and you get immersed in it, you start picking up certain aspects of identity. Then you come back and you relate to being an American, then going back, there's a huge shock going each way. Eventually, you integrate all this to great benefit. That's what foreign services are all about, to be able to interpret the world to us and us to the world, because Foreign Service Officers have a capacity to see the two things. That's why it's a greatly underrated profession. Anyway, about the first of May 1964, I read about a visiting scholar at Wesleyan who'd been there for a year, my senior year, writing a book, named Douglass Cater, who'd been with Reporter magazine. His father had been the editor of a newspaper in Montgomery, Alabama, great civil rights people. So I'd had a tutorial with Cater at Wesleyan. I read in Time magazine that President Lyndon Johnson had asked Cater to come down to be a Special Assistant in the White House, to run education and other things for him. So I said, what the hell, he'd be an interesting guy to work for. So I wrote to a professor I'd had in the Wesleyan Government Department, Joe Palamountain. He'd gone off to be president of Skidmore, and I wrote, "Do you think this guy Douglass Cater might be interested in my services?" I came back to Washington, rooming with these friends and looking for a job, and somebody forwarded a letter to me, it was from Palamountain. It was a copy of a letter that he'd sent to Cater, and the response from Cater saying to have me give him a call. So I called up the office and I went to see Doug Cater, beginning of July 1964. Two weeks later, I was working at the White House. Spent just about a year there.

Q: Let's talk about the time you were in the UK (United Kingdom). Was there a growing anti-American movement? Or was it anti-Vietnam? Did you see things changing?

HUNTER: There was a lot of skepticism about Vietnam. Part of that was -- and, of course, it was different in various parts of the society -- part of that was concern that the United States was going in a bad direction and that would take away from American engagement in Europe. Of course, there were widespread debates there as elsewhere. Another book to write I guess. There was a combination of opposition to Vietnam, along with a mimicking of the American radical

movement and the American societal transformation. One of the things is that we were going through this period of, I don't know how many different elements. The racial transformation, the role of government in society to give people opportunities, the freeing up of the first of the sexual revolutions, and the musical revolution... all of these things were happening at the same time, and then Vietnam.

Q: It was called the Sixties Syndrome, kind of.

HUNTER: Whatever you want to call it, and all of it was good except Vietnam, where the problem in terms of tragedy for our country, in addition to a lot of people dying, which was bad enough, was that the white middle class, which really fueled the Great Society, moved away from the Great Society and from racial issues to take care of their own kids, who were vulnerable to going off and being killed. That's a major reason I'm convinced that Martin Luther King became so anti-war. Not only that blacks were dying disproportionately, but that his constituency was disappearing. They could say the Great Society disappeared, even though ironically, Nixon carried it on. Nixon carried on the Great Society. Put up more money than even Johnson had. It was only well after Nixon, when we got to Reagan, that the whole thing collapsed.

Q: At the London School did you find, I mean, this is one of the producers of I suppose of what the British call the chattering class.

HUNTER: In my case, at least, out of necessity!

Q: Did you find that within intellectual groups there was a strong anti-American feeling? In France there always has been this with the intellectuals.

HUNTER: In Britain, no. Not at all. Sure, there were, I suspect, in some of the academics who were like that always, but there wasn't anti-Americanism, there was concern about what we were doing in Vietnam. There had been a negative attitude towards Johnson because he was a country bumpkin, but there was a lot of respect, and he was compared to what Kennedy had been. I have to tell you, even Kennedy hadn't been that popular in England before the assassination. I was there during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the popular view was that America was screwing things up, and it was only when Khrushchev admitted what he'd done that it flipped over. When Kennedy died, there was a tremendous outpouring of affection, and I thought at the time that it was even more so because there were the memories of how they had not trusted Kennedy and blamed him for the Cuban Missile Crisis, until the Khrushchev statement. But here along comes Johnson, and the only film they had on television was something shot by a local station, down in Texas, of Johnson riding up on his horse and getting off and pushing his hat back and saying something to the camera for his local constituents. By God, here's this cowboy. But they began to learn that, even though they didn't like Vietnam, this guy was really accomplishing things for American society. Of course, they looked down their noses a little bit at us -- this was the time when the argument was that they needed to be Athens to our Rome! -- but it wasn't anti-American, as such. Anti-Vietnam, not anti-American.

Q: Were you looking at British society because, and this is Margaret Thatcher talk, the British economic model didn't seem to be working very well, or how was it at the time?

HUNTER: They had a lot of economic problems, and still had the class system, which was slowly being broken down. It's dramatic in the last few years what has happened. Back then, they were still paying for the war. You could go around London in the early '60s and, even in the street where I lived, it was gap-toothed. You'd walk along and here would be a building that had been bombed in 1940 and still hadn't been replaced. They were still digging their way out from under in 1945, '46, but, as part of the price of US financial aid at the end of the war, we required them to make the pound convertible, and they lost billions and billions of pounds within 24 hours. Bad US economic policies. They were doing an awful lot of things, then, moving in the right direction. One thing, they valued education then far more highly than British society does now. Margaret Thatcher ruined the British educational system, particularly the higher educational system, by totally devaluing it. Yes, they've advanced economically, but I wonder whether the price of Thatcher-ism and Blair-ism -- Blair is just a Thatcher in different clothing -- whether in terms of the quality of British society, it's been worth it. I'll let somebody who lives there judge that. I had the good fortune, since I'd been a Fulbright, of having doors open to everything. I was in seminars and meetings with high quality people. For example, the LSE used to have these evening seminars on economics and security with some of the greats in the profession, like Alastair Buchan, and I was the rapporteur, doing reports on the meetings. I was in a meeting this last weekend in Geneva, and there were two very senior retired British diplomats there who were in the seminars 40 years ago. Later, they played a major part in building some of the central UK foreign policies. Some of these seminars were on European Union relations, then it was the European Economic Community, at the time of Britain trying to go in and not succeeding at that point. These meetings were held in a room named for Graham Wallas -- ironically, the guy who coined the phrase "great society" fifty years before Johnson used it. So I had the good fortune of being dropped in the deep end of a very important pool and having access to things.

Also, as an American in Britain, you were outside the class system, so you could go anywhere you wanted and, as soon as you opened your mouth, you were recognized as an American, you weren't upper class, middle class, working class. You could go into the working class part of the pub, where no middle class Englishman could go, and then you could go around and go into the Private Bar, the Lounge. The pubs were segregated. The Public Bar was for working class, and the Private Bar or Lounge was for middle class. That was it. The beer was cheaper in the Public Bar. Literally. It would be on the same counter with a glass partition and it would be tuppence less to get a pint on one side than on the other. That happens here, too, you know. We are in the process of creating a class system in the United States that we didn't have before.

Q: I remember in the Foreign Service when I called up a British embassy you could almost tell what type of job the person had by their accent.

HUNTER: Of course. The civil service there had three grades: Administrative, which strikingly is actually the top level, and the bottom was Clerical, and the middle one was Executive. It was done by class. If you got a first at Oxford or Cambridge, you could compete for the Administrative grade, and once you entered you were frozen for life. The day you entered you were frozen in that class for life. You couldn't migrate from Executive to Administrative.

Q: It's a different world.

HUNTER: As I said, we are heading in that direction, we are heading toward a class system here much more intensely, and it's tragic.

Q: Money differences, educational differences.

HUNTER: Which go together. The manner in which the American public school has been depressed by people who are sending their kids to private school in order to guarantee that they can have the access to privilege in the next generation. Reagan set out to do that, this current administration [George W. Bush] is doing that with abandon. "No child left behind" as long as his parents are wealthy, even reasonably wealthy.

Q: After the election, this would have been November of '68 on. Then what did you do?

HUNTER: I went back to LSE, and I was then teaching at LSE and working at the Institute for Strategic Studies, full-time both places. That year I earned \$11,000. Four thousand pounds. Which made me, in those days, upper-middle class in English society! That was before the huge inflation. Great disparities. The pound was worth an awful lot. Everything was cheap. I practically killed myself. I finished my Ph.D., wrote a book on NATO, did lots of other things. Went out to the Middle East, all around, then wrote two Adelphi Papers for the Institute for Strategic Studies on the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

Q: You were doing this how long?

HUNTER: I was two years teaching at LSE, and I finally finished my PhD. and came back to DC in December of '69 and kicked around for a while. Worked at the Democratic National Committee, wrote four speeches for Humphrey called the Pillsbury Lectures. It was the 100th anniversary of the Pillsbury Company, and John Stewart and I wrote them.

Q: And of course Humphrey's from Minneapolis.

HUNTER: In fact, these lectures still stand up. I wrote them with John Stewart, who was Humphrey's chief domestic guy. One of the great public servants of modern American history. He was the man who, in addition to Humphrey, more than anybody else pushed through the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and he was the chief issues guy in the '68 Humphrey campaign, etcetera. One of the extraordinarily dedicated, smart people who helped shape the good things that have happened domestically in this country in the last half century. So John got this commission from Humphrey, and he brought me in and he and I, with some advice from a couple of other people, including my LSE friend, Philip Windsor, wrote these four Pillsbury Lectures for him.

Q: I'd like to go back for a minute, from '67 to '69. Institute for Strategic Studies.

HUNTER: Yes, it's now called the International Institute for Strategic Studies, IISS.

Q: What was their role?

HUNTER: It was created in 1958 by essentially three people. Alastair Buchan, who had been a journalist here in Washington for *The Observer*. One of the extraordinarily fine people, with a very sharp mind, a sense of the coming issues, and a tremendous eye for talent. He recruited some outstanding people, almost all of whom have gone on to leading careers in strategic studies, foreign policy. Michael Howard, who ended up as Regius Professor at Oxford -- one of the highest quality military historians -- and Denis Healy, who later became Secretary of State for Defense, with Alastair created the ISS. It was in London, just off the Strand. It was created largely to "speak truth to power," that is, American power. In other words, to have a place, as America's role was evolving, where you could get people, both in and out of government, to talk honestly with one another. The US always had a lot of government support from Britain on US foreign policy, but as we got deeper into the Cold War, the ISS drew in people to help shape American foreign policy by speaking truth to power. As a result, during the '60s, the ISS did I think more genuinely creative thinking about the world than many other places, because they weren't hung up on the ideology. They didn't have to come out with the right answer. The right answer didn't have to be either "be in Vietnam or be against it." It didn't have to have, as we were building up the Cold War doctrines and everything, the patriotic requirement to come up with particular answers. They did extraordinary work. Not many of them are left. Michael Howard is still around, he's in his 80s now. Denis Healy is still alive, but Buchan died a long time ago. The ISS isn't what it used to be, because "speaking truth to power" isn't what it sees itself as doing, anymore. There are a lot of places where that could be useful, but it isn't done. Of course, the strategic profession now is in gross disarray. I was fortunate to be involved with the ISS at that time. I had a lot of lucky breaks, in terms of being able to work with, for, or observe some extraordinary human beings who had a major creative impact on the shape of the world, domestically and foreign. I've been a very privileged fly on the wall.

Q: Of course, one of the purposes of these oral histories is to pick up these flies on the wall. Can you characterize the view from the Institute about the Soviet Union during this period, particularly '68 to '70 or that era? Was it a menace?

HUNTER: Let's put it this way. There was far more analytical emphasis than political or emotional-ideological emphasis. I mean, you've got a problem, and what do you do about it? It's about power, it's about conflicting ideologies. It's not about manhood or fear and that sort of thing. I won't say dispassionate, but let's say a heavy emphasis on trying to figure out what was going on, like there were a lot of people here at RAND at the time doing that kind of thing. One thing we in the US lack today, in 2005, is that we don't have enough people to do that. At that time, the ISS people were part of the development of *détente*. Not from a leftist ideological perspective, but how do you get through these problems? How do you prevent the world from being blown up? The ISS quarterly journal, which came out more often in those days, Alastair gave it the name *Survival*. If you look back at it, extraordinary people wrote for it over the years. *Survival*. In other words, how do we get through this balance of terror, where, whatever you think about it, it has a kind of system to it that, if you get it wrong, you blow up the world? The great and the good came through the ISS. American people from all parts of the political spectrum saw the ISS as a place to pass through, to be engaged with, because there were people

there genuinely wrestling with the most important questions. I was fortunate to sit there and watch it happen and even play a small part in it.

Q: You put out that you look at the world and what you do about Survival, but who was reading this? Where was the impact?

HUNTER: It was read by just about everybody who mattered in the strategy business. One key publication, then and now, is *The Military Balance*. In fact, I have got copies of the last several annual issues here. The ISS began early on to produce an annual publication called *The Military Balance*, which went through strategic and military issues, nation by nation, showing comparisons, showing the relationships, it had the facts and figures. For particular reasons, it was *the* best source of global military data in public. It became the Bible. Anywhere in the world, if you wanted to have a discussion about the relationship of the militaries of one country to another, beginning with the Soviet Union and the United States, that's the document you worked with. In fact, over the years, I used to run into a lot of Soviets, people from the Soviet Union, who also used it, because they got better information from *the Military Balance* about their own forces, you know, for research, than they could get in their own country. Let's say there were a lot of very senior people around who made sure it was accurate.

Q: How was the role of Great Britain at that time, because it was going down and down? Was there concern that Great Britain was no longer a military force?

HUNTER: It was still a military force. It was a significant force on the Continent, and it had its nuclear capacity. Until '68, the British had the major Western deployments just East of Suez. We look back and, today, we see where Britain is in terms of its military power. One has to realize that, going into World War II as one of the top two or three in the world, we then eclipsed them, and coming out of World War II, they had a lot of problems, but they still were not insignificant. By the late 1960s, British military power was going down, but one has to remember that, just because somebody is relatively less important, now, doesn't mean they were down earlier. So they were taken very seriously, sure. They were the premier American ally.

Q: I remember as a kid, I grew up in Annapolis and everything was Navy-oriented, and I remember a book in which the author was advocating that we would have a fleet that was bigger and better than the British. This is a 1940s book, I think. But wasn't the late 1960s about the time when the British pulled out of East of Suez?

HUNTER: That was in '68. The East of Suez announcements to withdraw, sure. Where we then picked up the final set of British and French responsibilities. Which haunt us today because, as I argued at the time, through no fault of our own, we acquired all the opprobrium of the British and French colonial misbehavior. We go around saying we didn't do this, and we're right, we didn't do it, but we're seen in many of these countries as the legatee of British and French misbehavior, and so we have had in some countries to struggle back to square one.

Q: We're still dealing with the British and French carving up the Middle East right after World War I.

HUNTER: The British, when they created Iraq, followed the historic Ottoman idea, which was to have the majority Shiites dominated by the minority Sunnis, and the Kurds kind of left out in the cold. Saddam picked it up, but it changed when we picked up responsibility for Iraq's future in 2003. Now it's shattered, and we're in a circumstance where, for the first time in 300 years, it genuinely has to be sorted out, and we have to help do it.

WILLIAM J. GALLOWAY
Political Officer
London (1965-1974)

Mr. Galloway was born and raised in Texas and educated at Texas A&M. After service in the US Army in World War II, he joined the State Department in 1948. In his career as Foreign Affairs Officer, Mr. Galloway held a number of high level positions dealing primarily with International organizations including NATO and the European Union. His overseas posts include London, Paris and Vienna. In Washington, Mr. Galloway served as Special Assistant to the Director General of the Foreign Service and as Executive Assistant to the Undersecretary for Management. Mr. Galloway was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: Today is the 29th. of October, 1999. It is now 1964 and you are off to London. You were in London from '64 to when on this particular tour?

GALLOWAY: Actually, that should be '65. I was at the national war college in '64. In London from '65 to '74.

Q: Wow! All together. OK well, let's start at the beginning. When you arrived there, what was your job and what was the embassy like at the time?

GALLOWAY: When I arrived, my position was first secretary in the political section, and my assignment was to cover the Conservative Party which was not in power at that time.

Q: What party was in power then?

GALLOWAY: The Labour Party was in power.

Q: Who was the prime minister, Harold Wilson?

GALLOWAY: Harold Wilson. Labour had won the election just the year before, and they were getting things going. They were starting some of the programs they had been hatching for quite a long time. Wilson called another election a year or so later when the tide was very much in Labour's favor and got an additional five years on to 1970.

When I arrived, David Bruce with his legendary experiences, service, reputation and stature was Ambassador. He presided over the embassy with the charm and ease of a Virginia patrician, and had the full support and admiration of the staff. Bruce was his own political, economic, whatever reporter when he thought something merited his personal attention. Otherwise, he delegated responsibility for running the embassy, both substantively and administratively, to the staff through the Deputy Chief of Mission. He kept himself informed on the work of the staff by informal consultations, weekly staff meetings and reading all incoming and outgoing messages. He liked to read on his feet and had a lectern at the wall to the side of his desk. The DCM at that time was Phil Kaiser who had previously been Ambassador to Morocco. Phil had been a Rhodes scholar at Oxford at a time when many of the current leaders in the parties had been in their university or food line years. He had many friends in both parties and was particularly close to some of the academic dons in the Labour Party. His contacts and insight were significantly beneficial to the embassy. He, as well as Bruce, kept their doors open to all of us and we enjoyed an easy and instructive working relationship.

During that period of time, the political section in London was fairly large compared with most embassies. Two officers were assigned to cover the two main political parties in all aspects, their everyday activities, their performance in the House of Commons, their planning and policy formulation in their party headquarters, their principal ministerial level leaders, and their "backbenchers", or the rank and file of the parliamentary parties. We also had some "plums" to pass out in the form of grants under the Smith-Mundt program, which financed visits to the U.S. by foreign government leaders for a six week tour and consultations around the country. Many of these grants went to members of parliament of both parties. Al Irving was covering the Labour Party when I arrived. He was an old veteran, and they used to call him "the old colonial" down in the House of Commons where he enjoyed the friendship and respect of a large number of Labour MP's. He had been in London for a number of years and was truly an expert on British politics. I moved into the position responsible for "covering" the Conservative Party, or Tories as they were popularly known. I was able to get introductions to two or three key people in the party and branched off from there. I found that the best way for me to get a feel for the operation of government and to learn the numbers of the players, their names, who was doing what, whom to pay attention to and whom not to follow was to attend the sessions at the House of Commons. I did so regularly for about a year or two until I really felt that I knew the system and the players in both parties. That blanket pattern of attendance paid off in other ways. The attendants and doorkeepers there are for the most part retired guardsmen, big six foot plus fellows with grey hair, magisterial bearing and the most cooperative and friendly people one could ever want to know. I got to know some of them very well there in the house, the Sergeant at Arms' office, the Speaker's office and most important, the whip's office. The Chief Whip of the party in power is really the person who runs the House of Commons. The importance of the Chief Whip is illustrated by the office assigned to him and his staff outside Commons.

On Downing Street there are three office/residence buildings. No. 10 is the office of the Prime Minister and his living quarters, No. 11 is the office and housing of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and No. 12 is assigned to the Chief Whip and his staff. I spent quite a lot of time in No. 12 and also had occasions to be in the other two buildings.

Q: Were there two whips, one Tory and one Labour?

GALLOWAY: Yes. They have several subordinate whips appointed according to ability and the geographic area where their constituencies lie. It is generally considered that service as a whip is almost a prerequisite to further advancement to ministerial level appointments. To get to the ministerial plums, one often serves in the whips' office for a year or so. It is there where plans, timing and sponsorship for legislation were put together, not that the whips took the place of party operation as a whole but they largely planned the legislative agenda. Also, the whips were expected to be the locus for two way communication from the backbenchers to the leadership and *vice versa*. Naturally, they carried substantial influence with other MP's. They were key contacts whom I made special efforts to get to know. I faithfully put in a lot of time with them and it really paid off.

Q: Well just, I am not as familiar, I know the general idea of how the British system worked, but you know in the House of Representatives and the Senate so much work is done in committee or in the corridors or something. You can attend Senate or House sessions all the time and not really get too good an idea of what is going on.

GALLOWAY: The British government, being a parliamentary system, is different. The House of Commons has some standing committees, but they are not used in the same manner or as much as our congressional committees. Nor do they have anything like the influence and power of our congressional committees. During the time I was in London, the government did make some efforts to use committees in more substantial roles. In fact they sent people over here from each party to meet with our members of congress to learn about our committee system and how it operates. They came back with mixed opinions. In Britain so much of the business is carried on by debate in the house of commons.. For example, every Tuesday, the prime minister is there for half an hour to an hour and subjected to questions which have previously been filed. He gives answers to these questions, and there is always a follow up to the person who put in the question to ask a supplementary. That is when the fun begins. So, they carry out most of their work in the House of Commons really as a committee of the whole. They use the committees to some extent, but they have no control over the business of the house. It is not necessary for legislation to go through committee before being introduced on the floor.. Committee members as such really don't have all that much more influence in the Commons than back bench members.

My personal view is that the nature of a parliamentary system probably rules out the use of committees such as our congressional committees. In the parliamentary system, the executive and the legislative branches are melded together. To set up parliamentary committees of the scope and authority of our congressional committees on legislation would expose the executive to a serious dilution of his authority and power. It would introduce an institutional change over which the executive could be put in a vulnerable position beyond his control no matter what his parliamentary majority. Few heads of government would willingly make such a concession. To create such an institution of government would necessarily have to be the subject of general popular elections to change the constitution of the government. A prime minister must be able to rely on his cabinet, junior ministers, and whips to control parliament plus the fact that a majority of the members of parliament belong to his party or coalition. Those elements of a parliamentary government comprehend the functions of our congressional committees.

Holding a minority of seats in the House of Commons in 1965, the Conservatives were “Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition”. As such they organized their MP’s into a “shadow government” comprising the party leader as head of a shadow cabinet with shadow ministers named for each government department and junior shadow ministers assigned specific areas of responsibility. The chief whip and his subordinates operated pretty much as they would had they been in power. Seniority and previous ministerial experience has some influence on the shadow appointments, but by no means rule out advancing younger MPs of promise. A good case in point was Margaret Thatcher. I first met her when she was a back bencher while the Tories were in opposition. Her first assignment was in a shadow junior role on taxation, and after some time there, she went on to education. She was an unusual back bencher. I got to know her and her husband, Denis, quite well. We spent some time together socially. They came to our social functions and Denis invited me to some of the social activities at Burmah Oil where he was established. The point I want to make about her position in politics is that she was then the same woman who later became Prime Minister; in other words she would not hesitate to voice her views to anyone whomever. She was different from other women in the House of Commons. She was not particularly liked by her colleagues because of her personality and her kind of aggressiveness. Nevertheless, she was made a member of the shadow cabinet during that opposition period. It came about because it was traditional to have one woman member, and the lady who was already there became unable to continue because of her health. Largely as a result of persuasion by Jim Prior, parliamentary private secretary to party leader Ted Heath, the latter invited Margaret to join their group.

Heath had become party leader shortly after I got there. Sir Alec Douglas Home had been the prime minister and leader of the party until the election in the fall of '64. That's when Labour won the first time. That's when Wilson came in, in '64. After a few months, Sir Alec resigned as Leader of the Conservative Party when he realized that there was dissatisfaction with his leadership among Tory MPs. There had been a lively contest between Reginald Maudling and Edward Heath for the leadership which Heath won.

Q. You were saying with Margaret Thatcher...

GALLOWAY: Yes. I was very impressed by her despite her reputation and relationship with the rest of the Tory MPs. One who shared my views was Jim Prior, Conservative MP for Lowestoft, a constituency in East Anglia. He was a person of solid substance. After leaving Cambridge, he put together all the credit he could muster and bought a farm. He worked hard, did well and obviously gained the respect and confidence of the citizens in his community. He was persuaded to stand for parliament and won his seat in a close election. Soon he was a vice chairman of the party with an office in Conservative headquarters on Smith Square. When Heath won the party leadership, one of his first moves was to name Prior as his parliamentary private secretary. I had met Jim shortly before that and to coin a phrase, he took me under his wing. We became such close friends that he used to stay with us frequently, particularly after the Tories assumed power in the next election and he was in the cabinet. As he asked me, “If Ted doesn’t have a room for me at 10 Downing Street, can you put me up?” He was, of course, my best and most reliable source in London, which I made sure he knew so that he would not share with me anything he did not want known by us. He quickly became Heath’s closest confidant and adviser.

I talked with Jim about Margaret Thatcher and my high regard for her. I told him I was going to recommend her for a Smith-Mundt grant visit to the U.S. She was accepted and spent about six weeks in the states very profitably for her politically. Jim wanted to give her opportunity in the House of Commons, and as I recounted earlier, persuaded Heath, against his will, to take her in the shadow cabinet. According to Jim, she was not shy about joining in the deliberations. She irritated Heath repeatedly, and Jim had to intervene with him frequently to save her neck. By the time of the next general election in 1970, she had established herself as the foremost woman in the party's hierarchy. That did not change the situation, however, that she and Heath could never get along. Unfortunately, that situation persisted even after the Tories gained power, but Heath could not deny her a cabinet post. She became Minister of Education in the Conservative government.

Q: Tell me, as the political officer of the American embassy attending parliamentary sessions, what were you looking for? I mean how did you...

GALLOWAY: I was looking for the way they legislated, for the general lines of policy that emerged. For example, during the first year they were mired in the problem of Southern Rhodesia. That was the main theme, plus their economic situation which was at that point just beginning to look up a bit. The government was more preoccupied with Southern Rhodesia and its fate than just about anything else.

Some of the most heated debates in the House of Commons were over Southern Rhodesia. This was a difficult problem for both parties. One of my recollections, not having to do with the substance of the problem, was that Harold Wilson established himself as a consummate debater and leader during that difficult time, but despite his efforts, a solution eluded the government.

Q: Well, we were very much involved, too, because we had become sort of a party to many of the negotiations.

GALLOWAY: Yes. It was a very difficult thing for all of us because the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia had long been uncooperative with the British, and it was very reluctant to give up anything because the white population there was such a minority. It still was fighting against the inevitability of one man one vote. The Labour Party, of course, was all for working out some kind of transitional arrangement which would allow movement toward that goal. The Conservative party was hopelessly split, although Douglas Hurd, Heath's assistant, passed to me personally a message which Heath wanted the President to know, that when the Tories gained power, they would retain a consular presence. I passed it on but doubted it would help in the U.S. decision on that problem. For two or three years the Labour government wrestled with the Southern Rhodesia problem. They tried to negotiate. Wilson went down to Gibraltar for negotiations. At one time they thought they had made some progress but it collapsed. Inexorably the movement in Southern Rhodesia was just putting the government in a position where it tried to use every device it could think of to hang on to power. Eventually it was unable to do so, and power was shared. Now we have the results of that, fortunately without much bloodshed.

Q: Well, now, as you watch these debates, an awful lot of them must have been internal things in which we would have only a peripheral interest. Were you sort of looking for things where the

United States has an interest which could be on tariffs or foreign policy or NATO or something of that nature?

GALLOWAY: Yes, the daily routine in Commons, over a period of time, gave us a pretty good feel for what to expect from them on policies and programs of interest to us, NATO, Europe in all aspects, commonwealth and colonial issues, and particularly, economic conditions. The embassy was in the position, I think, to report to Washington and give a fairly good picture of what to expect, what not to expect, and what to get into and when to stay away.

Q: Then were you making book as well as your labor officer counterpart, political officer counterpart on where the various people in the Conservative Party stood on things that were of particular or potential interest to the United States?

GALLOWAY: Yes. Well, for example, the European Union was a classic example. Both parties had their problems with it. Both of them initially opposed full British membership. Then, as time went on, developments in both parties led them to move more toward the European structure and scene rather than to remain the outsider. Mainly, their relations with the Commonwealth and the United States caused them to be very cautious about joining the European Union fully.

At the same time the UK attempted to assume leadership with other countries, Sweden, Norway and those around the periphery who weren't sure about the European Union themselves. As you may remember, at one point they formed a separate economic organization mainly on paper which would cooperate with a Western European Union and be a sort of bridge to the rest of the world. Sitting in the House of Commons gave one a feeling of how things were apt to go, how difficult it was going to be for them to join a European union. Also, in the earlier days how much could we depend on them for their continued presence east of Suez, could they stay out there and help out in that part of the world. The Conservative Party was initially pretty sound on maintaining British presence there. The Labour Party was not so much. Then the Conservatives wobbled. When the financial situation became so rigidly confining that they had to watch every penny in the budget, there was just no question of being able to maintain any large military presence anywhere that would be meaningful. With what they had left, they still tried to do the best they could, but during the life of that Labour government, they really in effect cut their ties east of Suez. I remember David Bruce coming in after that vote in the House of Commons and writing one of the few telegrams that he would write personally, giving his views that the British government had just made one of the greatest mistakes in its history by abandoning the policy east of Suez and withdrawing its forces and presence from that part of the world. While I was very strongly committed to that view, as was just about everybody else in our camp, I think I probably had more misgivings about their ability to do it because I was closer to their thoughts and feelings, sitting in Commons listening and talking to people.

Through the good graces of people like Jim Prior and Willie Whitelaw, the chief whip of the Conservatives, I was able to meet and get to know many of the Tory MPs and other Conservative Party officials. One who became a fountain of information and a close friend was Sir Michael Fraser, later Lord Fraser of Kilmorack, who was vice chairman of the party. They had a sizeable staff at party headquarters and nearby a research department which had gained some fame in British politics. It had been established by Rab Butler back in earlier days and had been

responsible for drawing up most of the strategic policies of the party, political, economic and military. It was headed by Michael Fraser for a long time before he became vice chairman, and he had been largely responsible for its development and reputation. He was not only a source of information, but because he was not in the House of Commons himself, he could talk more freely. We could sit down and sort of brainstorm about what might or might not be possible. He was a great source of guidance and information to me. We have kept in touch since I left London, and he and his wife have visited us here in McLean.

Another MP I got to know quite well after he had served as Prime Minister of the previous Conservative government and later resigned as leader of the party was Sir Alec Douglas Home. Some time after he moved out of 10 Downing Street and resigned his party post (incidentally he held the foreign secretary post in the shadow cabinet under Heath) he gave a reception to which I was invited. After looking around, I realized that I was the only non-British person in the room of about 50 to 100 people. Soon the shadow cabinet had congregated out on the balcony and was working out its plans. One of them invited me to join in, and I listened until the confab broke up. I had a pretty good reporting telegram to send to Washington the next day.

After they won the election in 1970, we received a back channel message from the President asking whether Sir Alec would be Foreign Secretary in the new Conservative government. I put the question informally to Heath's office and received the answer that he would be if he wanted it. In any event, that immersion in the functioning of the political parties and the House of Commons coupled with relationships in the foreign office, the treasury, the ministry of defense and various other departments gave us some idea of just how things were apt to go with the new government. Unfortunately, it didn't look all that good because the government simply didn't have the means.

Q: Well, what about during this time of the European, it wasn't the Union at that time, it was the EEC, European community. In particular '65 up to a year or two later, de Gaulle was in power and this was about the time de Gaulle was essentially kicking NATO out of France, How was this received? I mean were we trying to do anything about how we would deal with this. I mean there were two ways of dealing with this. One was if this is the way you want it, we are sorry but we'll just do it nicely which is actually what we did, or the other one was screw you. Do you want us to take our dead from the graves of people who fought for France which was a very tempting thing to do. Was that sort of fought out? How did you see this?

GALLOWAY: If there was any nation with less regard for the French than we, it was the British. As for de Gaulle, they never had any use for him and still had the bad taste in their mouths of his troublesome presence in London during the war. They were in their own way outraged by his actions in NATO and by his decision to withdraw the French military forces from NATO command. That was the device he used so to speak to kick us out. The British, as well as most other NATO members, were united with us when we turned to the French and asked in effect what France proposed to do about all the installations and facilities we had made available to SHAPE forces in France, the lines of communication and all that. There were heated exchanges between our people and French ministers. I recall one of our leaders asking Couve de Murville, De Gaulle's Prime Minister, if he thought the American people would sit still for this enormously costly move in exchange for all the Americans who lay in graves on French soil.

Couve couldn't answer. As time passed, we came to realize that the best thing to do for NATO's continued effectiveness was to move its headquarters out of France. Sitting there with the host government acting with such recalcitrance would not enable NATO to operate the way it should. There were constant disputes with the French over many things. Among the French themselves, cleavage between the Gaullists and the non-Gaullists was very apparent during that period of time. Anyway, NATO finally did as you described.

The French wanted to stay in everything except for forces. They were told that they could no longer participate fully if that was the way they wanted to do it. In that situation we decided the best thing was to move headquarters. NATO went to Brussels.

Q: Were we during this time, I mean were you using your connections and all to tell the British to cool it?

GALLOWAY: Didn't have to. They were not out in front. They were pretty much on their own. We were consulting with them very closely. They were very much in the same frame of mind as we were, so that we really didn't have to tell them to cool it. Of course, the familiar old British attitude, which I always enjoyed, let them feel that with all of their experience with the French, they were really guiding us along.

Q: How did the Johnson administration view Harold Wilson's government? How good were relations would you say between these two administrations?

GALLOWAY: Cordial but not very active. For Wilson and the Labour Party this was their first chance to govern since Atlee's immediate post war government. They had all they could handle. They were naturally more interested in domestic policy. It wasn't long before that priority brought them to conclude that they needed to withdraw the resources committed to their east of Suez presence and cut defense spending generally. They knew we hoped they would do neither, but they really had little choice and the course left for them was just to put their forces under NATO command and try to go on from there.

Q: Well, now, when we were looking at the British, I mean, I assume that while it wasn't in a way our business, it was our concern about how the British dealt with their economy. You know, a strong Britain is a stronger ally. Were we concerned during the Wilson time about the power of the unions particularly the more militant ones that seemed to be able to tie things up and to keep Britain from becoming a powerful country?

GALLOWAY: Yes. We were still giving aid to the British. We did have to push them at times on certain aspects because economic policy would be their only means to stay in power. One issue was price controls. We pretty much forced them to put in price controls as a quid pro quo for further money from us. They did. It was a partial success. As such things happen, theoretically, they can be forced, but actually, when you get down to practicalities, it is never perfect. They muddled through it somehow. They pulled in their horns quite a lot. The economy was still very short on many things, and some were still on ration. They didn't have the money to import much. They were short on things like butter, other dairy products, and meat to some extent although Scotland supplied some meat and certain commonwealth countries, New Zealand

for example. Lamb was one of the staples in Britain at that time. They were scrimping and they were mindful of their major commitment to go through with the national health service. The capital outlay on that at the beginning wasn't too great, but after a couple of years when the demand for capital to maintain hospitals and other medical equipment became critical, they were strapped. The health program was really stretched to perform as they hoped it would. Fortunately, the medical profession cooperated with them. I spent some time in a hospital while I was there, and I found that the sense of cooperation and service by people in the hospital was very high indeed. The atmosphere in the wards of doctors and nurses was caring and close knit. As time went on they had to make some modifications because the costs became so staggering.

As for their relations with France, they were not as close to the de Gaulle problem as we. During that period, de Gaulle was still pushing his favorite concept of trying to create a "political standing group" so to speak. In other words, U.S., U.K., and France would form a political triumvirate to run the alliance and everything else. We rejected that and so did the British. We had never had close relationships with de Gaulle although the Free French had been an ally and post war France was generally friendly to the United States, but more passively than actively. The French were going through their problems in maintaining stability and had so many changes in government during that time. Then, when the North African situation began to simmer and came to a head, it was beyond the political power of the third or fourth republic to handle. Eventually, the public at large tuned to de Gaulle thinking at least the French right wing could get him in power. Once he was in power, he moved quickly to consolidate governmental power around himself. We continued to have contact with him mainly through the presence of the American commander of SHAPE, at that time General Norstad.

Q: Laurence Norstad.

GALLOWAY: He was one of our best. He spent quite a lot of time talking to De Gaulle about international control of NATO air defense. Norstad, being an air force general himself, recognized that the key to a really successful defense of western Europe was a coordinated and integrated air defense. He talked with de Gaulle on several occasions about the benefits this would bring France, how it would enable them to improve their own air defense establishment and communications. De Gaulle wanted to do some of those things, but he wanted more. In fact the French military informally did maintain contact, stayed abreast of what was going on and cooperated in a way without being part of the command structure, but de Gaulle was not going to leave French forces committed as long as he was not also in the top political command, back to the old political triumvirate..

Q: Well, the thing I never quite understood was I spent some time in the 50's in Germany, and in a way life was so much better, no rationing or anything like that. You go over to Britain or to France, all of a sudden the Brits were the only ones who seemed to be having to curb themselves.

GALLOWAY: West Germany certainly recovered itself quickly even though it had born the brunt of much devastation. In a way, I suppose, the damage to its basic infrastructure enabled it to rebuild faster. The Germans just had to start over which was easier than repairing and restoring. They built new structures and got on with it. We were certainly not holding them on very close purse strings at that time as I recall because we wanted to see a democratic Germany

as soon as it could possibly be. As far as the British and French were concerned, we were always urging and pushing them to try to do more. The fact is that the British and French simply did not have the productivity the Germans have in their labor force. That is the main difference. Britain was also short on capital. They had practically bankrupted themselves during the war as had the French. The Commonwealth had become a relationship in name only. They still had Commonwealth preferences, but it was no longer the source of revenue to them that it had been up to the war.

Q: Well during this period up through the end of '68, you had the Johnson administration in, and you were representing the looking after the Conservative Party. Were there any connections between the Republican Party in the United States and the Conservative Party, or were these...

GALLOWAY: Nixon came over on visits a few times. When he did, he made a point of going and talking with the Conservative leaders and the shadow cabinet, people like Ted Heath, Sir Alec Douglas Home and Harold Macmillan and some others. He touched all the bases there. He, incidentally, was a great admirer of Britain. On one visit he made later on as President, he visited the House of Commons. The only President ever to do so, and I made all the arrangements through the sergeant at arms and the chief whip's office.

The sergeant at arms box at that time was just behind the Tory side of the house. He made it available to the President. I had, I think, seven people. Let's see, there was the President, Rogers, Henry Kissinger and two or three others. They were met at the door of the house by the Leader of the House, at that time a Labour MP by the name of Fred Peart. He led the President and his party through the public lobby and then into the lobby where only members and the staff of the house were allowed. Peart took Nixon into that lobby where the members were conversing in small groups and going back and forth into the chamber of the house. The members began applauding Nixon in the lobby. He bowed and smiled and was a very happy man. He really enjoyed that. He was then led into the box and we got them all seated. By that time the word had gone around so that everyone knew he was visiting and taking in their proceedings. I think it was the prime minister's day for answering questions. Every MP who got up to ask a question or to make a comment said something to the effect that he would hope that the Prime Minister in his talks with the President of the United States would bring up such and such. They were all laying out their particular hopes. Nixon was sitting back there smiling really enjoying the occasion. One MP came in during the questioning obviously unaware what was happening and sat down in one of the Tory seats very near to the rear. He was just sitting down and happened to look around. He did the most dramatic double take I have ever witnessed as he saw the box filled with the American President and cabinet members just behind him. It was a happy and friendly session which everyone enjoyed.

Q: Was there, the Wilson administration was still in power when Nixon came in in '69, was there any difference in our attitude with the advent of Nixon and his security advisor, Henry Kissinger?

GALLOWAY: They worked well with the Wilson government. The Wilson government was anxious to work closely with their friends. I remember on the occasion of his visit when he and his party were flying in, something came up about the welcoming remarks the Prime Minister was going to make on the President's arrival. They had passed a copy to us and we had sent them

to the President's party. We got a telegram asking us to try to get to the Prime Minister and request that he make a change in the wording of the text. I went down to the prime minister's private secretary. This was just some hours before arrival. The Prime Minister looked it over and said he would be glad to accommodate the request. The President was already in the air, so we awaited their arrival. When they got off the plane, Hal Sonnenfeldt, one of Kissinger's staff, spied me and asked if we got the message. I responded that the Prime Minister had accepted the change. In fact, the British had seemed to imply that they were somewhat in an inferior position in dealing with the President's staff. They were cognizant of everything they were supposed to do, but I think the class system which had so structured Britain for so many years may have had a little reverse effect in that situation. None or very few of the Wilson people had any direct contacts with people in Nixon's government.

Q: Well, Annenberg came out as ambassador, and he had a very rough time at the beginning, didn't he? What was your impression of this?

GALLOWAY: He had a rough time with the press. It started before he ever left Washington. The foreign relations committee were not all happy about him and made some disparaging, un-called-for remarks during his confirmation hearings. He arrived in England to face the barrage of publicity from Washington surrounding the politics of the appointment and his lack of experience. That was supplemented by his background in Philadelphia which also touched on his family history in Philadelphia and earlier in Chicago.

Q: The father had gone to jail and was involved with Lister.

GALLOWAY: It all came during the Roosevelt administration and was connected to tax evasion. I think his father may have died in prison.

Q: I'm not sure.

GALLOWAY: I think perhaps he died. The action against his father had left a painful wound which Annenberg felt very deeply. He was determined to use the appointment Nixon had given him as a means of restoring his father's good name. He had worshiped his father, and what he had gone through obviously still cast a spell over his life. He had had no diplomatic experience, and even though he was a publisher, he did not have much experience in public relations when he was the target. With the press send off he got from Washington and was taken as a cue by the British, he was certainly in the floodlight from the time he arrived. Then, he did a couple of things early during his London tour which didn't help. Traditionally, the Ambassador's first contact with the British public is a speech at the Pilgrim's Club. Also, traditionally, that speech usually had the theme of Anglo-American unity, kinship, and cooperation - "the special relationship." Well, he decided that he wanted to take the occasion to warn against the drift he saw in young people in America and elsewhere taking stands in irresponsible ways. He thought his listeners would agree that the younger generation should pay attention to history, their parents and forbearers, and have respect for and support government. That was the tone of his speech which made headlines mainly in the sense that it departed from the traditional theme of such speeches at Pilgrims. I don't think there was disagreement with what he said; it was just that he had chosen that particular subject for his speech.

Then he presented his credentials. As you know, he has a speech impediment which he has worked hard all his life to improve, and, indeed it is not so noticeable as to detract from his conversation. But he still had difficulty with it from time to time, particularly when he was in a situation of some stress. When he went to Buckingham Palace to present his credentials, with all the fanfare and ceremony that went with that, he obviously was in a position of some stress. The Queen asked him a question about how he found it in London and how he was situated. He made that famous remark about the embassy residence being in need of some refurbishment. It was sort of a pompous way of saying that it needed to be put in shape before he moved in. This was picked up by the press from the presentation of credentials, and, also, that his wife could not be with him for the ceremony but was nearby in a position to watch. His wife, Lee, was a very charming lady and a force in her own right. The press did its job on the presentation of credentials which led to some developments in how the Ambassador was to conduct embassy business and eventually to his calling me into his office with Bobby Scott and specifying the role he wanted me to follow. Have I mentioned this previously?

Q: No, I don't know what follows.

GALLOWAY: Well, Annenberg had problems with his Ministers, Deputy Chiefs of Mission, from the outset, not through any fault of his but because there had been some very questionable decisions made in the State Department in advance. Phil Kaiser had been DCM under David Bruce. Phil had a foreign service reserve officer commission with a finite term. Phil thought somehow or other that he could get around that and would be allowed to stay to serve with the new Ambassador. Personally, I thought it would have been a good thing if he could stay because he had close contacts with the Labour government. He was bright and easy to work with, had enjoyed a good relationship with David Bruce and the staff worked well under him. I was aware of the limitation on the term of the foreign service reserve appointment, but since Phil was well acquainted in political circles at home, I would not have been surprised if some arrangement to keep him there evolved. Well, not only did it not happen, but also the State Department had set Ambassador Annenberg up to do the dirty work. His first chore was to tell Phil Kaiser that he would have to leave. That was the first contact they had. Phil had invited the Ambassador and Mrs. Annenberg to dinner the first or second night they were there. At dinner, the Ambassador gave Phil the news. There really was little or no cooperation between them from that point. In this strained atmosphere we did the best we could to carry on the embassy's business.

The ambassador was not sure of himself in this new environment. He was, however, a darned good executive. He knew how to manage an organization and he was accustomed to delegating authority to subordinates. He also understood institutional activity and institutional loyalty as contrasted with personal loyalty. He had brought with him a young assistant, Robert Scott, a scion of one of the Philadelphia mainline families. He was very intelligent, personable, friendly and well established as a member of a Philadelphia law firm. My first contact with him concerned the Pilgrims speech which he was drafting. I gave him the history and asked if he thought he could get the Ambassador to change his mind about the topic. Phil Kaiser also tried to get Annenberg to make a traditional speech. Both to no avail. Within a few weeks Bobby Scott came to me for a private talk. He could not work with Kaiser in the circumstances. He was very candid and told me he would appreciate it if I would help him.

Q: Helped in what?

GALLOWAY: So, I helped him out as much as possible to handle the ambassador; to get him acquainted with what he should do in the embassy and what he should do vis a vis the British government, public, and press. We drew up a memorandum for the Ambassador which recommended that he not try to follow in the footsteps of David Bruce as a United States post war diplomatist, and that in fact the situation did not call for that. As far as the embassy and Anglo-American relations were concerned, there was no need for a high level of diplomatic activity in London or for a continuing substantive interchange with the prime minister and the cabinet. We recommended instead that he take on a project of visiting several main areas of the country to meet people outside London to express and promote friendship and good will. We picked out Birmingham, Liverpool, Nottingham, Leeds, York, Edinburgh, and other main cities. He liked it and told me to set it up. From that point, Bobby and I cooperated informally on the whole range of the Ambassador's activities. He and I formed the closest working relationship in the embassy. For the first few months Annenberg pretty much relied on that as his way of getting things done. Bobby was very open. He didn't know how embassies worked and wanted to learn. Together, we functioned as *pseudo* executive directors *in lieu* of a direct line of authority down through the DCM. Given the Ambassador's executive capabilities, the informal arrangement served his purposes. In fact it was intact most of the time he was there and we managed to operate without any major difficulties except for the fact that almost until the time he left, he had trouble with his DCMs.

Q: I interviewed Tom Hughes recently who was one of his DCM's, and Tom was mentioning you and he said that he hadn't realized it but you were sort of the back channel contact with the Conservative Party to the Nixon administration until they came in. Could you comment on that?

GALLOWAY: During the first couple of years I was there, I spent much time at the House of Commons learning just how business was conducted and, at the same time, learning the players and their numbers in the Conservative party. The Tories were receptive and helpful as they got to know me, and because I was the officer in the embassy assigned to "shadow" them, they more or less took me under their wing as one of their own. Since they were in opposition, they didn't have many secrets to protect, so they were glad to fill me with information on their policies, operations and personalities.

Another valuable source of information is their annual party conferences. All parties have them, alternating between various cities. With the Conservatives when I was there, they gathered annually either in Brighton on the southeast coast or Blackpool on the northwest side. These regular reunions are important to the morale, organization, policies and unity of the parties. Representatives from all constituencies in the country gather, meet with party leaders, participate in policy development through their input to the agenda and substance by speaking from the podium, committee meetings, direct exchanges of views with each other and parliamentary leaders. I found that in a concentrated period of two or three days, I learned as much and met as many of the rank and file as almost the rest of the year. I think I attended almost every Tory party conference during my tour, including one of the Scottish Tories in Perth.

I was also made welcome at Conservative Central Office, the name for party headquarters, and the research department where much policy was conceived. In return, I was able to brief them and share information on general issues. I made it absolutely clear that I would not be passing to them any information which could be used against the Labour government. I briefed Ted Heath regularly, usually at his conference room office at Commons, which was assigned to the Leader of the Opposition. I covered broad foreign policy events and issues and specific events or issues as they occurred so long as they could not be used against the government. In other words it was international affairs information which they needed and wanted to know but gave them no preferred position to use to attack the Labour government. They were generally well informed and needed no help on Germany, NATO, the EEC, etc. Heath came over to the States a couple of times and visited the White House. He and Nixon hit it off very well, as a matter of fact, so well that Nixon let Heath know that they were going to have a personal relationship that would really work well for both sides. It continued that way until Kissinger went to China. Nixon had not informed Heath about that intention in advance, and Heath never forgot that. Heath was already a Europeanist, but he had recognized the importance of the United States relationship, and he had thought that he was known as having a close relationship with Nixon. But when Nixon did not tell him in advance about China, Heath interpreted that to mean that he would never be able to rely on knowing the true intention of the United States on the most important issues which might well affect the UK. In other words, he regarded the omission as evidence that he could never be sure that he would be taken into top counsel.

Q: Were you called on to kind of smooth feathers on this?

GALLOWAY: Yes to some extent, but there wasn't much to be done about it. Heath is a self made man, one of the few such to become leaders of the Conservative Party. Heath started out a poor boy and I believe one of his parents had died in his early youth. He was not living in poverty, but he was in the poorer class. He got to Oxford by winning an organ scholarship. He played for religious services and was given a scholarship to Balliol College. Heath was a man of very strict ethics. He had high standards in his beliefs of the way people should act and shouldn't act, and he applied them not only to himself but in his own mind set them for others. That was certainly true of his character even though he had come up through the political maelstrom to top leadership. He still held those very strong, high ethical and moral principles on how people should behave. He was a man of rocklike integrity. He tended to be sharp spoken with definitive views, was somewhat afraid of women and could not suffer fools. He never really recovered from Nixon's not informing him on such major policy. From that point on he pretty much steered a course toward the European Union without holding back, which was theoretically what we wanted but we wanted it both ways. We wanted Britain in, but we also wanted to keep the relationship with Britain. Through Jim Prior who was his closest confidante, I hope I was able to influence to some extent the continuation of at least the appearance of cordial relations between Nixon and Heath.

I'm not sure that Nixon ever knew. I had got to know Nixon fairly well when he visited London before he became president. He came over I think three different times. I was assigned to take him around because he always wanted to talk with the Tories. I took him to see some of the Labour ministers in government as well. On his last visit, he had agreed to have lunch or dinner with Cy Sulzberger, chief European correspondent for the New York Time. The affair was set

for Claridges and Nixon invited me to join them. He also had former Congressman Bob Ellsworth along as his caretaker arranger and presumably a putative member of the White House staff if Nixon won the next election. It was an interesting get together, and apart from general assessments by those noted pundits, I was a little surprised by Nixon's seeming deference to Sulzberger. I don't think any great secrets came out, but if Sulzberger had any doubts about Nixon's intentions, they were dispelled that evening. To project ahead a bit, Bob Ellsworth and I did keep in touch, and when he was actually in the White House after Nixon won the election, I was able to pass some things through him for Nixon. To go back to your question, given that the Tories had taken me into their confidence, I think I was able to exercise some influence on at least keeping Heath open to the necessity of good relationships with the United States, although from that point on, I don't think he ever entertained any ideas of trying to separate Britain from full integration in whatever European union came into being.

Q: Tom Hughes was saying that Annenberg sort of kept himself above dealing at the prime minister level and felt that he was the President's representative to the monarchy. Is that a fair estimation or not? It doesn't make much sense.

GALLOWAY: No. it wasn't. Being the social animals they were, the Ambassador and Mrs. Annenberg were perhaps a bit dazzled during their early days in London. They knew the social value of acceptance at the palace. They were soon on informal terms with members of the royal family and included them in their entertainment at Winfield House, the embassy residence. They organized a magnificent ball for Lord Mountbatten. It was close to being the social event of the year on both sides of the Atlantic. Every socialite worth his or her salt in Europe and the United States jockeyed for an invitation, and many succeeded. I remember when Betty and I walked in, the first person we met was Earl Sohm, our DCM, who had been tabbed to stay with the Prince of Wales and introduce him to members of the embassy family and other guests. The first thing Prince Charles asked me was about my job. As we talked he seemed to be really interested and was peppering me with questions. When he was pulled away to meet someone else, he remarked that he envied me. The Annenbergs certainly enjoyed the royal relationship and apparently it was reciprocated.

After Annenberg left London, the Queen visited the United States where her yacht put in at Philadelphia to be officially greeted by the Annenbergs. Mrs. Annenberg had been named by the mayor to organize the welcome and entertainment in Philadelphia. Remembering that Annenberg had never been fully accepted by the main line in that city, I hope he enjoyed that event as much as those of us who had worked for him. Later, the Queen conferred a knighthood on him which was done at the British Embassy in Washington to which I was invited. I was really pleased for this man whose main purpose in life had been to exonerate the name of his father.

As for the Ambassador's relationship with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and other members of the government, his simple view was that he should not try to take up their time unless he had instructions or information to convey at their level. He included them, of course, in his circle of conducting the business of the embassy and in his social activity, but he felt that such relationships should be based on the immediate interests of the President or Secretary of State. That aspect of his responsibility was made more complicated by the fact that Kissinger and the British Ambassador in Washington had developed such a close working relationship that the

embassy in London and the Department of State were largely bypassed to such extent that business between the two countries was carried out by those two men.

Q: This, of course, was a typical Kissingerian operation.

GALLOWAY: Yes, the way he wanted it. I was put in the position at times of having some of the officers in the foreign office tell me what had been going on in the White House. They also told me that they were tired of receiving telegrams from Ambassador Freeman prefaced by something along the lines of "I had lunch yesterday with Henry Kissinger who made it clear that the following information should not be given to the American Embassy in London or the State Department." Nevertheless, the foreign office officials, being the veterans they were, made life as easy for us as they could. We still had plenty of daily business to do at lower levels and embassy officers could work with the foreign office up to the equivalent of assistant secretary without difficulty. But the fact was that there wasn't all that much for the embassy to carry on with the prime minister and the foreign minister. Recognizing this, we reviewed the scope and substance of our reporting across the board, and we set ourselves to provide Washington with the best and most reliable information and advice possible. We reasoned that Kissinger would profit from reading what we had to say.

Q: We were tied up in foreign affairs particularly with the Soviet Union, with China, and with Vietnam. Did Vietnam and what we were doing there play any role. I mean was this something you had to deal with?

GALLOWAY: Marginally. We played a role in the sense that the British Communist Party made the most of the opportunity to set up demonstrations at the embassy and at Winfield House on every occasion they could. We learned from contacts in the Special Branch at Scotland Yard that substantial numbers of the demonstrators were hired and brought in to do most of the marching and picketing; however, there were enough true believers among the mob to make the right noises. There were obviously enough rogues to stir up trouble when the time seemed right to them, and then the police would go into action sometime on horseback. Those scenes were the nastiest because the bully boys in the crowd would try to go at the horses with cigarettes to their flanks which really did set off some violence and led to arrests. Those demonstrations went on for weeks, and the tail enders were mostly the paid marchers. Finally, they presumably realized that it was a waste of time and money and called them off. As far as the government to government relationship was concerned, there was never any question of the British joining us militarily in the field. Their resources were best situated in NATO. They were very hopeful of our success in Vietnam and some of the Labour Party were even more keenly supportive of our action. I had the unique experience of taking, oh he was Secretary of State, senator from Maine, ran for president.

Q: Oh, yes, secretary of state. Well, we can fill this in. Edmund Muskie.

GALLOWAY: Muskie. He came over on a visit, and I took him down to see the Foreign Secretary who at that time was Michael Stewart. Muskie, although he didn't say so, seemed to have had his doubts about Vietnam, I think. Michael Stewart delivered to him about the strongest argument for the United States to continue its efforts and policies in that part of the world,

particularly in Vietnam, of any I heard during that period. He was convinced that the security and welfare of the western world depended on our not letting Vietnam go the wrong way. He thought that part of the world would be severely threatened if we were to pull out. He almost lectured Muskie on it. He was a quiet scholarly fellow, but the dimensions of the reality of his feelings on our stand were very strong indeed.

Q: While you were there, there was a big demonstration and one of the participants was a Rhodes Scholar named William Jefferson Clinton, now our president.

GALLOWAY: Did he really take part in that?

Q: He was in one of them in front of the embassy, yes.

GALLOWAY: I have heard that rumor just in the past few years. I didn't hear about it when I was there.

Q: Well, he was just another American student. Were these demonstration in front of the embassy a bother?

GALLOWAY: Not really. After the first one or two, Scotland Yard set out a prescribed route which came no closer than a block away from the embassy. They tramped around from Oxford Street out on the other side of Grosvenor Square back onto Park Lane, really out of range of the embassy. I think we probably did our part in helping the Special Branch of Scotland Yard. We let them put a photographer inside on the second floor where a large window gave him an excellent view of the front ranks of all the demonstrators. They shot a lot of film there; it would be interesting to know if Mr. Clinton was in any of the photos.

Getting back to the work in the embassy, I started out covering the Conservative Party and moved up to deputy chief of the political section before Annenberg came. After some weeks the Ambassador seemed to be placing special trust in me as deputy in the political section and called on me increasingly for advice and information. Bobby Scott and I worked together informally very closely. This actually began during the time Tom Hughes was there, but it really intensified after Jerry Greene had come in as DCM. It finally became a de facto situation when the Ambassador called me in and said in effect that he wanted me to run the embassy. I responded that he had a deputy chief of mission for that. He responded that I should let him take care of that and that he wanted me to run the embassy. He told me there were three things I should always follow: that he wanted to be sure that the embassy was doing what it should and that he should be kept fully informed, that I should make sure that he was never blind-sided with information from other sources that he should have known, and that I should make him look good. That put me in a heck of a position.

Q: I was going to say, this is awful because I mean could you tell the DCM?

GALLOWAY: No. This was after Tom Hughes; Jerry Greene had been assigned as DCM.. My own position had also changed. Ron Spiers who had been chief of the political section was wanted in Washington by Alex Johnson to head the politico-military bureau. Annenberg put it to

the Department that he would let Spires go if they let him make Galloway chief of the political section. They did. From that point on, he wanted me to run the embassy.

Q: I mean, how would you do that because these people wouldn't be reporting to you. You would have no authority over the FBI or the Naval Attaché or anything else like that.

GALLOWAY: Well, there wasn't much activity in those areas so that the Ambassador could maintain the formal channels which were well established. We had a little trouble with one or two of the military attaches. However, we had an officer in the political section from the Defense Department who was from the office of the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, and his terms of reference were such that he could exercise oversight over all defense affairs.

Q: Yes, ISA.

GALLOWAY: ISA. We had a slot there for him which was very useful to us because in practice, he took care of practically everything with the ministry of defense. The attaches were left to more or less the protocol functions of an attaché. With the defense officer in the political section, I had direct control over him and the politico-military relationship with the UK.

Q: Well, how did you deal with the DCM?

GALLOWAY: Well, we had arguments. Not with Tom Hughes so much. I tried to help Tom as much as I could. He needed it. He was a very bright man with a healthy ego, but his assignment put him in the field into an unfamiliar environment and, unfortunately, he was just out of his element. When he came over, he had been accustomed to the atmosphere of upper level Washington both in the executive branch and on the congressional side. He knew scores of people in high places in Washington. In London he also knew many of the practicing politicians, but he just didn't know what he was supposed to do. I tried to help him as much as I could. Then, he suddenly was faced with a family problem. His wife became ill and it took many months for her to regain her health. As time went on, Tom realized that he should probably get back to Washington where his wife would be better off, and also where he knew all of the rules of the game. He did that. I liked Tom personally. While he was there, one of his sons had an eye problem which called for surgery. Annenberg arranged with an eye specialist he knew to do the surgery on the boy and paid for it all himself. Then this thing with Tom's wife. Annenberg was very understanding, his personal relationship with Tom was friendly and he tried to help out. I was really surprised when I was told that after he was back in Washington, Tom was speaking at the, what was it, the Yale or Harvard club?

Q: Cosmos Club, Metropolitan...

GALLOWAY: No, it wasn't. It was one of the university gatherings, either Harvard or Yale. Tom was speaking at a luncheon. I was told by someone who was there that Tom really ran down the ambassador, his reputation, his competence, his integrity, and his performance. I was surprised. I knew that Tom had not been very happy about the way his tour in London had gone, but I thought that was largely because the embassy was pretty much cut out by the Kissinger line

direct with the British embassy, and secondly because of the problems he had with his family. He certainly owed loyalty to Annenberg.

Q: Well, he, I mean his oral history was straight from himself but I didn't know there was any great animus, just Annenberg saw that his role was not to get down into politics which was quite fair. I mean, that's...

GALLOWAY: That was deliberate. As I told you earlier, we urged him not to do that, but to carry the presence of the embassy around the country. He did that on several trips, half a dozen or a dozen, which I arranged with the town clerks in the cities visited. They were delighted to have the Ambassador come and visit in places where they had never been host to the presence of an American ambassador. They went beyond traditional hospitality and each place tried to show that it was truly special. In each of these places, he would see something or find something where he could donate anonymously to a museum, a library, a cathedral's restoration or some other civic institution. Moreover, in each place there would be a police security escort of several officers. He would make a substantial contribution to the welfare fund of those organizations. He made friends. He made real friends on all of those trips, and later he invited some of them down to London for entertainment at Winfield House. As a result of this broad based approach to promoting good will, one could sense that the British press began to change their attitude toward him.

As for Annenberg's dealings with the government, he didn't shirk anything, but he did not take the initiative unless there was good reason to do so or Washington instructed him to take up something with the Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary. That did not hamper the continued effectiveness of the embassy as the diplomatic agency of the U.S. in England. I have already referred to our special efforts to make ourselves the best reporting post so that Washington would be fully informed. We had no problems in carrying on normal business with the foreign office and other government ministries. Everybody in my political section was able to deal directly with their opposite numbers and, indeed, at higher levels in the foreign office. In all areas, Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, we were able to work closely with the officers in charge of those areas, and we had direct entree to the foreign secretary's office and the prime minister's office. When the U.S. decided to put MIRV missiles in our strategic weapons, bombs and warheads, I think this was the occasion, although there were other times involving cold war activity, we received a telegram late in the evening instructing the ambassador to see the prime minister immediately, and convey to him our planned moves. The watch officer called me and I called the Ambassador and explained it to him. I told him I had already got to 10 Downing Street and that the Prime Minister would see him whenever he was ready. I told him the documents were being typed and that I would bring them out to Winfield House. When I went out there, he had Ambassador Strausz-Hupé from our embassy in Sri Lanka staying with him. You probably recall that he had been professor for international affairs at the University of Pennsylvania.

Q: Straus-Hupé?

GALLOWAY: Straus-Hupé. They were pals. I got to know Straus-Hupé and enjoyed him. He was an intelligent man. I showed Annenberg the telegram and explained the instructions. He told me that since I knew the Prime Minister well, I could handle the matter with him. I responded

that he had to go because the telegram that went out reporting the meeting must say, "I called on the Prime Minister late last night and carry on from there. He agreed but said the driver had gone to bed and the car was garaged for the night. I told him that I had my Volkswagen outside. So, I took him to 10 Downing Street in my Volkswagen without wasting time, which prompted a remark that I drove like a reporter. Ted Heath and one of his people were waiting for us. We made the demarche and explained the ramifications, and after answering a few questions, took our leave. I have told you this in some detail to demonstrate that the Ambassador had no jealousy or personal sensitivity about things relating to his position or the embassy, as long as they were done and done right. He knew that I had spent three or four years covering the Conservative Party before they won the election in 1970 and that I knew their leaders personally. Some of them had spent time at our house. Jim Prior, for example, when he was minister for agriculture and later leader of the house of commons, would come up sometimes on weekends and stay at 10 Downing Street. If Heath had other guests, Jim would stay with us. We were always delighted to have him join us in the large place on Sussex Square which housed the political counselor.

When the Tories won the general election in 1970, The White House wanted us to deliver a message personally to Heath, so the Ambassador dispatched me. I called Conservative Party headquarters where they were all celebrating, explained my mission and was invited to join them. Heath saw me and moved away from his group, and we started walking down the hall when he grinned at me and said, "Well, well." I said, "You're right." Nixon certainly was courting Heath at that point. Just the minute they declared him the winner, Nixon wanted to get his congratulations in, so I was able to convey them even before Heath had faced the press. I was careful not to use my personal entree with Heath unless it was necessary. He showed his appreciation by inviting Betty and me to Chequers for a Sunday lunch at which he promoted me to Minister for the day by having my place card at the table so inscribed.. This was a traditional weekend for prime ministers -- go to Chequers for the weekend and invite some people for Sunday lunch. It was not only a great honor for us but also a most enjoyable affair. One of the guests was Peter Ustinov, not widely thought of as a Tory, who was clad in a pale green plaid jacket which did stand out. He was just as entertaining in person as on the stage and had everyone laughing with a takeoff on an American from Cleveland in the third row at one of his performances. He was a great, friendly guy. Betty sat next to him and at one point asked him how he came to be there. He responded that he had been trying to figure that out himself. Another guest was Robert Kaiser, Phil's son, who had been in the Soviet Union as Washington Post correspondent. He is now in a high editorial position at the Post. Heath also invited us to dinner at one of the Conservative Party conferences and to receptions in his flat at the Albany. Another favorite of Nixon's and particularly of mine was Sir Alec Douglas Home. As foreign secretary in the Heath government, he hosted a visit by our Secretary of State William Rogers. A country house is provided for the foreign minister but not on the scale of Chequers. The talks with Rogers were held out there with each side gathered informally at a longish table. The subject of the Secretary General of the UN came up. Rogers asserted that the fellow wasn't very quick on the uptake or words to that effect. Sir Alec interjected, "He's dumb, is he?" I don't think Rogers caught the tone for I didn't see him crack a smile. Sir Alec looked down at me, saw me grinning from ear to ear, and returned a puckish smile. Nobody else was laughing. But Home was something. Once he asked me to come to see him down at the House of Commons. This was after he had been prime minister. I went down there and into a cubby hole about half the size of this room, but it had a desk in it and a sofa. He said, "The reason I asked you to come down here

was that I wanted you to see my sofa." He laughed mischievously and observed that tradition was followed by furnishing things lavishly for ex prime ministers even in the House of Commons. Space in the House of Commons was very restricted, not enough seats for all of the members in a full session, and most of them worked out of a locker or with others in very small offices.

Q: They are building a big office building now.

GALLOWAY: Are they?

Q: There are a lot of...

GALLOWAY: Where are they building it?

Q: Well, it is down around Whitehall.

GALLOWAY: On Whitehall? I'm trying to figure out...

Q: I'm not sure. I saw it this summer. I don't know. I'm not that good at London.

GALLOWAY: Was it on the river, on the bank there?

Q: I think it is off the river, not on the river, but it is behind. It has got big braces sticking up. It is quite controversial, the usual thing, you know. It is not traditional.

GALLOWAY: It is not over on the Big Ben side?

Q: I am not sure, maybe. Yes, it is very close to Big Ben.

GALLOWAY: Well, of course they need the space very much. They have five or six MP's sharing an office and a telephone if they are lucky.

Q: Well, Bill, what happened in '74 to you?

GALLOWAY: What happened in '74.? The Conservative Party called and lost a general election which surprised me and quite a number of pundits in the press and even, I think, quite a large number of the Labour Party. The results were so close that neither of the major parties won a majority of seats in the house of commons. The Liberal Party, which won some ten seats, could actually have joined in a coalition with either side. There was an interregnum of a few days while the parties explored possibilities. At one point it seemed there might be a possibility of a coalition between the Tories and Liberals; Jeremy Thorpe, the Liberal leader, obviously wanted very much to be in a government but some of the Liberals were really ex-Labourites who couldn't abide an alliance with the Tories.

Finally, Heath conceded and Labour formed a government with a majority of only a few seats over the Conservatives. The calling of the election had been controversial among the

Conservative leaders. The fundamental problem lay with the trade unions who had fixed value votes in the Labour Party which enabled them to dominate that party and exercise undue power in the country. Earlier in the winter, the power workers unions had become restive and negotiations to meet their demands made very little progress. They broke down and a strike was called. They were aided by other unions unofficially even though it was outside the law. As time passed, fuel for power stations became low and various coal miner unions were not breaking their necks to replenish the stocks. Heath's government decided to oppose the unions and took measures which had little effect and finally led to rolling brownouts over much of the country. British labour law is such that a government has little power to exercise in union disputes. Ultimately, the only thing the governing party can do is to call elections in the hope that the will of the public will politically exercise sanctions over the unions and oblige them to back down. As the confrontation reached its climax, Tory leaders met with Heath at Chequers over a weekend. I talked with Jim Prior when he returned from there and learned that the decision had been made to call a general election forthwith. At that time he was Leader of the House of Commons and Lord President of the Council (the Privy Council). The election was to take place in six weeks. Jim had been one of the foremost advocates of calling the election, believing that the public had had enough of the unions flouting the general welfare with highly questionable actions and would return the Conservatives to power with an increased majority and a mandate which the unions could not ignore. A couple of days later, when the election had not been called, I saw Jim in his rather splendid Lord President's office in Whitehall. He asked me to sit down and would I listen while he dictated a memorandum to the Prime Minister. The gist was that a grave tactical error had caused them not to call elections at the crucial time, and with expectations so high, they had lost their advantage and should postpone indefinitely. He was obviously very disappointed. As we talked, he surmised that Willie Whitelaw, who had not been with them at Chequers, had subsequently talked with Heath and advised him not to proceed. Jim implied that Heath had lost his nerve. He had decided originally to take on the unions, but when the time came to act he could not. The election was called somewhat later with the indecisive outcome I described earlier. Heath tried to work out some coalition arrangement with Jeremy Thorpe, but it came to nothing. So, Heath had a short term in office, and the Conservative Party drifted until Margaret Thatcher won the leadership.

As for what happened to me and my family, we were preparing to leave London to return to Washington. I had been there for a long time, about nine years, starting out with three or four years under Ambassador Bruce. Then, Ambassador Annenberg came. I have told you about my unusual experiences. Annenberg had got a commitment that I'd remain as long as he wanted me to stay. So much for the situation in the embassy.

As time passed our children who arrived in London at the ages of one and a half years for Jeff and about two months for Mary were growing up. Our first house there had been at Cresswell Gardens in South Kensington; when I became chief of the political section, we moved across Hyde Park to a large house reserved for the political counselor on Sussex Square in Paddington just a couple of blocks off Bayswater Road which borders Hyde Park. Our neighbor for about a year was Rupert Murdoch who was beginning to make his presence felt both in the publishing world and politics. We enrolled the children in a private school at Marble Arch right across from speakers corner in Hyde Park. It was a fine little school called Connaught House. An old weathered brick house, all its rooms were converted into class rooms except for kitchen and

dining room and the living quarters of the head mistress, Mrs. Keane. Its student body was rather small and varied, with other diplomatic corps children as well as English children. I believe the Jordanian Ambassador had a child there, and the actress Joan Collins had a daughter there. Like most private British schools, it had a very good scholastic program. Our children got off to an excellent start academically and they became accustomed to mixed nationalities as fellow students. It was a valuable experience for them, and they enjoyed it. Nevertheless, Betty and I realized that the longer we were abroad, the more difficult it might be for the children to adjust when we did return to the U.S. Also, diplomatic life abroad for an extended period puts strains on the family due to the lack of time they can spend together. The social life is demanding, too, in that it calls for the wife to try to extend herself to be a representative of her country, a leader and frequent hostess of the other wives, a hostess at other diplomatic functions, as well as an attendee -- and to be a good mother. In short, it is rough on wives.

Q: Oh, yes, we all know about that.

GALLOWAY: I had, of course, discussed my situation with Ambassador Annenberg who was understanding and released me from the commitment to remain until he left, which, actually he thought would happen quite soon. Kissinger came over on a visit in early '74 and was accompanied by Larry Eagleburger. I had got to know Larry when he was head of the political section at NATO in Brussels. When he went back to Washington and to Kissinger's staff, we had more contacts, usually in conjunction with visits by Kissinger and then by the President. I discussed my personal situation with him. He was understanding and asked if I would like to have a mission. I responded that I really did not aspire to an Ambassadorship; I had been so fortunate in my assignments that I had been in the policy mainstream and had been the beneficiary of much job satisfaction and enjoyment. I did not think that the caliber of embassy that might be offered would be as interesting, and I knew that my wife would prefer not to be asked. Returning to Washington would probably be a better use of me than going to an embassy. He accepted my reasoning and said he thought Dean Brown would like to have me in his office. He said he would be in touch and the assignment with Dean worked out, so I came back as executive assistant to the undersecretary for management.

Q: You were there from when to when?

GALLOWAY: I was there from '74, when did I leave?

Q: You said '74 you left.

NANCY E. JOHNSON
Student and Private Employment
United Kingdom (1965-1978)

Ms. Johnson was born in Washington, DC and was raised in Germany and the Washington, DC area. She was educated at Oberlin College and attended several colleges and Universities in the United Kingdom. After returning to the U.S. Ms.

Johnson joined the State Department as a contract employee and later joined the Foreign Service, serving as Political Officer in Colombo, London, Algiers and Baghdad. Her Washington assignments were primarily in the Near East, South Asia bureau. Ms. Johnson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: Let's talk about the five most amazing years of your life.

JOHNSON: I had never worked as hard in my life as I did in those years. When I first found out that the terms were only eight week long I thought, "This is nothing." Exhausting. I was writing two ten page papers a week, going to lectures as well as to . . . I can remember one tutor giving a the reading list that was a full foolscap page in small type. I got as much done of it as I could. Then my tutorial partner and I would go to tutorial and we would either read or hand in our essays. You took turns. I remember I was reading that time and the comment was, "But you haven't read Miss Hurnard's article on Clause 34 on Magna Carta," which was down on the very bottom of that long list. They were expecting me to read everything on the reading list. As I say, I have never worked as hard in my life. At the end of the first year, I felt as if someone had taken my brain and gone, "Boing! Boing! Boing!," just expanded it, defined it, sharpened it in all kinds of ways. It was incredibly stimulating. I was one of the dummies. The people all around me were positively brilliant.

Q: What about woman in Oxford at that time?

JOHNSON: They had been there a long time. LMH was the first women's college and it had been giving degrees since the twenties. I used to tease them about it. I went to Oberlin College where women had been getting degrees since 1835. As an American I was lucky because I didn't belong to any class. In my group of contemporaries in my year there was a woman called Pauline who was from a working class family from Leeds. She was made to feel lesser somehow by the middle or upper middle class girls who had gone to places like Cheltenham Ladies College, although she was positively brilliant as is her husband. Both are full professors now. As an American, I didn't belong to any class. Everyone was open to me and that was really nice. I knew people from all social classes and had entrée all over.

Q: But you did feel very much the class system was . . .

JOHNSON: Very conscious of it, yes. I was aware that I was crossing borders and sometimes might not be able to cross them. Of course, there are men at Oxford. I stayed away from my fellow Americans who were Rhodes Scholars and therefore failed to become a friend of Bill's because he was there at the time.

Q: You're talking about Bill Clinton?

JOHNSON: Yes. Bill Clinton was there. We didn't have men tutorial partners. We sometimes got sent to men's colleges for our tutorials because the men's colleges liked to send their undergraduates to the women's colleges because the women teachers were so good. I had tutorials at more than one college. I can't remember all the different places I went out to.

Q: Were you picking up from your British female colleagues that there were limitations by being a woman?

JOHNSON: No, because I was among the women who were going to go on to be the doctors, the professors, teachers, etc. And they were the crème de la crème. We each had a moral tutor, a faculty advisor. Mine was a wonderful woman called Anne Whiteman who had been mentioned in dispatches in World War II. She got a first class degree and she told the story that she called her mother and said, "Mum, I got a first class degree and I've joined the Air Force." And, her mother's reply was, "But my dear, we've always been Army." Anyway, Anne Whiteman was a wonderful moral tutor. She was a short birdlike lady. LMH was next to the University Parks and from her rooms you could hear cricket bats on balls sometimes in the summer. She was a fine tutor, stimulating and just amazing.

Q: What did you end up concentrating on?

JOHNSON: I stayed away from American History because I felt that I had done it. Everybody had to do parts of the syllabus and then you could pick optional subjects. I did a special subject in diplomatic history. I knew that ultimately I would specialize in British nineteenth century political and diplomatic history. After the two years doing the BA, I started on a PhD. I was telling somebody the other day that in those days my tuition for a PhD was ten pounds a term, which was thirty pounds a year or about \$100. I studied with a woman called Agatha Ram and did a thesis on Cabinet and foreign policy making in the 1880s and '90s. I looked at just how the system worked, the mechanics of foreign policy formulation, and how Foreign Secretaries got Cabinet approval for their policies, and if they did or didn't. I was interested in what it felt like to be on the receiving end of a message. A cable from Africa took six weeks to come by ship to Lisbon and then was sent as a cable. There was a real art to formulating instructions for a diplomat who couldn't get in touch with you instantaneously.

Q: When you are doing British diplomatic history in the nineteenth century, you are really looking at cables, dispatches, memoirs?

JOHNSON: Yes, and letters and diaries. There are several diaries in that period. One of them was a two volume life and letters that a son had produced. It didn't really cover what was in the full diary. After I finished my thesis, I ended up staying on in England. I got a research fellowship at Reading University, after working for a couple of years first in London.

Q: Doing what?

JOHNSON: Doing research for a man called FWD Deacon, Bill Deacon who was the first head of St. Antony's College, Oxford. After twenty-five years as head, he retired. He thought it was time to go. He had an extremely distinguished war record. He had helped Winston Churchill write his History of the English Speaking Peoples. Bill was a brilliant historian. He was given a Leverhulme grant to hire a research assistant so he could write a couple of books. I became his research assistant. I lived in London, shared a flat with some friends and did research at the Public Record Office for Bill. In my spare time, I started working on a diary of a man called Gaythorne Hardy, who was a nineteenth century politician. I had come across the diary while

doing my thesis and I knew there was an awful lot in there. I would borrow fifty pounds from my flatmate who had money and I didn't. I would pay her back two quid a week. The Public Record Office in Ipswich, where the diaries are located, would Xerox fifty pounds worth (about two volumes) for me and send them to me. Then I typed them out. Boy, a computer would have made life so much easier. I typed them word for word. The next door neighbors used to say they heard the tap, tap, tapping of me typing away on these diaries. Then I did a first cut and got a professional to type that. I cut even more and it became a book that was published in 1981.

Q: Did you have any feel for British politics during this period?

JOHNSON: I watched it go on around me. Harold Wilson. Edward Heath. The memorable 1973 miners' strikes caused electricity to go on and off. I followed politics as an interested observer. I lived in England from '65 to '78. It was a wonderful time, no doubt about it. I have fabulous English friends. The English are funny because it takes them a while to decide they are going to like you. Once they do, it's the shirt off their backs and it's for life. I was adopted as the fourth sister of an English family and am an aunt to their kids. I discovered opera there and since 1974 I've been a keen opera goer.

Q: Did you see during the time you were there a change in the class operations as far as people working or was it pretty steady?

JOHNSON: I think that there has always been a certain fluidity. I was there for the sixties, the Beatles. People like Pauline, the woman from Leeds, did very well in ways that she might not have been able to do earlier. She and her husband are both, now at the point of retirement, distinguished historians. She is a medievalist and he does modern intellectual history. They've both done very well. I'm not sure fifty years ago it would have been possible for them to do as well. But Britain was changing. There were more immigrants coming in, from different places, not just from Europe.

Q: Did you get any feel in your particular crowd, the university intellectual crowd as to attitudes towards the United States during this period?

JOHNSON: I remember having long discussions with people when I first went about whether the Warren Commission was rigged. There was a suspicion of the United States. People didn't like the United States. They were prepared to like Americans. While they liked the concept of the United States, they didn't like some of our policies and actions. I think there was a lot of resentment that we were happy and wealthy and they had paid a big price for World War II.

Q: What about the race situation there? Did you see much change there?

JOHNSON: No, I didn't. I didn't have a lot of experience with it. I was thinking about the anti-American sentiments. When the British started to travel more and take holidays abroad, a lot more people came to this country and came to know it much better. But I can remember that people trying to be nice would not ask, "Are you an American?" but rather "Are you Canadian?" That was a compliment as opposed to, "Are you an American?" which wasn't.

Q: How about the Vietnam War? Did you . . . ?

JOHNSON: I missed the anger of that because I was away for all of it. I knew it was ugly here. It wasn't so much there. The Watergate hearings I followed. They were covered quite carefully in the press in Britain. Regarding Vietnam, I knew there was something going on here and I was missing it. There, the antagonism wasn't the way it was here.

Q: When did you get your PhD?

JOHNSON: It would have been, let me think, 1971.

Q: What did this mean in the British context the PhD?

JOHNSON: One of my difficulties was I had decided I wanted to be a history professor there. I had all kinds of things going against me because I was foreign and female. The British system was such that you were paid according to your experience and age. To hire me then at 35 was much more expensive than to hire a Brit at, say, 25. Whatever other reasons, there was things going against me and there weren't a lot of jobs then either. So I kept applying for jobs and, meanwhile, did other people's research. For two years I worked for Bill Deacon and then I got a research fellowship at Reading University for three years to work on the diary. I did some teaching there, too.

Q: Where is Reading University?

JOHNSON: Reading is halfway between London and Oxford. It was one of the original "red brick" universities, one of the newer universities. Because it was one of the original red bricks, it became more acceptable than some of the really new universities in the social scale of things. It had always been very strong in things like agriculture. I actually talked myself into the fellowship. It was open to post-doctoral researchers in all fields. I was invited for an interview and I took Xerox pages of the diary with me. When they started to ask me questions about the diary, I said, "I might as well make this show and tell." And, I pulled the pages and let the committee look at them. A mathematician who was on the committee told me later, "It was riveting. I never would have understood what you were doing until you put those pages in front of me." The mathematician and others on the mixed faculty committee gave me a three year fellowship which was wonderful.

Q: How did you fit in sort of a British scheme of things . . . Were you part of what is known as the 'chattering class' the sort of intellectuals? Do they play much of a role?

JOHNSON: I think they probably do. I was not really a part of them. The chattering classes are the people with money and power. After Reading I got a job writing the memoirs of a man called Howard Mitchell. I realized then that I was going to be facing a series of one year jobs with no real future in England doing what I wanted to do. It was time to come home. Meanwhile, my parents at a dinner party ran into Bill Slaney who was at the Office of the Historian in the Department. HO was looking for people to come on contract to do volumes of The Foreign

Relations of the United States because they were way behind producing them. I was hired on contract for a year to do U.S. and U.K. relations in the period 1955-57.

CHARLES T. CROSS
Asian Affairs
London (1966-1967)

Ambassador Charles T. Cross was born in China in 1922. He attended Carleton College and Yale University, and served as a lieutenant overseas in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1942-1946. His assignments abroad included Taipei, Jakarta, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Alexandria, Nicosia, London and Danang, with an ambassadorship to Singapore. Ambassador Cross was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: You may be right, but I would guess it is a non-starter. But to go on. In 1966, you were transferred to London. Did you think that by this time you had been tagged as a Near East hand?

CROSS: I felt that I knew the Cyprus situation, but that was only a small corner of the Near East. In London, I was assigned to handle Asian matters as part of the embassy's political section. I think that assignment was the doing of Bill Bundy, the assistant secretary for FE. It was a great job.

Q: At the time, did we have an Asian, an African and a Middle East expert in the London embassy?

CROSS: We did then; I don't think that is true any longer. The political section was headed by Bill Brubeck and had Tom Byrne in as the labor attaché, Bill Galloway as one of the political officers and so on. Bill was in London for many years; he was already a veteran when I arrived and stayed long after my departure. He had a stroke while we were in London, and I am glad to say that he recovered. I should note that I was in London for only 10 months and left in 1967. My family, however, stayed for over two years.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

CROSS: David Bruce. The DCM was Phil Kaiser. My job was to maintain contacts with the British Foreign Office on a variety of issues of mutual interest in the Asian area. We did tend to concentrate on China and Vietnam. But I was sent to London primarily to take part in some secret negotiations we had with the British and the Soviets concerning Vietnam.

I need to go back to the beginning of the negotiations. I mentioned earlier that the co-chairmen of the Indochina negotiations were the UK and the Soviet Union. This dual chairmanship allowed us to pass information and views to the British who could then pass them along to the Soviets. The Soviets, as co-chairmen, could then pass the information to the Vietnamese. It was a very long round about way; we did sometimes cut out the Soviets, but that was rather infrequent. My

job was not too stimulating because all I did was set up meetings and report back to Washington on them and on any other information on Vietnam that I picked up. The job did not call for much initiative.

My biggest challenge was public relations. In my first week in London, I called on David Bruce at his residence. He preferred that to meetings in the office. He was a wonderful guy - a first class diplomat. He told me that he personally felt that Vietnam was distracting our attention from Europe and that therefore we should probably disengage from there. While saying this, he had in front of him instructions to encourage political support for South Vietnam in Great Britain. So he told me to get together with USIS and do something. I worked with the PAO and the deputy PAO; they weren't very enthusiastic and neither was the rest of the political section. So the job landed in my lap.

As part of this PR [public relations] effort, we were to support Harold Wilson's Labor Party which was defending itself not from the Tories, but from its own back-benchers who were demanding a much more vigorous anti-Vietnam policy, reflecting some strong feelings in Great Britain, particularly from students. So I was involved to a considerable extent in preparing the answers that the prime minister was to use in Parliament during his weekly question-and-answer sessions. George Brown, who was the foreign minister, was not very adept in answering Parliamentary queries - they took place in the afternoon and that was a little too late for him - after a few naps. So the prime minister had to field the questions. We knew some of the questions that would arise; I would transmit them to Washington, even though we knew that the British embassy in Washington was already raising the same questions with the Department. I sent the same message to Saigon so that our embassy there could join in drafting a reply for the prime minister. My main concern was that London would say one thing, Washington something else and Saigon something different from the other two. We had to be on the same wave-length.

I would attend the Parliamentary session to listen to what the British prime minister did with our information. I think it worked very well and as far as I can remember, there were no PR problems from the prime minister's answers.

My other principal task - and the one that took most of my time - was to speak about Vietnam around Great Britain. I have described this in some length in the book I have written [Chapter 12 - Born a Foreigner]. Most of my audiences were hostile. In my 10 months in London, I think I spoke to about 20 audiences. One of these appearances was before the Lady Conservatives of Godalming - a region near London. The other was to the Army/Navy Club in London. That speech was given after dinner, which meant that half of the audience was already asleep. These were my only pro-American - or at least pro-American policy - audiences. All the rest were British students or trade unions. I would have to go to "red brick" universities in Birmingham, or Leeds or Manchester - industrial towns. I was usually met by the secretary of the Socialist club, who was also the head of the anti-Vietnam war committee. He hosted me to a lousy meal at the university cafeteria which was followed by a two-hour meeting in a format which was always the same, university after university. I would speak for 15 minutes after which a student representative would speak; that was followed by a question and answer period. The questions were mostly orations - anti-American. Some of them were undergraduate cagey - like "How many children did you kill yesterday?"

Q: What was the purpose of the exercise? Did anyone think you could change those audiences' minds?

CROSS: We thought it was important for our view of the war to be put in the public eye. What we had to do was to keep our tempers in check, mix some humor with our remarks, never maintain that we were "good" because the British regarded assistance to others as a private matter - not to boast of it publicly. There was considerable give-and-take in these sessions, and I think I actually succeeded in bringing some understanding of the U.S. role to some of the kids' minds.

I tell a story in my book which typifies my experiences. One day, I went to Brighton, to the University of Sussex. For some reason, the anti-Vietnam war movement was particularly strong there. I arrived from London on a train and was picked out as an American - although I carried an umbrella and a briefcase and thought I looked like part of any British crowd. But one student picked me out from all the other passengers who disembarked from the train that evening. I met a nice Quaker lady who was going to be the moderator of the evening's discussion. As I was leaving the station, I saw signs saying "Stop the war in Vietnam" and advertising the evening's meeting. I told the Quaker lady that I would not get into a debate about the war. Those were our instructions because to do so would have been an interference in the internal British political process. Furthermore, the other two participants in the panel were John Mendelsohn, who was on the far left fringes of the Labour Party and another who was said to be the only communist member of the House of Lords.

The meeting hall was packed. People were standing all over the place, with some standing on the platform already making speeches. The aisles had to be cleared so that we could reach the platform. I had learned a technique from previous appearances; I searched the audience with my eyes to see whether there might be anybody who at least would be willing to listen to my presentation. I was asked to speak first; the Quaker lady did not say that I couldn't debate; she just introduced me and thanked me for coming. So I started my speech which usually included quotes from a very important book that had been published in the mid-1960s by Lin Biao, Mao's designated successor at that time. Lin described the tactics that the communists had used first against the Japanese and then against the nationalists. It described how communists took power. It was considered at the time to be almost as important as Mao's "Little Red Book." I used that text because Lin Biao in his book had intimated that the testing place for this action program was now Vietnam. The essential part of the Mao program was to turn the Asian rural areas against the Western urban ones. So I used that thesis as part of my presentation.

Then the parliamentarians gave their speeches lauding the Vietnamese communists for doing all those good things for their countrymen. Mendelsohn was particularly harsh in his criticism of the U.S. After the presentations, the meeting was open to a question period. All the questions were addressed to me. Of course, they were more short speeches than questions which ended with the question of what I thought of whatever the audience member had said. Since I had heard most of these comments before, I had pretty much a ready reply already thought out. As time went by, the meeting became rowdier; suddenly one of the people who I thought might more objective on the subject - older and prosperous looking - stood up and in very proper English said he had been

listening to all of the anti-American accusations for over an hour and that I hadn't had a chance to complete but a few brief sentences. He suggested that I be given five minutes of uninterrupted time for a few comments. The Quaker lady agreed and I began my comments by saying how sad it was that in Great Britain one could hear such attacks on my country. That somehow stimulated me and I went on to speak of the American commitments which we had made to many countries around the world. I said that we would live up to those commitments and that the U.S. could be counted on by its friends and allies. I noted that we intended to live up to our commitments to the Asians just as we did to "you white Europeans." One could hear a gasp from the audience when I said that.

In the audience there was a black man who had spent most of the time looking at the ceiling. I assumed he was attending this meeting by mistake. But he stood up and clapped when I had finished my remarks about commitments. That stopped the antagonism and brought the meeting to an end. It was one of my triumphant moments.

I found speaking about Vietnam a little strange because I had originally opposed U.S. intervention. But I had learned from my parents and from the Marine Corps that it wasn't quite honorable to talk about wars in which one was not involved and from which one was quite far removed. It wasn't quite cricket to do that. So during one of Bill Bundy's visits to London, he asked me whether I would be interested in serving in Vietnam. I told him that I would only be interested if the assignment was in the field - not in Saigon - connected with the war itself. I didn't hear another word about that for a long time until one day in July 1967, I got a message asking me whether I could go to Vietnam to work at I-Corps headquarters. I said, "Okay" and off I went to Vietnam.

Q: Did you have a feeling that in attacking our involvement in Vietnam, many of the British were really showing an anti-American attitude which may have manifested itself in other opportunities?

CROSS: I suppose that there must have been some of the sentiment among the older generation. But on the whole, the opposition was pretty much a party issue. The Tories thought we were in the right, although they thought it was a losing cause. Many of the Tories were very well informed about Vietnam; I worked with many of them. They urged us to change our approach without abandoning our goals. That to me was a very important aspect of the British experience because I had become acquainted with a major point of view. I think that the British opposition to the Vietnam war was very much akin to that in the U.S. itself. Essentially, it was based on moral principles; they didn't believe it was right to oppose a native nationalist movement, even if communist led. Furthermore, this opposition also had a very negative view of the South Vietnam regimes.

I think in some cases, I did make a dent in the opposition by pointing out that the communists were attacking a sovereign nation - South Vietnam. It may have been said that South Vietnam left a lot to be desired because of the leadership, but that was hardly an excuse for attacking it. It wasn't happening against other countries whose leadership might not have been to the British liking. I think this argument did resonate with some. We sent some British journalists, like Mark Frankland of *The Guardian*, to Vietnam and he came back with some very positive comments. He and others had a free hand in Vietnam; they could see and talk to whomever they wanted.

Later, when I served in Vietnam, many of these journalists stayed with me and I showed them around.

I was excited to be assigned to Vietnam, particularly to a rural area.

STEPHEN E. PALMER, JR.
Political Officer for Middle East Affairs
London (1966-1968)

Stephen E. Palmer, Jr. graduated from Princeton University in 1944 and later received an M.A. degree from Columbia University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1951. His overseas career included posts in Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Israel, England, Pakistan, India, Switzerland, and Washington, DC. Mr. Palmer was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1995.

Q: *From Tel Aviv you went to London, is that right?*

PALMER: Yes.

Q: *You were there from '66 to '68. What was your position there?*

PALMER: Well, surprise, surprise, it was to handle Middle Eastern affairs.

Q: *Well, there's always an officer, isn't there, to...*

PALMER: There has been, yes. Those jobs in the political section were, at least at that time there was one for Africa and one for East Asia as well, had a lot of autonomy because we came in as the expert on a part of the world, and people let us develop our contacts in the official and non official circles, and maintain them without a lot of supervision. Which reminds me, at the time that the war broke out...

Q: *You're talking about the June '67 war.*

PALMER: Yes. I was in the embassy alone in the political section, and we had some teletype machines for Reuters and some other agencies, and all of a sudden these machines began to clatter clatter. So I went out to see, and I thereby found out about the attacks, and I called my boss who was Bill Brubeck, and I called Phil Kaiser who was DCM, and I called David Bruce, the ambassador -- another outstandingly fine gentleman. So Bruce said to collect everybody in his office, and he'd be there in one half an hour. By that time we had a couple of flash telegrams, so I briefed him as well as I could. I had called Washington in the meantime and gotten a little bit more. Everybody was so surprised and didn't have much information. And bless his heart, the other gentlemen were talking about what we needed to do, and whom we needed to see on the British side, and Bruce said, "Now gentlemen, Steve Palmer is the Middle East expert here, and Steve Palmer is going to be in charge of handling this in the embassy, and Steve if you need any

help, you call on us, but you're going to be it." The DCM and the political counselor readily accepted this, and I was indeed it. I called on particularly Ambassador Bruce when I thought the Foreign Secretary, for instance, should be involved and that was above my level of normal contacts.

It was another assignment in which, although I didn't live at the embassy, I spent almost all the daylight hours six-seven days a week, as I had in Tel Aviv. I saw almost nothing of England outside of London. Just because things were happening, it wasn't only that war but there was the Cyprus crisis -- one of the many Cyprus crises -- while I was there. And then more germane to my job was the sudden and unexpected British decision to pull out from the Gulf militarily.

Q: The Persian Gulf.

PALMER: They had known very well that we wanted them to stay. We thought it was critical that they do so, but they were in a really tough budget crunch and that was the factor which determined their decision. It was the only thing in the two years I worked there where I hadn't been tipped off by friends about some important policy matter. They were just sworn to keep that from us, and they did.

Q: How did we react to that?

PALMER: Oh, just with sadness. There was nothing we could do about it. Under instruction we went back to them, and asked them to reconsider but we in London knew that it was an irreversible change. Anyway, it turned out not to be the end of the world. But it led, naturally, to a greater U.S. military involvement in that part of the world.

Q: During the '67 war, was the ghost of the Suez crisis of '56 hanging over people? It was completely different, the British weren't involved but the point still was that this is probably the most critical parting of the ways between the British and the Americans in '56, and I was just wondering whether these things tend to linger on when something happens in the Middle East. I was wondering whether that came back or not?

PALMER: I'm trying to recall. There was one policy difference which put strain between the Brits and us. That was occasioned by Gene Rostow, who was...

Q: National Security Advisor.

PALMER: Yes, and he had this notion about a blockade, but an active blockade, sort of shoot on sight blockade, and he wanted all the western nations to join in that effort. And the Brits wouldn't do it, and others wouldn't do it either. We in the embassy thought it was a rather foolish endeavor.

Q: This is an active blockade of Egypt basically, and Syria too. How did you find the British expertise on the Middle East?

PALMER: They had some very sharp people, very knowledgeable. I would say, again in retrospect, that the vestiges of Arabism bordering on the questioning of the whole proposition of

Israel were more noticeable. They weren't noticeable at all, as I mentioned earlier, in our State establishment in those years. But there were remnants of that a bit in the UK, and the fact that I had just come from Israel gave me frequent opportunity to make some points which I thought were realistic, up and down the line in the Foreign Office with these Arabists. Some of those Brits had started out as Arabists and they had never served outside the Arab world.

Q: Did you find that in talking about Israel that your counterparts, both in Britain but I suppose whatever reflections you'd be getting from other German, French foreign services, sort of saying, well, of course, you're captive of your Jewish lobby in the United States, and therefore we can't really oppose you on a sophisticated level, or something of that nature.

PALMER: No, I think there was some appreciation, particularly during a national election campaign, be it presidential or congressional, that could not expect any administration to take any steps in the Middle East and Near East which would seriously antagonize Israel and its supporters in the United States. That was indeed an inhibition in terms of our freedom of action.

Q: How did you find the Arab representation in London at the time. I'm thinking of Syrian, Egyptian.

PALMER: I got to know all of them and the Israeli representatives. Frankly, there was only one Arab diplomat whom I found to be more than just someone who did things by rote and in a propagandistic way, and who was worthwhile keeping contact with in terms of information and insight, and that was the DCM of the Kuwaiti embassy, who happened to be a Palestinian. We became close friends in addition to being working colleagues. The others, because I had served in Israel may have been a factor, I'm not sure, I never got that close to the Egyptians and Syrians. I met King Hussein once because we got a NIACT from Washington instructing us to deliver a message to him, I've forgotten what the occasion was. I was awed by the fact that I was asked to deliver this -- I guess it was in his embassy. I remember he was sitting on a very high chair and he didn't arise. I had never realized he was so short in stature.

Q: The aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War of '67, which the Israelis took Jerusalem and the West Bank, what was the general feeling from your colleagues, and not just the people you were talking to in Great Britain, about what this was going to do to the Middle Eastern situation?

PALMER: I think the consensus was that the extent of the territorial expansion was determined, not only because of security interest, but because of water, again water. The Sinai was not deemed to be anything but sort of local strategic importance, almost uninhabitable. But the taking of the Old City of Jerusalem, of course, was yet another step in the Israeli long established Israeli campaign to gain complete and permanent control over the whole city and its environs. So the long and the short of it was that the war was viewed to make even more difficult any negotiated settlement. In the longer range that view was proven at least somewhat off base.

Q: I note that you got the superior honor award while you were in London.

PALMER: That was just for reporting and my contact making.

Q: You then left London and went off to a somewhat different terrain. You went to Pakistan.

RONALD I. SPIERS
Counselor for Political Affairs
London (1966-1968)

Ronald I. Spiers was born in New Jersey in 1925. He received his bachelor's degree from Dartmouth College in 1948 and a master's degree from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School. After serving in the U.S. Navy and a five year tenure with the Atomic Energy Commission, he entered the State Department, serving in many high level positions. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern on June, 1992.

Q: Let me now move to another issue and that is the "Sky Bolt" incident. Were you involved?

SPIERS: Yes. McNamara had reached agreement with the British to provide them with the "Sky Bolt" missile, which was a nuclear tipped, air to surface missile. But Defense decided to cancel procurement of the system for budgetary reasons. The British were so unhappy about that action that Kennedy had to meet with MacMillan at Nassau and it was there that the President agreed to provide the Polaris missile system to the British instead. That made the French very unhappy because it reaffirmed all their prejudices about the Anglo-Saxon hegemony in NATO. No one knew that Kennedy would make that offer; I was in George Ball's office when the word of the offer reached the Department. It really shook Ball up because he immediately saw the political implications.

The British were very unhappy about the cancellation of the "Sky Bolt" program although I suspect that it might well have been canceled under any circumstances because the system was not cost effective; a system should not be built just because the U.S. had an agreement with an ally. The Nassau solution, probably improvised on the spot, did considerable damage to the U.S.-France and the U.K.-France relationships.

Eventually, the Nassau imbroglio led to the MLF concept as a means of countering the pressures engendered by our offer to the British. That is because we then faced a choice between developing a multi-lateral nuclear force or watching the establishment of separate nuclear deterrents which might ultimately create severe pressures on Germany to go on its independent way. Our policies on Polaris, "Sky Bolt" and the MLF were perceived as anti-French, particularly by the French, although I don't want to suggest that they were purposely so. It was clear that the European integrationists were very much anti de Gaulle because they viewed him -- correctly, I might say -- as an obstacle to the achievement of their dream, unless it was done on his terms.

In some strange ways, that conference led to my assignment to the Embassy in London as Politico-Military Counselor. When "Sky Bolt" loomed on the horizon, people quickly realized that Defense was making deals with its British counterparts which had the profoundest foreign

policy implications without any one in State knowing anything about them. So the job of Politico-Military Counselor had been established to insure greater coordination within the U.S. government and with the British. George Newman was the first incumbent in that job.

By 1966, in light of my years in the AEC and in EUR/RPM, I was the logical candidate for the London job. George Newman was leaving, but when I was asked whether I would be interested in the job, I was very reluctant to agree because I saw Washington as the place of action and I didn't want to leave it. I was not interested in taking up a standard Foreign Service career, even if the first assignment was London. But I finally agreed and became a full fledged Foreign Service officer. Once having become a Foreign Service officer, I recognized that I would have to go overseas. It would have been very hard to make a career in the Foreign Service while staying in Washington all the time, although it has been done -- e.g Joe Sisco.

So I agreed to go to London. It was McNamara who wanted to have a politico-military man in the Embassy. I had known McNamara from my arms control work. I went under a kind of joint sponsorship. McNamara wrote to Denis Healey, then the British defense minister and told him he was sending "his" man to London. I don't think that State ever knew of that letter.

Q: You have touched on the issue of European integration on a number of occasions. Besides the Ball-Schaetzel-Owen group, was any other part of the Department engaged in this issue in the 1962-66 period?

SPIERS: There was considerable discussion of the issue in the Department. Many people were opposed to an independent Europe that might drift away from the close ties to the U.S. then existing. The consensus was that we should support a Europe in which we could play a strong role. Essentially, we all remembered the events of the 20th Century when the New World had to "step in" in order to save the Old World. The U.S. had been dragged into two world wars generated by essentially intra-European conflicts. The threat of that involvement has never really abated and is still very much with us today. The Danish refusal to approve the Maastricht Treaty will be a problem. I favored European integration anchored by a strong alliance between Europe and the U.S. The major difference I had with some of my colleagues was not about the goal, but the methods by which we were trying to force the process. I felt that integration had to develop organically among the Europeans and the U.S. should not try to accelerate the pace lest the concept be lost entirely. I favored the MLF if it developed in the natural course of events and not as a product of American manipulation, which the Ball group was always tempted to try.

I favored a U.S. presence in Europe as long as the Europeans wanted it. And the Europeans did want it. If they had ever told us "goodbye" then I would have supported withdrawal.

I think everybody recognized that if the west Germans ever developed a nuclear capability of their own, it would have devastating consequences on the Continent. I did not distrust the Germans and did not believe that their goal was to achieve an independent nuclear capability. But as I have said before, I never viewed nuclear weapons as a security blanket. I never believed that nuclear weapons would ever really be used in a war, either tactically or strategically. I had great skepticism, particularly, that tactical nuclear weapons would ever be used. I don't think from my conversations with Defense that we ever had any realistic plans for the use of our

tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. All the plans I knew about would have caused more collateral damage or damage to our forces than they would have inflicted on an enemy. Just look at Chernobyl; the fallout was less than would have been created by one nuclear weapon, but just remember how much damage that one reactor caused. I always felt that using nuclear weapons was totally unrealistic, although I did favor stationing some of our tactical weapons in Europe as long as the Europeans wanted them and felt comfortable with them. I did not favor pressuring the Europeans on these issues. I proposed what became the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in order to involve the Europeans in real nuclear planning.

That was another interesting experience because it also got me in hot water with Schaetzel and his friends. They regarded the NPG as a way to undermine the MLF. By the time I made my suggestion, it was clear to me and many others that the MLF was not going to come into being. In any case, even if by some major miracle the MLF was borne, the NPG would not be a competitor. I proposed the NPG to John McNaughton, then Assistant Secretary for Defense for International Security Affairs. I had in mind a very small, multi-national and carefully selected group who both knew and "needed to know" about nuclear matters who could discuss informally and intensively, nuclear strategy and weapons -- concepts, uses, etc. McNaughton managed to sell the idea to McNamara, who in his usual manner, proposed the idea in a speech without ever discussing it with any one in State. The Department was furious; that fury was not assuaged when McNaughton mentioned that the idea had come from a State official in the first place. As you can imagine, that did not go over very well. In any case, the NPG was established and it is still functioning today, although it has such a large membership today that it is no longer the kind of body I had in mind. Of course, nuclear issues also do not carry the sensitivity today that they did twenty five years ago.

Q: In 1966, you went to London as Counselor for Politico-Military Affairs. You have already mentioned how that assignment happened. What were the functions of a Politico-Military Counselor?

SPIERS: I had a mixture of responsibilities. It turned out that the most important one was our effort to persuade the British not to withdraw from east of the Suez. I developed a close personal friendship with Denis Healey. I also worked with the Foreign Office, primarily on issues created by the French withdrawal from NATO. That of course was a continuation of involvement in issues that had been of concern to me in EUR/RPM. I spent a lot of time following British Defense planning in a period when the British were retrenching around the world -- leaving Malta, Aden, etc. I also became involved in the sale of U.S. weapons to the British, like the F-111, working with Henry Kuss and his staff. We dealt a lot with matters relating to U.S. forces in Britain (the Third Air Force, Hollylock, etc). There were four officers in the section: Jock Stoddart, Dick Hennes and David Passage.

All in all, the assignment to London was very enjoyable; I learned that there is a life away from the office. I didn't work until 8 or 9 p.m. as I had done in the Department. I went to the theater; I became reacquainted with my family. London was fun and interesting and I met a lot of intelligent, cultured people. It was a great assignment.

I got along well with Ambassador David Bruce. We had a former political appointee as Political Counselor -- David Brubeck. I had no problems with Brubeck because I think he recognized that I had a background in politico-military matters. During my first day at the Embassy, he called me to tell me that he had been handling a lot of NATO-related matters and he felt that they should be transferred to me.

Bruce and Brubeck didn't hit it off very well and when the opportunity arose, Bruce combined the two sections and I became the Political Counselor and kept my politico-military portfolio. That brought me into touch with the whole range of U.S.-British relationships.

Q: Let me raise the issue of the British presence east of Suez. What were the British views and what were our views on this issue?

SPIERS: Bob Bowie used to say that it was a matter of "Atlantic politics". There was a lot of opposition in Britain to the withdrawal from east of Suez. I don't think that Denis Healey favored it, but they did have to face economic reality. The British were in deep economic difficulties; their presence in the Gulf Emirates was costing a lot of money. It was noted that the British forces were put in the Persian Gulf initially to block Napoleon's threat to British communication routes to India and that Napoleon had long hence left this earth. So that the rationale for assigning troops was no longer valid. It was an expensive policy which the British could ill afford. There were of course British who still viewed their country as having a world mission which required it to be engaged far from its shores -- it is an argument that one hears here in the United States when our country's role in the world is discussed. Then there were people who thought that the days of the British world responsibilities had passed. Ultimately, the economic realities won the day and forced the gradual British withdrawal. The British wanted to reduce their BAOR, but we managed avert that by talking to government people, political leaders, the media, etc. My contacts were both with the Labor Party, then in power, and the opposition. I would see Ted Heath about once a month and chat with him in his office. I spent a lot of time talking to the media -- Peter Jenkins, David Watt and other influential British newspaper people - - trying to make the case for those who opposed withdrawal. We did not want the British to withdraw because it would have made the world a lonelier place for us. We believed, rightly as it turned out, that we would have to fill the vacuum left by the British just as we had done in Greece and Turkey during then Truman administration. We saw the vacuum as an opportunity for the Soviets to move in, so that the British withdrawal was viewed essentially as an element of the East-West conflict. There was also some concern about the potential for instability in the area itself after British withdrawal, but that was not the major argument I used to make. Of course, being in an Embassy, I carried out the instructions sent by Washington; I can't therefore say what all the elements were that went into our opposition to the British plans.

Q: You were in London for Nixon's first overseas visit. What are your recollections of that event?

SPIERS: A succession of quasi-disasters. Every time there is a change in administrations in Washington, the poor State Department takes it in the neck. I will never forget Ralph Dungan, who had been a classmate of mine at Princeton and subsequently became one of Kennedy's White House aides, telling me that State Department was not very well liked by that new

administration. We were viewed as a bunch of conservative Republicans. When Nixon was elected, friends of mine who worked for him viewed us as a bunch of leftist Democrats. A lot of Nixon's attitude toward State, I believe, was shaped by his Vice Presidential experiences with Dulles. As I mentioned earlier, he was treated with some disdain by Dulles and I suspect that he felt that the whole Department regarded him with contempt. That is why he selected Rogers as Secretary of State; he could then move all the authority over foreign policy to the White House -- i.e. Kissinger -- with impunity.

I was not the responsible officer for Nixon's visit, but I did a lot of the control officer work. Getting ready for the visit was an experience in itself. It was suggested to me -- and I thought it was a good idea -- that Wilson invite Nixon to attend a British Cabinet meeting at No. 10 Downing. It would be a regular Cabinet meeting except that the President of the United States would be invited to join and observe it. Everybody agreed that it was a great idea.

As was the custom in those days, all arrangements were discussed in conference calls with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. During one of them, as we were reviewing the schedule, I recall Ehrlichman asking how many people would be in the Cabinet meeting. I told him that I would guess that there would be about 20-25 people. He said: "Too many! Tell the Prime Minister's office to cut down attendance!". I told him that it was the Prime Minister who was extending the invitation to his Cabinet meeting and that we had no right to dictate the number of attendees. Ehrlichman got furious. He started yelling at me, accusing me of insubordination and disloyalty. It was so acerbic that when the call was finished, I went to see Ambassador Bruce. He of course had a lot of prestige and although still an appointee of a previous administration, was highly regarded and respected by all. Bruce sent the President a personal message pointing out the absurdity of Ehrlichman's position. I am sure that the President knew nothing of what had transpired; it was undoubtedly the work of Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Of course, the Bruce message didn't help my standing with them; they became even more enraged with me. When they finally arrived in London, we went out to dinner together at a very expensive restaurant right off Barclay Square. I got stuck with the bill, which probably added up to half of my monthly pay.

Haldeman did the advance work for the visit. He came over personally and met with us and then held meetings with the British on the details of the visit. Kissinger, of course, came along with Nixon. I assembled some leading British figures that he could meet with at Claridge's, where he always stayed. I had known Kissinger fairly well from his consulting days during the Kennedy administration. He used to visit the Department periodically to meet with people like Schaetzel, Tyler, etc. Sometimes he would have to wait for his appointment and then he would walk across the hall to my office, which was on the opposite side of the hall from the Assistant Secretary's suite. He would pull up a chair in my office and just chat. So I got to know him and I think that when he came to the White House and later to the Department, he viewed me as one of the "good guys".

Q: What were your thoughts about working with the British bureaucracy?

SPIERS: I enjoyed it. They were very cooperative. I like them. They were a first class act. The British, when assigned overseas, are a problem, but in London they are a pleasure to work with.

When in an Embassy, they tend to be somewhat arrogant and dismissive of the natives, but in London they are very, very good.

Q: What were our major bilateral problems while you were in London?

SPIERS: The cancellation of the F-111. That was a traumatic experience. The British had contracted for a number of those planes. I had made a trip with one of their Air Force Marshals to the McDonald-Douglas headquarters in St. Louis and in Texas to look at the planes that were being built for the British. Some already had Royal Air Force insignia and tail numbers. The British Cabinet decided to cancel the order for economic reasons. That was a big shock. We tried to do what we could to minimize the cancellation penalty payments. What made it even more difficult was that I had made efforts to get the Marines to buy the Harrier, a British aircraft, as a sort of *quid pro quo*. The Marines procured the Harrier, but the British canceled the F-111 order. They did buy some Phantom aircraft in lieu, but it was not a pretty period.

Another interesting issue in which I became involved was Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia is a tiny island in the Indian Ocean, known for guano deposits. We wanted to build a base for our own use because since we were still involved in Vietnam and had major interests in the area, Defense wanted a base very badly. As part of their general withdrawal, the British were considering giving up their Mauritius base. We first looked at a little island called Aldabra, which happened to be the home of an endangered species -- the pink footed booby, a bird which was found mostly on that island. This brought us into a real buzz saw because there were some British Parliamentarians who became mightily upset by the thought that the last refuge of this booby bird might disappear because of the invasion of this American herd. It was something like the spotted owl debate today. Finally, I suggested Diego Garcia as an alternative. No one in Washington had ever heard of it. When Washington sent out a message to several posts to see what the reaction of their host government might be to an American base on Diego Garcia, the Embassy in Burma responded that their hosts would think it was a Cuban cigar! The negotiations were prolonged; I finally signed the agreement several years later when I was Chargé in London. Our deal with the British included a waiver on some R&D costs for the Polaris missile as an unspoken compensation for Diego Garcia expenses. Diego Garcia was very controversial because Mauritius was gaining its independence and the Mauritians were very unhappy with this scheme, even though Diego Garcia was over 1000 miles away. But there was guano on the island and it had been "mined" by Mauritians. That is still an issue because Mauritius still lays claim to Diego Garcia, although it never was a part of Mauritius; the island had always been an administrative part of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), as had Mauritius.

HENRY REITER WEBB, JR.
Assistant Agricultural Attaché
London (1966-1970)

Henry Reiter Webb, Jr. was born in Tennessee in 1929. He served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1946 to 1948. He joined the Foreign Agricultural Service in 1961, where his overseas posts included the UK and Egypt. Mr. Webb was

awarded the USDA Superior Service award in 1966. He was interviewed by Ray Ioanes in 1994.

Q: Then you moved on to another assignment abroad.

WEBB: Yes, that was my first time to live abroad. Of course in all these jobs we were traveling abroad constantly. In 1966 the Department decided, or FAS decided, to select 5 mid level officers to become the first Assistant Agricultural Attachés for Market Development.

Q: May I interrupt? This was in our budget proposal for the year to the Congress that we would have, in five different parts of the world, specialists in market development. And so it came in a special appropriation that we got in Congress that year and you were one of the people selected.

WEBB: Right. I went to London in the summer of '68. Alex Bernitz went to Germany; Glenn Tussey, my old buddy from AMS, went to Rome; Jimmy Minyard went to Tokyo; and I'm forgetting one. Each one of us had, I'm sure, very different experiences because the countries were different.

In London, basically I was responsible for approximately 25 commodities with a total promotion budget in the country of about 4 million dollars. Some of the commodities would have more than one cooperator so we might have had 35 to 40 different groups to work with.

It was a very interesting assignment. Up to that point, I had been involved mainly with cotton and then of course some of the other bulk commodities like wheat and all the grains.

Q: There was a project, as I recall it, at that time you were there, on corn which was used in the making of scotch whiskey.

WEBB: I don't recall that one.

I think the one I enjoyed the most was being told, not being asked being told, that we were going to do a promotion in the UK on fresh green celery out of Florida. We had a budget of perhaps \$2,000.00 to try to take on this whole new market.

To put this in perspective, the people that are reading this eventually may not be aware but in Britain at that time, celery was not eaten green. Basically celery was covered with earth as it was maturing to keep it white and they would eat it as a cooked vegetable. And here we were trying to introduce a completely new form of celery.

We had only a few limited tools to work with. The Florida Fresh Produce Exchange had some beautiful advertising materials that they provided to us free of charge.

What I basically did, I went to a chap that worked for an advertising agency and several other projects for us. A fellow named Peter Hood. Peter and I had gotten to be good friends. I went to Peter and I said, "Look, I'm not going to ask you if you want to do this because I know you don't,

on a budget of \$2,000.00. But we are just going to make this a condition of continuing to work on other things, that you are going to figure out a program here for."

Q: You blackmailed him!

WEBB: I blackmailed him for fresh green celery. He took the \$2,000.00, he hired a couple of pretty girls and put them in green pants suits, he rented a green mini van and gave them all the advertising material and sent them out to call on green grocers.

Now, we did have enough sense to find out who is importing this stuff, which retailers is it going to, which wholesalers, so we were not calling on people that would not have a supply of it. Basically, the girls would go into a retail store, and tell the store owner that if he would let them do so, they would dress up the store with these advertising materials free of charge.

The thing was a tremendous success. The reason it was so successful was that all we had to do was to get people to try it for one time. They were absolutely hooked on fresh green celery. A very limited campaign that I think had a lot of effect.

Q: Now this was a project that we put on ourselves.

WEBB: This was a project that we put on ourselves. We had no cooperators.

Q: When you mentioned the 4 million dollars for perhaps 25 groups, there were other projects that we did ourselves in that as well as cooperator projects?

WEBB: In addition to cooperator projects we had, at that point in time, a very busy Trade Fair and Trade Show program.

Q: Was that included in the 4 million?

WEBB: No, this was just for the cooperator programs. We had another Assistant Attaché in London at the time, Bill Joholl, who was running the Trade Fair program and the Trade Shows at another building, I can't remember what we called it.

Q: Albert Hall?

WEBB: No, it was near Albert Hall, well, it's not important.

Even though I was there as one of the 5 Assistant Attachés for Market Development, nobody in FAS ever went to a foreign post without having some reporting assignments.

Q: You had some reporting assignments.

WEBB: Right.

Q: Tobacco, wheat?

WEBB: I almost automatically got the responsibility for cotton reporting. Beyond that it was just a question of what strengths do other people have. And if we don't have anybody that knows anything about a particular field, we'll just divide up those as fairly as we can.

Basically I ended up handling responsibilities for cotton, tobacco, wheat and fruits and vegetables. Fruits and vegetables took up more of my time than anything else.

Q: Reiter, this maybe encompasses more of your career than you've talked about to date, but isn't there a difference between the quality of basic information that FAS would get in the field from most governments, in one country as opposed to another.

WEBB: It is as different as night and day. In the UK this was an extremely simple responsibility. We had access to some of the best statistical information in the world. The British were accurate, they could give you information on virtually anything that you wanted.

In fact, that brings me to another point. At that time, and he's only retired about 2 years now, we had an outstanding local employee in London named David Evans. By the time I got there, I'd known David for some years, but by the time I got there David had been doing cotton reporting for a long time. I've always been a believer in -- if it's not broke, don't fix it.

So what we basically did was David continued getting all this statistical information and preparing that part of the cotton reports. I would do the part that I could do better than him which was to draw upon my trade connections.

Once every quarter before our reports were due, I'd take a short trip up to Liverpool to the cotton trade and to Manchester for the textile industry. I would come back to the embassy and write the outlook and the situation part of the report. David would do all the statistics.

Q: Weren't you there at the time that EFTA was in being?

WEBB: Yes.

Q: What was EFTA?

WEBB: European Free Trade Association which was, as I recall, most of the Scandinavian countries plus the UK plus Portugal. It was the ones that were not in the European Community, or the Common Market as it was called in those days.

Q: Why did it come about?

WEBB: I think these countries were trying to enjoy some of the advantages of a trading bloc without being, as the British would have felt, being forced into the Common Market. It was never very successful.

Q: Did you ever get the impression that maybe this was a weapon of the British to have a mechanism they could belong to. Because they didn't want to belong to the Common Market.

WEBB: Absolutely, they did not want to belong to that. They were basically forced into the Common Market by circumstances. During the time I was there, they were not in the Common Market. Politically, I think it would have been a very negative thing to be favoring the Common Market because the British people did not want to belong.

Q: I'm going to become an interviewee at this point.

There was a time during this period, Reiter, when you were abroad, that the British government, through their Minister of Agriculture, approached Secretary Friedman with a deal.

Which said: We were prepared to sign an agreement with you, to guarantee you your grain market in the United Kingdom, through an adjustment in our pricing system -- if imports went down, we would lower prices; we would have the right to increase prices if the imports went up. But to guarantee our historical share of that market.

That was an amazing thing to do at that time. It never hit the papers because it never finally became a fact. But it is evidence of the lengths the British would go to, to stay out of the Common Market.

Then you moved to...

WEBB: Let me comment briefly on something else on the reporting responsibilities of fruits and vegetables.

One of the things that we reported on in London, I think we were probably the only post in the world, that reported on dried fruit. The British have always been very fond of dried fruit. We were suppose to come up with a quarterly report.

One of my predecessors, may have been Turner Oyloe who was there immediately before me, but as I recall, it went back years before that.

One of our predecessors had found a chap named Tommy Hammet, down in the city, who was the principal in a firm that was very active in dried fruit trade. All we had asked Tommy Hammet to do was to give us some prices. Well, whoever sent that first request asked for it back by a certain date. It didn't come back by that date. About a month later, not only did Mr. Hammet provide us with an extremely good set of prices, he basically wrote an analysis of the concurrent status of the world dried fruit trade, that was just a classic.

So we had learned that what we had to do was to trick Mr. Hammet. You had to tell him that you really needed it January 1st instead of February the 1st. So that he'd get it to you by February the 1st, when you really need it.

We found out that if you just gave Mr. Hammet enough of a lead time, that he would write an outstanding report for you. But there was a price to be paid. The price was that once a year whoever was reporting on dried fruit had to take Mr. Hammet out for lunch.

Q: *Small price.*

WEBB: Lunch with Mr. Hammet consisted of a couple of martinis before lunch, a bottle of wine with lunch, a glass of port after lunch. And this little tiny wizened man, of about 75 at the time, would then proceed to go back to work. It was well understood at the embassy that whoever took Mr. Hammet to lunch did not return to the embassy.

JONATHAN D. STODDART
Political/Military Officer
London (1966-1969)

Jonathan Stoddart was born in Maryland and was educated at Cornell University and the Fletcher School. He served in the Army, in both World War II and the Korean War. He has held posts in London and Italy. In Washington, he has also served a variety of posts, mainly focusing on political-military affairs. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

STODDART: Until mid-1966 and then I was seconded to Embassy London because in the early '60s, ISA had made an arrangement with EUR in the Department to arrange assignment of a civilian political/military officer from ISA to the embassy because of the growing volume of defense activities involving the British. We had some very big arms deals with the British that were ongoing. Besides the acquisition of the Polaris, the British wanted to buy the new F-111 swing wing fighter aircraft and in turn our Defense Department, the Air Force and Navy, in particular, eyed base right potential in the British Indian Ocean territories (BIOT) and two of its obscure islands, Diego Garcia and Aldabra. We also had some very important policy equities in the Defense reviews going on in the UK under Denis Healey, the Minister of Defense. ISA apparently made a persuasive case to State in the form of Bill Bundy, then Assistant Secretary of ISA before he went over and took Roger Hilsman's job as Assistant Secretary in East Asia in the Department. As a result, Phil Barringer was the first person in the job in London in 1963.

I was nominated as the second ISA officer to work in the Political/Military Section of the embassy. Ron Spiers was the political/military counselor designate. He interviewed me in the spring of 1966 and accepted my assignment and we both appeared about the same time in mid summer, 1966 in London. It was the beginning of a long professional and personal relationship that lasts to this day. I must say that Ron Spiers is the best boss I have worked for in the government in any capacity. He was an extremely competent officer with a style of management that served very well. He assumed that he had competent people working for him and he let them do their thing, so there was a minimum of peering over your shoulder. My three years in London were among the most enjoyable I have had in my professional life.

Q: This was from when to when?

STODDART: From mid 1966 to July 1969. I came home a little early because my wife was in the process of dying from cancer which she succumbed to in October 1969. Returning to my London period, I found it a magnificent assignment. It was stimulating and rewarding from the sort of issues we worked on. It was a very congenial embassy beginning at the top. David Bruce was a remarkable person and a wonderful man to work for and had an outstanding supporting staff. We equally had some very fine and competent people we worked with on the British side. Denis Healey is an extraordinary personality and very accessible. There were first rate people in the foreign office and what was then known as the Commonwealth and Colonial office. The latter two designations were phased out in the early seventies. So, as I say, it was a splendid time.

Q: What were some of the issues? Earlier on there had been the Skybolt business. Was that still operating?

STODDART: I was exposed to the Skybolt issue early on as it was tied into the Royal Navy's quest for Polaris submarines. As noted earlier, in June 1960, Defense Minister Watkinson and a horde of people from the Defense Ministry, including Lord Louis Mountbatten, and a couple of representatives from the foreign office came to the Pentagon to negotiate the Polaris arrangements. Skybolt was a secondary but important part of that because the RAF very much wanted Skybolt which at that time was only under development by the U.S. Air Force. The RAF Skybolt priority was credible as their aging "V" Bomber Force was on its last obsolescent legs and could not credibly penetrate Soviet air space. Skybolt, an air to ground launched missile, could do so from "V" bombers outside Soviet air space. The USAF-RAF cooperation was a cozy arrangement because the USAF felt if the RAF went through their contractual commitment to buy Skybolt that would mean the U.S. Air Force would have easier passage for deflecting Skybolt skeptics, of which there were many. It was a classical case of the RAF and the U.S. Air Force buttering each other up. That was very much part of the Gates-Watkinson June 1960 memorandum of understanding on our sale of Polaris to the Brits, our access to Holy Loch, Scotland, for our own Polaris and the continuation of the British commitment to Skybolt, which meant the USAF, with no reluctance, would have to continue the program by budgeting research and development funds.

All went well until January 21, 1961 when I was in my office and I got a direct call from the White House. JFK's inaugural balls were the night before and I had gone to one at the Mayflower because my wife was a prominent Democrat in Falls Church and got invited to the inaugural ball as a hostess. She carried me along as an invitee, spouse. Anyway, I had to go to work the next day and my secretary told me that the National Security Council's office in the White House was calling. I thought somebody was pulling a gag on me and I got on the phone and it was Kennedy's new National Security Advisor.

Q: Who was that?

STODDART: McGeorge Bundy. He said, "I understand you are the UK desk officer." I said, "Yes, sir." He said, "You must then have the file on Skybolt." I fessed up that I had a considerable file and was the reporting officer on the Watkinson-Gates memorandum of

understanding which included Skybolt.” He said, “I want you to bring that file over to me in the White House.” I said, “I am going to have to check it out with the front office.” And, he said, “I would like you over here at 2:30. You tell you front office that you should be here with the file.” So, I immediately ran across the hall and talked to Bob Knight, who was the acting Assistant Secretary. He could care less, being on the way out as an Eisenhower appointee. So, off I went with my Skybolt file. The upshot was I left the file with Bundy after an intense but civil hour of questions and answers. He sent it back to me about a week later. Kennedy was to see Macmillan, as I recall, in Bermuda in early February 1961. The White House made the decision that it was going to cancel Skybolt, which was the proper decision. Looking back on it, it was strictly a stratagem on the part of the USAF to use the RAF in a support role to secure the USAF end game.

Macmillan blew his top when he found out that Skybolt was going to be canceled. When he heard about it he sent Kennedy a very, very nasty and well documented personal cable. This didn’t get the Bermuda session off to a very good start.

Q: Was it considered not a very practical use of our money?

STODDART: It was not considered a very credible weapons system and except for some fly boys in the Air Force nobody else in the Pentagon had any regrets about it.

Q: The British had put an awful lot of prestige on to this particular item.

STODDART: Yes, they did and the RAF’s contention was that it was the only way that they could maintain their own aging strategic air command because they needed a standoff weapon. If they got near Soviet air space they would be minced meat. I think there was a consensus in both the Ministry of Defense and our Department of Defense that except for the air force guys that had an equity in it, that scrubbing was a very sagacious decision.

Q: This is more with Canada. Was Bluestreak something you dealt with? I can’t remember exactly what it was.

STODDART: I think it did involve the Canadians, but I don’t have any background on that.

Q: While you were in London, were there any major issues that you were dealing with?

STODDART: A wide range of issues. We had an interesting tripartite operation going between the political/military section of the embassy and the New Zealand and Australian High Commission offices. It all dealt on a succession of British defense reviews. We were concerned because they were talking about complete withdrawal east of Suez. And, the Australians and New Zealanders were equally concerned about maintaining a British military commitment to Hong Kong and Malaysia. And, of course, the Vietnamese thing was really heating up at this time. So, it was a tripartite interest group trying to pressure the British government to go slow on their decision making process to yank everything out east of Suez. We accepted the fact that a withdrawal was ultimately going to take place but we wanted to attenuate the rate of withdrawal. That was a lot of fun with good results. I met some very fine Australians and New Zealanders in

the process. The Australian Deputy High Commissioner at that time was Roy Fernandez, who is still a very, very close friend of ours and who subsequently became ambassador to Yugoslavia and then Belgium, the European Community, the European Assembly in Strasbourg, and the Arms Control negotiations in Geneva. He wore all those hats.

Q: Was this British withdrawal pretty much a political decision or was it economics saying they had to do it? I would have imagined the British military would have been rather unhappy about it.

STODDART: They were unhappy. So was Denis Healey. The problem was Prime Minister Harold Wilson's schizoid Cabinet. He had the extreme leftists in the Labour Party occupying several key domestic Cabinet positions and then there was George Brown, who was Foreign Secretary and a real hard nose and Denis Healey. They were the stalwarts in the Cabinet and were always trying to fend off the left winger "wets" in the Cabinet who for economic reasons wanted to cut back and invest the savings in domestic social programs. As Denis Healey told Ron Spiers and myself once, "It is not a question of having a presence east of Suez, but more than 50 percent of the cabinet doesn't was a presence east of Dover." It was a very, very sensitive and emotional issue. So, the pragmatist Wilson was trying to placate everybody. Denis Healey, and the Ministry of Defense, were joined by George Brown trying to ward off the leftists in the cabinet. They succeeded. The U.S., New Zealanders and Australians were doing just what Denis Healey and George Brown enlisted us to do - in most discreet fashion - to make the case that British continued presence was necessary and that an abrupt withdrawal would be a disaster.

Q: Underlining it was if the British pulled out we would almost certainly have to replace them.

STODDART: Yes. The Australians were willing to pick up some of the slack, but they just didn't have the resources and, of course, New Zealand could do virtually nothing except apply political pressure to the extent that they were capable of doing. I think our efforts of supporting Denis Healey and George Brown, and presumably Wilson himself, was reasonably successful, although Wilson was sort a chameleon on this sort of stuff, a mark of his political personality. The British were going through a very difficult time.

One of the other interesting things that became practically an annuity for me was the British Indian Ocean Territories [BIOT]. When I arrived in London in the summer of 1966, the groundwork had been laid for a joint agreement between the U.S. and the UK for the development of unspecified islands in the British Indian Ocean territory by the U.S. military. But, there were lots of loose ends and I inherited this when I arrived. Ron Spiers basically gave that particular issue to me and a very bright officer I had working for me named David Passage, who years later was ambassador to Botswana. We negotiated that agreement through the fall and at the British request we signed the agreement on New Year's Eve, 1966, as they didn't want any publicity. I remember we signed about 6 o'clock in the evening. There was a secret annex to the agreement which was interesting because it provided that the British would allow use of the island of Aldabra, off the east coast of Africa, for the USAF to develop a very large airfield complex. In exchange we would defray the research and development costs of the Royal Navy Polaris submarine which amounted, as I recall, to about \$50 million. They were supposed to pay part of R&D cost as a result of the Gates Watkinson agreement in June 1960. In due course this

secret annex seeped out because we couldn't hide the fact that the USAF was going to build a large installation on Aldabra, although it was supposed to be an unoccupied island.

Aldabra and the BIOT were issues that generated much energy over the three years that I was in the embassy. On Aldabra, the Royal Society and our National Academy of Science pooled resources and concluded that any development on Aldabra would spoil one of the unique ecosystems in the Indian Ocean and would affect not only the breeding ground of the giant tortoise, but it would also put to risk an ornithologist's list of endangered flightless rails, frigate birds, and the red headed booby.

Q: These names are engraved on your heart, I see.

STODDART: They certainly are. Over the years, the Aldabra issue was painful because the Royal Society started a letter writing campaign, mostly to the Times, and did we take the heat on that. And we were taking it back home too with our National Academy of Science. They were working in tandem and it was amusing. It turned out that the key adversary in the Royal Academy was Dr. George Stoddart, same Scots spelling, a namesake who provided much ribaldry in the embassy at my expense. I had lunch with him a couple of times and he was a real zealot. "You turn one spade of ground on Aldabra and..." Well, it turned out mercifully in November 1967, when the British were going through a very stressful economic period and decided to devalue the pound and engage in all sorts of governmental economies including the Ministry of Defense. That accelerated again a new review east of Suez and also meant the British, because they had to put up some seed money, were going to forsake their interest in Aldabra. They pulled the plug in Aldabra in effect because they were getting so much heat from the environmentalists and their own left wing, in and out of Parliament. They also canceled the F-111 deal and a couple of other arms arrangements they had with us.

My namesake won that one, but the U.S. Navy was poised and ready to move right in on the USAF's failure in Aldabra having already done a site survey on Diego Garcia, which was 2,000 miles further east, off the southwest coast of India and the Maldives. Little specks of coral islands. So, we started a new go around on Diego Garcia beginning in 1967. When I came back to work in the Department for Ron Spiers in September, 1969, we were still negotiating with the Brits about Diego Garcia.

We had less static on Diego Garcia than we did on Aldabra, but we did have problems. For instance, we and the British official public relations line was that it was an unpopulated island but it turned out that there were about 300 copra workers on the island. We said there wasn't anything of interest that would alert the environmentalists, but it turned out there were wild ponies on the island. We persuaded the Defense Department and the Seabees to build a fence across the island to keep the ponies on one side.

We had some problems when the Seabees initiated work on the island. In their off hours, they had nurtured a little marijuana farm. Under our agreement with the British, they exercised nominal control through a Royal Navy commander and his discovery of the pot farm, not unusual in such a small space, was embarrassing but papered over. Some of the environmentalists got a little upset because the navy had to blow up a lot of coral heads in the

harbor, the navy was developing. But the ensuing fish kill was nothing like Aldabra with giant tortoises, flightless rails and goony birds, etc.

Q: This might be a good place to stop. We can put at the end any other issues that you were dealing with in London that you can think of right now.

STODDART: We can reserve that for the next session, if you like.

Q: All right, we will stop here.

STODDART: Fine.

Q: Today is February 7, 2000. What were some of the other issues in this 1966-69 period? We talked about Skybolt.

STODDART: Right.

Q: Had Britain pretty much withdrawn its military forces east of Suez by this time?

STODDART: No, that came later when Harold Wilson was elected and the Labour Party came into office in 1964. They went through this agony of withdrawal. The big issue was the pace of the withdrawal east of Suez. That consumed a lot of our time. I arrived in the embassy in August, 1966 and from 1966 up to 1968 we went through this constant review and I told you how we were in cahoots with the Australians and New Zealanders and the British Ministry of Defense and foreign office in trying to slow the British decision makers in doing something that we all felt would affect our own separate national interests. The Australians and New Zealanders very much wanted the British to stay in Malaysia which they thought was a key piece of real estate in southeast Asia which had just gone through the very difficult insurrection that the British finally put down in the '50s. They were concerned with the rise of Sukarno in Indonesia. So, we had overlapping and at times competitive interests, but all of them were aiming to slow the British down, and we succeeded to a reasonable extent.

Q: What was your evaluation of the British military establishment at this time?

STODDART: Oh, very good. My experience with the British goes back to World War II when I had great admiration for the British military. When George Brown, our Air Force four star general, who was a delightful character, became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during the Carter years in the late '70s, he was quoted from a speech he made at Duke University, when he was asked the same question. He said that it is pitiful that the great British military legacy has been reduced to a surfeit of generals and admirals and very good bands. But, that was a little too much. The British were very well trained and still are. They had a very substantial presence in Germany, the British Army of the Rhine, about 50,000 men.

Q: How about the British navy at this point?

STODDART: Also very good, very professional.

Q: There is a difference between being very professional and being large enough to carry on tasks.

STODDART: Well, that is one of the reasons that the Royal Air Force wanted the Skybolt missile because they thought it would keep their air force sustainable for another 15 or 20 years because their strategic bombing force was aging and growing obsolescent and they didn't have any replacement for the bomber because it was just too expensive a proposition. They also wanted to maintain, you have heard this story over and over again in this country, at least a competitive edge with the Royal Navy which was getting the Polaris from us. That is in effect the military mind set that you will find any place in the world, that each service wants what it considers to be their fair share of the action.

Q: Were there any other issues that we haven't covered during this 1966-69 period?

STODDART: I was going to get into that. I think we were going to cover the three years I spent in the embassy. I should say that from a professional and personal standpoint they were three of the most pleasant years that I have had in my undistinguished career. We had a superlative embassy beginning with one of the finest men I have ever worked for, David Bruce. The DCM (deputy chief of mission) was Phil Kaiser, a first rate person. He had gone to Oxford and knew everybody - Denis, George Thompson, etc. He had incredible access. The economics minister was Willis Armstrong my first year who was succeeded by Harlan Cleveland's younger brother, Stanley. There were top people right across the board. Bill Brubeck was political counselor, Bill Galloway was his deputy, and Ron Spiers ran political/military as pol/mil counselor and I was his deputy. We had a very able officer named Dick Hennes and then the young newly minted Foreign Service officer, David Passage. David has just recently retired. He was ambassador in Botswana. There was a first rate administrative operation run by Pete Skoufis, who had some very good young people working with him - Sheldon Kryz was one of them. Harvey Buffalo was another. And all the regional officers in the political section were first rate, the positions being considered one of the plum assignments in the Foreign Service. We had some very unusual people who came out there - Bill Eagleton, who later became an ambassador, and is still active working for the UN in the Western Sahara, the Polisario dispute. Steve Palmer. Wendell [Wen] Coote, who was an African specialist. Bill Chapin was the East Asia officer. It was just a first rate professional embassy.

Q: Going back to you and what you were doing. You were working on this British withdrawal and you got involved in Skybolt. Were there any other issues that particularly engaged you?

STODDART: A wide number. We had constant basing issues with the British, including sites in the United Kingdom. Part of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), one of the three anchors, was at a place called Fylingdales Moor on the Yorkshire coast and the other two sites were in Greenland and Alaska. Our Defense Department wanted to upgrade the system and provide some needed redundancy and more sophistication, so our experts recommended that this massive installation be developed at a place called Orfordness, which is south of the Wash in

eastern England. This created a problem similar to the one I was telling you about with Aldabra where the British environmentalists got up in arms. One of the ugliest birds, equal in ugliness only to a turkey buzzard or vulture, called the avocet would be threatened. Where we wanted to build was on a marshy island actually right off the coast and it was a refugee for avocets. Plus, access to the island was through the small town of Aldeburgh and its June music festival. So, we got into the same problem we had with the Royal Society, Re Aldabra, that we were going to devastate the local ecology. That was a backbreaking task but we finally got that one through, although we took an awful lot of heat from, amongst others, my old antagonist from the Royal Society, George Stoddart.

Q: Were there concessions made to save the bird?

STODDART: Oh, yes. We made all sorts of concessions. None of the British environmentalists believed it. They said the electronic magnetic pulse (emp) would end up electrocuting or sterilizing all the birds, but we gave them assurance that the Avocet was eternal. Then there was the town of Aldeburgh, which hosted an annual summer music festival, so we agreed that large trucks would not transit town during the building phase. We had to build a ring road around the town to compensate. We also had to build a causeway to the island. All in all, enrichment of political/military officer's experience in ecology.

Throughout the 1960-69 period we spent an inordinate amount of time on arms sales issues with the British because McNamara, as Secretary of Defense, was a great enthusiast of trying to redress our balance of payment problem by dumping as much hardware as we could all around the world. He started something called off-set agreements which started with the Germans. McNamara had a very skillful, energetic arms merchant named Henry Kuss. We had multimillion dollar arms deals with the Germans. But, the Germans decided that for their own political and economic purposes that they wanted some sort of off-set arrangement. In other words, if we were going to sell them F-104 aircraft, which we sold them an abundance of, they wanted some of the pieces of the airframe made in Germany or assembled in Germany, whatever. Once that started with the Germans, the Brits quickly picked up on it and concluded that offset arrangements, more for political and economic appeal than military, were a necessity. So, we had about \$300 million worth of arms business with the British per year during that period. We are talking about a billion dollars equivalent now, which was big money in those days.

So, the British wanted offsets and we had to agree to them, with painful reluctance. I spent a lot of time as the political/military attaché looking at all sorts of things with people from the Pentagon that the Pentagon could presumably buy. Anything from electronics made by Marconi to DeHaviland aircraft and Short aircraft that were made in Belfast. The British were very interested in doing the latter to aid the depressed economy of Northern Ireland. And, the British also had something called the Harrier Jet, which was a vertical short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) aircraft. It had revolving jets that the pilot could turn down to lift off like a helicopter and then turn up for regular flight. This was in the early development stage but our Marine Corps was very interested and spent a lot of time over there looking at it. Just at the end of my period in 1969, the Marine Corps put in an initial order and they are still using the Harrier. This goes back 30 years.

Every year the Farnborough air show would attract a horde of commercial aviation representatives from the United States and senior people from the Pentagon plus a lot of congressmen. I must say that one of the parts of the job that I didn't like was the monstrous number of CODELs (congressional delegations) that came through London. Some of them were more interesting than others, but for most of them you had to have very good local contacts in terms of theater, shopping, sightseeing. Fortunately, we had a local employee woman named Joan Auten who was a legend and an incredible, energetic, and clued in on every aspect of London life, the sublime to the sleazy. She had been with the embassy since shortly after World War II. My first wife, Irene, got along with her very well, a great gift to me with all our visitors. Anything you wanted she could get for you if she liked you. When people like Senator Jake Javits came to town or Ted Kennedy, and they came solo quite frequently, Joan would always take care of them personally. She was a large woman weighing at least 200 pounds. She was great on the care and feeding of the super VIPs like Henry Kissinger.

When I was in Naples, Carol and I came up and spent some time in London and we would always take Joan out for dinner and a pub crawl. She told us some wonderful stories that I shall keep to myself about some of these high power celebrities. Although, she did tell us that every time Henry Kissinger came to town he always stayed at the Claridges [Hotel] and Joan or one of her assistants would man the desk in the corridor to his quarters. One Sunday, after attending a meeting in Brussels, he was flying into London and she got word from the airport in Brussels that the Secretary had left his special silk pajamas in Brussels and he would be very, very disgruntled if they didn't appear when his luggage was deposited at Claridges. The first thing that went through my mind was, "My God, don't tell me the Secretary of State travels with only one pair of pajamas." Anyway, Joan got the message and she called the manager of Harrods (this was a Sunday), had him open up the place, and got a pair of special pajamas and had them laid out on the bed in Henry's room when he arrived. A good story and, I think, rather credible.

Q: Oh, yes, this is the sort of thing one does.

STODDART: I remember Bob Skiff's story about being assigned to Vice President Lyndon Johnson's office. Johnson took a trip to Turkey in early 1963 and everywhere he traveled so did a monstrous double bed to be set up in his bedroom on arrival as well as a case of Cutty Sark. Well, Johnson arrived in Ankara and the bed was in place but no Cutty Sark. He threw a temper tantrum and Skiff got the short end of it. The Cutty Sark was flown down from Germany in a special air mission plane. When I first met Bob in London in 1966, he had just come up from Nairobi where he had been in semi-exile. I guess David Bruce might have heard about the LBJ affair, as he made Bob one of his personal assistants. But, such is the way the wheel turns at times in the Foreign Service.

Q: Any other issues?

STODDART: One of the most intriguing things that happened to me was in November 1967 when Richard Nixon was coming through London on his way to Bonn and then Moscow. He was dusting off his foreign policy credentials preparing for the run up to the 1968 campaign. He was coming to London with only one advisor, Bob Elsworth. Elsworth had been a one or two term congressman from Nebraska. He and Nixon hit it off very well so they traveled together. Nixon

was coming to London for two days and he wanted appointments set up in the foreign office, Ministry of Defense, etc., plus briefings at the embassy. Well, what happened was pretty funny. David Bruce was in the States. Phil Kaiser decided it would be a good time to be out of town in view of his close ties to the Kennedys. So, this gets down to Ron Spiers, because Nixon wanted to cover a lot of politico-military issues. But Ron was in absentia at an important conference near Oxford. So, by default, I had to host Nixon and Elsworth. I should add parenthetically, that I was not an admirer of Nixon at all going back many, many years to his first run for public office against Jerry Voorhees in the House in 1946 and then Helen Gahagan Douglas in the Senate in California in 1948. So, I did not have a very high opinion of Nixon. But, the job was thrown at me and I entertained them at the embassy in the ambassador's conference room - just the three of us. This went on for two and a half hours and then I took them to lunch and had somebody else escort them for their downtown schedule.

It, was absolutely absorbing. I must say that although I disliked the character of Nixon and had prejudged him, he was an extraordinary able man and asked all the right questions. He was a very good listener. We went through the gamut of British defense and security policies. I found Elsworth was an extremely competent man and got to know him over the years very well as he went on to many key positions. He was Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA, a prominent leader in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and ambassador to NATO. He headed for a while the Center for Strategic and International Studies here. Elsworth is a very able, solid person with good political instincts. And, of course, Nixon went on from this session in London to that famous kitchen scene in Moscow and his confrontation with Khrushchev, me thinks by design, where he got great press. He got very little public relations out of his visit to London.

We had some weird visiting personalities. Mendel Rivers, who was chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, would not accept embassy responsibility for his CODELs because he didn't think much of the foreign policy establishment. So the Navy always took care of him when he arrived. He was their bread and butter.

Q: He loaded Charleston with naval facilities and the place practically sank.

STODDART: Yes, between Dick Russell in the Senate and Mendel Rivers in the House, Georgia and South Carolina fared very well. But, Rivers was a fearsome alcoholic. He would make a courtesy call on the ambassador and that would be it.

We maintained very close contact with all of our military people in the UK and I was closely involved with them. There was the 3rd Air Force in nearby Ruislip, Holy Loch, and the whole Polaris operation in Scotland, which I visited several times, and, of course, the U.S. Navy Europe under Admiral Jack McCain, father of John McCain, which was headquartered across the street from the embassy. Did I tell you the story about John McCain being shot down?

Q: I don't think so.

STODDART: It was October, 1967 and I was in a very small meeting over in Admiral McCain's office and his executive, Captain Frank Shaw, came in with a piece of paper and handed it to McCain. With no change of expression he got up and said, "Excuse me gentlemen, I will be back

in a few minutes” and he left. He came back and we continued with the meeting. It turned out that I had a squash game that day with Captain Shaw down at the Bath Club next to Claridges. I asked him what the message was about and he said, “We just got word that his son, John McCain, had been shot down over North Vietnam.” That was interesting example of stoicism and grace under extreme pressure.

Q: Oh, yes.

STODDART: John McCain’s father was a splendid man. He died several years ago, but his wife, Roberta, is still alive. She is 87. I saw her last year at the Willard Hotel and my wife, Carol, was intrigued talking to her. Carol said she was very impressed with her son and Roberta McCain said, “Oh, yes, John is a delightful boy but he tends to talk too much.” She had an identical twin sister and when McCain was in London, the twins spent much time with the McCains. People would ask the admiral how he kept them apart and he would get a twinkle in his eye and say, “That is the interesting part, son.” He was splendid. When I ended up in PM (Political/Military Bureau) in May 1970 he invited me out for a 15 day active duty tour as an Army Reserve colonel when he was commander-in-chief Pacific in Honolulu.

So, it was a lot of fun. There were so many different problems. We had very good contact with selected elements of the British press. Ron was very adept at this. We also had some very able American based correspondents. Joe Fromm, who represented U.S. News & World Report, Bill Beecher of the New York Times, Bob Toth from the Los Angeles Times. They were very responsible news people so you could talk candidly to them and they would honor anything off the record. I’m not so sure that that is prevalent these days.

Q: You were dealing with American military in Great Britain and there has always been a rather strong leftist intellectual chattering class, or whatever you want to call it, in the British establishment which just basically is sort of anti-American and anti-military. Did you find that you had to deal with that or was it just a given?

STODDART: We had to deal with it every week of our lives because on a daily basis you would have half a dozen or a dozen people picketing the embassy, primarily because of Vietnam. Then you would have the monster demonstrations led by people like Vanessa Redgrave and Michael Foote, who later became a short-term labor minister. They would fill up all of Grosvenor Square and the bobbies would be out in force, many on horseback. The only time we got a good press in my memory during the three years I was there was when some of the demonstrators rolled ball bearings in the street to spook the horses and a couple of them prodded horse with needles. Any form of cruelty to an animal offended the British very much, more so than a comparable offense against humans.

When the Greek military junta seized power in 1967, the Greek embassy was right around the corner from ours so the demonstrators would get two for the price of one. They would demonstrate against the junta in front of the Greek embassy - Melina Mercouri was there - and then she would join forces with Vanessa Redgrave and shout “Americans Go Home” in front of our embassy. But, we put up with it all. They only had one demonstration - the ball bearings and

prodded horses - that got out of hand. Otherwise they were pretty harmless with a lot of shouting and yammering. We never felt bodily threatened at all.

Q: Anything else you want to mention covering this period?

STODDART: There is one last thing that I feel you might find interesting. I mentioned the third country contacts with the New Zealanders and Australians. There was another one that was very, very important at the time and again it followed me through most of my career, and that was with the Israelis and, to a secondary extent, the Jordanians. When I was still in ISA in the Pentagon, I forget to mention this, we got very much involved in revising U.S. arms policy to the Middle East. Up until 1964 our basic position on arms sales to the Middle East was to leave it to the tripartite countries, the UK, France and Italy.

In 1964, the U.S. started to get a lot of heat from both the Israelis and the Jordanians for the United States to become one of their major arms suppliers. We had an official visit first by a fascinating man named Amir Khammash. He was a general, semi-retired at that time, and a senior advisor to King Hussein. He came to the Pentagon and was interested in a wide variety of assistance, including aircraft. The Royal Jordanian Air Force consisted of 12 old Hawker Hunters, British aircraft. At the same time the Israelis were interested in upgrading their Air Force and armored units. To make a long story short, Phil Talbot was Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East/South Asia, Bill Bundy, the Assistant Secretary, ISA, and Bob Komer, NSC staff at the White House, decided that our arms policy should be restudied and, if necessary, revised in view of the Israeli and Jordanian arms overtures to the U.S.

In 1964-65, Rodger Davies was the director of the old office of Near Eastern affairs and Harry Symmes was his deputy. At that time, I was the deputy director in the comparable region in ISA. So, the powers to be, told Harry Symmes and myself to lock ourselves in a room and completely reevaluate existing policy and make appropriate recommendations for change. We spent several weeks on this tortured task that resulted in a drastic policy shift. As of early '65, we would selectively on a case-by-case basis, after a thorough review, be prepared to grant Middle East countries the right to buy military materiel.

Because of this, I had achieved a role of minor prominence with the Jordanians and Israelis. When I was in London, one of the first callers on me was an impressive officer named Zvi Zamir, who was the Israeli defense attaché [and later general, commanding Northern Israel and, on retirement, head of Mossad in Golda Meir's government]. We became very close friends and, of course, with the onset of the Six Day War, the U.S. became very much involved. Our politico-military office played a backup role in support of our air attaché because the USAF had 707s flying from the United States to Israel with ammunition primarily, but not exclusively. At the same time General Khammash was spending a lot of time in London because we had agreed with the Jordanians to upgrade their old Sherman tanks from 75mm to 105mm guns.

We had the same problem with the Israelis because they were upgrading their tank force. That is when I met General Israel Tal, who was commander of the Israeli Armored Corps during the Six Day War. A brilliant man. His avocation were tanks and his profession was as a philosopher at Hebrew University. Khammash, Zamir, and Tal remain good friends.

One of the more interesting things I remember goes back to David Bruce and the sort of person he was. Everybody thought Bruce was above the fray and did not involve himself in the more mundane operations of the embassy. He delegated very well, assuming he had competent people working for him. So the story was that General Tal called in late 1967 and asked if he could drop by my residence and talk with me after dinner. He came by about 9:00 at night after dinner and stayed all night talking. I reported by airgram that General Tal, commander of the Israeli Armored Corps, stopped by for an after dinner drink and stayed for coffee and an early breakfast, and then related the conversation about the Middle East, war, tanks, guns, and breech blocks. A couple of days later I received a note from Bruce in his minute handwriting saying, "Dear Mr. Stoddart, I cannot forego telling you what an absolutely magnificent piece of writing your airgram, A-118, was. DB," He had read the thing. I didn't know ambassadors ever read airgrams.

Q: No, I didn't either.

STODDART: So, that was one of the high water marks of my London days. I think on that note I have just about exhausted London.

PETER J. SKOUFIS
Counselor for Administration
London (1966-1971)

Peter J. Skoufis was born in Maine in 1919. After attending the George Washington University Law School, he entered the Foreign Service in 1947. He had served in the U.S. Army during World War II. In addition to London, Mr. Skoufis' career included assignments to France, Italy, South Africa, and the Netherlands. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1992.

Q: In 1966, you were off to London as the Counselor for Administration. Did this also come out of the clear blue sky?

SKOUFIS: It certainly did. I got a call sometime in February, 1966, telling me that my name was on a list for a senior training assignment, either the War College or the Senior Seminar. I had been in S/S for about two years at the time and I was happy to go to school. Sometime in the middle of May, I got a call from Fred Irving, at that time the Executive Director of the Bureau of European Affairs, telling me that he was putting me on a list of people to replace Findley Burns in London. I told Fred that I thought I was going to the senior training although I had not heard anything more since the call in February. I knew from my own experience that I would have gotten the official word in July. Fred told me that he had already checked my possible assignment with Bill Boswell in Personnel. I said: "Fine; if all agree, it is okay with me". About two-three weeks later, I got a call from Boswell, who in his usual dramatic fashion, said: "Damn you, I thought you said you wanted to go to senior training". I told him that I was told that I would go to senior training; I had really not been asked. He then told me that I had been approved to go to London as the Counselor for Administration. He seemed quite upset. He then

asked: "Do you want to go to the War College or London?" At that time, no one got an assignment to the War College until it was all over. Here I had an opportunity to go to London to do the administrative work; it was the job that people like myself dreamt about. So I told him "London". And that is where I went.

A few days later, Fred Irving called and said: "You guys better get ready to go to London in a hurry". I said: "What do you mean: you guys?". Fred said that both Jack Herford and I were assigned to London; he was going to be the Consul General. He wanted both of us to get to London in a hurry because Findley's appointment as Ambassador to Jordan had been announced and Ambassador Bruce didn't want too much of a gap. So Jack and I got on a boat in the middle of June for England. When I got to London, I found that poor Findley had a medical problem and he didn't leave the post for four weeks. So in the interim, I was extra baggage. We couldn't get into our house while the Burns were still in London. I took a quick tour of the constituent posts during that month.

Phil Kaiser was the DCM. It was very interesting assignment. Following Findley Burns at a post is an experience. I went to London with some trepidation because I realized that Findley had a very special relationship with the Ambassador. I realized that in very short order. When I got to London, I found that all the rush to get there had been somewhat exaggerated, although perhaps unavoidable. Findley, as I said, was ill; he couldn't leave for his post as Ambassador to Jordan. So I spent a lot of time being briefed. Therefore, the transition was easy for me; I had a greater opportunity that is afforded to other newcomers to learn both about the administrative operations and the people in London. We lived first of all in a hotel; then we moved to temporary quarters in some staff housing the U.S. government owned. Jack Herford was able to move into Consul General's house right away.

London, of course, was a large post and staffed by a good bunch of people. I don't recall any major problems that required immediate attention. Findley had developed a very smooth operation; it was clear that he ran the whole damn business practically. I benefitted greatly from his sage counsel and advice. The first problem I encountered was to fend off the political, economic and USIS section, all of which wanted the offices that had been assigned to the Administrative Counselor. All the Section heads were on the same floor with the Ambassador; everybody wanted Findley's office upon his departure. It was lucky there was an overlap; I might never had the same space if there had been a gap between Findley and myself. Some of the other section chiefs had made their case to Phil Kaiser, who told them that they better talk to me first. Of course, once established, I was not about to move; it was one of the most delightful set ups you can imagine in an Embassy, particularly for an Administrative Counselor. Findley had warned me not to be pushed off that floor and downstairs; it would just downgrade the Administrative section and was very much opposed to it. As it turned out, I was in London for five years and held on to the same office for all that time. I learned later that one of my successors did give up that office suite and moved to another part of the building. We also had one of the great houses in London in a beautiful area of the city.

Findley was good act to follow. During his time, the Embassy had fallen heir to a lot of homes that had been relinquished by the MAAG mission. The MAAG to the UK had been a sizeable contingent which was phased out. They left us several good properties, including the one that

became the residence of the Administrative Counselor. It was a delightful place within walking distance of the Chancery. The accommodations were beautiful and were well furnished. I was surprised that all the government properties in London had been upgraded in terms of furniture and furnishings. They all looked great. It had been FBO funds that had been used for this purpose. I was surprised that the FBO allotment for the maintenance of the residences was rather generous. It became even more generous when Ambassador Bruce refused to use any of it for his residence. I reviewed all our properties, including the Ambassador's residence, to which he invited me for lunch and then gave me a guided tour. It was clear that a lot of work needed to be done there -- painting, new drapes, new covers for the furniture -- but the Ambassador had a couple of dogs which behaved like all dogs. The Ambassador said that he wanted his residence just in that way. He said that if he let us administrative types into the house, we would never get out. He thought that he didn't have much more time in London anyway and therefore wouldn't let any of us in. He told me that if FBO allotted the post any money for his residence, I was to use for other residences. He didn't want it returned, but he was not going to use it for his residence. Therefore, we spent practically nothing on the Ambassador's residence. When Ambassador Annenberg came -- he was accustomed to living well -- he immediately set about refurbishing the residence at his own expense.

Tom Hughes, who had been the Director of INR, came to London, as the DCM. This was his first experience in the Foreign Service although he knew a lot of Britishers. It was a learning experience for him, but unfortunately he only stayed for a year or so because of his wife's medical problems. Then there was another hiatus, but it was not significant for me because we all continued to report to the Ambassador as we had done since Mr. Annenberg had arrived. As a matter of fact, we had an inspection team in London, headed by Bob McClintock, at the time; it couldn't understand how a large Embassy like London could operate so well without a DCM. The team couldn't understand why the Department was not more anxious to fill the DCM job. The fact was that we operated very well even without a DCM. McClintock described the situation as a "very unique management situation. The Ambassador runs the whole show through a college of counselors". The section chiefs coordinated well and the Embassy functioned quite well. What it had was an Ambassador who was quite willing to assume a management role. But you have to understand that Ambassador Annenberg didn't have much input in terms of the political or economic situation of the country, in terms of understanding the country. He had to rely on the professional staff to do that. His relationships with me were probably more frequent than with any other section chief; when I went to talk "budgets" with him, he knew what I was talking about immediately. He learned quickly on how we got our money, how we could spend it and whether we had enough; he learned very quickly how the Department worked. It was a very interesting experience for an administrative counselor.

Ambassador Annenberg did develop a lot of contacts through social activities. He entertained royally and I do mean "royally". If you got an invitation to a table at the Annenberg residence, you were in the upper class. He used the best china, the best wines, the best silverware -- his collections were gorgeous. The staff was greatly impressed. One day, he asked me what his car was. Ambassador Bruce had never used a Cadillac; he had decided that London was not a good place for it. So we had a Chrysler or a big Pontiac. The Bruces had two personal cars: a Jaguar and a Mercedes. She drove the Jaguar and when he wanted to go off by himself, he used the Mercedes. Of course, the official car and chauffeurs were available at all times. We had a couple

of chauffeurs dedicated to the Ambassador's car. Ambassador Bruce was very kind to the motor pool and since he knew his way around London, used to go by himself. We didn't have to take them to all their dinner parties. However, that situation changed; neither Annenbergs drove, although he brought his own Rolls Royce from Philadelphia. But one of the first things that Ambassador Annenberg wanted was a Cadillac. That was easy to do; all I did was call Bob Peck, then Director of Operations in the Department, who said that he had been expecting that call because I guess London was the only post that did not have a Cadillac. Undoubtedly, in briefing Ambassador Annenberg, someone told him that he was eligible to have a Cadillac. So the problem was not in procuring the car; the problem arose in how to get it there. I kept getting promised of shipping dates, but there seemed always to be a problem -- for example, whether it would be right or left hand drive. One day, we got word that President Nixon would be visiting London again. The Ambassador quite rightly was concerned that there would no Cadillac for the President. The Bob Peck really came through. He got the Cadillac driven to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware, where it was loaded on a cargo plane and delivered to an Air Force Base in England. We picked it up there and finally had a Cadillac. We used the rationale that the Cadillac was necessary for the Presidential visit, which it was.

They had a driver from the motor pool whom they liked and he was assigned full time to drive the Annenbergs. The Embassy of course provided all the transportation he needed, but the Ambassador knew that he needed a driver for his wife, who had her own schedule of events. So we took a driver out of the motor pool, put him on administrative leave without pay and the ambassador picked up his salary. That driver kept his re-employment rights and whenever his colleagues got raises, the Ambassador would increase the driver's salary as well. That way, there was no issue about using a government employee to chauffeur Mrs. Annenberg around. This was an illustration of the Ambassador's general approach which was not in any way embarrass "his President" by using an official car and driver to transport Mrs. Annenberg around. It was a pleasure to work for an ambassador like that. That was the kind of guy Ambassador Annenberg was.

After Tom Hughes' departure, as I said, there was a hiatus. Then we learned that Jerry Greene was coming as DCM. He was a professional Foreign Service officer, who had been in the Service for many years. His reputation was excellent. I hadn't know him before, but we became well acquainted after he arrived because he was to be my boss. We briefed him on how we had operated. He worked his way in slowly, learning about the post and trying to win the confidence of the Ambassador. It was clear that when he arrived, Ambassador Annenberg had some questions about the need for DCM. But Jerry was very good, establishing good relationships with all the sections of the Embassy. The Ambassador insisted that we continue to meet with him on a weekly basis. We all reported to the Ambassador, but I, as well as other section chiefs, made sure that Jerry knew what we were going to discuss with the Ambassador. This enabled him to have an input, so that he didn't feel left out. Herford made an effort to include him as well as Bill Galloway, the Political Counselor and others. But it was clear that the Ambassador was running the show. Then came performance evaluation time. I gave out the forms and set a schedule for completion. I gave the Counselors' forms to Jerry Greene; that was standard procedure in the Foreign Service. The DCM was the rating officer and the Ambassador was the reviewing officer. So Jerry drafted the ratings and showed them to us. Then he sent them to the Ambassador. One day, I got a call from the Ambassador who wished to see me right away. When I got into his

office, he showed me the ratings and said: "What are all these things?" I explained what they were and the system that we used to rate officers. He then asked: "But why is Jerry writing them? The section chiefs work for me!". I told him that was correct, but that was the way the system worked. He told me to take those ratings back and to send him fresh forms. I told him that he would have the last word as reviewing officer. But he insisted that he wanted to be the rating officer; he wanted to know why he couldn't be the rating officer if he wished to be so. I told him that if he wanted that, that is the way it would be. So I went back to Jerry to tell him what had happened. Jerry blew his stack. He told me not to do anything until he called me. So I went back to my office and sat on the ratings. The next day, Jerry called and said: "Pete, send the new forms to the Ambassador. I am leaving! He doesn't need me". Jerry talked to someone in the Department and got another assignment after only about one year. To be honest, I didn't blame him. It was clear that the Ambassador didn't want or needed a DCM. The Ambassador the reports, but they were very sparsely written. They had no depth like the ones written by Foreign Service officers. I mean that for me he probably wrote: "Skoufis is the best administrative guy I have ever met". Period. For Herford he wrote: "He is the best Consul General I have ever met". They were all very laudatory, but I don't think they were going to do any of us any good. I talked to Jerry about the situation; he suggested that I send them in as I had to do, with an explanatory note of what had happened.

Q: London had always been known for having morale problems, particularly among the staff employees. Was that true when you were there? How did it manifest itself? What was done about it?

SKOUFIS: It was true. It was a very difficult situation. It was difficult to deal with because of certain basic assumptions that had been made. London was a large post and as many of its counterparts was somewhat impersonal. A good percentage of the staff employees would go their own way after work. Many, particularly those with small families, lived in government housing, but some secretaries lived in private quarters -- apartments that were affordable within their allowances. A lot of morale problems came to my attention because several of the girls explained to me why they didn't like serving in posts like London, Paris or Rome. They had served previously in African posts where their social life centered around activities sponsored or encouraged by the Embassy. That was absent in London; we did very little for the Embassy staff as a group. We didn't have group outings or parties, except for the Marines who would have parties at their quarters. We had a sizeable Marine contingent and they hosted TGIF parties. But in general, the Embassy did not sponsor organized activities. When I discussed this issue with our personnel people, we felt that there wasn't any need for it. The resourceful people found plenty to do. London and England was full of activities. You could travel up and down the country; you could travel to Europe. A lot of people took advantage of those opportunities and they were no problem. But there was this group of Foreign Service staffers who had become dependent on an Embassy to do things for them; they felt when those services were not provided, it was somehow unfair. That created quite a morale problem. As I said, most of those who had a morale problem had come from posts where the Embassy took care of them 24 hours every day. They had a problem.

We did not have too much of a problem with the working conditions because there was a wide interchange among sections. The various section chiefs tried very hard to bring their staff

employees, mostly the female secretaries, into their homes whenever there were appropriate social occasions. I had to do a lot of that with my own people, most of whom were in the communications section. They were primarily single and many of whom had low morale. The communicators found it difficult to have a satisfactory tour because of their working hours. Perhaps we might have done more, but after all these people were not serving in a country with a different language.

There was some tensions created by the "staff vs. officers" syndrome. It was more evident in London than in any other post I have served in. Somehow the staff felt it was "second class". Maybe it was because the professionals had such an interesting life, both in the office and socially. This feeling of "second class" ran even through some of the consular staff. The consular staff worked very hard; they were overburdened. That was one of our major headaches. We insisted that the British had passports and visas for any trips they took to the U.S. So there were always lines outside the Embassy. The people in the consular section started at nine and didn't get a break until five when they went home. It was that kind of operation. The workload created a lot of morale problems. I think Herford did a great job. He included his people in functions at his house; he gave them as much time off as he could. But undoubtedly, the consular staff was the hardest working group in the Embassy. No other Embassy section worked as hard as the consular section. Certainly no one in the administrative section did. But this unevenness of workload contributed to the low morale of the consular staff.

We all were aware that we had a morale problem; very few of these people would ask to be returned to London for another tour. Many did not consider being assigned to London as being a reward for having served in Africa. Many asked to be sent back to Africa after just a few months in London. For certain categories of staff, big posts are just not an appropriate assignment. One would think that England would have been one of the easiest posts for anyone -- no language problem, favorable cost of living, plenty of cultural opportunities at reasonable prices, unlike Paris where you couldn't afford to take advantage of the opportunities even if you wanted. London had PX facilities; we had all of the creature comforts, but there was that feeling of belonging to an "Embassy family" that was lacking. That was hard to create at a post the size of London.

London was a most gratifying assignment. I was there, as I mentioned, for five years. After my home leave, I got back to London and received a call from the then Executive Director of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, advising me that he was going to recommend me for the administrative counselor job in Tokyo which was coming open. I said: "Fine". After three years in London, I was not surprised that someone in the Department, in his wisdom, would have thought that I had been in London long enough. So the Department sent a cable which went to the Ambassador who called me. He wanted to know what this proposed transfer was all about. He wanted to know if I was trying to leave London. I said quickly: "No, sir! But I have been here three years and I assume the Department wants someone else here. We are all part of a system and we go where the system sends us". He couldn't understand why I was being sent to somewhere else when I didn't want to leave London. I had originally told him that I was supposed to be in London for five years, but that the Department had the right and often invoked it to break tours whenever it wished. He finally said: "If you don't want to go, you are not going!" I said: "Thank you, Mr. Ambassador" and walked out. The Ambassador called Bill

Macomber and told him that he had understood that he could keep his staff and now the Department was pulling people out. He said that he didn't want me to go. Shortly thereafter, I got a call from Bill Macomber wanting to know what I was trying to do by siccing the Ambassador on him. I assured Bill that I had not done that and then I reviewed my conversation with the Ambassador. The latter thought that what I was doing for him and the Embassy in London was just as important as anything I might for in Tokyo and therefore saw no reason for a move. That was the end of my transfer to Tokyo.

About a year later, or perhaps even sooner, I got a call from the then Director General, John Burns, saying that Graham Martin had just called from Saigon saying that he wanted me to join his staff as the Administrative Counselor. Burns said that he would propose that assignment. I told Burns that before he did anything, he'd better check with Macomber. I told him that I thought all bases had to be touched before this idea went much further in light of the previous effort to reassign me. Burns said not to worry; that he could handle it. So a cable came to London, announcing that I had been assigned to Saigon to replace Theo Hall who was leaving. It also said that Graham Martin had requested my assignment. I had known Graham as did almost every one who had been in the administrative field. Ambassador Annenberg called me and we went through the same procedure. He said: "Skoufis, I thought you were going to stay here five years. What are you up to now?" I repeated to him what I had told him earlier about the Department's assignment process. I told him that Department could make any assignments it wished and that in this particular case, Vietnam had the highest priority. He then asked again: "Do you want to go or not?". This time I told him that I certainly did not want to go. He said: "I want you to stay here!" I told him that was fine with me, but that if the Department ordered my transfer, I would have to go or quit. The Ambassador repeated that he wanted me stay in London. Somehow, he seemed to feel that I was encouraging these transfers and I certainly was not. No one in his right mind would lobby to leave London to go to Vietnam or even Tokyo. So once again, Ambassador Annenberg called Washington, to Macomber, I would guess. Sure enough, another cable came from John Burns, canceling the Saigon assignment, but that at the end of my tour of duty in London, I would be considered for the Vietnam position. That was fine with me; I didn't care. So I stayed in London for five years. Very happy and still interesting even at the end. I suspect that weren't many officers who stayed in London that long and I only managed because of Ambassador Annenberg. He did the same thing for Bill Galloway, Jack Herford (he may have stayed for eight years. He didn't want to go anywhere; he just wanted to stay in London until he was eligible to retire. Galloway was there also for a long time. He also didn't want to go anywhere else).

When my five years were up, I told the Ambassador that I was not going to ask for an extension. I would have been crazy to do so after my experiences. I got a call from some one in Washington who told me that Ambassador Watson in Paris had requested that I replace Ralph Scarritt. I said that I didn't think that Scarritt had been in Paris long enough to be ready for reassignment. The answer was: "The Ambassador wants you to replace Scarritt!". I knew Watson; he used to fly over from Paris in his own airplane. He loved to go to the Navy PX. He also shopped elsewhere and went to the theater, with his wife and children. He would also visit the Embassy where we would greet him and he would talk to Ambassador Annenberg. So I got to know him; he was a "hail, well met" fellow. As soon as I hung up from that call from Washington, I immediately called Perry Culley who was the DCM in Paris. I wanted to find out what the score was. Perry

started to laugh. It was clear that he had cranked up this plot and had convinced the Ambassador that I was available. Culley of course knew that my five years were expiring and therefore had to be reassigned. I had previously told him that I was supposed to go to Vietnam. I think he talked to John Burns, who really didn't care because he was leaving. So Culley assured me that the assignment was mine, if I wanted it. It didn't take me long to agree. Who wouldn't want to go to Paris? I then told Ambassador Annenberg about the Paris assignment. He said he knew all about it because his good friend, Dick Watson, had called him to ask about me. He said: "Of course, I had to tell him the truth!".

We had the packers at our house on Friday night and that weekend we drove to Paris on a direct transfer (that was the only condition: no home leave that year). On Monday morning, the moving van was in front of our apartment house in Paris. Helen and I and our maid, whom we had brought from London, got out of our car and began to unpack. Three days later, I was at work at the Embassy, when I found out what had happened to poor Ralph Scarritt. He had run into a buzz saw with the Ambassador. FBO was refurbishing the Rothschild House on Rue St. Honore, which was the official residence. It had been a long term project moving from an empty building to an office for USIS to being a residence and then becoming the ambassador's residence after Congress had appropriated something like a million dollars. Wayne Hayes and Rooney were both instrumental in doing this. The idea was to restore the Rothschild House as a new residence for the Ambassador; then we would sell the Avenue D'Iena residential property, which was near the Eiffel Tower. This was property that the U.S. government had acquired in 1924. It was small and had outlived its usefulness; it had needed a lot of work, but it was a very valuable piece of real estate. FBO had surveyed the situation and had concluded that they could fix the Rothschild House for one million dollars and sell the old residence for two and a half million. So it was net gain for the U.S. government.

So the project got underway. Ralph had worked very closely with FBO on it; as a matter of fact, Leo Riordan of FBO was stationed in Paris to supervise the work. There was a personality problem. On a couple of occasions, Ralph had told the ambassador that there were certain things that couldn't be done. If you have to say "No" to an Ambassador, you better do it very diplomatically, particularly if you are dealing with a titan of industry like Mr. Watson. His father had been the head of IBM and he had had a big role in the same company. These guys are not accustomed to hearing that the rules didn't allow for something they wanted. Apparently Watson's position was that if his wife wanted something, she would get it. So sooner rather than later, both Ralph and Leo were transferred. So the problem was left to me. It was a real headache in terms of finishing the job in time for a move that had been scheduled long ago. Of course, both Mr. and Mrs. Watson were changing the work constantly which didn't help the time schedule. They weren't fussy, but there were some changes they insisted on. The money was being consumed rapidly; there were special panels and cornices and art work that had to be restored. It was very expensive work. The Ambassador himself had contributed something like \$400,000 in addition to the appropriation to keep the project going. Most of his money went to buy furniture. It was a funny process. Joe Donelan was back in the Department at the time and was following the project. The Deputy Secretary was John Irvin, who was the Ambassador's brother in law. My problem was trying to convince the Ambassador that we had to work within a framework, particularly a financial one. When it came time to move, we noticed that several things had fallen between the cracks. Part of it was due that the whole project was financed by a

number of allocations and that created problems. We had to pay for something out of one pocket and for others out of another. I could manage that because my mission was to move the Watson's into the new residence on time for a Fourth of July party. That was the target. We had to landscape the gardens.

We finally put together a group that was called "The Friends of 41", because that was the address of the residence on St. Honore. These were public spirited Americans who lived in Paris; they raised funds to purchase some items for the residence. One of the members was Randy Kidder and his wife; he was a former Foreign Service officer who became the President of the group. It was a very effective device to raise money; their donations became tax deductible. They bought carpets, etc. It was someone else's idea, but I developed and brought into being. Watson's contributions similarly were tax deductible. One time, the FBO supervisor came from Washington and made a "walk through". At the end of it, he declared the FBO role as finished with what ever was left being the Embassy's responsibility. I balked at that. For example, there was a powder room downstairs which did not have toilet paper dispenser in it. The roll of toilet paper sat on top of the tank. He told me that was my problem, not his. I pointed out to him that small problems like that multiplied by the many bathrooms the residence had (I think there must have been twenty) were a major headache and expense. I learned later that there were even difficulties in obtaining toilet seats not to mention other bathroom fixtures. But FBO insisted that those costs come out of the post's Maintenance and Repair budget and that it would not increase our allocation. I needed another \$200,000 to get the house ready; just to put the finishing touches on it, like bulb for the chandelier, etc. So I finally called Joe who came through with the necessary funds. I told him that unless I was able to complete the job, I too would be thrown out and the Department would have to find another Administrative Counselor; the Department might as well cough up the dough then because otherwise it might cost even more. In the final analysis, the new residence turned out to be a great success and it was finished in time for the Fourth of July party. After getting that job done, I was in pretty good shape with the Ambassador who turned out to be a very nice guy and a remarkable man.

He was the heir to one of the great fortunes of the world; he was extremely wealthy. He had his wife and six children at the post -- three boys and three girls. Some were teenagers and in some difficulties from time to time. He wanted to do everything he could to keep his family together; so he converted an upstairs room into a game room. He bought them a juke box, he bought them a pin ball game machine, he built a movie theater for them. He paid all of that from his own pockets. He did have a very difficult personality. A normal human being has a range of emotions from low to high; Watson was on the extreme of that range at both ends. When he was low, he was the meanest son of bitch you have ever seen. And I mean "mean". He was mean to his wife, his children, everybody. When he was up, there wasn't a more generous guy around. He would take me to lunch to "Tour de Jacques". We would sit around and chat. I wondered whether he was just lonesome, but it was just his way of trying to be a nice guy. Sometimes, he would call and tell me that I was working too hard; he would then ask me to come to his office and look at the entrance to Chancery wondering who was parked out there. Sometimes it was our representative to the OECD whose chauffeured car was parked outside. He would then tell me that there wasn't any parking allowed there and if the OECD man wanted to park, he should go into the parking garage. He just didn't want anyone parking in front of the entrance which he overlooked. That was the kind of guy he was. He was a man of tremendous contrasts which was

his undoing. He was a heavy drinker, although it was controlled during the day. I never saw him drunk in the office. Helen and I would be invited to the residence periodically with other staff members to see movies -- he had a tie in with a movie distributor so he and his kids could see American movies before they were shown in Paris. He would then drink a few scotches and before the evening was over, he was asleep. That was not an uncommon event. One time, he came home on an American passenger aircraft and made a pass at one of the stewardesses. That got into the papers after she reported the event. That forced him to resign.

Mrs. Watson was a very lovely and charming lady. She was easy to work with and not very demanding. Very nice. The children were not spoiled brats because she made sure that it wasn't going to happen. Mr. Watson had his own plane in Paris, as I mentioned. There was a crew of, I think, three people, whom he paid out of his own pockets. He was also a pilot so that he would fly the plane himself on occasions. He didn't travel that often, but he did go to England several times and to Vienna to a Chiefs of Mission conference. I don't think he ever flew his plane to the States.

My office was just under his. After I first arrived, he used to come down the steps. There was a IBM copying machine in the corridor outside my office. He wanted to know where we had gotten it. I said I didn't know. He said: "Get it the hell out of here. I don't want to see any IBM equipment in the offices. The next thing you know, there will be stories in the papers". I told him that we were just in the process of re-equipping the Embassy with IBM electric typewriters. He said that was okay, because that was part of a general government contract worked out in Washington. It turned out that the copying machine was there because the IBM Paris office asked us to try it out; if we had found it satisfactory we would have bought some. But after the Ambassador's comments, it went out. In any case, he came downstairs one day with an envelope full of gasoline receipts for his airplane. He wanted to know if he could get reimbursement for the taxes that were paid, as we did in the Embassy whenever we bought gas for our cars. I told him that I would see if that could be done. I sent a note to the Foreign Office. Then I got a call from the Protocol Office which said that it had no precedent for my request -- they never had had an Ambassador with his own airplane. But I said that the logic would seem to apply; if gasoline for our cars were tax exempt, then the same rules should apply to the gasoline for the Ambassador's airplane. The Protocol Officer agreed and in due course, the Ambassador got his reimbursement. Of course, the French had to establish a new procedure and that took some time, but I was told to assure the Ambassador that his taxes would be reimbursed. I said that I didn't think the money was an issue, but that the Ambassador saw it as a matter of principle.

One day, he told me that people were making long distance calls on the Embassy' system. He asked me whether all the calls were business related. I said: "They'd better be!". He wanted to know how I could assure him of that. He instructed me to put a pay station in the Embassy. He then told me that in IBM his father had the phone system so rigged that when any IBM official wanted to make a long distance call to Europe, a red light would flash in his father's office. That was one IBM's early fetishes' some of which the son brought with him. So we put a telephone pay station in the Chancery. Of course, no one used it. That was the kind of person Ambassador Watson was. He got along with the French quite well. He spoke French; he had been educated in France and had spent a good deal of time there when IBM was starting in France. That is where the headquarters of IBM World Trade was established; there was a big IBM complex just in back

of the Embassy where both the European and France offices were located. So he had spent considerable time in France before becoming ambassador. Of course, through him, we met many of the IBM people. He would see them socially, but I not aware that he ever intervened on IBM's behalf. He tried to be very careful about those relationships, as my story about the copier illustrates. Ambassador Watson was also a very generous patron of the American school which was attended by all his children.

In any case, serving with Ambassador Watson was a very interesting experience. He was the Republican member of the family; his brother, Tom, was a Democrat. The family covered both sides. Tom later went to the USSR as Ambassador in the Carter administration. Shortly after Arthur Watson left Paris, his brother in law, John Irvin was appointed. The contrast in personalities was amazing. Ambassador Irvin was a fine a gentleman as you would ever want to meet. He was a widower -- his wife, a Watson, had passed away some years earlier. He came to Paris with his son and daughter who were young teenagers at the time. It was a lovely family; the Ambassador was very devoted to his two children. They went to school in Paris, although the son eventually returned to the States to complete his education. Irvin had been the Deputy Secretary and therefore knew the system well. We had no problem in running the Embassy. He spoke French and had a very good relationship with the French. Culley, who had been the DCM, retired when Watson did and became the head of the American Hospital in Paris. The new DCM was Jack Kubisch with whom I worked closely. The Paris Embassy became a very conventional and good operation. There were no major problems.

The major difference between London and Paris was in the Ambassadorial style of the two principals. Annenberg ran his Embassy differently from a traditional style. Paris was much more the norm. Both were big Embassies with their usual problems. A freeze on travel, for example, which occurred from time to time took its toll on morale. Fortunately, it didn't happen very often, but when it did it had a bigger impact because more people were involved. My biggest problem in Paris was a financial one because the rate of exchange between the dollar and the franc kept changing in favor of the franc. It had been 6:1 or 7:1 or 8:1; it slid down to 3.8:1. It was very hard for the Department to obtain more dollars to match these changes in exchange rates. I remember very vividly the time we had to do a local wage survey; we were way behind on our pay scales because we had not been able to keep up with the inflation that was occurring in France. The Department sent a team to make the survey which showed that a sizeable increase was due to our local employees. We were faced with a very touchy situation; there was some discussion of a strike. Nothing fortunately developed. I finally convinced the Department to approve the new wage scale by surrendering a number of local positions; we cut back on motor pool services; we cut positions out of the administrative section and forced other sections to cut back as well. Those reductions, which included American positions as well, enable EUR finally to finance the new wage scale. That was an example of the kind of administrative problems we had to face.

Both London and Paris were qualitatively well staffed. Those posts attracted very good officers; the section chiefs were all good. Hank Cohen was the head of the Political Section; Allen Holmes was there. Many of the staff became ambassadors later and you could tell that would be so even in their junior years. They were sharp.

We had a very good relationship with other agencies. In both London and Paris we went through the periodic reduction of staffs exercises (BALPA, for example). In London we surveyed all U.S. government activities in England. We found several military units that were remnants of World War II -- assessing damage from strategic bombings, etc. But we told the Department that these units were the responsibilities of the DoD and that the Embassy would not pass judgment on them, but would look at all civilian activities. We found a guy in North Scotland from the Weather Bureau which was a part of the Department of Commerce. His job was to send balloons up to test the weather over the Arctic or somewhere.

JACK A. SULSER
Political Officer
London (1968-1972)

Jack A. Sulser was born in Illinois in 1925. Prior to receiving his graduate degree from the University of Wisconsin in 1950, he served in the U.S. Army overseas during World War II. After joining the Foreign Service, he served in a number of posts abroad including Dusseldorf, Newcastle on Tyne, Bologna, Vienna, and Frankfurt. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1994.

Q: Well then, you were assigned where?

SULSER: Since I had served only in Western Europe, the Personnel people told me policy called for me to be assigned to another area; and since I had been in subordinate positions abroad, in order to be promoted to senior rank -- I was then an old-style FSO-3 -- that I would need to have some executive management experience. They were recommending that I be assigned as DCM in a small African Embassy. This would give me both management experience and the out of Europe experience. That was fine with me. But when it came time for assignments in the spring of 1968, the African Bureau decided to abolish the DCM position in many of those small embassies. They couldn't afford to have a full time deputy chief of mission as well as all the functional jobs. So much of the category of positions for which the career counselors had said I should be considered suddenly disappeared. Unlike my Personnel experience, when placement had been centralized in the office of Personnel, we were then in a phase when assignments had been decentralized again and were effectively determined in the geographic and functional bureaus. I got a call one day at Maxwell from the personnel officer in the European Bureau, Dudley Miller, who said he understood I was still available for assignment, and would I be interested in going back to London as political officer. I told him that while I would not seek any job in the Embassy in London, that London was a place I would never be able to turn down. In any case, I was not offered any alternatives. I learned later that Bill Galloway, with whom I had worked in Personnel and indirectly replaced in Vienna, was then deputy chief of the London political section and had requested my assignment.

So I went from the Air War College back to London for a second assignment, this time in the Political Section rather than the Consular Section. My principal duties were to cover the Labor and Liberal parties, and I was also to deal with the Foreign Office on Western European affairs,

particularly Germany. I had various other internal political duties. I was the biographic officer and I was responsible for devolution, which was then a lively political subject in Britain. That was the effort to try and give Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland a little more autonomy from the central government. It didn't go very far. I also dealt with the Northern Ireland office. Shortly after I got there, that area exploded in the spell of "troubles" that lasted until now.

Q: What government was in power while you were there and how did you operate?

SULSER: Harold Wilson was Prime Minister, Labor, and when I went there David Bruce was Ambassador and Phillip Kaiser was the minister, the DCM. Kaiser had gone to Oxford with a number of people in the Cabinet, including Defense Minister Denis Healey and Home Secretary Jim Callaghan. He had also gone to school with Ted Heath, who was then Leader of the Conservative opposition. Kaiser was very generous in introducing me to Callaghan and Healey and a good many others. I mentioned earlier that my mother had gone to High School with a man who was labor attaché in London during my first assignment. He had introduced me to a number of his trade union friends, one of whom at the time was number two in the Transport and General Workers Union. When I went back the second time, he had become General Secretary of the Labor Party, the top functionary. So I, too, had a longstanding contact and had stayed in touch with this gentleman. He introduced me to all of his subordinates in Labor Party headquarters, so I was off to a good start. I proceeded to build relationships with the British Labor Party officials and also with the Liberal Party. I went to their conferences and other meetings, spent long hours in their offices and in Parliament, entertained them and was entertained by them.

Q: How did you find...I mean we were right in the middle of the Vietnam War, and the Labor Party at that time had a very strong left wing element to it, which obviously was not delighted about our involvement in the War, and also I take it was not fully behind NATO. Maybe I'm wrong, but how did you find that element of the Labor Party and what was our policy towards them?

SULSER: The Labor government, up until shortly before I went there in 1968 had been strongly supporting the U.S. effort, but they had backed off. There were very few in the top levels of the Labor Party by that time who would speak publicly or write in support of U.S. policy. Most of them were still sympathetic in private, and I guess their contribution to the Alliance then was keeping their mouths shut about their objections and letting the left fringe of the Labor Party do all the yakking on the subject. George Brown, who had been Deputy Leader of the Party, Minister of Economic Affairs and Foreign Minister, was one of the few who still would speak in the House of Commons or elsewhere, sympathetically about the U.S. and there were one or two Labor back benchers who would speak in favor. I annoyed Ambassador Annenberg once in staff meeting by lamenting that only "has beens" like Brown were still willing to speak out for us. He hoped that Brown's once great promise might still be realized, but it was my assessment that he was no longer going higher in the Labor Party and not mainly because of Vietnam. I would have to say nine-tenths of the words uttered or written by people in the Labor Party about Vietnam at that time were critical of U.S. actions. There were plenty of demonstrations with thousands of people jamming into Grosvenor Square in front of the Embassy, and...

Q: I think about the future President of the United States, Bill Clinton.

SULSER: That's right, he was at Oxford at that time and, yes, we learned recently that he was apparently in the crowd. And hundreds and hundreds of policemen, of course. I would often go out and circulate on the fringes of those demonstrations just to get a personal impression of the kinds of people that were there and make some assessment of how organized these things were, how well they were led. On the fringes there were bands of skin heads roaming around who would pick off stray demonstrators and beat them and kick them. I saw that happen. I don't think those skin heads were supporting the U.S. in Vietnam, they were just taking an opportunity to beat up on the kinds of people, long haired hippy types that they were in general opposed to. It was an interesting and exciting time to be there.

Q: Was there a problem with...I mean if they were speaking out against us, the War and all, what was the feeling in the Embassy and what was our policy, just to say well this is the way it is, pro forma protests, or explanations, or, how did you deal with it?

SULSER: Yes, I think that puts it as well as it could be. We did not have any trouble with the British government as such or with the Conservative opposition. The Embassy in general and USIS in particular tried to provide background articles about our policy in Vietnam and what we were attempting to do there, what our objectives and purposes were, the progress that was being made on pacification and all that kind of business. All the favorable aspects of our public policies to make those available to journalists, politicians and so on. We provided speakers whenever requested. But for the most part it was just something that you had to live through and survive.

Q: Were there any issues that you were involved in at the time aside from Vietnam, or were things on a pretty even keel?

SULSER: The Labor government's program to reduce the British military presence in the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia, we were constantly arguing against and trying to get them to maintain a healthy influence in those areas. We were accustomed to having them involved there, and we hated to see it diminish. We realized that their economic situation was such that they couldn't afford to maintain everything as it had been, but we kept hoping they would find ways to continue as much as they could. Their cooperation with us in those areas was very close. To some extent we were being sucked into the vacuum they were leaving so there was always a lot of coordination involved, using their facilities, taking over their facilities in some cases, using their presence and longstanding influence to assist us in negotiations with the host governments. The political-military cooperation was very close and extensive.

As far as Europe was concerned, there was the problem of the European Economic Community vs. the European Free Trade area, and the evolving British policy of European integration, the British role in Europe, which we had always hoped would continue to be a heavy one. We were also working on a new 4-power arrangement for Berlin. We always had close cooperation in the so-called Bonn Group, representatives of the U.S., British, and French embassies, with the German government involved, regarding the presence of foreign troops, German participation in NATO, and the status of Berlin. Occasionally the Bonn Group would escalate into the Ambassadorial Group, on which we were represented by the Assistant Secretary for European

Affairs, Martin Hillenbrand, an old German hand. One of these Ambassador Group meetings took place regarding Berlin while I was in London. I was the Embassy backstopper for that, since relations with that part of the British Foreign Office was in my portfolio. Jonathan Dean was the political counselor at our Embassy in Bonn and our representative on the Bonn Group. If you've had any dealings with Jock Dean, you know he is one of the most prolific reporters the Foreign Service has ever had. His reports of these Bonn meetings were always voluminous. They would be copied to the Embassy in London, and I would run over to the Foreign Office with them. Invariably, they would get reports of the Bonn Group meetings from me faster than they would from the British Embassy in Bonn. Even when they got the reports from their representatives in Bonn, they would be only a tenth as long and detailed as the reports I could supply them by Jock Dean.

When they had the higher level meeting in London with Marty Hillenbrand, Jock came over from Bonn to participate and suggested that we divide the reportorial duties. I did half the day and he would do half the day. I did the mornings and would go back to the Embassy and dictate what seemed to me a very long and detailed account of what had transpired. He would come in after the afternoon session and dictate several times as much. Then he would look over what I had done and add at least 50% more to what I had written. He was really phenomenal in that respect. Although he took some notes, they were by no means verbatim, and his reconstruction of the discussions was as close to verbatim as you could hope to get. Those discussions culminated shortly thereafter in the new 4-power Berlin arrangement that altered the situation considerably.

Q: In what manner?

SULSER: The relationship between Bonn and Berlin, between the Allied military commands and diplomatic missions in Berlin, access to the Soviet Zone in East Berlin, and protection for Soviet facilities in West Berlin. Many of the things that had been argued about over the 25 years since the War were then at least regularized.

Personally, during the whole three and a half years there, my time in grade in O3 since 1963 was getting longer, and I was concerned about my future. I was again in a subordinate political position, and Personnel kept telling me that to get promoted to Senior grades I would need to get some management position. I kept telling them, Fine, I didn't ask to come here any more than I asked to stay five years in Vienna. Finally, one day I got a telephone call saying, "You really mean you're available to leave London?" I said, "Yes, I've been saying that ever since I got here." They said, "Okay, we're going to assign you as chargé in Niamey." I said, "Fine, that's okay with me." I proceeded to get the post report and make arrangements to put our kids in boarding school. In London, in the '68-'72 assignment in the Political Section, there were a couple of things I didn't mention before. A month after Nixon became President in 1969, he came to London. Embassy officers were assigned different events on his program. One of the events I was assigned was the very first one on the program, his arrival at Chequers. I think it was on a Sunday, so Harold Wilson was at the Prime Minister's country place at Chequers. Ambassador Bruce went to the airport along with Foreign Minister Stewart to meet the President and bring him to Chequers. The Prime Minister and I were at the front door, waiting for the President. Henry Kissinger was with him, and Ronald Nessen, and the White House doctor; all the rest of the President's party went straight into town to the hotel to get themselves established. We had

our discussions out there, which was very pleasant, a nice supper and everything. Before the President left, he and Wilson went into a room for a private conversation, and Kissinger and Nessen and the Ambassador and I were parked in an anteroom someplace. The journey into town, of course, was all arranged; so and so was riding in this car and that car and so on, a whole caravan of cars. The Ambassador was supposed to ride into town with the President. Instead, when Nixon emerged, he piled into the limousine and Kissinger and Nessen piled in with him. The Ambassador was left standing on the doorstep, along with Wilson and myself. Of course, I had an Embassy car and driver who had brought me out to the place, so I gave the Ambassador a ride back into town.

Nixon had other appointments at the hotel. They took one whole floor of the Claridge Hotel, a block from Grosvenor Square. We brought in the head of the Conservative Party, Ted Heath at the time, and the head of the Liberal Party, Jeremy Thorpe, for private conversations with the President in his hotel. A White House photographer would take pictures of them when they arrived, shaking hands with the President, sitting down to begin their conversation. When it came Thorpe's turn, the White House photographer was missing, and Thorpe was very keen to have his picture taken with the President. While he was chatting with Nixon, I went dashing around the hotel looking for the photographer. Never did locate him. Thorpe's time with the President was up, and he had to leave because the next appointment was following on. He was very upset that he had been denied an opportunity for a photo with the President. Later that day when I reported this to Ron Spiers, who was Political Counselor, he said he'd take care of it. He got one of the White House staffers to agree to have Nixon sign a photo for Thorpe. It arrived a couple of weeks later, and I took it over to the House of Commons. I walked into Thorpe's office, and there on the wall was a photo apparently of him with the President in the room at the Claridge Hotel, identical to photos I had seen of the President with other people. He confessed that he had borrowed a photo from someone else who had had an appointment and had a picture of himself superimposed on it so it looked as though he had had a photo with the President! Which he should have had. Shows the ego of a politician who wants to be photographed with the President, and how a personally autographed photo with "To my dear friend Jeremy Thorpe" written on it was a poor second to what he had managed to fake for himself.

It was during that assignment, too, that the Labor Party was tossed out of office, in the elections of '70 or '71, and the Conservatives came in. Ted Heath was now Prime Minister. Secretary of State Rogers came to London to attend an annual conference of the American Bar Association. While he was there, he wanted to have a talk with the Prime Minister. It was a weekend, so Heath was at Chequers. Since I had become "Chequers attaché" in the Embassy, I took Secretary Rogers out there on a Sunday afternoon to meet with Ted Heath and the Foreign Secretary, Alex Douglas Home. Because it was a weekend, an informal occasion and everything, I took my own camera along. I took snapshots of Heath and Douglas Home greeting Secretary Rogers. Heath and Rogers went inside to have a private chat, while Douglas Home and a couple of people from the Foreign Office and I sat out in the garden, because it was a lovely summer afternoon. I took some more pictures of Douglas Home and others out there. Pretty soon, one of the staff came out of the house and said the Prime Minister wanted me to come in and take some photos of him with Rogers since there was no British official photographer present. I went in and took pictures of Heath and Rogers together, finished up the roll of film. Next day I took it to be developed; went back to pick up the prints a couple of days later, and there was nothing. Something had

gone wrong with the camera. There was not one useable picture. Nothing. For days after that I kept waiting for the telephone to ring, somebody from Number 10, saying that the Prime Minister would like to have copies of those photos. But they never did call, so the incident just passed off. I had no souvenirs to show for it and was not subject to the embarrassment of being asked for photos that I couldn't produce. I promptly got rid of that camera and bought a much simpler one.

In senior officer Personnel, in '75-'77, I mentioned before the frustration I felt trying to get anything done or any feeling of satisfaction as compared to my previous assignment in the old fashioned Personnel Operations Division. The introduction of the so-called Open Assignments System in 1975 was supposed to be accompanied by a re-establishment of PER's central authority. PER was supposed to have the final say again, except that Ambassadors and Assistant Secretaries could veto assignments of their immediate deputies and their personal secretaries. In practice, they were given their choice for those positions. Other senior officers were supposed to be chosen by the office of Personnel in consultation with the Bureau concerned. In other words, section chiefs in embassies we could assign without the ambassador's concurrence and office directors or assistant directors in bureaus without the concurrence of the bureau. After due consultation, of course. In fact, as far as the bureaus were concerned, it did not work that way. Any time we tried to assign a senior officer to a bureau that the bureau had not suggested itself, the assistant secretary would run to the Director General, and we would have to undo the assignment and put in whoever the bureau wanted. It worked better overseas, in that we could assign principal officers at constituent posts and section chiefs in embassies without running into much trouble. As a result, the three of us who manned the senior assignment branch at the time were personally affected. Bob Houghton had mostly Middle East background and was assigned to Istanbul as principal officer. Frank Starrs had served in Spain, spoke Spanish, and was assigned to Mexico City as Political Counselor. The job that I coveted, since I was completing only two years in Washington and expected to stay longer, was the Director of the Office of Central European Affairs -- Germany, Austria, Switzerland. But the European Bureau wanted Bill Woessner, who was then political counselor in London. Woessner had succeeded me in London in '72 as the officer covering the British Labor Party and had moved up in '76 to be Political Counselor. The bureau brought him back to be the Director of Central Europe. I declined Carl Ackerman's offer to stay on and run the senior assignments office. On the pattern of these other assignments, Ackerman told me one day he had consulted with the European Bureau and it was okay with them that I go back to London as Political Counselor. That's how that transpired.

ALAN G. JAMES
Political Officer
London (1968-1976)

Alan G. James was born in New York in 1920. He graduated from Williams College in 1943 and then attended Yale Law School. He entered the Foreign Service in 1950, where his career included posts in Germany, France, and England. He retired in 1980, and then became the Chairman of the Board of

Appellate Review in the State Department. Mr. James was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1995.

Q: *So you left [Paris] when?*

JAMES: September of 1968.

Q: *And you went where?*

JAMES: I went to the embassy at London.

Q: *What were you doing in London?*

JAMES: I was assigned to the Political Section where I dealt with British external policy. I observed and reported on British views of developments in various areas of the world and on important multilateral negotiations on such subjects as a partial nuclear test ban treaty, nuclear non proliferation.

David Bruce was the Ambassador. The Minister was Philip Kaiser, who had been Secretary of Labor in New York under Governor Harriman, an Ambassador in Africa and after London was Ambassador to Hungary. Ronald Spiers, who later was Minister in London, Ambassador to Pakistan and an Under Secretary in the Department, was Political Counselor. Not long after I arrived, Spiers gave a luncheon for me to which he invited half a dozen officials of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO, and Alastair Buchan, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. This was a gesture I appreciated for it introduced me under the right auspices to some of the most important FCO officials with whom I would deal, and to the Director of the UK's most influential national security think tank.

Labor was then in office; the late Harold Wilson was Prime Minister. The embassy had easy access to and excellent rapport with Labor ministers, thanks in no small way to the fact that Phil Kaiser had gone to Oxford with many of them.

Q: *He went way back. He was particularly close to the Labor Party, wasn't he?*

JAMES: He was indeed. He had studied at Balliol College, Oxford, with many ranking people in the Labor Party. Denis Healey, then Defense Minister, for example, was one he knew well. And he was on good terms with the PM and Mrs. Wilson too. I remember one day after I arrived I had been to the FCO and chanced to meet Kaiser near Number 10 Downing Street. Along came Mrs. Wilson, a cheery, friendly lady, evidently on her way to shop, who stopped to chat. I was introduced. Imagine seeing Lady Bird Johnson pop out of the White House, sans bodyguards, to go shopping and being introduced to her on Pennsylvania Avenue. I found the informality of it all refreshing.

I was struck too by the easy access one had at my level (I went back to being a First Secretary) to British ministers and ranking officials. That seemed to be Labor's style, but I should add, being a representative of the United States helped too. I recall that not long after I arrived in London one

of the political/military officers, also a First Secretary, and myself were instructed to call on the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Fred Mulley, later Defence Minister and now Lord Mulley of Sheffield, to make an important demarche about some cooperative weaponry arrangements. Mulley received us cordially. There was no fuss about receiving us rather than the Ambassador or Minister, in contrast to the protocol that the French follow rigidly. I got along famously with Mulley, a sensible Socialist and a very likeable man who was captured by the Germans at Dunkirk and spent five years in prison camp.

Q: Was what's been called the "special relationship" well in place at that time?

JAMES: I think it was pretty healthy, despite the fact that the British were not as important to us as formerly because their power and influence in the world were continuing to erode. Or, I might put it this way: because British standing in the world was diminishing, they clung to the special relationship tenaciously. The British government under Labor was prepared to mute its objections to our war in Vietnam and try to work closely with the United States to preserve as much influence in the world as it could.

David Bruce, who was widely respected, kept the relationship healthy. Unfortunately, I served under Bruce for only about 6 months. He and his wife were very friendly and invited us frequently to the Residence, Winfield House. We had known the Bruces slightly in Georgetown, and this made things additionally agreeable. Bruce was winding up his illustrious career and spent much of his last months in London working on his memoirs which have not been published, as far as I know. If and when they are, they will make fascinating reading. Bruce left the day to day running of the embassy to Kaiser who delegated well.

Two months after my arrival in London came the 1968 elections which brought Nixon to the White House. After Nixon visited London in the winter of 1969, Bruce departed. Nixon's early trip to London suggests that there was vitality in the special relationship at that time.

My first few months in London were devoted to getting to know key figures in the foreign policy network, but I also did a good deal of substantive reporting.

Q: Who became ambassador?

JAMES: Walter Annenberg, a multi-millionaire. I assume he is now a billionaire. Annenberg remained for some four years. He was succeeded by Elliot Richardson of Watergate renown. Richardson was in office only about 10 months, resigning in December 1975 to become President Ford's Secretary of Commerce.

Q: So you were there a very long time.

JAMES: I was indeed; from September 1968 to February 1976.

Q: Did you have the same job all the way through?

JAMES: No. I started out as Chief of the external affairs unit in the Political Section. When Ron Spiers was transferred, his place was taken by the Deputy Chief of the Political Section, Bill Galloway. I then became Galloway's deputy. After he was named special assistant to Ambassador Annenberg, I became acting chief of the Political Section and later Political Counselor. In my final year in London, I was Counselor for Reports and Analysis. The latter job was one I created with the approval of Ambassador Richardson and Spiers, who returned in October 1975 as Minister. I would like to talk more about my last job later in the interview.

After about a year as Counselor for Reports and Analysis, I left London in February 1976 and returned to Washington for my last Foreign Service assignment.

Q: Today is January 9, 1995. Last time we were just starting, as I noted on the tape, Great Britain and your time there. You were there from when to when?

JAMES: I was there from September 1968 to February 1976. I served under three ambassadors: Bruce, Annenberg and Richardson; and under five ministers: Phil Kaiser; Jerry Greene, whom I had known when he was personal assistant to Dulles; Tom Hughes, who succeeded Joe Johnson as President of the Carnegie Endowment; Earl Sohm, subsequently Director of Personnel in the Department; and Ron Spiers.

May I make an introductory observation about my 7 and a half years in London? I could not have had a more fulfilling, interesting, demanding, agreeable, memorable posting. As my colleague Bill Galloway once aptly put it, political counselor in London is the best job in the Foreign Service.

I must say a word about Galloway, who at that time had served in England longer than any recent Foreign Service officer. He knew the country and its politics intimately. He covered the Conservative Party and did it with consummate skill. He knew every important Tory figure and wrote authoritative reports and analyses about the Party, in and out of power. The Tories thought highly of Galloway. To me he was extraordinarily helpful and encouraging. I am grateful to him for his advice and for recommending me for two awards which I duly received -- for political reporting, and representing U.S. interests during the UK-Malta negotiations.

When I arrived in London the Czech crisis, the Russian repression of the Prague Spring and occupation of the country, was worrying Britain, as it was the United States and our other allies.

Q: That was '69, I think, wasn't it?

JAMES: No, the Russians occupied Prague in August 1968. Like us, the British were very steamed up about Russian actions, the implementation of the Brezhnev doctrine. My first assignment was to do as much useful reporting as I could about British attitudes and possible retaliatory actions.

My job was made easier, at least I did it more intelligently, because just a few weeks after I arrived in London I attended a conference on the Czech crisis at the University of Sussex, sponsored by the Institute for the Study of International Organizations of the University.

Conferees were senior British officials, diplomats and academics; foreign diplomats; and some Czechs who had gone underground in Prague to keep the spirit of resistance alive. One of these was Kamil Winter, an articulate radio commentator who courageously defied the Russians. This conference was an ideal introduction to the British foreign policy establishment and to some able foreign diplomats. The head of the Institute was Robert Rhodes James, now Sir Robert, a brilliant historian and biographer, who for some years was an assistant to Waldheim and later MP for Cambridge. A couple of years ago he retired from public life. Robert and his wife Angela and I and my wife became good friends.

I should interject that a month later there was another instructive conference at Wilton Park. Housed in an ancient manor house near Steyning in Sussex, Wilton Park was established during the war as an orientation center for German POWs, to inculcate some democracy in them. After it served its indoctrination purpose, the Foreign Office converted it into a conference center, country weekend style, and placed in charge a voluble, Anglophile and a refugee from Germany, Heinz, later Sir Heinz, Koeppler. In November 1968, I was invited by Koeppler to join a couple of dozen diplomats from NATO and friendly eastern Europe countries to discuss some foreign policy issue or other, possibly the Czech crisis. The memorable part of this meeting was the talks I had with some of the brightest members of the London diplomatic corps with whom I formed friendships which I enjoyed throughout my tour in London. I returned often to Wilton Park to make presentations on U.S. policy.

Q: This Czech intervention was a very important phase. Up till then, life had been kind of stagnant in the Eastern bloc. And here was a country, Czechoslovakia, that was trying to reform itself and get out from under. The Soviets, using force and pushing its other bloc countries, crushed it. And Czechoslovakia was really put back into deep freeze again. How did the British officialdom and American officialdom view it? Was there a divergence of nuances or anything like that?

JAMES: The British and Americans saw the Czech crisis from the same perspective. Like ourselves, the British took the Russian occupation very seriously, but of course realized that there was little of a practical nature that the western powers could do without provoking a potentially dangerous confrontation. British policy, therefore, was to be cold officially toward the Russians and leave their representatives in no doubt about British disapproval. They suspended some exchanges and took other marginal retaliatory actions. Contacts at the Foreign Office believed that clear expressions of British disapproval, both official and in the press, were getting through to the Russians and that they understood that their invasion was unacceptable and realized that they would have to pay some price.

I recall being propagandized about the Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia by one Soviet embassy official, a KGB officer, who was kicked out of Britain in 1970 when the British declared persona non grata most of the embassy staff, all KGB officers. This fellow, who later was caught shoplifting, peddled the Soviet line earnestly. I think I left him in no doubt about how despicable we thought Russian actions were.

Q: What was the effect of this from your point of view? You were charged with reporting on the politics in Great Britain. I've never served in Great Britain, but I have the feeling that the Labor

Party, particularly in those days, had a very strong left wing, knee jerk attitude: we're all internationalists, singing the Internationale, with a red banner forever, and that sort of thing. It was almost a benign look at the Soviet Union. Did this have the effect that, say, the German-Soviet agreement of 1939 did, which jerked an awful lot of people out of the Communist and Socialist left wing around the world? Did this have any effect on them that you saw?

JAMES: I don't think that the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia made the far left of the Labor Party less appreciably pro-Soviet or less anti- NATO. The Trotskyite element, which is hopelessly red and neutralist, did not change perceptibly because of this Soviet aggression. Main stream Labor, which was staunchly pro-NATO and pro-United States, was clearly strengthened in its conviction of the need for strong cooperative defense arrangements in Europe and partnership with the United States. Prime Minister Wilson, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart and Defense Minister Healey were staunch throughout the crisis in condemning Soviet actions.

Q: Did we have much contact with this extreme left wing, which was centered particularly in some of the unions, wasn't it?

JAMES: The Embassy had very little contact with the extreme left of the Labor Party; there was not much sense or profit in making the effort, for the far left was more a nuisance than a threat to mainstream Labor which was internationalist, pro-NATO and firmly pro-U.S. Our Labor Attaché knew many of the leaders of the leftist unions, such as Scargill of the Miners Union, who I guess is still their leader.

Q: You had a rather large political section, didn't you?

JAMES: It was indeed quite large. The Section was divided into several units. One dealt with internal British politics; its officers concentrated on the three main parties, the Tories, Labor and the small Liberal Party. We had an experienced Labor Attaché who was a part of the section and reported on the politics of the unions. Another unit handled political/military affairs. And there was an external affairs unit which included specialists on African and Near Eastern Affairs.

Initially, I was in charge of the unit dealing with British external affairs. When I became Deputy Chief of the Political Section, my mandate broadened and I began to get involved in internal politics. Finally, as Political Counselor, I supervised the entire range of embassy reporting on British domestic politics and foreign affairs. Having developed a good relationship with key people in the Foreign Office, I gradually came to know leading politicians in the three main parties as well. One who became one of my best friends and whom I still see occasionally was Michael Fraser, now Lord Fraser of Kilmorack. He was the professional in charge of the Conservative Central Office and held a position rather like that of chairman of an American political party. Naturally considerate and gregarious, Fraser was a fount of information and generously gave me and other embassy officers his time. He had an organizing hand in every general election from 1952 when Churchill returned to office and 1976 when Labor won only to go out two years later. A good friend of all the leading Tories of his time, Fraser was an indispensable source and awfully jolly company.

Q: Just to get a little feel for how we go about things, a young Foreign Service officer comes there on their first tour, as a political officer. Where would you normally put them? I assume the regional experts come out of those areas, so those are not as open, because regional experts know more about Latin America or Asia or somewhere. But a young officer trying to get started, where would you put them?

JAMES: That's a rather hard question to answer. The fact is that we had no one in the section at that time who was not at least a middle grade officer. If a junior officer had been sent to us, I would have put him/her to work in the internal affairs unit where he or she would have the guidance of an experienced officer and could serve an apprenticeship, learning the basics of British politics and the sources of British interests in the world.

You are correct. A junior officer probably could not creditably discharge the duties of one of the regional specialists on Africa or the Near East. The African and NEA bureaus had pretty much a free hand to assign the regional specialists to London and sent us seasoned officers.

This might be a good point to talk about the substance of the work I was doing.

The Conservative Party won the general election of 1970. Edward, now Sir Edward, Heath replaced Harold Wilson as Prime Minister. During the 4 years the Tories were in office, I broadened my knowledge of British internal politics and wrote several appreciations of the Conservative Government, which at the beginning at least looked like being very successful. Heath was determined to make a new beginning for Britain, economically and politically. The Tories tried to improve industrial productivity, to make Britain more competitive. And they might have been successful, but the unions were still very powerful and not helpful in encouraging market forces. In foreign policy, Heath was determined to lead Britain into the European Community, and in 1972 succeeded. I was in the gallery of the House of Commons in February 1972 when the key vote on British entry was taken. It was a dramatic moment, a turning point in British foreign policy. The Tories prevailed with the aid of the Liberals. After the vote was announced, some Labor MPs rushed Jeremy Thorpe, Liberal leader, and tried to throttle him for voting with the Tories. There was an unseemly scuffle on the floor of the House, but order was quickly restored.

Let me make an aside. Thorpe was a clever, witty politician; he is no longer in politics. He was a lively dinner companion. One night at dinner at Spiers, I think, Thorpe asked my wife if she could sing all the stanzas of the "Star Spangled Banner." When she said, "No," Thorpe boasted that he could sing them all, but declined an invitation to do so.

Heath was less ardently pro-U.S. than others in his cabinet. The reasons are complex. I suspect it was in part because he thought Britain was overly dependent on the United States and that Britain's true interests lay in closer association with Europe. Heath was from the first the most avid Europhile among the Tories. I guess he saw too that U.S. interest in the special relationship was inevitably waning.

In the Embassy we began to see signs of a weakening of the special relationship as Heath's premiership continued and he pursued his European policy. The Tory government was not as

emotional about Vietnam as Labor was but Conservatives were upset by several initiatives of the Nixon administration.

I have in mind our opening to China, and Nixon's new economic policy. Those were matters the British considered of importance to them and they resented not being taken into our confidence through prior consultation. These developments did nothing to enhance Heath's attitudes toward the United States. I suspect, but could not prove, that he has some personal anti-U.S. bias.

I did quite a bit of analytical reporting on the foregoing developments and Tory policy. The reports I wrote during the first year of Tory government contributed to my winning the Director General's award for political reporting in 1971.

Our British foreign policy crisis that directly involved the Embassy and me was the British negotiations with Malta over renewal of the UK-Malta base agreement. In the summer of 1971, British defense arrangements with Malta were about to end and the big issue was whether the British would renew the agreement. The Maltese said that unless new and better arrangements were made they would kick the British out.

Q: This was Dom Mintoff and his people.

JAMES: Mintoff was Prime Minister of Malta at the time. The United States was concerned that the British might quit Malta. We did not want the Russians to get a foothold in the middle of the Mediterranean. We wanted the British to stay. NATO collectively wanted the British to remain. The British government was disposed to renegotiate the terms of their lease of facilities in Malta; they too saw the strategic importance of remaining there, but they were not going to do so at any price. Their line was that if the United States and NATO thought it important for them to remain, they should share some of the cost to renew the base agreement.

My own involvement began one Sunday afternoon in August 1971 when Galloway and I called on the competent FCO official in his Chelsea garden to present U.S. views on the Malta question. From then until March 1972, I was engaged in an intensive period of observing and reporting, making recommendations to Washington, explaining U.S. views to the FCO. In that time I must have drafted something like 200 telegrams to the Department. In March 1972, the British concluded an agreement with Malta which renewed the base agreement for another 5 years. But the negotiations were a real cliff hanger and progressed from one crisis to another. The chief negotiator for Malta was Mintoff himself, a volcanic man. Lord Carrington, Defence Secretary, and exceedingly accomplished minister, led the British team. Much of my time during those nine months was devoted to the Malta question. The basic U.S. approach was to coax the British to remain in Malta because of the strategic imperatives involved. We in the Embassy were instructed to make that clear to the British. At the same time, we considered it essential that Washington should realize that the British would not stay at any price. We constantly stressed the importance of avoiding actions which would place an unreasonable strain on U.S.-UK relations. While faithfully representing U.S. positions to the British, we underscored repeatedly to Washington that constant, timely and candid consultation with the British was essential. I think we were successful in impressing the British with U.S. views and at the same time making Washington appreciate the limits of British tolerance of Mintoff's demands.

We had excellent support from Washington, Scott George, the UK office director was superb. Marty Hillenbrand was very helpful.

Q: He was Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

JAMES: Alex Johnson, then number three in the Department, followed the negotiations closely. I was frequently on the phone with him to get fast, authoritative guidance.

Ambassador Annenberg paid close attention to the base negotiations and gave the Political Section strong support and latitude in talking to the British and reporting to Washington. Of course, we cleared with him every message which had an Embassy recommendation. Usually, he approved those messages without change. On one occasion, however, after Mintoff had demanded a higher base rental from the British than the sum that had been on the table, Annenberg blew up when he saw my telegram reporting that fact. He added a comment to the effect that while he appreciated the strategic considerations involved, it would be unwise to accede to Mintoff's new demands. Otherwise, we and the British, he said, would only be subjected to more and more demands. He resisted the temptation to put the thought in the telegram, but Annenberg muttered something about how qualified Mintoff was to deal in rugs.

I look back with satisfaction on my part in the negotiations. I think I served our interests well, and helped keep U.S.-UK relations on an even keel. I was flattered to learn later from Galloway that Lord Carrington told him I had made a difference, a major contribution to avoidance of misunderstandings between our two countries.

Q: How well did you feel we were supported by our embassy in Malta? Malta, from time to time, has been used as a rewarding post for career people, but it's not a frontline post. How well were you served by Malta at that time?

JAMES: Frankly, I don't remember that there was much informative reporting from the Embassy in Malta, that is until near the end of the negotiations when my friend and War College classmate, John Getz, arrived as ambassador in early March 1972. Then there was good reporting, for John was very able.

What we learned of Mintoff's positions we learned from the British, and also from the Italian Ambassador, Raimondo Manzini, an ambitious, thrusting man in a hurry. (Incidentally, like de Gaulle, Manzini was one of the world's fastest eaters. Once my wife, daughter and I dined with Manzini, I think John Getz and his wife were there too. Manzini quickly devoured the first course -- succulent smoked salmon. Before my daughter, who was sitting below the salt, could pick up her fork, her plate was spirited away.) Manzini was well connected with the Italian establishment. His brother was a high Vatican official and a close friend with the Director General of the Italian Foreign Office.

Manzini evidently considered me someone useful to talk to about the negotiations, a handy channel to convey to Washington his ideas (and he had a lot of them) about how to induce Mintoff to agree to a deal with the British. He and his political counselor, who was a bit of a

ferret, invited me to see them frequently, sometimes at strange hours to impart confidential information about the Maltese position, or to try out on me (and through me to Washington) some of Manzini's ideas. I should add that Manzini may have been ambitious and eager to make a name for himself out of the Malta negotiations by appearing as the catalyst who clinched a deal, but I credit him with honestly trying to protect Italian and NATO interests and keep the British on Malta. The British had code names for those of us who were involved in the negotiations or were observing them. The Italian Political Counselor was called "running dog." I forget what mine was, but I am told by my FCO friend that it was more flattering.

Dealing so extensively with Manzini was rather delicate business because I was privy to so much of the British negotiating position. I obviously had to be very careful to protect confidences I had been given on condition that they were only for Washington. I handled matters discreetly, I believe, at least I got no complaints from the FCO.

Q: It does show that here we had something very delicate, and obviously we did not, for one reason or another, have our own information coming out of Malta at that time.

JAMES: As I said, I've gone over my papers again, and I recall nothing about it.

Q: I think that speaks for itself.

JAMES: I think so. As I said, until Getz arrived. By then, the drama had pretty well been played out.

Q: Was this strictly a matter of the British wanting us to give them more money? Was that the issue, or were there other things?

JAMES: The British were prepared to pay what they considered a fair base rent to the Maltese. Early in the negotiations they made clear that they would not go above a certain figure, 10 million pounds a year for 5 years, I believe. Remember, this was a time of economic stringency for the UK and they were determined to watch their pennies. They did not, for example, want Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus, to get any ideas about jacking up rent on the British bases there. The British said that if the U.S. and NATO considered it important for them to stay in Malta, the U.S. and NATO should help.

In the end, NATO and the U.S. did come up with a package that supplemented the British rent with cash, infrastructure help and technical advice.

Reaching the figure finally agreed upon was no easy matter. Negotiations were difficult and stormy from beginning to end. Carrington lost patience with Mintooff several times and threatened to break off. I think Mintooff also did so. Finally, Prime Minister Heath had to get involved. After one of a number of meetings with Mintooff, there was a break in the negotiations, helped of course by a package from NATO. Agreement then followed fairly quickly.

Q: How serious was the threat of the Soviets establishing a base there, at that time?

JAMES: We perceived it as serious. That's why the highest levels in Washington wanted to keep the British there.

Q: This was the time when Kissinger was National Security Advisor, I believe.

JAMES: I think that's right. He became Secretary of State in September 1973.

Q: After Nixon came in. So what role was the National Security Council playing, and what role was the Department of State playing, from your perspective, in this thing?

JAMES: I think the State Department clearly had the lead. I assume this was so because our "immediate" telegrams were answered immediately. Had the Department felt it necessary to consult the National Security Council, or get some other White House clearance, there would have been a delay. But we got our instructions quickly. If we needed guidance faster we could use the telephone and call for it. Or, if Washington perceived some urgency, some (on occasion, Alex Johnson) would ring us.

Q: What was your impression of the British foreign affairs establishment and how it worked in this?

JAMES: The British foreign affairs establishment comprehends, of course, more than the FCO. Many institutes, councils and foundations also contribute to the formulation of British foreign policy. I will come to the FCO in a minute, but let me first comment briefly on the extra government part of the foreign affairs community. In my time (and I am sure now too) it was made up of some of the most articulate, studious, best informed organizations to be found in any country. I think foremost of the renowned International Institute for Strategic Studies (I and several other Embassy officers were members) and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, known as Chatham House, cousin of our Council on Foreign Relations. The Ditchley Foundation convened intensive meetings on international affairs which drew prestigious U.S. and foreign participants as well as from the UK. All three produced papers of intellectual merit. The Royal United Services Institute presented lectures and discussions on political/military subjects of a high caliber. There were other, somewhat less intellectual but influential groups like the British-Atlantic Council and the European-Atlantic Committee, the names of which suggest their fields of interest. Retired officials of the FCO and ex-ministers were active in these organizations. Active ministers and officials regularly attended their meetings, so there was a beneficial interplay between the non-governmental foreign affairs community and government. We embassy officers were welcome at meetings of groups like these and tried to participate actively.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office was very strong during my time in London. The ministerial level was competent and well informed. The official level with which I usually dealt was stellar. All officials with whom I dealt were real pros, hard headed, hard working (they spent long hours in the office, but weekends tended to be sacred). They were always on top of their briefs. They were broad gauged. All had been superbly educated, at least 70% or more came from Oxford or Cambridge. In short, they were an elite corps of men and a few women. Not many women in the FCO or Foreign Service in those days.

Knowing so many FCO bright officials was a delightful experience. I enjoyed going to the FCO whenever the opportunity came up to deliver views of the Department or merely keep abreast of British views. I was always cordially received and never experienced British hauteur. I cannot mention as many officials as I would like but I must note several who were especially pleasant and useful to deal with.

Sir Thomas, now Lord Brimelow, kind, calm, with an imposing command of all major foreign policy issues, was Permanent Under Secretary of the FCO, the top professional. He was the soul of consideration and helpfulness. Charles, later Sir Charles Wigg, alas dead, was the FCO official to whom I felt the closest. He had been head of the North American Department, and, when I dealt with him on Malta, was an assistant under secretary supervising Southern European Affairs. He ended his career as Ambassador to Spain. More about my dealings with him on the Malta base negotiations in a moment.

I had extensive dealings with the Western Organization Department, which was concerned mainly with NATO, and I became friendly with successive heads of that Department whose confidence I enjoyed. John Waterfield was for me personally quite special. Our official intimacy became such that after a lively discussion of U.S., and UK views on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Waterfield invited me to prepare an informal, personal paper addressing U.S. criticisms of the British position. There were differences but not major ones. He proposed that if I wrote such a paper he would send it to the then Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart. I wrote the paper, gave it to Waterfield who showed it to Stewart, who thought it well done and useful.

The North American Department was another office with which I had much business. It was presided over consistently by competent, helpful officers. Hugh Overton, who was knighted after a difficult (much Irish-American harassment over Ulster) but successful tour in New York as Consul General, was one head of department who made a special contribution to understanding between the U.S. and the UK. I regretted his early death.

In my time in London, there were several peers in the FCO, all outstanding officers. Lord Thomas Bridges I saw frequently after he succeeded Waterfield as Head of Western Organizations. Son of a famous secretary of British cabinet and grandson of Poet Laureate, Robert Bridges, Tom was a first class professional. Another congenial type was Lord Nicholas Gordon Lennox, an able director of North American Department who claimed direct descent from Charles I.

Now as to my dealings with the FCO during the Malta crisis. I flatter myself that at an early date I had developed good rapport with many FCO officials and enjoyed a favorable reputation. My friend Wiggins once told me that my reputation at the FCO was golden. All this made my business with the FCO on Malta easy and smooth. As I mentioned, I dealt almost exclusively with Charles Wigg, who had establishment credentials -- Eton, Christ Church, Oxford. He had been decorated for gallantry while serving in the RAF. He loved his work and was always on top of his briefs. He had previously been private secretary to Lord Carrington (I guess when Carrington was a minister at the FCO in the 1960s). So his access to Carrington and others working on Malta in the Defence Department was excellent.

Wiggin was always current on the Malta negotiations of which he gave me vivid blow by blow accounts. He readily confided in me, and I in him. It went without saying that each expected the other to treat the sensitive information we exchanged correctly. Wiggin voluntarily called me to the FCO when he had something significant to tell me. If I wanted to see him, I had only to call. He never left me cooling my heels. I had to be available to see him at all hours and occasions, even holidays. I recall sending out telegrams on Christmas eve 1971, during Christmas week and on New Year's day after meeting him for lunch to be brought up to date. Wiggin and I transacted much useful business over civilized lunches, at his clubs (he belonged to two of London's most exclusive -- White's and Boodles) or mine, the comfortable, now defunct St. James. Those lunches were no less productive than our office meetings for being long and enjoyable. Wiggin had a droll sense of humor which made being with him fun.

Q: This was the high Nixon administration period. What was the feeling within the body politic and public about the Nixon administration? The Vietnam War was on.

JAMES: The term of office of the Nixon administration (1969-1975) coincided roughly with that of the Tories, 1970-1974. Philosophically in politics and economics -- the two administrations were not so dissimilar. They should have enjoyed cordial relations. The Conservatives were far less emotional than Labor about our war in Vietnam, and I think generally welcomed a conservative regime in Washington. Labor, of course, was very much against the Vietnam war and unsympathetic with many policies of the Nixon government.

Although the Tories as a pro-business party was on the same wave length in many respects as the Nixon administration, some things that the Nixon administration did, upset the Tories and put a strain on our relations, as I have already observed.

Prime Minister Heath was an outspoken nationalist, who repeatedly declared he intended to stand up for British interests. He also believed that the British, who still had worldwide interests and perspectives, if less power and influence, should be accepted as partners by the United States and consulted about initiatives in foreign affairs which the British considered affected them too. It must have hurt British pride that we were so casual about consulting them. Those lapses rubbed in the reality that they did not count as much as they did in the calculus of world politics. Our bombing of Cambodia also upset the British government which considered it unwise, at the least. Labor, of course, condemned it.

Q: This was in the spring of '70 that it at least became an issue. A little before that. It had been going on for some time.

JAMES: Well, that's right. And then there was the war of the autumn of 1973 which put a further strain on Anglo-American relations. The British government wanted to distance itself from the Americans who were supplying Israel. The Conservative government did not share our views about the threat to Israel from the Arabs. Moreover, they felt more sympathy with the Arabs and did not want to prejudice their position in Arab countries by being perceived to be helpful to Israel. They were, for example, concerned that the United States not supply Israel from stocks we had stored in the UK. I was called to the FCO in mid October 1973 by John Thomason, an

assistant Under Secretary supervising the FCO's Defence Department, a brilliant officer, son and grandson of Nobel Laureates. Thomason said that Prime Minister Heath would be asked in the Commons the next day whether the U.S. was in any way involved in resupply of arms through the UK to Israel. The British wanted absolute assurances that we were not drawing down our stocks to send to Israel or that U.S. aircraft were not transiting the UK with supplies en route to Israel. We were instructed to give the requested assurances.

I guess the same kinds of concerns were expressed to some other U.S. embassies in western Europe by host governments. For such attitudes led Kissinger to describe publicly the conduct of our NATO allies during the war as "craven." The British press was replete with rumors about a rift in NATO and with the British. British officials and ministers, however, studiously tried to play down speculation about damage to U.S.-UK and U.S.-NATO relations. But I know personally that for the Heath government Washington's (read Kissinger's) gratuitous expressions of indignation at the Europeans placed an unwelcome strain on Anglo-American relations. The British resented our acerbic public comments, but consistently avoided adding fuel to the public debate.

In the Embassy we found this state of affairs deplorable. Of course, we fully appreciated Washington's chagrin about the attitude of the British and other Europeans; it was selfish and overly cautious. However, we feared that Washington might lose sight of some broad considerations. The Europeans may have behaved badly but it was important, we thought, not to allow our rancor to have a deleterious effect on NATO and basic U.S.-European and U.S.-UK relations. We took this position in a number of telegrams which the Ambassador approved. Simultaneously I called again and again for better communication, better consultation between our two countries, and within NATO as well. I think this exercise reflects well on Annenberg. He appreciated fully that the framework of inter-allied cooperation and understanding should be repaired as quickly as possible.

Q: Talking about Annenberg, as I recall it, the British gave him quite a difficult time when he first came in. I think there had been some problems with his background, and he was considered just another one of these big money people who came in, and was sort of considered somewhat uncouth. How did you see him, particularly his early time, how he came in, how he used the embassy, how the embassy worked with him and all?

JAMES: You're right. He did have a rough ride at first, due in part to some verbal gaucheries that were ascribed to him, which apparently slipped out when he presented his credentials to the Queen. I was not political counselor then, and did not accompany him to the Palace, but he was supposed to have expressed himself clumsily, and the press laughed at him. They also took note that he was fabulously wealthy and had obviously been appointed in return for his contributions to the Nixon campaign.

The Embassy behaved well toward Annenberg, I believe. We were determined to work with him closely, not to be patronizing; had we been, Annenberg, who is no fool, would not have tolerated it. We did our best to school him on the British scene. He tried to learn. Over the years he came to know well people in many walks of public life. I doubt he became a close friend of many politicians. And after Labor came back in 1974, I didn't think he felt very comfortable with them

although he always conducted himself correctly with them. I remember being in the company at the farewell dinner Foreign Secretary Callaghan gave for him in October 1974. Callaghan's remarks about Annenberg and his ambassadorship were warm and felicitous. If I remember correctly, Callaghan was a Labor politician Annenberg admired. At bottom, Annenberg was an Anglophile. I should add that he became a good friend of the Queen Mother, an astute lady who would not have warmed to Annenberg had she not perceived in him admirable qualities.

Q: The mother of Queen Elizabeth.

JAMES: Yes, the present Queen's mother. I understand that when Annenberg goes to London he visits the Queen Mother.

Annenberg was disposed to give the Embassy its head. I think he respected the professionalism of the officers who served under him. And, as I recall, no one gave him cause to feel any lack of loyalty.

He took his job seriously. He read diligently reports coming into the Embassy, and we passed to him outgoing messages we thought he should see or ones we knew interested him.

Alas, he had a stutter which made him shy about public speaking. He did not go on the speaking circuit as many Ambassadors would do. So I and other colleagues did a great deal of talking to a variety of groups, from the English-Speaking Union which I addressed once in an annual conference, to Sixth Form conferences where a couple of diplomats from other NATO countries and I appeared on a panel called a "brains trust" to talk about NATO to high school seniors. I also traveled frequently to speak at meetings organized by my friend Bill Davies, Director of the Welsh Council on International Affairs. Another forum where one could get across profitably U.S. views was the London Diplomats Group, organized by the Quakers at William Penn House. There, at a frugal, healthy supper, every other month, a prominent British politician or other public figure would speak. Not only did one get fresh insights into British politics but also came to know well some agreeable and talented diplomats.

Let's return to Annenberg. His benefactions were many, and included gifts to Cambridge and, I think, also to Oxford. After he mounted an exhibition of his magnificent impressionist paintings, which was a great success, it became clear to Brits of goodwill that he was much more than just a moneyed ambassador, that he had an aesthetic side as well.

Now, he could get pretty worked up about things he read in the press that he found derogatory of the United States. As a former publisher, he read the newspapers compulsively. I remember one Saturday morning Earl Sohm and I were at the Embassy when the Ambassador called us up, indignant about an article he had read in The Times critical of U.S. policy in Central America. He wanted to bawl out the editor, William Rees-Mogg, on the phone or in a letter, I forget which. Well, the matter seemed too trivial to Sohm and me to warrant a blast from the Ambassador but we, or at least Sohm, had a hard time talking Annenberg out of giving Rees-Mogg a piece of his mind. This simply underscores how great is his pride in the United States and how prone he was to call foul when he spotted something he thought wrong or unfair.

While Annenberg was ambassador, a number of important international treaties were concluded, among them the NPT, the Seabeds Denuclearization Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and treaties on Biological and Chemical Weapons. For his part in ceremonies marking conclusion of some of these agreements, I prepared statements which he read well and found appropriate.

Toward his officers he was cordial and gracious. My wife and I often enjoyed the elegant hospitality he offered at the Residence and looking unhurriedly at his stunning pictures.

Looking back on the years with Annenberg, I believe he grew in the job. He surely became engrossed in it. He respected career people and we reciprocated his respect. I think that in the end the British foreign policy establishment regarded him as well disposed and helpful. Plainly he was not an envoy in the mold of other non-pros like David Bruce, Douglas Dillon or Jock Whitney, but he was astute. He could pick out capable people and then delegate a lot of responsibility to them. Most of all, he really did care about good U.S.-UK relations and did his best to foster them.

Q: How did you find the British media?

JAMES: In my opinion, the British media (I speak of the London press, for outside London the media has had little influence on national affairs), was articulate, lively, well informed, independent, robust. As to radio and television, well, the programs of the BBC were objective, comprehensive and a bit staid, but I found them entertaining and instructive.

It was with the "print" journalists that we in the Embassy had most to do. We read the national papers diligently, for they reliably supplemented information we picked up through our own contacts. The Embassy had an open door policy toward journalists, that is, the responsible ones. We were constantly asked for interviews which were granted, for they offered welcome opportunities to explain U.S. policy to advantage. Many journalists were worth seeing and talking with regularly. I think with affection of my late friend, the affable Diplomatic Correspondent of The Times, A.M. "Sandy" Rendel, who served during the war with Greek partisans and had expert knowledge of Balkan politics.

Among others whom we respected and knew quite well, was David Watt of The Financial Times, regarded by most journalists and politicians as the preeminent British political commentator of the time. Erudite, comprehensively informed about British politics, Watt later became Director of Chatham House and, sadly, died young a few years ago. Another journalist whose writing was a must was the late Peter Jenkins of The Guardian. The influential Economist was also essential reading. Its scholarly political editor, Brian Beedham, became one of my fourth estate friends.

In those days, British papers reported more extensively on the American scene than on developments in any other country. Of course, one topic on which they continually reported or commented, was the war in Vietnam. With exceptions, like the conservative Daily Telegraph, most papers were critical of our war there. Most also astutely discerned in the Heath years an incipient attenuation of the U.S.-UK relationship, as Britain began to focus more heavily on Europe.

British journalists could not (in my time in London, at least) reach their full potential, for there were numerous restraints which handicapped them in pursuit of the truth. British society then was not an open one. The constraints on investigative reporting were considerable. Uncovering misdoing in government was one thing; exposing it to the public another. It is hard to imagine that British journalists would have been able to print the kinds of revelations that Woodward and Bernstein were able to do about Watergate. The laws of libel, privacy, parliamentary privilege, and contempt, and the doctrine of prior restraint and the Official Secrets Act all stood in the path of the investigative journalist.

Harold Evans, the intrepid crusading editor of The Sunday Times, whom I admired and knew slightly, was an indefatigable exponent of freedom of information and open government. In the early 1970s, Evans published a series of articles demanding compensation for thousands of British children who had been born deformed because their mothers had used the drug thalidomide during pregnancy. In doing this obviously justified public service, Evans was found guilty of contempt (litigation on the matter was before the courts), but advanced the cause of freedom of information magnificently. In a paper I wrote at the Embassy I explored in depth the issues connected with freedom of information and the press in Britain.

Q: Early on when you were there, this was a time of great protests about the Vietnam War. Were you sort of any part of the point person who had to go out and meet these demonstrators and all that sort of thing? How did we handle that?

JAMES: I was in the Embassy on several occasions when protest marchers went to Grosvenor Square. I don't recall receiving petitions. I guess the duty officer who had to be there on the weekend, would have received them. We tried to avoid having senior officers receive petitions or protests. We had no discourse with these groups with whom argument would have been futile.

Some marchers were obviously there to raise hell, not because they felt morally outraged about the war in Vietnam. Some may have been agents provocateurs or from the Trotskyite wing of the Labor Party. Many, I will grant, may have been sincere. I saw a number of unprovoked assaults on the police which were started by marchers who jabbed mounted policemen or their horses with the long poles on which they carried their slogans. In the face of this kind of provocation I thought the police showed a great deal of restraint. They only struck back when the attacks got severe.

Q: Shall we talk about Elliot Richardson as ambassador? Were you with him for very long?

JAMES: I was with him all the time that he was in London.

Q: How long was he there?

JAMES: Annenberg left in October 1974. There was an interregnum during which Ron Spiers returned to London and became Chargé d'Affaires. Richardson arrived in March 1975, departed in January 1976 to return to Washington as Secretary of Commerce.

I was with him all the time he served in London. As political counselor I was responsible for planning a good deal of his orientation program, to ensure that he got a quick, informative introduction to British public life. He made what is traditionally the first ambassadorial speech to the Pilgrims. It was a good speech but rather too long (I didn't write it), as he later realized. But that didn't bother the luminaries present who were delighted that such a distinguished American public figure would now be ambassador.

Shortly afterwards Richardson presented his credentials to the Queen. As one of his counselors, I went with him one morning to Buckingham Palace in a gilded coach wearing white tie and tail coat, traditional dress for such occasions. I thought the Queen a charmer. When it came my turn to be presented, I overstayed my time, I am afraid, but I was determined to give her a complete answer to her question how I like Britain.

Richardson's arrival was a splendid occasion for me to do favors for many of my own contacts by getting him to attend their functions. He was terribly good about doing this. I took him to the House of Lords where Lord Fraser talked about Westminster. I went with him when he called on Foreign Secretary Callaghan. As a lawyer and former Attorney General he was very interested in the British legal system. I arranged for him to attend a sitting of the Court of Appeals in December 1975, just after his appointment as Secretary of Commerce was made. This was laid on by Lord Scarman, an eminent jurist, and firm advocate of freedom of information, open government and a written constitution for Britain; Scarman was another eminent Briton I was fortunate to know.

When Richardson and I went to the Law Courts, we were received by the Master of the Rolls who invited Richardson to sit with the Court as it heard an appeal. Richardson was very pleased by this courteous gesture, as he had been when he was earlier made an honorary bencher of the Middle Temple, one of the Inns of Court.

Under Richardson, as under Annenberg, my work was varied and consistently interesting. How unusual it was is illustrated by our part in the rescue of some American students, from Stanford I believe, who were captured by bandits near Lake Victoria. This must have happened in the summer of 1975. Richardson was out of town and Spiers was Charge. Lord Sherfield, who as Roger Makins was British ambassador to the United States in the 1950s and in 1975 was an officer of Wells Fargo, called at the Embassy one day to ask our help to raise the ransom demanded by the bandits. The sum they wanted was 200,000 pounds sterling, in small used bills, ones and fives, maybe tens. Sherfield said that the parents of the students (clients of Wells Fargo) were trying to raise the money but that was taking time and time was of the essence. I suppose it was hard to find such a large sum in so many small bills anywhere but London. So until the parents could raise the money, he asked could the Embassy work out a solution. Well, what it came down to was that we had to turn to the Bank of England for assistance. Matters came to a head on a Friday. The money was wanted in Nairobi that weekend, on Sunday, I think. I told Spiers about the problem.

He telephoned Sir Gordon Richardson, Governor of the Bank of England, and asked him for help, which was readily forthcoming. I went down to the Bank of England on Saturday and withdrew two hundred thousand pounds sterling in small bills. There wasn't time to mark them. They filled

a very large suitcase. I guess I was pretty sure that the parents of the students were good for the money, for I did not demur when I was asked to sign a personal note for 200,000. I then left the Bank of England with a Scotland Yard escort, and returned to the Embassy. That evening we sent the money by diplomatic courier to Nairobi where our Ambassador Beverly Carter speedily arranged for it to reach the bandits who released the students unharmed. The Bank of England returned my note a few days later after Sheffield paid it off. I could then relax. I would not be bankrupt. I recall that Henry Kissinger was not happy about paying a ransom to the bandits, and Carter, a most capable officer, caught flak for it. I did not. As far as I was concerned, our action was wholly justified. It was not as if we had given in to terrorists to save the skin of some government official. It was very gratifying to be thanked in person by one of the students' father.

London is a permanent magnet for official visitors from the United States, of both high and low station. I was often control officer for such visits. Although often a bit tedious, that duty gave me the opportunity to meet and talk more than casually with some interesting and eminent people. One memorable visitor was Averell Harriman who spent a week in London in the spring of 1975. I took him telegrams and briefed him on important developments over breakfast at Claridge's. Harriman was then in his mid eighties but was keen and asked sharp questions. He was especially interested in developments affecting our relations with the USSR. A few months later Vice President Rockefeller came to London to talk with the British about the bicentenary. Richardson asked me to accompany him and the Vice President to call on Prime Minister Wilson. I arrived early at Number 10 Downing Street, was admitted, and immediately ran into the PM. We chatted amiably while we waited for the VP and Richardson to arrive. Such was the informality of British officialdom, at least under Labor

The VP presented to Wilson, an avid pipe smoker, a box of pipes with garish, multicolored bowls. Wilson professed to find them unusual and a welcome addition to his collection. The talks were detailed and substantive. The VP was well briefed on British policies, and the call on Wilson evidently was gratifying to both of them.

Rather like my boss of 20 years earlier, Charlie Thayer, Richardson was determined that the Embassy should have an impact on foreign policy. He asked me and our economic minister, Bill Miller, to collaborate to develop some ideas he had wanted to propose to send to Kissinger. There must have been one dealing with economic matters, but I don't remember it clearly. Two that I do remember dealt with security issues like guarantees for Spain (before entry into NATO was possible) in order to keep our bases there; and the Indian Ocean. Kissinger professed to be impressed by Richardson's recommendations which he found "most stimulating," as I have noted from my records. He said he appreciated Richardson's initiative.

As the year wore on, Britain's economic situation worsened. There were strikes again in the cold mines which caused blackouts. There was widespread malaise. After I left London in February 1976, conditions worsened. Wilson resigned later that year and was succeeded by Callaghan who was in office only about a year. In the general election of 1977 the Tories obtained a majority in the House of Commons. Mrs. Thatcher became Prime Minister and inaugurated a new era in British politics and economics. Slowly, British fortunes began to improve, but life became very expensive in contrast to my years in London when one could live quite comfortably on a modest income, gracious living was not too expensive.

Q: You're looking at this as an American, and so from a different perspective. What, in your opinion, was the main problem with Britain at that time?

JAMES: Britain was not competitive.

Q: And why not?

JAMES: Much of industry was inefficient. Labor union practices were restrictive, anti-innovation, anti-streamlining. There were too many strikes which a few bosses could call too easily. Probably the unions had too much power for the good of the nation. Witness the trouble they caused for Heath in 1974; strikes in effect brought down his government. I suppose that the class system also played a part; too few bright university graduates were going into industry and business. The government was living on capital, as were many Britons. Friends and acquaintances would regularly and quietly sell valuables to maintain a style of living they considered necessary and proper.

As I said, for me and for my family, it was an exhilarating period, because we felt we had some impact or effect. Brits were friendly and agreeable. We had a terrific time. I couldn't have worked harder. But it was not a happy time for Britain. Whether it became happier after Margaret Thatcher came in, I don't know, but Britain was in much better shape afterwards than before. The market economy reigned.

Q: It was a strong dose of medicine, which is still having its repercussions.

JAMES: Well, that's very true.

Q: Then you left in '76.

JAMES: Yes, I did. However, before we leave London I would like to talk a bit about the last job I had there. I referred to it earlier in the interview.

For some time I had thought that the Embassy was spending a disproportionate amount of time doing day to day reporting and not putting enough emphasis on analyses of major forces of change at work in Britain. There was not enough time for busy political and economic officers to do thoughtful, thorough studies of political, economic and social trends that would shape the UK in 5 to 10 years. I thought it would be desirable to have a process to identify and explain such trends, not only because of the effect they would have on Britain's future, but also because the United States might profit from British experience, good or bad, from the success of innovation or the consequences of failure to innovate.

I therefore proposed to Richardson and Spiers that there be established an autonomous position called "Counselor for Reports and Analysis." They agreed and I was given a secretary and an office. From the summer of 1975 to February 1976, I worked on two reports: freedom of information in the UK, and industrial democracy or worker participation in industrial decisions. Doing these studies was highly instructive and brought me in contact with many stimulating,

informative people. For example, research on freedom of information introduced me to Lord Scarman, Harold Evans and Lord Devlin, the latter a senior judge and accomplished author who wrote a scholarly study of President Wilson's neutrality policy. When I told Devlin that I wanted to talk to him about freedom of information he graciously invited me and my wife to have luncheon with him and Lady Devlin at his home in the country. I had not only an instructive talk but a most enjoyable one in a country house setting. I also met many people in government and out who were disposed to talk quite frankly about how closed British society was and about the restraints on open government. Elliot Richardson was most helpful in my endeavors. He agreed with alacrity when I asked him to take me to talk with Roy Jenkins, Labor's Home Secretary in 1975 and an ardent proponent of more access to official information by the press and public. For my study on industrial democracy I not only had a number of informative interviews but also visited a couple of industrial establishments, a spinning mill in the midlands and a small, very competitive and profitable machine tool factory.

The paper on freedom of information was well received in Washington and by Richardson who read it after he left London. Monroe Leigh, the Department's Legal Adviser, was complimentary.

Two reports of some length and substance were all I could write in the six months I had left in London. However, I prepared a list of additional reports to be done by the political and economic sections after I departed, and some general guidance for their preparation. Two or three of those on my list were written. Ray Seitz, later Ambassador in London, wrote an excellent one of the British Foreign Service. I forget the subject of the other.

The project lapsed after I left London. Carol Laise, the Director General of the Foreign Service, apparently was favorably impressed by the idea, after Richardson sent her and Larry Eagleburger, then Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, letters explaining it. I don't recall that we heard from Eagleburger. Ambassador Laise didn't take any positive action, however.

After I returned from London to an assignment in the Department, I tried to boost the idea, but there was insufficient interest and it never caught on.

I might close the London chapter with a final comment about Richardson. He probably would have been an outstanding ambassador, had he had a longer run, for he had the empathy, enthusiasm, imagination and intellect of our most successful representatives. The British keenly regretted his departure after only 10 months in office. He had been favorably received everywhere from the Palace, Westminster, and Whitehall, by the professions and especially by the press, which thought he was great because he was so articulate and well informed. Then too he was the hero of Watergate and to many Britons the model of probity. I know he deeply regretted leaving London, but he believed he was duty bound to respond to President Ford's request to join his cabinet.

Q: From London, you came back to Washington . . .

BERNARD F. SHINKMAN

**Publishing
London (1968-1976)**

Bernard F. Shinkman was born in New York City and raised in Vienna. He graduated from Dartmouth College. After entering the Foreign Service in 1978, he served in Accra, Mindanao, London, Belgrade and Ottawa. Mr. Shinkman was interviewed in 2004 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: How did you find the publishing world in that area?

SHINKMAN: I thought it was fascinating. I thought it was really interesting. Probably the least interesting work I did was the selling of advertising space which, in the trade industry, is a pretty hard slog. Not that I had really hard work, but it just wasn't terribly rewarding work. But I found the publishing industry very interesting and in those days, of course, content was still set with hot metal. They had linotype machines. It wasn't individual pieces of type. But you went down to the printer on Thursday - the night that the magazine went to press - and you read proofs as they came off after the type had been set in hot metal on the linotype machine. You were really involved in all aspects of the production of magazines and reference works. So I enjoyed it.

It was a pleasant life. I was paid a pathetic salary, but it gave me enough to live on. And I had a modest apartment with a cousin which we shared in Earl's Court. And then moved into a classic sort of late-'60s, early-'70s set up in a very nice row house in Central London, where I shared a house with four other people, two men and two women. It was just a very pleasant relationship. And we had a nice house. I lived there for three or four years before my wife and I got married and bought a house in Fulham in Southwest London.

Q: I always think of some of the battles - I'm not sure when it happened - but with Murdock and the press. As an American, how did you observe, they call it "class conflict," particularly within a business?

SHINKMAN: Well the class system then and I think probably now is just really entrenched in the UK as it is in many places. I think in France, although they don't carry titles, there is still very much that sentiment that there are people who are inherently more important because of their family background and that sort of thing. But it was very evident in the U.K. It could be very frustrating at times. I think there is less of that now than there was then.

It was a time of considerable labor strife. The publishers had not yet taken on the unions on Fleet Street, but there was still extraordinary feather-bedding. All the major publishers were still right there on Fleet Street. There was, however, the garbage strike that went on for something like three months. And I can remember driving around Berkeley Square, one of the most beautiful squares in London, and it was piled six feet high with garbage bags. The whole area. There were some pretty tough times. Harold Wilson was the prime minister. There were some very difficult labor problems.

Q: Did you get involved as your responsibility?

SHINKMAN: No, not really, because we were in business publishing. So those sorts of events didn't really come to my attention. Occasionally people would approach me for comments, knowing I was a Vietnam veteran, about anti-war protests. And of course I had nothing to do with the American embassy, so I rarely went to Grosvenor Square where the American embassy is. There were major protests there for days on end. But I rarely had anything particularly interesting to say about it. I can remember a daily newspaper calling me once and saying what did I think about all the protests about the war. And I said I thought it was reasonable that they protest. I might disagree with them. So I didn't provide anything they wanted to print. I just wasn't very controversial.

Q: Did you sense a feeling of anti-Americanism at all?

SHINKMAN: I don't think so. There was strong anti-war sentiment. I think anti-Americanism in the UK – I think because I've now lived there for fairly long stretches at a couple of times – has not changed very much. There are certain relatively small segments, the British upper class, who can't get over the fact that the British are no longer running the world and resent the fact that we are the predominant military, political, cultural power in the world. And so they are going to be anti-American or resentful. But I think the majority of people who are in a position to know what is going on admire the United States. They may not approve of everything and think we are a bit rough-edged and should be a little bit smoother about things. But I think there is more admiration in the UK. Even at all levels, I think, even in the working class levels, if you call them that. It is probably not polite to call it that anymore, but from the shop floor up to the boardroom I think you still find great admiration for the United States.

Q: You really hadn't had any real experience in American business. As you watched business being conducted, did you see things you thought were outdated or not the way you thought they should be done?

SHINKMAN: I think you put your finger on it. I really didn't have that much experience in the American corporate world to be able to make a comparison. I know I thought various of the procedures were pretty archaic. The amount of deference that you had to show to people above you in the chain of command seemed to me a bit excessive. I remember I used to get my payslip every two weeks. It was written in longhand with a fountain pen by somebody in the accounts department. I thought, they have got to be able to do better than that. This was 1968, 1969. They could have typed it or something. But you know, fairly old procedures.

Q: Was a lot of business conducted in the boardroom? I'm exaggerating . . .

SHINKMAN: Yes. There was very much that sort of thing for major items. The members of the board of directors had their own bathroom on their floor of the building. The tea lady came around every morning and every afternoon and served tea. We got our tea in modest mugs and occasionally you would see the Board's tea going on a silver salver and nice tablecloth on the little tea trolley, and that sort of stuff. So yes, there was some of that. And I suppose half of the board were people who had titles. They would be, "Sir John" this and "Sir Edward" that. So there wasn't easy upward mobility. And I think a lot of Brits admired that in American business there generally was a lot more mobility.

Q: *Were you keeping an eye on American publications?*

SHINKMAN: To a certain extent. I would read them. I would come back to the States once a year. The company was kind enough, generous enough, to send me on a business trip and I would spend a week around Thanksgiving or Christmas in New York calling on clients that we had, companies which advertised in our publications, who were based in New York, and then I would come down to Washington to spend the holiday with family. So I kept an eye on U.S. media. And they looked a little smarter, a little sharper, a little more smoothly produced, a little more up-to-date than our publications did. But we published some very good magazines and people wanted to buy them. It was a prosperous little company, so we seemed to be doing things right. And were pretty good at keeping up with technology as it existed in those days.

Q: *And you did thus until . . .*

SHINKMAN: '68 to '76. I had been in the UK for eight years. I married a Brit in '74. And I thought to myself, I need to make a fairly fundamental decision here. It became clear to me - a number of things came clear to me - that no matter how long I stayed in the UK. I was still going to be an expatriate living there. Did I want to be an expatriate for the rest of my life? Did I want to re-establish my Americanism by going back to the States? And tied into this cultural thing that we've been talking about, it became clear to me that although I would reach a management level in the company, I would never in any wildest dreams be put on the main board of directors of such a stereotypically British company. They just wouldn't have an American on that board. Whereas there were other people who I thought were about of equal talent - or may have even been, I dare say, of less talent than I had at that stage - who were on the board of directors of the company.

So I thought, I think I do need to leave. And I thought, how can I do that and maintain this wonderful international lifestyle that I enjoy so thoroughly? So I wrote a letter to Henry Kissinger and said "Secretary Kissinger, how do I join your operation?" And got a very nice letter back from somebody in the personnel office of the State Department saying, "well the first thing you do is take this thing called the Foreign Service exam."

THOMAS L. HUGHES
Deputy Chief of Mission
London (1969-1970)

Mr. Hughes was born and raised in Minnesota and was educated at Carleton College, Oxford University and Yale University. After service with the US Air Force he worked on Capitol Hill and became active in Democratic Party politics. He later joined the Department of State, first as Assistant to Under Secretary Chester Bowles and subsequently as Deputy Director, then as Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, where he served during the event filled period 1961 to 1969. His assignments brought him in close contact with the major

political figures of that era. His final government assignment was to Embassy London as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mr. Hughes was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: You were deputy chief of mission in London with Walter Annenberg from when to when?

HUGHES: During the last years of Harold Wilson, 1969-70. When we went, we assumed that the Nixon administration and the Labor government were not naturally destined to be very congenial. Unpredictably it turned out that the British ambassador in Washington, John Freeman, the former editor of the New Statesman, ingratiated himself with Henry Kissinger. Nixon himself, in a rare burst of humor, referred to "the new Nixon and the new statesman." The downside of this collegiality for us in London was that serious bi-lateral diplomacy was handled in Washington among Nixon, Kissinger, Richardson, and Freeman. That was a much more powerful lineup than Annenberg and the Queen.

Q: Was there any attempt to educate Annenberg about the Queen? The protocol side was nice but it really wasn't of the essence.

HUGHES: No, everyone wanted to humor the ambassador. The BBC's film of his famous presentation of credentials to the Queen had already securely entered British history. But Annenberg was not put off by being made a figure of fun. Protocol was his forte. He liked dealing at the Buckingham Palace level. He wanted to be a social ambassador and to spend his way into British high life. The Annenbergs lavishly redid the embassy residence, they entertained frequently and elaborately, and they looked for opportunities to show their affection for Britain. The Ambassador found one outlet after another for his charitable impulses. His splendid art collection was put on public display. He hired on impulse an Austrian photographer whom he had met in Vienna, and he brought him to London to photograph Westminster Abbey. He subsidized the splendid book that resulted, and induced Sir Kenneth Clark among others to write a chapter.

One day he saw Sir Francis Drake's sword at the Inner Temple and he promptly had a copy struck for Lincoln's Inn. The finer things in life appealed to him. Chalice in memory of his ambassadorship were given to English cathedrals. He built a "non-partisan" swimming pool at Checkers "for the prime ministers of either party." The Annenbergs supported the American textile museum at Bath.

My wife and I were the beneficiaries of life with an American tycoon, and the experience was an enjoyable social grace note to my State Department career. Of course it was a personal pleasure for me to be back in England, and there were opportunities to revisit Oxford and renew acquaintances from twenty years earlier. The Annenbergs themselves could not have been nicer to us. On arrival, we were welcomed by an intimate embassy party at Annabelle's, one of London's celebrated night clubs. Later they organized a glittering reception for us at Claridge's with Nureyev and Fonteyn among the guests. When the Ambassador discovered that my eldest son had slightly crossed eyes, he insisted on arranging for an operation by a leading Harley Street surgeon.

I myself did a fair amount of public speaking in England, representing the Ambassador at a large Thanksgiving dinner in London, for example, or at Plymouth on the occasion of the 350th anniversary of the Pilgrims' voyage. Sir Dennis Greenhill, then Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, hosted a lunch at Lancaster House for me to speak to an assemblage of Foreign Office noteworthies. A year or so after we returned to Washington, I lampooned our British adventure at the annual Oxford-Cambridge dinner, but we always looked back with affection on our stay at our diplomatic residence, Wychwood House in Kensington.

There was a serious side to this adventure, as well. I was the Ambassador's designated detail man. When the then Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart would summon the ambassador, I would be taken along. After the introductory niceties, the Foreign Secretary would say: "Ambassador, tell me, are you seriously going to allow the Israelis to have these airplanes? It will upset the whole strategic balance." Annenberg would reply: "My minister, Mr. Hughes, will now explain that to you."

My wife and I rather enjoyed the extra responsibilities that fell to us in dealing with Cabinet ministers, other MP's, and the Foreign Office. We got to know several politicians quite well—from Dennis Healey and Roy Hattersley to David Owen and Tony Benn. I resumed earlier acquaintances with Sir Kenneth Strong and Sir Dick White. We frequently had dinners of our own revolving around either visiting Americans or prominent British government figures.

Actually since most of the substantive work was done in Washington, the Embassy tended to concentrate on those areas or problems where our being located in London gave us a comparative advantage. Rhodesia was an example. The Wilson Government's policy toward Ian Smith and his unilateral declaration of independence was bitterly contested by the Tory opposition. The result was that we witnessed a replay of Anna Chennault's Vietnam caper in Washington a year earlier. Once again an opposition party undercut an elected government's diplomatic position by intriguing directly with a foreign leader.

In this case it was Edward Heath, leader of the opposition in the UK, using a back channel to Kissinger and Nixon to undermine official British policy. This gambit of Heath's complicated our chain of command in the embassy. While the ambassador formally, and I more practically, were working with the Labor Government, Bill Galloway, a foreign service officer who headed the Embassy's political section, was assigned to work with the conservatives. He got to know them very well, perhaps too well. Through Galloway's good offices as intermediary, Heath set up a back channel communication to Nixon. Galloway facilitated the delivery of secret messages from Her Majesties "Loyal Opposition," urging the President of the United States to ignore the British Prime Minister of the day on Rhodesia. The Tory leader in effect told the US president that the conservatives were going to be in office the following year, and that they had their own plans for Rhodesia. They didn't want the U.S. to help Wilson muck it up in the meantime.

Q: Was there any disquiet on the part of the Labor government over this Tory relationship with the Nixon administration?

HUGHES: There certainly would have been if they had known about it.

Q: I was just wondering whether they were picking up the anti-Labor vibes?

HUGHES: The US administration wasn't overtly anti-Labor. Nixon was decent to Wilson when he visited Washington. And, as I mentioned, Wilson's ambassador Freeman was enjoying a rather comfortable relationship with Kissinger.

The Heath-Nixon back channel was only one example of the complications in managing our London embassy. It was the largest American embassy in the world, full of people doing all kinds of things that were not really high level diplomacy. Departmental interests in Washington had exploded, and consequently we had sections devoted to agriculture, commerce, labor, the treasury, and public relations, not to speak of intelligence and the military. The President's official letter still told the ambassador that he was in charge of his embassy, but the London embassy was conspicuous proof that formal authority was one thing, and actual control something else.

In the first place, for the President's letter to be effective, the ambassador had to be interested in being in charge. Annenberg really wasn't. There was a controversy over parking rights for cars in the embassy which I had to referee. When the foreign service tried to take a parking space away from the navy, the ranking admiral flew back to Washington to arrange Navy Department resistance. Americans liked living in London so we had many CIA residents even though they were not working on targets in Britain but rather in continental Europe or beyond. There were protocol disputes over who was being invited to British functions and in what pecking order.

Then there was the anti-American demonstration in front of the embassy at Grosvenor Square. Annenberg had had a lunch that day for the Prime Minister at Winfield House. We were outside on the terrace and Wilson said merrily, "Well, Ambassador, you will be glad to know that the Cabinet this morning approved the agrément for your successor." Annenberg was taken aback by this and sort of slumped backwards into a garden chair. I went over to him and said, "I'm sure that the Prime Minister is joking, Ambassador. It is a joke, of sorts."

After lunch the chauffeur who was driving me back to work said he would have to take a different route from his normal one because of a demonstration. When I returned to my office and looked out of my window, it was obvious that many children of embassy officials were massing in Grosvenor Square. Along with many others, they had been let out of the American School to come and demonstrate against American policies in Southeast Asia. The British Bobbies were lined up on their horses with their billy clubs, protecting the embassy from a howling group of youngsters marching around and gesticulating.

We didn't know until later that Bill Clinton, the future US president, was there with the crowd. At Oxford among the Americans he was known as "the brightest man at Univ" (University College, Oxford). Harold Wilson himself, when he was up at Oxford, had also been called "the brightest man at Univ". So in the space of few hours we had been in the presence of two of the brightest men of Univ. In front of the crowd facing the embassy was my 13-year-old son Evan. As the lightest member of his class at school, he was being tossed skyward from a blanket to the cheers of the crowd.

Meanwhile the high-jinks from Washington continued to provide amusement. One day Kissinger phoned me about the Annenbergs' palatial residence in Palm Springs, California, which Nixon loved to use, especially if the Annenbergs were not there. "Tom, this is a non-conversation." "Of course, Henry, all your conversations are non-conversations. What is it this time?" "Ve (we) might go to Palm Springs this weekend, but would (would) they come?" "Impossible," I replied, "they are already in Baden-Baden unpacking for the weekend, and there is no way the jetstar can get them back to California by tomorrow" "Good, ve vill go."

Q: What feeling did you have for the UK Foreign Service?

HUGHES: The British Foreign Service excelled in self-confidence, gentility, and in their ability to speak the Queen's English. Time and again I have watched these attributes intimidate their American counterparts. In their attitude toward the U.S., they cast themselves in the role of experienced advisors—the posture ancient Greeks once took towards ancient Rome. The "special relationship" was essentially built on those assumptions, although the pull toward Europe was beginning to modify that connection. Ted Heath, who turned out to be pro-Europe, was already calling it "the dread phrase."

Q: October 5, 1999. When did you leave London as DCM?

HUGHES: When Labour lost the election to Heath in 1970, we took advantage of the change in government to say goodbye to the Annenbergs and return to Washington. I spent some intervening months with the Policy Planning Council in the State Department, but was soon offered the presidency of the Carnegie Endowment.

Q: Well, could we talk about policy planning at that time? How did policy planning change per administration. How did it seem to fit in at that particular time?

HUGHES: I was just parking there for the interim between London and Carnegie and I didn't plan much policy. If policy was being planned anywhere, it was not in the State Department and certainly not by the Policy Planning staff. As usual, people were writing speeches for their superiors. Nominally, Bill Rogers was still Secretary, but Henry Kissinger's star was clearly ascendant. The State Department was feeling sorry for itself, as it so often does. My mind was on my next job. INR had finished the internal Pentagon Papers type of review of INR's Vietnam role, 1961-69, which I had commissioned while Director. This was still locked up in the State Department, the CIA refusing clearance. I unsuccessfully tried to get this 400-500 page self-study released when I was in Policy Planning. (Note: As mentioned previously, this study was finally freed up in 2005 through the efforts of the National Security Archive. It is now available on their website.)

Q: Well, maybe it takes one more war.

HUGHES: I think the CIA was not eager to show that there was another part of the intelligence community that was consistently ahead of them on Vietnam.

Q: Tell me about how the Carnegie people came to you or how you came to them and could you talk about what the Carnegie Endowment was at that time in 1970?

HUGHES: I was contacted first by Professor Milton Katz of Harvard Law School, who was the new chairman of the Carnegie board. Possibly David Rockefeller, another trustee, may also have been involved. (David had come to see me earlier to sound me out about taking the editorship of Foreign Affairs in New York. However I had told him that I wanted to stay in Washington and had declined. Despite protests and controversy over his Vietnam role, Bill Bundy was subsequently appointed.)

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is the oldest foreign policy and international affairs foundation in the country. It was founded in 1910 by Andrew Carnegie, then the richest man in America. He thought that to die rich was to die disgraced. He embarrassed the Rockefellers and other tycoons of his day into giving much of their money away as well. After his libraries, the Peace Endowment was the first of Carnegie's major philanthropies. In 1910 World War I was still over the horizon. Carnegie turned to his advisor, Elihu Root, the former Secretary of State and Secretary of War, inquiring in effect whether \$10 million would be enough to buy peace. Root said he thought that was enough. Carnegie reminded him that he could easily triple or quadruple that figure. "Well," said Root, "if you want second opinions, why not check with your friends Theodore Roosevelt and Kaiser Wilhelm and see what they think about \$10 million."

So Carnegie checked with those two well-known peaceniks. Roosevelt, then in the White House, thought that a foundation for peace was just about the funniest thing imaginable, but that \$10 million was about right. Then Carnegie went to Germany where the Kaiser invited him to board the royal yacht, the Hohenzollern, at the Kiel regatta. Wilhelm agreed with TR that this was a very funny proposition, but he too thought that \$10 million was about right. The Endowment could have started with \$100 million, but it got \$10 million. The blame could be apportioned among this triumvirate of high level advisors. By 1913 the Endowment had set up offices in Washington across from the White House, in that corner building which is now part of Blair House. The location was chosen for the convenience of President Taft, so that he could walk over for tea to discuss his enthusiasm for compulsory arbitration with the then leaders of the Endowment— Elihu Root, Nicholas Murray Butler, and James Brown Scott.

At the same time the Endowment opened an office in Paris in a beautiful building on the Boulevard St. Germain, which we gave some years later to the University of Paris. Anyway, a year before the guns of August started booming and World War I began, the Endowment's Washington and Paris offices were going full tilt, mostly under the auspices of international lawyers. The preferred emphasis of the Endowment from the beginning, and continuing into the '20s and '30s, was international law, as opposed to international organization. The leaders were almost all establishment Republicans. They failed to stop World War I, but they helped stop Wilson with his League of Nations. They were for the World Court.

JOSEPH N. GREENE, JR.

**Deputy Chief of Mission
London (1970-1971)**

Joseph N. Greene, Jr. was born in New York in 1920. He received his undergraduate degree from Yale in 1941 and immediately thereafter joined the Foreign Service. His career spanned 35 years during which time he served in Rome, London, Singapore, Ottawa, Montreal, Lagos, Cairo, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in March 1993.

Q: You went to London in 1970. How did that come about?

GREENE: It came about sadly. Tom Hughes who had been involved in Democratic politics and wound up as Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Johnson Administration, had been picked as the number two to Walter Annenberg in London in the Nixon administration. It was the first time that a non-career person, and a Democrat at that, had been sent to be Deputy Chief of Mission in London. He seemed a fish out of water. But more sadly, his wife, Jean, didn't take to it. After five or six months, Jean tried to take her own life. So Tom had to leave. His departure was delayed because he broke his ankle in an accident at home. When it was decided that he had to go, I was later told, by people involved such as Martin Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and Bill Macomber, Under Secretary for Management, both of whom I knew from my line of work, decided I was the person to go in Tom Hughes' place. That got the DCM job back in the Foreign Service. When I was told I was going to London, I pointed out that my wife was British and asked whether it mattered. They said it didn't. I held out to first ask my wife how she felt about it and they told me to hurry up, they were anxious to settle this. My wife, Kitty, was delighted. When I had been a junior officer, the best career job in the Foreign Service was number two in London. So, when you are asked to go, you don't really argue. I went out in May and the family came at the end of the school year.

I tried to set up the embassy as an operating unit, providing support for whatever the ambassador and our government were trying to do. Annenberg saw his job as primarily one of public relations. But he had a terrible job because the British press was being mean to the former publisher of The Daily Racing Forum and the Philadelphia Inquirer. They really didn't take him very seriously. Gradually, it emerged, to the extent the U.S. and British governments had business to transact, it was being done through John Freeman, the ambassador in Washington. I had known him very well when he had been High Commissioner in New Delhi. We became good friends and saw each other socially in Washington before I went to London. I began to also feel that the Embassy there was a set of fiefdoms: every agency in Washington who had a couple of officers in London didn't want anyone monkeying with their business. It also seemed to me that a lot of our talented people in diplomatic work spent a lot of time on the schedules of important visitors on their way to somewhere through London. The most important person in the embassy was the lady who made hotel accommodations and got theater tickets. The rest were making appointments for visitors with people in the British government. Then the question always arose of who would accompany whom. The ambassador didn't like to so I did a lot of that. This included Henry Kissinger. The ambassador and Mr. Kissinger didn't really take to each other.

There was a memorable time when I went out to Heathrow Airport to meet Kissinger's plane. On the way back to town, we talked about his schedule. Since no one could really agree on the schedule, I suggested that Mr. Kissinger come back to my house where we could more freely discuss it. He often didn't want anyone from an American embassy around when he talked to someone of importance in a government he was visiting. We finally got that schedule settled and I went with him everywhere he went. When it was time to go to the Prime Minister, however, he went alone. That was his habit no matter where he was. Not the ambassador nor the deputy would accompany him except when he wanted a witness. He went on from London to Pakistan. He was there a couple of days, was said to have suffered a stomach bug and was out of circulation. Then he suddenly resurfaced, having been to Peking with Winston Lord. My British friends were annoyed with me because Kissinger had been to China without telling them. I pleaded ignorance, as did the ambassador. But they were outraged. That was how Henry Kissinger worked.

When Black September broke out in the fall of 1970 in Jordan and the Palestinians blew up planes in the desert, I set up an embassy task force. We had the military attachés to help keep track of military events, and the intelligence people and the political section with a Middle East expert, and an economic officer watching the oil embargo, just to monitor it and talk to the British. The British had a big stake in it and wanted to know what was going on and what we were going to do about it. Of course, as I said earlier, big decisions, particularly on what we might do, were made in Washington. At one point, the British police arrested some Arabs in London on terrorism charges. They told the FBI staffer in the Embassy that one of them, Leila Khalali, had an American passport. Only incidentally did I hear about her some days later, from the Foreign Office, which assumed we knew. Whatever else she was, she was entitled to consular protection, so I had it out with the FBI fellow. One illustration of fiefdoms at work oblivious to their context as part of an Embassy.

STEPHEN H. ROGERS
Counselor for Economic Affairs
London (1970-1972)

Ambassador Stephen H. Rogers was born in 1931 and grew up in New York. He entered the Foreign Service in 1956, where his posts included in India, Paris, London, Mexico, South Africa, and Swaziland. He was interviewed by Raymond C. Ewing in 1994.

Q: At the end of that training then you have what looks like another good assignment. You went as counselor for economic affairs in London.

ROGERS: Yes. One other thing that was interesting about ICAF was the international trip we took. I went with a group that spent a week in Argentina and a week in Chile. That was quite an eye opening experience. Argentina was not democratic, but was very neat, orderly and seemed secure. And then to spend a week in Chile at the time of the campaigning for the election that resulted in Mr. Allende's becoming president was really quite fascinating. Things were

disorderly with political slogans painted on walls and streets. You got a feeling of great political, democratic vitality in Chile. A freshness in a rather disorderly way that you didn't see in Argentina. It was my introduction to Latin America and it served me well later.

Then I went to London where I was the number two in the economic section. Stan Cleveland was the minister for economic affairs, and I was his deputy and the head of a section that included quite a wide variety of different economic relationships of about ten or twelve people and different aspects including one person who spent all of his time on commodity trade because of the commodity institutions that were centered in London. We had a civil air attaché, a maritime person, trade people, quite a variety.

Q: All of those people were in the unit which you headed?

ROGERS: Yes. They were responsible to me.

Q: That included British relations with Common Market and some of the other regional issues as well as the specific air and commodities issues?

ROGERS: That's right. Several of the people in my section were from different agencies in Washington. So I had only a couple of just plain Foreign Service officers, generalists.

Q: What sort of things did you, yourself, specially work on?

ROGERS: The question of British entry into the Common Market was an issue for discussion in much of that period. We had trade issues, we had maritime issues, we had civil air issues.

Q: Meanwhile, you and your family now consisted of your wife and four children and enjoyed living in London, I assume.

ROGERS: We enjoyed London very much. We lived in a house built about 1815 on Edwards Square just off Kensington High Street, one of maybe 80 row houses around this very pleasant two or three acre fenced in square for the residences. A lot of charm. There was a certain amount of inconvenience associated with that charm, but it was very nice. We enjoyed London very much.

Q: Who was ambassador during that period?

ROGERS: It was Walter Annenberg.

Q: This was during the Nixon administration.

ROGERS: Yes.

Q: And the DCM?

ROGERS: It was Jerry Greene (Joseph N. Greene, Jr.), who didn't stay very long. He left and Earl Soames came and replaced him.

LACY A. WRIGHT
Aide to Ambassador; Commercial Officer
London (1970-1972)

Mr. Wright joined the Foreign Service in 1968 after earning degrees at Mendelien College and Loyola University. His foreign service took him to Vietnam both during and after the War. Other assignments took him to Milan, London and Bangkok as well as to the State Department in Washington, where he worked with International Organizations in matters concerning refugees, and UNESCO affairs. Mr. Wright was born and raised in Springfield, Illinois. Mr. Wright was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: You were in London from when to when?

WRIGHT: For two years, from September of 1970 until June or so of 1972.

Q: Well, London and Saigon—there's a certain difference between the two places.

WRIGHT: Yes, quite a bit. In fact, I think I made a mistake by going to London. I wish now that I had stayed in Vietnam, which John Vann asked me to do. But I didn't. I went to London, and I was first aide to the Ambassador, and then I was in the commercial section, and then I went back to the United States, was in the economics course—

Q: This was in '72.

WRIGHT: '72.

Q: Well, why don't we stick to London first? Who was the Ambassador when you got there?

WRIGHT: Walter Annenberg.

Q: Could you talk about Ambassador Annenberg a bit. When he first arrived he was rather controversial, but by the time you got there I guess he was—

WRIGHT: Well, by the time I got there he was still controversial. I would say by the time he left, which must have been in '73 or '74, he was much less so and, I believe, fairly well liked. But from the time that he arrived, for two or three years, he was badly criticized by the British press, often unfairly, I think. It seemed he could do nothing right. But he got off to a bad start in London by chance, having appeared on a television show with the Queen, which had nothing to do with him but which had to do with the Queen receiving the credentials of an ambassador, and he happened to be up next. And so his presentation of his credentials to the Queen was filmed,

and in it he made some remarks which, when they appeared on television, appeared stilted and, indeed, strange to the British public, and he was criticized for it.

Annenberg had some challenges to overcome when he went to London. First, he was, of course, the appointee of President Nixon, who was not very popular there, partially because we were in the middle of the Vietnam War. Secondly, his own past lent itself to a certain amount of criticism, his father having been sometimes on the other side of the law, and the British popular press didn't hesitate to remind readers of this from time to time. It was embarrassing. Third, a very critical book had come out about Annenberg about this time, which was widely disseminated and read. Fourth, Annenberg had a physical defect, in the sense that he stuttered. And this apparently was a lifelong affliction, and he had to go to certain lengths to try to overcome it. And one of the things that he did was to speak in very clipped and precise tones, syllable by syllable, which appeared stilted and strange when it was heard. And this was one of the things that was taken as an object of ridicule in the television piece that I referred to before.

Within the embassy? Annenberg was, of course a very wealthy man, in the tradition of people that go to places like London and Paris and Rome, and this in itself set him apart from everybody else there. But he was not a nasty man, by any means, and I think that he tried hard in the situation there to be liked in the embassy and, of course, do a good job. His style of management was—let me see how to put this... Let me not talk about his style, but let me talk about the situation that he found there. When he first arrived, he had a DCM in the person of Philip Kaiser, who was a political appointee DCM, the only one that I have ever known in my entire career in the Foreign Service, a Democrat, of course, from the previous administration. And naturally, the first thing that Annenberg did when he arrived was to fire Phil Kaiser, which seems to me the most normal thing in the world. Phil Kaiser apparently took umbrage at this, and one of the things that he did was not to leave London. He stayed there and got a job, and this was a source of a certain amount—at least from my bird's-eye view—of tension between Annenberg and him, which continued. I don't think he played a big role; I think it was a bit of an irritant, though, to have a situation that went on like that.

He was replaced by a man named Tom Hughes, who, I believe, left for personal reasons not very long after, a fairly short tenure. When I arrived, the DCM was a man named Jerry Green, a very fine career Foreign Service officer, an all-star—that's why he was in London—very nice man, as well. And I was his aide as well as aide to the Ambassador for a certain time. Jerry Green and the Ambassador eventually fell out, which was very unfortunate, I think. It was unfortunate for the career of Jerry Green, who only had one or two more assignments and then left the Service and did not become an ambassador, although he was certainly very much headed in that direction. But Jerry Green was caught in a strange situation. He was the DCM, and a strong one, but he found himself between a political ambassador, who was uncertain of his own role, I believe, and did not know how the Foreign Service worked (no reason why he should), on the one hand, and on the other hand, a group of heads of section, counselors, most of whom were prima donnas and all of whom wanted direct access to the Ambassador. In the middle of this sandwich was Jerry Green. And eventually, I guess after several situations which were not totally pleasing to the Ambassador, one arose in which Jerry Green made a decision, because he thought he needed to. It was something that must have been time-sensitive; I don't remember what it was. But he made the decision, as I remember it, and then told the Ambassador later, and the Ambassador felt this

was something that he should have been in on from the beginning—a common kind of contretemps in the Foreign Service, but this one coming on top of other things probably assumed bigger proportions than it might have otherwise. And Jerry Green, knowing that he had displeased the Ambassador, took the initiative and asked to be reassigned and was. So I haven't explained much yet, I think, about Annenberg's management style, but I believe it's more correct to put it in terms of a situation which developed there and which was not entirely felicitous.

After I left, I understand, things settled down there, and Annenberg, in fact, became fairly well liked by the British. And that was, I think, an achievement on his part, since before that, as I said, almost every thing he did was criticized. He gave, I remember, a painting to Chequers, you know, one of the residences of the prime minister, and he was criticized for that in an editorial in the *Times*, with words to the effect of "Who does this guy think he is, giving us a painting?" So almost nothing he did seemed to turn out right. But as I say, in the end, I think when he left much of that situation had been redressed.

Q: During the '70-'72 period, Vietnam was still very much in everybody's mind. Did you find yourself being sort of the resident advisor on what's happening in Vietnam and all, I mean, people coming to you, including the Ambassador, and saying, "Tell me about Vietnam"?

WRIGHT: There was some of that, although one of the things that happened when I was there was that John Vann came and visited. Before I had left Vietnam, Vann and I talked, and he knew I was coming to London, so taking the initiative as usual, said, "Look, when you get there, why don't you have the embassy ask that I come there and brief them about Vietnam, because I'm going to be in the US and I could come back through there and I could brief the embassy?" So that, in fact, is what I did. I made this suggestion. Vann was—I wouldn't say he was a household word by any means—but he was known among people in our service who followed this, so I was able to persuade the Ambassador and one of his political-appointee aides that this would be a good idea, and so it was done. And Vann came to London. He had gone back to the United States and gotten sick, and I don't know what it was, whether it was hepatitis or what, but it laid him low for several weeks, so he was some weeks late in getting back to Vietnam. But he did come through London. He stayed with me in my apartment, and he spoke to the country team, including the Ambassador, as I remember, and he was received with a lot of interest because we were at the height of the war and at the height of the criticism of the war, and the British, particularly the press—not totally, but certainly the left side of the spectrum—was very critical of our involvement there. We also had a number of demonstrations in front of the embassy, which became a favorite haunt of people who were against the war.

Q: I'm sure this was the time a little earlier that the now President of the United States, William Clinton, demonstrated. Do you know which one he demonstrated in?

WRIGHT: I don't know. I can't quite place him, but I guess he might have been. Another one of the things that happened then was that even within our embassy, there were differences of view, of course, about Vietnam. And I remember that we had a USIS officer who had come into the Foreign Service with me who was stationed there, very much against the war, and one of his jobs was to explain our position on Vietnam to people who called or wrote in, and he found this so distasteful that he quit that service. And he was a person who was never able to, or maybe he

didn't want to, make the distinction between what the US Government had as its position and what he himself thought personally. He didn't seem to realize that when people called in they didn't care what he thought, they cared what the US Government thought.

Q: Well, I think it's always these things. People say, "Aw, the poor bright guy shouldn't have been put in that position," but in a way it's a good weeding-out process, because there'll be other things, too. From the reflection of the Ambassador or the DCM and also in your other jobs, what was your feeling toward the Labor Party in that time?

WRIGHT: Well, Wilson was prime minister then. As I remember it, I think Wilson himself was well regarded. He was a very able politician, a very smart man. Our embassy, the political section, of course, had lots of links with both parties, and in fact, the political counselor scored a bit of a triumph by having become very close to a Conservative politician by the name of Ted Heath, who later, of course, became prime minister. But I don't know that I can shed much more light than that on your question.

Q: In your time as aide, what was your impression of the Ambassador's social life? Was it pretty much focused on the political establishment and the media, or did it get off into the higher reaches of the royals and all that?

WRIGHT: I don't think it got much into the reaches of the royals. First of all, let me say that I'm sure the Ambassador did lots of things that I was not aware of. I don't remember his being involved with the Royal Family. I do think that he was involved with a number of politicians, which he ought to have been. That was the right thing to have done. And I'm sure that he must have entertained lots of people from the United States, lots of Republicans and other people that he knew, but within British society—and I'm sure he knew lots of people one way or another in British society—what I do remember are various politicians, political figures, that he entertained, as he should have done as part of his job.

Q: The group of visitors from the United States, I would think that this would be almost a traffic control problem. So many visitors would come from so many levels of government and from outside and all that.

WRIGHT: Yes, there were lots and lots of them. And of course, the embassy itself was huge, so there were lots of people to take care of these visitors, but as you can imagine, there was a steady stream of State Department official, congressmen, and others who traipsed through our halls.

Q: When you went down to be in the commercial section, what was your work, mainly?

WRIGHT: The work was mainly to try to promote American exports. The section was divided among different kinds of products, so that one officer had high-technology products, for example. I had consumer products and other things. I also had a kind of sideline, which was the steel industry, with which we had a certain number of policy matters to take up, particularly involving the so-called "voluntary restraints" arrangement, which, as I'm sure you know, was a commercial policy of ours the effect of which was to limit exports of steel into the United States from various steel-producing countries and do it in a way that did not require legislation or the

imposition of quotas or anything like that, but which was "voluntary." Of course, it wasn't really voluntary, but more voluntary than the alternatives. And since the UK was a big steel-producer, that was a big item on our agenda.

Q: Did you have problems with that, or was it just a matter of sort of monitoring?

WRIGHT: It was a matter of monitoring it, keeping up to speed on what was going on in the different parts of the steel industry. I'm sure at levels higher than mine there was some knocking of heads, but that did not impede my work.

Q: What about consumer products? Did you feel the British market was pretty open as far as, I assume, things like Post Toasties or sportswear or what have you?

WRIGHT: Yes, I think so. In fact, we had in the area of sportswear and men's wear and the entire textile area, we had large trade shows come from the United States. There was, as I think everywhere in the world in the fashion area, a broad acceptance of things made in the United States, and even at that time, even with a certain amount of anti-Americanism in the air, among the young, there was a certain fascination with American pop culture, and that all played to our benefit.

Q: Did you find, as you mixed in British society, that your time in Vietnam... How old were you then?

WRIGHT: In 1970, I was 30 years old.

Q: So you're still part of the youth generation, pretty young, and I would have thought that the people you were meeting, the British society, would give you a difficult time for your time in Vietnam.

WRIGHT: Oh, they did, yes, they did. That is correct. One of my friends even before I went there was a man named Malcolm Dean, a man who was and still is with the Guardian, which is a leftist newspaper, and so many of the people that I met I met through him, and they all tended to think more or less alike, and the one thing that they knew for sure was that we were wrong in Vietnam. And so yes, this was a kind of constant feature of life.

On the other hand, I also met young Conservatives, who held quite a different view. One of the people that I met then that I still have a little bit of contact with every now and then was a man named Ian Sproat, who was at one time during those years the youngest M.P. in the British Parliament—he is still around, although he might have lost out this last time—and became a junior minister later on. But he, in fact, took a big interest in Vietnam and visited Vietnam and met John Vann in Vietnam as well as when Vann came to London, if I'm not mistaken. So he and other Conservatives that I met took quite a different view. But I would say that most of the people that I knew were on the left.

Q: What about the Guardian crowd that you knew? How did they view the Soviet Union at that time, '70-'72?

WRIGHT: Oh, I'm not sure I remember any conversations about the Soviet Union. I could make some guesses. I suppose that, if pressed, they would acknowledge that the Soviet Union had done a number of bad things, but probably they would have added that our approach to the Soviet Union was often unnecessarily harsh and we should be nurturing the people in the USSR who were more moderate. I imagine that's the kind of line they would have taken.

EUGENE ROSENFELD
Press Attaché, USIS
London (1970-1975)

Eugene Rosenfeld was born in New York in 1922. His career began as a newspaper reporter and was assigned to the Office of War Information in London in 1944. He later became a Foreign Service Reserve officer in 1952 and served in New Delhi, Dar es Salaam, Addis Ababa, and Saigon. He received a meritorious honor award in 1967. Jack O'Brien conducted the interview in 1989.

Q: What was your next job, then?

ROSENFELD: I was assigned to London as press attaché and I, of course, was delighted. The time was coming -- I was, oh, fifty five at the time, which meant I had another five years. At that time there was the mandatory retirement age of sixty, so I figured if I got sent to London I would spend the rest of my time in the Agency in London as press attaché -- press counsel or whatever the job would turn out to be.

So for my last five years I had this perfect wind up in a great city, super media activities, which is what I was there for, centered in London, in a highly civilized country with great cultural opportunities, an excellent USIS staff, an almost completely amenable group of colleagues all the way around. I was delighted to fall into this assignment after having served only in relatively hardship posts like India, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Saigon, with occasional forays to Peru, Liberia and Nepal for inspections or special assignments or whatever.

The fact that I had total empathy for my host country, its history, culture and people, didn't blind me to the realization that British intellectuals, including some media types, looked down their noses at Americans in general and the embassy people, especially USIS, in particular.

Add to that their disdain for Ambassador Annenberg because he was extremely rich, a Nixon lover, inarticulate and far from an intellectual. He may have been all these things, but not in a negative way so far as I was concerned. I knew of his drawbacks but I learned that he had plenty on his side, so it made for, as they say, a very "challenging" job to do, to try to turn the media around in his favor.

American correspondents were not all that favorable to him, either. As a matter of fact, I talked to one of them recently. I said, "What did you think of Annenberg? How do the American

correspondents feel about him?" He said, "Contempt." I said, "Come on, now, that is a little heavy." He said, "No, no." I said, "But they got to like him after a while?" He said, "Yeah, yeah, oh it got to be better."

Anyway, so I tried after casing the situation for a couple of months -- he was already in place when I got there, so I replaced a long time press attaché. So I tried to use the Bunker system with him -- you know, getting together with the press every week, but he wouldn't go for that at all. I knew why -- he had a rather bad stammer and therefore couldn't express himself easily, or confidently, not at ease in handling a tough group of newsmen.

He was very much afraid of saying something that might get the embassy or Nixon in a flap. He really disliked newsmen, since he used to be able, as a publisher, to hire and fire them whenever he felt like it.

Eventually he agreed to give a luncheon for the American Correspondents' Association at the embassy residence, Winfield House. I suggested that we all meet for drinks in the reception areas, where his wonderful collection of French Impressionists, worth maybe \$15 or \$20 million at least, would be on view and, I added, where he could tell them about his favorite paintings -- their provenance, how he got them and such. This would have laid to rest the gossip that he did not know one picture from another, that he was just a rich collector. I knew differently and that this would be a strong point, because I had been at the residence a number of times and he had taken me around and pointed to this picture and that one, the situation of it, when the artist had painted it and all the rest of it. He knew what the stuff was.

Q: *Yes.*

ROSENFELD: But he vetoed that approach, even though he agreed to the luncheon. He wanted the pre lunch drinks to be held up in his study, a beautifully appointed area where, he said, "they can see all those wonderful books I have."

So that is the way it went -- a fine informal icebreaking up in the study and then a marvelous lunch by his incomparable kitchen staff, served impeccably with wines I haven't tasted since, and then some easy back and forth at the table over the dessert with him (at my suggestion) asking them questions and a final look around at the paintings.

The result was positive beyond my best expectations. The ambassador realized that the newsmen were not out to scalp him and were rather civilized people on their own and they got a different, very pleasing and positive contact with him. He really handled himself very well since he knew he didn't have to get up and make any speeches or answer any questions, or even, if he did, as I told him, everything was going to be off the record and there wouldn't be any problem or anything like that.

It just was cool. There were a lot of questions and he handled everything, on a personal basis. Since he knew a lot about business and he had great contacts with the top business people in London, he was able to talk about that. This was an expertise they did not realize that he had.

Anyway, within a few weeks, actually, they gave him a luncheon as the honored guest, with more of the same easy conversation. I made it clear that there would not be any speeches at this luncheon, which he would refuse to do because he knew he was a lousy speaker.

So everything went off very well again and the attitude toward Annenberg had sort of turned around -- not completely, but pretty decently. How to do it with the Brits -- Annenberg never forgave them for the way they had covered his presentation of his credentials to the Queen -- you remember when she asked him, "How are things at the residence?" He said, "Well, we are in the process of refurbishment." Everybody made fun of that. He said it because of his stammer. He had to choose words that he wouldn't fumble, but nobody knew that and so he had to use his own tricks and mechanisms. Now, that happened -- that refurbishment thing happened before my time, fortunately.

So he decided, in terms of his relations with the British media and public, to do it his way: first with tasteful, quiet, unpublicized donations to important public charities and by his close association with a number of top publishers like Lord Harmsworth, Lord Astor and such.

By the time he left in November of 1974 he was hailed as a friend of Britain, a gentleman if not a scholar, and a self effacing philanthropist who had done more than most people realized.

In keeping with the sensationalist approach of the British press, which everybody knows about -- it is even worse now with Murdoch in charge of some of it -- the papers, much less so for TV, were running about three anti-CIA stories a week. This was coupled with routine but regular coverage of anti-Vietnam protests at the embassy.

I was one of relatively few embassy people who had been to Saigon at the time, so I was tapped with maybe one or two other guys to receive protest delegations. I doubt whether these audiences had any positive effect in either the short or long run, but it at least gave these people and those they represented the feeling that they had really told us off and thus had vented some of their steam, at least for the time being.

I remember one group that was really weird. This one guy really swished with a long nun's habit, with a white band across his forehead, a long black cape; his companion called him "sister." They were among the questioners, and there was one young fellow who really turned around whatever I had said. I asked, "Do you go to a Jesuit school?" He got pale, because he knew that his position he gave on Vietnam was not going to go down too well at the church.

He said, "How did you know I was a Jebbie?" I said, "By the way you argue." I laughed and said: "You are a good arguer."

Anyway, that sort of softened them up a bit. We had -- I must have seen half a dozen of these groups and they were intense, very eager, very devoted to letting me have it.

Q: Anything else on London, Gene?

ROSENFELD: Well, yes. I mentioned earlier about the anti-CIA stuff. This one other case involved the CIA. Even the Times, the exalted, great Times had descended to front paging a phony story about what they said was CIA interference in the British elections in some northern constituencies.

The CIA invariably refuses to comment on such allegations, but I felt this was sufficiently serious -- you know, interference in an election, an absolute no no -- that we had to knock this one down, at least rebut it.

So I talked to the station chief about it to get McLean to issue a strong denial. I had known this station chief before and he agreed with me. He said, "Okay, let's get a denial." I drafted a very tough paragraph, very strongly worded, objecting to everything, that this was totally false and absolutely no basis in fact whatever, you know.

He went back to McLean and in twenty minutes it came back okayed, with no changes.

Q: *Well.*

ROSENFELD: So I was learning that when you need it you can do it. So don't hesitate.

Now, the aftermath was -- you never win these things, you know. A special call was made to Louie Heren, who was acting editor at the Times at that time. I had known Louie in India, where he was a Times correspondent. He was sort of embarrassed because he didn't really know what the story we were denying was all about. He admitted that it had been put in the paper after he went home and he hadn't seen it.

Q.: *We are talking about the London Times, of course?*

ROSENFELD: Yes, of course. He said he would check into it and that it had apparently been printed after he had left the office, but we all knew that both the printers' union and the journalists' guild were communist-dominated at that time, so it was quite possible that the story had been inserted without Louie's knowledge.

This, however, did not prevent him from writing a piece the following day with a sort of clarification, but noting that the embassy had issued "its usual denial."

Q.: *I see.*

ROSENFELD: Completely disregarding the fact that the CIA almost never confirms or denies an allegation of CIA involvement.

So you do the best you can, but that is no guarantee you will get the results you want, but you still have to make the effort. To my recollection there was something of a drop off in the anti-CIA stuff after that.

Q: Now, London, obviously in the five years you were there, or close, there were some anecdotes worth telling -- I leave it to you. Do you want to continue with that or do you want to wrap it up?

ROSENFELD: I have a couple of stories that are sort of interesting. I don't know if they have a moral -- I mean, if they have a relevance today, not a moral. This is on "turf struggle" revolving around Yehudi Menuhin. This is sort of a turf thing. It occurred in connection with Yehudi Menuhin, the violinist.

We had received from some music school in the Midwest a tribute to him from young violin pupils who were using a method he had been sponsoring. For some reason it was turned over to me.

I called him to tell him about it and he was delighted, so I said that maybe we could fix up some kind of a presentation at the embassy, but I would have to work it out and get back to him. He said it was a lovely idea and we chatted a bit about how the first time I saw him was at his twelfth birthday concert at Carnegie Hall, to which my aunt had taken me for a Bar Mitzvah present, and we both chuckled, since his parents were born in Israel. He was born in San Francisco.

Next, I went to the CAO with the idea. He thought it would be ridiculous, since Menuhin was a "has been". I was astounded but left it in the hands of the PAO to decide. Nothing was ever done, except that two weeks later Menuhin gave a concert to a standing room only audience at the Albert Hall which got the expected rave notices. I couldn't resist putting a clipping of the Times review on the CAO's desk. The moral of this story: don't try to invade another guy's turf, no matter how brilliant the idea is, especially when the invaded officer is a jerk.

Q.: Okay. What else?

ROSENFELD: Another name dropping item. I heard that Ella Fitzgerald was in on a concert tour and I mentioned it to Annenberg because I knew he was having a party and it might be a good idea to invite her as a distinguished American artist. He said, "Great. See if you can get her." I tracked her down to a hotel in Brighton, where she was due to give a concert, and finally got her on the phone. I explained the situation and she was pleased but not all that excited and suggested that I talk to her manager, since he had the schedule and so forth.

I wanted to continue the conversation, but she cut me off rather delicately, saying, "I would like to chat but I just got out of the shower and I am standing here naked, so I've got to go."

Moral -- even if you get turned down, it is worth the effort, so you can tell the story for some oral history or other!

MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ
Institute for International Strategic Studies
London (1971-1972)

Ambassador Abramowitz was born in New Jersey and educated at Stanford and Harvard Universities. He entered the Foreign Service in 1960 after service in the US Army. A specialist in East Asian and Political/Military Affairs, the Ambassador held a number of senior positions in the Department of State and Department of Defense. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and as US Ambassador to Thailand (1978-1981) and Turkey (1989-1991). He also served in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Vienna. Ambassador Abramowitz was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 2007.

ABRAMOWITZ: As I said, I was told all of this confidentially by Macomber. Beyond telling Macomber that the secretary was all wrong, I didn't do anything further. I am not sure that Macomber believed me; he may well have agreed with Rogers. After Richardson left and before Irwin arrived, Macomber asked me what I wanted to do next. I had already talked with Irwin who seemed to be a very decent man. I told Macomber that I thought that given the situation it might be time for me to take some time off from the daily work grind and spend it in some kind of academic-research institution. I mentioned the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. This was a stretch for someone at my grade level, but having been the special assistant to the undersecretary certainly made it possible.

I wanted to go to London. I wanted to join a prestigious and small institution, which IISS really was. I had met a few members and fellows and was impressed by their caliber. I was familiar with the IISS publications which I think were highly regarded. And so it was off to London and a very good eight months at IISS.

I must say that Macomber was more than solicitous as far as I was concerned. I hope it was because he was impressed by the work I had done for Richardson. In any event he backed me in any way he could. He was extremely helpful.

IISS was very happy to have me, particularly since I came at no cost to them, except for some office space. This situation allowed me to choose whatever issues I wanted to explore further; I had complete freedom to do what I wanted.

I wrote a paper in 1972 while at IISS which generated quite a stir and may have had some influence on policy makers. It was entitled "Moving the Glacier". Not surprisingly it got plenty of attention in Korea. The U.S. had just pulled out the Seventh Division from South Korea as part of the Nixon doctrine which called for more self-reliance on part of our allies. I noted that the long-range answer to the tensions on the peninsula – however remote – was a North-South dialogue leading eventually to a peace agreement and unification. I took the position that the withdrawal of our troops was inimical to the achievement of that long-range goal because it reduced any incentive the North might have in coming to the negotiating table. I mentioned this paper earlier while discussing my role as a member of the SIG review calling for a withdrawal of U.S. troops over an extended period of time in part on grounds that our participation in the Vietnam war had so soured the American public that it would probably not support any further American military involvement overseas and particularly in Asia.

But when I got to IISS, I took another look at the situation and came to a different conclusion, namely, that the presence of American troops in Korea was essential to the maintenance of stability on the Korean Peninsula and the achievement of long range goals of peace and eventually unification. Part of the reason for my change of view was that the U.S. domestic situation had changed. Furthermore, as the junior member of the SIG working group, I went along with the views of my seniors, who felt stronger than me; since 1968 I had gained considerable experience and knowledge and could strike out on my own. I also came to the conclusion that some sort of détente on the Korean peninsula and ultimately negotiations between South and North was essential. In fact, the two agreed to start talks in 1972.

I had been in Korea only once on one of my trips to the area. But as I said, I had learned a lot working in the undersecretary's office. My paper was published by IISS after I had left and, as I said, was widely read in Korea. Three years later, I think when I accompanied Secretary Schlesinger to Korea for an annual Security Consultative Meeting, President Park Chung Hee congratulated me for it. I also got a new Korean watch from him – as did all the other members of the Schlesinger delegation; the Koreans had just started a watch manufacturing enterprise. It stopped after a month.

The year at IISS brought me into contact with a wide variety of people. My office roommate was a senior Japanese Foreign Office official, with whom I have stayed in contact over the years, Yoshio Hatano, who became Japan's UN representative. Percy Cradock, who at the time was head of the UK Foreign Office's policy planning staff and later became chief advisor to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and chief intelligence advisor. These people and others became an informal advisory committee for me as I wrote the paper on Korea. The informal group met three times and was enormously helpful. I am still very proud of that paper. It said something.

During the period immediately following the end of my special assistant assignment and before leaving for London, I wrote a small book with Dick Moorsteen then at the Rand Corporation, called "Remaking China Policy" which was published in 1972. I was essentially on my own with the Department, which let me do what I wanted before I went to IISS. I went back and forth to California to work with Dick on this book. He had been a special assistant to Katzenbach when he was undersecretary, working primarily on Vietnam, although he was really a China expert. We finished this book in two months; I am also proud of that work because it was written clearly and in simple declarative terms, and also said something. It was indeed perhaps more a long paper than a book. In it, a reader will find the outline of what was to become the "Shanghai Communiqué" – after the Nixon visit. The essence of our proposal was "One China, but not now" which became the administration's position. That was one of the few favorite phrases I have coined; the other one was "From dominos to dynamos."

Of course, we were not the only ones that were urging the U.S. government to take the position that it eventually took in the "Shanghai Communiqué." Paul Kreisberg of the Department had come to the same conclusion.

The book covered China associated issues of the time – Indochina, Sino-Soviet-U.S.-relations, Taiwan. It was an effort to have people focus on what a dialogue with the PRC might cover and what policy decisions would have to be reached before such a dialogue could take place – e.g.,

the position of Taiwan. Harvard Press published the book, although Rand had already published it as a “Rand Volume.” When I left for London, the draft had been completed. At the request of Harvard Press, which wanted a longer document, Moorsteen then picked a number of documents which accompanied our analysis and became part of the published book. The book got excellent reviews in academic journals. The New York Times reviewer was a woman whom I had dated at Harvard, who had become a “radical left winger” and had joined “The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars”, a pro-Maoist group antagonistic to the Vietnam War. She wrote that the book had a fundamental flaw in that it did not deal with the “destructive war” that the U.S. was waging in Vietnam. She was right, our book was not about Vietnam; it was about China and that was damning to her. So The New York Times commentary became the exception to the generally favorable attitude of other reviewers. Of course, our date may have worse than I thought. She became a prominent scholar.

Q: In retrospect, was your “time out” useful?

ABRAMOWITZ: It was. It helped me decompress which I needed after my tour in the undersecretary’s office, which was “14 hour” days, often seven days per week. I don’t complain about the work-load; in fact, I enjoyed it a lot. But I needed a change of pace, just to return to a “normal” family life. We had a lot of fun in London.

I can’t say that my period at IISS was a “serious” one. But it helped me intellectually in becoming more thoroughly acquainted with an issue which has bedeviled the foreign policies of many countries over decades – and is still unresolved today. I still write about it. I also met many foreign policy officials and academics whom I would not have engaged otherwise. So I am a supporter of an academic assignment for all officers sometime during their careers. I think that an assignment to an institution such as IISS may even be better than a tour at a war college or other governmental institutions – even those academically oriented – because it enables one to escape the bureaucratic environment. These assignments do not seem to have much attraction in today’s Foreign Service.

As I mentioned, I shared an office suite with a Japanese foreign ministry official. He eventually became the Foreign Ministry’s spokesman as well as ambassador to the UN. We became close friends. He introduced me to a number of his friends and acquaintances, which was the beginning for me of a long relationship with the Japanese Foreign Ministry. That was very useful when I became the POLAD to CINCPAC and later deputy assistant secretary for East Asia in DoD/ISA. IISS, now a larger impressive institution, even than had a good representation of people from all over the world. It made sure that non-Britishers were well represented. The deputy director was a German, Chris Bertram. I invited Bertram to participate in a program while I was president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He was a prominent journalist as well as head of a “think tank.” He spent a year with us at Carnegie. So used some associations into life-long friendships.

LAWRENCE H. HYDLE
Vice Consul for Political Affairs

Belfast, Northern Ireland (1972-1974)

Lawrence H. Hydle was born in Indiana in 1940. He graduated from Occidental College in 1960 and then attended Columbia University, where he received a Ph.D. He joined the Foreign Service in 1965, where his overseas career included posts in Vietnam, Northern Ireland, Ghana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Bahrain. Mr. Hydle was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1994.

Q: In 72 you moved over where?

HYDLE: A job came open in Belfast, Northern Ireland. For some reason the personnel guys thought of me. I suppose they really didn't have anybody in Europe. You had their Europe, EUR, the European bureau who would have been accustomed to doing anything like that.

Q: You're talking about the time when there were, you know, the growing of the IRA. We weren't particularly targeted, but still.

HYDLE: They thought I had more relative experience than these other guys who were accustomed to wearing suits and going to teas. So they asked me if I would like to do that. I said yes.

It was a two man consulate general which had been in Belfast for a long time since 1796. At that time the conflict had flared up. Initially, this phase of it was kind of a civil rights struggle in which the Catholics wanted to be treated equally in Northern Ireland with the Protestant majority. But in which they didn't challenge the right of Northern Ireland to exist as they had always in the past.

Then the British troops got involved. There had been a big massacre, it was called, I don't remember how many people were killed, maybe in the teens, let's say, in Londonderry or Derry as the Catholics called it. The British had imposed direct rule and had taken away the power of the local Protestant dominated government. There was an out cry in the US, mostly from Irish Americans, for the US to do something. Nixon didn't want to do anything that would have created problems with the British government. So he sent me.

In other words, he wanted to watch the situation closer but not to change the policy in any significant way. So I was there, kind of like in Da Nang, I was the vice consul for political affairs and I basically did political reporting.

Q: You were there from when to when?

HYDLE: I started there in April of 72. I finished in June of 74. Strangely, that was broken by a TDY back in Vietnam in 73 after the peace agreement. You might remember that there were 5 guys that went back for a 6 month TDY.

Q: We'll move to the Vietnam thing in a minute. But, how did you find things in Belfast? Who was the consul general?

HYDLE: A guy named Grover Penberthy.

Q: I knew Grover in Belgrade. How did you find it? Here you had these two groups who were literally at each other's throats. We were there and everybody was trying to get us committed and we were trying to stay out of it. How did you find the situation?

HYDLE: I thought it was very interesting. I was very interested in the whole subject of counterinsurgency in those days -- we had experienced and written about, and so had the British. It was a different feeling because we were not being blamed for the situation. We were observers and both people wanted to appeal to us. So we had good access to both sides of the conflict, and also to the British who were there.

We didn't deal with people who said that they were IRA. There were plenty of sympathizers to the IRA position -- that Northern Ireland should be part of Ireland. But the IRA, an illegal organization as such, we couldn't really talk directly to knowingly.

Q: A name that pops out is Ian Paisley, a right wing, very strong British- Irish Protestant. How did you find various people?

HYDLE: There were a lot of very colorful characters and Paisley certainly was one. One time I went to a sermon in his church. He was saying, It's a great morning to be a Protestant. Tribalism is basically what it was all about, more than it was about religion. The Protestants were a mixture of Anglicans, who were sort of British people who had come over; and Scots who originated from Scotland. That group was united in their desire not to be Irish. It was more not to be Irish than it was to be part of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom was their refuge against being Irish.

Q: It must have been a very difficult thing because Irish-American politicians are a very strong group. Did you find that representing the United States, did you find that you were tripping over Ted Kennedy, Tip O'Neill and all the Massachusetts Irishmen and all?

HYDLE: A little bit. None of those big names came during the time that I was there. But there was one congressman whose name I can't remember, he was Irish-American. He was from somewhere in New York, not far outside New York city. He came to visit, but of course he already knew what he thought.

One of the things that struck me, soon after I got there when I got to know about it, was that actually there were a very significant number of Irish Catholics who did not want to be part of the Irish republic; wanted to be part of the UK but they wanted to be treated fairly. They were not separatists. They were civil rights guys basically. Whereas I found that most Irish American politicians and their constituents have ideas about Northern Ireland that were formed maybe back in 1920, frozen in time.

This congressman who came, I was sort of his escort, I suggested to him some moderate politicians that he could visit. There was, for example, a party called the Alliance Party which

actually was both Protestant and Catholic, consciously you know multi-cultural. The SDLP, the Social Democratic Labor Party, also was basically Irish Catholic but within Northern Ireland.

His idea of a moderate politician was Jerry Adams who was then clearly an IRA guy. Now he's become a member of parliament and is sort of a Sinn Fein leader, the political figure. I drove him to an area, I couldn't just drive the consulate car into these areas, they were called no go areas where you couldn't go safely. He walked in to see Jerry Adams and then came back. I showed him these statistics about how most Irish Catholics wanted to be part of Northern Ireland not Ireland. He said something like, The Rockland Democratic Club isn't going to like this.

Rockland -- where is that?

Q: *I don't know.*

HYDLE: Somewhere in Yonkers, you know, in his constituency.

Q: *It's in Cleveland, New York.*

Did you find that you had to exercise constraint in reporting because of, yet you've got a couple of places where one has to worry about. If you're in Israel you have to worry about everything that you report will probably end up on a congressman's desk before it gets to the action officer. I would imagine that Belfast would be somewhat the same.

HYDLE: It was a little different. I didn't have any trouble from Grover Penberthy trying to sanitize my stuff. He edited of course and he approved it, but there was no ideological baggage that he was carrying. But we had to report through the embassy in London. They had their own British spin that they wanted to put on things. They did talk to me one time about how they would like, if I was going to write something controversial, they hoped it would be to them and they would put some spin on it. We also had no ability to receive classified messages so we went down to Dublin to pick up the pouch every now and then. So we were in touch with those guys quite a bit too.

The problem that I saw was that few people understood the specifically Northern Ireland perspective on events in Northern Ireland. The embassy in London understood how the British saw it, which was just as a pain in the ass. Of course Dublin saw the Irish government perspective, but nobody quite understood how it was seen up there, so I tried to emphasize that point.

Q: *Dealing with the Brits in Northern Ireland, were they sort of the hell on both your houses.*

HYDLE: The British that I dealt with, of course, were basically military people -- they saw that they couldn't solve the problem. They were just holding a line and keeping things from getting completely out of hand, until the politicians worked out a solution. They had not problems with us, particularly because we were not creating any problems. We were not challenging their control but I felt that in Britain itself, we would read the British papers, they were getting increasingly fed up with the whole situation in Northern Ireland as time went on. I'm sure that

there were some Brits who would have liked to get rid of that problem, if only by doing so they wouldn't have been giving in to the IRA.

Q: At that time, and in your own analysis, what would have happened if the British had said, Oh the hell with it. And just pulled their troops out.

HYDLE: There would have been a big, like a civil war. The Irish government is certainly not prepared at any time to invade the north. The IRA certainly wasn't prepared to raise some general uprising and take over the country. There was already at that time major Protestant underground movements like the Ulster Defense Force, Ulster volunteer force, they were very bloody then, as they still are.

So that would have been, the British -- I don't think they would have wanted to do that because there would have been a major conflict which still, after all, is right on their doorstep. If you look carefully at the IRA positions at the time, they were not merely saying that the British should leave and that Northern Ireland should be Irish. They were also saying that the British had convinced the Protestants that they should be happy to be part of Ireland. This was never on.

I think the British felt -- why do we have to do that? It's up to them and why do we have to convince the Protestants. Most of the issues that existed then, I think, pretty much still exist today from what little I've been involved in.

Q: What was your impression, again at the time, was the IRA doing a major fund-raising, even recruiting? Were you having problems with Americans getting involved in IRA activities?

HYDLE: A few problems came up like that but most of what was happening was not directly visible to us. I think the IRA raised funds in the US and then used that to buy weapons or whatever. They would do the fighting themselves.

Q: Did you have the normal diplomatic receptions, the dinners, and all this. Were you constantly getting hit with the tribal status of one side or another?

HYDLE: Oh sure, but I loved it. That was why I was there.

One thing I might mention. One of the issues that came up from time to time, was whether we should give visas to the people who were going to the US, but who had been involved in some fashion with the IRA. I can't recall now all of the details of the law which, I think, since then have been changed. If you were a member of an organization, if you yourself advocated overthrowing an established government, or a member of an organization that advocated that, then you could be banned. But the State Department never wanted us to make those decisions ourselves. They wanted us to forward the facts to them and they would decide, but they would let us announce the decision.

I always felt that's where the Irish-American pressure came in. They rarely denied a visa to people even though, I think, a reasonable person would have said, "That person had said plenty of things that were contrary to the norm, and may have been going to raise funds."

I remember giving a visa to Bernadette Devlin, who is a famous civil rights leader in the earlier period; and refusing one to Mary Drum, who was an irate -- clearly there were a lot of books out, people quoting what she said -- I said, Did you say that?

Well, I may have said that. You know, she would say things in the heat of public speaking.

I didn't decide these questions but I would write about these because it was political. I think we denied her a visa. She assumed -- she said that she was sure this was because the British got to us. There was very solid grounds for denial in the law.

Q: So we'll leave there. You did have this interlude over in Vietnam after the peace agreement in 73. . . . Then you finished off in Belfast.

HYDLE: That would be October 73 until June 74.

Q: Then what did you do?

HYDLE: During that period, I got married by the way in September 73 and took my wife to Belfast, that was a period in which there had been elections and the local legislature had been restored. There was local government although not quite as autonomous as it had been before. By June of 74, the Protestants conducted a strike which basically made Northern Ireland ungovernable. There had been a change in the British government, Harold Wilson, the Labor Party, replaced Heath and the Conservatives. In that period I just continued to do my reporting.

Q: You left there in June of 74, did you see any hope for the situation when you left?

HYDLE: I had a view of that, which was kind of different than most people at the time, I thought that eventually there had to be an independent Northern Ireland with boundaries redrawn. Some of the parts of Northern Ireland, the border areas, are very Catholic. Those could have just been hived off to the Irish Republic while what was left could have been a small state. Admittedly small but still viable if it was in the common market like Britain and Ireland were. It would have been a more heavily Protestant state.

The problem there was that the Protestants were about two thirds of the population, the Catholics one third. The Catholics tended to have more children. The Protestants constantly felt that they were going to be out bred or out numbered by the Catholics. So they felt, to them, putting the Catholics down and mistreating them was really policy. It seemed to them that it would get the Catholics to move to the UK which they were entitled to do.

So this tension, I felt, could continue indefinitely because it had already been going on for years. But, maybe it wouldn't continue if there was a state that was clearly likely to be always Protestant. Then maybe class factors would have asserted themselves and you would have a Catholic and Protestant working class being more sublime, as they should.

So my idea was to let, somehow arrange independence for Northern Ireland. I said that not that people are enthusiastic about that idea. But it had some merit as sort of a fall back solution for the Irish. At least for the Irish, they would be getting the British out of Ireland; for the Protestants at least they wouldn't be going into Ireland.

This is not a view that has ever picked up much support.

Q: The whole time you were there the American policy was one of really trying to stay out from it.

HYDLE: Yes, it was.

WILLIAM M. WOESSNER
Political Officer/Political Counselor
London (1972-1977)

William Woessner was born in 1931 in Queens, New York. He attended Queens College. He later received a Fulbright Scholarship which took him to Glasgow University. He then returned to the United States and attended Northwestern University. He served in the Korean War and then entered the Foreign Service in 1956. His career took him to Germany, Austria, and London.

WOESSNER: I found out that in fact EUR Personnel had me very much in their little index card and as far as they were concerned, I belonged to them. This was a mentality that Henry Kissinger tried hard to smash, but as far as EUR was concerned, I was theirs. In May just before I went on the trip to Africa, I learned I was being assigned to the Political Section in London. My wife, coming from Scotland, was very excited. We were going to London, which was wonderful indeed. It would put her close to her mother. Her mother would be able to see us and the children. It was a Friday afternoon. I got back from class. We're now in June, close to graduation. I got back from class at the National War College and there was a message waiting for me from Joan Clark, who was the head of EUR Personnel. Ms. Clark wanted to see me right away. I said, "Like this afternoon?" and they said, "Yes." Here we were, approaching 5:00 p.m. and I lived out in Annandale. I said, "Okay, I'm on my way in." I couldn't imagine what this was about. I knew Joan. I liked her and respected her greatly, but we were hardly close friends. She called me in, just the two of us, and said, "Bill, I want to change your assignment." I said, "Why?" She proceeded to describe the situation in London, that it was a huge section, a nine-officer section. Morale was very low. She proceeded to say very uncomplimentary things about the leadership of the section as well as the leadership of the embassy.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

WOESSNER: Walter Annenberg. Of course, the State Department had no control whatsoever over him or what he did. Joan wanted to send me to Bonn. She said, "Frank Meehan is now the head of the Political Section in Bonn. He's told me he would like to have you serve under him again. Here would be a chance to do that. I think you'd find the work more satisfying, the

environment more satisfying.” I said, “Can I talk to my wife about this? Is it a real option?” She said, “Yes, of course, I’ll abide by what you decide to do.” So, I went home. My wife was deeply disappointed not to be going to London. But as always in those 30 years, she said, “What you think is best for your career, of course, I’ll do it.” I wanted to have somebody I could talk to. I called Jim Carson. Jim had been the head of the Political Section in Berlin when Frank Meehan was head of the Eastern Affairs Section. He was packing to go on a trip with the Secretary. He was working up on the seventh floor at the time. He said, “If you come over right now and don’t mind talking to me while I’m packing.” He was a very close friend of Frank’s. I went and told him what was eating me up. I said, “We had our hearts set on going to London. On the other hand, it looks from a career point of view, that might be a great mistake and I would very much like to serve with Frank again. Of course, my credentials are sort of in Germany. It would make sense to go back to Bonn.” Jim, God bless him, said, “You will go back to Germany someday, I can assure you. They’re not going to let all that go to waste. You have the chance now to live and serve in the greatest city in the world. Frank would be the first one to say you should go to London. Don’t listen to what people tell you about the leadership or about personalities or what’s good for your career and what’s not good for your career.” I was reminded then of what I had been told before going to Berlin, that I wouldn’t like my boss there, Glenn Mays; he turned out to be one of the most wonderful, caring, mentoring people. He did so much for me as an officer, training me, my writing skills, etc. Jim said, “Every night when you come out of that embassy, you’ll stand on the steps and look across Grosvenor Square and smell the air and say, ‘This is the greatest city in the world.’” I said, “Thank you.” He went off. I called Joan. She accepted my decision. I went to London. In a nutshell, six months later, Jim Carson was dead. He died in the Caribbean. It was really medical malpractice. Botched surgery. He had an intestinal problem. Great loss, great tragedy. He was a super human being.

I went to London. Yes, I was the ninth man in the Political Section. I received not one but two promotions in the time I was there. I finished as the political counselor. It was another great assignment. All of the things I had been warned about were just nonsense.

Q: I think all of us have been warned. My best friend was DCM when I went to Seoul. I was warned that, “He plays his cards very close to his chest. You’ve got to watch him.” I never quite figured out what they were talking about.

You were in London from when to when?

WOESSNER: I was there from the summer of 1972 to the summer of 1977. My tour was twice extended, due in part to the two promotions.

Q: When you arrived, what was the atmosphere there? It was a peculiar situation.

WOESSNER: The head of the Political Section was- (end of tape)

Bill Galloway was the head of the Section. He and the ambassador had a very close relationship. The ambassador trusted him and relied on him. Bill was extraordinarily good to me. He took me in hand, gave me lots of responsibilities and encouraged me and mentored me. I’m very grateful to him. The downside of the equation was that there was a running feud between him and the

head of the Economic Section, somebody who was also very good to me, very kind to me, but the ambassador didn't like him and didn't trust him, and so you really had the good boys and the bad boys. If you were in the Political Section, everything was great. If you were in the Economic Section, you were largely ignored. If you think how important our relationship with Britain is in all fields, that was a great loss.

Walter Annenberg was an enormously complex individual. Just recently, I finished "Legacy," a biography of him and his father. I understand so many things much better now. He didn't function as an ambassador normally does. He had an excellent DCM, Earl Sohm. Earl and Bill Galloway had a good relationship. Earl also was very good to me and took an interest in me. Some of these things sound repetitive, but again and again over the years, I encountered senior officers who took an interest in me. I owe them a lot. Not everybody can say that in the Foreign Service.

Q: When you got to the Political Section, what slice of the political pie were you given?

WOESSNER: I was to handle the relationships with the Labour Party, which was in opposition. As far as Bill Galloway was concerned, if they stayed in opposition for 100 years, that was fine with him. Dick Gleysteen handled the relationship with the Tory Party, but actually it was Bill Galloway who kept all the important relationships to himself. He knew all these people so intimately. But the opposition did feel sort of like stepchildren and outcasts. I had my office next to the labor attaché, who was Irv Lippe. There were two during my five years. Both of them had long experience with the AFL-CIO. Of course, the AFL-CIO relationship with the trade unions in Britain was politically terribly important. The labor attaches worked very closely with me. They were not at all exclusive, keeping me at arm's length. I not only attended the annual Labour Party conference in Blackpool, but also the annual TUC conference and was introduced to the top trade union leaders. That was all fun. I asked Bill if I could also establish a relationship with the Liberal Party. Nobody took the Liberal Party seriously or paid any attention to it. He was only too happy I wanted to do it. That provided a very interesting additional dimension.

Q: Let's talk about when you were there. How did we view the Labour Party at that time? Who were the characters? What were the American views of the various stands that it was taking?

WOESSNER: How did we view it? Different people viewed it different ways. I remember the briefing I got in INR. One of the insights the briefer gave me was, "Just remember that the TUC, the British labor movement, has not had its Bad Godesberg." By that, he meant that they had not reached the fundamental position that others in Germany had reached, rejecting socialism and such. There was still this ideological hang-up in the Labour movement and there were some very wild and radical people attached. I think the powers that be in Washington and certainly as far as the ambassador and Bill Galloway and others were concerned, these people were dangerous, hostile, not to be trusted. We paid lip service to the idea that they were the government in opposition and had to be treated as such and we didn't take sides. But in fact, that wasn't true. In my own experience with the Labourites - this may be a slight overstatement - but down deep, you scratch a little bit, most of them (and I'm excluding the extreme left) were more pro-American than the Tories. The Tories still had a lot of the class attitudes and the regret of the loss of empire and viewing the American upstarts with suspicion and so on. This was a generational thing and among younger Tories you didn't come across that so much. But Labourites still had a

lot of time for Americans. One of their heroes was Hubert Humphrey - a personal hero of mine as well. I did cultivate very good relationships. I was down at the House of Commons a lot. Many an evening I would spend in the gallery. The rules of the House prohibit members on the floor from acknowledging the presence of anybody in the galleries, but I had a number of MPs who would look up to where I sat and then they would bend the elbow, which indicated I should meet them at the bar. Then they would give me a running brief as to what exactly was going on on the floor or what the implications of some of these things were.

We entertained a lot, my wife and I. She was just marvelous. I had no representational allowance, of course, but we entertained at home. She did the cooking and served, the kind of thing unheard of nowadays. But then, as at every stage in my career, she was a major factor in whatever success I had in working the scene.

Q: During this 1972-1977 period, who were the leaders of Labour?

WOESSNER: Harold Wilson, of course, who came up on the left. This was so traditional. I see the same thing happening now with Gerhard Schröder in Germany. In the "party of the left" you come up on the left and then once you've got the leadership, you steer resolutely towards the center because that's where elections are won. Harold Wilson was past master at that. I spent a lot of time covering the fight over joining the European Union [EC]. Roy Jenkins was the leader of that part of the party. Harold Lever, Shirley Williams. It was sad to watch but literally on that issue the best people in the Labour Party were destroyed. One by one, they came undone, either domestically lost their seats or were exiled to a meaningless job in Brussels and so forth.

Q: When you say "the best people," these are the people who saw this as where Britain had to go.

WOESSNER: That's right. Some of the opposition was quite rational and based on the idea a cold shower is all well and good and healthy but not if it results in pneumonia. So there was concern that Britain wasn't remotely ready. There was that element. One of the most vehement opponents of going into Europe was one of the most conservative people in the Party and that was Douglas Jay, whose son Peter was appointed ambassador to Washington by Callahan, but that is another story. I spent a lot of time on the European issue and reporting on it and what it was doing to the Labour Party. There was a fair bit of interest in that back in Washington.

Q: You were saying that you saw that the forces within the Labour Party – were these the union types who were chewing up those that wanted to-

WOESSNER: A lot of them were beholden to the unions. But again even in the unions you had some very conservative elements. The two biggest unions were quite radical. You had the system of party conferences, the bloc voting. The way they went, the conference would go. The most exciting time was when the renegotiation took place. Oliver Wright was the primary negotiator and he and Wilson together combined to work out the terms. Even more exciting was the change in government. It was the coal miners who brought down Ted Heath. I lived through that winter when all the lights went out in Britain. I was there when they won the election, when Labour dumped Ted Heath and Harold Wilson came in. I was down at Transport House the next

morning with mobs and mobs of people. My wife was watching on television. She saw me going into a private session with the Labour leaders. One of my Party friends had brought me in and there I was when they were having their first planning session. I was well placed with the Labour Party because I had key contacts everywhere, which during the years that they were in office was great fun. So, there was that. There was the fight for the heart and soul of the party. We were at a miners' gala in Durham one year and it was traditional that the head of the party, whether he was in office or out of office, would attend the gala. Harold Wilson was Prime Minister by this time. He attended the gala. We were each required to stand and do a solo song. Somebody did "I Left My Heart in San Francisco." Harold Wilson stood up and said that the only song he knew was "On Ilkley Moor Bar T'at" and he needed somebody to sing it with him. There was silence in the room. Then I heard a female voice say, "Well, I know that." I looked and said, "Oh, my God, my wife!" She stood up and sang "on Ilkley moor" to which Wilson responded "bar t'at." Ilkley Moor is a moor in Yorkshire and "bar t'" means "without my hat." A totally dumb and meaningless song. I said to my wife afterwards, "That rumbling sound you heard was your father rolling in his grave." She was seated next to one of the communist labor leaders, Nick McGahey, who was a Scot and a rogue of the worst kind. These were unregenerate old-line Stalinists, make no bones about it. He proceeded to tell her how they were going to take over the government. "We will just squeeze and squeeze." She came to our room that night absolutely terrified. He was just outlining the same thing I was used to from New York politics in the '40s and the '50s. If you stay late enough at the meetings, all people who get to bed at a decent hour go home and then in the closing hours you pushed through some totally unacceptable resolution you never could have gotten passed otherwise. Those kinds of tactics they were applying in the trade union. It gained really key positions. Certainly that did give pause to people back in Washington.

There were other fun things to do. The Liberal Party was grateful to have somebody from the American Embassy finally interested in them. These were the days of Jeremy Thorpe and before David Steele came on. There were a lot of good people in the Liberal Party, but because of the first-pass-the-post system in Britain, they never really had a chance. I see that's all being reformed now. The politics in Britain will never be the same after Tony Blair. I was a regular at their Welsh Party congresses and a group took me aside one day and actually asked if I would stand as a candidate for one of the seats. I thought that was rather touching.

Q: Were there any major issues at that time between the U.S. and Britain?

WOESSNER: There must have been over a period of five years. Our relationship was not uneventful and there were major things at stake and weapons systems, intelligence sharing, and nuclear issues. There was always a certain ambivalence in Washington. We trusted the British and worked with them more closely than with anybody else, no question about that, but there were still limits on how far we would go, which was understandable.

Q: This was during the high time of Henry Kissinger. Was there a difference in view of Kissinger and Nixon that you'd get from the Labour side and the Tory side?

WOESSNER: No, I can't say that. Obviously, they would have preferred a Democrat in the White House. But, no. What was noticeable in Britain as elsewhere in Europe was the incredulity over Watergate. That was much more marked. "You're not serious. You're not going to dump

your President.” I remember my contact at the Soviet embassy. We had regular meetings. He was genuinely alarmed. When we were getting near the end and it was obvious which way it was going, I said, “No, you really need to prepare. The President is not going to survive this.” They never understood that. Years later, I would still hear that.

Q: “They” being who?

WOESSNER: The British, the Europeans. It was that more sophisticated Realpolitik approach to things. It’s the same thing when there are scandals regarding amorous goings on in the White House. “Americans are so ridiculous, so childish.” But concerning Watergate, they could not understand the seriousness with which we regarded the abuse and betrayal of power. So, that was more noticeable than anything that they didn’t like in Kissinger or in Nixon. I would say that Kissinger was widely respected. They didn’t always agree with him.

Q: Well, he was European in a way.

WOESSNER: It wasn’t so much that but rather that he was a global thinker. There were policies and themes undergirding those policies. Of course, Europeans always wanted to be consulted more than they ever were. You couldn’t consult enough. They defined consultation to be more meaningful than the cursory bits and pieces we would give them. There would be an occasional sore place over that.

Q: There was always this famous thing when Henry Kissinger was told something and told, “We should consult Europe” and he said, “What’s their telephone number?”

WOESSNER: There were so many parts of Europe going in so many different directions.

Q: Did you find a difference in the relationship when Harold Wilson’s government took over as far as our embassy goes?

WOESSNER: Walter Annenberg was succeeded by Elliot Richardson.

Q: Annenberg left in ’74.

WOESSNER: Halfway through the Nixon term.

Q: Was there a difference when Elliott Richardson became the ambassador?

WOESSNER: The first difference was, I remember Jim Callahan saying that now they had an ambassador they could talk to as an ambassador. He had made no bones about the fact that with Walter Annenberg, you couldn’t rely on private conversations being relayed back to Washington. Annenberg just didn’t do that. It either went through Earl Sohm or Bill Galloway or more likely it went through the Washington Embassy. But they were very pleased to have Elliott Richardson as ambassador. He only lasted a year. Although he was very active, I always felt he hadn’t begun to deploy his full intellectual powers, which were considerable, because he was still investing a lot of time writing a book. It was sheer joy to be at Elliott’s staff meetings. The intellectual

power of the man and his utter decency. He was just a wonderful human being. He was very well liked. He didn't want to go back. Gerry Ford called him. In fact, he was at our house for a small dinner and he was called to the telephone. It was the White House. I went and I got him. Ford asked him to come back to be Secretary of Commerce and said he needed him for his reelection campaign. That turned out to be totally misleading. I don't know what was going on at the Washington end, but perhaps they needed to find a spot for Anne Armstrong. She came from the Armstrong ranch in Texas and was a big contributor. But exactly what the internal politics were, I don't know. Elliott did go back to be Secretary of Commerce but was not used in the campaign.

Q: The Secretary of Commerce is no position for anything.

WOESSNER: Right. You could do that nominally but be given a portfolio that says, "Help me raise money." But that wasn't what it was all about. Elliott was really disappointed to have only one year in London and be yanked out. Armstrong was totally different. The DCM by this time was Ron Spiers, who had a wonderful relationship with Elliott and really functioned as the DCM. He was in despair at his early dealings with Anne Armstrong and with her people. I was afraid we were heading into a major disaster. The first couple weeks were tense. I wasn't sure that Ron would stay or that she would keep him. Like so many political appointees, she brought with her somebody from Washington as a security blanket. But I have to tell you, within a year, she turned into one of the most effective ambassadors I have ever seen. She had tremendous personal charm and grace, great people skills, a wonderful way of remembering everybody's name and things associated with them, taking the time to pay attention to junior people at the embassy with small gifts and little tokens of appreciation. That may seem superficial, but it was part of her style of working. She entertained very well but, most of all, she valued the embassy staff and knew how important they were, knew how to use them and when and how to take their advice. Within short order, she didn't need a security blanket or anything else. That was a surprising development. I remember the day she went to the Palace to present her credentials. That was shortly after she got there, within the first month. By that time, we were already feeling very comfortable with Anne to the point that when we were all decked out in our white tie and tails on the steps of the embassy and the coaches came up front, she was in a beautiful yellow dress, the yellow rose of Texas, and I said to the others, "Okay, this is what we're going to do," and we stood at the top steps on this very solemn occasion, a festive, beautiful day, and we held hands and sang "A Pretty Girl is Like a Melody" and danced a soft shoe routine as we escorted her down the stairs. She just loved it. That was Anne Armstrong. When she left post, Ron Spiers and the country team gave a small, intimate party for her and her husband and we just fell all over her.

Then came Kingman Brewster. Unfortunately, by that time, I had my orders to go back to Washington. I had the privilege of going around paying calls with him. By then, I was the political counselor. I went with him to see this key figure in the opposition named Maggie Thatcher. Who could have seen what a powerful force she would become?

Q: When did Wilson come in?

WOESSNER: Heath was there when I arrived in 1972.

Q: The Labour Party was in?

WOESSNER: The election came after the coal miners strike. That toppled Ted Heath and Wilson came in. Callahan was his foreign secretary. Then when he stepped down for reasons of health, I was still there when Callahan succeeded him as Prime Minister. I remember Wilson saying at the time that he would in no way sit on Callahan's shoulder or second-guess him or make comments or so except on Israel. That was the one issue on which he felt so strongly that if the Labour Party were to do anything to make a move against Israel, he would feel morally obliged to speak out.

Q: Where did that come from?

WOESSNER: No idea. Otherwise, Wilson struck me as a man of no great moral principle. He was a tactician, very good at that.

Q: The miners and the unions_ I've never served in Great Britain and this has not been a matter of my professional concern, but they always struck me as being a great hindrance to Great Britain and that Maggie Thatcher by knocking them out did a tremendous service despite everything else.

WOESSNER: That's not unfair. And Tony Blair picked up the pieces. Trade unions are no longer running the Labour Party.

Q: How did we view the unions?

WOESSNER: Just as you've described them, troglodyte, backward looking, and infiltrated with some very dangerous, pro-communist elements. But the big industries were in a period of inexorable decline. The unions desperately tried to hold on to jobs and resisted anything that would have overhauled either the great social welfare system that had been erected in 1945-1951, the entitlements, or any reform of control of the Labour Party. This was true not just of these radicals but also the more traditional trade union leaders. Arthur Scargill was truly a radical and a dangerous one. At the other end of the ideological spectrum was Joe Gormley, leader of the miners. The labor attaché took me over to meet with him. It was after midnight at a party conference. He was very pro-American, old fashioned in that way. But the miners had a privileged position in the whole hierarchy of British labor and they had the wherewithal to hold on to that. They could and did on more than one occasion cripple the economy. They held the economy and the government hostage. I said, "Good evening. Pleased to meet you." I was a new man and this was my introduction to a Labour Party conference. He said, "What do you drink?" I politely declined. He said, "If you want to sit here and talk with me, you'll drink with me." He could consume two bottles of whiskey in a night, that's how far along he was. A big, strong, burly guy, tough as nails. P.S. I had a beer.

Q: On the security side, were we concerned about Labour Party ties to the Kremlin?

WOESSNER: Oh, sure. That's what I mean by the nervousness, the mistrust. But some of the worst spy cases occurred with the Tory government, so there was a general unease in the intelligence community. How far you could trust them. We had so close a community of interest

and there were so many ways in which we shared tasks – they would do it or we would do it – so there was a lot of the relationship that was in our interest to cultivate and pursue, but how did you guard against the rogue elements. That is a thread that runs through the Anglo-American relationship in the whole postwar period.

Q: What about the press? How did you view them as a political officer?

WOESSNER: There was the yellow press, which by American standards is so scurrilous it's unbelievable. The things they were allowed to get away with were just terrible. But the more serious press, "The Times," "The Guardian," even some of the locals, such as "The Manchester Guardian" (which became "The Guardian"), "The Glasgow Herald," maintained a very high standard of journalism. "The Guardian" and "The Observer" tended to be more liberal, left-wing, and The Times more conservative but all of them respectable.

Q: I know that Annenberg before your time was given a very difficult time by the press.

WOESSNER: Remember the story briefly. He embarrassed himself when he presented his credentials. The Queen asked how things were and he gave her a very elaborate, convoluted answer about the work that was going on at Winfield House. He paid for the whole thing and it was redone from top to bottom. The walls were redone with paper that was brought from a castle in Scotland. It was done to exquisite taste and at great personal expense. It turned out to be a triumph when it was finally ready, but in those early months there was a lot of turmoil out at Winfield House. Because of Annenberg's speech impediment and a life spent in elocution lessons, overcoming a stutter that he had as a young man, he had been taught to speak in a certain way which was rather stilted and which used big words when smaller words would have done. He came across that way while newsmen and cameras were present for his presentation of credentials. The meeting was then included in a documentary called "A Day in the Life of the Queen" and shown in movie theaters across Britain sometime thereafter. It produced gales of laughter from audiences, especially Annenberg's reference to the "refurbishment" of the embassy. The press then seized on that and he became a figure of ridicule. It was so bad, at least according to the biography I read, he gave serious thought to going back, fearing that he couldn't be useful to the administration. Nixon wouldn't hear of it. Annenberg overcame all of that. He left very highly respected. The politicians knew that he was not a traditional ambassador, but there were things that he did do that he did very well, gifts he made for Chequers, a big addition, the book he financed on Westminster Abbey, which was a stunning work. He did lots of good things. He entertained well. But most endearing was a farewell luncheon he gave at Winfield House for the trade union leaders and he began by making reference to the refurbishment of the embassy and his early gaffe. By that time, he was able to laugh at it and make a joke of it. Of course, the British just loved that. His stiffness had evaporated. He ended on a very high note. Not a traditional ambassador, but a lot of popular appeal.

Q: I take it you found that dealing with the Labour members, you had already established your personal credentials early on. How about with the Tories? Did you find this a different kettle of fish?

WOESSNER: The relationships probably were not as personal, warm, and intense, but they were perfectly cordial and I had a number of friends in the Tory Party even though I had been poaching on somebody else's territory at the time. Then being political counselor opened a lot of avenues. That was enough to get me in where I needed to go. But you're right, there was something about those first relationships that you established while the Labour people were in opposition. When they became ministers or junior ministers, they didn't forget, and that was nice. That paid off in a lot of things that were shared with me that made for good reporting back home.

CARL EDWARD DILLERY
Political/Military Officer
London (1973-1976)

Carl Edward Dillery was born in Seattle in 1930, and received a B.S. degree from Seattle Pacific University. Much later in his career, he completed an M.S. degree from George Washington University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1955, where his overseas posts included Japan, Belgium, Vietnam, England, Cyprus, and Fiji. Mr. Dillery was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1994.

Q: You were in London from 1973-76.

DILLERY: That is correct.

Q: What were you doing there?

DILLERY: For two years I was the political/military officer. Actually I was sort of a co-equal, again doing exactly the same kind of work I had done before. DOD/ISA had people stationed abroad in our embassies who were basically political/military officers and there was one in London. So we had one section with no head. He might have been senior to me, I don't know, it never became a problem. He did have a bigger office. So there was a DOD civilian and myself and we were the political/military office, a division of the political section of the embassy.

I did that for two years. Again it was operations. We were relocating the headquarters of our Air Force from an airfield near London out to a place up in Norfolk. We also had a few little things about nuclear submarines and Holy Loch, and Diego Garcia was still bubbling along.

For the last year of my tour I was deputy head of the political section. I think we had eleven or twelve officers in the unit. There was a deputy to sit in for the counselor, so I was deputy. In that year I was really the gatekeeper for reporting and the editor and task assigner and that sort of thing. I didn't do a lot of reporting myself, but did some. I really managed the section and made sure that we were meeting deadlines.

Q: Going back to the political/military side, how were our relations with the British military at that time?

DILLERY: Oh, they were good. I don't remember anything in which we had arguments with them. We would be trying to negotiate small points to our advantage. At that time, for instance, the nuclear issue first surfaced with regard to the presence of nuclear weapons at our airfields. This became a big political issue later on but was not a problem at that time. There was still quite a lot of Cold War feeling so there was no particular problems about American troop presence. It was really a question of just normal diplomacy again. No strong tensions.

One of the things we did at that time...it was the beginning of what used to be called MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction), trying to work out an agreement with the Soviet bloc to reduce forces in Europe. This was a huge operation with the center in NATO. But, since the British were our closest associates, we did quite a lot of work with them in London. That was another aspect of our work and maybe in some respects the most fun.

I remember the chief person I worked with, who was later their ambassador to the UN, Crispin Charles Cervantes (C.C.C.) Tickell. We did have an argument because the US government position led by Secretary Kissinger was that we should not go in with a negotiating position which was not what we really wanted, i.e., not a traditional negotiating position, asking them to give more than we expected and trying to allow us to give less. Kissinger wanted to go to the Soviets with our bottom line and stick to it. And that tactical question of the negotiations was perhaps the most interesting one we had to deal with because the British were very much in favor of more normal negotiating tactics, build in some leeway on both sides. So we had a long back and forth on that. I don't think it was solved by the time I left.

Q: When you were being the gatekeeper and watching this...as part of what we are doing with this oral history program, I have been collecting excerpts from people who were political officers to be used as a political officer reader. I would like to get a feel for...here you are in England which is well reported in beautiful prose by their papers, our papers and all. I am talking about internal British politics. How much do we have to get concerned with this except to say here they are and read the papers.

DILLERY: Of course that is a big question and I believe that in past years and probably still now we duplicated a lot of stuff that was in the Economist to say nothing of the New York Times. Everybody has reporters in London and there is a lot of academic work, etc. I think it is a little different than that. We did have officers who watched each of the major parties and, unlike many other places, it is possible in England to really get to know the political leaders and comers. So our somewhat junior people who followed the parties went to all of the party conventions and were hanging out in the party offices and were in Parliament frequently. They did a lot of entertaining. Interestingly enough the Labor MPs would come to our parties and the Conservatives didn't so much. The Conservatives were much harder to get to know. They were much stuffier and more insular.

Q: It is more of a class thing.

DILLERY: Exactly. And, of course, our political officers were young, normal Foreign Service officers and probably a little bit liberal oriented, so they had great access to the Labor Party and would be near the center of party activities and have access to things that reporters probably did

not know. But this insider information really is secondary to the more important activity of getting to know current and future leaders. So we do our political reporting on stuff that is sexy and fun, the intrigue of the internal stuff going on in the parties, but what is really important is to develop a feeling for the parties and people so we will have a good idea what their reaction will be to what we want the UK to do and to give us guidance as to how to approach them. That runs through the gamut of everything from biographic reporting, so that you know individuals, down to sentiment within the party and how the labor unions might impact on the party, and that sort of thing.

My best example of this was, I guess it was when Ted Heath came in as Prime Minister and Walter Annenberg was Ambassador, this was before my time, but the Conservative Party reporting officer at that time was Bill Galloway. All of a sudden the Tories came in and Bill was the only person in the embassy who really knew them. He became vital to our representation and reporting activities because he could call up people and had an access that really nobody else had. So there he was being able to do this and as a result, he went from being the Conservative Party reporting officer to being the head of the political section to becoming the special assistant to the Ambassador. He became so useful to Annenberg that I think he stayed on for eight or nine years.

So, we may do too much political reporting, but on the other hand I think you do want somebody there who really knows a couple of layers down from what you get out of the press.

Let me add one other thing. In a place like England you have one other aspect that you don't have in many places and that is that their interest in world affairs is about as great as ours. So that we had a Far East watcher, a Middle East watcher and an African watcher, who worked with their people on these areas. We would gain a lot of intelligence from them as well as kind of coordinating policies and that sort of thing. Some of our famous ones: Ray Seitz was the African watcher and he is now the ambassador. So when I said we had thirteen or so in the political section, a good three or four of them were of that type just doing external reporting.

Q: It really is quite a unique operation.

DILLERY: I think we have a similar thing in Paris.

Q: Yes, I think we have the other watchers in Paris too. Of course, one of the things as you were pointing out is that it is not just reporting on things but developing contacts which means that when things come up you can call up and be able to find out where things are done and how things are done and what is going to happen. This takes quite a bit of legitimate work just to get to know the people involved.

DILLERY: Take an important case. Thatcher's current head of loyal opposition, Neil Kinnock, was a junior MP when I was there. Our Labor Party reporting officer, Jack Binns, was a real friend of his. He was a great party guy and would come to all of our parties and talk to all of us. He and Jack were on a first name basis. So Jack became the political counselor when Kinnock got to be the leader of the Labor Party. Literally, Binns could call up and have access to him at any time. So that is another example of what I am talking about.

It is a two way street. One of the aspects is to know what they are doing and we want good reporting. By the way I think we find that our analysis is hopefully written in such a way that it is more aimed at supporting decision makers than to provide general knowledge. And the second thing is we want channels to get our messages to them and that is what they do.

Q: Were there any issues where the United States and the UK were having problems when you were there?

DILLERY: I mentioned that MBFR problem which was a tactical issue. Clearly this was now coming to the end of the Vietnam period and the British were supporting us on Vietnam. You have to really put yourself back in that time to realize how much the US was focusing on Vietnam. NATO was relatively quiet at that time. There were no immediate crises. Basically we were pretty much together on almost everything.

Q: Were you getting from your British counterparts a fascination about the Henry Kissinger phenomena?

DILLERY: Oh yes. And he was there a lot because he liked to go to London. It seemed he ended up there very two or three months. He knew everybody. The British press was fascinated with him. The British, while very interested in their own stuff, reporting on the United States is almost as good as it is here. He certainly was the most fascinating person of that Administration.

Q: How did Watergate play? You were there at that time weren't you?

DILLERY: Remind me when Watergate was.

Q: I think it was really 1974.

DILLERY: I don't remember having to explain what happened. I think they were amused by it but there was no great feeling one way or another.

Q: Who was our Ambassador most of the time?

DILLERY: Well, there were actually three during my period. First of all it was Walter Annenberg, and then it was Elliot Richardson and for a short period it was Anne Armstrong.

Q: Did you get any feelings about these ambassadors or where they off doing their thing? Did any of them strike a particularly decisive note or something within the embassy?

DILLERY: Well, all three of them were memorable and were good ambassadors, each in their own way. Of course, Annenberg was a real interesting person. He was serious about being ambassador. He was very generous, that was the first thing you noticed. He took no representation money and gave all the government funds to the embassy, using his own money for representation. He was also very good with staff. He had occasions where he was with staff. Even fairly junior members were invited to the residence quite frequently. He was very close to

the highest levels of the British community and had excellent entree to the conservative side of things -- and they were in charge at that time.

Elliot Richardson was even more active across a wider spectrum of people. By the time he came out I was deputy head of the political section and frequently acting head of the section. So while Ambassador Annenberg was into society, the nobility and lots of that kind of thing, Ambassador Richardson seemed to want to get to know every inhabitant of the UK. He would make trips to all parts of the country where he would meet with the boards of labor unions and take trips to cities and meet mayors. He always took someone along with him so we went on that kind of trips and increased our knowledge of the UK. For knowing the widest range of people in the UK and being an activist in his own right, Richardson was that.

I was there for just a few weeks when Anne Armstrong was Ambassador, but it was clear that she was going to be very active, very serious, and very much of a manager. She had set goals for what she wanted to do and really ran the embassy. She was a strong personality

Q: One last question on the UK. We alluded to it before, but I am always surprised, being first cousins and all, that when you get one slice down you realize how pervasive the class system is in the UK. Did you find that this was something with which political officers particularly had to deal and to understand?

DILLERY: Certainly to understand. It came up mostly in the political sense, but I will tell you one anecdote which may be one of the highlights of my whole diplomatic life. My DOD colleague, Jack Reed, and I were squash players so we wanted to have a place to play squash. There was an English club that traditionally accepted Embassy and Naval personnel (from the Navy headquarters across the street from the Embassy), the Bath Club. It was an old, British men's club (although it now had women members) and you know that is kind of the epitome of the upper class. This one had been the place where the present Queen Elizabeth had learned to swim before World War II. The building she used had been bombed and the club was now in a new location a couple of blocks from the embassy. The legal attaché of the embassy was the one embassy member when we arrived. He had been there quite a while and arranged for us to become members and then he unfortunately passed away.

Meanwhile, some other people wanted to become members; they asked if we would put them up for membership and we did. I think there were probably five or six of them and you had to get proposers and then several seconders before they would come up for formal membership. Their names were on the board for about six months and nothing ever happened to their applications. Then all of a sudden an invitation came in the mail to Jack and me inviting us to dinner with the committee of the club. We thought maybe it was an annual thing they did for new members.

When we got there it was just we two and the committee. The club was closed except for us that night. The "fag" of the evening -- a British term for the junior member of the group, who kind of waited on tables was the heir of the Guinness stout family. We had a magnificent meal and there was a great wine cellar. By the way, there were lots of Peers in this club as well. So about half way through dinner...I was seated next to the chairman of the club and Jack was next to the president...the chairman turned to me and said, "We are awfully pleased to have a few colonials

in the club, but we want to make sure they are the right sort of chap. You know the sort of chap that you would take home for a fortnight." And I thought, "Oh, I see -- I don't know anybody I would take home for a fortnight." At the same time the other head of the club turned to my friend and made a similar comment except he said, "Now you take my partner, we have been in business together for 23 years and I bring him to the club for lunch but I would never put him up for membership." So I think we got a great preview of how the system really worked. And it is still there, there is no question about it. By the way, we passed muster and all of our nominees to the club were approved the next day.

Q: Then you move from this congenial area to something quite different.

HENRY E. MATTOX
Commercial Officer
London (1973-1975)

Henry E. Mattox was born in Mississippi in 1930. After receiving both his undergraduate and graduate degrees from University of Mississippi, he earned his M.P.A. from Harvard University in 1966. Mr. Mattox began his government career at the Department of Agriculture in 1955. He joined the State Department in 1957 and served in Paris, Ponta Delgada, Sao Paulo, Kathmandu, and Port au Prince. He received a meritorious honor award for his service in 1965. Mr. Mattox was interviewed by William N. Dale in 1993.

Q: I believe you went on to London from there.

MATTOX: London was very enjoyable. I went there as one of the commercial officers. We had an office setup in London, a rather large commercial section, with FSOs named to handle certain industrial areas. I happened to have high tech, I don't know why exactly, all of the computer industries, and the computer products, and the nuclear energy, and aviation, and things like that. That was fun. It was not terribly significant. The ambassador during part of the time I was there was Walter Annenberg. And toward the end of my tour of two years, Elliot Richardson came in as ambassador.

Therein lay a tale. Apparently at that time I looked like the long lost twin brother of Elliot Richardson. I'm not sure that we even look anything alike now at all, but at that time apparently so. I had Marines constantly saluting me. It took me quite a while to figure out what it was all about. Out there in Grosvenor Square when I would come back from lunch, I had herds of tourists pointing at me and whispering. It took me a while to figure out what that was. Eventually the Marines got used to the fact that I was not Richardson.

All I did -- we pushed exports. We didn't push investment, of course, but exports. The last year that I was there -- and this may be coincidental, I don't know -- in 1975 was the last year that the United States had an export surplus on merchandise account.

Q: *I'm sure its a tribute to you.*

MATTOX: I'd say it might be coincidental.

Q: *Did you have the impression at that time that England was making real progress in its technological industries?*

MATTOX: I had the impression then that the English were very good, as we've known for a long time, at innovation but rather poor at implementation of their technology. We had a long controversy, an almost polite kind of battle over the technology that would be used in England's future nuclear energy program. It was a U.S. versus a British technology. A U.S. development versus a British development. One was called something or other...I shouldn't have said that because I can't remember the names of the technology now. But we did our best in the embassy to get the British to adopt, at a lesser cost, the American technology through Westinghouse and GE, and people of that sort. We were really pushing, and the Senate would have been proud...Senator what's his name, from Delaware would have been pleased if he had known how hard we were pushing.

But at the last moment it was, of course, as you might have predicted, a political decision, and the British adopted the British technology. Eventually it cost them a great deal more money and I'm not sure how successful it was. But there you are. It just reminded me of the British development of the jet aviation, the plane, the DeHavilland, that flew first across the Atlantic and then disappeared from sight, and never was developed. The U.S. developed the technology for jet airliners.

Q: *Henry, when you were there, and you had Ambassador Annenberg, did he know the names of officers in the embassy, say at your level?*

MATTOX: Oh, no, no.

Q: *How did he operate in that sense? With a few top officers? Or by himself?*

MATTOX: Well, he ran through four DCMs, I understand. I should have looked up some of these names because I'm very bad at remembering names. To the extent that he dealt with anybody, at any level, it was through his DCM. He had staff meetings about once every two months at which he presided, with the DCM there, and a fairly large group of officers. Everyone looked forward to it because people wondered exactly what he was going to say, what kind of verbal gaffs he might make. Now I know it is not very nice to say these things. But it was just an embarrassment sometimes to listen to him.

One of the strange things was that movie that he had made of his presentation to Queen Elizabeth at which he made all kinds of strange remarks, and became so tongue tied, and so embarrassed, that he talked like a jabbering idiot almost. The strange thing was he was very proud of that film, and he showed it to audiences of embassy people every once in a while.

Q: Obviously he had different standards from you. Do you consider him to have been what you might call a working ambassador, who took an interest in the work of the embassy. Or was he there chiefly for the social prestige, and the social events.

MATTOX: He was there chiefly for the prestige. He did accomplish a couple of good things. He made a lot of friends eventually for the embassy, and for the United States, by contributing rather heavily, I think, to certain British charities. And he did contribute a great deal to the upkeep of Winfield House and renovations of certain aspects of Winfield House. It had gotten rather run down sitting there in Regents Park. But when he left and Richardson came, unfortunately he took his art collection with him. So when Richardson, before I left, would give some big reception, it was painfully obvious that there had been paintings hanging on the walls here and there and everywhere, but there were just sort of blank, slightly faded spots around and about.

He did help, though, in the sense of, if you consider this really important, he did help in the sense of putting a lot of money into Winfield House in renovations.

DAVID L. HOBBS
Visa Officer
London (1973-1976)

David L. Hobbs was born in Iowa in 1940. After serving in the US Army from 1960-1963 he received his bachelor's degree from University of California at Berkeley. His career included positions in Germany, Brazil, England, Japan, Colombia, and an ambassadorship to Guyana. Ambassador Hobbs was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in March 1997.

Q: You left in 1972. Where did you go?

HOBBS: I hadn't submitted any requests of where I wanted to go next, but I got a call from the personnel office in Washington asking me if I would mind if they put me in for London. I said I wouldn't mind. They said that the problem was that I would have to go on home leave for two months in order to line up with the assignment. I said that was okay too. Then I got a call before I left Brazil and they asked if I could take three months home leave so I could go to London. I said that was okay. I got on home leave and got another call and asking if I could stay one more month, arriving in London in April. I said okay. I was beginning to feel I would never get to London, but I did.

Q: Out of curiosity, what happens when they keep extending home leave? Does this count against anything?

HOBBS: Yes, I had a deficit for a while but I never took much home leave after that. That was the one time I ever had any home leave to speak of.

Q: Where did you go?

HOBBS: I went to California where my parents and family were living. I went to Japan to visit my wife's family for a little while and then back to California where I waited it out enjoying hanging around the beach and visiting people. It was fun but really too long. You get tired of being a guest of somebody. If I ever had to do it again I would rent a house or apartment somewhere and tell people where I was and hope they would come and see me.

Q: You were in London from...?

HOBBS: From 1973-76.

Q: What were you doing?

HOBBS: Actually I was assigned there to be one of the visa interviewing officers in the consular section. That was before they waved the visa requirement for the British and in those days issued and processed the most visas of any place in the world, I think. I only worked two weeks on the visa line, having sweet-talked my way into a job supervising the office which handed all the ineligible cases, the visa coordination unit. It coordinated the waivers for those who were ineligible for visas because of their criminal background or their political affiliations or medical reasons, etc. It turned out to be a fascinating job because there was a large number people who seemed to need the services of my office.

The Rolling Stones and the Beatles all had marijuana problems and had to have our help. A number of well known people had been part of the Oxford Group in the '30s and were of leftist, communist background and needed waivers. I helped Michael York once plan his vacation across the United States. He asked me what I thought he should be doing and I got to telling him. I gave Mohammed Ali his passport after we whisked him off the streets where he got mobbed because everybody recognized him. Tony Curtis came in once with arm loads of flowers for all the staff. It was kind of fun. You never knew who you would see next.

Q: What was the attitude during this time re visas? Was it to try to be as helpful as possible?

HOBBS: It was a difficult time. We were far, far, far too busy. We did not have enough people to do the work. We didn't have a signature slug, every piece had to be signed individually. At the end of the day we would bring down officers from the commercial/economic and political sections to sign visas. Sometimes counselors of embassy would be down there, not at all happy having to sign their name over and over again. It was mindless. When they got the signature slug to go into the visa stamp that ended that chore.

One of the problems with London was that it was a crossroad of the world, Heathrow airport. One year I counted we had done visas for 123 nationalities, which I think is almost all of them. I met my first Communist Chinese official, a Mongolian official. I did visas for Estonians and Latvians. We were so, so busy.

I went on, after doing the coordination job, to be chief of the visa unit, which was a tremendous job. There were 20-some vice consuls working there and they couldn't keep up with it.

Q: Did you find there was a problem, particularly in the visa unit, because of the people often assigned there as vice consuls? I recall in an earlier time when I was dealing with consular assignments there was a tendency, if we had a problem case (an alcoholic or someone who wasn't doing well, or a medical problem), to send them to London because it is English-speaking and a big post so nobody will notice.

HOBBS: Alan Gise was my supervisor and I enjoyed working with him. He was fantastic to work for. I learned a lot from him because this was really my first consular job. I was a rotational officer in Hamburg and in Brazil I was a political/labor officer. So, London was my first major consular job and it was great to have a supervisor like that.

But personnel was a problem. I remember we had a woman who would put her hands on her hips and start out every interview by saying, "All right, what's your story?" That never got interviews off to a good start. We had to get the marines to rescue her from attackers more often than all the rest of the staff combined because of her attitude. It was awful.

Q: Could you do anything about it?

HOBBS: I was very much on her case. She was old enough to retire and she announced one day that she didn't have to take such stuff from me and was retiring. I suggested that might not be a bad idea since she didn't seem to be enjoying her tour very much.

And she did. And that was great. It gave us a chance to get somebody else. But, what we got was a woman who had never done consular work before, who had been working in Washington in the office which you called if you saw coffee spilled on a hallway floor and someone would come and clean it up. She was taking those calls and working in a sort of isolated office by herself. Sending her to London to try to deal with this mad horde of applicants was too much. She would break down regularly fleeing from the line crying. I would have to try to get her courage up to go back and try to do it some more. I would have liked to have fired her, but you can't.

I had another case of a woman who was terribly, terribly burned out, having been doing this for many years. This was in the years when staff officers could not go beyond what is now the FSSO-1 level now and most didn't make it to that rank. Many of them came from other types of foreign service work. I used to get the impression that they were fleeing that other work for some reason or another and they weren't so interested in consular work but just wanted to get away from something else.

Q: When I was in personnel often [as career consular counselors] we would get [to find an assignment having been transferred to the consular cone] former secretaries who ambassadors wanted to get rid of, or personnel officers who didn't like people, or something like that.

HOBBS: Yes, you found that. When I first came into the consular business I got the impression that one of the problems of consular work was that it had become a dumping ground for people who were not happy in some other job. So there were a lot of people who didn't really like consular work either, but it was where they had fled too. When the Department started recruiting

people more specifically for consular work, I think they did a very good thing because they got some fine officers who really wanted to do the work, and did it very well.

Now, of course, there were exceptions among the other group. In the old days there were people who were fantastic too, but there were a number of people who just didn't want to be there. In London we would get junior officers who were planning to do something else in the world, but also wanted to do a good job while in consular work. And that was great. However, we also got a big chunk of people who just really didn't want to be there. We always knew that the Department felt London could always absorb one more, but if you keep absorbing just one more, after awhile you have so many wounded people on your staff that it becomes very hard to deal with.

I have always said that business talks about knowing how to manage because they are real managers, but actually try managing something where you have no control over the staff. You get either in numbers who you get, or the budget, which passes through so many levels, before it gets to the consular level. So, try managing under those conditions. It takes quite a bit of skill to weasel your way out of some of the messes you get into.

In London we had a tremendous challenge. Not enough people, not enough of the right people, and not enough money. The place had deteriorated physically into a dump.

Q: Did you have any feel for the interest of the "high command", the ambassador and his or her staff, towards consular business?

HOBBS: I was there three years and had three ambassadors. I was there for the last year of Annenberg. Then Elliot Richardson came in for a year and left. Then Ann Armstrong, a political appointee from Texas, arrived. Each of them were very different but good in their own way. None of them was particularly interested in consular affairs. However, the DCM was more interested and that made it easier for us. Ron Spiers was the DCM for my last two years or so. He was fantastic. He came down very frequently to check it out and see what was going on and what he could do. He allowed us to get some money to refurbish the premises which helped morale a little bit. He made us feel that what we were doing was worthwhile.

Q: Why had the consular section gotten so run down?

HOBBS: The consular section had been for eight years under the same consul general. He was a man who had been an economic/commercial officer.

Q: What was his name?

HOBBS: Jack Herfurt. He was a nice man and we enjoyed him personally, but he did not have a clue about what was going on in the consular section or how to run it. He sat up in an office up next to the ambassador and his job was to take care of any problems that came to Annenberg's attention, that were consular in nature. He would occasionally come down as things got really bad that one summer when we were filmed on CBS or NBC news showing the piles of passports everywhere that we were trying to process. He would interview 10 or 12 people and then go away thinking he had done his part. I used to think it would be more helpful if he could get us

some more people and resources as we could handle the small number of interviews he did. I think that is how it deteriorated over the years. Being in the hands of somebody who didn't really know much about the business and what to do and was more focused on keeping consular matters off the hands of the ambassador.

Q: I recall when I was consular officer in Athens his coming up to visit me one time and chatting with him and being sort of astounded that he was so removed from the consular section. There didn't seem to be much of a connect.

HOBBS: There wasn't. A few of us he would choose to be pleasant with, and I was one, but he ignored most of the staff. Alan Gise was doing as much as he could to make things work under very difficult circumstances. He was a tremendous motivator and got a lot out of what he had. Alan later went back as consul general, but I didn't work there then. John Diggins came in after that. He had been head of the visa office in Washington. We continued on under Diggins to do some of the renovations; we began a study. We tried a little trick. We knew what we needed but we couldn't get anybody to give us what we needed, so we had to hire an outside consultant, tell him what our problem was and he told us back what our problem was and then we could get the money to do what we wanted to do. Otherwise we couldn't get it. We spent \$10,000 on a consultant who would tell us what we told him and then we would take it upstairs and get the money. That all went on through Diggins' time and then he left.

I remember once trying to talk him into doing some changes and he looked at me and said, "Look, I tell you what, you go ahead and do it. If it works, I will take the credit, if it doesn't work, I will get your ass." I thought that was fair enough, an interesting way to motivate people.

Q: Sounds like you didn't have much chance to make contact with the body politik at the time.

HOBBS: No. Personally I had time to go to the theater and all of that. I remember I actually sent a FLASH message out of London on a consular issue to Washington. It got their attention. There was a new member of the Wilson Cabinet, who came in to get his visa to go to the States and turned up to be someone who needed a waiver because of some of his affiliations that were leftist. I had to be the one to tell him that he had a problem with his visa. He was outraged and came down on me very, very hard demanding to know what was the problem. This was based on some information that I could not divulge, so I had to pussy foot around it a bit. I got him to understand that this was a political problem. He leaned over and stuck his nose practically in my nose and told me with a snarl that if I don't straighten this out by 5:00 today, Harold Wilson would be on the phone to the White House and that my ass was going to be in deep, deep trouble.

I huddled with Alan Gise and went to where this information was stored and discussed it with those who had evaluated it. We decided that we would send a FLASH message—of course we called Washington to tell them it was coming—in order to get that request there immediately. We didn't make it by 5:00, but by 5:15 we gave that guy a visa and I got off the hook.

The only other time I sent a FLASH message was from Brazil when there was an aircraft that had been hijacked landed at the airport in Sao Paulo. The message said the plane had landed and

that the consul was on his way to protect the one American on board, who was Felix Grant, the jockey who used to have a disk jockey program.

MICHAEL PISTOR
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
London (1973-1976)

Mr. Pistor was born in Oregon and raised in Arizona. After graduating from the University of Arizona and serving with the US Army, in 1959 he joined the United States Information Agency. He served as Public Affairs Officer in Teheran, Kampala, Douala, London and New Delhi. He also held senior positions at USIA headquarters in Washington before being appointed Ambassador to Malawi in 1991. Ambassador Pistor was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: So you were in Washington '69 to '73?

PISTOR: That's right, at a pretty interesting time in USIA's history, and certainly it was fascinating for me. So we went back to London. Things had changed. When we left in 1969, the Conservative and Labor Parties were going back and forth seeing who could govern for the least amount of time. By the time we returned, they had adopted decimal currency, and the worldwide inflation had hit Britain. The political climate was clouding, and Margaret Thatcher and her allies were moving up through the Conservative Party senior councils.

The big thing that USIA wanted us to emphasize in our programming at that point was the coming bicentennial celebrations in 1976. But real life kept breaking in. Just after Dr. Kissinger declared 1973 "The Year of Europe," OPEC made it the year of oil shortages instead. President Nixon and his administration were falling apart. Vietnam was still on the boil. There were serious discussions going on between Britain and the United States, not only at the official level but at the foreign policy establishment levels, concerning weaponry, defense posture, the special relationship: Do we have a special relationship? Is it the same as it was? What about Britain and the rest of Europe? Is the UK turning toward Europe instead of across the Atlantic as it had done traditionally.

All of these interesting questions were in the air, but the kind of fervor that we had seen in the '60s where it looked very much as if the left wing, if you could call it that, of the Tory Party and the right wing of the Labor Party had more in common than they had with other elements of their own parties, and there was some expectation it that they would join in some combination, together with the Liberal Party perhaps. The passion had cooled by the time we returned in '73, but some of the principal proponents of political change, Roy Jenkins, Shirley Williams and others were trying for a kind of 'third way'— I hate to use that phrase now; they certainly weren't using it then— but some different way of getting away from the prescriptions of the socialist Left in the Labor Party and the rigidities of the Conservative Party to move into a kind of social democratic territory. At the same time, the civil rights movement in Britain was actually moving forward, propelled by pressure and sensible legislation. So the UK we found on our return in '73

was quite different from what we had left in 1969. My wife and I had some adjusting to do. And of course I was taking up a very different job, which took some adjusting too.

I had the great good luck to inherit an absolutely splendid Super CAO. I don't know if anybody's discussed with you the concept of the Super CAO, which USIA has applied in some countries, bringing out of academe a recognized expert to head the cultural program. When I was in London the first time, we had Cleanth Brooks, the great American literary critic, as CAO. When I returned in '73, our CAO was a Columbia professor named Wayne Wilcox, an academic rising star who was an expert on South Asia, well known around the world, and a defense expert who was one of the challengers in the discussion of what the American defense posture should be in the next decade or so.

On my first day of work in London the political counselor, whom I had known in earlier days, asked me to come in and talk to him. He had with him a manuscript, and the manuscript looked like a porcupine it had so many paper clips in it. It turns out the manuscript was of an article the Royal Society of Foreign Affairs, Chatham House, had asked Wayne to do. The political counselor was so disturbed by what he considered an invasion of his territory that he said, "Wayne doesn't listen to me, and you've got to do something." So we were off and running right then. I talked to Wayne and said, "You really upset Bill," and he said, "I know it," and made a few cosmetic and courtesy changes, which satisfied (barely) the political counselor. The two entered a fairly amicable truce, and I didn't have to referee any further contests.

Then, the post suffered a terrible tragedy. Wayne did some lecturing on the continent, and after Christmas he went to Europe, made a lecture or two, met his wife and their two eldest children in Paris, leaving two younger children back in London. One of them was to have a birthday the day after they were to come back. That day, there was a British Airways strike, and they wanted to get back right away so they could be there for the birthday, and they took the only flight available. It was a Turkish Airlines DC-11, which crashed and killed everybody on it. That was a devastating blow to us at the Embassy and to the American community as well.

After a time we got a new, very good Super CAO, Charles Ritcheson, a well regarded historian with many ties to England. Then, to free him from the thickets of government bureaucratic procedures, we were sent somebody I'd known from the NEA days to serve as Deputy Cultural Affairs Officer. Four or five months after he got settled in London, he had a heart attack and died. At about the same time our press attache was diagnosed with lymphatic cancer, and was flown immediately to the United States for treatment. That story had a happy ending because it turned out not to be lymphoma and he came back and finished out his tour. Then our program officer got cancer and had to leave. So we had our share of trouble and the kind of trouble that takes a lot of your time and energy. It was a marvelous assignment, a wonderful job, terrific challenges, good people, but these terrible losses did dampen the spirit.

Q: Vietnam....

PISTOR: Just before leaving the United States for London I was, like everybody else, at the office glued to the television set watching the Nixon Watergate hearings. We went to London and it turned out that everybody was watching exactly the same thing, only six hours later, at

night. People were spellbound just as they were in the US. So as I started my tour as Public Affairs Counselor in London, I had two big, unrelated, things in front of me.

We had the celebration of the 200th anniversary coming up, and then we had the problem of the impeachment of the President of the United States. He had not been unpopular in Britain. They knew “Tricky Dick” and all of that because the press picks up the can and kicks it down the street in Britain just as it does in the US, but so far as foreign policy concerns were concerned, President Nixon got a pretty good audience in Britain and so did Dr. Kissinger. But in USIS London we still had Vietnam to contend with, you know, because we hadn’t wound it up, and the growing Nixon scandal to think about and to react to, respond to.

Q: How does one respond to the President being attacked, and probably rightly so?

PISTOR: Well, it was difficult in the U.K., but again one of the things we had to explain was our system of government, because in Britain or in any other place in Europe they would have shrugged off this man right away. They wouldn’t have the Nixon scandal, because he just would have resigned and that would have been the end of that.

Q: A vote of no confidence....

PISTOR: That’s right, and the other party would have come into power and that would be that, so they just could not understand why this disgrace couldn’t be dispensed with. “What in God’s Name is the matter with you?” they were saying to us. We could then explain a good deal about our system of checks and balances, and people were interested, and some were half-way convinced that our system wasn’t loony.

Also, during this time Dr. Kissinger was busy practicing shuttle diplomacy, and he almost always stopped in Britain and briefed and got advice from the party in power, either party, and he did very well with those, demonstrating that the government was functioning energetically (at least in his area). We had this important dialogue going on at the top, which could filter down into our talks with journalists and academic people— foreign affairs establishment people.

Still, Nixon was a very tough sell, and we had an ambassador in the person of Walter Annenberg who was a great Nixon loyalist— and a dignified one. On the week he left London, he had a lunch at Winfield House with 24 members of the American press. I was there at one end of the long table and he was at the other, and there were all these news guys, 12 along each side, asking questions. His answer to the inevitable question about Nixon was, “He has given me the greatest honor in my life in asking me to represent the United States here, in the United Kingdom, and for that I will be forever grateful to President Nixon.” It was a really a quite nice, modest little tribute. Walter Annenberg, who came into his Ambassadorship through a storm of ugly stories in the British press and television, went out with a nice pat on the back and feeling good.

But the Nixon mess was a constant embarrassment to all the others of us in the embassy, because you’d meet your friends and contacts just after having seen a television thing in which he said, “I am not a crook,” so unconvincingly. And then all that bizarre business of the serial firings. I remember that Gene Kopp, a lovely guy who was at that point the Deputy Director of USIA, was

making a trip through Europe and he was in London at the time of the Saturday night massacre with Nixon and Elliot Richardson and William Ruckelshaus and Archibald Cox and everybody. It was my duty to call Gene in his hotel room periodically throughout the night to announce yet another firing or resignation. It was astonishing.

We just had to let the Watergate debacle play out, and we gave or arranged backgrounders to get press and political people to talk to Senators and Congressmen who were traveling and could report first-hand about what was going on in Washington. We were trying to be fair to the President and also demonstrate the toughness and the resilience of the system. I think it wasn't so much that we were convincing; it's that the system did work and proved itself.

Q: Your duties were essentially what?

PISTOR: As PAO?

Q: Yes.

PISTOR: I was in charge of the USIS programs in Britain. This would be the cultural programs, educational exchanges, an excellent reference and research library, and to a certain extent, productions, cooperative arrangements, in the arts and the humanities, lecturers and discussion groups. The information section provided the British press with speech texts, background material, press conference transcripts and the like. Our information section played a special role in helping the embassy avoid an embarrassing incident during Nixon's final months in office.

At that time the President was hunkered down and depressed, and the White House photographer, Ollie Atkins, I believe, wanted to cheer him up, and he put together a photo exhibition that was sent to post offices around the United States— pictures of Nixon at work and Nixon with children and Nixon with the great and Nixon the sympathetic listener and so forth; a project designed just to buck up the boss. Then somebody in the White House had another bright idea: why not send the exhibition overseas? This at the time when Nixon was within an ace of resigning; it was awful timing. They decided that the two places to send it would be London and Paris.

I tried to wriggle out from under it, but I didn't succeed; somebody in the White House called Ambassador Annenberg and said, "Listen, there's somebody on your staff there who's not entirely happy about this exhibit." Annenberg was a very decent man and he just let me know that he thought this was an interesting and worthwhile exhibit; he didn't say, "What the hell are you doing?" So there we were. My colleague, Burnett Anderson, the PAO in Paris, was on the phone saying, "For God's sake, what are we going to do about this?" I thought it could be a serious problem in public relations for the U.S. embassy, giving the London press a wonderful opportunity to give Nixon another poke in the eye.

The White House crowd didn't trust us to mount the exhibit respectfully, because from the White House Ollie Atkins himself didn't come to London, he sent one of his senior staff to London to help set up the photo show. I thought the best thing to do would be to have mount the exhibit in the embassy itself, rather in a more public place. We had adequate space to show it in the USIS end of the building, and I would call it "White House Photographer." Atkins' office sent captions

like “Pathetic Deaf Child Listens to President.” They were just terrible, terrible captions, and so the first thing we had to do was get rid of captions altogether. Then we numbered the photographs and provided accompanying fact sheets that gave technical data about them. Finally, we held a reception for the photography editors of the news papers; they don’t get free drinks as often as the other editors.

A lot of these photography editors were old friends of our local press section employees, who had worked with them for years. The photo editors turned up happily, joined by our press staff, packing the house. Then we called Ambassador and Mrs. Annenberg downstairs and had their picture taken with the exhibition. It got about a quarter of an inch in one of the papers, and nothing at all anywhere else. My Paris colleague thought he might try this too, but by the time the exhibit was shipped to Paris, Nixon had resigned..

Q: When you first went in '73 and '74, with Vietnam - by '74 we pulled out - how did this play?

PISTOR: What I think we don’t remember is that successive British governments, both Labor and Conservative, stood fast with us on Vietnam, and it became uncomfortable for them, what with major portions of the populace vehemently denouncing the war. So Downing Street shared some of the heat. British public opinion, like US public opinion, was fixed on the Nixon-Watergate drama. After the uncertain conclusion of the Paris peace talks our USIA Public affairs strategy was uncertain, too. It was mostly, in Britain as in everywhere else, a question of how we were going to get out, and then we had the terrible collapse, and I think that was just played. I don’t think there was much for us to do except let it play out.

Q: Let it play out, yes.

PISTOR: There was no adequate explaining possible. We could only witness the tragedy that was in play.

Q: With the sort of collapse of our involvement in Vietnam, was there a noticeable collapse of interest on the part of the left wing in British society, politics, against the United States, or did they shift to other targets?

PISTOR: In Britain it isn’t just the Left; it’s as if anti-Americanism is rocks in a pool and, as long as the water level is above a certain depth, things sail smoothly. But when the level drops, you hit the rocks, and those rocks are always there. As I say, the Right can be just as poisonous as the Left, and it isn’t Vietnam or Watergate, or our involvement in Chile or Pakistan in ‘73. These issues were trundled out by people who didn’t like us for any reason, anyway. They didn’t like us in World War II— the business of, what was it, ‘oversexed, overpaid, and over here.’ There is always an element of that in our relationship, and you can see why. Here’s a former great power, no longer so great, and here’s another great power getting bigger and getting more powerful. So we always have this under water resentment to contend with, and while our British (and other) critics might have changed targets, we can always count on running into this dyspeptic view of us.

President Johnson got a rough ride in the British press; he didn't travel well internationally, but later I think the interested British public got a chance to see some of the social legislation that he had put through, and that helped soften his image a little bit. And the Left itself in Britain was having real struggles, largely because of the hard-nosed attitudes and tactics of some powerful trade union leaders.

Q: There was the left that was talking about international solidarity and saying the red flag for...

PISTOR: And by the '70s I didn't see as much of that. It was there, but the problems in Britain were becoming internal, the question of education, of making available a better education for more people, and we had things to say that would be useful in that regard. Yet I know during the time I was PAO in the UK we didn't have the resources to work with secondary schools at all. We did quite a lot of stuff at the university level. By the way, some of those who were most inimical to us were professors of American studies. At the same time, some of our staunchest defenders were American studies people.

Q: We were going along about the various groups that supported us and didn't support us, but when you're saying the problems were getting internal, of the increasing militancy of the trade unions too, which eventually ended up with Margaret Thatcher knocking him out of the ballpark.

PISTOR: In the UK, Labor was in power when Jimmy Carter was elected in 1976, and the first thing the Carter Administration did, so far as we were concerned in Britain, was to send Vice President Walter Mondale on a quick around-the-world trip, starting in London, within a day or two of Carter's inauguration. At that point our Ambassador was Ann Armstrong, a Ford appointee. She had been a counselor in the Nixon White House, and she was thought of as extremely conservative. But she was a real charmer, and she got along brilliantly with the Labor Left as well as with the Conservatives. The intellectual leader of the Labor Party was the Foreign Minister, Anthony Crosland— who since his Oxford student days had been representative of the intellectual Left, and he got along famously with Ann Armstrong. Let me tell a little story out of school. I might want to edit it out.

Q: You can look at it and see.

PISTOR: In preparing to take office, the Carter team had sent a cable to our ambassadors in England, France and Italy, where Mondale was to stop, instructing them to make themselves scarce, to go somewhere, go golfing or fishing, just get out of the country during the time of the visit, because the Vice President wanted to talk in private with the right people in each government.

Ann Armstrong sent a message back saying that, if requested, she would resign and leave the country, but she would not leave the UK temporarily to be out of the way; she was still the representative of the President of the United States in Britain. Challenged, the Carter people backed away. She stayed. The reason I'm saying it's a story told out of school is that Ambassador Armstrong kept entirely mum about that clumsy and demeaning slight; no leak, no story.

I think it did get out at the upper levels of the UK government, because Anthony Crosland, the Foreign Minister, when Mondale arrived at the airport and it was pouring rain and everybody was under umbrellas, greeted him and there were speeches on both sides, Crosland's speech was a ringing endorsement of the marvelous job Ann Armstrong had done for the President of the United States and for her country. It was one of those little gems that I would have liked people to know. Well, that's a digression.

Q: Well, but when you hear something like that - a new administration comes in, you get a bunch of ideologues and people don't really understand how things work and they want to control things, it's just completely inappropriate.

PISTOR: Sure, and they never learn, neither party: I've never been through a change of office when the incoming crowd wasn't heavy footed. All those young guys who didn't know anything about anything except that "this must be Cleveland and the mayor has to be Democrat or Republican or whatever I am, and they better damn well do what I say." They do it every time. It often happens, or happens enough, when it just goes from President to Vice President of the same party. It's just astonishing.

Q: I will say this: the Bush Jr. Administration told the Clinton ambassadors that had children to stay on until June.

PISTOR: That was nice.

Q: It was well done. Somebody paid a little attention. Normally...

PISTOR: That sounds like Colin Powell.

Q: It sounds like Colin Powell, yes.

PISTOR: Because he seems to be the one with the sensitivity.

Q: How about with the media? Did you have much to do with the media there?

PISTOR: We had a press attaché and we had a press section chief, two Americans. The marvelous thing about being a PAO— it's a wonderful job, or used to be a wonderful job— is that you can encroach on your colleagues' responsibilities. If you are good at your job, you don't overdo it, but you pinch a little over there where it's fun on the cultural side and you pinch a little over in the press section where it's fun. And of course the same thing happens elsewhere in the embassy; the political counselor tries to do that and the DCM tries to do that, but as PAO you have a pretty good range of options in choosing activities or targets to develop.

The thing to do is develop some relationships that don't cross those being nurtured by your press attaché or cultural officer or even some of the local employees. So I would say that I had good relations in the press side, both with the television people and with the newspaper editors and columnists. This being Britain, these contacts are often— almost always— interesting and

entertaining people ; so it's quite a pleasure to work with them, and there's always something to talk about, because we always have issues or interests in play between our two countries. You can bank on that. And during my time in London, we also had the Bicentennial celebrations, which unexpectedly brought us together. As I say, it turned out to be something that the British enjoyed and did extremely well.

Q: What sort of things went on?

PISTOR: One of the big pieces was a large exhibition designed and mounted by Charles Eames. The exhibition was for showings in Paris and London, and I think Eames had Paris in mind when he created the thing. It was called "The World of Franklin and Jefferson," and it aimed to show how their words helped transform America from a collection of insecure colonies to a thriving nation. The history of the two men unfolds in panels and displays, culminating with the Louisiana Purchase. The final display was a stuffed bison. I wanted the London version to have a somewhat different ending with less emphasis on the French connection— perhaps the founding of the University of Virginia. Naively, I thought I could convince Charles Eames. In the first of several Eames visits I thought that we could negotiate. He pretended that he was willing to negotiate, but he wasn't going to negotiate for a second. He knew exactly what he wanted to do and he did it. It took me a while to understand this, that all I could do was roll with the punches and have a good time.

I had a good friend in the Foreign Office, their cultural man, John Morgan, and the two of us tried to restrain Eames from some of his enthusiasms, generally without success. The first thing he wanted to do was to put the London exhibition in the Banqueting Hall at Whitehall, you know, the Inigo Jones building with the Rubens ceiling. It's a gorgeous piece of architecture. The British didn't much like the idea of mounting a major exhibition there, but they reluctantly agreed to it.

I remember that we then had a meeting at the Banqueting Hall itself with senior mandarins from several British government agencies-- suave men right out of "Yes, Minister." What Eames said, to the group was "You know, we have banners that have to stretch across the room with quotes from Jefferson." (These would obscure the Rubens ceiling.) "Also, we're going to have to have the lights over here." The officials' eyes widened and their lips pursed, because the lights would have to be attached to a delicate balustrade. Eames waved his hand toward the throne at the end of the room and said, "We will have to move that throne out." That throne was a special project of the Queen Mother's. She had actually done some of the throne's embroidery herself, we were told. And the mandarins weren't going to take that throne out at all. Ever. I suggested to John Morgan that we have the sculptor George Segal put a statue of George III on the throne, looking bemused, but he thought nobody would buy that solution. The officials' icy response to Eames's demands meant that the Banqueting Hall was out of the question.

We then decided that the next best location would be the British Museum, and so that's what we did. Charles Eames, John and I went to the British Museum, and Eames parleyed with Sir John Pope Hennessey, who was no slouch himself at negotiating; it was wonderful to see these two pros sizing each other up and seeing what each could do to further the project. Anyway, we had

that marvelous exhibition at the British Museum and we had the reception for it in the Elgin Marbles Room.

Q: The Elgin marbles.

PISTOR: That's right, where the marbles are. The speakers were the Vice President of the United States, who was at that point Nelson Rockefeller; Prime Minister Harold Wilson; the Foreign Minister; and the American Ambassador, Elliot Richardson. The opening was a great success. One thing that nobody ever knew somehow was that in the great babble of voices in that vast, echoey hall— the sound system failed. So you had the Vice President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Britain, the Foreign Minister of Britain, the American Ambassador, all talking to a dead microphone, and nobody cared. I've never seen anything like it, and I've never told that story before. "The World of Franklin and Jefferson" received enthusiastic reviews and drew large crowds

The British loved the bicentennial, and there were some extraordinary scenes with American groups who would come to Britain. The head of the British-American Bicentennial Committee was the Marquess of Lothian, Lord Lothian. His uncle had been ambassador to the United States and an ancestor had been in the court of George III at the time of our revolution. Peter Lothian is a very charming, very pleasant, very modest man. I remember a group of people from the 13 original colonies came to Britain, from the United States to present something and Lord Lothian was the designated recipient of such commemorative gifts. The senior delegate of this American group kept talking about "the Lord," as in, "We thank the Lord for this occasion," and "the Lord knows best." Peter Lothian was very good about this kind of thing.

I have to tell you one more bicentennial thing. Soon after I got to London in 1973, the Cultural Affairs Officer, the wonderful Wayne Wilcox, had a call from the Earl of Perth-- I'm not going to tell many stories about lords-- the Earl of Perth called and asked Wayne if he'd like to come over for a drink. He said, "Sure. I'd like to bring my friend Mike Pistor." He said, "Of course." So we went to this lovely apartment in London and there was the Earl of Perth. He stood and poured drinks for us and we sat down, and he had a proposition. His ancestor Lord Dunmore, who was the last British governor of Virginia and was run out, had a folly built on one of his estates in Scotland, known as the Dunmore Pineapple. It was indeed a small building in the shape of a pineapple, and what the Earl of Perth wanted was for the Williamsburg Foundation to have an association with this, so American tourists in Britain and Scotland could go see the Dunmore Pineapple. He had sent a picture and a letter to the people at Williamsburg and he never got an answer. They just ignored it entirely. So Wayne and I said we'd do what we could, and we never could do anything. I think he finally got an acknowledgment, a kind of a no-thanks acknowledgment. It's just a peculiar little story. He wanted us to be involved with the Dunmore Pineapple, and David Wills, who was the heir to a huge tobacco fortune, wanted very much to send a carillon that would chime every hour and he wanted an American radio network to use it. We could never explain to him that our radio was not the BBC, that there was NBC and ABC and they're not going to get together and ring those chimes. There were some little frustrations that were more amusing than others in my four years as PAO in London..

There were real sadnesses in that four years because of the deaths of friends and colleagues, but there were great rewards, too, in the assignment, some amusing, some really inspiring moments in the relationship reflecting 200 years since our breakaway from the mother country, and then the opportunities of Nixon and post-Nixon and the winding down of the Vietnam War, all of these, and then again the European questions that were beginning to really haunt us. I remember in 1973 just as I got to Britain, it was when Kissinger announced the Year of Europe, and Europeans including the British were furious saying, "Every year's a year of Europe. What are you talking about?" But no sooner had he said, "This is the Year of Europe," than the "Yom Kippur War" caused the OPEC countries to pull themselves together for the first time in their history and then we had all of that. So we always had a lot to think about and talk about in Britain.

LARRY C. WILLIAMSON
Commercial Attaché
London (1973-1977)

Mr. Williamson was born and raised in Arkansas. After graduating from the University of California and serving a tour of duty with the US Marine Corps, he entered the Foreign Service in 1958. His foreign assignments took him to a number of African posts, including Sierra Leone, Northern Rhodesia, Tanzania, Kenya and Gabon, where he served as Ambassador, and in England. He had a number of assignments in Washington, several dealing with African Affairs. He also served in the Department's Executive Secretariat and as Assistant to the Counselor

WILLIAMSON: I went to London.

Q: You were there from '73 to when?

WILLIAMSON: Four years.

Q: Were you the African man?

WILLIAMSON: No, no such thing. That was in the hands of the political officers. I was really kind of sweating around because it was the year of the first big women's meeting. Jean Wilkowski, Ambassador Wilkowski, had been down in Zambia, and she and I had had a chance to work there. We got along very well. When she got back, she needed somebody that she could trust to be her deputy, and that was to be me. The embarrassing situation was I didn't want to do that, but I couldn't tell Jean I didn't want to work for her. How do I do this? Talk about a problem. I got a phone call from the Department of Commerce of all places because I've always been an economic/commercial officer. They said, "We've got a terrible problem, and I wonder if you could help us? We know it's kind of cheesy of us and I'm sure you've got a wonderful assignment all worked out, but we'd sure like to send you to London as a commercial attaché."

Q: Did you say, "Don't throw me in that briar patch?"

WILLIAMSON: I gave it about three and a half seconds considered thought, and I said, "I'd be delighted to run for the office." I said, "How realistic is this?" I really didn't have good Department of Commerce contacts. It turns out I had really good contacts in the economic section, the personnel business, in the person of Charlie Jones who was the liaison officer from Commerce. He and I got along like a house afire. Had a wonderful time with each other. He said, "Don't worry about it. You're on your way."

Q: Did you run across Frances Wilson?

WILLIAMSON: I ran across her, yes.

Q: She was quite an influential figure in economics.

WILLIAMSON: Very much a figure in economics, but she was really up with the big kids playing with the international funds, and I was still the gooney on the ground there. I horrified the European commercial clique all of whom had their eye on that job, but I showed up and had a wonderful time for four years.

Q: You were there '73 to...

WILLIAMSON: '77.

Q: Who was the ambassador at the time?

WILLIAMSON: When I first got there it was that prince of good fellows, the all-around horse's ass, the rich guy.

Q: They're all rich guys.

WILLIAMSON: This guy was really rich. His father had...

Q: You mean the newspaper...

WILLIAMSON: Yes. All these foundations. Very nice guy, by the way.

Q: Annenberg.

WILLIAMSON: Walter Annenberg. A walking malapropism. Very pleasant and very good to his staff. Exceedingly good. As a sidebar, he gave a great sum to the American school in London. Cash and board. This was after he rebuilt the residence entirely. They would get that money on the proviso that no dependent of an American diplomat would be refused admission.

Q: It sounded like he was being ponderous or pontificating when actually he was just trying to overcome something which was a fiscal problem.

WILLIAMSON: That's what I think. Also, he was born to be the American ambassador to a Tory government. When the Wilson government came in which was in the first year I was there, it turned out the ambassador's social contacts in the Labor party were all very upper level and all very superficial. He knew nobody there. As a friend of mine who was in the political section said, "It wasn't a question of things going badly, it was just there were so many opportunities missed because the ambassador had already blotted his copy book in many ways." Also, he simply didn't know where to start with those guys. If they weren't in Debrett's Peerage, he didn't care.

Q: That's a real problem in some countries where the social side came almost... One can almost misunderstand where authority lies.

WILLIAMSON: Yes. He dressed extravagantly modestly. It was all hand made, tailor made. It was blue suits and pinstripes.

Q: Who followed him?

WILLIAMSON: After Annenberg was...

Q: Price or someone. Did the ambassador impede on your business...

WILLIAMSON: No. The shop that I ran was about 25 locals all of whom knew much more about the British economy and the British business thing than I did or any of the five guys I had on the American side working for me. The big trick in our game, one that became clear to me after about three months, was to just to get out of their way. Seriously. They had the contacts; they were always very good about copying me on things, and I could go to them for almost anything I needed and get it. They also had the trade fair bunch. I'm trying to think who the hell the person was that followed, and I'm damned if I can remember right offhand. We finally got Elliot Richardson for his entire tour with us. He was a delight to work with. He was all over the area, talked to us, came down to see how we were doing. All of us, not just myself, but the civil air attaché and all kinds of people. He was a really capable administrator and knew how to build up morale. He came to us with his fearsome reputation after the October massacre and had a wonderful time with him. There was a Texas lady, who was like Ann Armstrong was but earlier, and she came with a good reputation and turned out to be very, very sharp but she was always thinking about the home office and running for office back in Texas or wherever she was. She didn't spend a lot of time with us at all.

Q: You were the commercial officer.

WILLIAMSON: Commercial attaché and head of the commercial section, yes.

Q: Did you fit into the economic section or were you...

WILLIAMSON: Yes. Every so often the department used to get excited because commerce was going to steal this job. They would make gestures. My first boss was a commerce schedule C who had screwed up royally apparently in the budget presentation.

Q: A schedule C being a political appointee.

WILLIAMSON: Yes, being a political appointee who had screwed up amazingly in making a budget presentation apparently and may have lost millions of dollars on the screen. He had great political clout. They took him, and they made him the Commercial Counselor. He's the guy I was technically reporting to. There was also an Economic Counselor and the minister for commercial and economic affairs. There was a status thing up there, not that it made a lot of difference to the grunts on the ground. The big thing with the Commercial Counselor was to give him things to play with. He loved to go on business calls, plus he was a ferocious member of the American Club. He was a decent sort of guy, but just was not super intelligent. He was not very intelligent at all, as a matter of fact, but he had his political clout. When it came time for him to be transferred, they tried to terminate him. He had that limited appointment. He fought the damn thing, and he ended up doing something over at Commerce for the next ten years or so as a career civil servant which is a wonder. The major problem for me was to keep him the hell out of my staff. He was always trying to go in there. He belonged to the old "count the minutes" school: How long does it take to do one paper?

Q: Time study.

WILLIAMSON: Yes, a time study, an Albright sort of thing. He was big on that in an area that didn't really lend itself to that. Businessmen came in and we dealt with them. We had lots of contacts. We went out to scout what was going on, and we had a lot of trade surveys. We had a trade center, so we would, in the season, have at least one trade show a month; probably more. We got involved in all of that, staffing that up and doing things. Thanks to the trade center we had the money to also go out and do little mini-shows. The other guy that could do that was the agricultural attaché. He had money to stage little shows, pushing American wine or pushing American beef or what have you. We went out and pushed American products, and how we could help them.

From that point of view it was great. From a personal point of view, it was the best assignment—it was the most fun—that I ever had because I had enough money and rank so I could afford to do all of this stuff. The kids were in good schools. I was still junior enough that I didn't get caught up in that dreadful cocktail party circuit that was floating around just above my head. There was an association of commercial officers from all the other embassies, and we met about once every two months. I was always at that, but I found my colleagues on the whole not terribly pre-possessing.

One good thing that came out of that was they were constantly trying to arrange for us to talk to British personalities. Margaret Thatcher, before she was the Margaret Thatcher, came and spoke to us. She was rad! She'd step in front of that microphone and say what she was going to do and how things were going to change. One of my colleagues, if he wasn't a German he was at least Germanic, stood up. He was one of those guys who'd pose a five or ten minute question from the floor which was really a speech. She clearly understood this kind of guy, and she gave him her best Cambridge debate treatment by cutting his damn throat in front of the whole group. The guy was so embarrassed he didn't realize he had been killed until it was all over! I thought, "That

woman is going to go places,” but I didn’t want to go with her. She was really ferocious even then.

Q: We’re talking about a specific period before Margaret Thatcher came to power, your dealings with the British United Kingdom commercial system. Obviously Labor was in there; Labor had lots of clout and this, “I’m all right, Jack.” Do you have any insights?

WILLIAMSON: We all took a look at the thing and decided that the retail, if I might use that phrase, the retail business could take care of itself. There’s no sense in our trying to help Sears & Roebuck. The areas that we could concentrate on and could make a difference in the government were North Sea Oil where we had this wonderful advantage of taxes and ...

Q: We had all sorts of equipment.

WILLIAMSON: The Norwegians did, too. The Norwegians and the Finns were right in there. We actually had a guy in the economic section who did nothing but petroleum reporting. I had a guy who did nothing but North Sea stuff.

Q: When you say North Sea stuff, you mean basically selling huge equipment or the equivalent...

WILLIAMSON: Contact more than anything else. Up to Aberdeen quite often, meeting people, joining clubs up there. We had a hell of a fight with the budget people about getting a club membership up there. We did that one, and we decided aircraft was quite ripe for trade exploitation. Here we had the military helping us along with the civil air attaché. We were streaks ahead in electronics, so we could get on that job. We didn’t try to do a lot of other stuff. I didn’t have the staff to do that, but I had the staff to do this. I’m sure the consular section was the same way. Thirty percent of our time was spent dealing with the traditional Department of Commerce demands for information, board surveys, job surveys. “Mr. So-and-so makes dog collars. What’s the market for dog collars?” That was grinding it out, and I had some Brits who could do that with no trouble whatsoever and whose grammar was far better than at least two of my American staff! I had a big commercial library, too. I convinced my first boss that these were the areas we should concentrate in. When you’re in the business of receiving visitors from the States, you can’t call the shots, but on a day in, day out basis, we stayed with communications, aircraft, oil drilling equipment. We got into tourism toward the end.

Q: And electronics.

WILLIAMSON: And electronics, yes. We got into tourism when that was a big thing in the Department of Commerce. We got into tourism because they gave us the money to get into tourism. I’m not quite sure what we were doing, but we had a big hunk of money to do it with. One thing about the British economic scene was that it was at a leisurely pace. The British Labor party was hell on working to rules, so there was no way you were going to hurry up because there’s no sense in breaking into a sweat. At five o’clock when the bell rings, you might as well go home because you can bet that at five-thirty if you’re trying to call somebody in their office, they’re not there, and that includes the government. I dealt very seldom with the Foreign Office. I dealt with the Foreign Office on strategic trade controls because I was co-com officer.

Q: This was keeping a good step away from the bad guys.

WILLIAMSON: Exactly right. I was a little dubious about it when I started out, but I was stunned about how many people work in gun-running business.

Q: One has the feeling that at the top of so many British corporations particularly in that period, they were loaded with not very effective people, but they had the right social credentials with the right schools.

WILLIAMSON: I have a classic story on that. I didn't deal too often with bankers because we had a Treasury Attaché, and he had an assistant. When a banker came to do real work or someone was dealing with the Treasury, they'd cut me out. This was just as well because I couldn't have done it; however, when bankers came around to shop themselves, they would call me up. It was always good for a great lunch with house wine. At two-thirty we'd all go home and go to bed. I can't even remember the bank or the bankers that I was with, but they were earnest young guys from the Midwest and they were hot to trot. They had their Brooks Brothers suits, and they came in.

When my staff made the appointments, with the appropriate officer level in the bank, they invited us as I hoped to lunch in the dining room. We went into the office first—business first—and sat down, did introductions all around and exchanged cards. These guys then started talking about the many advantages of working with the First National Bank of Milwaukee or whatever the hell it was. The British guys—there are two of them—in tailor-made suits, the whole thing, nice hairdos, and very, very well spoken with, “Hmms” and “hums,” and taking notes. No commitments; no comeback at all. About 30 minutes into the conversation, there was a knock on the door and a short redheaded guy, clearly not a public school graduate, with a London accent, came in and said he was terribly sorry for being late, and they said, “This is Mr. X” whatever his name was. Mr. Whatever-his-name-was, shoddy as he was, sat down and dominated the conversation from then on. He was the real brains! The two bankers, the young guys, couldn't figure it out. They kept trying to deal with who they thought were the bosses. They thought they were being stiffed by having to work with this guy who clearly spent his time sharpening pencils. I kept trying to get the conversation over there, and the two British guys trying to get the conversation over there, too. The two American guys wouldn't switch! We all walked out, and they said, “Do you have to go to the john?” I said, “Yes, I do.” One of the other guys said, “Yes, I think I do, too.” I went in to the toilet and I said, “Listen. You guys are barking up the wrong tree! It's the redheaded guy you have to deal with!” He said, “Huh?” I said, “That's the brains! The other two guys are going to have a hell of a good time telling you about their wine list. This is the guy you've got to work with if you want to work.” He looked at me and said, “That can't be so.” I swear to God, those two guys still walked out. They'd taken my best advice. They even talked to me a bit afterwards. I have no idea whether they would consummate any deals with these people or not, but they had no idea that that was how that bank worked. That was a classic story. The same thing happened to me a couple of time in the British aviation industry. I'd be talking with one of the most impressive looking guys you ever saw in your life, and I'd have Mr. Bowie on my right flank here talking about intimate contacts with Barry Goldwater. I said, “This is not the guy to use that with!” As a matter of fact, I was wrong. He probably was the guy to use

Barry Goldwater with. Eventually they came down and saw a real engineer who knew what an airplane looked like, might even be able to fly one. Then you could get some business done, but you had to get through that. It was a great way—I suppose it still is—for the Brits to go it, to just murder all kinds of things. You put Simon and Lewis up front, and Simon and Lewis take all the crap and all the boring stuff. If they decide that somebody should come out that can do the job, I guess they push a button someplace and the redheaded guy shows up, and their work gets started.

Q: Did you find yourself going head to head with the French from time to time?

WILLIAMSON: Not so much in Britain, no. I went head to head with a very, very nice guy from the Norwegian embassy, we were bitter enemies about some of the contracts. The guy in the Finnish embassy who was about 30 years old knew far more about engineering than I did. They were my big troubles there.

Q: This was in oil.

WILLIAMSON: This was oil; oil drilling specifically. The deal was they had all of these platforms sitting up in the Baltic, and they could run one of those mothers out in jig dandy time and rig it while they were going down. My big rigs were down in the Gulf of Mexico someplace being built. The competition was really intense. Our rig, I'm convinced, was a better rig, had more advantages. The thing is, it wasn't here, it was there. Their rig could be down in a week.

Q: Particularly in something like this but also in aviation, you run into political considerations where the British were saying, "We've got to throw prey to the Norwegians." Every country has that.

WILLIAMSON: This was back in the time when Britain was not in the common market and we had eight and the inner seven. Aircraft were particularly delicate. We had a small task force of myself and the civil air attaché and the political military guy and Hillary from the political section, and there was an FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) guy there. The guys on the other side were ruthless, and so were we, but you would walk in and you would think you'd be talking about DC (Douglas Aircraft Company) something or other sale. You'd find out halfway through that you were talking about DC something or other sale, but you were also talking about a squadron of F-150s. It was a shell game. We kept pulling cards out and looking at the sale. It's one of those things where you go on and on and on, when you're dealing with government procurement, government budgets, and everything else, plus any number of guys from the American community who were trying to bust in on already established relationships that Boeing may have had or McDonnell may have had, and here is Grumman who doesn't have a thing, and they want to get in the action. You've got to be adamant about it.

Q: I understand the way the game is played in most other countries. The country says, "OK, we'll roll back a particular country for fighter planes or something like this. We would have Grumman, and we'd have Northrop, and we'd have a whole series, and you have to give equal treatment which means you're dissipating your strength."

WILLIAMSON: That's quite true, and we did on a number of cases. The only thing was that engineering-wise... That's not too true, either, because the British aircraft industry although not in a hell of a lot better shape, was a lot bigger than now. I was there for four years, so some of these deals came close to consummation. At the last minute the fact that you were going to throw three button manufacturers out of work in upper Marlborough would be decisive in making some decision. I understand that. It was a highly politicized thing. In the final analysis, all we could do was facilitate. We had nothing as an embassy to put on the table. It was up to whether Northrop wants to do it or not, or Grumman, or who have you, and how that works.

Q: You say retail.

WILLIAMSON: I use that term generically.

Q: They could basically take care of themselves. There are firms that are just used to dealing abroad. Let's say a microfilm company in Des Moines wants to break into international markets. Did you find that you were having to hold their hands?

WILLIAMSON: Oh, yes. We had a whole process for that. We had these world trade directory reports, and we would do a market survey, a swift down and dirty one because they want to get some sort of feel for it. Then the guy would come over and we'd shuffle them, and I'd send one of my guys up with him to Birmingham or wherever the center of the paintbrush industry was. It wasn't entirely successful largely because American businessmen, particularly small and medium-sized manufacturers, if they're in the general sort of business—I'm not talking about a specific gizmo of their own—really aren't that sophisticated about international trade and don't have the banking connections. They usually drag along an American lawyer to start with. That's all very nice, and you should have an American lawyer. Far be it for me to ever doubt that, but you damn well better have a British lawyer, too. You're dealing with a whole different order of business. The problem is that it really is like Shaw said: two people divided by a common language. It looks so much like our system that almost every one of these guys came in thinking, "This is just like Des Moines!" It never was. It's not Kansas.

Q: Were the British throwing up a "we too were throwing up all sorts of taxes, tariffs." The Japanese are renowned for closing off their markets to all sorts of inspections. How about the British?

WILLIAMSON: The British were much more open traders. Where the British and we really crossed swords (I never had anything to do with this problem, it was way above my pay grade), was when they imposed the value added tax. That put ten percent right on top of everything else and skewed a lot of very closely pared contracts. The average paid two and a half percent more. Either there was an added tax and everybody else had to do it, too, or just throw your calculations right out. That was always a big trouble, but it was part of the deal for getting into the common market, and there was no way out of it.

Q: It was not designed specifically to throw foreign things out.

WILLIAMSON: Oh, no.

Q: It was money raising.

WILLIAMSON: It was a money raising thing. I'm not at all convinced that the Brits didn't think it was something to keep people out. It turned out to be a good way to do it, but not in the way that they had hoped. Big firms swallowed that and went right ahead on. They hoist themselves by their own petard because there was a huge battle with inflation that hit all of Europe shortly after the VAT came in. All these businessmen said they were going to collect their ten and a half percent, and they picked up a couple or three more percent extra profit. It's easier to divide by one and a half than it is by one – that sort of thing. Unfortunately, it was one of those moves that you couldn't undo. It was part of the price of doing business, in the Common Market. Once the commitment is made, politicians always say they're going to cut income tax, but you can't cut income tax because that's where the money comes from. There's a law here in the US about the tax they've tacked on, the alternative minimum tax. They can't cut that. There's billions of dollars coming into the Treasury because of that. Everybody says, "That's a terrible thing," and it is.

Q: Did you find Members of Congress intruding from time to time?

WILLIAMSON: That's an interesting story. Not very much; however, often enough the Farnborough Air Show was a great...

Q: That's the big one.

WILLIAMSON: That was a great attraction, and Congressmen descended in droves on that. They were usually the guests of Lockheed, who took care of them. Actually, the embassy in London in those days had a high powered travel section led by a person named Joan Auten who was a legend around Britain.

Q: Joan Auten was Miss Reception, wasn't she?

WILLIAMSON: She knew everybody. "You want tickets to the opera, honey?" This sort of stuff, and she knew people to call and deal with. Barry Goldwater thought she was wonderful, and he was always coming to the air show with an entourage of 50. She was actually the control officer for these VIPs without going very far to inform me except she would call me and say, "The senator's coming in, and we need five cars from the motor pool." I said, "Pardon me?" She said, "Five cars from the motor pool, and he'll pay for them. Don't worry about it." I told my British locals, "How the hell do you find cars? You can't get five. You'll get ten maybe, but you can't get five. You have to rent." We did all that sort of stuff. They came in. Joan's mafia out there could handle almost anything.

Q: She was an absolute legend.

WILLIAMSON: She was grand. She and I got along very well. I'd met her years before when I was in the secretariat, and I'd come out with Humphrey. She took over the whole section there, so we got along fine. She was really very helpful to me over the years.

Q: Did Vietnam play any role, demonstrations?

WILLIAMSON: Yes, all kinds of demonstrations. We had three things going at the same time. Massive anti-Vietnam demonstrations, and the British police would come down on the horses and herd them along. There was the tried and true, "You can't cross the street here, gang" sort of thing. We had that as a recurring problem. Sometimes large demonstrations depending on what particular thing had attracted the attention of the press that week; sometimes small, kind of pathetic, people who were just upset about the thing and standing there in the damn British winter rain come hell or high water to let their position be known. Since I wasn't too wild about the war myself, I didn't bother about it. At the same time we had the IRA (Irish Republican Army) bombing campaigns going on. They took out a pub just down from the embassy. They took out a pub just around the corner from my apartment. My daughter was dating and I said, "What I would like you to do, dearest, is if you're going to go out and drink, go to some low class Irish working class pub. Take two big boys with you. They aren't going to blow themselves up." They occasionally did, but it would be a bad mistake. "Stay away from these downtown bars." This was the heyday of the Reverend Doctor Moon. The reverend Doctor Moon was very active. You probably had him someplace, too.

Q: I was in Korea at the time of Jonestown, and I was told they panicked and said, "Go take a look at what's he doing there." This is where it came from. He wasn't doing much there, but they were scared as hell when he would all of a sudden start...

WILLIAMSON: Agitated. Yes.

Q: ...because he was a cult, and they were afraid that his cult was like unto the Jonestown cult.

WILLIAMSON: Our big problem with the Reverend Doctor Moon was he'd have these massive weddings he'd schedule. He did it deliberately, I'm sure. Friday afternoon just before the consular section was set to close, some 300 brides would show up, all needing visas to be at their wedding ceremony on Sunday in Milwaukee or someplace. Just the whole thing of dealing with that was a mess, but it made the embassy-- which was a very nicely placed embassy as you know-- made it very inaccessible at times. You'd go for a drink at lunch and come back, and there'd be a demonstration going on or they'd blow up your pub. But it was interesting.

Q: How did your kids find the American schools?

WILLIAMSON: They were in the American School.

Q: Were there mostly Americans there?

WILLIAMSON: It was mostly Americans, probably 50 to 60% American and the rest foreign. It was an international school.

Q: Were there any British reflections on Americans?

WILLIAMSON: My daughter, who had come from International Schools in Tanzania and Zambia, flat refused to go out with Americans. Right next to the American school there was a great big British high school, and her boyfriends all came from there. She used to bring them home just to get me going. She had one guy who drove a motorcycle.

Q: Long hair, I assume?

WILLIAMSON: Long hair. She dated a Jamaican guy for a while who wore snake skin boots. She had a boyfriend for a while whose father who had one of the original licenses for the fish monger businesses down at the fish market, Billingsgate, which is very lucrative, I must say. He had a huge house east of London. It definitely wasn't diplomatic corps kind of stuff. My son on the other hand fell in with a bunch of spoiled diplomatic and American business kids and discovered the joys of pot. Again, the kids, being 14 - 15 had absolutely no discretion whatsoever and he was busted by the police twice. They got into the British scene, and they both loved London. They just loved it. My daughter could—still can—say... "Let's see how puce we can turn Father's face tonight. What are we going to bring home tonight?"

Q: Did you get involved with presidential visits?

WILLIAMSON: Oh, Lord, yes. The embassy is well known for that. When Henry Kissinger came, when the president came, everyone came to, "Here's your spear, go stand over there," whatever it was. On the other hand, Arthur Burns—it was all during those terrible British currency crises—dropped into town at the drop of a hat. The Treasury Attaché was all distraught, but it didn't touch us in the slightest. Same thing with the military stuff. The political military guys—it's a huge embassy. There's all kinds of resources. But when the president came, we were usually all mustered including the locals.

Q: You left there in 1977.

ROY T. HAVERKAMP
Political Officer for African Affairs
London (1974-1975)

Roy T. Haverkamp was born in Missouri in 1924. He served in the U.S. Army from 1943 to 1945, and then graduated from Yale University in 1949. He then went on to complete a law degree at Cambridge University in England. He joined the Foreign Service in 1952, where his posts included Korea, Sweden, Japan, Cambodia, Congo, Benin, Vietnam, Guinea, England, Jamaica, and Grenada. Mr. Haverkamp was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 11, 1994.

HAVERKAMP: I was transferred to London.

Q: You were there how long?

HAVERKAMP: I was in London for a year, after which I was probably put into the nut file because I asked to leave.

Q: So you were there from 1974-75. What were you doing in London?

HAVERKAMP: I was in the political section following Africa, the Commonwealth Organization and Latin America.

Q: I take it wasn't to your liking there.

HAVERKAMP: Well, the people in the embassy were very good to me and it was a fascinating place and all that kind of thing, but there wasn't anything moving in any of those places. It was before Kissinger decided he was going to become interested in the Rhodesian issue. Many of the liberation movements were there including the ANC. It was charming and delightful and there was almost never any overtime. I felt that it would have been much more interesting working with something where the British were more directly involved and more interested or on British politics. In fact, the whole embassy didn't really function at top efficiency because it had a political ambassador who really didn't give two hoots in hell about conducting government business. A charming and delightful guy and very generous.

Q: Who was this?

HAVERKAMP: Ambassador Annenberg. The British did most of their high level stuff back here. Kissinger and the Foreign Secretary communicated directly with each other. So we could go in and do the normal things that mid level and junior officers do, but there was no contact at the highest levels when Annenberg was there or when he was away. And he didn't become pals with the Prime Minister or the leader of the opposition or the leader of any party. He just didn't seem to be interested.

I read part of Phil Kaiser's book recently and he had been a Rhodes Scholar in England before the war. While he was there he became friends with Ted Heath, who became head of the Conservative Party, he met Harold Wilson who was teaching at Oxford then and he became head of the Labour Party. Both of them became Prime Ministers. And he met people in the Liberal Party and the labor unions as well. So when he went back there as Minister, he had an entree which was promising. It must have been difficult for him. I think Walter Annenberg had him transferred out. But Annenberg's idea of a DCM was not a very active character. We had outstanding officers in the political and other sections who were first rate. The missing link was contact with the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and leaders of the opposition, which should have taken up the time of the Ambassador. Elliot Richardson replaced Ambassador Annenberg and established relations with the country's political leadership.

Q: But this was after your time?

HAVERKAMP: Just at the end of my time.

RONALD I. SPIERS
Deputy Chief of Mission
London (1974-1977)

Ronald I. Spiers was born in New Jersey in 1925. He attended Dartmouth College for his undergraduate work and then received a Master's Degree from Princeton University. He joined the State Department in 1955, where his posts included England, the Bahamas, Turkey, and Pakistan. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1992.

SPIERS: . . . when Kissinger became Secretary in 1974, he questioned my assignment. Furthermore, Washington wanted to move Annenberg out of London. The general view was that he had served his term, but he didn't want to leave. He had first agreed to leave, then changed his mind. A search had been made for a replacement for Annenberg, but nothing seemed to click. So Kissinger decided that I should return to London as Chargé, which delighted me. Eagleburger later told me that a cable was sent to Annenberg telling him of my appointment and requesting that he leave before I got there. That is the main reason I spent almost three months in Vermont waiting for all the pieces to fall into place. I left Nassau on September 2 and I didn't reach London until late November. It took them that long to get Annenberg out; Kissinger didn't want me to go except as Chargé.

I was Chargé for approximately four months when Elliot Richardson became Ambassador. I was Chargé again for a couple of months in 1976 between the time Richardson left and Anne Armstrong arrived. She left in early 1977 after a new President had taken over in Washington and then I was Chargé again until Kingman Brewster presented his credentials in June 1977. By that time, I had been appointed as Ambassador to Turkey, so that I worked with Brewster for only about a month. So much of my tour in London was as Chargé.

I had made many friends during my previous tour in London and most of them were still in influential positions. In fact, many had moved up in the hierarchy. For example, I had known David Owen who had been Navy Secretary in the late 60s and had become the Foreign Secretary. Much to the consternation of the British Foreign office bureaucracy, the first thing he did when he became Foreign Secretary was to call me to his office; I spent three hours talking to him about a whole host of foreign policy concerns. No one from the Foreign Office was in the meeting. Mrs. Owen was an American and a good friend of my wife's. I picked up my relationships with Denis Healey, who had been Minister of Defense and now was the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I had known Jim Callaghan when he was the Chancellor and who was then Prime Minister. I was essentially on a first name basis with most if not all of the Labor Government ministers and leaders. My friendships of the 60s stood me in very good stead. The fact that I was a Chargé was of no significance; as a matter of fact it was an advantage because it spared me from having to do a lot of things that Ambassadors to the Court of St. James usually had done. Ray Seitz, who is now Ambassador in London, was a junior officer in the Political Section in the mid 70s; he is the first career officer to be appointed as Ambassador; all the others have been political appointees. Moving from Chargé to DCM, back to Chargé back to DCM etc. was no problem; being Chargé or DCM in London was more interesting than being Ambassador in the Bahamas.

I got along well with Elliot Richardson, who, as I have mentioned, was a long time friend. Times were a little rockier with Anne Armstrong at least at the beginning of her tour. That was an interesting experience. She had been in the White House with Nixon; she may have felt that being a woman she was at a disadvantage and had to impose an extra heavy hand on her bureaucracy in order to make it respond. When she was named as Ambassador, she called me from Washington and began to give me a list of requests, most of which were silly or outrageous. I told her that we just didn't have the capability to meet most of her demands; that made her very angry. That of course led me to believe that after she had arrived, my days in London were numbered. She had no concept of the role of an Ambassador; she didn't know what she was supposed to do. She was very insecure and undoubtedly felt completely lost in a world of which she knew precious little. I think she was probably concerned by the fact that I had been an Ambassador. Strangely enough, we ended up being very good friends. I was completely straight forward with her. Gradually she began to see that I was not her enemy; I had told her that the Embassy's reputation depended on her success; her failures would come back to haunt us. I pointed out to her that we came from different parts of the United States -- she was from Texas, I was from New England -- and that I had always been absolutely candid. I said if anything about me made her uncomfortable, all she had to do was to call Washington and I would be gone very quickly. Such a move wouldn't hurt my career. She immediately picked that up and said: "It may not hurt your career, but it will certainly hurt mine!". After that, we got along famously.

She was great on public relations. The British really liked her. They were entranced by the Texas style -- informal, casual, friendly. It was the total opposite of British -- tight, proper, class conscious. She was entirely different from any of her predecessors, which worked both to her advantage and disadvantage. One of her predecessors had spent a lot of money in London, but was somewhat of a laughing stock. The British liked Elliot Richardson. But Anne Armstrong was genuinely popular; the British loved her. So her tour was a real success.

Q: During the 1974-77 period, what were the major issues in our relationship with the U.K.?

SPIERS: The major issues were economic. I spent a lot of time on such matters as IMF agreements, etc. By this time, the Defense issues had receded in importance and were no longer central. It was the British economic situation that was the core problem. I used to send first person cable to Kissinger trying to engage his attention in the British economic situation and the IMF programs. The Treasury Department was difficult to deal with because it considered itself independent and sovereign. Treasury officials would come to London without informing State and went about their business in London without telling anyone what they were doing; they in fact were involving themselves with issues which were at the core of our relationships with the British. We found out what went on and then had to tell State and Kissinger what was going on. Kissinger would then have to talk to Treasury in Washington -- he finally did get involved even if economics was not his favorite subject or interest. Economic issues received the same treatment from Kissinger as arms control matters had from Rogers.

The British were going through a period of pound devaluation. They wanted to borrow large sums from the IMF to support their currency. They were trying to marshal international support for their plans and that brought me fully into the issue because U.S. backing was crucial. Denis

Healey was the Chancellor of the Exchequer and since we knew each other well, that helped considerably. That was true also for the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister who were also old friends. I don't think that my personal relationships concerned my Ambassadors too greatly. One of the problems was that our Ambassadors were in London for such a short time (Richardson'10 months, Armstrong'one year) that once they had gone through the protocol requirements, there weren't there long enough to grasp hold of the issues and get to know the people well. This I think was all coincidence; Richardson left to become Secretary of Commerce and Armstrong left when Carter became President. I think she was treated very cavalierly. Mondale and David Aaron -- who was to become the deputy to Brzezinski on the NSC staff -- came to London and wanted to see the Foreign Minister. They told Armstrong that she couldn't go along to the meeting; they asked that I go along instead. I told Armstrong that if she didn't want me to go, I would refuse to do so, but she told me to go. I suggested to her that she resign because there would more incidents of his kind; I had seen it happen in other circumstances. I told her she should return to Texas; her political opponents had won and undoubtedly wanted her job. Sooner or later, I am sure that she would have had to resign anyway, but she wanted to hang on in London as long as possible; she liked it. The British did not like the way she was treated by the new Carter administration. They have never understood our system and it sometimes offends them.

While I was Chargé, in the Spring of 1977, Carter made his first overseas trip. That was an interesting experience. It was much different from the Nixon visit. It did begin with an embarrassment because at the request of the Department of State we had booked the suites and rooms at Claridge's that we had used in the past for Nixon and Kissinger visits. When Carter heard that, he said he was not going to stay at Claridge's. In the meantime, the hotel had given notice to all of its guests that they would have to vacate; it canceled reservations already made. We had a major uproar on our hands when Carter said that he wouldn't stay at Claridge's. The hotel wanted payment for its losses; the White House refused. It said that it had not authorized the reservations in the first place. It got very messy. Carter stayed at the residence. I went to the airport to meet him. We rode back to town together with his son Chip, all of us crowded together in the back seat of a Chevy. We had two motorcycle escorts, but no motorcade. Kissinger would never have traveled like that.

This was of course Carter's first trip abroad. He acted genuinely surprised when a few Londoners would stop and wave. He didn't think that anyone would recognize him. I took him into the residence and showed him around. I took him into the Ambassador's bedroom where he was going to stay. There was a huge bed. He said that he would find it difficult to make up the bed in the morning. He was serious; that was the way he was, at least at the beginning of his administration. It was sort of funny!

Q: Did the visit go well substantively?

SPIERS: Yes. He met with a lot of people in one on one situations. He had a meeting with the Queen. He wrote notes by hand after the meetings thanking people. I got one; they all were addressed "TO:" -- the Queen, Ronald Spiers, etc. It was his style. He wrote the notes on little White House stationery pads. I think the British were puzzled by Carter; they didn't know what to make of him. In some respects, I suspect they viewed him as a hick. He didn't seem to be

overawed by the pomp and circumstances, although it is true that he had less of that than his successors had. It was also much more informal than the Nixon visit.

The London tour was another great three years. A lot of it was just personal enjoyment of London life -- the theater, the music, the city, the intelligent people.

Q: Did you have any difficulties with the large presence of other U.S. government agencies?

SPIERS: Indeed I did. Everybody wanted to be represented in London. It was a constant problem for the Department of State. The whole question of U.S. representation abroad was an issue because the State Department is too often the minority of an Embassy staff. That was certainly true in London. Carter raised this question with me on the way in from the airport. He asked him many American government employees there were in London. I gave him the number, which I read from a little 3x5 card that Mike Conlon, the Counselor for Administration, had given me. It was something like 741 people and Carter was aghast. He thought that that was just terrible; actually that was a reduction of approximately 500 from the level that was in effect when I had been in the U.K. in 1969. That was due in part to the closing of most of our consulates. But then I asked the President to guess how many were Foreign Service officers. He tried several numbers, all too high. The lowest he got to was 50; in fact, there were only 46 Foreign Service officers in the whole Embassy and that included all of the political, economic, consular and administrative staffs. We continually tried to lower the American presence. Kingman Brewster was perhaps more effective on this issue than any of his predecessors because I had impressed on him that he had to take some actions. For example, we had twelve Coast Guard people in London. We had too many USIA people, we had AID personnel, a big CIA liaison staff -- the CIA personnel were "declared" -- not clandestine. Everything was unnecessarily large. Almost every agency of government had representation. The U.S. government would not have suffered had there been fewer people in the Embassy, but London was a very attractive post; it was good living, it was easy to reach, there was no problem in assigning people there. So it was an obvious place for federal agencies to set up shop.

The American presence was essentially an issue of cost control. It was not a foreign policy problem as it is in some posts. The British don't pay that much attention to Embassies. It is always an embarrassment when other diplomats or a Britisher ask you the size of your staff and you have to confess to this huge number.

We had a lot of Congressional delegations; it was a constant stream. Most of them were shopping trips. When I first went to London as Minister in 1974, we came directly from Vermont, where, as I mentioned, we were waiting out the Annenberg departure. We flew overnight and arrived in London in the morning. As soon as I arrived at the Embassy, I immediately had to brief a Congressional delegation. One of the Congressmen was Wayne Hayes who was as always very nasty. When I started the briefings, he stood up rustling his papers and said: "I know all this stuff. I have heard all this before from the State Department". And he left to go shopping. He would buy antiques, intimidating the shopkeepers to bring the prices down. His military escorts would carry the objects away to the military aircraft for a customs-free flight home. He was corrupt.

Most of the Congressional delegations were not in London for serious business. But we had to put on a show for each -- a reception, a party or something. We'd give them a briefing, but then we would leave them alone to do their own thing. Many were very demanding. Fortunately, the Embassy had a British employee -- Joan Auten -- who was well known to every American Congressman because she performed for each all sorts of services -- and I do mean "all sorts". One does not get a favorable view of the U.S. Congress through the Congressional delegations that pass through London.

Q: Auten set the standard for service to U.S. Congressmen throughout Europe. She was known to all American Embassies on the Continent. In 1977, you were appointed as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey.

DOUGLAS G. HARTLEY
Commercial Attaché
London (1974-1978)

Douglas G. Hartley was born in England to American parents and was educated at Eton and Harvard University. After entering the Foreign Service in 1956, his assignments abroad have included Copenhagen, Salzburg, Belgrade, Milan, Athens, Rome, London and Brazil. Mr. Hartley was interviewed in 1998 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: You were in London from when to when?

HARTLEY: From 1974 to '78.

Q: I would have thought that a commercial attaché in the United Kingdom would be sort of almost an oxymoron, our ties are so close.

HARTLEY: London was still an enormous embassy. I was one of four assistant attaches, there was a commercial attaché and there was a minister for commercial affairs! My specialty was the engineering and industrial sector which after a while I managed to gain the offshore oil sector which was interesting as it was a time of rapid development of the North Sea oil. The economic section was very jealous lest the commercial section get involved in matters that were economic in nature. So we ended up by sticking pretty close to the commerce-mandated programs such as WTDRs [World Trade Directory Reports], Agency-Distribution searches, and, of course, support of the Trade Center, which had its own rather ample staff and its own building about a mile away from the embassy. The commercial function at that time was still in the hands of the State Department.

The Commercial Minister in the beginning was Archie Andrews. He was an old-line commerce type. Later, fortunately for me, Andrews was replaced by Cal Berlin. My immediate boss for a good part of the time was Larry Williamson. After having had a fairly free reign in Belgrade, I didn't really initially certainly find it at all challenging.

Q: You were sort of given the toothpick industry to work on?

HARTLEY: Basically, light bulbs and toothpicks! Yes, I was given the least desirable sectors to deal with. I was not a particularly happy camper professionally those first couple of years and there were many bewildering adjustments to a single life, so different is the single state to the married one. I found that I was ignored by the embassy's married set but I still had the double responsibilities of the single parent. I had four kids in four different schools. I decided to opt for English schools because I felt that the education that my daughters were getting was probably better than they would get in the American schools in London. My son went into what the British call a prep school - equivalent to junior high - and then ended up in Rugby School, one of the outstanding so-called public schools (actually what we call prep schools) in England. And I initially had daughters in three different schools, though that narrowed to two when Virginia, my eldest, graduated from Tring, a ballet academy and launched her career as a dancer. So every two weeks I spent the weekend visiting offspring and although the schools were more or less in the same area (the midlands) they were several hours north of London. For the two younger children, the sudden divorce and uprooting to new schools, boarding schools at that, was traumatic to say the least. Richard tried to run away twice, even boarding a truck at midnight not far from his school, then being turned in to the police. Charlotte was also in a strict school in the countryside and lost about 10 or 15 pounds. My personal life was a shambles, it was a very, very difficult adjustment. If you've been for married 18 years and suddenly go into the life of a single person, it's extremely difficult. I had no conception of the difficulties of converting from being a married person, family oriented, to being a bachelor, trying to establish relationships! I married when I was 22 and had minimal experience of dating, had been to single sex schools. I was floundering around like a teenager, seeking I guess the security that a long-term relationship brings, and of course, not finding it. It was probably just as well that I didn't have a demanding job. I don't think I could have handled it. It wasn't by the way, all negative, there was the excitement of the chase, if you want to call it that, and I most certainly wasn't bored at least the first two years. From 1976 or thereabouts, however, I became restless, I needed to reestablish myself and move on both personally and professionally. But I didn't want to uproot the kids yet again so I extended a tour.

Q: Well, looking at the British economy. Essentially, you were there in the pre-Thatcher years.

HARTLEY: The big thing about England at that time was that it was first of all, the discovery of North Sea oil, the discovery and the flow of North Sea oil into the British economy. That was probably the most important thing we had. And the second thing was that you had a pretty doctrinaire labor government. The labor unions were at the height of their powers, and were very destructive to the British economy. One of the interesting things about the offshore oil: when I went to one of the offshore rigs, I asked the manager particularly about whether the workers there were members of trade unions. They said, "God, no. Can you imagine if we would ever get this oil out if we had eighteen different guild unions represented on this particular offshore platform? We'd never get anything done. We'd spend out whole life quarreling with the unions and people going on strike." So basically, the labor government, much against all their ideological will, ended up by never asserting this trade union movement in respect to the offshore oil.

Q: That's interesting. I would have thought that there would have been a built-in--I'm not sure it's the right word--disdain for how the British labor movement treated its economy, by the American diplomats. I mean, just the feeling, you know...I mean at a certain point they seem to be more interested in quarreling than producing. And Americans--we may have our problems--but there is the bottom line. The British bottom line was not keyed to productivity, I would think.

HARTLEY: No. That's true. It was very frustrating, because it was a very bad time in English economic life, and political life for that matter earlier. You had the great Carnaby Street business - the Beatles and all that stuff in the late '60s and early '70s. And that was when British fashions were in vogue and London was kind of the center of things.

Q: Swinging.

HARTLEY: Swinging. That was pretty well burnt out by the time I got there. Not only that, the other thing was the Irish Republican Army. The IRA was extremely active when I was there. In fact my kids, I remember when they went Christmas shopping - they had just been in England a couple of months. They went to Harrod's. They were all hustled out of Harrod's because someone saw something smoking in some sort of bin you kept wastepaper in. The IRA was threatening bomb strikes throughout London, so that was an unsettling time. The British economy was in pretty poor shape, particularly larger industrial works like Leyland Motors were being crippled by these strikes. The labor union was obviously very left-wing, if not communist. I think the Brits felt that they were kind of put-upon, and they felt very frustrated by the performance of their economy even though there were still areas that were technically very good. But the influence of heavy taxation on the smaller producers, crippling competition from Japan and Europe and the threat of nationalization or strikes by belligerent workers, made it hard to do business there.

I was able to break out of my--well, I think it was partly me--I sort of recovered from my lethargy. And I looked about to see what was interesting. One of my areas was machine tools and equipment so I used that to get to Scotland and follow the evolution of the oil rigs. Even though the economic section kept grumbling about stepping on their toes and getting in their way, I was able to write some interesting reports about offshore oil.

Q: I would have thought that it would have been a good commercial place, because as far as I know the United States is sort of preeminent in the oil drilling equipment and that sort of thing.

HARTLEY: That's right. Another growth area that I got involved in, something that I was just developing when I left, was the Middle East. We were the powers in Saudi Arabia, but in UAE and Qatar and other places along the Gulf, the British absolutely had a monopoly there. So I was working with Commerce to introduce U.S. subcontractors to the large UK construction firms. I developed a Middle Eastern section within the commercial section in the embassy. I was able to get this recognized in the embassy and had a local, Colin Moore to work on it with me. It was pretty lively. We were making contacts with actual people from the Middle East and those areas were coming in. We had lunch with them and talked with them. In the meantime, politically the offshore oil was beginning to get results for the British and beginning to have an impact on them.

Thatcher was the rising star of the Conservative Party. She took over the leadership from Heath and then in 1978, just after my departure, she became prime minister.

Oh, the other thing from a personal point of view, this is the second time I've been involved in a presidential visit. In 1977 Jimmy Carter decided to take his first overseas trip. After consultation with Edward Callaghan, who was the British prime minister, it was decided that Jimmy Carter - rather than going to London right away - should go to Newcastle, which is up in the northeastern part of England. It is a rather drab, underdeveloped area of England, home for some of the old rust-belt industries like shipbuilding and steel working and that sort of thing. But Union Carbide and Corning Glass had fairly large-scale operations there. For some reason they decided... I guess maybe the president had met the president of Union Carbide or something, and they said, "Why don't you go and see our factory." So a team of us went up--I was control officer--to Newcastle. I was one of the control officers, not THE overall control officer that I was working with. I had been in touch with the security concerns of the presidential advance people before, but this was more than I could believe possible. Everyone was so damned nervous because this was, as I said, the first time the president had been on an overseas and this was the very first stop. So you can imagine how people felt about this. But out of it comes one of my better stories, which I'm going to inflict on you.

One of the things about Newcastle was that part of George Washington's family came from the Newcastle area called Washington, the town Washington near Newcastle. So one of the deals was for the president to visit the family residence, I guess it was, of the first president. Someone came up with the idea of getting a cherry tree from Mt. Vernon, transporting it over to Newcastle, and planting it in a park in Newcastle. So this was done with true military precision. They got this little cherry tree and they put it on a C-109 transportation plane, a huge thing. It arrived in Newcastle in the middle of the night and was duly escorted. But when it was opened and the sackcloth was removed, it was looking extremely sick and wilted. So we summoned a tree surgeon, the cherry tree was put in a hotel room, and he injected the tree with various substances. A vigil was mounted and believe it or not, as morning came the tree showed signs of life. So when the president arrived, the tree was duly planted and everything was fine. It was great. I came back to Newcastle nine months later for no particular reason--I mean, I had a business meeting. I happened to look in the paper that morning. It said, there was a little item that said, "The cherry tree that President Carter planted on this site nine months ago died and has been taken out."

In early 1978, there was a meeting of the foreign ministers of Israel and Egypt which had taken months of delicate preparations in which our ambassador, Kingman Brewster, was involved. The meeting took place at Leeds Castle in Kent, a picture postcard castle about an hour's drive southeast of London. The first thing they had to do--and it was very funny to watch this: before everybody came to Leeds Castle, they had to figure out who was going to occupy which room. I remember seeing this huge map of the castle, an enormous castle with all the floors pictorially represented. The Jews and the Egyptians and the others, all on their knees sort of jockeying as to who was going to be in each room. And arguing. I thought, "Well, at least this is one way of getting together." What else can I say about England at that time?

Q: Who was the ambassador?

HARTLEY: We had four different ambassadors.

Q: Good God!

HARTLEY: We had Walter Annenberg, a Republican, there for a few months. I just remember meeting him briefly and going to the house. They said that all the florists in that part of London went into mourning when Annenbergs left because they spent so much money on floral decorations. He was replaced by Elliot Richardson, who had been sent out in the aftermath of Watergate. He was there for about a year, and then Anne Armstrong, who was a Republican from Texas, replaced him. Anne Armstrong was actually there, I think, when the Carter visit came, because that was just after he had become president. She was replaced by Kingman Brewster, a Carter appointee who had been the former president of Yale. He was there for the last two years I was there. Of those, Richardson was a very fine guy, and I felt was very much respected in England. He was the right type for the English--very much a gentleman and a very nice person. Anne Armstrong was popular, an attractive, spunky woman. She was not an easy person to deal with. Fortunately, I never had much to do with her but I knew a couple of people who did, who ran afoul of her and were shot down in no uncertain terms, one of them having been her aide for about two weeks. It was enough. Again, I never had any problems with her, but then I never had anything much to do with her. My theory was to stay away from the ambassadors in a place like London. You tended just to get yourself in hot water.

Q: Did you find that there was any particular interest on the part of the ambassadors? Really, in the embassy and the commercial side of things?

HARTLEY: Not really. I guess, you know, when you had a really high-level visitor from Esso or Exxon, maybe the minister would come with the ambassador for a meeting. But as far as the day to day stuff went, the ambassadors were never really much involved. They were very busy, a tremendous social schedule. They had a lot of high-level visitors. They weren't much involved in the day to day operations.

Q: How about, on the commerce side, did the trade missions sort of vacation or have a rest stop in England, or are they more likely to go to Paris?

HARTLEY: Well, we did have a trade center in London, as I believe I mentioned. In fact, one of my jobs was to be a kind of liaison with the trade center, help them with their recruiting of publications of their stuff--briefing U.S. businessmen about conditions in England in that particular sector, and giving them the usual kind of briefing thing Foreign Service officers do. But I used to get to all the trade fairs. I was once able to wrangle a trip to Stavanger, in Norway, which also had an oil and gas show. We needed to do some recruiting efforts in Stavanger. I was able to get over there and help try to recruit some companies for a show that was being given in Birmingham. Yes, so I was very much in these shows, though I didn't actually directly organize them as I had in Belgrade. I used to help. That was all right.

Q: After this time in London in '78, what was on your plate?

HARTLEY: Well, I was coming up to the end of my assignment and thank god Cal Berlin, in 1977 who became the new commercial minister, was on the same wavelength. Cal was very pragmatic, a very bright guy who didn't put up with a lot of guff. He and I took to each other. So he kind of put me in charge of a reorganization of the commercial section, which was quite a task because it was one of these commercial sections that had been running along for years and years. The locals had been there for years, and he felt that they needed to be streamlined, updated, and reorganized. I became a kind of running dog. This didn't help my popularity with some of the locals, I might hastily add. We had to basically reorganize the commercial library and in a way managed to force the librarian to go. She was very competent but she wasn't responsive to some of the new organization standards that were being applied to commercial libraries across the board. So this was another aspect of what I did in London. I ended up feeling that I had accomplished a fair amount in London and had broken away from the real humdrum stuff that I was saddled with when I started.

The only ambassador that I really had anything much to do with at all was maybe Elliot Richardson, but that was tangentially. I did, however, know Ray Seitz. He was then in the political section. He went on to become ambassador. The only career ambassador, I think, who had ever been in England. Ray and I used to play squash together and I got to know him quite well though he lived in Windsor so was usually unavailable after office hours.

The only thing is that I was, I guess, getting used to the fact of bachelorhood. I felt there was a lot of suspicion from the married people at the post--about somebody who was single the way I was--even though I had my own children and everything. They just didn't think of inviting me or including me on a lot of functions that I normally would have been involved in. So I felt quite isolated. In a way that was good, because I had a lot of things I wanted to do on the side. So I didn't really care that much. But certainly initially I didn't get a whole lot of sympathy, not that I needed or wanted it. From that point of view, it was very cold. Also, I had come from a post like Belgrade where people were very much warmer and more congenial. You were on top of each other a lot more, which had both bad and good sides. But to go to a place like London, from that point of view was a shock--even though England, as far as a post goes, you can't complain, goodness knows. I'm not complaining.

JACK R. BINNS
Political Counselor
London (1974-1979)

Jack R. Binns was born in Oregon in 1933. He received a bachelor's of science from the Naval Academy in 1956 and subsequently served overseas with the U.S. Navy. In 1963, he joined the Foreign Service, serving in Guatemala, La Paz, and San Salvador. Mr. Binns was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: You served in London from 1974 to 1979 -- five years. What was your assignment?

BINNS: I started out working on the Labor Party, the Northern Ireland issue, the Scottish and Welsh national issues and I was the resident expert on Latin America.

Q: Lets' start with Northern Ireland. What were we doing on this subject?

BINNS: Kingman Brewster, who was my Ambassador at the end of my tour in London, put it best. He said: "In law, you have to distinguish between a problem and a fact. The problem you can resolve; the fact you have to accept. Northern Ireland clearly appears to be a fact". That sums it up precisely. What we in the Embassy tried to do, not always with success, was to try to keep the United States out of it. We had no business in it; we wished both sides -- the Irish, the British, the Ulstermen Protestants and the Catholics -- well. But it was not our problem or our fact. There was and still may be, although less so, a tendency particularly in the Irish-American community, to try to get the United States involved in the resolution of what they perceive to be as the "Northern Island problem" as opposed to the "Northern Ireland fact".

Q: Were there any pressures from people like Senator Kennedy and Speaker Tip O'Neill, both of whom represented large Irish-American communities, on behalf of the Northern Ireland Catholics?

BINNS: In 1974, when I went to London, Ted Kennedy had made some statements that upset the British. They were outraged by his involvement which they felt was based on ignorance of the situation in Northern Ireland. They thought that his statements were unhelpful. In case of O'Neill, during my five years there, I don't remember anything that he did that drew British outrage or even concern. In that same period, Kennedy's activities became less obnoxious to the British; he may have gained a better appreciation of the situation in Northern Ireland and what the two governments were doing. In my last year in London, I became the Political Counselor -- chief of the Political Section. I had four different Ambassadors while I was in London -- Walter Annenberg, Elliot Richardson, Ann Armstrong and Kingston Brewster.

Q: In the Northern Ireland case, we were not trying to play the "honest broker"?

BINNS: That was certainly the institutional preference. The State Department didn't want to touch it because it was and still is a "tar baby" and something over which we really have no influence and no ability to affect.

There was one compelling issue which to some extent is still an issue -- or a collection of issues. I refer to the fund raising by the IRA in the U.S., illegal arm shipments from the U.S. to Northern Ireland in support of the IRA, extradition of people that the British want and who live in the U.S. Those issues are always with us.

Q: During this period, how were we dealing with these IRA problems and how did the British Government perceive our efforts?

BINNS: We condemned the IRA as government. Certainly there were members of Congress -- and not all were Irish-American. There were some Italian-Americans who were very vocal -- pro IRA. We supported the efforts of the Irish and British governments to resolve the problem. We

supported direct rule and power sharing. There was a power sharing government for the first time in 1973-74 that ultimately collapsed in the face of popular opposition. Power sharing called for Catholic and Protestant politicians who formed a single government for the Northern province. But it lacked popular support and was brought down by a labor strike by Protestant workers. They closed the economy of the province and the government collapsed and direct rule from Westminster followed -- no local Parliament, no local government.

Q: What was the status of the Welsh and Scottish nationalities issues at the time?

BINNS: There was a major interest concerning Scotland. The national problem of Wales is basically non-existent. There was an opportunity in 1979 for the Welsh and Scots to vote on what the British called "devolution" -- essentially the return of powers from the central government to regional governments, which at the time didn't exist. The regional governments would have to be established. In Wales, about 70% of the people voted against devolution. In Scotland, of the people who bothered to vote, about 60% voted in favor, but the referendum was so drafted that in order to be approved, it required the support of 60% of registered voters. In Scotland, the vote fell short of it. So there was no devolution there either. However in Scotland, nationalism is alive although not well. In Wales, it is a dead issue.

Q: As a political officer and subsequently Counselor, what were your main concerns?

BINNS: It was a matter of avoiding problems. We tried to have the British government to continue to support our strategic interests in NATO and other parts of the world. The British, through the Commonwealth, an historical association with and influence over areas of Africa, the Middle East and South Asia that allow them to do things that we can't do. They can gain information which we couldn't collect on our own. So they are very helpful to us. The preservation of that collaboration, the preservation of their commitment to NATO, the preservation of their position vis a vis the Soviet Union were the main interests.

Q: Were there any major point of conflict with which you had to deal?

BINNS: There a number of them, none of them earth shaking. One thing that was of concern was the leftward drift of the Labor Party, which, if it had continued, might have threatened the British commitment to the alliance, threatened their participation in European affairs and our collaboration in other areas of the world. Michael Foot was identified with this left wing strain in the Labor party as was Neil Kinnock, the current Party leader. In fact he has brought the party toward the right. What concerned us most was what we called "entryism" which because of the Labor Party's structure, permitted extreme left wing groups -- usually Trotskyites -- to enter a constituency party organization and with twenty or thirty people who were willing to dedicate time to the effort, could take over that organization. A Labor Party constituent party in Dorking, England is no threat to the United States, but what they did, when they took over the party, was to determine who the party's candidate for Parliament might be from that constituency. Theoretically at least, if they were able to make this "entryism" program stick, they could control and dominate the Parliamentary party, which is, of course, when Labor wins an election, is what runs the government.

I arrived just after Ted Heath had lost the February elections. So Labor was in power when I arrived and when I left in July 1979, Margaret Thatcher had just come into office. So I served my London tour entirely with a Labor government. Harold Wilson was the Prime Minister initially and he was followed by Jim Callaghan.

Q: There was book written about Wilson's overthrow. What was that all about?

BINNS: According to the person who advanced this theory, MI-5, which is the domestic intelligence organization comparable in some, but not many, respects to our FBI, felt that Wilson, for a long, convoluted and not very persuasive series of reasons, was an agent of influence for the Soviet Union. Some people say that helped contribute to his resignation and in turning the plot over to Callaghan. The plot was that the MI-5 people and their cohorts were going to make this public and that threat caused Wilson to step down. I don't believe a word of it.

Q: Were we comfortable with a Labor government?

BINNS: Quite. They were extremely supportive not only in NATO but also vis a vis the European Community, etc. We might have a discrete problem here and there -- e.g. shipping arms to Chile -- but no major issues. There were extensive consultations on all issues, global as well as local. Our level of foreign policy cooperation and consultation was closer with the British than any other foreign country. Not because the British were better allies than for example the Germans, but because the British through the Commonwealth and their historical connections, had a greater reach than others.

Q: Were you able to contact anyone in the British government?

BINNS: It was a unique experience for me that a foreign government was so open. People were extremely open with us. It was almost like working in Washington, maybe even better.

Q: Did you find it a problem to keep on top of all the relationships between the Embassy and the government? Or of telephonic conversations between Washington and the British government?

BINNS: I think that was true in the U.K. and some other posts. A lot of it has to do with who the Ambassador is. Clearly during the Annenberg period, the British, while many liked him personally, did not consider him to be a "serious" representative. As a consequence, the British began to conduct more business through their Embassy in Washington than through us in London. I think that changed with the advent of Elliot Richardson, who was probably at that time, at his peak of fame. He was regarded as a "serious" person and politician and was extremely connected in the U.S.; Annenberg's departure coincided almost with a change in the U.S. government. I think then the Labor government was more comfortable dealing with us than with unknown persons in the State Department and other agencies in Washington. Later, they solved that perception by changing their ambassador in Washington. But clearly the change of our ambassadors in London shifted the burden of dialogue from the British Embassy in Washington to the American Embassy in London.

Q: How was Anne Armstrong regarded?

BINNS: She was extremely well liked and earned everyone's respect -- British as well as Embassy staff -- because of her intelligence and her ability to pick up very quickly on an issue. While her appointment initially was not greeted with a great deal of enthusiasm, she won the respect of all through her intelligence, diligence and the seriousness of her approach to her job. Both Richardson and Armstrong had rather brief periods in London -- a year plus. That of course increased the burdens on the Embassy's professional staff. We were blessed during this period with Ron Spiers as the DCM -- an extremely able officer who had had a distinguished career. He was followed by Ed Streater, who was also a very able and distinguished officer.

Q: Brewster had a much longer tour. He had been President of Yale. How did he perform?

BINNS: He was an outstanding Ambassador. He was the best that I served, partly because he had a longer tenure, but also because of his relationship with Cy Vance, the Secretary of State. They were close personally and Brewster could reach Vance at any time and essentially get anything he wanted out of the State Department. Unless you have witnessed such a relationship, you don't realize how helpful it can be, whether you are talking about resources, policy issues or anything else. Brewster could make things happen.

Q: That is an interesting point. It is often assumed that a political appointee has automatic access to people in power. This is not always the case. But it is certainly helpful an Ambassador who has direct access to the Secretary of State instead of some White House staffer.

BINNS: That is certainly true. There are many issues that are resolved by the White House, either through the NSC or through a staffer to the President. Rarely, although I am sure it happens, the issue is resolved by a direct call to the President.

Q: How did Carter relate to the British?

BINNS: Callaghan had a very strong and close relationship with Henry Kissinger. They were two different types, but they struck it off very well. They were personally close. For example, when Callaghan was named a "free man" of Cardiff, Wales, which was quite an honor, Henry Kissinger came from the United States to participate in the ceremonies at Callaghan's invitation. That was a personal gesture; it was not a policy matter; the two just liked each other considerably. That did not happen in the Carter period, in part because Vance was not the same type as Kissinger. Callaghan had become Prime Minister; David Owen was the Foreign Secretary and the same chemistry that existed between Kissinger and Callaghan did not flow between Vance and Owens. On the other hand, the Labor party liked Jimmy Carter a lot and particularly were pleased with his emphasis on human rights. The decision on the neutron bomb, for example, blindsided the British, who felt that it was handled very amateurishly.

In NATO, we had mooted the possibility of deploying an advance nuclear weapon that had the advantage of destroying targets by radiation -- it killed the men inside a tank, but not the tank. It could be dropped on an occupied village for example and not destroy it, although the occupying army would be killed. Unfortunately, it would also kill any civilians in the village as well. There would be no long term radiation effect. It was believed that it was a partial answer to the West

German and other continental European concerns about the possible destructiveness of nuclear war in Europe. We labored long and hard to persuade our allies that this was the weapon of the future and necessary for the defense of Western Europe. They were not easily convinced; in fact, the Germans were never convinced at all. Others went along with varying degrees of reluctance and agreed with the decision. At the last minute, without previous consultation -- which was the key -- the Administration decided not to deploy the neutron weapon. Because a lot of people had their arms twisted and had been forced to agree to decision to deploy -- a decision with which they were somewhat uncomfortable and which was unpopular in their countries -- they felt they had been left out on a limb and that Carter then sawed off the limb. If he had consulted with them, they could have scrambled back to safety.

Q: *How did the U.S. view Thatcher's election at the time it happened?*

BINNS: As George Brown once said, after he had lost his Parliamentary seat: "Democracy is democ". We are democrats and we think democracy is a great thing, so we were happy to deal with her. Personally, I never liked her. I found her very hard edged, opinionated, not open to reason and argument in my limited contacts with her at dinner parties and social events. For the Embassy, it was business as usual.

ELLIOT RICHARDSON
Ambassador
United Kingdom (1975-1976)

Ambassador Richardson was born and raised in Boston, Massachusetts and educated at Harvard College. He served in the US Army in World War II, A lawyer by profession, he began his distinguished career in public service as assistant to Senator Saltonstall, later accepting senior level appointments in the Executive Branch of the government. Among the positions in which he served were Secretary of the Departments of Health, Education and Welfare (1970-1973); Defense (1973), and Commerce (1976-1977). In the Department of State he served as Under Secretary (1969-1970), and in 1975 he was named US Ambassador to Great Britain, where he served until 1976. From 1977 to 1980 Mr. Richardson held the title of Ambassador at Large. He died in 1999. Ambassador Richardson was interviewed by Alan James in 1996.

Q: *Let's just jump in a little bit to your tour as ambassador to the Court of St. James's.*

RICHARDSON: You probably know more about that than I do.

Q: *Yes, but people want to hear what you have to say and not what I want to say. I've said it once in an interview I did.*

RICHARDSON: I might as well level with you and anybody who later realizes this. The job you had, the job the DCM had, the jobs the economic counselor and the information officer had in

London were all important jobs. The job the ambassador had was not. I think there are two reasons for that. One is that Presidents and Secretaries of State like dealing directly with their British counterparts. The other reason, at least in that period, was that there were few large issues that needed to be taken up by the American ambassador with the British foreign secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer or, indeed, the Prime Minister. On the economic front, in almost all the difficult issues, the party seeking some action or some benefit was on the British side--landing rights for the Concorde or Pilkington Plate Glass, for instance. There were a lot of things that properly fell within the role of the DCM, a highly capable guy. All the Embassy's junior people were highly capable and experienced. But the things they dealt with were not appropriately things that I was called upon to deal with.

The result was, therefore, that my role and my wife's was largely one of trying to maintain and sustain cordial relations with a variety of people. We deliberately sought to broaden the range of people who were invited to Winfield House. I was perhaps the only ambassador who ever met with the Executive Committee of the Trade Union Congress, whom I invited for dinner one evening at the chancery. We had people from a variety of other roles and backgrounds. I found it very valuable that having been both a politician and a bureaucrat, I could empathize with and imagine what was going on politically, where Callahan and Heale and Jenkins were involved, and also...I can't come up with the name.

Q: Harold Wilson?

RICHARDSON: Not Wilson. I didn't see him a lot. That reminds me, though, of a conversational gambit I sometimes employed when I found myself sitting next to a corporate CEO or a prominent leader. I would lean over to him and say, "You know, it's so interesting to have the opportunity to meet someone like yourself. I can't resist asking a question that has long fascinated me." I used this on Wilson at a luncheon he gave for me at Number 10 Downing Street. I said, "Has intrigue ever played a significant part in your career?" He had a row of pipes in front of him, including a colored pipe that had been given to him by Gerry Ford.

Q: And Nelson Rockefeller, too. I remember, we went to call on him and Rockefeller pulled out three colored pipes.

RICHARDSON: Oh, he did? Puffing on one of his pipes, Wilson said, "Well, in my career, I can't say that I've ever practiced intrigue on my own account, but I have been called upon from time to time to deal in the requirements of counter-intrigue." Well, damned if sometime later I heard Wilson give the principal speech at the annual dinner at the British Academy. He spent a lot of time building on the uniqueness of his own prime ministerial career and then turned to some of the insights derived from that experience. "In the course of my career," he said, "I have never found it necessary to engage in intrigue. There have been times, however, when I have been obliged to practice counter-intrigue."

ROGER SCHRADER
British Trade Union Congress

London (1975-1979)

In addition to London, Roger Schrader served in New Zealand and West Germany. He was interviewed by Herbert Weiner on June 18, 1991.

SCHRADER: The development of this particular issue had a spin off in terms of the relationship between the British trade union movement and the AFL-CIO in the United States. During this period many of the leaders and significant elements in the British trade union movement were adamantly opposed not only to the foreign policy and defense policy of the Thatcher Government, but of the United States and of the NATO countries. The AFL-CIO was seen by many of these elements as a strong and staunch supporter of these issues and that perception was which was real caused a considerable freeze in the relationships between the two organizations. During the time that I was there in the early years this began to thaw with the exchange of delegations which was instituted by the AFL-CIO and the TUC at the level of the respective economic committees of the two organizations. This was done principally because both sides, that was elements of both sides who wanted to continue the relationship and rebuild it realized that there were so many frictions on the political issues that there really would be no incentive for discussions to take place at that level simply because there would be so much disagreement on the basic issues. The wiser heads on both sides decided that the better choice would be to get together on economic issues and to discuss these. This was continued during the first year that I was in London with some success. The existence of an American trade union fraternal delegate at the annual TUC Conference persisted during this whole period. It was not shut off at least during my time there. However, there were some pretty uneasy situations where the AFL-CIO representative was confronted with either large blocks of delegates walking out of the conference hall or lack of applause and in some case boos about things that this person would say, so the relationship was a very uneasy one during these years caused in large part by the hard left's view or antagonism towards the views of the AFL-CIO on foreign policy and defense issues, with which both the United States Government and the British Government under Thatcher were in pretty solid agreement.

ANNE LEGENDRE ARMSTRONG

Ambassador

United Kingdom (1976-1977)

Ambassador Anne Legendre Armstrong was born in New Orleans in 1927. She graduated from Vassar College in 1949. Throughout her political career, Ms. Armstrong was very involved in the Republican Party. She was a presidential counselor under Presidents Nixon and Ford and was appointed as ambassador to the United Kingdom in 1976. Ambassador Armstrong was interviewed by Ann Miller Morin in 1987 and 1988.

Q: For this second interview, I would like, if you don't mind, to discuss how you came to be chosen to be first woman ambassador to the Court of St. James, which is a very big job.

ARMSTRONG: You've asked me about one of the few mysteries as far as my jobs go in my career, because almost every other job I've had, I've wanted and I've tried for. Certainly that was true of being co-chairman of the Republican National Committee; I asked for it. It was true of being a counselor for the president; I certainly hinted broadly to the president that I would like it. And President Ford knew I wanted to stay on after Nixon. This one is, really -- I don't know, because I had been out of public life. I thought I owed it to my family to go back and be a wife and mother again. I was living that kind of a life in Armstrong, Texas, when I got a very surprising phone call in December from President Ford, asking me to be ambassador to Great Britain.

Q: What was your immediate reaction?

ARMSTRONG: I was totally thrilled and totally surprised. I knew I wanted very much to do it, but it took quite a while. I couldn't have done it, or wouldn't have done it, if my husband hadn't agreed that he would go, and that meant then we had to find somebody to run the ranch in his absence, because it's a family ranch and we had to find someone that the rest of the family would be happy with. That took about three weeks to get all those things settled.

We had our eldest son working on a ranch in Venezuela, and he had just started the job a few months before; adored it, but agreed to come back, and that was hard for him. My husband was so upset by the idea that he literally got sick and lost weight beforehand -- in the months before we went over. But the happy end to that story is that although he said that he would try to be there for all the most important times that I needed him, he would have to go back every month to help our son with the ranch and other business interests. The way it turned out, he went back once from England to Texas and never went back again except when we both went on vacation. He was very happy, very busy; made the friends that truly are our best friends now. He agrees with me that was, if not the best time in his life, one of the best times.

Q: Was there any initial reaction on his part? "No, this is out of the question. We can't do this."

ARMSTRONG: There may have been, but he didn't say so to me. He listened to all my arguments. We talked to lots of people we both respected. We both talked to our son and the rest of our family, and he finally agreed, and agreed wholeheartedly, as far as what he intended to do. But it did make him very unhappy. When I was doing these jobs in Washington, he didn't have to be here. I mean, he rarely came up. I would go home on weekends. But for this job, he'd have to leave the ranch and be there. And there's no doubt that most males don't like the idea of being three steps behind.

Q: I know it. I can imagine, especially in such a visible job as that.

ARMSTRONG: That's right.

Q: Yes, but he did do it.

ARMSTRONG: And in a new milieu. I mean, neither one of us knew very much about England; had very few friends there. It would be strange territory.

Q: You say it's just a mystery; you don't know why --

ARMSTRONG: It is a mystery. I don't know. I think President Ford genuinely wanted to appoint more women, and he had worked with me for a number of years. And then, of course, most recently I was his counselor in the White House. I think he thought I could do the job, and he really was reaching out to find women to give them top jobs.

Q: You had left that job in the White House for personal reasons, hadn't you?

ARMSTRONG: I had really wanted to leave earlier than that, but then Watergate came. That was a horrible experience. And President Ford asked me to stay on, really to help get the White House and him through that period; plus, in a way, I wanted to sort of cleanse myself, as it were, so I stayed a few months with him. It was just a wonderful experience in every way. He was marvelous to work for.

Q: From the tone of the letters in your correspondence at his library, you seem to know him very well.

ARMSTRONG: Yes, I do, and I have the highest regard and friendship for him. I see him, oh, almost every month; we're both on a board together. And I adore Mrs. Ford, so I feel close to them personally. He's really a very fine man.

Q: And she's a very courageous --

ARMSTRONG: Really. I'm just so proud. She's always been a lovable person and a dear, fine person, but what she's accomplished in recent years is extraordinary and commendable.

Q: It's remarkable. Well, you had the backing of many people, which you didn't even seem to be aware of, for this job.

ARMSTRONG: I didn't know anything about any campaign; and, in fact, if there was a campaign, this is the first I've known it. Maybe I should have shown more curiosity, but I never have known there was a campaign. In fact, it was embarrassing, because a fellow Texan, for one, and probably some other people that I don't even remember, but one man that I thought was a very good candidate, had enlisted my aid, and I had written several people in his behalf. But I never heard a word that anybody was backing me.

Q: Your swearing in ceremony seems to have been rather a formal occasion.

ARMSTRONG: It was much higher profile than those things usually are. And, again, probably several dimensions to this -- I was close to the President and Mrs. Ford, and it did highlight a high role for a woman.

Q: Yes. There was a great deal of press coverage at the time, wasn't there?

ARMSTRONG: Yes.

Q: *It was very unusual.*

ARMSTRONG: For such a, you know, big post.

Q: *And our biggest ally. Other than Clare Boothe Luce, you were the only woman who had ever been to one.*

ARMSTRONG: To a major post.

Q: *To a major post of that caliber.*

ARMSTRONG: That's right.

Q: *And still are. Kenya has been elevated to a [class] one [post], but we don't think of Kenya in the same [light], as far as being allies, and so forth.*

ARMSTRONG: That's right.

Q: *Apparently, Secretary Kissinger was there, [Brent] Scowcroft, Arthur Hartman. Here you are -- this is what was supposed to take place. They prepare this so the president will know exactly what he's to do, and so forth.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, right. Well, but it doesn't say that I said anything particularly. I think anything I said would have been in one minute.

Q: *Of course, your counterpart from Great Britain was present.*

ARMSTRONG: Peter Ramsbottam, yes.

Q: *Peter Ramsbottam was present, yes, whom you already knew. Before you left, did you go again to the White House?*

ARMSTRONG: No, not that I remember.

Q: *But you had photographs taken at that time, didn't you?*

ARMSTRONG: Yes.

Q: *Signed by Ford at the time?*

ARMSTRONG: Yes.

Q: *This is something that not all ambassadors have.*

ARMSTRONG: No. I realized at the time, novice that I was, that this was quite rare. I asked the president to do it, and he agreed to.

Q: *The swearing in, you mean?*

ARMSTRONG: Yes.

Q: *And then the pictures.*

ARMSTRONG: Oh, the pictures are rare, too?

Q: *The pictures are rare, too -- actually to have them with the president. Now, not under President Reagan -- he's very good at ceremonial things -- but under some of the others. They don't always --*

ARMSTRONG: That's a pity, because think what that means on the ambassador's wall. Oh, that little symbol can just do --

Q: *Exactly.*

ARMSTRONG: Oh, we ought to see to that.

Q: *A lot of them will send pictures of themselves and sign it, but it won't be with the ambassador.*

ARMSTRONG: Oh, that's so important.

Q: *It is, ceremonially.*

ARMSTRONG: Surely. Oh, I understand.

Q: *And Reagan, of course, has a very good grasp of what this means. But Carter never did it.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes. What a pity.

Q: *It was difficult for some of his people not to have that, because other countries always do it, I guess.*

Now, you didn't have to worry about language training. [Laughter] And did you stop over? No, you would go directly.

ARMSTRONG: I went directly. We went directly; flew in, arrived at night, and Ron Spiers and the chief counselors met us.

Q: *Did your children come to the swearing in, by the way?*

ARMSTRONG: They were all occupied at the time.

Q: Now, had you read much about the reaction of the British to your appointment?

ARMSTRONG: Let me think. Well, there was some -- I'd say slightly unfavorable -- at first, that I remember. The only really bad one -- but it was so funny that it was all right -- it was *Punch*. *Punch* did a devastating thing on -- it was a takeoff on *High Noon*. I was the ambassador, and my husband was really the chief protagonist in this piece as the shoot 'em up Texan. But if there was any other problem in the British press, I wasn't aware of it.

Q: Oh, good. Well, after all, they have a queen.

ARMSTRONG: Yes. And once I got there, I'd say the press -- because then I did see it -- was very favorable; I mean, unusually favorable, more so than I expected or probably deserved. They sort of thought it was a romantic thing -- mainly the woman, and then I think the Texan, too, rather intrigued them. Texas was riding high then, you know.

Q: That's very true; it was. When you went there as ambassador, which is, as you said, an overwhelming idea, what did you hope to accomplish as ambassador?

ARMSTRONG: Well, it is our closest ally, or certainly one of the top two or three. I hoped to further cement those relationships. I realized there'd be some economic problems over there. At that point, I really didn't know what my role was, but England was in the depths then, as you'll remember; had to get an IMF loan, which just seems unbelievable today. As far as the issues, I didn't know that Croatian terrorists overhead in a plane, hijackers, would be an issue. That never occurred to me. I knew Northern Ireland would. It was not clear to me when I went what, if anything, an American ambassador could do. I saw England, too, with London as a hub of many of our activities -- military, economic, NATO, otherwise -- so I hoped to be able to be useful in areas that weren't even strictly London, as it were.

And I guess, drawing on my own past, I thought I'd probably be pretty good -- and then this turned out to be maybe the thing I was strongest at -- was portraying the United States through the ambassador to your host country. I'd had a lot of experience doing that. I had not had a lot of experience in negotiations or running an embassy. I had been able to run volunteers -- thousands of them -- but that was my limited managerial experience.

Q: Did the job sort of frighten you at first?

ARMSTRONG: It did, although I had had some of my fears assuaged even before I went by people assuring me of the caliber of people who'd be working for me. And that, of course, turned out to be exactly what it was. And no matter what job I'd had -- and I guess the most demanding in a management sense had been co-chairman of the Republican National Committee -- you certainly can't do it all, even when you know a field as I knew U.S. politics. So, as it turned out, that's what was there. Ron Spiers couldn't have been a better complement to me; I mean, the consummate pro. Poor Ron, he'd already trained Walter Annenberg, Elliot Richardson. As you know Ron, there's nothing put-on about him. He wasn't too happy about this job, but he gave it his all; he would never hold back. And although it wasn't the challenge he was looking for at the

moment -- and he told me so -- I couldn't have asked for a finer DCM. At first, I thought he was awfully prickly, and I didn't particularly take to it. But as the weeks went on, I did appreciate him, and I wouldn't have changed him. At first I thought, "Oh oh, I don't think that this flint and steel or oil and water is going to mix at all." But it did. And our counselors, with one exception, were very strong, and therefore that makes the ambassador strong. And they were not only professionally most able, but also the chemistry was right in these instances. It was just a top flight embassy.

Q: *Well, I guess London gets the best people anyway.*

ARMSTRONG: Well, it's a plum assignment. People yearn to go there at some point in their career. And so we really had fantastic people. I mean, I was made a believer in the Foreign Service in no time flat. And their loyalty, too: the professionalism of being able to serve, to the utmost of their abilities, the person who's in place. It really is inspiring.

Q: *Yes.*

ARMSTRONG: The problems we would have were, I'd say -- I've heard from other ambassadors -- often happen in big posts, of course. Treasury and your economic ministers don't often get along. And there was some of that problem. The Henry Kissinger syndrome of conducting diplomacy behind the ambassador's back. And Henry kids me; he still hasn't got the story straight. We had a big blowup once. I picked him up at Claridge's, and I'd found out he was having some meetings with the foreign minister that I was not privy to, so I blew my top and told him, "That better not happen again." And Henry tells the story and claims I cried. Well, the last thing I was going to do was cry then. I might have bitten him, but I wasn't going to cry. So after that, that went better. But these were things that happen to ambassadors in many, many posts. In London, they're often glamorous because they involve a Henry Kissinger or a Bill Simon.

Q: *Did Bill Simon come over, too?*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, often. And he had an able person in Treasury there at the mission. He was extraordinarily able, and Treasury was the tail wagging the dog, as far as the economic section of the embassy proper.

Q: *Really?*

ARMSTRONG: It was hard to quarrel with, because it was a pretty able combination. But we had problems of them trying to send cables behind even the DCM's back.

Q: *Treasury and Econ, you mean?*

ARMSTRONG: Treasury, straight to Treasury in Washington. I quickly learned that that's a common ailment.

Q: *And so the econ officer got all upset?*

ARMSTRONG: The econ officer and Spiers got pretty upset. Simon was not exactly the most malleable soul. But no harm done. It all worked out well. In other cases, harm can be done. I don't think in these instances it was.

Q: Did you ever have to call people in and dress them down? Or did you leave Ron to do that?

ARMSTRONG: Dressing down is not usually what I do, no matter what. Correction, yes, in some instances. Mainly, Ron handled things so well that very little had to come to my attention. It would usually be such things as Cabinet heads or heads of committees that I'd have to handle. Ron would have been willing to try, but in many instances I was just the one to do it.

Q: You would have to be the one to do it, of course. They wouldn't take it from him.

ARMSTRONG: But he's so able that very little had to percolate up and cause scenes.

Q: I'm sure of that. Yes, he certainly is able, isn't he?

ARMSTRONG: Yes, and he's very straightforward. I mean, Ron calls a spade a spade. He would not have hesitated to say, "You do this," or, "You'll be no good with that." He did it. I mean, he's very honest with me, which I, once I got over my hurt feelings --

Q: You said you had a rough settling in period there. Did you ever have words, the two of you?

ARMSTRONG: No, not words. I think I'm generally pretty controlled, but I certainly had misgivings. But I got over that.

Q: I understand that you had collegial staff meetings.

ARMSTRONG: Yes. It was a splendid spirit in that mission. I really enjoyed the work. It was something you looked forward to every day.

Q: Well, tell me, had you any idea that you would have to do so much entertaining and be involved in so many things?

ARMSTRONG: No. That was probably one of the few things that wasn't surprising, because not just ambassadors, but especially females are supposed [to be], you know, "easy on the head and hard on the feet." So really, it was not as demanding, particularly in a post like London. London is so sophisticated that the demands on the ambassador, as far as the formal calls, et cetera, are less than they would be in a smaller post. The other ambassadors have plenty to do, and they really care very little if the U.S. ambassador calls on them. Whereas in another post, you know, it's a very important matter. So the entertaining was not a surprise, and I didn't feel it was out of line. I didn't get exhausted.

Q: Of course, you were always used to entertaining a great deal anyway. You must have had a good staff running the residence?

ARMSTRONG: Excellent staff. Just as in the chancery, the residence was splendid. I didn't run the best residence in London. You know, it's funny. Maybe it's because you're so sensitive that you'd spend too much time on getting the right chef because you're a woman that you don't do enough. I didn't get a good enough chef. I had able help with the guest lists and the entertainment, and the entertainment was fun. It was not as elegant nearly, say, as I am sure Evangeline Bruce did or Lenore Annenberg, and so I could have done better there.

Q: *Yes, but you had a full time job to do.*

ARMSTRONG: I know, but your full time job is also to set one of the best tables in London.

Q: *Oh, I suppose that's true.*

ARMSTRONG: And that's management, too.

Q: *Did your husband take on any of that?*

ARMSTRONG: He's not particularly good at that kind of thing. Now, he was splendid at thinking up groups of people or who would be exciting in that group of people or who'd leaven the loaf in that one, but as far as menus and chefs, that's not his bag.

Q: *Some husbands have done that.*

ARMSTRONG: Oh, I realize that. But Tobin just -- he'd have a good idea for a theme for a party or he'd hear somebody from the United States was coming, in politics or culture, and he helped a lot that way, and was a marvelous host. He was one of the reasons people had a good time and an interesting time.

Q: *Yes, so I have heard, that he was an excellent host. In fact, there were even newspaper clippings that I've got about him at the post.*

ARMSTRONG: Really? Good. Well, he deserved the praise.

Q: *Yes. And I imagine this was so different from being on the ranch that it must have --*

ARMSTRONG: But as I said, within about a month's time, he had fallen in love.

Q: *Isn't that wonderful? And you say you met some very good friends over there?*

ARMSTRONG: We did make wonderful friends. And we go back -- Tobin isn't as interested in politics as I am by a long shot, so we don't keep up with the political friends that were more the ones I made. We keep up more with the social friends.

Q: *Well, now, did you go grouse hunting?*

ARMSTRONG: Yes. Tobin loves to shoot. I do, too, but I didn't shoot over there for several reasons, mainly because it is tough shooting. And since it's their livelihood, they sell the grouse or the pheasant or the partridge, whatever it is, and so when you miss, that's money flying out of the bank. So they're magnificent shots, and I'm not that good a shot to stand in a line. Plus, I never had a chance to be with the women except on the weekends, and so this was a chance to meet and get to know the women, the wives or their friends or whatever. So that was just fine by me. I shot a couple of times over there, and we would go on weekends when there was no shooting, just for country life or going to the American museum or doing this or doing that, sightseeing. We were gone many, many weekends.

Q: Well, I gathered the reason you were so popular and you were extremely popular, because most ambassadors -- there are so many of them and they're so blasé.

ARMSTRONG: Well, they're men and they wear gray suits, too.

Q: And they wear gray suits. But also they're so used to it that you were a novelty and were very popular. But I understand one of the reasons is that you met a great cross section of the British.

ARMSTRONG: That was Ron Spiers' idea. I remember sort of your traditional, number one speech is the Pilgrims [Society] over there. And I remember him saying, "Now, you must say that you want to get all around this country and meet all kinds of people." Well, I did, but I wasn't necessarily going to say that. He made a point of pointing out to me that I'd probably do well at that. And I did, and I guess the people sensed that I was enthusiastic and thoroughly enjoyed that. So we did; we traveled a lot and met all sorts of people.

Q: You enjoyed the ceremonial parts of the job. Representational, I should say, not ceremonial.

ARMSTRONG: Yes, I loved that. True, the most boring would be the cocktail parties in town. That's boring for most people. But at least when you're an ambassador, you have a mission usually to see a couple or three, or a dozen people, and ask this or that, so you're often there for a purpose.

Q: You and Ron would work out your little scenarios, would you, before you'd go to these?

ARMSTRONG: That makes it too precise. I'd have an idea from him at our almost daily staff meetings, counselors' meetings, of what was on the agenda for the embassy and what I could be useful in trying to pick up or plant, to get some ideas around, et cetera. But, no, Ron and I did not put our heads together before each party and say, "Now, I'll do 1-2-3, and you do 4-5-6."

Q: But would you ever do that when you were working on a specific issue?

ARMSTRONG: Maybe on a couple of occasions it would get down that precisely to that night what you did, but not generally; not every night of the week.

Q: It was more spontaneous than that the way you ran things?

ARMSTRONG: Or let's say it wasn't each party; it was occasional parties where you'd have an agenda that was pretty clear in everybody's minds.

Q: *So you were quite definite in wanting to get around to see everybody?*

ARMSTRONG: Yes.

Q: *As many as you could, because I understand that can be a trap in these Old World capitals, that you will only see the aristocracy. You were quite aware of this, I think.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes. But again, you know, I think having been in politics in the U.S. was a big help. I mean, you wouldn't think of representing the Republican Party by going to see Madam La De Da and her pals, and quitting and thinking that was Chicago or Peoria or whatever. You'd know you wouldn't know a place or what was on people's minds if you were limiting it.

Q: *But you know as well as I do, Ambassador, that many ambassadors go over there with the idea that they're just going to have a nice social time.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes. Well, that's when, one, they've either picked the wrong person for ambassador, or two, the ambassador hasn't been enlightened on what's expected of him. And if they go over there and don't change, well, that's a disaster. That's a waste of everybody's time and money.

Q: *Yes, indeed, it is. The principal problems at the time were economic, were they not?*

ARMSTRONG: They were. And NATO, of course, you're always working on -- the military aspects. But it was economic above all. We had Rhodesia going on then, and that's one reason Kissinger was in town so often.

Q: *Well, after you got through scolding him, he didn't do that anymore? (Laughter)*

ARMSTRONG: Not that I've ever learned.

Q: *Yes, that seems to have been his way of operating.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, it was. And I'm not sure -- he seemed so surprised, I'm not sure it was even deliberate. I think he'd just gotten in the habit.

Q: *Were there any special humanitarian events that took place at that time? I mean, things that you had to help with. Were there any floods or any --*

ARMSTRONG: Disasters, no. The only disasters were slow -- like drought in the summer of '76. There was a bad drought, and the farmers suffered badly and there was water rationing and gardens died. But it was not a quick disaster.

Q: *So it didn't have to call for U.S. help?*

ARMSTRONG: No. There were just the humanitarian things, just things that are not of nature but -- oh, I would go to things like for handicapped children or that sort of thing.

Q: *You cut a lot of ribbons, didn't you?*

ARMSTRONG: Cut a lot of ribbons; did a lot of the ceremonial, did a lot of the trade shows, which some ambassadors don't like to do.

Q: *Was promoting U.S. trade one of your pursuits?*

ARMSTRONG: That was one. I gathered from the embassy talk that a lot of ambassadors are averse to that. I'm not at all.

Q: *You saw yourself as representing the whole of the United States, didn't you?*

ARMSTRONG: Yes.

Q: *Which is, of course, what you are doing, but, unfortunately, not all ambassadors realize this.*

ARMSTRONG: One reason I think, too, and I think you're right and I think I was a popular ambassador, was the Bicentennial. And so America was on everybody's minds, and here was the American lady.

Q: *Well, now tell us about the Bicentennial. What did you do over there before you came with the queen over to America?*

ARMSTRONG: To me, the most moving and impressive thing I did was at Westminster Abbey. They had me read the Thanksgiving service, and they had the service in honor of America. That was an absolutely magnificent ceremony.

Q: *And you read the --*

ARMSTRONG: I read the, oh, whose is it -- Governor Bradford's. It's the famous description of the first winter of the pilgrims. I read that and I read a lesson, too. I read lessons all over England and Scotland and Wales. They liked ambassadors to do that.

Q: *Yes. Well, I don't think we ever got into that the last time. We didn't get into religion. Are you a --*

ARMSTRONG: I'm an Episcopalian.

Q: *Episcopalian. Oh, well then, that's perfect.*

ARMSTRONG: So that fits; but the Presbyterians had me in Scotland, too.

Q: *Did they really?*

ARMSTRONG: Yes. And I was interested in that. Prince Phillip would often read lessons. Prince Charles would. I don't think the queen would. That was a very pleasant ceremonial way, too -- of combining the Church and the representation. And, of course, their beautiful church services. I just love them.

Q: *Well, did you have a particular kind of entertaining? Was there some particular type of function you liked to give that you felt really served the purpose better and made good use of the money?*

ARMSTRONG: Well, yes. It would have to be the good ol' drinks party, because really what people want to do is see that beautiful house. And that would not serve the purpose of making warm friends or conducting negotiations in a conducive social venue. It served getting a lot of people to say, "I met the ambassador and her husband and their children, and we saw that gorgeous house," et cetera. So we did more of that than anything, and that served that purpose of the huge numbers of Americans in London, of the congressmen that want their constituents entertained.

Q: *You had to do all of that?*

ARMSTRONG: We did a lot of that. It was only abused once, and he was very key to the State Department budget, so we didn't say anything, but there was one real problem. But those occasions, obviously, are not where the ambassador learns a lot or where the ambassador teaches other people very much about what's on America's mind. Then, the dinners are better. I did very few lunches, mainly because we did quite nicely at the chancery, and it was just easier for the counselors, rather than having to stop work and go -- because it took a good fifteen, often twenty minutes with traffic back to Winfield House. We had many lunches at the chancery.

Q: *When you had lunches at the chancery, Ron [Spiers] would sort of stand in for your husband? Or would he come over and join you, too?*

ARMSTRONG: My husband hardly ever joined us. No, he was sensitive to that and I was, too. That wouldn't have been right.

Q: *Just at the home, he was your host?*

ARMSTRONG: The only time he had anything to do with embassy business was with agriculture, which he's thoroughly competent in. And Butz, who was then Secretary of Agriculture, had given him a commission to try to promote U.S. exports, which was wonderful of Earl Butz and useful to the country.

Q: *Of course.*

ARMSTRONG: And he wasn't paid, but he did it well. And he did it in England, and he went to Poland, some Iron Curtain countries, Greece. I think those were the main countries. And he

would work occasionally, maybe a couple of days a month, with the agricultural attaché; he'd try to go to the agricultural shows. It was a part time job that maybe took a day a week. But otherwise, he did not have anything to do with embassy business, and would not have wanted to; he knew better than that. That was never a problem.

Q: A very delicate sense of what is fitting, obviously, you both have. When you had these drinks parties for all these hordes of people, did you also have British people at the same time?

ARMSTRONG: Oh, definitely. I could count on one hand, I think, the times we would have just Americans, and then it would not have been a big party. No, I think that's a key function of an ambassador's entertainment, unless there's a very good reason -- you know, if you're having a caucus of congressmen who want to talk privately. But unless there's a good reason to have only Americans, no.

Q: Now, I understand that Elliot Richardson was given -- the Senate voted him special allowances when he was there. Did you also have the benefit of that?

ARMSTRONG: I never had to dig into my pocket, unless I wanted to do something exceptional, which was hardly ever. I mean, if I wanted to have a better champagne than we paid for, which was quite adequate, then I did that on a couple of occasions. It never occurred to me that was something special voted by the Senate. I don't know whether it was or not in my case.

Q: In your case, I don't know, either.

ARMSTRONG: Remember Larry Eagleburger?

Q: Yes.

ARMSTRONG: He'd know. And, of course, our excellent administrative counselor, Mike Conlin, who would say, "Now, we've got this much," and da da da. "Here's where you are in the budget." But I thought, "Well, isn't this a splendid thing?" because I asked before I went. Because my husband and I are well off, and had we been there for a short time, which we were, we could have handled several thousand dollars extra. Had we been there longer, it would have been hard.

Q: Of course.

ARMSTRONG: But they told me I was not going to have to unless I wanted to have, you know, yellow roses or champagne that was beyond the norm. So I did not have to dig into my pocket for anything over a couple of thousand -- \$3,000, something like that.

Q: That's a very good point. I don't know whether or not you were given the special allowance. I know Elliot Richardson was.

ARMSTRONG: Yes. We ought to find that out. I'd like to know, too. I'm going to make a note of that, because it never even occurred to me. I just thought that that was a general situation, and I thought, "How healthy; at last they fixed it so you don't have to be rich."

Q: I think Richardson said, "I just can't afford to take the job otherwise."

ARMSTRONG: Well, I never said that, so -- I would be very happy if it was not special, because I can tell you, it's enough to do it very nicely. You'd never be criticized. We had California wines, but they were very good wines. And I was happy to do that anyway -- the things American. We had a wonderful American art that year for the Bicentennial. I had a friend -- you've heard of the famous Bass brothers? Well, they weren't that famous then. But Perry Bass, the father, was a friend of ours and lent us their marvelous Remington & Reynolds collection of bronzes and pictures, which for Texans, too, was just -- and I always had a little trepidation: how will these things look in that Georgian house? They were absolutely stupendous. And in that foyer, those bronzes -- it was sensational. And we got help from Art in Embassies; they were very useful, too.

Q: Did you select them yourself?

ARMSTRONG: Yes. So we had American art.

Q: Well, now Annenberg had just redone the house not too long ago?

ARMSTRONG: It was in the most beautiful shape. Yes, Elliot and Anne had been there since, and there was just scarcely a thing to do. I remember saying before I went, "Well, of course, I'll put my touch here and there." It would have been a mistake.

Q: Really, really.

ARMSTRONG: Upstairs we painted the library, and that was a little worn. That was the only thing we did. Put some music in and changed the pictures, because the walls were bare. But Wildenstein's pitched in. A friend who's a decorator, Betty Sherrill of MacMillan, which is with a very fine firm in New York, went over with us. The only disappointing thing was, all the walls were not only bare, but the alarms -- because Annenberg had had that fantastic art, so the pictures were alarmed -- so here were all these dreadful gadgets hanging out of the walls. But within a couple of days, Wildenstein's had lent us enough. We gave a dinner party within two nights, I think it was.

Q: Wildenstein's is an art gallery?

ARMSTRONG: It's an art dealer who's been, evidently, good to Americans around the world at times, and they were certainly good to us.

Q: A London firm?

ARMSTRONG: London firm. Well, they're in Paris, New York. And through our decorator friend, Betty Sherrill, who was doing this for nothing, they came up with magnificent art until we got pictures. Some of them weren't replaced for months, until everything came over.

Q: And you featured American art.

ARMSTRONG: Yes. That would have been much easier for us, anyway; and being the Bicentennial, it was appropriate.

Q: *Let's talk about the queen. You came over to the United States with the queen.*

ARMSTRONG: We did not actually come with her in the yacht, the *Britannia*, and really for a very homespun reason: my husband gets violently seasick. And as it turned out, they did have a horrible storm while they were -- I think they were laying off Bermuda and got caught in the storm. We met them in Philadelphia and had a marvelous tour. We did ride the *Britannia* on inland waterways, across to Manhattan. I'm trying to think. I think maybe we then -- did we go up to Boston, too, on the *Britannia*? I can't remember. Or maybe Connecticut and then to Boston. Anyway, we were on the *Britannia*, which was fun in calm waters.

Q: *And did you spend all of your time with her during the day?*

ARMSTRONG: That's right. We would go wherever -- accompanied her everywhere, from the University of Virginia, Wall Street. We landed -- she landed in Philadelphia. It was really interesting. It was so interesting to see the different ways the cities would manage it. And Philadelphia amused her. It horrified me. Rizzo was mayor, and Rizzo's idea of a proper greeting for the monarch was to have more policemen than I have ever seen in my life, arms akimbo like this, from the dock to downtown Philadelphia, with their backs to the Queen, facing the crowd, as if there were imminent danger of a riot any minute. It was really something. And, of course, nothing happened. They were happy crowds. The Northern Ireland problems did not cause much of a disturbance. And Boston did it magnificently. I think Dukakis was governor then. They had their police people -- they weren't police people, but they were from the local towns, and probably sheriffs or other sorts of law enforcement people -- done in Colonial costume. So it was attractive, rather than a downer. Everywhere, I was very proud of America. Other than the Rizzo meeting, I think everything was just perfect. [Laughter] And she was amused by that, so that wasn't bad.

Q: *I suppose that your husbands got along well, did they?*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, very well. They had known each other in England.

Q: *They're both outdoors men.*

ARMSTRONG: Both outdoors men, both horsemen.

Q: *Did you actually see the Queen very often as Ambassador?*

ARMSTRONG: No. Mostly at ceremonial occasions. She would always be gracious, of course, to the Ambassador of the United States and always have some words to say. But we did see her at Sandringham. I guess that was the most personal visit we had with her.

Q: *You stayed at Sandringham, did you?*

ARMSTRONG: No, we went to visit. We spent the day at Sandringham. We were with some friends nearby, and evidently her people called and asked us over. We were really sort of surprised, which was even more fun. And the Queen was there, the Prince, or what is he -- King Constantine of Greece, the cousin, very attractive. Princess Margaret was there, the Queen Mother, Prince Phillip, and the Queen, and I guess that was it. We had a very informal, delightful time -- luncheon. And then she puts on her bandanna and her low shoes and takes me out to the landrover, and off we go to see the horses and the corgis are piled all over. And we had just a delightful family time that time -- Tobin and I and some friends, another couple who knew them very well indeed -- that's the other ones that we were staying with.

A very different picture of the Queen, when we were close, was on board the *Britannia*, when she had President Ford and Henry Kissinger in conversation after a party. And for the first time, I realized how knowledgeable she is in foreign affairs; it really was an eye opener. They were talking about the complexities of Cypriot politics, which, of course, is Byzantine; all sorts of subjects, and the Queen was an expert on all those subjects. She was terrific and, you know, couldn't have had sharper colleagues than the President and Henry Kissinger.

Q: *I should say not. Now, this was right after the Fourth?*

ARMSTRONG: That's right.

Q: *You were not in New York for the Fourth with the tall ships?*

ARMSTRONG: No, we missed them. We came on the sixth. We were not there on the Fourth; we stayed in London and then flew over, saw some friends for the weekend, and then, as I remember, the tour started during the week. I'm not precise on that. But we missed the tall ships, unfortunately, which is interesting. I was the liaison for Presidents Nixon and Ford to the Bicentennial, and we were desperately trying to get a central theme for that Bicentennial. Would each state do a kind of a festival? Or would each state dedicate a new Bicentennial park? Something that would tie the country together. We never could come up with anything that the states would all accept, and I wouldn't have dreamed that probably the most popular thing was the tall ships. I mean, we were all in on the planning for that; it sounded like a nice thing. But it's interesting how it came in.

Q: *Yes, indeed it was. Well, I suppose it was felt it might be a bit of a gaffe to have the Queen of England at our Fourth of July party. [Laughter]*

ARMSTRONG: That would ask a little much of her -- although some of her talks were very interesting and quite direct. She opened in Philadelphia by saying, "I stand before you, the great, great, great, great granddaughter of George III." And she just lit right into the Revolution.

Q: *Yes, fascinating. When you visited her at Sandringham, the people you were with, were they Americans?*

ARMSTRONG: No, they were British.

Q: *I would have thought she wouldn't have close American friends.*

ARMSTRONG: No, they were two of our closest friends, Bryan and Carey Bassett is their name. They're a couple, ten or fifteen years younger than Tobin and I, who are, I guess, our closest personal friends over there.

Q: *Oh, really. And is the Queen Mother as delightful as everyone says?*

ARMSTRONG: Every time -- in fact, every year, I think -- we've given a luncheon or a dinner for her in London, and we are very pleased to say we're close to her. She's astounding, just the warmest and very quick, very quick. Doesn't miss anything. And, of course, beloved by all. Tremendous energy.

Q: *Has the Queen that sort of energy?*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, but she's not effervescent like her mother. The Queen is far more composed. And it's interesting to me, the English people seem to like that just as well. Their public persona is so different. The Queen, when you're alone -- but it takes a very small group -- has a delightful and much more outgoing personality. In public, you notice she rarely smiles; the wave is a little half gesture. Whereas, the Queen Mother just effervesces and is ebullient and smiling all the time. And the English people seem to respond to both approaches to public life. They're quite different. It makes a nice balance.

Q: *The Queen has to be the queen, as well as the consort.*

ARMSTRONG: She does. She has to be more serious, and she's got a long way to go.

Q: *Which is just what you had to do. You had to be the ambassador and the ambassador's consort, didn't you? Or was your husband able to, in his own way, be the consort?*

ARMSTRONG: Somewhat. I don't know that I could judge that to what extent.

Q: *Did he ever go to the lengths that Henry Luce did, of sitting with the women while you sat with the men after a dinner?*

ARMSTRONG: Well, we didn't do that. We didn't separate the sexes. Now, I had to make up my mind whether I was going to take a stand on that in other people's houses. I did not. The only women's issue you'd say I took a stand on was at a club; I wish I could remember the name of it. They had a separate entrance for the women, and I did take a stand there. I said, "If I'm coming to speak here, we're all going in the same entrance."

Q: *Good for you.*

ARMSTRONG: But as far as separating after dinner, if we were in somebody's house and did it, I did not squawk.

Q: *It's a little bit tricky, isn't it? You have to pick your issues.*

ARMSTRONG: Well, you know, each woman has her own way of doing things. And I have not been as confrontational as some women I respect very much who get things done by making more noise. So it takes all kinds.

Q: *I have a lot of questions I want to ask you, but today I wanted to concentrate on your time in England.*

ARMSTRONG: Mrs. Thatcher, maybe?

Q: *Mrs. Thatcher, indeed.*

ARMSTRONG: She was the head of shadow government. She commanded my respect then, and I think I knew her well enough not to be at all surprised at what she's accomplished. A most commanding woman that makes an instant impression of power and authority. The first time I met her, she'd invited me to her quarter. She was just back from a trip to Israel, which had been a big success, and tremendously impressive with her grasp of the issues, of her analysis of the personalities, and she was very pleased. She had accomplished what she went for. Then we got to know her after that.

Since then, I have a better insight into her as a wife, because it was hard to get her. We had a very hard time. Ron and I tried and tried to get her to come for dinner to Winfield House, and she was slow to accept. Finally, we got her, and it tickled me so afterwards. You know how the English are very polite about seeing you literally to your car when you're their guests? So Tobin and I, as hosts that night, after dinner at Winfield House took Mr. Thatcher and Mrs. Thatcher to their car. Mr. Thatcher gets in behind the driver's seat and drives, and Mrs. Thatcher gets in the back seat and he drives her. I thought Tobin would die, because he liked her so much. But this was quite a blow to him. [Laughter]

Q: *Oh, isn't that wonderful.*

ARMSTRONG: But she probably had some papers back there that she was going to attend to. And since then, we have learned that Dennis is a very happy husband, that she is a wife very dependent on him, that they're a marvelous pair. But that was kind of a blow.

Q: *Oh, that's priceless. I can't imagine your husband doing that.*

ARMSTRONG: Oh, no.

Q: *I could see him behind the wheel, but you would sit up front.*

ARMSTRONG: I'd sit up front; that's quite right.

Q: When you traveled around, speaking of cars -- traveled around England -- did you go by car mostly?

ARMSTRONG: Yes, we did. Very rarely by plane. It just doesn't make sense, usually. We went by plane to Northern Ireland. I did; Tobin did not go then. But we'd travel, and, of course, that was one of the delights. The English countryside has to be one of the most gorgeous things in the world to drive through. We shipped over a car of ours, a big car, and we had children over there at various times, so we were able to make some family trips.

Q: Oh, wonderful, not all official trips.

ARMSTRONG: Not all official.

Q: I suppose you took the embassy car for those. What was your idea on when you should and when you shouldn't fly the flag on the car?

ARMSTRONG: In those days, there was not the problem of terrorism. Yes, there were still sandbags around some buildings in England because there'd been a bad rash of bombings several months before we got there. And as I was leaving -- well, actually several months before I left -- they changed the curtains in our offices in the chancery to those mesh curtains that catch glass.

Q: Oh, yes.

ARMSTRONG: So there were a few steps taken, anti-terrorist steps. But there was not the fear for the ambassador that there has been in recent years. So as far as flying the flag, any time I was on official business, there was no problem with drawing attention to the American ambassador; it was a good thing to do. So only when I was on personal business would I not fly it.

Q: Did you ever have any health problems over there?

ARMSTRONG: No, I can't think . . . Well, I did lose my voice for a week or two. Our daughter was there, and she took over some of my speaking engagements. I can't remember any other health problems.

Q: And your husband regained his lost weight?

ARMSTRONG: Yes, he did. He would say, "Unfortunately." It didn't take long.

Q: Did you do all your traveling around the British Isles or did you take vacations on the Continent?

ARMSTRONG: We went to Mons, to Belgium, twice; to Germany once on a NATO tour; down to Cadiz, Spain -- the naval base, once.

Q: These were all official things?

ARMSTRONG: These were official. That was it . . . and Northern Ireland.

Q: *That must be a sad place.*

ARMSTRONG: Terribly sad; it's like an armed camp. It's just awful. The amazing part is how normal life is.

Q: *Really?*

ARMSTRONG: I don't know whether -- I guess they're just injured; just go on.

Q: *Well, you had your husband with you, so you didn't have the problem of being lonely as Chief of Mission.*

ARMSTRONG: Not a bit.

Q: *But were you able to have a private life at all?*

ARMSTRONG: Yes. Maybe it's partly because of the big, beautiful house and the upstairs rooms. I never felt put upon as far as lack of privacy. And those gorgeous grounds; you could take a walk. You've got several acres there to walk around. Regents Park. So I never felt hemmed in. And, of course, the British people are such civil, wonderful people. They'll leave you alone, usually. Or if they bother you, it's in a nice way.

Q: *There's no culture clash at all?*

ARMSTRONG: There's no culture clash, and, of course, their politeness is famous, and justly so. So if you were walking down Stratford on Avon and you were sightseeing, if they had anything to say, it would be something complimentary about your country or, "We're so glad to have a lady ambassador," or something like that. It would never be hurtful or intrusive.

Q: *No. And even the ones who are on the left are not fanatical.*

ARMSTRONG: Oh, no. In fact, of course, there was a left government, a Labor government, in [power] the entire time I was there, and here I am a Republican on the conservative end of Republicans. Wilson was a P.M. just a few weeks while I was there. Maybe I told you the last time my distress when it came over the wire that he had resigned, and I thought I was the only ambassador in London who hadn't known. Of course, it turned out nobody'd known. But that was a very bleak time. Callaghan was a very fair and good man. I feel we had a good relationship.

Q: *It does make a difference -- all of those things. You, then, never had any personal danger?*

ARMSTRONG: No personal danger that I was aware of at all.

Q: *No death threats?*

ARMSTRONG: No death threats, no. We had guard dogs that ran around Winfield House at night, but it was really quite relaxed and amateurish compared to what people have to do now.

Q: *What kind of guard dogs were they?*

ARMSTRONG: This was a German shepherd.

Q: *Provided by the government?*

ARMSTRONG: (Laughter) Yes. It bit. Obviously, didn't bite too hard, but our son was returning late with a poor friend from a night on the town and the friend had got bit. Thank goodness the friend didn't want to sue the State Department.

Q: *I should say. Did you have any major honors that you were given by the British?*

ARMSTRONG: Oh, yes. I've got a bookcase full of them -- all sorts of things; a couple of honorary degrees, and then various associations, everything from Ladies of the Press to the this to the that would honor you.

Q: *How about decorations?*

ARMSTRONG: No decorations. I was delighted Cap Weinberger got one recently. He's a great Anglophile. There are not many things that you can do to please Cap that way, but that really did it.

Q: *Well, is there anything that you think being a woman contributed to your great success? Do you think that was a large part of your success?*

ARMSTRONG: It certainly contributed to being well known and being a novelty, and so you certainly got your foot in the door as far as getting people's attention. You were noticed the minute you arrived. Ambassadors can do good jobs in so many different ways, I've learned. One of my strengths was knowing how to deal with the public and enjoying it, and this was the kind of a post where that could be useful. In many countries, you wouldn't think of doing that -- to be out and about often. I think it helped to be a woman.

Q: *You didn't do the actual, the nitty gritty, day to day work on IMF and things like that, did you?*

ARMSTRONG: Only on the most important parts. I mean, Ron would go over cables with me when he thought I needed to know. Had I been there longer -- I would say it was an ambassadorship in stages, because had Ford been re-elected, you know it's reasonably certain he would have asked me to stay on. When he wasn't, obviously I was going to go, although they were very civil to me. Cy Vance, Bob Strauss knew me, and they said, "Do stay on. Take your time." Mr. Vance said he was busy reorganizing the State Department. So it couldn't have been more nicely handled that way.

I tell you, the only truly unpleasant thing that happened the whole time I was over there -- other than this one congressman, who was a problem not just for me, but for the whole embassy -- was at the very end. After Carter was elected, even though Vance had been marvelous, we get a phone call that I am to leave the country because Mondale is coming. I said, "What? I'm ambassador for the vice president elect, and I'm ambassador for all the Americans."

"No. You get out of the country."

Q: *When was this?*

ARMSTRONG: This was about in January.

Q: *Before the Inauguration?*

ARMSTRONG: I think it was before the Inauguration, it was possibly after. It was certainly close, one way or the other. And then I found out -- oh, I know. Ken Rush was ambassador to France, and he called and said he was getting out of France, and could he come stay with me?

I said, "Well, I've just gotten a phone call that I'm supposed to vacate."

And so I said to Ron, "Ron, you tell them I want to see a cable to that effect. Put it in writing." And it never came, and so I stayed.

The Foreign Minister came out to meet Mondale and said very nice things about me as I was standing there. On purpose, because I'm sure the British were privy to this. And, you know, that isn't the way diplomacy works. I bet Mondale -- I doubt, from the way he talked, I don't even think he knew about it. Somebody had done it.

Q: *He probably didn't. Somebody down the line. What a gaffe!*

ARMSTRONG: But then there was an interesting thing that happened. There was an unfortunate set of statements by one of Mondale's people after a party that the prime minister gave them, and he had served them some famous old brandy or famous old wine. Anyway, the next day the press person said, "Well, the Vice President never would have been elected if he spent that kind of money on an obscene party." Well, poor Mondale by that time, was in Tokyo. That was the other ambassador who didn't leave, the ambassador to Japan; he stayed put, too.

Q: *But Rush left?*

ARMSTRONG: Rush left. All the others left. There were some others involved. And so Mondale called me and said could I explain to the Prime Minister that, of course, those weren't his sentiments and that he was terribly embarrassed about this statement. They had not invited me to that party and had said it was a stag party. I found out later there were women there. But anyway, I called the Prime Minister and said, "The Vice President -- this is certainly not the way he feels. It was a beautiful party. He's so upset that he's called from Tokyo to make sure that you understand this."

Q: So you had to clean up after the mess made by those people.

ARMSTRONG: Well, that was the only mess.

Q: That's too bad, though, that you had to. It's a shame that you didn't get to stay longer.

ARMSTRONG: No, but they couldn't have. I want to reiterate. I quickly saw that, really, it didn't work either way. I could have stayed longer as far as Cy Vance was concerned, but since I was so political, it wasn't right. There'd be issues and people where it was slightly awkward for them and awkward for me. So it wasn't the best. Whereas, for 90 percent of the ambassadors, it would have worked. But I had been highly politicized.

Q: And too highly visible. You were such a well known figure, too.

ARMSTRONG: Well, that's true too. That was another thing. But it was beautifully handled, with the utmost tact.

JOHN W. HOLMES
Economic Counselor
London (1976-1979)

John W. Holmes was born in 1935 and raised in Massachusetts. He graduated from Columbia University in 1957 with a degree in European cultural history. In addition to London, Mr. Holmes served in Iran, Italy, Vietnam, and Belgium. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 18, 1996.

Q: Then in 1976 you were off to where?

HOLMES: I went to London as the Economic Counselor, which was the number two position on the economic side of the Embassy. There was an Economic Minister above me. That was a welcome change for a number of reasons but especially because London is a much nicer place, a much more interesting place than Brussels.

Q: You were there from when to when?

HOLMES: Just about precisely 3 years, from January of 1976 to January of 1979.

Q: Who was the Ambassador when you were there?

HOLMES: There were two. First there was Anne Armstrong. And then there was Kingman Brewster.

Q: At least from your perspective in the economic field, how did they...did they take much interest in economics?

HOLMES: Anne Armstrong took a certain amount of interest but not a great deal. She was a very nice woman, about whom I have nothing bad to say. But she was always conscious of not being a professional in the job. It's better, certainly, to have doubts about your grasp of things than to think you know things you don't know. But she tended to be something of an absentee landlord -- not in terms of showing up in the office and doing her duty, but she didn't get involved in the nuts and bolts of what the Embassy was doing in any great degree.

I would have to go on to say that I don't think it mattered very much because at least at that time and I suspect at most times most of the business between the United States and the UK is done in Washington. It was something we lamented throughout the time I was there but it's generally continued through most periods and was true before my time. It derives in part from the fact that the British put so much more weight on their relationship with the United States than we do on our relationship with the UK. They try their best and frequently succeed in having direct connections with the powers that be in Washington and that's how the more important business gets done.

The balance changed a little bit when Kingman Brewster took over because he was a personal friend of Cy Vance and they seemed to be in close contact. Even then I don't think it had much influence on the work of the Embassy but Brewster seemed to spend a lot of his time sitting in his office at his manual typewriter writing long letters to Cy Vance. He let the Embassy do its own thing. He was more conscious of what was going on and he certainly knew what was "up" more in the UK than Armstrong did but he and the Embassy were like two generally parallel tracks that rarely crossed.

It wasn't that we had a hell of a lot of business to deal with. Any big Embassy in a fairly big country has a certain amount of work to do but we didn't have many big bilateral problems with the UK. On things like civil air rights periodically there would be. But the most interesting thing was to talk to the Brits and get their views on international issues. It was a good place to report from because the British are great at formulating things and giving avuncular advice of a sort that Washington used to have an appetite for receiving.

What was going on within the UK itself was interesting, too, because the great social democrat experiment was coming to an end in the UK. Mrs. Thatcher was flapping her wings and preparing to take off. Clearly the Labor Party was running out of steam. Its relationship to the labor movement was a handicap to it. The British economy needed to be shaken up. Without being a Thatcherite, it was evident that something had to be done and she certainly responded to the situation.

Q: As you were looking at the British scene, did you, having come from the European Community, did you see major problems particularly on the Labor field but I mean, just, one has the impression that things weren't working very well. Machinery was getting old and worn and the people that were doing it were doing it to make sure they had long weekends and it was just seemed unimpressive at the time.

HOLMES: I remember a trip. I kept a finger in international economics. I remember going off to Geneva at one point to visit the negotiations there and a bunch of us traveled together and somehow our plane couldn't land in Geneva but landed in Basel instead, but the Swiss Railways managed to put on a special train to convey us to Geneva. Various other things happened which were in contrast with the "do it tomorrow or don't do it at all" attitude that seemed to be prevalent in the UK. And I remember coming back to London and saying "I've seen the past and it works."

I thought I saw, what other observers saw, that the British got used to a set of habits, of sort of "featherbedding" almost every job and having deeply entrenched rules about how you did things that rendered them basically uncompetitive in a world that was increasingly open to competition. British industry was clearly, in most categories, falling behind its continental competitors not to speak of the United States or Japan. The British government, or more accurately local government, even seemed to be incapable of doing things like getting garbage collected efficiently. The Labor Movement did seem to have a grip on things that made it difficult to shift some of these practices. British management seemed to be largely inhabited by people who wanted an easy life, who wanted to get up late in the morning and go home early after having had a three gin and tonic lunch. I went around enough and saw enough people in British management to get the feeling that the stereotype was correct, that this was a bunch of idlers who thought that they could keep on living that way forever.

Q: Did you see the class system as an influence on the economics?

HOLMES: I think it was although I think that can be exaggerated. Certainly I was struck when I was in the UK by the obsession with the class system, by how people as well as the media spent a lot of time discussing the class system and its problems. I think the only rival for a strange obsession on the part of the British was their obsession with World War Two. The second obsession, I think, was almost as much of a handicap. Dwelling on the past says something about where your interest lies. Maybe it was a more glorious past but it was still the past.

I'm not sure that the class system, though significant in a social-cultural way, was really as important a problem for the British economy as many people thought. It was one of the forces that underlay the particular attitudes of the British labor movement, which tended to view the class system as a permanent thing: it was "us" against "them" and the "us" would always be the same and the "them" would always be the same. Yes, in that sense I think it was significant. But, in reality, there was some flexibility in the British class system and it has become evident in more recent years. One reads about the boy from a poor working class suburb of London who was able to wreck Barings Bank.

Q: We're talking about a Hong Kong stock broker who quite young, who ...

HOLMES: Yes (but he was working in Singapore for Barings). The city of London was increasingly taking in people from non traditional social backgrounds, and in the 1970s the city of London was the one part of the British economy that seemed to be functioning. By the "city of London" is meant is the financial sector; saying that is like referring to "Wall Street." The relative success of the "City," and its relative openness to talent, whatever that talent's social

origin, are facts true not so much as the ordinary commercial banks as the stock brokers and investment bankers. In those firms, I think even by the mid 1970's careers were open to talents. Yes, maybe the stuffy, alcoholized chairmen of these institutions would be out of Eton and Oxford or maybe Sandhurst, but the people on the staff would often be from very modest social backgrounds -- even cockneys, like Barings' unfortunate employee -- and often from immigrant groups...Jewish, Indian, whatever. England was already in the 1970's ceasing to be, perhaps had ceased to be, as homogeneous a place as before.

Q: How did you find the British civil servants that you dealt with?

HOLMES: Well, I thought that they were very good. They were almost uniformly of a high intellectual caliber, at least at the middle and upper levels. What was striking to me though was the fantastic -- for an American trying to do business with them, fantastically and frustratingly good -- coordination that existed between British government Ministries and Departments. I realized after awhile that, whereas in Washington, one could by wandering around, get different points of view from the State Department, the Pentagon, STR, Treasury -- that was also true in Brussels, by going around to different country mission or different parts of the European Commission one could get some differences -- that was by no means the case in London. There was an almost Leninist quality to the British government. On almost in all issues, if I made the effort to tap opinion in several places, I would encounter the same opinion, sometimes expressed in identical words. It was fantastic -- frustrating as well -- but I thought the British bureaucracy was a tremendous machine. I also thought its excellence represented a misuse of obviously very skilled people who might very well have been more usefully employed in the private sector. Britain, after all, had been for years a second rate power. It had, at least in some parts of the government, the parts I dealt with, had a first rate bureaucracy. But, maybe it could have got along with a second rate bureaucracy. I have to add that the excellence of that bureaucracy, and its self consciousness of excellence, together with its traditions of prestige, gave the British upper civil servants an admirable self confidence. They very much resembled a ruling class, in the sense Mosca gives to that phrase. Of course they had to defer to their political masters, but they managed to retain very real power -- and they remained, while politicians came and went.

IRVING SABLOSKY
Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS
London (1976-1979)

Irving Sablosky was born in Indiana in 1924. He graduated from Indiana University in 1947 and served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1943 to 1945. His postings abroad have included Seoul, Cebu, Hamburg, Bangkok and London.

SABLOSKY: 1976 to London. At the end of the bicentennial year, I went there as Culture Affairs officer. For several years, they had had so-called "super CAOs" in London. These were top-notch academics - Wayne Wilcox and Robin Winks, Cleanth Brooks, Charles Ritcheson had been academic Cultural Affairs officers there, imported from American universities to be in touch with the British universities, at a high level. For some reason, in 1976, it was thought it

was time to go back to what we call a professional CAO in London, and I was it. So, I was the first after some years. I had my work cut out for me because it was a time of dwindling resources, dwindling staff; and in England, the opportunities are so great - there is so great a demand for our participation, so great a potential for activity - that you just find yourself saying "no" a lot of the time. To me, it was very frustrating because there were so many things you could do, but you can't do, because there isn't the staff or money for it.

Q: *You were there from 1976 to when?*

SABLOSKY: 1979.

Q: *In a way, one almost wonders what we would do in the cultural field, because the ties are so close that it sort of goes on... It's like the dog barks at the caravan, but the caravan moves on. In a way, no matter what you did, these ties would be back and forth.*

SABLOSKY: Well, that is certainly true. We talked about the special relationship, and I think that does exist. Of course, there is a tie of the language, many jokes are made about it. But there are a lot of misconceptions, too. It was worth a shot to try to demonstrate the vitality and depth of cultural achievement in the United States. Of course, the British academics know our writers and so forth. In the field of American music, some of the Brits knew more about "doo-wop" than I did - and they knew jazz. But they weren't that conversant with American concert music. That was a field in which I had some expertise, so I gave lectures, in a number of universities, on recent trends in American concert music. Again, the field of American studies - as it had been in Hamburg - was very important to us. Many British universities were establishing departments of American studies; alongside the departments that associated American literature and British literature, they were now teaching film, jazz, folklore, and American literature as American literature. There was an opportunity here for us to reinforce that and encourage it. We certainly did that. One thing we did, for example, was to sponsor a study which would coordinate the holdings in American studies in the libraries at all the British universities, so one university would know what another university had. Making these connections was very important to us. We managed to come up with \$25,000 to support the project, and they were able to make a catalogue that would be used for coordination among the libraries. We helped to sponsor other activities of the British Association of American Studies. Whatever we could do to strengthen that movement, we did.

Q: *What one always hears about the chattering class in England and Great Britain, these are the people who appear on TV and talk shows, write columns for the major papers. That is a relatively small group. They are not quite the same as the intellectuals, say, in France, but they sort of pass for that. Did you mark these as being one of your targets?*

SABLOSKY: Journalists, in general, were among the people we made an effort to be in touch with. Not so much for the Cultural Affairs Section as for the Press Attache and the Information section. It seems to be a little compartmentalized. We, of course, had contacts with the cultural writers of the newspapers, particularly, the music critics, the dance critics, the art critics, people like that. One example - when the American poet Robert Lowell died, an acquaintance of mine at the National Theater liked the idea of arranging a memorial poetry reading in the Embassy

auditorium, with some of the leading actors from the National Theater taking part. Harold Pinter insisted on taking part; he wanted to read. Ronald Pickup was another participant. Helen Mirren attended, but she didn't actually read. Anyway, it was a well-attended program, invitational, for a very select audience with wonderful cooperation of the National Theater in honor of an American poet who had many admirers in England. Another example: When the BBC Symphony performed Elliott Carter's Piano Concerto, we arranged for a conversation in the embassy auditorium between Carter, who was there for the performance, Charles Rosen, the American pianist who was the soloist, and William Glock, who for years had been head of BBC music, to discuss Carter's music on the stage of the Embassy auditorium. Again, the audience was a carefully selected group of academics, journalists, political and cultural leaders... The Queen's silver jubilee took place in that year, 1979, I guess it was, or maybe 1978. Anyway, we wanted to do something about that, so we arranged what we called a series of Jubilee Lectures in the embassy auditorium. Bill Leuchtenberg from Columbia University came and gave the first address. We had four lectures, Leuchtenberg, David Owen, who was Foreign Secretary at the time, talking about the transatlantic alliance and its history, Anthony Quinton, about American philosophy, and George W. Ball, who was Undersecretary of State. The lectures were then published as a book called America and Britain. So, that was pretty substantial. Also for the Queen's silver jubilee, we latched onto the American Ballet Theater, which was in Europe at the time. They actually had a couple of free dates, and with the cooperation of the State Department (Jean Lashly, in the Office of Cultural and Educational Affairs (CU), to be specific - this was before CU was integrated into USIA) we got some extra money to bring them over to London to do a week's season in honor of the Queen's jubilee, under the auspices of the embassy and the State Department, with an additional contribution from a private-sector co-sponsor, American Express, I think it was.

Q: It would strike me that you were really dealing with, as you say, the field was so great that you must have really had a crush in you time and efforts, didn't you?

SABLOSKY: Yes, indeed. It was very exciting...the people we dealt with... For instance, when Philip Roth was in town, we (my wife and I, that is) had a brunch at which he met fellow writers like Malcolm Bradbury and V.S. Pritchett and Angus Wilson, Eric Mottram, the poet and professor of American literature at the University of London... We had the same kind of thing at the time that Steve Reich, the composer was performing in London with his group. We had an evening set aside for Steve Reich, and some of the younger British composers - Michael Nyman and Brian Eno, and several others of the avant garde. We could do things like that. You had such easy access to all these people. It was wonderful to become acquainted with them.

Q: How did you find the music and cultural type critics of the British papers? This has been your thing before, and how did you find them, particularly in dealing with American things?

SABLOSKY: I thought the level of criticism in London was quite respectable. They did not condescend to American music. I think American music was respected in that quarter. London, of course, was and I think probably still is, the most musical city in the world. There is more going on musically in London than anyplace else that I can think of. There are four or five orchestras, countless chamber music groups, two major opera companies, and a smaller opera company. It is just amazing what goes on in London. It has gotten a lot more expensive, but it

was comparatively inexpensive at that time, certainly less than what you would pay for similar programs in New York.

Q: Well, 1979, you were off again.

JACK A. SULSER
Political Counselor
London (1977-1978)

Jack A. Sulser was born in Illinois in 1925. Prior to receiving his graduate degree from the University of Wisconsin in 1950, he served with the U.S. Army overseas during World War II. After joining the Foreign Service, he served in a number of posts including Dusseldorf, Newcastle on Tyne, Bologna, Vienna, and Frankfurt. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1994.

Q: You were [in London] from '77 to '78.

SULSER: There were two things we did in that senior assignments office that I didn't mention. After Carter became President, he set up an ambassadorial screening panel chaired by Warren Christopher, who was then the Deputy Secretary. This panel, which included non governmental people as well, was supposed to assure that the best qualified candidates were chosen for ambassadorial posts. Our office acted as secretariat for this screening committee in that we wrote up the resumes of the candidates. At the beginning we were invited to suggest people we thought should be serious candidates for ambassadorships, but Houghton and Starrs and I soon found that that didn't cut much ice. The names we suggested never seemed to make it onto the lists of people we were told to prepare resumes on. The panel met more or less weekly, so each week we would get a list of names we were supposed to write up for various, specific ambassadorial vacancies. We were to emphasize their abilities, experience, management, creative skills, policy innovativeness and all that kind of thing, and to make each one appear to be the obvious, ideal candidate for post x, whatever might be on the agenda for that week. There were a number of people who were obviously favorites of higher ups in the Department, Carol Laise or assistant secretaries around the place, who appeared and reappeared on these lists all the time. If they would fail to be selected for post x, they would appear next week on the list of candidates for post y. We had to rewrite the resume to make them sound like the absolutely right choice for post y or post w or post z, and so on.

The other regular piece of work we had to do was to prepare a written report monthly, to Carol Laise, on women officers who had been assigned during the month to what were called "key" positions. Those were identified as DCMships, deputy assistant secretaryships, principal officerships, office directorships. She was keen to make sure that women were given opportunities. This was apart from the Open Assignment System. It didn't matter whether these women had asked for these jobs on their bid lists or not, or even whether they were completing their current assignment

When I was due to leave Frankfurt in the summer of '75, the political counselor in Bonn was transferred to a DCMship in Austria or Hungary, and Ambassador Hillenbrand asked the Department to transfer me to Bonn as his political counselor. But the Department came back and said I had been at that stage over three and a half years in Germany, four years without home leave and that to remain another assignment in Germany would be contrary to Personnel policies. Besides, we had just withdrawn from Vietnam and they had several senior German speaking officers who had served in Vietnam or on the Vietnam Task Force in Washington who needed assignment, and one of those (Dick Smyser) was being assigned as political counselor. Hillenbrand went back and said, "Okay, then extend Sulser for a year, move him up to be Principal Officer in Frankfurt," because Bob Harlan, the Principal Officer, was transferred that summer too. The Department came back with the same reasoning, and in fact Wolf Lehmann, who had been the last DCM in Saigon, was transferred to Frankfurt as the Principal Officer. So two jobs I could have moved up to, aspired to as a new 01, were taken by officers who became available because of our withdrawal from Vietnam. I declined the Inspection Corps and wound up in Personnel, when Bob Houghton called and asked me to work with him in Senior Assignments.

Q: So then we move to London. Who was ambassador when you moved to London in '77?

SULSER: Kingman Brewster.

Q: What was his background and how did he operate?

SULSER: He had been the head of Yale University, president, I guess he was called. By coincidence his resume for the Court of St. James was one of those I had written up for the Ambassadorial Selection Panel. Of course, I did my best to make him sound like the absolute ideal candidate for ambassador to Great Britain. I'm absolutely sure my resume had nothing to do with his selection. The key factor was that he had been a roommate, in college or in law school, of Cyrus Vance, who was then the Secretary of State.

Brewster was selected as Ambassador and came in to see Bob Houghton and me about the candidates for his DCMship, the minister, in London. We had prepared a good list of candidates, some of whom we had chosen, some of whom had been proposed by the European Bureau. He had talked to Art Hartman, the Assistant Secretary for Europe, who had supported the candidacy of Ed Streater, who was then the DCM at our Mission to NATO, in Brussels. Because of the European Bureau's recommendation, Streater was on our list of candidates too. We spent an hour or so with Brewster in Bob Houghton's office going through the files of all of these candidates. To no one's surprise, he chose the one that Art Hartman had recommended to him, Ed Streater. As Brewster was leaving our office he said, "I understand I'll be needing a new Political Counselor as well because the fellow there is coming back to the Department." I said, "Yes, Mr. Ambassador, we'll take care of that in consultation with the European Bureau." In the end I got assigned to the job myself, and that proved to be the biggest disaster of my Foreign Service career.

It got off to a very bad start. Brewster arrived in London a couple of months before I did, and Streater arrived a couple of weeks before I did. One of my first days there, Streater met with me

and the head of the Economic Section. He said that when he was DCM in the U.S. Mission to NATO, nothing went out of that Mission without him personally approving it. He realized that in London the reporting volume was too extensive to require anything like that, but he wanted to know what was in preparation. If there was a report being planned that he was interested in, then he would get involved. He intended to meet with me and the head of the Economic Section every day for us to tell him what our staffs were planning to report about, what approach we were taking, sources, why we were doing this, how we were planning to handle it, etc. Every day we'd meet with him and report what our staffs were planning. He would occasionally suggest a subject he thought worthwhile. Only very rarely would he ask to see something in draft. More often he would ask to see it in final before it went out. At the end of this first conversation he looked at the Economic Counselor and me and said, "If you don't like doing things this way, Ambassador Brewster will use his personal connection with Secretary Vance to get you transferred." Just like that. Neither the Economic Counselor nor I had expressed any objections or reservations.

Q: It's standard operating procedure to do it.

SULSER: Not unusual, I guess. Certainly nothing like that happened with Jimmy Riddleberger in Vienna. He was not concerned on a daily basis with reporting, nor his DCMs either. But, okay. Before we even had a chance to express our views on it, he threatens us with transfer if we didn't like doing things that way. Also, at Streater's suggestion, the Ambassador met with what you might call the Country Team on a daily basis. Streater said that he had suggested to the Ambassador that since he was new to this business, to begin with at least, instead of having weekly staff meetings he might like to meet every day and have a closer idea of what was going on in the Embassy. So every morning at 9:00 this small group of 10 or 12 people would meet with the Ambassador. We'd go around the table and report what was going on, what we were planning to do for the day, what our staffing situation was, things like that, whatever we wanted to mention. At the end of that meeting the Economic Counselor and I would adjourn to Streater's office and we'd have our session on reporting subjects. These daily meetings with the Ambassador went on every day the year I was there. He never did get to the point when he might go back to the usual practice of weekly staff meetings. The number of people participating in these daily meetings grew. Pretty soon we were 15 or 20 people meeting every morning, including members of the Economic, Political and USIS sections, rather than just the section chiefs.

The first time the Ambassador asked to see me, not long after I got there, he called me to his office. He was there with Will Ito, his junior staff aide, a first tour Foreign Service officer who had been in the Political Section for a while, and was now working out of the Ambassador's office. The Ambassador wanted to know what my plans were for realigning the reporting responsibilities in the Political Section to benefit what he called "some real hot shots." He mentioned Bob Blackwill, who was dealing with Western European affairs, and Jack Binns, who was in my old job, covering the Labor Party, and Ray Seitz, who was covering Africa and the Conservative Party. The Ambassador wanted to have their workloads lightened so they could concentrate more on these particular subjects, which he thought to be of key importance. I told him I had several ideas for accomplishing that, but Seitz and Blackwill were both in the U.S. on home leave and Binns was on extended local leave. I hadn't even met them yet. It amounted to an instruction to let these favored three do only what they wanted, and the other six political officers

should take up the slack. I responded to the Ambassador that I wanted to talk with these members of my staff personally about my ideas before I made any decisions. That was all there was to that "private" conversation.

These daily meetings with the Ambassador were very strange, in that in my recollection he never once responded to anything that was said by any of the people around the table. He would occasionally ask a question, but he would never indicate whether he agreed with what was being said or planned, or disagreed, or whether he had some idea about how whatever subject was under discussion should be approached or handled. Never any kind of a response that indicated how he felt or what his desires were on any of the things that were discussed there. As far as I was concerned, there was a complete lack of communication, any kind of guidance or real dialogue at all.

Having served in London twice before I knew a lot of people in the Labor and Liberal Party in the British government who were then in higher positions than when I had first known them. The Ambassador being new to this business and Streator being new to Britain, I was concerned that I should not try to appear as the know it all and say I, I, I all the time, that I knew this guy and that guy and therefore should be kingpin. I tried to play a low key role, concern myself with what the Political Section was doing and help them with their reporting, get stuff out on time. At one of the very first conversations with Streator, he said he hoped I didn't mind that he and the Ambassador liked to deal directly with members of my staff. Although Woessner had warned me, stupidly, I didn't object. I figured, it's their Embassy, these people are on their staff, if they want to deal directly with people that are handling subjects of interest to them, I certainly couldn't stop them. I suppose in hindsight what I should have done was tell the members of my staff that if they saw the Ambassador or Streator they should tell me about it. I didn't do that either. Luke Kinsolving, who covered the Middle East, was the only one who ever made a point after being asked up to the front office of coming in and telling me what had transpired. Blackwill and Binns and Seitz never did. These four were up and down the hallway to Streator's or the Ambassador's office quite regularly. My door was usually open, and I saw them parading up and down there a lot.

A couple of times early on Streator, in making his calls on ministers and junior ministers in the government, had asked me to go along with him. On the way I would tell him what I knew about these people, their background, their interests and so on, without saying I've known this guy for years and he's a friend of mine, or anything like that. We'd arrive at the office, be ushered in and I'd be greeted very warmly on a first name basis which kind of embarrassed me. I don't know how Streator felt about it, but after that happened a couple of times he stopped asking me to go with him.

So it was not a very harmonious situation. My first assignment in London, in the visa section, I had thought, gee, if I were in the Political Section I'd have some idea of what was going on in this huge Embassy. Then the next time I was in the Political Section, and I thought, Boy, to be head of the Political Section I'd finally know what was going on at the top levels of this place. The third time I was head of the Political Section, and despite these daily meetings with the Ambassador and the DCM I still didn't feel I was in any way privy to their concerns or their political activities. EXDIS and NODIS telegrams that came in were not shared with me; they

went into the front office and I was never invited to see them regularly. Almost every day, Streator would call me several times on the telephone and ask if I had seen such and such telegram from the Department. Once in a while that would be an EXDIS telegram, usually it was not. Whenever he would call I would say, "Yes, I have seen it and this is what we're doing about it." Which was always his second question. On those rare occasions when it was an EXDIS telegram I'd say, "No, I haven't seen that." He'd say, "Oh, you don't see EXDIS telegrams?" and I'd say, "No, not unless you show them to me." Then he'd have me come down and I'd see that particular telegram and tell him what I proposed to do about it, if it involved Political Section activity or response, which it often did. On my last day there, after a year, he called as usual several times. On the last call he said, "I've been calling you about these telegrams for a year, and you have always seen it, and you've always made arrangements to deal with it. I don't know why I keep calling you." Of course, I wondered too. He's that kind of a very close manager. He needs to feel that there is nothing happening that he is not involved in, that is not under his control. Since then I've talked to people who have worked with him at NATO and other places and this apparently has been SOP throughout his career.

Q: Did you get any feel for his relationship with Brewster? I mean, was Brewster pushing something, or was he sort of absorbing, with all this. In the first place these staff meetings sound like a tremendous use of important time for the Embassy, to have staff meetings to inform the Ambassador. It's all very nice, but at the same time these are all working people. It's a lot of resource time.

SULSER: Some of my colleagues, other section leaders, used to complain about having to go down there every day and spend a half hour to 45 minutes, getting nothing for it, no response or guidance, or being reined in on anything either, which you'd have to expect sometimes too. That it was a waste of time they would rather be spending doing something else. Other than invoking the Ambassador's name to get us transferred if we didn't like the way he did business, I really couldn't tell what their relationship was. I had no reason to believe it was difficult in any way, or that it was really the Ambassador who was pushing any of this stuff.

It might have been Streator's idea, but the Ambassador seemed to be behind the plan to convene meetings of selected U.S. ambassadors in Western Europe quarterly to talk about regional things, keep in touch with each other on common problems, such as European integration, NATO, and things like that. This was Blackwill's area, at least as far as political-military things were concerned, and he acted as the executive secretary, if you will, of these meetings. The first one was held at Brewster's invitation in London, and the others were held in other places. They didn't include all U.S. ambassadors in Western Europe by any means, just what they considered the principal ones, France, Germany, Italy, NATO. Not long after this started, probably after the first meeting, I was informed that Blackwill was being detached from the Political Section and henceforth would get instructions from the DCM and Ambassador. About nine months after I got there, Blackwill was transferred to Tel Aviv as political counselor, and Streator asked me to write his Efficiency Report, even though Blackwill had worked theoretically as a member of my staff only the first three months I was there, and had been six months up in the front office. I wrote a good Efficiency Report and Streator put the reviewing officer statement on it.

Once, during these daily meetings with the Ambassador, the Ambassador noted that President Carter was not getting very good press in Britain, and did anyone have any ideas what we might do to improve this. I said I knew that the Guardian, the major national newspaper of an independent political sort (now -- in 1994 -- The Independent), had off the record editorial staff background meetings for invited people. If the Ambassador was interested in doing that, the editor of the editorial page was an old friend and I could arrange for him to be invited to meet with the editorial staff of the Guardian to explain and defend Carter's policies. As usual, there was no reaction to this suggestion. I never heard any more about it until about a month later I got a telephone call from my friend at the Guardian asking if I could have lunch with him the next day. He told me then that the Ambassador had been in the day before for such a session. Apparently, the Ambassador had decided that this was something that might be worth doing, but instead of asking me, who had made the suggestion, to set this up, he asked the Press Attaché to arrange it. The reason my friend, who chaired these meetings, wanted to see me afterward was to ask me about the Ambassador, because he said of the scores of such meetings they had had with various ambassadors, government officials, business leaders, etc., this was the least informative, most unresponsive such meeting he had ever participated in. He said he had gotten up and walked out during the meeting while the Ambassador was speaking because he didn't have anything to say. I was in the very uncomfortable position of being asked what I thought about this. What could I say to an old friend? I did not want to be in the position of criticizing my Ambassador, but based on my own observations of him in these daily staff meetings I was not totally surprised. I just tried not to respond, not to join in the criticism.

During both of my London political tours, I gave talks on U.S. foreign policy at the senior British military colleges, and I usually handled briefings for visiting American groups, World Affairs Councils, university groups, whatever, about U.S.-U.K. relations. On two occasions during the time I was there with Brewster, people from these groups came up to me afterwards and introduced themselves as trustees of Yale University and asked me what I thought about my Ambassador. I tried to say nothing critical whatsoever about him, but they would proceed to tell me how glad they were to get rid of him, that he had been a detriment as head of Yale, I suppose because of his sympathy with the sit-ins and whatnot during the Vietnam War. These trustees claimed that during his time as president of Yale their fund-raising had suffered badly because a lot of the alumni of Yale who normally could be counted on to contribute substantially to endowment funds were so critical of him. These occasions in which people were putting me on the spot were very difficult.

By the time these incidents occurred, I was already a short timer.

Q: I can understand your unhappiness, but what happened? Why did you leave within such a short time?

SULSER: About three or four months after I got there I was attending a Conservative Party conference with Ray Seitz. About the second day, he wasn't there anymore. I began to worry that something had happened to him. I telephoned the Embassy and learned that he had been called back to London because the Assistant Secretary for Africa was in town and they wanted Ray to look after him. Neither he nor anybody else in the Embassy had bothered to tell me that he was being called back and that I was up there for the rest of the conference on my own.

Q: It sounds like...I don't know. Discipline just wasn't there. Or normal courtesy.

SULSER: There was no problem in covering the rest of the conference and doing up the report afterward and everything. The reason the Assistant Secretary for Africa was there was to meet with the British regarding plans for the independence of Rhodesia, to become Zimbabwe. Dick Moose was the Assistant Secretary and he was meeting with David Owen, who was the Foreign Secretary. After I got back from the Conservative Party conference and could follow these discussions that were going on, I was having lunch one day with Tom McNally, who was another old friend. He had been one of the junior staffers in the international section at Labor Party headquarters during my previous assignment and then moved up to be the International Secretary. When Callaghan became Foreign Secretary, McNally became his political adviser, and now when I was there as Political Counselor, Callaghan was the Prime Minister and McNally was his political adviser at No. 10 Downing Street. I was having lunch with him one day and he asked me how I thought these talks about Rhodesia were going. I told him, "Well, they seem to be going alright, but there is one little point on which Moose is unhappy, thinks that Owen is doing the wrong thing, so he has sent a telegram back to Washington suggesting that Secretary Vance call Owen and reinforce the U.S. view on this particular point." As I learned later, when McNally went back to No. 10 after this luncheon, he ran into David Owen on Downing Street, between No. 10 and the Foreign Office, and said, "Oh, David, you're going to be getting a call from Cyrus Vance about these talks." Owen, apparently, went in and complained to Johnny Graham, who was Under Secretary for African Affairs, one of Ray Seitz' regular contacts, that the Americans were "going over his head to the Prime Minister." He was annoyed about this, that the U.S. had "gone over his head to the Prime Minister," which I didn't see as anything like that. I was having lunch with an old friend, who happened to be the political adviser to the Prime Minister, who asked me a direct question on how we thought the talks were going. I never have learned to lie, or at least not very convincingly, when somebody asks me a question. So I answered his question.

The next day, the Ambassador called me in for the second time since I had gotten there and said he was afraid my usefulness at the Foreign Office had been lost because the Foreign Secretary was mad at me. Johnny Graham had told Ray Seitz about this and Seitz had told the Ambassador and the Ambassador called me in and said he was afraid my usefulness with the Foreign Ministry was finished and he was going to request my transfer. I said, "That's fine, Mr. Ambassador, I'm not happy here anyhow, and I'm sorry but I'll be glad to get out of here." I went back to my office and called Carl Ackerman, who was still chief of Foreign Service Assignments, and Bill Galloway, who was executive assistant to the Under Secretary for Management, and told them that they would be getting a request from the Ambassador for my transfer, and that this was fine with me. Of course, they had not heard about it yet. In fact, it wasn't until more than two months later, as I learned in due course, that the Ambassador had sent in his message to the Director General asking not only that I be transferred, but also that the number two in the political section, Jerry Friedman, be transferred. No reference to any specific incident like this business over Rhodesia, but because he wanted to move Binns and Seitz into those jobs. There were ten officers in the political section then. Seitz was the most junior of them. He was an old style 04. Binns was the second most junior, a junior 03. Brewster wished Binns to be the chief of the section and Seitz to be the deputy chief. I learned later that the Department, after discussing it among the responsible people in Washington, decided that there was no way they could prevent

the Ambassador from moving Binns and Seitz into these jobs on an acting basis. But since neither one of them was a senior officer, they would on paper put Binns into the No. 2 job and leave the No. 1 position, on paper, vacant for the duration of Binns' assignment there. Which meant in effect that the political section would operate one person short. They would have nine officers instead of ten. The Ambassador agreed to this. I learned from friends in Washington that he had asked for Friedman's transfer as well as my own, so he could give a career opportunity to these relatively junior officers. It was several weeks after that that Friedman finally told me he was being transferred. No one in London had told me. Friedman told me when he was called in to be told they were going to request his transfer, Streater had done this and had instructed him not to say anything to me about it. But he reached the point when he just couldn't stomach going to these daily meetings any more, and he wanted me to know why he would refuse to go to them, because they were kicking him out. I told him I sympathized with him, I could understand why he did not want to continue to go to those meetings, but I thought he ought to know that I was also leaving -- which he had not known up to that point. They had not told him I was being transferred; they had not told me he was being transferred and had told him not to tell me. I continued to go to those meetings until my assignment to Rotterdam came through.

The day I got my orders I went on annual leave and had no intention of going into the Embassy any more. Let Binns and Seitz have those jobs. Friedman did the same thing. His DCMship in Abidjan came through about the same time my transfer to Rotterdam did, and we both went on leave and vacated our offices. Inspectors arrived at that point, for which Friedman and I had helped prepare the required documents, and the head of the inspection team called me at home one day to ask me to come in the office. He had formed his own impressions, had heard a lot of things from different people about how the post was managed, and wanted to ask me some questions about it. I still tried to be as objective as I could. Leave out the personal stuff to the greatest extent I could in responding to his questions. More than four months later, when I was in Washington for consultations after I had been in Rotterdam for three months, I was allowed to see the inspection report and found that the inspector had chastised the management of the post, criticized the Ambassador for playing no role and for allowing Streater to run the place with a heavy hand. The Deputy Inspector General, an old London colleague from my second time there, told me that Brewster had hit the roof over the inspection report and had tried to get it suppressed. I was interested to note that Terry Arnold, the fellow who had headed the inspection team, got a principal officership for his final assignment, as well, whereas a lot of the senior officers running inspection teams got ambassadorships. So I guess Brewster still had some clout around there, with an old roommate of his as Secretary of State. It was a very unhappy experience.

Q: To finish up here...Ray Seitz became the only Foreign Service officer ever to become ambassador to Great Britain.

SULSER: I recognized he was an exceptional officer. Before I left London I successfully recommended him for the Director General's reporting award and obtained his promotion to O3 ahead of his class by stating in his efficiency report that of the ten officers in the section, he was the only one I could see as ambassador at his next post, having in mind a small embassy in Africa. When the award and early promotion came through, he acknowledged his debt on both counts in a letter to me in Rotterdam. A year later, he went back to Washington as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in Public Affairs and became Executive Secretary of the Department before

returning to London as DCM. Then he was appointed Assistant Secretary for Europe and then back to London as Ambassador. When I wrote to congratulate him on being the new Ambassador to the Court of St. James and the first career officer to hold that position, I told him that he now joined me as the only Foreign Service officer to serve three times in London, which I believe is correct. I suppose he is now out of there; I think Admiral Crowe is there now.

Q: *Yes, I think he's out. What about Ed Streater?*

SULSER: Streater stayed on a long time. The rest of Brewster's time and through the next two if not three Ambassadors he remained the DCM, then he was to get an ambassadorship in Africa but failed the physical. He had had a heart attack before he came to London as DCM. He had heart surgery, as I understand it, and then went to Paris as head of our mission to OECD and then retired. He took a job as Executive Secretary of the American Chamber of Commerce in London, where he was the last time I heard anything about him.

After I had been in Rotterdam for a time, my friend on the Guardian sent me a clipping from the New York Times, an article by R.W. "Johnny" Apple, who was then the London bureau chief, later the Washington bureau chief. It was an article about Brewster called "The Silent Ambassador," saying that of all the recent ambassadors to London, Brewster seemed to be the quietest in terms of his involvement, almost nonexistent in terms of impact.

Shortly before I left London, Richard Perle, who was well known as the political military adviser to Senator "Scoop" Jackson, came to London on a CODEL visit, and we organized a luncheon for him in the Ambassador's private dining room with McNally and a couple of other influential young Brits. During the course of the conversation McNally said this might be his last chance to see Binns, whom he knew must be leaving pretty soon. Binns, visibly embarrassed, said no, his assignment had been extended. I made sure I saw McNally out and I told him, "You touched on an embarrassing point because Binns is not leaving, I'm leaving. Binns is taking my job." McNally was very upset and said, "Why are they doing this? There couldn't possibly be any better Political Counselor from our standpoint than you," and that sort of thing. (Bill Woessner had told me that when McNally learned at Woessner's farewell party that I would be replacing him, McNally responded very warmly and told the Ambassador they couldn't possibly have a better person for the job than me.)

I told him it went back to the luncheon I'd had with him about Zimbabwe, and that I gathered he had run into David Owen and mentioned our unhappiness with one particular issue and that Owen had been upset that we had "gone over his head," as he put it, and had passed it on to Johnny Graham, who passed it on to Ray Seitz, who told the Ambassador. As a result he was booting me out of there. McNally got very upset and said, "They can't do that! I will see that the Ambassador never gets to see the Prime Minister again; I can prevent that, I can see that he is never in No. 10 again," and so on. I said, "Please, don't do anything like that. U.S.-U.K. relations are a hell of a lot more important than the career of Jack Sulser. Please don't do anything like that. In fact, I am glad to be leaving here. I'm not enjoying working with these guys. I am out of here!"

This has been kind of a confessional for me. I am putting on this tape things I have never said to anybody in the 16 or 17 years since this happened.

BURNETT ANDERSON
Director, USIS
London (1977-1979)

Burnett Anderson was born in Wisconsin in 1919. He received his undergraduate degree in economics in 1940. Shortly thereafter, he started his career with a Minnesota newspaper working both as a political and foreign correspondent. In 1952, he joined the Marshall Plan as a press officer. Upon the creation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1953, he was brought in to handle domestic press relations. During his career with USIA, he served in Tehran, Madrid, Paris, and London. He was interviewed by Jack O'Brien on January 5, 1990.

ANDERSON: I was assigned over to London for my last tour with the Agency.

Q: *Those were what years in London?*

ANDERSON: 1977 to 1979. I came in with Kingman Brewster and then left when the 60 year retirement rule was briefly in effect, just at the time of my 60th birthday. If my birthday had been five months earlier or two months later, I wouldn't have been caught by it. But as it turned out, it was a good thing. It was time for me to move on, and I was glad to do so.

Q: *You were pleased to round out your career in London, then?*

ANDERSON: Oh, yes, indeed. Those were interesting years. London, of course, is an extraordinarily civilized place still, on certainly any comparative basis with other large urban concentrations. I had a lot of fun there.

HERBERT E. WEINER
Labor Attaché
London (1977-1980)

Herbert E. Weiner was born in New York. He was a teacher before entering the U.S. Army. He was interviewed by Roger Schrader on June 18, 1991 and by Linda and Eric Christenson on June 8, 1993.

WEINER: Subsequently during my tour in London, which preceded Roger Schrader's, a different issue came up which persisted for a long time. As Roger has pointed out there was considerable left wing agitation in the British labor movement over cruise missiles and particularly nuclear testing and the CND (the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament) was quite active and quite vocal. This went hand in hand with a general decline in the influence of the Labour Party at the time.

The Labour Party lost an election very badly in November 1979 after a long period in power, and there was a general feeling in the electorate that ran against the trade unions for a whole host of reasons. Mainly this popular feeling crystalized around the issue that trade union power had become excessive, and Mrs. Thatcher developed it effectively as a political issue in her election campaign. This raised a much larger issue that persisted for almost a dozen years afterwards, which actually involved the leadership of Neil Kinnock as leader of the Labor Party, who had been a unilateral nuclear disarmar. Feelings began to develop in the U.S., particularly those with a policy interest in the subject, that possibly the special relationship between Britain and the United States would be weakened significantly if a Labor Government were elected. This was a new development that had never existed before in my experience since World War II. Britain and the United States had been seen in both countries as the closest allies; and, now in the 1980's for the first time, one could say that there were feelings of serious concern in the United States, even among people even who were considered visceral friends of British labor, and had had long held feelings toward the British labor movement, over what would happen to the relationship with the United States under a Labor Government. This has been to a large extent since alleviated with the movement of the Labor Party and the trade union movement closer to the political center. But throughout this period from my arrival in August 1977 until I left on October 26, 1980, the general focus of the Labor Attaché was the question of where Britain would stand if there were a Labor Government and where it would stand on the issue of unilateral nuclear disarmament.

Although the AFL-CIO (and its predecessor AFL) and the British Trade Union Congress have had formal fraternal relations since 1895, there were serious strains between the two since World War II over East-West relations and labor contact. The AFL-CIO eschewed any dealings with Communist controlled labor fronts, while British unions leaned toward "contact" for a variety of reasons. However, by 1979 after some delicate minuets on both sides the TUC sent a high level economic delegation to the AFL-CIO breaking the ice. The idea was to discuss important economic issues which faced both of them and resume a useful dialogue between the world's two largest free trade union centers, while avoiding the strains generated by the politics of how to deal with the "Cold War" in the international labor arena.

JOHN W. KIMBALL
Political Officer
London (1977-1980)

John W. Kimball was born in California in 1934 and received his bachelor's and master's degree from Stanford University. He was positioned in Saigon, Sarajevo, Brussels and London. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 24, 1999.

Q: When you went to London, we've had pretty good political relations with the British for years, how were they at this point?

KIMBALL: Very good. At least I never saw any problems in bilateral relations, except possibly over Northern Ireland. The working relationship with the Foreign Office and later for me with

the Northern Ireland Office was just superb. They had very friendly and perceptive people in all ranks. Of course they had their own interest, I suppose, in keeping in close touch with the Americans but their doors were always open. The intellectual quality of their analyses and advice was always high caliber, even if the U.S. didn't want to follow it precisely. They had really impressive people at all levels in those jobs and it was just a real delight to work there and to work with them.

My subjects evolved a little bit. I was assigned there on the understanding that a long-time DOD civilian pol/mil position would revert to State, but it didn't happen. When I arrived, Jack Sulser was the affable head of the political section. Bob Blackwell was already there dealing with disarmament, NATO, and European security issues. Jim Dobbins followed Blackwell. Jack Binns was doing internal reporting and later became Political Counselor. Tom Simons followed him as Counselor. Ray Seitz was the African specialist and later Deputy of the section. April Glaspie was doing the Middle East. Brunson McKinley followed internal affairs. Midway through my tour, Peter Sommers took over the DOD civilian slot from the DOD incumbent. In retrospect it was an all-star cast and many of them eventually became Ambassadors. One of the ironies of my career was a phrase in one of my London efficiency reports saying "he carried on his duties in a highly professional manner and *became the most valuable single member* of a highly talented and closely integrated section."

I started, not surprisingly, with a portfolio that included liaison with the Foreign Office on United Nations affairs, humanitarian issues, and refugees which, in the aftermath of Vietnam, was a subject of frequent conversations. The humanitarian issues involved me with Amnesty International headquarters in London. The individuals there struck me as much more sensible than some of their later pronouncements, but of course we were in the middle of the Carter Administration and officially quite sympathetic. I was also backup on all European security and NATO issues. That occupied some time, especially in the care and feeding of numerous official visitors to London. After Jack Binns headed the political section, I took over his Northern Ireland portfolio.

Q: The Carter administration came in strong on human rights and you had Northern Ireland. Did this get us involved?

KIMBALL: The Embassy was already quite involved in consultations about Northern Ireland. We were able, if I may say so, to avoid meddling on human rights grounds. We were interested in having Northern Ireland come out right, that is, peacefully and fairly for both communities. But we were very careful not to tell the British what to do or to imply that it was a so-called humanitarian issue. For one thing, we would have been preaching to the converted about human rights. The British Government deplored violence and any excesses by one side or the other in Northern Ireland. Of course, we had to draft an entry for the annual U.S. Human Rights report. In it, we said the British Government faces a dilemma of maintaining fair judicial processes even where terrorists abuse, discredit, or violate those processes. I don't recall whether this approach was retained in the Department's publication.

What life in London usually boiled down to was arranging visits for Washington officials and Congressional delegates. Pat Derian (Assistant Secretary for Human Rights) came through

frequently, especially when the Labor Government was still in power. She once had a meeting with the Foreign Secretary, then David Owen, in his office, which I was privileged to attend. We had statistics showing that during one month in the fall of 1978 the Political Section of six officers was tied up with 58 visitors for 80 person-days. Each FSO spent 13.3 days out of 25 calendar work days just with the visitors, not counting planning and follow up.

Q: I would think that you would be getting some pressure from the Senate, particularly from Senator Kennedy and all, on the Irish issue. He seemed to take the IRA side.

KIMBALL: Yes, the so-called Irish lobby was strong in those times too, but I guess they regarded the London Embassy as hopeless. Most of their advice that we heard about seemed directed at the White House. I think our ambassador in Dublin (Ambassador Shannon) sympathized with those efforts, naturally.

Q: It was an Irish American political appointee.

KIMBALL: He was a political appointee. Kingman Brewster in London was also a political appointee, and it was natural for the two Embassies to have different views. A good friend of mine from the UNP days was a political officer in Dublin so we could compare notes. While pressures were indeed exerted by the Irish American lobby, in fairness, this was a period when leading Irish-Americans were beginning to say that Americans should not support the IRA with money or arms. So that was fairly helpful. Tip O'Neill came through London once with an entourage but I was not included in his group's meetings with Prime Minister Callahan. They had separate meetings with Margaret Thatcher as head of the opposition. I don't know whether they mounted any pressure on Northern Ireland issues.

My biggest disappointment on Northern Ireland was in July 1979 when the Administration, reportedly the President and Secretary Vance personally, agreed with the Congressional Irish lobby to ban U.S. arms sales to the Royal Ulster Constabulary, that is, the Northern Ireland police force. I drafted a cable saying the decision would go down hard in the UK, as indeed I think it did behind the facade of civility always shown to us. I was probably insufficiently attuned to our own domestic political cross-currents. Some might say I suffered from clientitis. But I was really upset by our apparent capitulation to the "Irish mafia" and by the implied moral equivalency of the RUC and IRA in U.S. eyes. Several of my draft cables along these lines were never acted upon higher up the Embassy ladder. I later learned from someone who had worked for a Department principal in this period that "balanced" talking points prepared for the Secretary's meeting with Speaker O'Neill had been "totally ignored." It was also a time when there were many new proposals for U.S. economic investment in Northern Ireland as a means of jump-starting political accommodation. This was a sensible idea, but the means of implementation were not always fully explored, nor were the results as advertised. The DeLorean auto assembly plant was widely touted at its inception in this period, but ran into early difficulties and closed.

Q: How about the Carter administration, Carter was pushing Germany to accept what was called the neutron... (end side one)

KIMBALL: I'm fuzzy now on the details, but I recall that Deputy Secretary Christopher made a special trip to Europe at one point to say that after all our pushing for production and deployment of a neutron bomb (actually, a "reduced-blast, enhanced radiation" weapon), not a popular policy in western Europe, that we wouldn't do it after all. Our policy reversal was noticed in London and I think the inconsistencies made the Embassy up and down the line uncomfortable. But in terms of bilateral relations I think British officials absorbed it and no damage was done.

Q: Do you recall when Thatcher came in? Was it during your time?

KIMBALL: Yes.

Q: Was there any feeling that we really were going to have a revolution in the British system?

KIMBALL: Not so much a "revolution" but a revitalization, certainly. Maybe it's my own prejudices but after looking at the way the British economy was going for a year-and-a-half there, I was hopeful that a new government would be able to turn things around. It seemed clear that the welfare state had probably gone too far; that the labor unions had used their power more to stifle than to create; and that things needed to be done in Britain to encourage business initiative and get the economy rolling again. They were in kind of a decline, I thought. I guess there were varied opinions in the political section; some were apprehensive about the implied threat to the labor unions. Anyway, to answer your question, I think it was mainly a matter of hopefulness that a little fresh air might turn things around.

Q: The ambassador during this time was Ann Armstrong?

KIMBALL: No, it was Kingman Brewster, the former president of Yale.

Q: How was it felt he was an ambassador? What was the impression?

KIMBALL: My impressions were all favorable. I liked him very much as a person and enjoyed working with him as a subordinate. I think the British community respected him. He fit in well with them, and had the intellectual qualities that Britons admire. As far as influence over British thinking is concerned, I always felt that if the British really wanted to make a point they would make their case in Washington. I think in terms of relations with British society, Ambassador Brewster was an excellent choice.

Q: How was living in London in those days?

KIMBALL: Superb. Simply superb. It was the best living we ever had overseas. We were given embassy housing on a beautiful landscaped square in Kensington. It was one of perhaps 20 atmospheric old rowhouses on the Square, built in Napoleon's time and convenient to transportation, good schools, shopping, and the Embassy. Compared to suburban Maryland, ours was a little run down and ill equipped, and certainly its amenities were behind the others on our Square. It took perseverance to get General Services to do much about it. Our children attended the nearby British grammar school as well as the excellent American School in London. It was a perfect place for a school age family, to say nothing of the cultural attractions. I can account for

attending 60 plays or concerts in 30 months, plus 3 invitations to Buckingham Palace and one to Royal Ascot races. In short, it was fabulous.

EDWARD GIBSON LANPHER
Political Officer
London (1977-1982)

Ambassador Edward Gibson Lanpher was born in 1942 in Richmond Virginia. He earned his undergraduate degree in 1966 from Brown University and was sworn into the Foreign Service later that same year. His first post was as a Rotation Officer in Tel Aviv, Israel but later his Foreign Service career took him to such posts as Gabon, England, Zimbabwe, and Australia before he was appointed Ambassador to Zimbabwe. He was interviewed in June 2002 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

LANPHER: But as it worked out, I did go to London in August 1979 about two weeks before the Rhodesian negotiations began in September.

Q: You were there from '79 until when?

LANPHER: '82.

Q: Let's talk about it. What was the status when you got there of the Rhodesian negotiations?

LANPHER: We had been working very closely with the British for at least three or four years. As I arrived in London in August 1979, because of all sorts of pressures – the war was dragging on – the British had convinced all parties to come to London in September for an all-parties negotiation of a settlement. Those negotiations began about the 10th of September and they went on for 105 days, morning, noon, and night, weekends, no time off. My role was to represent the United States. We weren't a formal part of the Lancaster House Conference in the sense that we were not a direct party. It was chaired by the British foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, and all the Rhodesian parties, black and white, were represented at the conference. Our role was to be supportive of the British toward the edges of the conference and to intervene where we thought it was the right thing to do and in support of the British.

So, I was the American in London during that period. It was literally a 24 hour a day job. I'd be out meeting with the various African parties and representatives of Rhodesia's neighboring states, the Zambians, the Mozambicans, or the South Africans, in the middle of the night in strange places around London. I think we played a fairly major and key supporting role at that conference. And the British were devoting 100% effort to this conference. They were going to put Rhodesia behind them one way or the other. So, Carrington did nothing but Rhodesia for three or four months. Mrs. Thatcher had to be kept on board. She was the Prime Minister. She didn't much like black communists, as I recall. But the British ran a very clever and very tough conference. They brought all their intelligence resources out of Africa and devoted them to

working the streets of London. They tapped everybody's phone. They were on top of this like a blanket. There was an impasse over the issue of the future constitution in the first part of October. At this point, the Secretary General of the Commonwealth, who was keenly involved, Sonny Ramphal, called me up and said, "Come over. I need to talk." He said, "I've been in touch with all the parties. The British are being too tough and this conference could break down. I think it's time that the United States made an intervention here with black parties." I said, "Okay. Let me talk to Washington." At the same time, the British came to me and said, "We think we're having a bit of a problem here. Maybe you should intervene."

One of the problems was on the issue of land and aid to a future independent state. Working with Washington over a period of about 48 hours, working closely with the Africa Bureau, Tony Lake, Andy Young and the NSC, we put together an intervention instruction that was actually signed off by President Carter. I was asked to deliver it to Mugabe and Nkomo, which I did in Sonny Ramphal's living room in his private house. I had no notetaker with me. Kingman Brewster was entirely supportive of this whole effort and I kept him closely informed. He offered his help in many occasions.

When people got out of line in Washington, he'd call his college roommate, Mr. Vance, and problems were solved back in Washington. I sat down with Mugabe and Nkomo and made this U.S. offer, if you will, the essence of which was, "If this conference is successful and a new democratically elected government emerges, we will be very, very generous in terms of aid." It was conditional. It had to be a democratically successful outcome and everything like that. I remember Mugabe and Nkomo questioning me closely on this. They said, "This aid, will you buy out the white farmers?" I said, "No. We will be very generous in terms of reconstruction aid, clinics, hospitals, schools, cattle dips, and development assistance, but the American taxpayer was not going to be in the business of buying out white farmers." They didn't like that answer. This must have gone on for an hour and a half and they came at me every which way. I said, "Well, President Carter has instructed me to make this offer. We're not going to be in a position to buy out white farmers." This stuck in their craw.

Finally, I had to ad hoc it and explain to them in very simple terms that to the extent that we are supportive of building schools and hospitals and everything else, "Your people won't. That will free up resources from the new government of Zimbabwe to do with what you want." The fungibility concept. Half a light went on and then it got fuller and fuller as they understood what I was saying. It had never occurred to them.

I guess way back in about 1975, Kissinger had talked about setting up an international fund, supported by the U.S. and others, to buy out white farmers. This had stuck in their minds all these years. They kept asking me about this Kissinger fund. I said, "Understand, gentlemen, Henry Kissinger is not Secretary of State today. That idea is dead. I'm representing Mr. Vance and Mr. Carter." They got it and it gave them enough of a hook and a sense of commitment that about two days later they agreed to the British constitutional proposal. In their public statement, they said some flattering things about the U.S. having given assurances that made this possible or words to that effect. Our intervention was constructive. Ultimately after independence, in the first four or five years of independence, we did deliver over \$350 million worth of aid.

Q: What was your reading of Mugabe and Nkomo?

LANPHER: Let's start with Nkomo. His movement had been based on primarily the Ndebele people of southwestern Rhodesia. He had been based in exile. He was an old union leader going back to the '50s and '60s. He was an enormous man, huge, tall, fat, everything. He had been based in Lusaka, Zambia, and supported heavily by the Soviet Union and other countries, but primarily the Soviet Union. I first met him in March 1978 on a visit to Lusaka just after he had survived an assassination attempt by the Rhodesians. Joshua was a wheeler dealer. They used to say facetiously about Joshua that you can't buy Nkomo, but you can rent him on a short-term basis. But he was a wheeler dealer and somewhat of an opportunist. He was a grand old man of the liberation movement.

Mugabe, by contrast, had spent a lot of time in Ian Smith's jails. He got out in about 1976 and fled the country, went to Mozambique. His party, the ZANU, had had a fairly stormy history of people getting killed, assassinated, within the party. There were constant fights for control of the party. And Mugabe emerged as the leader in '76/'77. I always thought he emerged because he was the most ascetic of the bunch. The others were sort of boozers, womanizers, and some of them thugs and not terribly articulate for the most part.

Mugabe was ascetic. He wasn't a womanizer or a boozier. He was very articulate. But he wasn't a politician in the way most people regard a politician. He had real problems, and I observed this throughout my association with that country... He was always very formal. He didn't appear to have any close friends. He wasn't a back slapper or a schmoozer. I always guessed that he emerged because he was the cleanest of the bunch. But he was also clearly ruthless. He had enemies eliminated. There were allegations going way back that he had enemies within the party silenced. But I never had the sense – and this is with the benefit of some hindsight – that he was in any way committed to a democratic outcome. I think he was committed to achieving power by whatever means. I think a democratic election was very definitely a second best alternative from his point of view. He would rather have come to power through the gun, the bullet, as opposed to the ballot. But as it turned out, he was compelled. The British put a squeezeplay on. Everybody put a squeezeplay on. The neighboring states, particularly Mozambique, where Mugabe had been in exile in the end, put the squeeze on Mugabe and forced him into signing this Lancaster House accord in the middle of December.

It really got down to the end in early to mid-December. Everything had been agreed and we all thought that we were going to have a signing. Everything had been agreed to the point where the British had come to me about two weeks earlier and said to me, "We think we're going to make it, but if we're going to make it (and there was an elaborate transition period built into this draft agreement), we're going to have to get our troops and the Commonwealth troops there in a hurry for this transition period and election monitoring period. We can't lose any momentum. But we don't have the airlift for it. Can we get airlift from you all?" I said, "I'll find out." We organized a military airlift and had all the planning begin and everything. We told the British we'd have to charge them for it and they said, "Fine."

But we gave the okay in principal. But we got down to the last week and Mugabe and his party began to balk. They were unhappy with this and that. Finally, I recall, it was a Friday night in

that Christmas party season, and I was at a Christmas party, I guess at the embassy, and my beeper went off and I had two phone calls, one from Sunny Ramphal, the Secretary General of the Commonwealth, and the second from the British, saying, "It looks like things are falling apart. Nkomo is now threatening to walk out. Mugabe is threatening to walk out." Ramphal said, "You need to see Joshua Nkomo as soon as possible. Find out what's bothering him. See what you can do about it."

So, I asked the British, and I guess I must have talked to Washington as well, and I had some very good, supportive fellows back in Washington. One was Jerry Funk at the NSC, the Africa guy there; and country director for Southern Africa, Paul Hare; and then Moose and his people. I spent most of the night on the phone. I worked it out so that I would see Joshua Nkomo first thing on Saturday morning at a hotel where was staying. I went to see Nkomo. It was just the two of us. He was sitting there with his chief stick, pounding it in his hand. We went back and forth for the better part of an hour. He was grumbling about the British and these pressure tactics. Finally, I don't know exactly what I said, but I talked a good line, "You can't sacrifice the boys in the bush just because of some petty issue. Peace is still important and the future of your country is too important." The usual.

Finally, I got down to business with him after letting him blow off steam and said, "What is it that you want that will make it easier for you to sign this agreement on Monday?" He hemmed and hawed. Finally, I got his bottom line, which was, one more assembly point for his guerrillas in the central part of the country. The way it had been agreed at that point was that these assembly points were going to be on the periphery. Thinking politically, he wanted to have an assembly point in the center. So, I said, "Fine. I'll see what I can do about that." So, I went back to my office in the embassy. It was kind of a dramatic weekend. I was exhausted. When I got to the embassy, there in the lobby was the chief of protocol for ZANU, Mugabe's party, with a wad of passports, about 15 of them. I said to him, Peter Chenetsa, "What are you doing here, Peter?" I knew all these characters by this time. He said, "We're leaving the conference. We want visas to go to New York to present our case to the United Nations." I said, "Peter, that's a mistake." But he wasn't a policy official. I said, "That's a big mistake. You'll have to come back on Monday. Our consular section is closed down – can't issue visas over the weekend. We have rules against that." I was sort of gilding the truth here a little bit. But I got rid of him.

I went to my office and called the British and told them what I had gotten out of Nkomo, his bottom line, and that the ZANU were serious about leaving, that I had just thrown their chief of protocol out of the embassy and that they had to get on to Mugabe and stop this nonsense. The Brits were very appreciative. They instructed their then-governor and military chief, who were already down in Salisbury, Rhodesia, at this point, to go to the Rhodesians and get one more assembly point.

The British later told me it was very difficult down in Salisbury, but they prevailed and got the assembly point. As far as Mugabe was concerned, the British did a very wise thing. I can't remember if I recommended it. I think I did, but I think they would have figured it out on their own. And that was that they had to get the Mozambican president, Samora Machel, to intervene with Mugabe and tell him to sign the damned document. The Mozambicans had a 28 year old diplomat in London who was probably the best diplomat in London at the time, Fernando

Honwana, who I had introduced to the British and they had worked very closely with him. That Saturday afternoon, the British got onto Honwana, told him what the situation was, and asked if he could get his president to intervene.

As I learned later, that's exactly what happened. Honwana called Machel and Machel got on the phone to Mugabe and said, in essence, "If you don't sign, all you'll have in Mozambique is a house in exile. You will sign." And they initialed the agreement on the Monday and the formal signing was set up for the Thursday. And it worked. The Mozambicans played a very key role. This young 28 year old, who I had gotten very close to – I'd be in his hotel room late at night and the phone would ring, Machel asking, "What the hell's going on? Give me a progress report." He was that close to his president. Sadly, both this young fellow, Honwana, and Machel died in an air crash in 1986. Very sad.

Q: How about the Ian Smith side? Did you have much to do with that?

LANPHER: I didn't have a lot to do with them. Number one, that was the side of the negotiations that the British handled pretty exclusively. This was agreed. The Smith people were pretty hostile to the U.S. One of the interesting vignettes out of Lancaster House was that Jesse Helms back here in the Senate didn't much care for what was going on in London and he didn't want to see his white friends there disenfranchised. So, Jesse Helms made every effort he could to play a spoiler role at that conference. It was quite incredible. One day coming back from lunch at the foreign office I looked out the cab window and saw two of Jesse Helms' key staff members, John Carbaugh and Jim Lucier, on the sidewalk right outside the Ritz Hotel. I got the cab to stop and jumped out and went over to these two, who I had known from my battles on the Hill. I said, "What are you guys doing here in London?" They said, "Oh, we're here to advise Ian Smith and his side. We don't want to see this conference succeed." I said, "We're on opposite sides of the fence on this one." But there they were in London.

I called the British and said, "Are you aware?" They said, "We've just become aware that they are here. We want them out of here, but we can't do much about it." So, I went back to the embassy and sent a cable back to Washington, one of these NODIS cables, "These guys are here trying to play a spoiler role. Is there anything we can do to get them out?" I had a call that evening or early the next morning from Dick Moose, the Assistant Secretary, saying, "When your cable on Carbaugh and Lucier hit Mr. Vance's desk, he had to be scraped off the ceiling. He was hopping mad." He was following the negotiations very closely, reading every cable out of London and everywhere else.

Vance had had problems with Carbaugh and Lucier on the Panama Canal treaties, on SALT, on Central America policy, and other things. And here they were, screwing up Rhodesia. But according to Moose, and I don't have this except by hearsay, apparently, Vance just went ballistic. He was a very calm man. I had known him for several years. He had offered me the job as his executive assistant on one occasion when I was in Commercial Relations. But he apparently told his staff to clear his schedule, get his car, he was going to the Hill. He went up to the Hill and grabbed Senator Javits and maybe a couple of others and briefed them on what was going on and got the Senate to get to Jesse Helms and order his aides out of London. It was a personal intervention by Vance that got them out. That's just a vignette.

Q: This was the time of the Cold War. There was always this thing about Africa about communist influence and red arrows pointing from Africa from one country to another. How seriously was the communist/Soviet issue during this? How were we treating that?

LANPHER: With the benefit of hindsight, certainly we got fairly worked up as a country, as a government, over Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban activities in Africa I would say in about 1974 or in '75 with the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa - Mozambique, Angola - the Soviets, East Germans, Cubans coming in. I think Kissinger as Vietnam disappeared from the landscape or into the wreckage and as SALT - this was 1975 - wasn't going to happen on his watch, problems with the Soviets... Kissinger fastened on Africa and the Soviets and the Cubans - this was in 1975 - and got fairly deeply involved, made several trips to Africa and was quite serious about containing this menace. If you recall, and I worked on it later when I was country director for Southern Africa in the late '80s, we finally in December 1988 achieved an agreement on Angola that had the Cubans withdraw. They were there a long time. They were in Ethiopia. But we got them out of Angola. I think we signed the agreement at the UN a day or two days before Christmas in '88. That was in the Reagan administration.

Q: During these Lancaster House negotiations, were the Soviets playing any role?

LANPHER: I didn't talk to the Soviets in London. I was aware that there were Soviet diplomats chasing after, presumably advising, or at least staying well informed particularly with Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU party. British intelligence was watching the Soviets very carefully and were monitoring whatever they could monitor in London at the time. The Chinese and others were advising, consulting with, staying abreast, of what was happening in Mugabe's party. The Chinese had been primarily supportive of ZANU. But the British stayed in pretty firm control. The long and short of it is, I'm not sure what the Soviets and the Chinese did in terms of influence with either ZAPU or ZANU at Lancaster House.

Q: But anyway, they weren't a major factor.

LANPHER: I don't think so.

Q: After this time, I hope you got a day or two off to meet your family again.

LANPHER: Well, it was interesting. As a matter of fact, the agreement was initialed on a Monday, and the formal agreement was to be signed on Thursday. In the natural course of events, I would have been at the signing ceremony. I was invited. But as soon as we got the initials on the agreement on Monday, the British wanted to launch the airlift. We got an execute order. It would have been on the Tuesday night, the first of our planes came into RAF Brise Norton northwest of London up in Oxfordshire. The Brits had all their gear and their people ready to go. I was asked to go down on this airlift. We had a liaison fellow in Salisbury. I was to go down and liaise with him and the British governor, Lord Soames. Our man in Salisbury was my old friend Jeff Davidow, who's now just leaving as ambassador to Mexico. So, I went up to Brise Norton and rode down to Salisbury on a C5 Galaxy with six big helicopters in the belly of the plane and

60 crewmen upstairs. It was quite a sight to have a C5 land in Salisbury. I think it was 26 or 28 flights into Salisbury within 36 hours and Salisbury had never seen a show like that.

Q: You're pointing out one of the foreign policy weapons that we had, which was the ability with the U.S. military to call upon these airlifts. It's not just there but all over. Nobody else can do this. Way back in the Congo when they did parachute drops of Belgian paratroopers in Operation Dragon Rouge, there were American planes. The airlift capacity is a significant part of our foreign policy in so many places.

LANPHER: I think you're right. Certainly the British when they came to me two or three weeks before the end of the conference and said, "We just think we might," but for budgetary reasons, we got rid of their Britannias, their long-range RAF transports. They said, "We got rid of our Britannias back in the early '70s or something like that. We don't have the lift capability. The biggest planes we have now are C130s. We've got to move a lot of men and a lot of equipment very quickly. We just don't have the capacity to do it." If they had done it by ship or by slow plane or whatever, they would have lost the momentum and they thought it was very important to have the momentum, outnumbered as they were going to be, with a show of force right up front. It was an impressive show of force. There were 5,000 people out at the Salisbury airport that weekend with their jaws hanging down. When a C5 comes in, it kneels down, the front comes up, and out come six helicopters ready to go. One of the first planes in this was an Air Lift Control Element plane. A C141 comes in and sets up satellite dishes and drags a Coke machine out from the belly of the plane. The Americans are here and they're in charge. They know what they're doing. It was the British in charge, but we made it possible. And it was an impressive show as those planes rolled in. They had never seen anything like it. And it sent a message that this is a serious operation. So, I think you're right. The fact that we do have that lift capability... Well, we see it in Afghanistan. We've seen it every place.

Q: This is a good place to stop for now. We're in December of '79.

Today is September 5, 2002. We've got you in December 1979. You have landed in Salisbury. What were you up to?

LANPHER: I was sent down there basically to hand the baton over to our man in Salisbury who was there sort of officially, sort of unofficially. He had been there for about three or four months. This was Jeff Davidow, who currently has just left his post as ambassador to Mexico. I went down and it was kind of an impressive show of force at the Salisbury airport. It was an auspicious beginning. Anyway, I passed the baton to Jeff, briefed him on a lot of the ins and outs of the Lancaster House conference, who was up, who was down, who the key players were that he should be working with. I was there for two or three days. Jeff and I went and called on the British governor, Lord Soames, and his deputy governor, Sir Anthony Duff. That was about it. I went back out to the airport two days later and grabbed a C141 to go back to London. After a refueling stop in Kenya, in Mombasa, we headed towards Cairo for our next refueling stop. This is a sidebar. But I heard a pop when I was sitting in the cockpit. I said to the pilot, "What was that?" He said, "That was one of our engines blowing up." I said, "Well, are we going to turn

around and go back.” He said, “We’ll go into Cairo.” About half an hour further along, I heard another pop and I said, “What was that?” He said, “That was another engine blowing.” I said, “Now what are we going to do?” He said, “We’re going back to Mombasa.” Anyway, I wound up getting back to London on Christmas Eve, so that was a good thing.

The transition period was set for about two months with elections to be held at the end of February. It was a short electoral period. The British wanted it short, knowing it was going to be very difficult to keep all the parties in the agreement. When they saw how they thought they were going to do on the ground, somebody might back out, and go back to the bush. So, it was a very tense time. The British did an admirable job of what you and I would call “deception.” They lied to all the parties. They’d meet with the parties separately and say, “Our polls indicate that you’re going to win.” Then they’d tell the next guy, “You’re going to win.” But ultimately, they kept all the parties in, although it was very close at times. And they had other problems like getting the South Africans out of the country. They had some troops in Rhodesia. The British conduct of the transition period raised a lot of hackles among the frontline states like Tanzania and Zambia. The British were very tough. They weren’t nice. They were going to put this problem behind them. There were any number of Security Council meetings on the conduct of the transition period. There were resolutions condemning the British in the Security Council. We really got into it with the British because my ambassador and I in London knew, and our man in Salisbury, Jeff Davidow, knew full well that there was no alternative to the British conduct of this transition period. Whatever the British did, we had to back them up, that was our view. There were people back in Washington, however, people like Don McHenry, Andy Young, Tony Lake, and Dick Moose, who took a different view. We really got into it with Washington over these Security Council resolutions. We unfortunately abstained on a resolution and let it pass rather than vetoing it, which I believe we should have. I’ll never forget, the next morning, I got a call from the deputy acting head of the Rhodesia department, Charles Powel, who later went on to become Mrs. Thatcher’s national security advisor. This was the morning after this vote. He said, “The Secretary of State, Lord Carrington, has asked me to pass along a message to you from him and asks that you pass it on to Washington.” It was words to the effect, “I see you joined up with the fucking Tanzanians.” I passed it on to Washington in a NODIS message. In the end, the elections were held and Mugabe won. There were 80 contested seats and he won 57 of them. Joshua Nkomo won 20. Muzawewa won two or three. That was about it. They had a midnight flag lowering at the Harare, then Salisbury Stadium, Rufaro Stadium, and that was it. Soames did a good job of working on Mugabe when the election results were announced. Mugabe - that was then, not now - was persuaded to give a speech of reconciliation. I was in London for that period. It was as difficult in many ways as the Lancaster House conference had been.

Q: At least from the perspective of London, did we get involved in nation building in Zimbabwe?

LANPHER: Yes. Following up on our pledges at Lancaster House that if the process were successful we would move fast and with lots of money in terms of reconstruction assistance, cattle, schools, clinics, you name it. So, I had a steady stream of visitors from Washington as we tried to put some flesh on the bones and worked with the British on this and with the other members of the Commonwealth. Starting with the transition period but over the next six months

until we got an AID mission established on the ground in Harare, much of that activity, discussions, coordination, took place in London. I was heavily involved in that.

Q: What else? You had other things on your plate, didn't you?

LANPHER: In my job as political officer there in London, it was the Africa position. But after Zimbabwe was gone, I volunteered to take on the center of British politics, the Liberal Party, which merged later on with the Social Democrats and was an attempt to have a third party. That was kind of interesting. I met a lot of interesting people, visited a lot of constituencies, and did the normal job as political officer. I continued to do the Africa beat. There were other interesting things. In December 1980, in the post-Idi Amin era in Uganda, I worked with the British and the Commonwealth on getting elections organized in Uganda. At the fairly last moment, they discovered in Uganda that they didn't have any tamper proof ballot boxes. They ordered some quickly from a British company, aluminum boxes, but at the last moment they discovered they had no way of getting the ballot boxes to Kampala in time for the election. So, the British and the Commonwealth came to me and said, "Can you guys supply some airlift?" I asked Washington. We found some human rights or democracy money and hired two U.S. Air Force C141s to come into Gatwick Airport south of London. They actually came in the morning after my father died. I had heard on a Friday night and they came in on a Saturday morning. I was down there at Gatwick helping them put thousands of these ballot boxes on the 141s. But I stayed busy in London. I guess my last six months in London... I left in June '82. I had a three year tour. It was originally going to be a four year tour, but I curtailed to three years in hopes of putting my hat in the ring for the DCM job in Harare. I was due to leave in June '82. It was February '82 that the Falklands War began. I was taken off the Africa beat and everybody in the embassy on the political side devoted just about full-time to the Falklands War.

Q: Except for the ambassador.

LANPHER: He didn't come back right away. He was on vacation in the Bahamas. The DCM, Ed Streeter, briefed him by phone. He thought he'd finish his vacation. His name was John Lewis, a nice man but not all there. But it was quite an experience to watch the British government twice in a three year tour devote all their efforts to a single issue, absolutely focused.

Q: Did you feel our administration... Here you are in London. First, what was the impression you and your colleagues had about the Falklands situation and what to do about it? And what was your perspective on Washington?

LANPHER: Yes. It was kind of difficult at times. The British were determined to take it back. They lost the Falklands. They had no garrison there.

Q: They had a constable.

LANPHER: Yes, but it was not much. But they decided that they were going to take it back. They knew they couldn't without a lot of support from us on the logistics side and weaponry and so on. So, there were very tense debates back and forth between Washington and London. The embassy was involved in a lot of this. There was a loud public debate back in the United States. I

think the champion of the Argentine lot against the British was Jeanne Kirkpatrick, our ambassador to the UN.

Q: She seemed to have an affinity for Latin American dictators.

LANPHER: Yes. Well, anyway, in the end, good sense prevailed in Washington. Our oldest and most reliable ally, the British, we helped them immeasurably. As a matter of fact, the day I left London was the day the British retook Port Stanley. Watching the British government twice in three years turn all energies, drop everything else and focus on an issue in a way that I think we would have great difficulty doing...

Q: Would you ascribe this to the discipline of the party system?

LANPHER: I'm not sure I could ascribe it to anything. But their bureaucracy, once they got their marching orders, was amazingly disciplined. Their armed forces were amazingly disciplined. When I say they pulled out all the stops, they were censoring the press, they were doing everything.

Q: What was your impression of the Liberal and then the Social Democratic parties?

LANPHER: They had a lot of enthusiasm, small numbers in Parliament, maybe 20-25 seats at most. The leadership, when you had people like David Steele, a Liberal who's quite an interesting border Scot, and then Shirley Williams and David Owen, former foreign secretary, Lord Roy Jenkins, there were some people with some real substance, real brains. But in political terms, they were just nice people. They weren't tough, bare knuckled politicians. I never thought they'd go very far, but I thought because of the stature of some of their leaders they did change the nature of the debates a bit in a positive way as between the Tories and Labor.

Q: In '82, you left in the summer.

JAMES DOBBINS
Political-Military Officer
London (1978-1981)

Ambassador James Dobbins was born in Brooklyn, NY and raised in New York, Philadelphia, Manila, Philippines and Washington, D.C. area. He attended Georgetown University and served in the US Navy before entering the Foreign Service in 1967. He served in France, German and England.

Q: Well, then, you went to London in, what, '78?

DOBBINS: Yes.

Q: And you were in London from '78 to ...

DOBBINS: Eighty-one. Three years.

Q: What were you doing?

DOBBINS: I was the political-military officer.

Q: Was it an assignment you looked after, or how did it come about?

DOBBINS: I had replaced Bob Blackwell in Sonnenfeldt's office. I'm not sure how he had come across my name, but somebody had recommended it to him, had called and asked would I be interested. So he and I had maintained an acquaintance thereafter, and he went to London from Sonnenfeldt's office. Then, when he was due to leave London, he went to Israel, so he was vacating this position, and he called me and said would I be interested. I said, "Sure, it's a great job."

He had set up an interview with the DCM, who I had met, but ...

Q: Who was the DCM?

DOBBINS: Ed Streater, who had a mandate from Kingman Brewster essentially to clear out the entire embassy staff and replace it with better people. He was recruiting what he wanted to be a star-studded cast, because Brewster wanted to be surrounded by sharp and inquiring minds. He interviewed me and hired me.

Q: On this, what was your impression of the ambassador's impression of the embassy, Kingman Brewster, who came from Yale, wasn't it?

DOBBINS: Yes.

Q: His impression of the embassy when he took over.

DOBBINS: I think he felt there were too many time servers. London was such an attractive post that you tended to get a lot of senior officers filling billets that really didn't require that degree of seniority. The political counselor, for instance, was a very senior officer who had been the head of senior officer personnel and then used that position to send himself off to be political counselor in London, a job for he wasn't terribly well qualified. He was okay. Brewster wanted younger, more inquiring minds, so he got rid of that guy and a number of others. He actually made one of the most junior officers in the section the head of it, a fellow who was the assistant Labor reporting officer.

Q: Who was that?

DOBBINS: Jack Binns. He made him the head of the section. And then he made the next-most junior officer in the section, who was the African reporting officer, the deputy political counselor – that was Ray Seitz. And he brought in a number of other fast-track people. The result was that

when he finished putting the section together, every single person in that political section became ambassador. In fact, every one of them became an ambassador before I did. Even the guy who was not a Foreign Service officer, but came from OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) and was the OSD representative in the section, he became an ambassador.

Q: Now, before you went out, you must have been hearing rumblings within the personnel process and within the department about this.

DOBBINS: Not much. It was really more in the embassy at that stage. It wasn't that many people he got rid of. The only section he really cared about was the political section, to some extent, the economic section. He got good people and he was really an ideal political ambassador. He was well-connected, willing to use his influence, worked hard, and didn't interfere with the professionals. I mean, he didn't care what you wrote as long as you wrote it well. He didn't care whether he agreed with it or not.

I remember once, he and I were waiting for some dignitary at the airport, and he said, "Well, Jim, what did Washington think about the cable you sent last month?" I said, "Well, they didn't agree with it." He said, "Well, I didn't agree with it either, but I thought it was very well written." He would send his own cables, first person, and then the embassies would send cables in the third person. It didn't bother him at all if they were totally in disagreement.

The embassy would come in one day with a cable saying "We think the correct approach to this is X," and he'd send his own personal cable the next day advising "Y," and it would be exactly different. And it didn't bother him at all. He figured if it was first person, they'd know it was him, and it was third person, they'd know it was his professional staff. And it didn't bother him that Embassy London was sending conflicting advice. Washington would just have to sort it out.

He was a good friend of the secretary of state, stayed with him whenever he went to Washington. If you brought him a problem and said, "I think the department's making a mistake here," he would say, "Get me Cy Vance on the phone." While you sat and waited, the secretary of state would come on the phone and he'd say, "One of my officers here has pointed out that we're really on the wrong track on this issue, Cy." So it was very satisfying. He was a lot of fun.

His other thing, which he did very well, was every week or two he would bring in some really senior dignitary who was traveling through London and have them talk to a selection of the senior staff. It was the senior staff plus the junior staff who he thought were interesting. So, you'd meet George Will one week, or Senator Tower the next week, various people transiting. We met some interesting people.

Q: It sounds like a fascinating period. On the political-military side, what were the issues that you were dealing with?

DOBBINS: There were two main issues. One was Britain wrestling with the decision as to whether or not to replace the Polaris missile, which was wearing out, with a new generation of American nuclear-armed missiles. They eventually did buy the Trident, and this was potentially very controversial with the Labor Party. So it was a delicate negotiation, very closely held.

The second was the equally sensitive issue of whether or not the United States should deploy a new generation of cruise missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe, which eventually led to a decision to do so, and then years of controversy over that decision. But the whole nature of that decision and linkage to an arms control proposal was all being negotiated while I was there. So those were the two issues that were principally there.

Q: Well, let's talk about the Polaris/Trident thing. First place, could you use the Trident in the Polaris mounting?

DOBBINS: No, you had to buy a whole new generation of submarines. The British built their own submarines, but they would have to build them new. It was a very expensive decision.

Q: The government, while you were there was?

DOBBINS: It changed. It was Callaghan, and then he gave way to Thatcher.

Q: On the Trident/Polaris missile controversy, I would assume that the British military wanted it, or did they?

DOBBINS: I assume they did. At least elements of them did. Clearly, it would skew the budget in that direction. The conservative leadership of the Labor Party, the ones who actually had responsibilities for defense, wanted it as well, but had to keep that from the rest of their party, which made it very sensitive.

Q: Well, the British were going through a difficult time when they were essentially selling off their fleet, if I recall.

DOBBINS: Well, the economy wasn't in good shape.

Q: The economy wasn't in good shape, and at least one of the carriers, Ark Royal or something, they were going to decommission and then all of a sudden they finally needed it for the Falklands operation.

DOBBINS: They didn't have it for the Falklands. I think it was gone by then. They didn't have any fixed-wing, or they didn't have any ...

Q: It was a Harrier-type thing.

DOBBINS: Those they had, and they had to rely on those. The Falklands would have been much easier if they had the Ark Royal.

Q: Well, in the political-military side, what were you dealing with from sort of our military side?

DOBBINS: Well, mostly the Political-Military and European Bureaus in the State Department, some from DOD (Department of Defense). Reg Bartholomew, who was the assistant secretary,

David Gompert, who here at Rand now, was the deputy assistant secretary in PM (Political-Military). I guess they didn't have assistant secretary titles at the time. And then Vest was the secretary. I was the person who handled their schedules when they came to London, so I saw them quite regularly.

Q: Well, what was the British setup in dealing with – did they have political-military people, too?

DOBBINS: They had an office in the FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), which they called the Defense Department, which was essentially a political-military affairs office, which I dealt with the planning staff. I was basically in charge of not just political-military, but European issues, so I dealt with the planning staff, the European elements of the Foreign Office, the political-military, and I had a lot of dealings with the Ministry of Defense.

Q: Well, were you here when the Soviets introduced the SS-20?

DOBBINS: Well, that was what gave the whole impetus to what eventually became the two-track decision.

Q: How did the act of deploying the SS-20 hit us?

DOBBINS: The Carter administration was initially inclined to downplay it, because they were heavily focused on getting a strategic arms control treaty, because this was not aimed at us, and because it did replace other older systems. They argued it didn't measurably change the threat to Europe, which would be obliterated in any case. I think it could be obliterated twice, so why worry about it? The Europeans didn't take such a relaxed attitude and agitated, initially, for the Carter administration to include it as an objective in the SALT talks. When the Carter administration, in the end, refused to do that, the Europeans then argued that the United States needed to deploy a counterweight, and then use that as a basis for a new negotiation, which is what eventually happened.

Q: Well, how did the British view this, from your perspective?

DOBBINS: Pretty much as I've suggested. There was a feeling that it was a challenge. It threatened, in the terminology at the time, to decouple Europe from the American nuclear guarantee, and therefore needed to be responded to through some combination of military response and arms control.

Q: What were we recommending for London?

DOBBINS: We were basically recommending the policy that was ultimately accepted.

Q: In other words, this had to be included, or that we should respond.

DOBBINS: Well, that we needed to both meet the Russian deployment with a counter-deployment, and needed at the same time to make an offer to restrict these weapons in a future arms control agreement.

Q: Did the subject of the neutron bomb come up while you were there, or had that been before?

DOBBINS: I'm trying to remember whether I was still in Washington. It did come up. I think it came up when I was in London as opposed to while I was back in Washington.

Q: This was sort of people dealing with Carter, is a little bit nervous-making, that he went all out, particularly pushed the Germans, Helmut Schmidt.

DOBBINS: Yes, it had more of an effect in Germany than in the UK.

Q: I was wondering whether one question is resolved, because he went very hard on "let's put it out there," and then all of a sudden changed his mind overnight.

DOBBINS: Right, and after the bureaucracy had worked pretty hard to implement the original decision and brought everybody onboard. He did reverse it, to everybody's surprise. I think it had more reverberations in Germany than in the UK, but it certainly was an episode that led to a good deal of criticism, particularly on the conservative side of the spectrum.

Q: How did you find the British military? Were you dealing with them at all?

DOBBINS: Only occasionally. I spoke at the military academies fairly regularly. At their staff colleges, I was a regular speaker, so I met them in that framework, but by and large, I was dealing with civilians in the Ministry of Defense.

Q: What were you speaking on?

DOBBINS: U.S. foreign policy. I basically filled a slot in their lecture series, so I would go explain what the Carter administration's policies were and try to reassure them that they weren't as bad as they looked.

Q: When the Carter administration came onboard, they had made some promises. I mentioned my time in Korea. They were going to withdraw the 2nd Division, which they eventually did not do. It's still there. But there were some of these. It was sort of a reaction against commitment in Vietnam, and sent a fairly young group of people. They took a while to train them.

DOBBINS: Right.

Q: Did we see pretty much eye to eye with the British on what constituted the Soviet threat, or lack of threat?

DOBBINS: I think it obviously depended on who was in power. We first had the Callaghan administration, and there was the Thatcher, so that changed somewhat. I'd tell you that the Callaghan administration would have been closer to Vance's view, and Thatcher's closer to Brzezinski's view.

Q: Vance's view.

DOBBINS: In terms of the U.S. debate. But issues tended to focus more on details than on broad pictures. Nobody questioned that the Soviet Union presented a threat, and that there needed to be some kind of combination of deterrence, defense and détente. So the issue tended to be on the nuances of those.

Q: Well, you were in London in the fall of '79, which was a rather cataclysmic time, when you have the dual thing of the Iranian revolution and our embassy being taken hostage, and also shortly thereafter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

First, on the Iranian thing, did that involve you at all?

DOBBINS: I don't remember anything. The Afghan thing did.

Q: I was thinking the Afghan thing. It's been one of those things where I'm sure later on you probably talked to some of the people who were involved in this, but at that time, how did we see the decision of the Soviets to go into Afghanistan?

DOBBINS: I think it came as a complete surprise, and it obviously completely undermined the whole sort of rationale for the détente policies. Arms control, and the US-Soviet relationship tended to come pretty much to a halt. The U.S. introduced a series of sanctions and punitive steps, which tended to make the Europeans uncomfortable, and so a lot of U.S.-European issues arose, regarding how exactly to respond to this.

Q: Well, these quadrilateral talks, did that change things at all?

DOBBINS: How do you mean?

Q: Of course, because you weren't dealing with that at the time, but the British, were the British reluctant to take measures, did you find, or more reluctant?

DOBBINS: They weren't our biggest problems in Europe. It tended to be more the Germans, and probably French, that resisted economic sanctions, for instance. I don't quite recall what the British position was.

Q: How about the Falklands thing?

DOBBINS: Well, I was in Washington.

Q: You were in Washington, right. Did the Soviet move into Afghanistan, did you sense a change in the British attitude toward sort of the Soviet threat or not, or there might be a new age of aggression?

DOBBINS: There had been an ongoing debate between conservatives, who tended to think of the Soviet Union as having global ambitions and endlessly opportunistic and aggressive intentions

and the sort of liberal view that the Soviet Union was largely a status quo of power that could be worked with. Particularly, in Europe, the status quo argument rang true, but when you looked at their activities in Africa, Afghanistan and some other places, the more aggressive and opportunistic explanations tended to ring true. So the question was, the Europeans naturally tended to look at Soviet behavior in Europe as the most important factor, whereas the United States took a more global view, and therefore was less inclined to accept the benign explanation.

Q: Did the advent of the Thatcher administration cause any change?

DOBBINS: Oh, sure.

Q: From your perspective, I mean.

DOBBINS: To some degree. New faces. The main problem, and one that I did have to work on, was that it looked like the Thatcher administration would come in very critical of the Carter administration on the SALT talks, which would damage the prospects for ratification, if they came out against it. I, with Brewster's cooperation and support, mounted a campaign to persuade the Thatcherites that it wasn't that bad. They eventually subsided and didn't make an issue of it, although they never were enthusiastic, they decided not to make an issue of it or publicly criticize the negotiation, which was then coming to a conclusion. It went to the Congress, and as I recall, it never did get ratified.

Q: Did you deal at all with Parliament?

DOBBINS: Yes, in fact, one of my jobs for the first year or so was following the Liberal Party. So I did spend some time in Parliament and with parliamentarians. I also worked on the political-military front with parliamentarians interested in those affairs, so I would take parliamentarians to lunch occasionally and get to know ones, sort of the junior spokespersons for defense or security or European affairs, and met a number of them. Robin Cook, who became the foreign minister, is someone who at that time was a junior Labor guy who I used to take to lunch.

Q: Were you seeing a change, I can't recall where the Labor Party was these days.

DOBBINS: They were tearing themselves apart.

Q: There was this extreme left wing. I always think of these guys getting down to one of the beach resorts and holding hands and singing "Internationale" or something like that. This is with Michael Foot.

DOBBINS: Yes, I met a lot of those people. There was a major debate in the Labor Party, particularly on defense and security affairs, with the conservatives, who had been pro-alliance and had followed the tradition of Ernest Bevin, were under attack. Although they retained control of those policies, really through my time there, there as a strong more left-wing segment which ultimately tossed them out. In fact, many of them left the party and joined the new party that David Owen created. Then that party collapsed and most of them faded into anonymity. But there were a number of people I knew on both sides of that debate. Cook was among the more

radical, for instance. He lost his position as junior defense spokesperson because he was too radical.

Q: When you say radical, what were they after?

DOBBINS: They would have been more arms control, less defense, less skeptical of the Soviet Union, more disarmament, and of course ultimately they did oppose the two-track decision on the deployment of cruise missiles.

Q: We talked about the French intellectuals. How about the British chattering class. Did they play much of a role? These are the commentators.

DOBBINS: Yes, Britain had a fairly lively strategic debate. It really had more than the other European capitals. It had the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Chatham House, which was the Council on Foreign Relations equivalent, the Royal United Services Institute, which was sort of a military strategy institute. A lot of thinkers came through. So it was a very lively strategic debate, with lots of interesting people to meet and active commentary in the papers.

Q: Well, intellectually, it sounds like you ought to have a lot of fun.

DOBBINS: Yes, it was a great time. It was a wonderful place.

Q: Margaret Thatcher, how was she viewed when she first came onboard?

DOBBINS: By?

Q: By the embassy.

DOBBINS: Well, of course, at the time, you had a Democratic government in Washington that was rather apprehensive about what they would encounter, but in the end there weren't any real difficulties in the relationship.

Q: Well, any other issue that you were dealing with the British?

DOBBINS: I think those were pretty much it. Africa, I mean, the whole Rhodesia issue was a major issue, which I didn't do, but Ray Seitz did that. But those negotiations, which David Owen was head of, were pretty active.

Q: How about Cuba? Did that come across your radar at all?

DOBBINS: I don't really recall anything going on with Cuba at the time.

LANGE SCHERMERHORN

**Commercial Officer
London (1978-1981)**

Ambassador Schermerhorn was born and raised in New Jersey and educated at Mt. Holyoke College. Entering the Foreign Service in 1966, she had several assignments in the State Department in Washington dealing with a variety of administrative and political matters. Her overseas posts include Colombo, Saigon, Teheran, London, and Brussels, where she served twice. In 1992 she was named US Ambassador to Djibouti, where she served until 2000. Ambassador Schermerhorn was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

SCHERMERHORN: I went to London as a commercial officer. London is a wonderful city and I knew a lot of people there – college friends and some other friends and whatnot – but I consider it my least interesting job.

Q: When you think about it, sometimes on some issues it is the center, but as a commercial officer, I mean America has been dealing with the British for a few years.

SCHERMERHORN: Actually what turned out as kind of interesting because in those days, again, still the follow-on from all this oil money sloshing around and of course London is host to people of every possible nationality, but a lot of African and Middle East businessmen would come in and want to talk about how they could do business. My favorite line is – we used to joke about this – I think every second African who came in, he wanted to come in and he'd say, "I have a very confidential...I want to get the Carrier air conditioner franchise for my country," and I'd say, "Well you were a little late." It was sort of a joke. It actually turned out to be a little niche because I knew how to talk to these people. There wasn't much we could do for them but at least I could...

My two bosses there – Calvin Berlin was the commercial counselor and Stan Harris was the deputy, the commercial attaché, and Stan was completely flummoxed; one day I was out at a lunch or something and I came in and the secretary said, "Mr. Harris wants you to go into his office right away," and he had some Iraqi or somebody in there and he looked totally flummoxed and he said, "Oh, yes, Miss Schermerhorn will take care of you." Afterward he said to me, "I don't understand any of that." So even though it wasn't very productive in the sense that we had any great business dealings, they had to be dealt with because they appeared. So that kind of ended up as my specialty.

It was a fascinating place though. You know it shows you have funny turns in the Foreign Service because Cal Berlin had a Ph.D. and one day we were talking and it turned out that his Ph.D. was in eighteenth century British politics and he knew more about the workings of the British parliament than anybody in the political section. He said, "I used to be a professor and I taught all that, but now my job is something else here." It was kind of interesting.

Q: Sometimes these large posts, unless you really have another life, it can be pretty awful.

SCHERMERHORN: I knew a lot of people there but I think for new, junior people, and often for the secretaries or the communicators who didn't have as much opportunity to meet British people; British people are very difficult to meet on a social level even if you're – it sounds funny, but anybody who's been there can confirm that. I could amuse myself very easily.

I must say, I was taken aback because the first week I was there I went around – and it's a big building – to introduce myself. First of all, I'm walking down these corridors and everybody has got their door closed. Well I'd never been in an embassy where people had their door closed all the time. So I'm knocking on the door and one of them is the agricultural attaché and he's got about six people in his office there so I knock on the door and I go in and I say, "I'm so-and-so. I'm the new commercial officer," and blah, and he comes and the attaché kind of looks at me and he says, "Oh. Well what do you want?" Then I said, "I don't want anything. I just, I'm in the embassy now and I want to introduce myself," and then he smiled and he said, "Oh, that's nice. Nobody ever does that." The culture there was completely different. And he said, "But you don't have anything to do with what I do," and I said, "Well maybe I won't have anything to do with it here, but I certainly did in Iran and I knew your colleague there very well and we worked together." I mean it was very bizarre.

Q: Often the places pick up the coloration of where they are sometimes.

SCHERMERHORN: I made a point after that of always leaving my door open, which I like to do anyway. My office was in a corridor at the end of which was the office of a British woman who was legendary; her name was Joan Auten...

Q: Oh, yes.

SCHERMERHORN: She had been the visitors control, and of course London had so many visitors she had a whole office of VIP (Very Important Person) and so a lot of people came back and forth in that corridor. And I had friends in the political section, a couple of people who had been in SS with me. I am fascinated by British politics; I was before I went, so I had fun following that. They used to get tickets to the parliament; you could go in. Sometimes nobody would use them and I'd ask if I could go. It wasn't very interesting.

The whole British thing was very fascinating because I got there in December of '78 and then they had what they called the winter of discontent, when the Labour Party was still in power but there were strikes all over and so forth, and then in May of '79 they had the election in which Mrs. Thatcher won. I remember people would say to me, "And where have you been, dear?" (in a British accent) and I'd say, "Sri Lanka," which by that time was having some internal problems itself, "Vietnam, Iran" and they'd kind of look at me as if I were Typhoid Mary, you know, what was coming. Then of course when Mrs. Thatcher won some of them thought that was my fault.

That was very interesting to watch her first couple of years because she really waded in full bore with this economic reform and it wasn't going very well in the beginning because of course there's a time lag with all economic...that I learned in my economic course. You could institute changes but seeing the results takes time, and the ordering which you do them is important, how they interact with each other. So she was having some heavy weather. I think, and I think it's

now come to be a pretty well accepted view, that she may well not have been reelected in 1983 if she hadn't had the Falklands factor, because the subsequent benefits of the economic reform were not yet sufficiently apparent to persuade people that she was on the right track.

However, you know, in the period when I was there you almost felt that the U.K. was threatening to become one big theme park. I mean it was kind of not moving in the right direction, and she changed that. Now of course there are people that have subsequently criticized a lot of what she's done but I think that the Labour Party today certainly owes her a lot too. It really wouldn't exist in any [inaudible].

Q: By hurting the unions which would really just be obstructive; these were not a positive factor from as far as I could see, but this was from a distance. That whole class system is...

SCHERMERHORN: People ask me, "Wasn't it difficult being in a Muslim country?" meaning Iran, and finally I got a little exasperated – this was in London – and I said, "Well actually, it's not quite as difficult as it is here." Because the attitude both toward women and Americans, and put that together with American women... I can remember going to a lunch in a chamber of commerce or something and I was sitting at a table with a couple of British businessmen and I'm chatting to one and I forget what we were talking about – something turned on a literary thing – and so the lunch is over and he says to me, "That was very interesting," and one of his friends comes over and he looks at me and he says to the other fellow, "How did you enjoy yourself?" and he says, "Well, very much, surprisingly." They can be so rude but they don't think of it, and I'm thinking, well, okay.

I can remember going to a dinner party with a very charming set of English people, or charming I thought, and one of the wives was not saying very much but at one point in the conversation over the dinner table she started to venture a little comment and her husband who's sitting diagonally, he doesn't look at her but he did say, "Shut up, darling." I mean these are upper echelon.

Q: Did you find something that I've noticed a little in my visits there, but I've never served there, you have the feeling they're trying to figure out how to place you in American standards?

SCHERMERHORN: We don't get placed then.

Q: We exalted coming from a log cabin if we happened to, whereas they tried to duck it. Who are we and where are we and we want to know what you do, who are you?

SCHERMERHORN: That's changed a lot now fortunately, but you're right.

The ambassador when I arrived was Kingman Brewster, and of course the British adored him because he had been president of Yale and he was a wonderful, witty public speaker in this country where the after dinner toast is an art form. He could do that beautifully as well or better than any of his... Ed Streeter was the DCM and he was very kind to me. When I got there, April Glaspie – whom I mentioned earlier when we were in the Ops Center together – by that time was a full-fledged Arabist and she was assigned and arrived virtually at the same time as I did to be

what we call the “NEA watcher” there. She was there but then at some point somebody back in Washington looked at her assignment record and found that she was approaching fifteen years in the Foreign Service and she hadn’t been back the requisite three years out of fifteen, so they curtailed her to go to the UN and do the same. So after a year she left. So I was really the senior woman and I got promoted the first year, so I was a 1. I noticed as a senior woman, other than some vice consuls, I was about the only one.

I went to a reception that Halliburton Corporation gave and Ann Armstrong, who had been ambassador in the U.K., was on the board and she was in the receiving line and I introduced myself and she said, “Oh, I’m so glad. When I was the ambassador there, there were no women at all except...” It was funny. However, Brewster had a very good idea. He invited for the weekly staff meetings a prominent Brit to come and address the staff; it could be a politician, like we had Shirley Williams come – that was the point when they were starting the new party, the Social Democrats – and Robin Day, who is now Sir Robin Day, the journalist/broadcaster; David Frost and various other public figures that were pretty high-powered people. So to get them to come and talk to twenty people in the embassy was pretty good.

Brewster was wonderful and then he left at the change of administration in 1980. When he left, of course there were a series of farewell dinners for cabinet members and whatnot. I got invited to many of them, because a lot of the British parliamentarians’ families may not be in London so they always need extra women because you can’t have the table not sit right. That was fun. I sat next to Callahan one time and you know. So it was very interesting. Then the new ambassador came and there were a set of dinners to introduce him so the same thing happened.

Q: Who was the new ambassador?

SCHERMERHORN: The new ambassador was a fellow called John Louis, whose money supposedly came from the Johnson-Wax family.

Q: He was a graduate of Williams about the time I was there. I never knew him, but...

SCHERMERHORN: Well he was a very nice, sweet man and I can remember going to one of his first dinners or something and I went the requisite ten minutes early and nobody else was there yet and he was down and we chatted; and as I mentioned in Iran I had sort of an a vocational interest in architecture and the Johnson-Wax building is a famous architectural icon, so we talked about that and so on. Then the moment came after dinner to get up and do the toasts and it was so painful; it became immediately clear that he was not accustomed to public speaking and he found it extremely painful to do this. The DCM, Ed Streeter, was a master at this; he was almost as good as Brewster. He was very witty and urbane and whatsoever. And at these successive occasions it became more painful each time and it makes you wonder what did people tell him that this job entailed, because of all ambassadorships, the one in London is where the public speaking, they grade you on it. That’s how they look at you. As I said, unfortunately he had a very difficult act to follow because Brewster was a master.

He’d only been there about a year and a half when the Falklands happened – I had left by that point – and he was back on leave and he got pilloried in a way; they said, oh, he didn’t go back,

or something, but that's a little bit of a canard because clearly if they wanted him to go back, they'd get on the phone and say, "Go back." So I don't know. I think maybe everybody decided it was a good thing to move on to something else. I mean he wasn't comfortable with it and what a terrible burden if you're not.

Q: I was interviewing Roger Harrison about this. He was there during the Louis period. Do you know Roger?

SCHERMERHORN: Roger came just as I was leaving.

Q: Well Roger was saying that Louis really didn't like dinners.

SCHERMERHORN: No, because he had to do the chit-chat.

Q: And he said that you learned very quickly to eat up because he would have a buzzer by his seat to tell them to clear the table and it was not a leisurely time; he wanted to get it over with as quickly as possible.

SCHERMERHORN: You know that communicates itself to people. So people who I'm sure used to love to come to the American embassy with Brewster and feel it was an honor and they had this relaxed, important exchange that this was just a duty that clearly he didn't enjoy.

Q: And also he was really cut off at the knees as far as the British, particularly Margaret Thatcher was concerned, by the Grenada thing because he was told to consult with her and he went there and she called a cabinet meeting on this and then was told that we'd already invaded and he didn't know that.

SCHERMERHORN: Oh god.

Q: She dismissed him after that because...

SCHERMERHORN: She felt he wasn't clued in.

Q: He wasn't clued in and he put her in a very embarrassing position.

SCHERMERHORN: As I said, that was early '82 – I'd gone. I left in '81 but I went back through London in July of '82 and when I got there they were just announcing the Falklands was going on. I left in July about two days after the great royal wedding, so that was kind of the sendoff. However, professionally, as I said, it wasn't very interesting for me. I had gotten promoted there but I got promoted on what I had done in Iran, not on anything I did there. But I enjoyed very much working with Stan and with Cal Berlin.

There was another very important thing going on there which was a reorganization issue for the U.S. government, and that was there had been a groundswell ever since the oil price increase – a groundswell of opinion that the Department of Commerce should be the agency that actually did the commercial work overseas because the businessmen and the Commerce people said, "Read

whatever you want. Those pinko, lefty, they don't know how to talk to businessmen," and yakkety-yak-yak, and "Look at this; our trade balance has gone to hell while their..." and so on. Then when Bob Strauss got in the White House as whatever he was there – he was secretary of Commerce at one point, too – he made a big push for this, so there was in 1980 as part of the Foreign Service Act; I don't think it's actually in the Foreign Service Act, but there was this agreement that the commercial function would be taken over by Commerce overseas. The devil was in those details and it turned out that it wasn't going to be everywhere overseas, it was going to be in the twenty most important markets based on the trade statistics at that time, which of course meant mostly in the Middle East and places like London where they wanted to go and so on.

So when the Foreign Commercial Service was created they said they would take some Foreign Service officers; basically they made it sound as if they really didn't want to take anybody, but they'd take a few. It turned out they took a lot and they needed to because they didn't know how to do it, but that's another thing. And I'm sitting there talking to Cal and I had said, "Look, I was in Iran and I certainly knew how to talk to those businessmen," and I said, "A lot of people in the Foreign Service maybe don't because it's not their interest, but it's not true that nobody knows how to do this." And I said that in fact they used to even ask and come to us rather than the commercial person who was there. I told you that. He counseled me. He said, "If you want to apply, I think you would get in and I would certainly recommend that you get in." But he said, "On a personal level I don't think you should do it. You've done a lot of other things, not only commercial work, and you can and you should." And I thought about it, but then I decided no. I joined the Foreign Service as a diplomat and that's what I wanted to do. That didn't preclude me from working with business, but I didn't want to do it exclusively.

Q: Also, in a way it narrows your opportunities as far as interesting work; as you move up you want to be able to broaden out and not to stick in.

SCHERMERHORN: Well my problem is I've always been too broad. It's more of a problem sometimes later on, but mostly it's stood me in good stead. I mean, I appreciated his confidence in me and he himself went over – and so did Stan Harris – but they had more time in the Service and they had different perspectives on this. He said, "I wouldn't do it if I were you."

Q: I think it was probably good advice.

SCHERMERHORN: Yes. I thought about it in passing, but not very long.

Q: Then in '81 whither?

SCHERMERHORN: While I was bidding on my assignment, by that time the bidding process had become fairly well refined and you had all these things to bid on, but at the one level they also, as I didn't understand the process at the time but later when I was in personnel myself, I did, the war college, what they call "senior training," which means one year training opportunities for people at the -01 grade. The Foreign Service Act of 1980 had rejiggered these grades and created a Senior Foreign Service which was the promotion up from -01, and so as an -01 you were supposed to be trained by going to some form of course for the Senior Foreign Service; the

theory being that it was selective and everybody wasn't going to go to the Senior Foreign Service. You didn't bid for that, they automatically looked at all the -01s.

So my counselor calls me and says, "Well you're on the list for senior training." And that was because, as I said, Stan was very happy that he could give me things to deal with that he didn't have to deal with so he was very nice in his evaluation, although I don't feel that I did anything there to merit much of anything; it wasn't that great a job. So the counselor calls and he says, "Well you're on the senior training schedule," and I said, "Well I don't want to do that. I'd much prefer one of these things that I bid." He said, "Never mind. You're going to do it," and I said, "Well, why do I have to?" They have to fill the... And he said, "You're high enough on the list that you were supposed to put down three choices in rank order from among the various opportunities for training. And he said, "You're high enough on the list," because we go down numerically to assign people to their preferences, "that whatever you put first on your list you will probably get. So send us the three and do it right now." Some of them were out of Washington and that's a problem because you move for a year and then you have to move again. So I put down as a first choice the national war college which is right here in Washington, but I said at one point to him, "If I'm high enough for that I should be able to get one of those jobs I bid," and – this is my counselor – he said, "Well you're not the first choice for any of them." I said, "Well if I'm not the first choice for any of those, I probably shouldn't be high..." [laughs] It was one of these rhetorical... They were going to sell their quota to go to the training regardless.

Although it's true because I had moved around in bureaus, I mean I had several jobs in NEA, but one was South Asia, one was Iran and so forth, so there wasn't really a lot of cohesion; I couldn't call myself an area specialist so that does become a problem. But anyway I was going off to the National War College.

RICHARD H. MELTON
Political Officer
London (1979-1982)

Richard H. Melton was born on August 8, 1935 in Rockville, Maryland. He received his BA from Cornell University in 1958. He later attended Wisconsin University where he received his MA in 1971. He entered the Foreign Service in 1961 and served in many countries throughout his career including Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Portugal, England, Uruguay, and Costa Rica. Mr. Melton was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 27, 1997.

MELTON: A few days later, I received a call from Kingston Brewster, our Ambassador to the Court of St. James, asking me whether I was interested in a job in his Political Section. My answer was the same; "Sure." And off to London I went where I worked for three years. I chose London over Brasilia--even though it was a lower graded position--because the bulk of my career still had been in Latin America. I continued to believe that I needed to become more familiar with--at least another area of the world--I suppose this view was reinforced by my experience at

the War College. London was a great opportunity to get an additional perspective--not to mention all of the advantages of living in London.

When I arrived, my job was deputy in the Political Section. It was a large section with about ten officers. My responsibilities, in addition to the management of the Section, included coverage of the Labor Party and Latin American issues as they concerned the British. I had been recruited for that job specifically, in part because of my work in Portugal with the socialists there. I also had some familiarity with defense issues as well as the general spectrum of political work. The Embassy was very selective about its staff. It could afford to be. It tried as best it could to match the work to the talents and experiences of the new arrivals. It actively recruited whenever vacancies occurred and tried to find the right person for every upcoming vacancy. London had great advantages, it could offer a living and working environment which could not be matched by most other embassies. And as good officers went there, that attracted other good officers to bid on assignments to London. In the late 1970s, London was riding a pretty good wave. The Political Section was formidable--Tom Simons, now our Ambassador to Pakistan, was the Political Counselor; Jack Binns, whom I replaced, became our Ambassador to Honduras; Jim Dobbins, who became our Ambassador to the OECD and is now in the NSC, was there; Brunson McKinley, who later became our Ambassador to Haiti, was there; Peter Sommer, who was a DoD civilian, later became our Ambassador to Malta; Gib Lanpher became our Ambassador to Zimbabwe, covered Africa; April Glaspie, later Ambassador to Iraq, covered the Middle East. So we had a pretty impressive group of people.

The political situation in the UK had changed considerably from the days when a Labor government--Jim Callaghan--had been in power. Now the Tories, in the person of Margaret Thatcher, were in charge. The expectations were that Labor would take control again--probably relatively soon. The last election had been close. The sentiment for unilateral disarmament was strong and growing and that was Labor's issue. The basing of cruise missiles in Europe was coming to a head with the UK being one of the countries in which this would be based. In order for the program to go forward--and it was one of the cornerstones of the defense strategy--required a critical mass of European participation with the UK being a pivotal country.

There was some concern in the Embassy that a future Labor government might well withdraw its support for the basing of US intermediate range missiles, under NATO, on British soil. The party remained divided on the issue. There was a strong unilateral and pacifist sentiment among party cadres. However, David Steele, who later defected from the Labor Party to form the Social Democrats Party, was the defense spokesman, and he certainly did not favor unilateral disarmament. But there were many in the Party who were, particularly the left wing which was strongly linked to the labor unions.

The domestic debate on this issue really revolved around the basing of the ground-launched cruise missiles and the question of whether to proceed with a new generation of the British independent nuclear weapon capability--a submarine system and a missile capability. There were also questions about the basing of US nuclear capable submarines. So the general debate about the UK's position on defense strategy was very important to us; we had a large stake in the outcome. The debate within the Labor Party was very vigorous and made my job most interesting. One of my assignments was to make sure that the Labor Party understood our

position on defense issues, not only to try to explain our policies but also to expose Labor MPs more broadly to defense issues, which can be very intricate and complex.

My approach was mainly through individual members of Parliament. I would see them privately; I would attend Labor Party conventions. I developed many personal relationships with individual Labor MPs. During my tour, I think I had contact with almost every Labor MP and established personal relationships with many. I tried to put some of them in touch with other members of our Embassy and introduced some to officials of our government including visiting Congressmen. This was intended to expose those MPs to a wider cross section of views, many of which were shared by our people--as a government we are far from monolithic. That was fine.

Some observers might question the need for such a large Political Section for a friendly country, completely democratic and open with a free and unfettered press. That debate was going on when I was in London and persists today. The question is whether with CNN and other media outlets so active, is all the diplomatic reporting required? In some respects, this question misses the mark because the Political Section in London was not simply a reporting unit, it was very much policy oriented, focusing on areas of US concern across the board. London, like all of our major posts--Paris, Bonn, Rome, Tokyo--have a much larger function than the conduct of bilateral relations. They devote much time to tracking and exploring what is going on in their host countries on issues of vital concern to our government. An indication of that was the staffing of the London Political Section which had, for example, an African expert--this was the time of the Lancaster House discussions on the future of Rhodesia, soon to become Zimbabwe. Latin America was of some importance at the time, with Grenada, a former British possession, heating up. Most of the leaders in Grenada had been educated in the UK, giving that island continuing ties to Great Britain. The Middle East has always ranked very high on the British foreign policy agenda as well as ours; many meetings on issues in that region took place in London. We had a Middle East expert in the Section as well.

We did have bilateral issues of importance--on the European Community for example where the British then and now have a continuing debate internally on the degree and depth of their association with Europe will be. They still have more of the same reservations today than they had in my time. The Bank of England played a heavy role in financial circles--even more then than today. So we had a broad range of issues that had to be discussed with the British. If the London Political Section was doing its job well, it was covering all of those issues of vital importance to the US.

There are of course many other means of communications between the two governments besides communication through diplomatic establishments. But these means are not really a substitute for direct, continuing contacts between representatives of the two governments. A staff living locally is better able to report continually on issues of interest, can prepare for visits to ensure they are as useful as possible and can integrate specific events or issues into the larger context of our relationship and interests. An embassy is in a very good position to pull these various aspects together into a more meaningful over-all picture in part because very often the same people in the government or in Parliament are involved in many of these issues as well.

Let me mention briefly some of my reactions to the Labor Party. Some people have viewed its members as a collection of trade unionists and leftists, all joining together to sing "The Red Flag Forever," viscerally responding negatively to anything that smacked of a free market economy--and America--holding an affinity for collectivist government. That is a caricature and an unfair characterization. There were some people in the Labor Party that might be described that way, but the Party represented a broad spectrum of British society. On the far left, it included the "Tribune Group" and people like Arthur Scargill--the head of the mine workers--and others who were certainly anti free enterprise and sympathetic to the communists. At the same time, there were many others--the vast majority--who were much more balanced in their views.

The Labor Party originated when an ideological split occurred in the orthodox socialist and Marxist parties. The hope was that this new party would be able to achieve a socialist society--balancing individualism and communitarianism--through democratic means. There were many philosophical strains represented in the British Labor Party; but support for democracy was the thread which held them together. There were some authoritarian views expressed while I followed the Party; a major issue was whether the Party should remain the voice and instrument of the trade union movement or whether it should strive to be something larger. Increasingly, economic development and political necessities answered that question; the Labor Party, to return to power, would have to have a broader constituency than the trade union movement. The British unions, as their American counterparts, have declined in membership. A party that was an exclusive trade union party would not have prospered at the polls; that was the key factor which eventually drove the Labor Party to seek a truly national constituency.

It was apparent then, and became clearer subsequently, that the Labor Party could not afford to remain in lock-step with the big unions. The people who had dominated the Party--and perhaps even a majority of the members--really didn't want to change to a broad-based institution. They preferred to control the Party--even if small--rather than giving up some of their powers and beliefs in the competitive process of competing for national leadership. That was the essence of the debate.

As I mentioned, there were a few left wing militant members of the Party who were essentially authoritarian--the "Tribune Group." They considered themselves to be a vanguard group within the Labor Party and British society; they would lead their "brothers" to the promised land. They envisioned the UK becoming a Marxist society. I talked to them often and even debated them. I became fairly well known among the Labor Party members; so I would often be singled out when I attended Labor gatherings. Arthur Scargill, a former communist, engaged me on several occasions in open debate about such things as US visa issuance policies--he was on the "watch list," and could only come to the U.S. with a waiver. He resented this, and would periodically raise it publicly as an example of US intolerance; I would be called on to refute his allegations.

I also covered the Socialist International. Its executive secretary, Brent Carlsson, was based in London. That was an additional responsibility which at times was quite time consuming. Carlsson was Swedish. The International and others were becoming more active in Central America and were serious critics of US policy. One of its vice-presidents was Salvadoran; he also resided in London. The Labor Party also became interested in Central America. That became a time consuming brief.

The Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan called into question some of the genuflecting responses of Labor's left. They eventually came up with a new rationale: all super-powers were the same--we were all imperialists who acted the same way--"a plague on all of you."

While I was in London, Anastasio Somoza was deposed by the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. There was an affinity between the Sandinistas and the socialists. I would go to the annual Labor Party conferences, which were major political events, as were the conventions of the other British parties. The most interesting aspects of these conferences were not the speeches and activities on the floor, but the side events. Groups would reserve hotel rooms and lobby the delegates to support their points of view. They would invite delegates and observers and the public, to meetings outside the conference hall. I would go from meeting to meeting listening to all possible views. The Central American faction--including the Sandinistas and various groups on the left--would hold forth. Sandinista leaders as well as people from Grenada, Salvador, and Guatemala were all there. There were groups at these conferences from all parts of the world. It was quite interesting.

There was some concern in the Embassy about the future directions of the UK. Devolution was a subject of major public debate as were the various economic difficulties that the UK was facing. The issue of Northern Ireland was very much alive as it is today. Scottish nationalism raised its head periodically. The United Kingdom at times did not seem to be very united. The independence of Wales was less of a factor, in part because that part of the UK was well represented in the upper councils of the Labor Party--Party leader Michael Foot and his heir apparent Neil Kinnock. The Scots were also well represented within the Party, but pro-independence sentiment was prospering--to a large extent, at the expense of the Labor Party. In fact, the Scottish Nationalist Party was largely formed by defectors from the British Labor Party. The England-based Conservative Party majority in the House of Commons was mirrored by a solid majority of the Labor Party in both Scotland and Wales.

As I said, there was vigorous debate in Great Britain about the economic direction of the country. The conservative view was quite clear: the previous Labor Government was responsible for the drag on the economy; there needed to be a significant re-direction of the economy which would undoubtedly entail much pain for the people. While I was there, the unemployment rate was growing, running counter to the traditional trends in Europe where the consequences of unemployment in any case were cushioned by a large social net and extensive welfare programs. The question of who would pay for these programs was very much on people's minds.

The Conservative Party was achieving some success in its efforts to reorient the economy. It was clear that the majority of Britishers supported its policies. Many of the Conservative views coincided with those of our government while Labor policies on such issues as defense were quite different. The Embassy held that there were no fundamental issues that divided the U.S. from either the Labor or Liberal Parties. They were democratic parties and the differences between us were clearly within acceptable limits.

I think I mentioned that Kingman Brewster was our Ambassador during most of my assignment in London. He was an impressive man. He relied heavily on his DCM, Ed Streater, and his staff.

Ed managed the Embassy and did most of the recruiting. Brewster had excellent relations with the top levels of the British government and other parts of society. He made real efforts to establish a dialogue with the Labor Party--a classical Liberal, he had an affinity for many of the policies espoused by the Labor Party--except for unilateralism and some other defense related issues. He had been shaped by WWII and strongly supported a united Europe. He believed that the close relationship between the UK and the U.S. and between the U.S. and Europe was and should remain--the foundation of US policy. He very much supported the solidarity of the Western alliance, which he hoped to reinvigorate. He was convinced that "right reason" would prevail if the story could only be disseminated; given the facts, people would rally around this concept of unity. He was often perplexed that right reason was not adequately disseminated or did not prevail--particularly with the Labor left.

Northern Ireland was on our agenda. We continued to do the things that we had done consistently. We were looking for the solutions to this very vexing problem--a sectarian dispute that had defied reason. There had been so much blood spilled and so much history had flowed among the protagonists that the dispute seemed irreconcilable. Although I didn't have direct responsibility for the Northern Ireland, I did talk to people who were following the issue closely. They were frustrated; it seemed so intractable. The British seemed committed to finding a way out; many distinguished people had literally given their lives to trying to find a solution. Hundreds of people were being killed each year, either by bombs or shootings or other terrorist acts--in Great Britain and in Northern Ireland. Some people would shake their heads and decry the deaths, but would maintain that a solution imposed on the parties would only result in open civil war with the loss of many, many more lives. So the loss of life then occurring, according to this point of view, was still at a relatively low level and in light of the alternative, still acceptable. I didn't necessarily agree with this view, but it was frequently expressed.

Nevertheless, there were significant efforts made to find solutions. One suggestion was to try to dangle an economic incentive before the combatants, giving all the protagonists an opportunity to improve their standards of living if they could find a political settlement--something akin to what today are known as "enterprise zones" where US manufacturers and others would invest in Northern Ireland in return for tax breaks and other official inducements. The sectarian nature of the struggle was reflected in the work place. They would be either all Catholic or all Protestant. Since the government in Belfast was controlled by the Protestant majority, most of the work places were similarly controlled. It was very hard to find political accommodations when every aspect of daily life is compartmentalized along sectarian lines, which reinforced division rather than building bridges of understanding. So while many were actively looking for solutions, progress was glacial.

I was in London when administrations changed in Washington. There were a number of people in the UK--particularly those on the left--who viewed President Reagan through the prism of his movies and thought of him as something of a "right wing kook." But many Britishers, accustomed to civil service governance as well as the prominent role played by graduates of "public" schools, viewed events in the U.S. as the natural result of the management of affairs by the "ruling" class. So whatever they thought about Ronald Reagan, they were more interested in determining who in the U.S. was responsible for policy initiatives. If those people were thought to be competent, then the British were reassured--regardless of who occupied the White House. I

think that view was probably more prevalent in the Conservative Party, partly because they were the government and Labor was the opposition. Our role was mainly to explain policies, and not to probe the predilections of individuals within the U.S. government. We might hear criticisms of a particular policy and then perhaps a condemnation of the President, but the first focus was on the policy not the chief executive. I did establish a fruitful, if at times frustrating, dialogue with Labor members on the policies of the new administration; they were often critical, whether it was Grenada, Central America, or defense questions.

Grenada was an interesting issue because the island was in an area in which the British had an interest and knew something about. They had strong diplomatic, cultural, and political ties in the region. We attempted to work closely with the British as the situation evolved. Early on, we formed consultative groups. A number of senior Washington officials were named to coordinate with the British--most prominent among them was Phil Habib, who came to London to conduct periodic discussions. Since I was the Embassy's "expert" on Latin America, I participated in those discussions and generally provided staff support to Ambassador Habib. We were trying to coordinate our view points; we and the British were not entirely on the same wave length. The British were reluctant to become over-involved. Many of the Grenada leaders had been British educated. Grenada's High Commissioner-designate (Ambassador) to the UK was a resident solicitor, and the British were reluctant to accredit him, but eventually did so. The British view was that the situation in Grenada, after the mini-revolution, though distasteful, would just have to be accepted. Our view was that the situation in Grenada was serious and that more forceful response was called for to protect the region against Cuban-supported subversion or worse from Grenada. The British were much more passive, assuming that this problem would eventually dissipate.

I had developed a fairly close relationship with the new Grenada High Commissioner through Labor Party associations. He was an engaging personality. He would try to convince me of the error of our ways, and I would try to convince him that he was serving bad masters. I would report our conversations to Washington--he knew that I was doing that and was probably the reason he talked to me. As events unfolded, he conveyed a sense of disagreement and disillusion among his country's leaders. I reported what he said, but I had the feeling that Washington was not listening. Apparently, Washington had made up its mind about what had to be done in Grenada; signs of flexibility in the New Jewel Movement were not in the script. So my reports may not have been welcomed by all.

There was little enthusiasm in Labor circles for our military actions. Grenada was a tiny speck and did not attract much British interest, particularly after the invasion which took place without British participation. We had been in touch with the British High Commissioner in Grenada who was a distinguished figure in his own right. He had certain residual authority and when our military went in, he had some residual legal authorities by virtue of his position to make decisions without reference to other authority. Therefore he was a protagonist of some significance when we landed. Before then, we had warned him that the situation of the American students--about 600--at the Grenada medical school was becoming untenable.

The British understood our concern about Grenada, but many Foreign Officers had some misgivings, particularly since we had moved forward in concert with East Caribbean

governments and not with the UK. Some of the people involved had prickly personalities. For example, in the Foreign Office, Latin America was the responsibility of a senior Tory MP, who was later sacked following some intemperate remarks about Europe and Germans in particular. He was close to Margaret Thatcher. This gentleman was prone to state his views in an off-the-cuff manner, with considerable bite. He was not enthralled by our actions in Grenada--as he told me several times in his own inimitable fashion. So I had considerable fence-mending to do in the Foreign Office after the Grenada passions had died down.

During my tour, we had a change in ambassadors. John Lewis followed Kingman Brewster. Lewis had very limited experience in foreign affairs. Brewster had been a distinguished public figure as the President of Yale University with long standing connections with the UK and with Europe--from his days working with the Marshall Plan. John Lewis had no such background; he came from the family that owned and ran the Johnson Wax Company. He was a nice man, but did not cover himself with glory as ambassador. The British establishment has a way of destroying people; they did a pretty good job on Lewis. I think if the truth be known, that "inner circle" had a role in the Ambassador's early replacement. They wanted someone of substance and someone who had the President's ear. They became convinced that Lewis was a lightweight with little access to the Oval Office--and therefore wanted another ambassador.

Lewis' early departure was precipitated by the Falklands War. He was on vacation in the U.S. when Argentina and the UK came to blows over the islands. I was told that he called the Embassy and said that he had read about events and wondered whether he should return to London. The Charge told him that everything was under control and that there was no need to cut short his vacation. So he didn't and soon thereafter was replaced--a victim of inexperience and bad advice.

The Falklands episode was a very difficult period for us. The Foreign Office initially was not on top of events, just as the British government was not. So as the situation evolved, there was a lot of embarrassment. The early stages were characterized by an atmosphere of recrimination which was just below the surface of relationships. Some wondered how the whole incident got started--the signs were misread by the British, and the situation threatened to immobilize by mounting recriminations. As matters evolved and the situation became a military problem, the tendency to worry about who was at fault dissipated; that was very fortunate for the British officials responsible for management of Falklands' policy. The Foreign Secretary resigned, although he was not directly responsible for the miscalculation of Argentine intent. He took the blame because that was what was expected of senior officials under the British form of government--if there is a major problem, the Cabinet officer presumably responsible takes the fall, whether or not he or she had anything to do with that problem. In this case, the Foreign Secretary was broadly applauded for his action; I think it would be interesting if that pattern of behavior were followed in Washington; would be refreshing--but it would never happen in the US.

Latin America was my area of responsibility although it was not my major responsibility. So I followed the Falklands story. One of the British decisions that might have encouraged Argentine miscalculation was to change the schedule for their supply ships calling at the islands. This was misread in Buenos Aires as a signal that the UK was not prepared to defend its interests in the Falklands. The Argentine government was thereby encouraged to believe it could act with

impunity. The British Foreign Office could have been seriously criticized for going along with this rescheduling. I reported this but never got any reaction from Washington. I left London before the outbreak of hostility and followed events from my next post in Uruguay where the Falklands were also an issue.

DIANE DILLARD
Consular Officer
London (1980-1982)

Diane Dillard was born in Texas in 1934. She attended North Texas State University. In 1965 she entered the Foreign Service, where she served in Paris, Athens, Monterrey, London, and Beirut. Ms. Dillard was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 7, 1990.

Q: You went to London. I remember when I was a career management officer, what you would call career development officer, there was a tendency in personnel to take London and Paris and some other places, more at the middle level, not at the upper and not at the junior level, but to take your problem people, and not only from the consular specialty, but from some others who have got problems -- often alcoholism or personality problems or what have you, and say, "Well, it won't hurt if we put them in London. Nobody will notice it. Or we'll put them in Paris."

The problem was that when I was there, this was another era, but I suddenly noticed that we had staffed London's consular section almost completely with "problem officers."

DILLARD: Oh, I know exactly what you mean. I think we used to do that a lot during the time I was in personnel. I can think of one post where we never really provided them with good officers, and it was a shame. I don't know how that happened. Somehow it was not seen as being that important. I know Vern McAninch left under a cloud, but I think he was one of the best managers that I ever ran into in the Foreign Service. When he was in Mexico, I had some lower mid level officers who weren't that good, and I'd send them to him, and he would say, "Why do you send me these people?" I'd say, "Because I know you can get the best out of that person. That person will feel fulfilled and will do a good job for you." I mean, that's a terrible thing to do to people, but you tend to have to do that with people who can manage with whoever you and them.

So it does happen. It is often easier to find a role for limited people in a big post.

Q: Putting this in practice, you went to London and you were in charge of the non immigrant visas.

DILLARD: That's right.

Q: How did you find the staff? What was the operation like?

DILLARD: At that time we had 12 junior officers, and we had three mid level officers, 03 officers. When I got there, just two of the three were supervising junior officers. I made all three supervisors. We had such turnover, because the JOs only stayed 18 months -- they were in our section for a year -- that we probably had 45 people in the two years that I was there.

It was a hard job. Of these three people, they weren't going to go to the top, but they worked flat out. You had to realize that their priorities were different from yours. I was responsible for the whole section. At one point we had 65 people in the section. We had such a volume of work, we had PITs, we had contracts. But 65 people!

Q: PITs being part time, interim employees.

DILLARD: Yes. We had to just go out in the street, practically, and pull people in to work. I tried to manage all that kind of stuff, all the nationals. I supervised the nationals and the PITs and that crowd.

When junior officers have not yet received tenure, the DCM is basically responsible for their progress. In a big post, it would go to the consul general. So the consul general did work with the junior officers, and I worked with the junior officers. Their supervisors mainly were responsible for making schedules for the various jobs, training them on how to do the various jobs, and keeping an eye out after them. I think they did pretty well. One did not really labor over the performance reports as he should. They were all somewhat limited. So I didn't want to put too much on them, because I wanted them to work with the junior officers in the best way they could, because that was very important. It was a factory.

What we tried to do was make enough separate tasks that people could rotate, not do the same thing all day, just to keep them from going out of their minds. Then I picked a specific task outside the regular work for each one. For instance, I would have one prepare a manual on how you deal with treaty traders, or I had one redesign the office so it would work better. You know, after one batch left, you could do the same things over again, update your manuals and such. But I wanted each one to have something different and something he or she could look back on and say, "I did that when I was there." It also gave us something to write about. I learned from Vern McAninch that you have to work with the material you're given. There was a limit to what I could expect from these three supervisors. I mean, they were all about 50 years old and they couldn't kill themselves over this. It was too late to require that. They just didn't have the drive to do that. So you had to work with what you had. It was not the work that caused me to leave.

Q: What were some of the other pressures? Were you getting many pressures from elsewhere in the embassy on non immigrant visas, or were you completely in isolation?

DILLARD: The consular section almost wasn't part of the embassy, you see, even though it took over the whole ground floor -- unless someone needed a visa for somebody. I had worked very closely with the agency people and got a great deal of support from them, but other than that, the consular section was not really a part of the embassy.

When I went to London, I was recruited to go to London. We three chiefs of branches within the section felt that we were very much part of running the thing. It wasn't that easy. I did run into some problems as a woman from one colleague, and that was not pleasant.

Q: How did this manifest itself?

DILLARD: This was the staff aide to the consul general. He had a way of saying things about people that made the consul general unhappy, but it wasn't anything you could really put your finger on. I had to fight a lot of battles, and it made it unpleasant, because we had a tremendous workload. You don't have 12 junior officers, which later went up to 15, to do just non immigrant visa work, unless you've got a million visa applicants, which we had.

At the same time, they were putting in this AVLOS system, as we talked about earlier, which meant that you had people in working as you were trying to work. You were trying to use the system. It would fail. You'd have to make decisions, like, "We'll just give all the visas and we'll worry about the checks later." You had to cope with all the people coming. You had to have a drop box system, so people wouldn't have to be interviewed. People would come in and drop their passports in a black box. We would review the passports and decide if we had to interview them or if we could just issue. You had thousands of mail in applications.

You had a waiting room that was hot and crowded and noisy. You had a situation where at the end of the day, you might have 800 people outside waiting to collect their passports. They would get unhappy if we'd have a hot day, which was unusual, or if we'd have a rainy day, and we just could not let them in the building. We had to hand them the passports through the door; there was no other way to handle it. Some days I'd have to go outside and get them to line up and convince them this was going to work, or we'd go out with baskets in the morning to collect their passports. It was a mill. It was incredible.

Then they redesigned the consular section, which meant at one point we were 30 people in an area far too small for ten. That was a very hard period. That nearly drove us all mad, but we survived that. When you have that many people, it really becomes a management problem. We ended up, at one point, deluged with passports. We received 30,000 passports for visas one day.

Q: Good God!

DILLARD: Because of a mail strike. We had a new admin counselor who didn't understand that we really did need to have some contract employees on board before this happened. Then when he finally authorized the hiring, we had to just get them as fast as we could and find places for them to sit. All our desks were fortified with boxes of passports, just great big boxes full of passports around every desk. And the public would get panicky about their passports and want them now.

The directions from the Department were, "Keep them outside and tell them they'll have to wait." The consul general and I deduced that that was only going to make enemies for us. So we decided to let people in to look for their passports if they couldn't wait, because then they would see that we weren't keeping their passports from them. The boxes were by day of receipt, so we'd

try to figure out when their passport had been received. They'd go through the boxes, and when they found it, it was like Swensen's ice cream parlor, if you remember that. We carried on, how wonderful! Every British person is a character underneath, we had some great ones. Finally, I think it was CBS which came and did a little program on us and got some of the best characters on tape. The Department was very unhappy about this. But it helped the public understand our situation.

Q: *Why was the Department unhappy?*

DILLARD: They didn't like us airing our dirty linen like that, I guess. I don't know. I don't know if they thought we should be able to cope better or not, but the national employees never, never faltered. They were incredible.

The year that I arrived, in August, we had a backlog of -- oh, I don't know how much, but we had a backlog. At Christmas, finally, just before Christmas, I got the admin counselor to let me have any other nationals in the building who wanted to work. We got some of the guard force and the telephone operators to come in after hours and they opened the envelopes of passports and they got everything ready for us. So we were able to clear it up. After that agreement, the locals would say, "Well, it will all be cleared up. We'll get cleared up by Christmas." They never, never panicked, they never faltered.

Q: *That's wonderful.*

DILLARD: We had a situation where the locals -- we kind of had an agitator in the group, which was fine. In a way, it was excellent, because she probably voiced concerns of a lot of the national employees. So I asked her to get a list of questions people wanted to ask and to be prepared. We would have a big staff meeting of everybody, all 65 people, and I would attempt to answer their questions. It went well. They were pleased. I kept pressing them about having another meeting. They said, "We don't have any more questions." So we just had parties instead.

Q: *Why did you leave to volunteer for "sunny Beirut?" In a minute we'll come to what the situation was like in Beirut. One does not go to that voluntarily.*

DILLARD: The weather in London got to me and the crowds got to me. London is such a crowded city, and working with as many people as I did was enough people for me. Also, having served in Washington, I had fallen prey to the real estate bug, and I had overextended myself. London was a very expensive town, and it was dark and rainy, and I couldn't afford to do much.

Then the situation changed at work. We were no longer part of a team directing this great effort; we were just "clerks" who were responding to direction. So since the work had been the main interest there, and I felt that I did not get along that well with the consul general, and he was going to find that out sooner or later, it behooved me to move along.

So I volunteered to go to Beirut because it was sunny and I could make some money. And I never regretted it.

AURELIUS "AURY" FERNANDEZ
Press Attaché, USIS
London (1980-1982)

Aurelius Fernandez was born in 1931 in Niagara Falls, New York. He first attended a small teacher's college in Fredonia, NY but then went on to Bowling Green State University in Ohio where he completed his BA and graduated in 1953. That same year he started a master's degree in English Literature but was drafted in November 1953 served in the military for three years. Upon being discharged in 1956 he attended the Columbia school of international affairs and concentrated on German affairs. He joined the Foreign Service and his career took him to Chile, Germany, Romania, Austria, England, and France. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: Today is September 4, 1997. Aury, you're off to London. You were in London from when to when?

FERNANDEZ: Well, I had two tours in London. The first from 1980 to 1982.

Q: All right, well, let's stick just to that.

FERNANDEZ: The second one is 1986 to 1989.

Q: Well, we'll just stick to '80 to '82. What was your job there?

FERNANDEZ: Well, I was brought in there actually by [Ambassador] Kingman Brewster, I'm always flattered to say, who wanted a press attaché. Somebody who worked with him on the press really wanted to be more active than he was, but the feeling was we needed somebody. Actually, ambassadors don't pass up press attaches that easily. In the assignments process you had USIA at the time, the feeling was that you would take or leave whatever you could get and you wouldn't have somebody to interview. But it turned out I had seen [USIA Director] John Reinhardt at a PAO meeting in Vienna and he said, "Let's go over there and have your interview," and I had the interview which led to the job with not just Kingman Brewster, but with Ed Speer. That began a very exciting period of my career.

As I said at the end of the last segment, it was sort of the end of the rainbow for me to go to London and it was extraordinarily flattering for me personally and professionally to be working with Kingman Brewster. I worked directly with him. Of course I was under the PAO and he was my rating officer and such. But it really gave me exposure to what a big embassy is like. London is in many respects, unique. We have all those things about the special relationship and such between the United States and the United Kingdom. We have all these ties which extend so far and wide. Some of which are dramatically unique. For example, the CIA station there did not engage in intelligence recruiting and such on the British government and there is an enormous

amount of sharing of intelligence that goes on between the United States and Britain through CIA...through the chief of station there.

My work was focused mainly on the press, as I would say and the ambassador's press relations. One of my tasks was to do a summary of the daily press for the country team meeting which helped bring me into the orbit of all of the issues that were of interest to the country team and to U.S. interests in general. It was a marvelous embassy to work in from many standpoints. I had wanted to go there many, many years and I always wanted to make sure when I got there I would have a job that would be high enough up so that I could have access to what was really going on. Among the activities and way the embassy was run, was what they called expanded staff meetings. There they would bring in all the foreign service staff from all the agencies and they would hear someone hold forth, a prominent British politician or a visiting American leader. It was enormously exciting and one could keep very, very well informed and could ask questions directly of people involved in the political process. People who come to mind: John Major, Tony Benn, and many others who would come and we would have the chance, a group of about 30 people or so, to ask questions of them about Britain and what was going on.

As for the nature of the British press, another point, maybe we could focus on that, and overlap the two assignments because there wasn't much change in terms of the procedures and the way the press operates there. But as for issues between the United States and Britain, the major one was really in the defense policy of Labour, I would say. Where there was still a great deal of residual influence of the old Labour of the '50s and '60s. Neutralist and certainly anti-nuclear [opposition]. That presented us with an information problem.

Q: By the way, at the time, what was the political situation, where did Labour stand as far as...?

FERNANDEZ: Well, Labour's position was anti-nuclear and it really was quite reserved and not fully in support of NATO and U.S. and British policy.

Q: But Labour was not the government?

FERNANDEZ: No, these were the Thatcher years. Thatcher went in, was it '69?

Q: I think considerably later, in the '70s. She went up till about 1990, about 16 years, so we're talking about '74. So, anyway, it was well into the Thatcher years, but Labour was still, obviously, the alternate government that we had to consider.

FERNANDEZ: I'd like to just make another comment about Labour and how it was working internally. An experience I had was during this period I remember going to a Labour party conference. We always went to all the party conferences. The issue was how the party would elect its leader. Whether it would be as it had been previously, the parliamentary party had the major voice in all of this. What came out of that was a vote in the Labour party that led to the election of the Labour party leader with one third parliamentarians, one third constituency, and forgot what the other third was now.

Q: The unions?

FERNANDEZ: I think it was the unions. This brought Michael Foote to the front and that seems to me ancient history because I remember as a student from the university in '58, '59, studying about the position of the Labour party at the time, because he became leader. Well, this exacerbated really, the whole matter of relations between the United States and Britain as I say, in terms of an information policy. There were repeated statements of opposition to U.S. defense policy.

Q: How did we respond?

FERNANDEZ: I'm trying to think back here of the things that we had underway. At the time, it seems to me, we working on the issue of intermediate nuclear forces, the INF, intermediate range. We bring them in, we call them theater nuclear forces, but that sounded too much like it was just aimed at Britain...or at Europe, so they made it intermediate range missiles. That was one of the subjects that we were working on and to some extent I was engaged with the Ministry of Defense in working on these problems to work on public opinion in Britain to be accepting of intermediate range missiles. They already had some capability in this area, but I really couldn't, just off the top of my head.

Q: Well, I think we talked earlier about the Soviet SS-20s and we were introducing the Pershing II missile which was in response, and there had been a great outcry particularly instigated by the Soviet Union and communist parties and leftist parties against this. What the Soviets did was all right, but our response to it was not. At least this is our viewpoint.

FERNANDEZ: This is exactly what was going on. That was the thing we had to convince them. But ironically, to jump ahead to my second assignment, because it is directly related to what we're speaking about. We say there is an information problem we have. When I returned to London in '86 we were then carrying out information programs with the Ministry of Defense about the dismantling of strategic nuclear weapons. It sort of went full circle on that. But times change and policies change and also realities. At any rate, back in those times there was considerable Labour party opposition to the response we were seeking to give to the SS-20.

Q: I'd like to come to back the press. You mention Kingman Brewster. Who was he and how did he operate?

FERNANDEZ: Kingman Brewster was a very, very warm man, and as I say over and again it was just a great honor and flattering for me to work with him. The early stages...I arrived in July of 1980. Of course, in November Carter lost the election so Kingman was getting ready to leave. In that period in July to November I was really quite privileged to go on a number of things with him. He sort of liked, I guess, some of the ideas and some of the experience I had and I had occasion to sit with him in the big limousine going off to lunch and was just accompanying him to press interviews and such.

He had been the president of Yale. He had, of course, defused the uprisings at Yale and that occurred at other universities during Vietnam. He was very clever, very relaxed, very literate, just a very pleasant man. But he was, really, quite involved with policy. For example, on issues

about the Middle East, he was certainly very well informed about that and made demarches to the FCO, and to the British government about Middle East issues that were always sort of lurking there.

At any rate, singular to Kingman Brewster's great success in London was Ed Streeter who was a career Foreign Service officer I had occasion to then serve with in OECD later. There was a real style, there was a real substance, and there was real class to the way things were carried out. Now, I don't know how much you want me to go off on what the nature of British society as it from my worm's eye view and how it affected our operation.

Q: Let's talk about the fit. We're talking not about the social side but we're talking about the political society. That as far as the American...what we wanted and how the embassy saw British society and how we worked within it. This is during the '80s.

FERNANDEZ: Contacts with people were very easy to make, obviously. You had a common language. As the wags always say, "A common language is dividing you." But we were very, very accessible and the nature of British society although it is incredibly [different] from ours, the United States, the whole...committed on their part all these...class nature of their society and such, makes it for a very different sort of place. The top leadership all came from the best schools and everything.

But there was a slow process beginning of sort of, that one hesitates to say about Britain democratizing it, but opening up opportunities to the Asians and Africans that were coming in to the society in greater numbers to the Commonwealth. And just the normal course of things. More people were becoming better educated and being drawn into the political process. There was a slow erosion of this class structure which nonetheless, and I think in the eyes of most Britons, still remains pretty rigid and pretty stratifying and effects the way they view the United States and the way we view them.

As for their views of the United States, again focusing on sort of the information side, I could almost say [they were] forever appalled by some of the misunderstandings about how our presidential operated vis a vis their prime ministerial or parliamentary system. This tended to often, to lead to criticism of the United States which was ill thought out and really not taking into account our great differences. Just to take one. When the government comes up and [proposes] its budgets, the chancellor of the exchequer takes it to the parliament and he sort of is really sort the central bank, head of the central bank and the head of the department of treasury. Now, that gave the chancellor of the exchequer really a tremendous amount of power. Very often one would read things which would criticize what was going on in the United States, "Why doesn't the Secretary of the Treasury do this or that or the other." Really what it was was the misunderstanding of the limits of the Secretary of the Treasury vis a vis the chancellor of the exchequer in the United Kingdom.

One worked at those things and, you know, over here in the Commons and the club houses and it never really disappeared, probably never will. I wouldn't want to draw it as the major problem, but I would suggest it as indicative of the differences of the prism through which they were looking to the United States.

Q: Did you get any feel for the fit between the Carter administration and the Thatcher administration? Margaret Thatcher later had the great love affair with Ronald Reagan. Let's talk about it. Ronald Reagan was not even on the horizon when you arrived there and Margaret Thatcher had been doing some things which in many peoples' eyes were quite justified, and [she reduced] the power of the unions. It was a major change in British policy since World War II. The Carter administration came out, in some ways, more closely akin to the Labour government. Was this, in fact, true? What was the fit?

FERNANDEZ: I never sensed any great Thatcher-Carter warmth, I guess, because as you pointed out, this became so intense during the Reagan years. Reagan and Thatcher were so close. There was nothing resembling that in the period I can recall. But, you know, they had good relations. There was always the cheer for the special relationship.

Q: Well, also, it's like, "How's life? Well, it's great if you consider the alternative." In this case, how is the Conservative government? It's great if you consider the alternative, which is Michael Foote, who is almost unacceptable.

FERNANDEZ: Oh, clearly unacceptable, yes.

Q: Could you talk a little about how Michael Foote was perceived at this time and the Labour party by the embassy?

FERNANDEZ: I was mentioning the party conference that I went to. I'll never forget it. Where Michael Foote was elected party leader was at Wembley. I was near there with Tom Siantz who was the political counselor. I'll never forget how David Owen, after giving his talk at the party conference, came up and sat with the diplomats and press section. We were sitting [in the visitors section]. Foote was giving a speech. Foote was a very literary man. His demeanor in the House of Commons in debates is a great picture to watch. It's very cultivating, in a way, and it was always ideological. With Thatcher the Conservatives were so firmly in power and they had such a clear majority at the time the numbers of which escape me entirely. But he was certainly not viewed, nor were many of the radical Labour leaders as being the best alternative or any alternative particularly in the area of defense which is so central to our relations.

The whole society has a texture to it that for the foreign diplomat or press attache to understand it, [one] has to really be engaged and go and see. You could see it plain as day at the party conferences. The SPD, and of course the Conservative Labour Party conferences, all of this, and also the trade unions conference. One had a chance to see the professional politicians and labor unions involved in the whole process. They were pretty powerful people who were being eroded, whose power was being eroded, by the policies that Thatcher was just sort of barreling through. It diminished the power of the trade unions. You, know who it actually gained in some respects within the party, the labor unions contribute to the funding of the Labour party, so they're a very important element.

One could go off to these party conferences, see all these people, one would know all the journalists in the position I was in. We had a chance to see what these people were about. There

wasn't any personal hostility to any of this. I never encountered this in talking to people even like Robin Cooke the British Foreign Ministry back in those days. But it was clear that their policies and interests in that certain place, certain kind of time, were just contrary to our interests.

Q: Did you have a feeling that on the Labour side... There are two things that are going on. One is what they're pointed towards, their old idol, which is long since gone - their mortal enemy, the Soviet Union. The other one is... their ship was, if not sinking, listing a great deal because of what Margaret Thatcher was doing. When you got those people aside, were they concerned about what was happening?

FERNANDEZ: Well, no, I never heard any wave of persons...criticisms from people in the party about other persons in the party were easy enough to come by, but they were not severe. It was always about the opposition. You know, you have a very open dialogue with them, but you certainly never came to any fast agreements as to how...that would effect policy. When we get to talking about '86 it may be a time to bring this in because it demonstrates what happened when after Neil Kennek became the party leader.

When the party conference of Labour [occurred in] the fall of '86, a very [strong] statement made by Casper Weinberger the Secretary of Defense was picked up by Kennek as being an argument in support of the Labour party's position on nuclear weapons. We went in that party conference. Charles Price was then the U.S. ambassador. Bud Korngold was my boss and the public affairs counselor. We countered this at the party conference in front of the press saying, "What Mr. Weinberger said does not accord with what the Labour party is saying." I could remember Kennek taking umbrage at this [and] really grating the ambassador and Ambassador Price for speaking out in effect against the Labour party's position. But it was well remembered what we did at that party conference as far as presenting the U.S. position on defense policy and that is... where we were headed, I guess, way back when, whatever comes out. And [if] our policies were misrepresented, we would counter them, and would put in the counter arguments.

Q: Let's talk about the press. Probably it'll overlap into the two periods, but let's concentrate on the first part. You'd been in various places. What was your initial impression and how did it develop of the British press?

FERNANDEZ: I was familiar with the British press on a daily basis for many years, certainly going back to my MBFR years in '76. I always read the *Financial Times* and the *London Times* and the *Guardian*. So when I went there I had a leg up on all the names and who was doing what and such. The British press is hyperactive. [For instance, look at] the tragedy with Princess Diana. You know, just pouring out, they have this capacity to pour it out and on and on and on and on. They're real news junkies and there are many of them. There are many different outlets and there are different people on them.

[During this] period, [Rupert] Murdoch of course, had come in. You had the *Sun*, the biggest newspaper with a circulation of at least [100,000 or perhaps one million], and there was just this plethora of papers of different varieties all going after the story and they went to varying levels of sensationalism. The *Guardian* was on the left. Clearly, ideologically left. The *Daily Telegraph* was supporting the Tories. The *Times* was sort of conservative, but certainly more in tune with

the Tories. For the purposes of our interests in our work. One of the curious things to work with for us in terms of our foreign policy was the broadcasting. The word broadcasting.

Now, curiously, the best outlets and the best forms for getting our position across was a morning radio program called the *Today* program, which was on from about six to eight in the morning. It was not television. It was always, in both of my tours there, most often difficult to convince a press man, a government press spokesman, anybody who is bringing an official, government official of the United States, to want to go on morning television. You'd have to say, well, you know, morning television is the place to go, you go on the BBC Radio Four, and you do the *Today* show.

But it was a very different structure in which to work. Here you certainly want to catch NPR, but you don't catch the nation as you do with Radio Four. We did a considerable amount of work with them and just this countless numbers of people from [government officials] to general [official visitors] to...just any number of people. We would always take to that morning radio program where well informed journalists would question about U.S. policy and we had a chance to present our positions.

Q: This is from a perspective almost of a tourist going over to England. I just recently came from there. You have a paper of four million like the Sun. All one can think about is the third page, which is a bare-breasted lady. But under the lens compared to what I would consider the red meat of the New York Times or the Washington Post, which go into things in some detail, these papers seem to be pretty skimpy on what I would consider a real analysis and real information.

FERNANDEZ: That's direction. These are tabloids. But there is something to be said about the Sun and their writing, which is actually very, very, accomplished. It wasn't always sensationalism. More often than that there was sensationalism involved, but when they did an editorial or a commentary it was well written and well reasoned and well informed. Which is not to say that that justifies all the other [sensationalism] that had sold them. But it had enormous influence. You'd walk down the street and you'd see the headline of the *Sun*, you know, that influenced a lot of opinions. You know, it was out there in the newsstand the kiosk which was sort of a...

Q: Here you are, the American embassy, the press officer. How did you make contact? How did you find it dealing with the reporters? Or did it make any difference because it was going to be decided in the board room of the Sun?

FERNANDEZ: There was a good bit of that. I remember when I first arrived in 1982 and [Ambassador] Brewster had a reception for me at Winfield House, introducing me to the press. Of course the guys who were there for all these years had all these hundreds of names of people. They would come to these things. I had the privilege of [knowing] some of the more familiar people who would come to receptions such as that of other receptions at the embassy. Winfield House was always a great contact point. A good indication of that was a hot ticket [for a Middle Eastern] journalist who would generally go. So it was really easy to see that.

I can recall after [Rupert] Murdoch bought the *Times* and Harry Evans was the editor. He's now the Random House editor. I can recall going to see [a man named Weiss] with Casper Weinberger, our secretary of defense, and having a discussion [with] their defense correspondent and Harry himself and Murdoch was there. This is sort of a little tattletale, but an interesting footnote. He had just taken over the *Times of London* and Harry Evans is a very self-sufficient and hard-driving man. Really sort of treated Murdoch not dismissively, but he didn't have him in the conversation and then all of these correspondents, the defense correspondents, asking probing questions about the Libya bombing raids and just going on and on and on and Murdoch would ask a question. But I remember again, Harry takes Casper Weinberger out and all, everybody follows on his [trail], but Murdoch would go down the elevator, he'd say, made some comment about, "Well, that doesn't represent my view." Now that is paraphrasing, he didn't say that.

But, obviously, this is a time which great change was taking place with his ownership of the *Times*, and getting ready to move up and walk into one thing or another... Really, he was changing the whole structure and management on the paper and modernizing it. At any rate, I mentioned that Weinberger was going in and how the press would treat him. But these are all fellows...I'm still in touch with one of these guys who was very interested in the oral history project who was here in the States much of his time and doing a book on East-West relations during the Cold War that I was mentioning the other day. He was with that group and I can remember his probing questions about the Libyan bombing raids.

Q: Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980. What was the feeling both in the embassy and in Britain about the election of Ronald Reagan? He was pretty much an unknown as far as politics were concerned. It's sort of scary. Could you talk about this?

FERNANDEZ: Well, it's sort of scary, as you say. There were many people who said "Here is an untested man who has a reputation as being in a Hollywood background and everything and not being a very substantive man and being a great friend of Maggie Thatcher, being very conservative." Yes, there were concerns about him. I mean, the president of the United States having his finger on the nuclear button. In every country, all of us had served in, is always a concern, in the case of Reagan, when that black box is, or attache case, that black button is carried around, is turned over to him then there is this great concern about...

Throughout that, Reagan came back to London on one or two occasions. The one I remember was when he came over after his presidency and spoke at the Guild Hall and that was an occasion I had to speak to him. He gave a very stirring and soaring speech that was well accepted. He was out of office and supported, of course the administration policy. But there was this feeling that this is a widespread [view] in the United States that this man who you knew from a substantive and intellectual point of view was not wholly prepared to do the lending that he ultimately did.

Q: Did you as the press spokesman both when Reagan was running for president, before he had been elected, and after the election, find that there was a great deal of concern from the press?

FERNANDEZ: The United States is reported on very closely and is followed very closely. There's a big corps here and a very accomplished press corps here. Here in the United States there is a very influential press corps. Probably their stories had in many instances greater

influence that something generated locally. It was a Washington story so it was a Washington correspondent who reported it. These are people who know a great deal about the United States and [are] enormously [qualified]. Those stories tended to shape views a lot. They reflected very often views of the United States. Of the press corps, everyone wouldn't call it derogatorily these pack journalists, but there was a certain amount of these journalists who came...opinion a week opinions that would be formed by them in the United States from Americans.

Q: In our analysis is the press officer at USIA and the political officer, one of the things is you have to identify where is the power in the country. You can't go around and talk to everybody or deal with everybody, you want to figure out who is really important. British society is a stratified one, but did you find certain elements of it interesting from the society point of view but of little account as far as what we were after?

FERNANDEZ: Well, no, I think more of in terms of our interests in how we focused. We had these extensive contact lists, we separated the correspondents. There were diplomatic correspondents, there was political correspondents, the editorialists, there were the [reporters]. All of these were on our lists and the effort was to get in touch with them. Now at the very highest levels of these people, the commentators, who were well known, we didn't really work with them very much because we knew them. I'm thinking at my level, we certainly knew them all because they would call every once in a while and want to go to the top of the embassy [hierarchy]. One would be in touch with them.

There was also a great deal of contact between the political section and the top commentators about domestic politics. Very, very close relations. Something that was carried out independent of what we did in the USIS post information program. We knew about these and we worked very, very closely with the political section. Over the years we worked very, very closely and my interests gravitated to that and I knew from the press, I did more of the reading of the press than maybe some of the political officers did perhaps. But at any rate, we really had a wide range of contacts, I would say, we went across the board. The ambassador would meet with editors who would meet with the big publishers, Thomas Black, Rupert Murdoch...who was our friend who fell off the ship [Robert] Maxwell. These people were all quite accessible at the top levels and I'm sure Ed Streeter had a vast program of contacts with journalists as well as across the board in the political spectrum.

Probably the first thing I would say in any circumstance about the British press is how different it is and the British media situation from the United States and our First Amendment society. The British still have the Official Secrets Act that was passed in 1918, they have what are called the Green Notices where editors consult with the best [lawyers] to clear about information they might have doubts about, or they were told by the ministry of defense what information is sensitive and they don't want to come out. It's a very different situation from the First Amendment society we have here and really doesn't exist anyplace else in the world. But it always struck me, looking back and observing Britain over the years, the extent to which there are, for purposes of our Constitution, restrictions on press freedom. They're very severe. It doesn't lower the decibel level of the debate.

Q: But sometimes it moves off into other fields more.

FERNANDEZ: Well, it's just that they wouldn't publish certain things if that threat was there. There was a press counsel that was supposed to pass on this, at the time was William Moog, that's M-O-O-G, who was the head of the press counsel, to whom complaints could be addressed. They would run things through the press counsel if there were any complaints about the particular story.

Q: You were there into '82, so you were there with the transition. How did the transition go within the embassy from the Carter administration to the Reagan administration?

FERNANDEZ: Well, the first thing was, [Ambassador] Kingman had to leave. Which saddened me, when he left in January of '81. Then John Louis came in. John Louis was without any previous experience in the Foreign Service. He had some foreign business experience in Latin America...

Q: Johnson Wax.

FERNANDEZ: Johnson Wax, right.

Q: He was I think, a classmate of mine in college.

FERNANDEZ: Is that right? It fell to me under Ed Streeter's guidance to put together the press program for him. It might be at this point interesting to describe some of the fora that exist for the ambassador that are public affairs and media related. For example, there is always the Pilgrim Society which was formed I think during the war years, the British and Americans. There weren't many Labourites around at that point...it was largely the lay of this and the law of that. But it was a big forum for the ambassador to present his ideas. That speech was always worked over by a lot of different people. I played a larger role in Charlie Price's speech than I did in Kingman Brewster's.

But it was a forum that you could really take the ambassador to and that's who took John Louis. That's where Kingman Brewster gave his farewell address. That's where Ray Sykes gave his farewell address in the year he left. Starting off saying, "I promised myself when I came here that I'd never say 'special relationship' or quote Churchill." Which all his speeches always did.

Q: Did Louis take a different approach? From the time you were with him did he seem to take a different approach than...

FERNANDEZ: See, I was only with him for several months. But one of the things that he established that was exciting and interesting to me, and it was Ed's initiative, was to try to brief him on certain aspects of Britain and the Northern Ireland question and defense policy and such, and with the political section, with Kim Pendleton, we worked on this, we briefed him and Sandy Verchbauer and also, he's gone to NATO now, was in that group. To me, this is about the best it could get in terms of having a substantive knowledge of the issues and problems. Most of these were way beyond in experience of John Louis but he worked very hard at the time to grasp it.

I left that following summer. I was already on my way to OECD and I didn't really spend that much time with him. He then was away during the Falklands war and he was someplace in the Caribbean or in Florida and the war broke out and he called up and said, "Should I go back?" It was already, you know, after that he was then replaced by Charlie Price. A very difficult post for an American ambassador. He's very, very visible. There are some elements that would be critical of him whatever he does. There were very, very high demands on his knowledge of what is going on. Moreover, there are so many things that go on that are sort of exogenous to what he could do every day. The experts would come and negotiate their issues, and they were certainly numerous. The ambassador didn't always play a big role in this, but he had a steady stream of high-level visitors.

Q: It's a problem. I think with Louis, for example, he was in way over his head. He was a garden variety political appointee. It wasn't his fault, this just wasn't his thing. Compared to some of the others, the president of Yale goes with tremendous prestige. The present ambassador, Admiral Crowe, is head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These people really bring something with them. But the head of Johnson Wax... He wasn't even the head of Johnson Wax, it was a family thing and he's just a, you might say, garden variety political appointee. To put him in London, he just doesn't bring a damn thing with him.

FERNANDEZ: Well, that unfortunately was true, and this is something you can't really do much about from an information point of view if the person does not bring those qualities that make them have access. That I think certainly John Louis had to Reagan but I wasn't that particular level of policy...

Q: You know, the cool story that went around the Foreign Service was the best thing that John Louis did during the Falklands crisis was stay down in the Caribbean. This has happened with other political appointees when something really went on. They don't have the same feeling of immediacy that I think those who grew up in the trade do. When there's a crisis you show up.

FERNANDEZ: Well, this is an interesting point about our foreign relations, relations with Britain. The whole Falkland crisis. Now, this broke just as I was leaving for Paris. I regretted that because it would have been interesting to have been in on some of these meetings with Haig and Thatcher and such. But this frenetic Buenos Aires to London shuttle that Haig undertook...

Q: Alexander Haig, our Secretary of State at the time.

FERNANDEZ: I was probably very closely from Paris and OECD with the British newspapers of course with the British radio. I used to listen to Radio Four on longwave. So I was informed about it and I would go back regularly to London because my wife and my son were still there, they were not coming over until the following summer. It was really a period of a lot of criticism of Haig becoming so involved in this. Of course, Mrs. Thatcher was tremendously dismissive of all that. I can still see one time when I was there and I could probably look this up in my daybook, where early along when this first started I went...the crisis grew. But I can remember Maggie instructing Haig as to what to say an appearance that would make before the press as they came out of the...coming out of Number 10 Downing Street and Maggie was just sort of

telling [Secretary Haig,] “No, Al, that’s not right,” telling him what to say. This was not, come to think of it, this was not during the Falkland crisis.

As I say, I was already on the way, but Haig had come through there on one or two occasions during the time that I was still there and I can remember how dramatic all that seemed. [George] Bush came through as vice president at that time, too, in that period before I left for OECD. But here was Maggie really dominating so many things. She really was very, very forceful and I can still see the two of them on the stairs coming out of Number 10. Through the work just trying to describe a little more about what it’s like in a... Foreign Service officer carrying on America’s foreign relations during the period with Britain.

I was always pleased with the relations we had with the spokesman at Number 10. Bernard Evans, very close to him, many a time you’d see him at small dinner parties. Very, very, forceful and colorful man. The same thing was true in the palace, too. In Buckingham Palace, Mike Shae was the Queen’s press spokesman. I had served with him in Bucharest so we sort of had an in with that. All of those contacts were useful for visiting dignitaries all the time.

Q: Other than protocol procedures how important was the palace, the queen, the royals and that from your perspective.

FERNANDEZ: Well, it remains important these days of now as we see the Princess Diana tragedy is really being raked over the coals. There was always this undercurrent of questioning and opposition and criticism of the royal family. Well, how did this work itself out with the United States? The palace is not supposed to be involved in politics, but there were times...this was after ‘86 when Reagan came back. He went and had lunch with the queen, but it didn’t play a big role in all of this, which is not to say, from what I knew from talking to the press secretaries over the years was that the queen didn’t understand much. She was very, very well informed, but there was just this style that was very, very difficult to project in that class ridden society, always in favorable terms.

The queen mom and the queen have their fans, and so does Prince Charles. But it never really came up in any big way in what we did. I went to a few parties a couple times. But our contact with them was more just on a personal basis as I was saying in the case of Mike Shea who became the Queen’s spokesman and when we went over to Buckingham Palace I checked up with him, but it was really not a terribly operational sort of thing from an information point of view.

Q: During the ‘80 to ‘82 period, you were in London, other than the beginning of the Falklands war, were there any other major events that...?

FERNANDEZ: There probably were and they’re not coming to mind, but I’ll probably see the transcript... I would get to them.

Q: Well, you can add anything you want.

FERNANDEZ: No, there certainly must have been because of this distraction I've had the past 24 hours as far as this job I have not gone back to my...

DAVID LAMBERTSON
Royal College of Defense Studies
London (1981)

David Lambertson was born in Kansas in 1940. He received his BA from the University of Redlands in 1962. He entered the Foreign Service in 1963, and his assignments abroad included Saigon, Medan, Paris, Canberra and Seoul with an ambassadorship to Thailand.

LAMBERTSON: Right. I left Japan in the summer of 1980 and I was by then assigned to the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) in London, which began in January of 1981. So, I had nothing to do for the remainder of 1980. I was technically, by then, assigned to the European bureau because of where the RCDS is located. I was assigned by the European bureau to be their man at USUN for the General Assembly session of 1980, because that way they could fulfill their obligation to USUN without really having to dig into their own people. It was very handy for the bureau.

I spent September through December in New York and enjoyed it very much. I had very little work to do. There was not much of consequence that involved Europe as far as I could tell. All the action was Middle Eastern, relating to the Iran-Iraq War, which had just broken out. We were tilting toward Iraq. April Glaspie was the USUN Mid-East expert and I was impressed with her. She really seemed to know what she was talking about. Dirk Gleysteen, Bill's brother, was the political counselor.

As I mentioned to you, another interesting part of those three months was living at the Dakota, which I did. I lucked into a sublease well within my housing allowance. I was there the night John Lennon was shot and that was a strange and other-worldly kind of experience. I didn't witness the shooting, but I lived with the rather surreal aftermath for a number of days. I enjoyed living in New York.

Q: I think the thing to note here is that when the UN General Assembly meets in the fall, there's a surge, the Department adds more officers to the USUN, because all the speakers – the prime and foreign ministers – make speeches and meet with the Secretary of State.

LAMBERTSON: Right. Yes, there are going to be a lot of bilaterals. There's an annual infusion of world leaders into New York and it takes more than the USUN Mission itself to handle that. They need help.

Q: It's a considerable dance in scheduling the Secretary of State. He's to meet with this minister and that minister. That's why there's this surge, so that you just lucked into an annual process.

LAMBERTSON: That's right and it's one that is good experience. I was much more deeply involved, though, later on as a DAS. I think if in your normal course of Foreign Service assignments, you don't have any exposure to the UN or multilateral diplomacy, a General Assembly session in New York wouldn't hurt you at all. I would recommend it.

Q: The senior training that you're talking about the Royal College of Defence Studies, would that be the same thing as going to the Army War College at Carlisle?

LAMBERTSON: Yes, basically it is. It is something that comes up and it was an option that I had and it's the one that I wanted. I had a Stanford possibility also, but I really liked the idea of going to London and I liked the idea of the RCDS. Again, this is one of those things that Bill Sherman advised me on; he thought the RCDS would be great fun and he was right.

Q: Had he gone through it himself?

LAMBERTSON: He had not, but he knew people who had. I don't know whether it is still part of the menu for senior training in the State Department. I think it's a rather expensive year for the Department. I'm not sure what the tuition fee is, but there is one for Americans and for anybody from a developed country. Then the living expenses are not inconsiderable in London. Anyway, it was a wonderful year. The RCDS was formerly called the Imperial Defence College, until that became politically incorrect. It's been around a long time.

Q: Is that where John Keegan teaches?

LAMBERTSON: No, they don't have a teaching staff. They have a small administrative staff and that's all.

Q: Oh, okay.

LAMBERTSON: Every year they have 76 students, because that's the number of chairs that comfortably fit in the lecture hall. It's an old mansion in Belgravia. Belgrave Square in fact. We would be expected to be there by around 10:00 in the morning, but that would be only for coffee or tea and it was kind of like a gentlemen's club with big overstuffed chairs and racks of newspapers. That's the way the day began. I think maybe around 10:30 or so there would be a lecture, until noon. Sometimes a lecture in the afternoon, sometimes small group meetings of one kind or another in the afternoon, sometimes nothing in the afternoon. It was not a back-breaking schedule, but the people were great.

The Australians had two or three very good people there who I got to know well, and that was useful for me later on. The British had many outstanding people. The composition of the class was roughly two-thirds British and one-third the rest of the world and I would say two-thirds military and about one-third civilian.

Ranks were a little bit higher than at war colleges in the United States. There were a lot of brigadiers and even some two star generals from foreign places. A number of people who succeeded brilliantly in their respective services in years to come. So, I enjoyed it very much.

I'm very comfortable around the military. I always have been. The quality of the lecturers was almost without exception quite high. One of the best was General Bernard Rogers, NATO Commander and fellow Fairview man.

There was a great travel program. We broke up into small groups for orientation visits around the UK early in the spring. I went with a group of about ten people to Wales. Then in July the college closed down for a month. Sacie and I did bicycle trips in Ireland and France. In the fall we had a large group trip to NATO and to the British Army on the Rhine and then again a small group trip, in my case to the Middle East where I'd never been before and knew I probably would never go again. That's the one I wanted and got. We met Anwar Sadat, a couple of weeks before he was killed – a highly charismatic man.

Q: That's introductions to things that are going to expand you either by virtue of your personal contacts or the material.

LAMBERTSON: Yes, I thought it was all quite relevant to a Foreign Service Officer who was going to have a few more years of service. It broadened my perspective. I'd been working primarily, almost exclusively, on East Asian issues since joining the Foreign Service, and it was interesting and refreshing to be in a European venue and to hear a lot about NATO, and U.S.-NATO issues. I liked that very much.

Q: You finished RCDS by writing a memorable paper?

LAMBERTSON: No, not memorable, but I was quite proud of it. It was done with no footnotes and very little research but it read well and it was chosen for publication in the annual journal of the college, along with about eight or nine others. A triumph of sorts. "Sustaining the Alliance: The Future of Transatlantic Political Cooperation." Good bed-time reading.

Q: Now you had arranged this year of sort of decompression and exposure to new issues in advance. How did the opportunity to come back to Washington arise?

LAMBERTSON: I obviously began thinking about that not long after arriving in London. It was fairly early in the year that Mike Armacost called me and asked me if I would be interested in being the Korea Country Director. Mike was DAS at that time, with Japan and Korea and some other things in his portfolio, and he was the senior DAS. Mike was there under Dick Holbrooke, and this was now the Reagan administration. Holbrooke had left and Mike I guess was still there, although he didn't remain there very long. I said that I'd be delighted. So I knew fairly early on in the calendar year of 1981 that I'd be going to EAP/K.

Q: In fact when you finish up in London, you...

LAMBERTSON: So, when I finished in London I went back to Washington by way of Seoul.

KEITH C. SMITH

**Desk Officer, United Kingdom and Ireland
Washington, DC (1981-1982)**

Ambassador Keith C. Smith was born in California in 1938. While attending Brigham Young University he received his bachelor's degree in 1960 and master's degree in 1962. He entered the foreign service in 1962. His career includes positions in Mexico, Venezuela Hungary, Washington D.C., and an ambassadorship to Lithuania. Mr. Smith was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in February 2004.

Q: About '81 when you left. Whither?

SMITH: I went down one floor in the State Department and became a desk officer in the Office of Northern European Affairs. I headed the Office for the UK and Ireland. That was also an interesting job and I traveled extensively around those two countries, including Northern Ireland, a major headache for us. I benefited intellectually from working on three different European desks. I had decided to remain in Washington for eight years in order to allow two of my children to finish high school in the U.S.

Q: This was '81 to..

SMITH: It must have been 1981 to 1983. During the last year, I also became deputy director of the office under Bob Funseth, who had been Spokesman for the State Department. .

Q: He didn't go up to the Netherlands as ambassador did he?

SMITH: No, he never went out as ambassador. Reagan came in to office, pulled out all of the career officers from Europe. Therefore, our office had 10 new ambassadors to prepare. Nine of them were political. Only one career person went out to Northern Europe as ambassador in 1982. It was sad watching our office director preparing nine political ambassadors, when he was more qualified than any of them and should have gone out himself. The only one career person was Jerry Bremer, who went to the Netherlands. As it turned out, he had close ties with some Republican politicians.

In any case, it was an interesting time in the UK. The U.S. and U.K. were cooperating on a lot of military and intelligence issues in third countries. There were Soviet, African, Middle East and China watchers in our embassy in London, and in the British Embassy in Washington. Northern Ireland obviously was a very big issue for us. I made two trips to Belfast and Dublin while I was on the desk. I found Belfast a fascinating place and the countryside was lovely. I fell in love with Northern Ireland, and thought about going to Belfast as the consul general. The DCM in London told me that he could arrange for me to be assigned there, but said that it wasn't a good career move, which was correct. In any case, the only place in Belfast where the leaders of the Protestant and Catholic communities would meet informally was at the American Consulate General's house. The U.S. Consulate General, therefore, played an important role in trying to keep a lid on things. It was my first experience with sectarian violence. I had to learn a lot in a

short time about the “troubles,” as they called it in Ireland. One had to study three hundred years of history and understand the complex web of discrimination against Catholics.

Q: Did we have a stand on this? Were we conflicted because of our Irish leaders, the Kennedys, the others?

SMITH: Not at that time. This became more of an issue in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when a Kennedy went to Dublin as ambassador. The IRA did have a fair amount of sympathy from the Irish in New England. During the period I was on the desk, we were supportive of British efforts to resolve the crisis. The Government viewed the IRA (Irish Republican Army) as terrorists, and there wasn't a strong lobby opposing this viewpoint.

During one of my visits, I visited the heavily-fortified Stormont Castle in Belfast, where the British Government offices were located. I met with the U.K. intelligence people about sectarian violence and possible arms shipments from the U.S. During two trips, I visited the headquarters of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the police who had to deal with the violence from both sides. The RUC tried to recruit Catholics, but those who joined up, were threatened with assassination by the IRA

Q: How about this Noraid or whatever it was coming out of Boston, New York?

SMITH: We felt that the charge of U.S. help to the IRA was somewhat overplayed by the British, in part, because it provided London with an excuse for not being able to stop the violence. Most of the weapons that were purchased by the IRA people came from non-U.S. sources. Much more money for weapons was raised from extorting businessmen and others in Ireland, than from donations from the Irish community in the U.S. The IRA bought most of their weapons in Belgium. The money raised at Irish wakes and in bars around New York and Boston was pretty small potatoes. Every once in a while, the FBI would arrest somebody who was involved in trying to smuggle weapons to Ireland, or they would raid some organization that was collecting money for the IRA. But we felt that the activities of the Irish in American were overplayed by the Brits.

Q: Did you ever talk to Ian Paisley or his ilk?

SMITH: Yes, I talked to him once, and I talked a couple of times to his primary assistant whose name I can't remember. I found them both to be very unpleasant characters.

Q: These were the Protestant militants.

SMITH: They really turned me off. We didn't talk to anybody who we thought was involved directly in terrorism from either side of the sectarian barrier. They were a strange bunch. The sectarian situation resembled tribalism more than religious conflict. Aside from the Paisleys and others extremists, I found the people very nice. They all seemed to be quite rational until one came to the subject of living together with other religions. There was a moderate party started in the early 1980s that tried to appeal to both Catholics and Protestants. I think it was called the Alliance Party. Their hope was to bridge this sectarian gap and get people from both sides

cooperating. I remember thinking that this group had a great future, but they never got more than 5% of the vote. I was thinking like an American, not a person steeped in the history of Irish-British sectarianism and past imperialism. I remember meeting with the Anglican bishop in Belfast about the situation. He was a very savvy person, who understood the complexities better than anyone else I met. I don't remember too much of what he said, but I was enormously impressed with his ability to see both sides of the issues.

Q: I served a long time in Yugoslavia. Tito was there, and I just couldn't believe that these wonderful people would revert to something really medieval. Again, it's not religion. In some ways it was more the highlanders versus the lowlanders or something of that nature. It's hard for us, I think, as Americans, to understand. We haven't been living in one place so long to understand.

But was this something that you were involved in when you were on the UK desk?

SMITH: Yes, I can see what you mean about the difficulties of outsiders understanding the deep hatreds that stem from religion, discrimination, nationalism and greed. I finally traveled to Dublin, to try and better understand the “troubles.” Everyone wanted to see more self-representation in Northern Ireland, because Northern Ireland was being ruled from London, but it was impossible to establish home rule while I worked on the desk. It took another 15 years before home rule was agreed to. The British and Irish owe a great deal to the efforts of Senator John Mitchell.

Q: Was our embassy in London and our embassy in Dublin pretty much in the same line? Were there any problems there of different approaches?

SMITH: No, I think they were pretty much in agreement on how to deal with Northern Ireland. Both embassies worked well on this issue. Later, it became a problem when the Kennedy family became more engaged. Fortunately, I had a great assistant on the U.K. desk. He had a Ph.D. in British studies and he'd served in France. The fact that he knew Britain so well was a tremendous advantage for me. I didn't know that much about Ireland before I went to the desk..

Q: Maggie Thatcher was Prime Minister when you were there. You were there when the Reagan administration came in. Were you sort of observing, I'm using this in political terms, that the great love affair affinity between Thatcher and Reagan or not?

SMITH: Yes. I saw that. I believe that their good relationship played a positive role in our bilateral dealings. It also contributed to the ability of both sides to prevent disagreements from getting out of hand – and we did have serious arguments. Later on, I saw how that actually worked after the Falkland War. I was head of the task force in the State Department in the operations center during the whole war. While the public blamed us for being “neutral” on the side of the Argentines, Mrs. Thatcher recognized that we had to appear to be neutral in order to maintain some influence with the Argentine military junta. After the war, however, we had some serious conflicts with the Brits over military issues, particularly U.S. weapon sales to Argentina. Of course, the British were opposed to any sale of spare parts for Argentine aircraft. We went ahead and made the sale, and Margaret Thatcher sent a tough note to President Reagan;

one strong enough to have broken diplomatic relations with any other two countries. Reagan's reaction was, "well that's Maggie." I remember being furious at the British ambassador, who had put her up to writing the letter, but it didn't have any effect on our bilateral relations because of the close ties between Thatcher and Reagan.

Q: Were you there during the miners strike and all that? How did we view that? First place, how did we think it was going to come out? This was the first time that a British government had really gone into real honest to God confrontation with the unions.

SMITH: As I remember, we didn't take a public stand on the strike of the coal miners and power plant workers. Obviously, within the U.S. Government, Reagan supported Mrs. Thatcher's tough stand in opposing the unions. I remember being in London during the strike. It was unusually dark at night, since most of the streetlights were turned off. It was colder than usual in my hotel room. Some other unions were on strike in solidarity with the miners, such as public utilities workers. There was very little support for the inflexibility of the miners within the U.S. Government, because we were concerned about the relative economic decline of Britain compared to France and Germany. Washington believed that most of the miners were going to lose their jobs in the long run, and there was no way to keep much of the British coal industry operating in the face of massive losses.

Q: The mines were no longer viable economically?

SMITH: We could send coal from the United States to Britain cheaper than they could mine it and sell it there.

Q: You're talking about when they closed Newcastle.

SMITH: About that time, gas and oil was discovered in the North Sea, both in the British and the Norwegian sectors. I think people also recognized that while there was a humanitarian question of how to provide help to the miners, the mine closures were not going to cause any long-term energy shortage in Britain, thank to the discoveries of hydrocarbons in the North Sea.

Q: When you were there, looking at Great Britain, were we concerned about sort of the power of the unions and all. There was talk of the "British disease."

SMITH: Well, some people were worried about it, including Margaret Thatcher. When I was on the UK desk, the British ambassador to the U.S. was Sir Nicholas Henderson. He had been ambassador to France, and I believe Germany. He had retired a few years before coming to Washington and had written an article for The Economist in which he talked about the "British disease" and the relative economic weakening of Britain. He had pinpointed a lot of domestic problems, including inflexible trade unionism and a lack of entrepreneurial talent by company managers. His article gained the attention of Margaret Thatcher, and she appointed him ambassador to Washington. In the U.S. there was also concern that Britain's weak economy was undermining the UK's ability to support U.S. policies in other parts of the world. Henderson was a very active and successful ambassador, and he had considerable influence in the Reagan Administration.

I played tennis with Henderson from time to time. It was useful in collecting information regarding the UK Embassy's activities in Washington. At times, I had trouble tracking important policy initiatives of the very active British diplomats in Washington. Henderson recognized that this was a problem for my office, and he arranged for us to meet with his top diplomats on a regular basis. During the Falkland War, Henderson was on television four times every morning, but he met with someone from the task force every day. While I was on the desk, and in spite of the close Thatcher-Reagan tie, the U.S. maintained an active relationship with the leadership of the British Labor Party. I remember visiting London and attending a dinner at the ambassador's residence, where the whole Labor shadow cabinet showed up. It was a particularly interesting evening. The ambassador was a markedly conservative businessman, while most members of the shadow cabinet were very much to the left politically.

Q: Who was the U.S. ambassador?

SMITH: I have forgotten his name. He was a Reagan appointee; had great manners, but spent more time in the U.S. than in Britain. He was not really interested in policy issues. Fortunately, the career people in the embassy were some of our best. The ambassador was absent from London during the entire Falkland War. He was taking in the sun in Florida.

Q: Let's talk a little bit about the Falklands War and what you were doing. Secretary of State Alexander Haig got very much involved.

SMITH: When the war broke out, I was deputy director of the Office of Northern European affairs. It was my job to call Ambassador Henderson early in the morning to inform him of the landing of Argentine troops on the Falklands. He didn't believe me at first. We and the British had been sharing intelligence about the Argentines for the previous week, but we learned about the landing before the UK Embassy in Washington, even though the information was originally a British intercept. Henderson, however, hadn't thought that the invasion would happen that soon. In any case, that morning he questioned me in a skeptical tone. Am I sure about this? And I said, well, yes it comes from your people and we believe it. The next three months were highly intense and we worked 18 hour days without weekend breaks. Secretary Haig began to act as middle man in negotiations between London and Buenos Aires. There were times when they wanted to put me on the plane with Al Hague, flying back and forth. Fortunately, I was able to stay in Washington and continued to run the task force in the operations center. But it was a night and day operation. I think I went weeks without seeing daylight. We had to go through this charade of being impartial for the sake of the Argentines. From day one, however, we were supporting the Brits with weapons shipments and with intelligence.

Q: Yeah, there was no way in a way when you looked at it that you could possibly..

SMITH: The Argentine military junta had to believe that the American Government was impartial, otherwise there would have been no negotiations. We actually did have some high level officials in the State Department who wanted us to lean in the direction of the Argentines, but they were always overruled. In Britain, and in the U.S., there were a lot of people who were upset with us for our alleged neutrality. They believed that Britain had always stood by America,

and that when U.K. territory was invaded by the Argentines, the U.S. proved to be a lousy ally. Unfortunately, we couldn't come out and say what we were doing behind the scenes. We were providing the Brits with Stinger and Harpoon missiles, and all kinds of weaponry from day one. We had some useful intelligence assets in the area. One of the ironies was that if the Argentines had just said yes to one of the Haig compromise proposals, the Falklands would belong to Argentina today. The military junta was too stupid to see beyond the immediate horizon.

Q: You were saying about how Bob Funseth was your office director..

SMITH: He was the office director when I was UK desk officer, and when I later became Deputy Director for Northern European Affairs, about a year before I went overseas.

Q: Could you explain, we had to present the aspect of neutrality in this. It seemed like we were being, it got a lot of people in the States also enraged that we seemed to be playing this overly neutral stance.

SMITH: Looking back, it was the only way we could have played any credible role in trying to prevent an armed conflict between two friends; one of whom was our closest ally, and the other a military junta that we wanted to maintain influence with. Our ties with the Junta were not a particularly honorable part of our foreign policy. They were seen as "useful" to the Reagan Administration's policies.

Q: They were playing a role in Central America I think.

SMITH: A pretty sleazy role in Central America and a horrible role within Argentina. I thought that many of our policies in Latin America were very short-sighted. Unfortunately, our attempt to resist the armed leftists in Central America, who were supported in part by the USSR, led to our support for some pretty terrible leaders in the Southern Cone of South America. A lot of innocent civilians were murdered by military leaders in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Nicaragua and El Salvador. It was not a black and white situation, however, because of clandestine Soviet help to the extreme left. In any case, we were not able to state publicly that we recognized British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. I've forgotten the exact legal definition we used; something to the effect that we recognized Britain's effective control of the Falklands. I was personally happy that the Argentines had turned down Hague's mediation efforts, because there had been some consideration of me being flown in to the Falklands. I spoke Spanish, had worked on Latin American and UK issues, and could be seen as somewhat neutral by the Argentines. My going to the Falklands was dependent on Buenos Aires peacefully withdrawing Argentine forces. The last thing I wanted to do was go to the Falklands in the middle of the winter.

Q: Don't you like mutton?

SMITH: It's not so bad, but I was not looking forward to going, in part because the U.S. military was talking about dropping me in by air. This was not a great prospect for someone who had never been in a parachute, particularly during winter in the South Atlantic.

Q: Were you feeling, was there at all a battle within the State Department between EUR and ARA?

SMITH: There was a battle. Tom Enders, who was the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, had a lot of influence in the Department. Enders felt that we should be more supportive of the Argentines, who were helping us against the Contras in Central America. He was very vigorous at pursuing that issue. In the end, the Secretary rejected his arguments. With Margaret Thatcher calling Reagan on this issue almost daily, Enders was not able to change the policy. Actually, Enders always treated me well, even if I, a junior official, openly disagreed with him. I respected him for that.

Q: I remember going past the British embassy and honking my horn in support, because I felt we were being too evenhanded in this thing.

SMITH: It was a policy we had to pursue in the first two months. Under the table, we were shoveling stuff to the Brits. We sent Stinger missiles as I said before, and everything else under the sun was being shipped to the Ascension Islands, the British launching pad for operations in the South Atlantic. I think we sent a submarine to the area to provide the Brits with additional intelligence.

Q: What sort of things were you doing while you were submerged for weeks at a time in the State Department?

SMITH: I was answering inquiries from other parts of the government on what we could or couldn't say about our policy. I was writing policy recommendations on how to deal with questions from other allies, drafting State's responses to Defense Department recommendations, writing summaries of intelligence cables and working with the British Embassy on military and public affairs issues. Some of my work involved responding to cables from the Haig entourage, whether they were in London or Buenos Aires. They were usually in one of the two places. I wrote reports on the military situation on the ground and on Argentine damage to British military transport ships, etc.; all of this for the seventh floor. I remember that we knew in advance that the Argentine troop ship, the Belgrano, was going to be attacked by a British submarine. A lot of young Argentine navy conscripts lost their life that night. It kind of haunted me for some time.

Q: The former American cruiser.

SMITH: I don't remember if it was originally an American ship. I do remember feeling really horrible, thinking of all those young sailors who were dying. And I remember one night when we thought the Brits had located an Argentine submarine and were going to sink it. It had about 85 young sailors on board. I went to bed that night thinking that when I woke up in the morning, all those young sailors would be drowned. It weighed on my mind that night. I was happy the next morning that the Brits had not been able to locate the sub. The failure to locate it hadn't made any difference in the course of the war. The war became very personal for me at times.

Q: What was your impression that you were getting from your particular view of the Argentine junta?

SMITH: The Junta had the typical Latin American military dictator mentality. They were not a particularly intelligent group, and they were not democratic, in any sense of the word. I felt embarrassed about our policy in Central America. Even though the Soviets were supporting much of the left-wing radicals, I felt that our policy put us too much in bed with thugs who were running governments in Central and South America.

Q: What was your impression of Hague? From the outside, one had the feeling that Hague jumped on this thing with a great deal of gusto because he was going to out-Kissinger Kissinger or something like that. I have nothing to base it on, but almost a loose cannon.

SMITH: My experience with him in the Spanish crisis left me with a view of him as a loose cannon, and a person too arrogant to take advice from those around him. He thought that he knew better than certainly the career people how to deal with everything. Because of his military background, he had a lot more faith in military officers than he did in Foreign Service officers. Before Haig, Kissinger in fact had been a problem for the Foreign Service, with his wheeling and dealing on his own. I think he set a bad precedent for successive secretaries, including Zbigniew Brzezinski and Haig. Brzezinski engaged in the same kind of secretive diplomacy as Kissinger. For instance, he went to Paris for secret meetings with the French, and would order his French counterparts not to tell the U.S. ambassador that he had been in the country. I thought that was outrageous. The way things operated at the top levels only added to America's problems. I thought Kissinger had been much overrated as a secretary of state.

Q: He became a sort of superstar.

SMITH: He certainly considered himself a superstar. The one secretary of state who acted as a collegial manager and policy maker was George Shultz. I respected Shultz very much. He was a team player and had a certain amount of modesty, which I hadn't seen in other secretaries of state. I had not seen any humility in Secretaries Hague, Brzezinski or Baker.

Q: During the Falklands thing, were you all kind of a little worried about Hague, what's he going to do or say?

SMITH: I don't remember that being a big concern because he stuck pretty close to the Department's instructions, which had been cleared personally by the President. We were hoping that there would be some sort of settlement short of war. But once the Argentine planes sunk a major British troop and transport ship, it became almost impossible to talk about compromise with the British. After the ship sinking, there was no stopping British military action on the ground. The British were faced with enormous logistical problems, because of the distances from supply bases, but once they decided to go in, it was all over for the Argentine forces. Some negotiations continued for a short time, but basically the game was over.

Q: Was there any feeling that the Argentines could put up a battle.

SMITH: No. We had a pretty good feel about Argentine capabilities, since most of their equipment and much of their training came from the U.S. We knew in the end that the Brits

would win. We thought it might last longer, because the Brits were really stretched, but the Argentine ground forces were also under-equipped and not as well trained or motivated.

Q: A most remarkable sort of armada that went down there.

SMITH: Britain sent planes down from the Ascension Islands to bomb Port Stanley. They had to be refueled about eight times on route. British planes would repeatedly bomb the runway at the airport at Port Stanley. Within two hours, the Argentines had it patched up. It was more symbolic than anything else. But the Brits hoped that they could put it out of action. It demonstrated how difficult it is to put a runway permanently out of operation. The war, however, was decided from ground action.

Q: Was there any putting together things after this was over? Were there any developments after the British had seized control?

SMITH: After the British seized control of the Falklands, we were pressured by the Argentines to sell them spare parts for some old Navy Skyhawks, and they really wanted more functioning planes. Enders, of course, was pushing for the sale of a few planes and some parts, arguing that they had little military importance, but would keep the Junta supporting us in Central America. We decided not to sell them planes which they wanted, but sold them some spare parts. Enders convinced the White House that we should supply some spare parts. Maggie Thatcher was furious. I remember, the British successor to Ambassador Henderson came to the Department left us a nasty diplomatic note from his government. I think his name was Robinson. He pushed us hard, implying that we were terrible allies. Even though I was a ways down the food chain, I told him that he had no idea how much the Brits owed the U.S. during the war, and that he was being stupid. In the end, the aircraft parts sale didn't make a hell of a lot of difference. The Argentines couldn't do use the planes for much anyway, once the Brits had fighter planes based at Port Stanley. In any case, shortly after the war, the junta fell apart. Any public support for them evaporated after Argentina's defeat. Divisions within Argentina weakened the military to the point where they really weren't a threat to the Falklands or Malvinas. The military defeat also led to the introduction of civilian rule and publicity about the Junta's "dirty war" against its civilian opponents. Shortly after the Argentine military fell, the military lost power in Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.

TIMOTHY DEAL
Energy Attaché
London (1981-1985)

Timothy Deal was born in Missouri and educated at the University of California at Berkeley. Entering the Foreign Service in 1965, he has served in a variety of foreign posts in Honduras, Poland, the Czech Republic and England. Mr. Deal also worked in the National Security Council for several years. He was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 2004.

DEAL: So while the Carter Administration was coming to a close, I began to look at overseas options where Jill could put her legal skills to use and I could do something reasonably interesting. There weren't a lot of good choices at the FSO-3 level. The job as Energy Attaché in Embassy London looked the most promising so I applied for it and was selected. We left for London in the summer of 1981.

Q: Ok, why don't we talk about that job just for a minute? That's mainly working with the oil companies in London?

DEAL: Yes, in the 1970's the UK became a major oil producer. The British were not members of OPEC and were, therefore, considered reliable suppliers. With high oil prices, there was a lot of interest in energy issues generally and the UK in particular. I did not have any special expertise or background in energy issues, but I learned quickly and ended up enjoying that position.

In 1981, the Department introduced a new personnel system, establishing the Senior Foreign Service. I took the first opportunity to compete for the Senior Foreign Service and I was promoted to the new rank of Counselor that year. As a result, I was really too high a grade for the Energy Attaché position. DCM Ed Streator, Economic Minister Bob Morris, and Economic Counselor Mike Boerner thought I would be a good candidate to replace Boerner when he took over for Morris as Economic Minister in summer 1982. The Department concurred, and I received the assignment as Economic Counselor. In the spring, Mike Boerner was medically evacuated to Washington, and I took over the Economic Counselor's slot on an acting basis. Then Bob Morris departed post on schedule so that within the space of five weeks I went from being Energy Attaché to Acting Economic Minister. Over the course of my tour in London, I would eventually serve as Acting Economic Minister for over a year.

Q: And then eventually there was a new Economic Minister?

DEAL: The new Economic Minister, Jim Stroymayer, arrived in the fall of '82. Before his arrival, we had the huge controversy with the British and our other allies over the proposed Soviet natural gas pipeline to Western Europe. Following the Versailles Economic Summit, the Reagan Administration had imposed economic sanctions to stop the pipeline. British firms such as John Browne had a big stake in the project, and the U.S. through extraterritorial measures attempted to block their activities in the USSR. This became the most serious rift in U.S.-UK relations for many years and threatened to end the "era of good feeling" between the Thatcher and Reagan Administrations. Prime Minister Thatcher was outraged by the decision and made her views known loudly and often.

Q: Directly to the President too, do you think?

DEAL: Directly, I'm sure. It was a very difficult period for us in the Embassy. The British press was absolutely rabid about the issue.

Q: So you were dealing, not just with British government, but with the British business community and press as well?

DEAL: Yes. I had the misfortune of having to inform the Chairman of John Brown about the sanctions, and he practically exploded out of his chair. The Ambassador and DCM entrusted me with press briefings to explain the rationale for the decision. The loonier parts of the British press concocted incredible conspiracy theories and put me in the center of the plot. I certainly learned a lot about dealing with the foreign press.

Q: What other major issues were there during those years?

DEAL: Throughout my tour in the UK, we continued to have serious differences with the British over the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. The Soviet pipeline episode was the prime example, but earlier fights over U.S. antitrust activities had led Britain to pass legislation in the late 1970's, the Protection of Trading Interests Act (PTIA), which, when invoked, blocked the application of U.S. laws on British companies or British subsidiaries of American companies. The British invoked the PTIA during the Soviet pipeline dispute.

Another sensitive extraterritorial issue that infuriated Prime Minister Thatcher was the Laker anti-trust case. This involved an alleged conspiracy by U.S. and European airlines to do in Laker Airlines, whose low prices were cutting into their market share. The conspiracy supposedly took place in Florida. It involved a meeting among airline officials who reached agreement to tell Boeing and Airbus, the principal aircraft suppliers, that if they continued to provide generous leasing arrangements to Laker, then the carriers would not buy aircraft from them any longer.

The Justice Department launched a criminal antitrust investigation. The Embassy needed to be informed about developments in the investigation including hearings before a Grand Jury. But the judge in the case would not allow the transmission of information to the Embassy through normal State Department channels because too many people would have access to grand jury information. So there was a special arrangement whereby a designated person in the European Bureau at State would pass on the information to me personally, and I could brief the Ambassador and the DCM, but no one else including the Economic Minister. Ultimately, on the advice of the DCM and me, the Ambassador called President Reagan and asked him to terminate the antitrust investigation, which he eventually did. It was only the second time in American history that a President had overturned a Justice Department criminal antitrust investigation.

Extraterritorial disputes continued to plague the bilateral relationship. We were concerned not only about past disputes such as the pipeline and Laker, but ongoing negotiations over money-laundering in places like the Cayman Islands where such matters as bank secrecy and intelligence-sharing were important considerations. Consequently, I worked with an Assistant Secretary in the British Foreign Office to develop a procedural solution to the problem. We eventually came up with the idea of a "hotline" between the Deputy Secretary of State and his counterpart in the British Foreign Office to provide the other side advance warning of a possible extraterritorial dispute.

Q: Ok, you were Acting Economic Minister and Economic Counselor, which is kind of the number two position in the economic world of the embassy in London. There are sections and

agencies within the economic portfolio. Did you have to spend a lot of time coordinating, administering, and managing all of that?

DEAL: Yes, in the Economic Counselor's job I had four sections reporting to me. When I served as Acting Economic Minister, I had a general supervisory responsibility for other agencies as well. My dealings with other agencies, such as Treasury, were cordial. I don't recall any particular problems with the other agencies; things generally went smoothly. Again, I had two stints as Acting Economic Minister once in 1982 and again in 1983 after Jim Stromayer became ill and eventually died.

Q: Ok, I was starting to ask whether there were many issues involving the Economic Section of the Embassy that related to the British role in the European community of the time?

DEAL: Not very much. That was not an issue we followed that closely. Of course, Britain's role in the European Community has always been a sensitive political problem, and we did a certain amount of reporting on Britain's demands for compensation from the EC budget, for example. But as far as the larger Trans-Atlantic issues involving the EC and the U.S., we primarily had a watching brief.

Q: Of course the other thing that anybody who has served in Embassy London ever, and certainly during this period like all other periods, is that you had a lot of visitors and that took up a lot of your time and energy. Were those opportunities, as you saw them, more than handicaps or difficulties?

DEAL: Well, they were time-consuming and painful, at times, but, for the most part, I think they were rewarding and interesting. You did meet some people that you would not normally have contact with, both private individuals, as well as Members of Congress. And Administration visitors were frequent, of course. A post such as London will always have its share of official visitors and, while burdensome, they are also necessary and worthwhile.

Q: I was ambassador to Cyprus at that time ('81 to '84), and Bob Hopper was in the political section, I guess he was my main point of contact when I came through several times, because it was far easier to get to Cyprus through London than any other way. I was there for a Chiefs-of-Missions conference, I think it was December of '83, and Secretary Shultz was there. I think that was the first time I had seen him in action. I was very impressed with how he conducted that meeting.

DEAL: Speaking of Secretary Shultz, I want to recall a meeting he had with Prime Minister Thatcher shortly after I had taken over as Acting Economic Minister in 1982. Before the ill-fated Versailles Economic Summit, which led to the Soviet pipeline fiasco, President Reagan sent George Shultz to G-7 capitals to consult with leaders in advance of the summit. On my first day as Acting Economic Minister, we had a briefing for him and drinks with Ambassador Lewis. The next day I accompanied Shultz to the Prime Minister's residence at Chequers to meet with Mrs. Thatcher and the Economic team in her cabinet. It was the first time that I had seen Mrs. Thatcher in action. We arrived at Chequers ahead of the Ambassador, because she wanted to meet with George Shultz alone. When we arrived, she said very cordially to her Private Secretary,

Michael Scholar, “Michael, why don’t you take George’s friend (meaning me) and show him around, and George and I will talk about this matter of the economic summit”. And they met alone about an hour. At that point, she rushed out the room where they had been meeting with a copy of the draft Economic Summit communiqué and ran up to the Secretary of the Cabinet, Robert Armstrong, and said “Robert, the ‘Japs’ aren’t going to get away with this again! I want the language changed in this communiqué!” Then she immediately turned on her charms and greeted her Ministers and the Ambassador. I was really taken aback by her performance on that occasion. We then had a working lunch. During the lunch a number of helicopters started landing on the front lawn of Chequers carrying members of the War Cabinet. Mrs. Thatcher excused herself and said that she would turn the meeting over to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, since she had to go upstairs and meet with the war cabinet. The Chequers meeting took place while the Falklands War was underway. At the time, I thought it had something to do with the decision to sink the Argentine battleship, the Belgrano, but Michael Scholar subsequently told me it was about another important military matter, but not the Belgrano.

Q: It certainly was related to the Falklands War?

DEAL: Yes.

Q: I think George Shultz, in his book, devotes quite a number of pages to that trip he took for President Reagan, and I think it was not too long afterwards that he was asked to become Secretary of State.

DEAL: That’s right. It was just a few weeks later that he got the call, when, ironically enough, he was back in London on a private visit.

Q: Ok, anything else about London?

DEAL: Well, I worked very closely with the DCM, Ed Streator, throughout my tour. He had a small group that met every Monday in his office to plan the weeks’ reporting, and I took part in those meetings. In addition, Ed and His wife Priscilla hosted some wonderful representational dinners. Jill and I took every opportunity to attend these affairs, even on one day’s notice, when, for example, one of the guests had dropped out. We met some fantastic people there and learned from the Streators a style of entertaining that we put to good use when I returned to London as DCM in 1992. In Ed’s final year as DCM there, he was under consideration for a number of ambassadorial appointments and finally accepted the ambassadorship to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) mission in Paris. By training and interest, he had been a Political-Military Officer, but he had picked up a lot of economics during his stay in London. We talked a lot about the job, and when he was called back to Washington, he asked me to draft a paper about a possible new U.S. approach to the OECD.

Q: For the record, what does OECD stand for?

DEAL: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. It is the successor organization to the one that implemented the Marshall Plan.

Q: Based in Paris?

DEAL: Based in Paris. So, I drafted the program for him. He liked it and took it back with him to Washington. It was eventually approved by Allen Wallis, the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs. It became the roadmap for the kinds of initiatives that we would take at the OECD. And it was at this time that Ed asked me if I would be his DCM at the OECD mission.

Q: And he had been DCM in London for how long?

DEAL: I think it was almost seven years. He left in '84 and went to Paris, and so in my last year Ray Seitz was DCM. I worked very closely with him on a lot of those extraterritorial questions that I mentioned earlier,

Q: Ok, do you want to say anything more about London or is that pretty well it?

DEAL: That's pretty well it. Certainly from a personal standpoint, it was my most rewarding overseas assignment. And London was great for my family. It was a wonderful time, and I was lucky to spend four years there.

Q: And Jill had employment?

DEAL: She had a difficult time finding a job initially, but she got the rare opportunity to work for a British company, GEC (the British General Electric), a major defense and telecommunications company. Initially, she worked on a part-time basis, but it quickly became a full-time job in their legal department providing help with their American subsidiaries and working directly for the General Counsel of the firm.

Q: And your children liked the school?

DEAL: Yes. They both attended the American School in London. My oldest son, Chris, graduated from the American School, and my youngest son, Bart, went through the four years of middle school there.

Q: And even though it's the American school in London, they probably know something about the British system and...?

DEAL: Some. I don't think they had any special classes on British politics or society.

Q: O levels or A levels or anything like that?

DEAL: No.

ROGER G. HARRISON

**Deputy Political Counselor
London (1981-1985)**

Ambassador Harrison was born and raised in California. He was educated at San Jose State and Claremont Colleges, Oxford University and Freie University in Berlin. Entering the Foreign Service in 1967, Ambassador Harrison served in London, Manila, Warsaw, Manila and Tel Aviv before being named US Ambassador to the Kingdom of Jordan, where he served from 1990 to 1993. He also had postings in Washington, primarily dealing with Political/Military Affairs. Ambassador Harrison was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: You were in London from when to when?

HARRISON: From '81 to '85.

Q: What were you doing in London?

HARRISON: Well, I was after a short interval, the deputy political counselor in London, but my portfolio was all of that defense stuff that I had been, well much more than I had been doing in PM because I hadn't been doing all the hard arms control in PM. I'd been doing the soft stuff that had just turned out to my great career benefit that the soft stuff was always going on. Of course, in London the big issues were nuclear arms reduction. There was a big movement then. CND, Committee on Nuclear Disarmament, which existed in the '50s for the first time, but had been revived in the late '70s, to Russell, you know, the mathematician. Lord Russell who had a first name.

Q: Lord Russell was his name; it'll be submitted. Let his wife worry about that.

HARRISON: It certainly was not Bernard, but that's the only one that occurs to me. Anyway, he had been one of the fathers, intellectual fathers of this, but it had been revived and it was drawing enormous crowds.

Q: The Ladies of Green Common.

HARRISON: The Ladies of Green Common. Yes, they were great fun. We were trying at that time, in keeping with our theory of nuclear deterrence, to deploy intermediate range nuclear forces. I hope this will be put in the media because a hundred years from now people are going to have a hard time understanding this, but I will explain. We and the Europeans had different perceptions about the purpose of our nuclear deterrent policy. The Europeans perceived this as an effort to fight a nuclear war in Europe and we perceived it as an attempt to prevent a nuclear war in general. We had evolved over the years from massive retaliation which had turned out not to be credible, that is anyone launches at us, we massively retaliate, destroy them, root and branch. This made a lot of sense when we were the only ones with nuclear weapons and even a lot of sense when we had a huge preponderance of nuclear weapons, but no sense at all when the other side built survivable nuclear delivery systems because we could maybe wipe them out, but not the nuclear weapons and therefore, we'd have to take a hundred million or so casualties and

no one thought that was credible. Therefore, under that standoff the Soviets with their conventional preponderance could easily invade Western Europe, roll up our allies and establish their reign, and too bad for us since we wouldn't be able to oppose them conventionally in time. In order to counter this idea, we developed all kinds of intermediate stages in this process. Now the Indians and the Pakistanis are going through the same process interestingly enough, with all kinds of concepts, which were brought together under the rubric of flexible response. Flexible response required that you'd be able to respond at various levels in the nuclear escalation. That is, if the other side attacked you with tactical nuclear weapons you would have tactical nuclear weapons, battlefield weapons to use and you could respond on that level and keep this was a theory the escalation from moving to what was called the central systems which meant blowing us up. So, tactical nuclear weapons and then theater nuclear weapons were the next level. For a long time there weren't such things, weapons with a range of 2,000 miles, that is enough to reach all of Europe from the Soviet Union and enough from Europe to reach all of the Soviet Union this side of the Urals. That had been a hole in the nuclear standoff for a long time. The Soviets filled it in the '70s with a weapon called the SS-20, which had three warheads. They started deploying these things and now we had no response. The issue was: suppose we have a Soviet tactical attack on Europe, will we respond with central systems, which was all we had? We had bombers, but bombers were vulnerable. By then you couldn't guarantee they'd get through the Soviet air defenses which had become formidable, and probably they couldn't have so or at least any numbers. So, our argument was we needed to station nuclear weapons in Europe as a deterrent because if we had them and the Soviets launched this attack against Europe we would destroy the Soviet Union from Europe and therefore, they wouldn't launch the attack; they would be effectively deterred and we would not move to central system. What we saw as a deterrent, many Europeans saw as war fighting strategy. That is the Soviets launch on Europe, and we fight to the last European, exchanging between Europe and the Soviet Union and then getting rich on the scrap after these places had been reduced to rubble, while keeping U.S. sanctuary. That was the other side of the puzzle. Really, you could draw both conclusions depending on the presumptions you began with about U.S. intentions and so forth. The weakness of the U.S. argument had always been the willingness of the United States to accept a hundred million casualties on behalf of the Europeans which the Europeans never believed and which the Americans never really believed either because the issue was never really raised. If you put it to a vote it would not have carried a majority of the American people and no one in the administration really believed it either. We were in a position of trying to convince the Europeans of the truth of something we were ourselves not convinced of, really in our heart of hearts. We wanted to deploy these missiles to create this balance and therefore keep a seamless deterrent. That was our argument. In Great Britain there was a huge opposition to this. They had their own independent nuclear deterrent of course. Polaris submarines, they still have, supplied by us. Because they didn't trust that guarantee ultimately that was why they had them. They had a big political debate going. This was the time of the nadir of the Labour Party in the UK and Thatcher triumphant. She was facing the election of '82 I think it was, Michael Foot and the Labour Party which had been dominated by the kind of loony socialist left which Michael Foot, a very nice man, had always represented politically. The very left coterie of the party which had provoked the break off of the social democrats, David Owen and friends, Roy Jenkins and others protesting that left-wing movement. It left the Labour Party a very ineffective opposition and one of the reasons they were ineffective was because they were both anti-Reagan and anti-nuclear. They were constantly portraying Reagan as a moronic ex-actor of great irresponsibility and

simultaneously arguing that they should rely on the nuclear weapons of the United States and get rid of our independent nuclear deterrent. People saw through that and there was absolutely no argument there that could be sustained by them. The public on the other hand which was more viscerally against these deployments rose up in their hundreds of thousands to protest and one way, and these protests in Hyde Park I used to go over, it was a lot of fun actually. They'd march around with banners and corpses and effigies and American flags and have a gay old time which is a good thing on the whole I think. My job was to coordinate with the British government to get these things deployed and to defeat the Women of Greenham. Now, Greenham Common is one of our deployment sites and it was the one closest to London, or the easiest one to get to really. It was the center of a lot of demonstrations and eventually a vigil which began as a coed vigil, but it got cold and rained and the men being men went home, but the women being women, they may still be there. I don't know, but they stayed and after that had happened the women became militant being by themselves and excluded men. This had begun as kind of a de facto situation, but had rapidly become an ideological statement so men weren't invited. The women ran around harassing the base. One of these things they did was to pour super glue on locks on this big chain link fence around the place, they'd super glue the locks. The military would constantly chop those locks off and put new locks on and those were being super glued. They would lie down and prevent people from leaving and coming and then the British police would come and drag them off and they would go and lie down again. So, this was kind of a suractic thing that went on and very dismal circumstances. You had to admire them because it's the worst in the English countryside in March after six months of gloom with another two to go and you live in tents out there. I mean it was just awful. Her Majesty's government was making common cause with us in getting these cruise missiles deployed so what we did -- actually what I did -- was to form a committee which included them and us at the Embassy and then the commands in Europe that had charge of this, EUCOM (European Command), for example, to get everybody together. We did that once a month to plot strategy, which in the end was successful. It was a last sort of gasp, but the peace forces had a mole inside the defense ministry -- Hazleton's office -- who leaked to the papers the day that the C-140s were going to show up; were the first of these missiles. It was a Saturday this leaked and the British government, being civilized, doesn't work on Saturday. They all go to their country homes, those who have them. We being puritans and having left because of the sinful imbalance that we saw around us, work on Saturday much of the time. I called Murray Stuart who was the Under Secretary of Defense at his country place with this, and we conspired to move up the date of the arrival by one day, so they were all preparing together on Monday when the first of these airplanes were going to show up, but actually they showed up on Sunday. We kind of stole the march on them and they began to be deployed; a very expensive and nice facility out there. That was the main thing I was engaged in, but I was also coordinating with HMG on all aspects of defense and arms control policy which was great fun because my counterparts in the bureaucracy at the FCO -- and I'm going to forget one man's name now, but I will remember it for the transcript. One was John Westin who was at the defense department and later went on to be the ambassador to the UN, Sir John and the other whose name is escaping me to my great chagrin, one of the greatest men I've known in my service who was the assistant under secretary at the time for this subject and then went on to be the permanent under secretary eventually and then was made Lord and then died young tragically three or four years ago. At any rate they were tremendous people, at the top levels of the British foreign office are, they're all smart. Some of them are patronizing in a way which renders them less effective than they otherwise might be, but cling to that sense of superiority with tenacity which would amaze.

Neither of the people I dealt with principally were in that category. Later Brian Cartilage moved into that job and he was much more a foreign office type, although a nice guy, but much different. I was very fortunate in my counterparts and my interlocutors. They were much higher ranking than I was, but you know, I was the U.S. guy and it was very good. This was the period of the Star Wars speech by President Reagan so that was in March of '82 I think it was. He gave the Star Wars speech taking our bureaucracy by surprise, and theirs certainly and changing the whole nuclear debate, the whole strategy on doing Herman Kahn. Undoing 35 years of nuclear strategy which we thought he knew nothing about so could easily undo it. Couldn't be confused by all of it and putting a new emphasis on defense. That was interesting, too because it showed, I think better than anything in my career, the power of a president who knows what he knows. I saw this cartoon that was -- a lobby group called High Frontier had produced this cartoon -- of laser platforms in space destroying reentry vehicles as they try to get through this defense, and it looked like a good idea. It was of course, complete fantasy at the time, a complete fantasy now as far as that goes. It had great political appeal and Reagan was a great politician, maybe the best, well certainly since FDR, a man who knew what would appeal. If it appealed to him, it would appeal to the people and it appealed to him and it did appeal to people, but didn't appeal to the people who had laboring in the vineyards all these years according to a theory which had been propounded by Shelly and Herman Kahn, both of them mathematicians, 40 years before. That theory of nuclear strategy, which I gave an inadequate summary of a few moments ago. All of that contrary to common sense, horrific in its consequences and a justification for the massing of massive nuclear arsenals on the two sides, far beyond anything that could conceivably ever be used: 23,000 warheads at one time for us. One of the great challenges in those years had been finding targets because there aren't that many or even kind of that many legitimate targets for nuclear in the world as a whole, let alone in the Soviet Union. It was all a kind of a huge bloodthirsty, awful, academic nonsense in fact, but Reagan was the first one to see since he, I don't think he did the puzzling through of this to reach that conclusion, it just didn't make any sense to him. He said that we enacted on it, which was a complete right turn or maybe a 180 for the federal government.

Q: How did your British colleagues react? How were they seeing this?

HARRISON: SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative), very negatively. They thought it was terrible. They thought it was going to throw off negotiation. They thought that -- because the theory held that defenses were aggressive: they were aggressive because they created a sanctuary for your forces and therefore gave you freedom to use your forces, and therefore gave you freedom to use your forces and therefore they were destabilizing. We all, that's the theory we had been operating on, the forces were based on it, the negotiations were based on it, everything was based on it, the mindset was based on it and their programs were based on it, too among others. They were just trying to get their submarine force modernized at that period and Reagan had just said all that stuff was irrelevant, would soon be useless. It also for them meant that the United States was going to shelter behind this kind of cosmic national line, and it portrayed -- and I think they interpreted it this way quite rightly, this idea of which we've always had if we just got the right technological fix it would relieve us of the necessity of dealing with these pesky foreigners all the time. They saw that. For all those reasons they thought it was a disaster and said so and I dutifully reported that fact with the great encouragement of Rick Burt who was then Assistant Secretary for European Affairs and also saw this as a disaster. I went on reporting all of this after

he had sensed that the political winds were shifting, he decided that he would get with the program. Before that I was back talking with Jim Dobbins who was then Deputy Under Secretary and he said essentially we'll just sort of ignore this thing and he'll forget about it and it will go away, but Reagan didn't forget about it. He became a kind of road star of policy. The whole policy machinery, because Reagan couldn't be confused with facts, he couldn't be out argued because you knew more about Herman Kahn and his theory of deterrence than Reagan did. He didn't know and he didn't care which may in retrospect have been precisely the right attitude to take. An aside here: when nuclear weapons became a weapon of war and when the Soviets acquired them in the late '40s, politicians found themselves unable to cope and essentially abdicated responsibility. And bureaucracy did, too, to academics to deal with -- what to do with these things. The academics were eager, as academics are when presented with an opening in the policy world to propound a policy for this. Although it had absolutely nothing to do with anything really except itself. It was this great invert universe of massive retaliation and flexible response and defense and depth and all of these things which intellectually followed from one another, but followed in this course and erringly departing from anything that anybody was actually going to do. Reagan didn't see all that, but somehow intuitively cut through all this endless crap. For example, in the late '70s, one of the debates that I was involved with had to do with multiple pinpoint basing because the theory held that your forces had to be survivable, your central systems had to be survivable, but there had been increases in accuracy, there had been MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle) missiles and overwhelming defenses you'd built for them. These silos out in Wyoming, which were good if the guy could get within half a mile of you, but if he could get within ten feet, not so good. The theory held that he would therefore preempt because he could disarm you with the first strike and in order to prevent that and to keep robust and deterrent you had to protect those systems. Because of accuracy improvements you couldn't protect them if they were in one place. The other side would know where that is could destroy them. You had to cover them. How are you going to move them? All kinds of ideas were created which were as fantastical as can be imagined. One of them was racetrack. The idea was you would dig a huge trench in the shape of an oval out in the Nevada desert somewhere and the problem by the way you had to do it somewhere and wherever you wanted to do it there were senators and congressmen who didn't want you to do it. You never were going to be able to do it. You would be in this trench which would have a cement movable cover which would be 50 miles in diameter or so, 20 miles in diameter. You would have railroad tracks. On these tracks you'd have cars and on these cars you'd have missiles. The cars would move around in unpredictable ways on these tracks so that the other side would never know exactly where you'd take the target to get the missiles and you would have these cement covers so they wouldn't be able to see and they couldn't destroy your deterrent. They couldn't target them enough to destroy them all if you made that circle big enough. Somebody once calculated that it would take the cement production of the United States for ten years to create the cement to do that, but we were off in this Herman Kahn-Shelly world of fantasy anyway, so what difference did it make? Then, since you also had to try to limit these weapons you had to have verification and you couldn't have verification with a mobile system because when the verifiers showed up it could be someplace else. These cement covers you had on this race track would have to roll back once a year or once a month or once a week or whenever it was when a Soviet satellite was overhead and they could then see the whole race track and see how many missiles were on it and verify that we hadn't put too many on there and then you'd roll them back and

move your missiles real quick so that they were someplace else by the time the Soviet targeting missiles arrived. Millions of man-hours were put into devising plans like this.

Another one was called dense pack and the idea there was that you'd put all your missiles close together and now the Soviets are attacking, but they have fratricide problems because the initial explosions, it's impossible to coordinate all these missiles coming in so that they'd explode simultaneously and the first ones would explode and destroy the others coming in. Even though you'd lose some of your missiles you'd have enough when you could attack. Complete baloney. I mean, unbelievably inventive nonsense, all of it. Reagan just cut through all that stuff with another bit of unbelievable nonsense, but a different kind and a bureaucracy which had been headed off in this direction unstopably. This bureaucracy in this sense, a lot like the Soviet tank production. Once you started, you couldn't stop. We had built 35 years of theory and treaty and armament systems and spent hundreds of billions of dollars to flesh out this thing that these mathematicians had devised and by God, we'd give it up reluctantly. In fact, we didn't give it up, we kept it and had the defensive thing, too which was the ultimate outcome because we were trying to get congressional funding of the MX missile at that time and you know, at the same time Reagan had said that these missiles are all going to be obsolete by the year... it kept moving, but I think the original goal was '95 or something. I don't know. You know, there's a period of time in bureaucracy, seven years, which really is forever. It's like counting in prehistoric, one, two and a bunch. The government's the same way. The first year out here, the second year out here and then forever. Now Bush is saying ten years from now we're going to do something. What was it the other day, I forget? Well, ten years doesn't exist. I mean ten years from now that's fantasyland. The only thing we've ever done for ten years in this country is the interstate highway system and social security, but otherwise, ten years is beyond the policy horizon. You're not going to be there in ten years and 90% of congress is not going to be there in ten years. California is going to be 60% Hispanic in ten years. You don't know what's going to happen in ten years. You can say that you're going to have an impenetrable missile defense. I think, what is it now, 2006? Congress continually passing resolutions saying when this is going to be. So, it's another bit of nonsense, but the great thing about it was that it broke the old glacier of the previous nonsense and that's got to be good. If it had been issued in something rational, that would have been even better. At least we got some innovative thinking and racetrack was dumped and dense pack was dumped and all that other nonsense. Now, of course, we're talking about maybe having a force, which is a tenth the size of the one that we thought was necessary because of what all these academics thought in 1948. It's kind of parabola. You know, God loves fools and drunks and the United States, even though we stumble along blindly, never thinking reading a map drawn by idiots, we seem to have sometimes stumbled along in the right direction.

Q: Tell me how did you feel about this, were you seen and your colleagues as having to look at this hard; in more practical terms than the academics, you know, the blackboard and they're sitting back in New Haven?

HARRISON: Well, no, I mean I was part of the "in" mindset. I'd been raised in that mindset. That was the way I saw the world so I thought this was nonsense. I think it was nonsense, but so was the stuff we were doing.

Q: But, were you seeing the stuff we were doing as nonsense or had you gotten so absorbed in the minutia that you're beginning to lose the forest?

HARRISON: I think there was much of the tree phenomenon, but there was an argument to be made and which can still be made that no matter how nonsensical it is, it was stable.

Q: If the other side is looking at it the same way, then it has a dynamic of its own.

HARRISON: But they always refused to, that was the kicker. They always refused to accept any of it. They said, no, no, no, this is all nonsense that we don't accept. This is just a device that you use to negotiate from the point of advantage with us, nonsense. Once nuclear war starts, it cannot be controlled. Yes, when you gamed it, you sit down and do some gaming, that's right, that's the way it'd come out. Somebody said the battle plan never lasts beyond the first shot that is fired. Certainly in nuclear war, the notion that you were going to escalate by any precise plan that you had was absolute errant dangerous nonsense, and the Soviets said so. Now, they said we've got to prevent any exchange, but you see, they said that because they had, we said, a conventional advantage in Europe. If the nuclear weapons were taken out of the equation because they could not be used without ultimate destruction for both sides then we were left with the conventional balance. That meant we had to spend more money, put more troops and persuade our recalcitrant allies in Europe to actually do something robust, which we knew was beyond us.

Q: Were you seen at this time, now it's extremely evident that the Europeans were falling way behind in technical innovation, well investment in military things?

HARRISON: Oh yes, absolutely. We spent a lot of time talking about it. Carter had set a 6% -- was it 6? I think so -- their defense budget should rise 6% in real terms every year and however long it took to and they all solemnly swore that that would happen. It was a nice thing to solemnly swear and made us all feel better, but didn't happen. They didn't have any political constituency to do that so that was the end of it.

Q: Well, the British by this time, you know, one of our, I don't remember who it was, you know, the British have got wonderful bands and good parade functions, but they really don't have much. They had to scrape together a navy, which had already, to go to the Falklands which?

HARRISON: And could easily have been beaten there.

Q: Easily been beaten and it was the navy that if they'd waited another year wouldn't have even been there?

HARRISON: Right, plus if the Argentine armorers had fused their bombs better it would have been a complete disaster for them. There was a lot of luck involved in that. We could see it and the armies are a lot like symphony orchestras really. They get relatively more expensive over time because they're labor intense. Labor becomes an expensive commodity and also in defense terms the machinery of defense was doubling in cost in real terms every generation and they simply weren't going to do it. One of the things they tried to do was to combine, build a fighter for Europe, because none of them could afford to do it on their own, but they simply didn't have

a political consensus. In Britain it was better, I think they got 3% or 4% in real terms in Thatcher's first four or five years. On the continent it just wasn't going to happen and when the Soviet Union faded from view, we were out of luck. They were going to spend their money on other things and not see the threat.

Q: While you were doing this, although you were with the British, were you seen, how were the French on this? I mean, the French usually are the odd man out.

HARRISON: Well, we hadn't made the mistake of trying to deploy any of these missiles in France so they didn't really have a voice in debate. They had their own nuclear deterrent and their view had always been, we don't rely on American systems. We have a sufficient deterrent to bloody the Soviet nose and relative to the prize we constitute it's sufficient to deter them and we don't care what anyone else does. That's their business, so they were not actors in this play. The Italians were because we wanted to deploy there and the Dutch because we wanted to deploy there, because we wanted to spread out this, you know, we knew if we tried to go into any single country we'd be defeated because no country would take all the risks. We had to have multiple deployment sites which meant we had to fight in multiple parliaments and everyone of them it was a political uphill battle to get these things deployed, these intermediate range missiles because of a perception that we were eager to fight to the last European. The interesting thing was, the bureaucratic dynamic was that if you wanted to get these parliaments to agree therefore, you had to have a credible position on arms control. Even though you were in the Reagan administration and then dominated by people who were very anti-arms control, they found themselves forced to engage in the process credibly because otherwise they were going to lose that battle. Their goal throughout these years was to look credible without doing anything. The State Department's goal was, too, because they saw that was a transparent strategy which would lose the fight in the end to get them to do things which were actually meaningful in terms of arms control and that was the dynamic. It was a dynamic because we wanted to deploy. Once we got the deployment in, that became less pressing, but by then Reagan had become the most anti-nuclear president we ever had. He didn't like nuclear weapons, he wanted to see them gone and it was another part of the orthodoxy, which he rejected, which was again very refreshing and in a way wonderful. He at Reykjavik in these years agreed to give up all land based ICBMs, had to be dragged into the bathroom by Bob Linhart and Richard Perle and persuaded that he couldn't do that. Then they had to spin their hearts out to claim that he never had. Everyone knew he had and it was absolutely marvelous. They were terrible destabilizing weapons and he didn't like them. He wanted to see them gone. So, in the INF debate, we're trying to force credibility on defense, but trying to avoid any real steps in state defense. Richard Perle came up with what he thought was the wonderful solution and that was a zero option. The zero option was that in the negotiation that both sides would eliminate all of this weaponry. Neither side would have any. It wouldn't be reduction which we'd been trying to negotiate, stable level, no, none of that, none. It was wonderful because from his point of view he thought it was unattainable for a very good reason and that was that the Soviets had already deployed 600 odd warheads. They'd spent a lot of money doing it. There was no assurance that we could do it. We hadn't gotten the political agreement in Europe yet. That was questionable and even if we did it, ours were going to be mainly cruise missiles which was a much less effective weapon system than the SS-120 and they would have a permanent advantage. Why on earth would they give up something they'd already done for something we might do, but maybe couldn't? At least Richard Perle thought so and he

thought it was foolproof because he knew it would be very popular with Reagan, who hated nuclear weapons, and with the Europeans and would undercut the movement in Europe against this INF negotiation which effectively it did. It was marvelous from that point of view, but the irony, which history is rich in which I have discovered, is that Reagan did not see it as a tactic, as Perle did, but as a genuine negotiating goal and got Gorbachev to agree. So, instead the outcome was exactly the opposite of the one that Perle had hoped for, which was to have a robust nuclear deterrent in this area, but nothing in this area because the INF treaty was agreed. All these missiles that I had worked so hard to deploy were removed in the late '80s, and that probably is a good place to stop.

Q: Okay, well is there anything else developing during the London time?

HARRISON: I would have to think about it. There was always the domestic politics. That was the period of the coal strike and I want to talk a little about the embassy itself because some future historian may wonder. Ed Streater and John Louis our first ambassador and Price our second ambassador there and sort of how that embassy worked in those days.

Q: Yes, I'd like that very much, the view of Thatcher and the coal strike and particularly how this is dealt with. Also, how were your political military mandates viewed by the embassy? In other words, what were you getting or were you kind of doing it and working it? So, we'll pick all that up next time. Today is April 30, 2002. We're in London in 1982.

HARRISON: 1981.

Q: 1981. So, your job is what?

HARRISON: I was the pol/mil officer there and then I was the deputy political counselor after Rick Melton left to a guy to Dick McCormack who was the political counselor and had come out of policy planning before that. Big political section, a lot of future stars worked in it. Bob Frasure who later became a luminary on various ways and tragically died in Bosnia, was the guy who did African affairs and Jim Hooper did Middle East and Brunson McKinley who was later ambassador. All three of those people became ambassadors, and Robin Raphel who became ambassador a couple of times, and assistant secretary always a lot of very good people there which mean that the embassy and the political section ran without a lot of supervision. Most of those people, too were sent by their respective bureaus. They had slots, the bureaus all had slots there and they sent people there as reward for good service as well. Gib Lanpher who later became ambassador to Zimbabwe was in that section. You know, when you work with good people it is always a joy and there were certainly a lot of good people there. Dick McCormack took a very hands off management approach. He had to be persuaded to have a staff meeting. He thought professionals should be self-directing and so which they all loved because they were self-directing. There weren't a lot of people there that needed supervision. My job was to liaise with HMG on arms control issues and political military affairs at large. That was my portfolio. Later when I became a deputy counselor I did some other things, but that was always my main focus. There were many things going on at the time on arms control, the star treaty. This was the period in which Reagan made his speech; Star Wars in March of '83 during my tenure there, so debate was hot and heavy. Also, the British anti-nuclear campaign CND, Committee on Nuclear

Disarmament, had revived. It had initially had its heyday when Bertram Russell was its most prominent figure in the 1950s and '60s and then had submerged only to reappear. The occasion of that reappearance being the desire of our government, supported by Thatcher's government, to deploy intermediate range nuclear forces in Britain as well as in Belgium, Italy.

Q: This is in response to the Soviet SS-20s?

HARRISON: That's right and a part of the general theory of deterrence, which held that you had to be able to match the other side of each possible level of escalation. The problem was that from the European point of view, stationing missiles in Europe was a way of limiting the war to Europe. What we argued was that stationing missiles in Europe was a way of linking the European conflict to central systems and therefore, that is to say that our land based and sea-based nuclear forces and therefore increasing the strength of deterrence. That is, we argued always, under NATO Article 5, attack on Europe our NATO partners would be an attack on us and be treated the same and therefore, a nuclear attack on Europe would be treated as a nuclear attack on the United States. The theory was that we would have, therefore, we had to link this nuclear exchange which might occur in Europe because of the Soviet SS-20s which were multiple warhead missiles which could reach all of the European capitals of our NATO partners, but to deter their use we had to build a linkage to our systems so that we could argue with the Europeans that this would involve a general nuclear war and therefore, not one limited to Europe. Their fear always was that we were devising this strategy to have a nuclear exchange which did not touch our homeland, to keep the United States as a sanctuary. The problem was that the argument cut both ways. You could argue either way, it all depended on your perception and intention and you could never establish intention and you could never change perception so the side you ended up on could argue with equal ferocity from their point of view. The problem that the British opposition had – and it was being led by the Labour Party, Michael Foot, was its leader, a very ineffective fellow, past his sell by date by ten years or so, an old socialist and kind of a ditherer, no match for Thatcher who had certainly in abundance. Foot was one of those people who liked to analyze issues. He generally came out on one side, but he liked to dither a lot first. He was not a decisive force, but a more fundamental problem they had was that they were very anti-Reagan, very anti-Reagan administration.

Q: This is talking about the Labour Party?

HARRISON: The Labour Party I should say, yes, very anti-Reagan who was pictured as a cowboy, having a hair trigger on the nuclear might of the United States and therefore, absolutely undependable on the one hand. On the other hand, they were arguing for the abolition of British nuclear forces. The Polaris system the British had and were about to modernize, they were arguing against that. That argument depended on your assumption that the American nuclear forces could be counted on for deterrence against a Soviet nuclear threat. I used to tell them that they were pressing on the gas pedal and the brake at the same time. It was not a credible policy; it was not acceptable to the British public. They were decisively defeated in the elections of '82 I think; I might be wrong, and driven to kind of a rump party in parliament. The protest in the meantime was going on in the streets, CND was gathering 400,000 or 500,000 people in Hyde Park to protest the deployment of these missiles and the British government under Thatcher was staunch for this, as she was staunch for many things. There is no underestimating the value of

staunchness in politics. If you are prepared to defend your position and you have a certain force of personality, as she certainly did, to intimidate those less certain, you can go a long way in life. Or you do what Reagan did which was to have a vision which is unsullied by fact and cannot be influenced by fact. It can be influenced by anecdote if you could think of the right one, but not by fact. An example of that anecdote thing, there was a cartoon we were trying at that time to deploy or that is to say we were trying to reduce the vulnerability of our land based systems and how would we do that? Well, one I think we talked about last time. One idea was to put these things on rail cars and run them around in tunnels in Nevada and then lift the roof every so often. A cartoonist named Off, I think at the Philadelphia Enquirer in those days did a cartoon, which I think was Brezhnev, he's standing, he's one of these shell game guys. He's got his three shells and he's standing behind the table. I'm sorry I've told it wrong. Reagan is standing behind the table with these shells and he mixes these shells up and he grins at Gorbachev who takes out a hammer and breaks all the shells. That cartoon by anecdote changed Reagan's mind and killed the multiple in point bases. It was true that if you could present your argument in a picturesque way or in terms of an anecdote because that's how he thought. He argued, too in terms of an anecdote. Back to the certainty of the Thatcher policy. You had on the one hand an absolute force of nature in Margaret Thatcher who was solidly behind the deployment policy and that in the end of a parliamentary system where the prime minister is recently reelected with a majority which is undesirable, in the House of Parliament that's the last word on the issue.

Q: I take it that you and others in our embassy felt quite comfortable with her?

HARRISON: With Thatcher? Oh, I think so. John Louis was the ambassador then. I was going to talk some about him. He as a very nice man, a very shy man. He'd inherited a lot of money. He was on the Fortune 400 list. His father had been the man who suggested to the Johnson Brothers, of Johnson's Wax, that they sponsor a radio program called Fiber McGhee and Molly. He was a publicist, Louis's father, and married one of the Johnson daughters and therefore. No, I'm sorry, his father did. He inherited the money from his dad, four hundred million or so, which is peanuts these days, but in the early '80s put him on the Fortune 500 list with the board saying that he had like actually pretensions to the first book of the republic. Sisyphus says to himself that his father, his grandfather had made the money, his father had pissed it away and he had maintained the fortune that he had inherited which is what Johnson had done, Louis had done. A very shy man, very retiring and absolutely no knowledge at all of European politics or any politics. He was not a political man. He had been appointed. I may have gone through this last time and, if so, the editor can take this all out because as the candidate, well, the rumor was because Mrs. Annenberg, who was the wife of the ambassador publisher who had rebuilt the residence to a high standard -- a wonderful house, one of the greatest in the world -- thought that she was the person to maintain it. Mrs. Louis, who was as in many cases you will find the opposite of her shy, retiring husband, a very forceful dynamo of a woman who in the modern era would doubtless be a CEO of some corporation, but grew up in a time when you had to count on your husband to do that sort of thing, so you ended up with a lot of frustrated women using energy and intelligence for relatively meaningless tasks, like that embassy residence. That's all, but I don't know that that's true, but there must have been some reason for it. He was, there were two factions in the Reagan camp. There was the Annenberg faction and the Tuttle faction and they fought over these big embassies and Louis was an Annenberg man. At Louis's first wedding, the best man had been Charlie Price. Charlie Price in the end was a Tuttle man, Holmes Tuttle in L.A. who'd been

one of the early bankroll people for Reagan when he was running for office in California. They had resented losing this embassy to the Annenberg people so were kind of gunning for Louis. Louis who had arrived self-deprecatingly and acknowledging his lack of experience in diplomacy or lack of knowledge in European affairs, unfortunately never gave up that sort of line. He kept doing that. I remember talking about Ed Streater who at that time when I arrived in '81 had already been there for five years as DCM and was to stay for another three. In many ways the epitome of the diplomat of that generation, ambitious certainly in intelligence, but with a style that you don't find much anymore. A very cosmopolitan man with some money himself. There is a famous story; I was just in London since our last encounter here. I was in London. There was a famous story in the embassy in those days of the battling Streators. Coming from a reception on the M3, they had a fight on the superhighway outside of London, so he ordered the car to stop and ordered her out beside the freeway. It turns out when I was back there, there was one driver who's still there that I knew from 20 years ago, the last of the old crowd and I asked him about this story. He'd been Streater's driver so he told me no, she'd ordered him to stop and to get out of the car. Then Streater tried to get him to go and negotiated back in. A very contentious relationship. Streater was also a diplomat of the old school in the sense that he cared about the political functions of the embassy and was extremely well connected in the British establishment. He was seen by the government and society as a whole as really the substantive part of the embassy. Kingman Brewster was ambassador before that and he was a man of a certain standing and weight in which Streater played a secondary role. When Louis got there, Streater emerged as the power not even behind the throne, kind of in front of the throne.

Q: Somehow or other Louis and I overlapped at Williams, but I never knew him.

HARRISON: Oh, as undergrads? Yes, well he is a very nice man. I told I think the story of about how he had a button under his place at the table at the residence there so he could summon the staff to clear the course and how he got to pushing that faster and faster so he could get those people out of there and how someone like me who came there for the meals a lot learned to eat quick. That food was not going to be there long so he could get out. It's been my experience in life that some people are just pathologically shy. You're born with that. I think they've done tests now to show that is a congenital thing. I mean, you're shy and many of them join the Foreign Service for reasons which I've never understood. I mean it's a job for an insurance salesman. It's a job for a carnival barker. It's not a job for a shy person and I think they see this side, this analytical side of it as you know, as attractive and then they end up at cocktail parties talking to sock manufacturers from Dubuque and it's torture for them. It was torture for him. I was once going out to the residence in the car with him and I asked him what he was going to do on the weekend and he said he was going to I don't know, one of the lord and lady's country houses, with incredibly boring and meaningless people who would have long since fallen into obscurity in any place but England which is the last place you can excel because of who you are and not because of what you do. Our ambassadors tend to get very fond of that community and see these people as their social set; useless. So, they spend a lot of time because of sin of pride at country homes over weekends with boring conversations with people who have no influence on anything. He told me how much he was dreading the weekend to come and the worst of it was, he said, there wasn't even a golf course within range. He was a great shooter of birds, was John Louis, so that I think helped keep him sane.

Streator, because Louis was there dependent entirely on Streator, Streator emerged as de facto ambassador for all substantive purposes. Streator was a difficult man, but he had the great quality of appreciating good work which I've always found to make up for a lot of evils in supervisors, but only good political work. He didn't care much about the economic part of what we did and he cared nothing at all for the rest of the embassy. The fact that he was good at communicating to the people who worked in those sections. I remember when he left, we tried to get a fund up for a present for him from the embassy staff, but it was hard salami except in the political section because we all thought he was great. He would be querulous and difficult, but if you stuck to your guns and if you did good work at the end of the day he was very supportive. The great thing about him was that he was willing to try anything. He was willing to contradict Washington. He was willing to launch any idea you came up with and we came up with a lot of ideas. It was a time and I think for those in future generations who may find this dusty CD someplace, it's always time for good ideas. I just had this come up the other day, people now have a lot of money for terrorism programs. They don't have a lot of terrorism programs, so you're in charge of some office, you suddenly find yourself with ten million dollars, you're desperate for good ideas. You have a speech to give, you're desperate for good ideas and it's unlikely that you're going to have many. The fact that you're creative is not necessarily what put you in your present job and some people are imaginative and other people aren't. If you can find a guy with money and you have an idea, he'll be on you like a cheap suit. I mean it's like magazines. You know, they've got to divide the ads, the offices have to have ideas to spend that money. We had all kinds of good ideas we came funneling. Anything I came up with he'd send through.

Q: Can you give me some feel?

HARRISON: Yes, I'll give you a good example. We were trying to organize the deployment of these missiles. Well, after the election, the political outcome was preordained. We were going to deploy the missiles, but the women of Greenham Common, and I think I told this story, too were out there at one of the bases where these missiles were going to be deployed. We had to exercise if we were going to use these because a lot of them were mobile missiles, so to make them effective you've got to get them out of that base and out on the countryside roads. To do that you have to exercise doing that because the military can't do anything they haven't exercised to do. It's a fact of life. Once you get out of the base you were at the mercy of these women, so there was a big political issue there. In also just managing the deployment thing. I suggested that we form a committee because we had all these different people involved and one of them was EUCOM, the European command, the military side who was in charge of that. We had the FCO, Foreign Commonwealth Office and we had the MOD and of course the embassy and the State Department. I suggested that we form a committee and we'll meet once a month in London with the embassy chairing together with the MOD, my counterpart.

Q: MOD is the Ministry of Defense?

HARRISON: Ministry of Defense, we'd bring all these people together. In short order they had such committees in all the deployment countries, things like that. We also had a meeting of all the deployment countries that we hosted in London where we brought all the officials from Washington talk about the political intricacies of this. It was great for me. I got a lot of exposure on the issue and I dealt luckily with two of the best diplomats of that generation at the Foreign

Commonwealth Office, primarily David Gilmore who was the head of the Defense Department at FCO, a wonderful man, very untypical British diplomat, a terrific guy among other things. He was also very adept and ended up as permanent under secretary and ended up as Lord Gilmore and died tragically young a couple of years ago in his early '60s and John Westin, both Lord Gilmore and Sir John as he was to later become the British ambassador to the United Nations was also. Both of them were wonderful interlocutors to have in that they had agile minds and the best of the British system which are very good indeed. Since we had this special relationship, I was free to share a lot of information with them and they with me and Rick Burt who had been in London and was back in Washington and was very solicitous of the British and these people in particular. I ended up having a whale of a time until Ed Streater left and we just had a good time. The policy was successful; it's a wonderful place to live. There's great people to deal with, the conversation is the best in the world, around a British dinner table. It's kind of I think also diplomatically it's a validating experience because like they used to say in the old song, if you can make it there, you can make it anywhere. The British don't suffer fools badly, but you can hold your own in that company you can hold your own in any diplomatic company.

Q: Tell me, what was your estimate at this time of the British military establishment because at one time one of our generals had said well the British have got great military bands, but I was just wondering. I mean, they had had a real problem scraping up enough just to get to the Falklands just shortly before you arrived there?

HARRISON: Yes, they had a secular decline in defense spending over the past 20 years. I was just talking to some Brits in London this last time around. Professionalism of course in the highest order, but continuing strains on the budget and so they began shrinking. One of the problems they had was that, too, to maintain equal standing with great powers you had to have all kinds of very expensive weapon systems. They tried kind of to do it half heartedly, for example, with the carriers with the Harriers on them, and they were debating in my time a new destroyer. It turned out the platform is relatively cheap to build, but the equipment that goes on the platform is hugely expensive because it is all even then getting increasingly complex in electronics. So, the question was not sort of building the shell of the ship, but how much equipment you should put on it. This was where the compromises were being made. I think they'd already accepted their relatively subordinate role militarily, but they were still sort of viewing themselves as a praetorian guard for the Western alliance, shrinking, but not trying to shrink the essentials and keeping the nuclear deterrent which was sort of the hallmark of their military standing, great power standing, nuclear power standing kept them at the table. Not a credible deterrent really, but their argument, which the French also made, was that you didn't have to do a lot of damage to the Soviets to discourage them from destroying Britain as opposed to discourage them from destroying the United States, a greater rival. Otherwise, you'd be dependent on American nuclear release policy, which you couldn't trust. They face it again now because their systems are getting old and they have to decide whether to replace them and that's going to be even more hugely expensive against a shrunken defense budget.

Q: Was it evident then and a matter of concern about the discrepancy between the American capabilities you know, I'm talking about equipment and all?

HARRISON: Not so much. I think first of all, the technology had not exploded as it did in the '80s and '90s. Precision guided munitions were not yet an issue, not yet a possibility. It was just a question of size and you could hope that quality in the kind of conflict you were liable to fight in would count for a lot in that circumstance. It was a subordinate role, but arguably had been a subordinate role since about '44. It was still a legitimate one and then as the gap increased I think the mood set in later after I'd gone that you couldn't really play as meaningful a military role anymore because the gap between you and the Americans had grown so great. But arguably the kind of conflict that we're now fighting, there's a British contingent in Afghanistan, feeds right into British capability because now we're talking again about small unit operations and high quality special forces and all the kinds of things that they can support. We're happy to share technology so I think a British military role is emerging again, albeit always subordinate to the United States. One of the things that they lack is lift capability. Actually everybody does now except us. If you want to get someplace to do whatever you want to do you've got to count on us to get you there pretty much unless you want to go by ship and by the time you get there, the crisis is long past. The Russians have some lifts that you can rent, but I don't think that probably is politically acceptable yet. Maybe, actually before too long because I think the Europeans would like to have an alternative to this dependency, but so you know, the standards of professionalism are very high and of course, the traditions. I once had a regiment up in Sandhurst I went up. It went up and ate in the regimental mess. This was, it was like eating in college at Oxford, even more so. It is a very tradition filled thing. You don't just tuck in. You go into the dining area of the commander's house and the regimental honors are there and there's a whole procedure you go through. You know we'll betide you if you miss a step in this process. I don't remember all of it, but it's a little like a church service, to maintain the traditions of the regiment. Their traditions are all ... and I can see the point of it, it's important to have that tradition to maintain morale in the fallow periods, like the '80s. So, I think the MOD will continue to be a major player and maybe a more major player now than they have been. I think that Washington would see them as an essential component of this anti-terrorism war because the political backing for it is there and it is very questionable elsewhere.

Q: How are we doing on time?

HARRISON: I'm going to have to leave in about five minutes. I'm sorry.

Q: What war were we looking at? You were there from '81 to '85? What war were we looking at?

HARRISON: Well, we were looking at the inter-German border. That was our main focus. The Soviets were at a conventional Soviet superiority offset by a superior U.S. technology and by the threat of nuclear retaliation for conventional attack. Flexible response, defense and depth, all of these strategies that had been devised for that asymmetry to maintain stability were very much at the forefront and pushed weapons procurement like the INF debate and the intermediate nuclear force debate like the tornado decision. It's nuclear capability, like the Polaris decision. All these things were based on its essential theory of deterrents which went back to mathematicians and game theorists in the late '40s and which was overthrown by Reagan in '83 who didn't understand it and therefore, felt no compunction about contradicting it. I'm sorry about this. I didn't realize I was going to have to go and we're only probably to '82.

Q: Well, we've kind of done a tour of the horizon, but we will pick up any issues in '82 to '85 so to speak. Great.

This is the 31st of May, 2002. Roger, let's, we may be repeating ourselves, but you were in London '82 to '85. Do you want to talk about the British election that was held then and from our perspective what were some of the issues?

HARRISON: Actually it was interesting, the election for British political purposes, too, because it was Thatcher's first re-election. She had been in office four years so the outlines to where Thatcherism had become fairly clear: the dismantling of much of the welfare state and the reprivatization of key industries, sort of the undoing of much of what had been done in '48 to '46 actually by the Atlee government that followed the war. This stuff that hadn't been working very well, and arguably just in time. Also, assault on the power of the unions which really was mounted in earnest after the election. The Labour Party had been drifting left as the Conservatives moved right and made as their leader, Michael Foot, who was an old socialist activist from the '30s, a newspaper man originally. Intellectual, a very nice man, kind of befuddled and I think he has always been kind of befuddled. He was sort of the typical absentminded hyperactive politician who was more ambitious than he seemed and seemed to have been for the Labour Party kind of a nod toward their past before they rushed onto the future. One of the key issues was updating their Polaris missile system and coincident issue was the Reagan administration. Thatcher's relationship with Reagan, Reagan having a very poor public image in England and much of Europe, much as George W. does now actually to which he has just been adding or maybe I should say subtracting.

Q: We're talking about George W. Bush the first time in Russia who was able to tour the Hermitage Museum in 15 minutes which I thought showed a great grasp.

HARRISON: Of speed and assimilation? Yes, maybe. Reagan had something of the same reputation and since Thatcher had seen the Reagan connection as one of the mainstays of her foreign policy, indeed, the mainstay of the foreign policy, this was used against her as well. The thing of probably having a problem of being anti-nuclear and at the meantime, defaming Reagan as a cowboy who was irrational and marginally sane. The problem with that was their nuclear posture was implicitly reliance on U.S. nuclear deterrents because the Soviet Union was very much in business in those days and none of us knew that it was only going to last another 16 years or so. Therefore, they were as I used to tell them pressing on the accelerator and the brake at the same time. They were trying to use the Reagan connection against Thatcher at the same time they were implicitly relying on the U.S. good nature and reason in controlling the deterrence for the West to which they would then not have any trigger as their nuclear deterrents had traditionally been seen. Also, they were burdened still with the labor movement in the Labour Party, which controlled the nominating process as much as the screwballs in our parties now control our nominating process. The activists tend to be more influential in that process than any actual election and they therefore were unable to nominate a more modern figure in the party so they were moving left. Tony Benn was staying out to the left of course and was kind of the

figure they were trying to avoid and Michael Foot was a bit of a compromise, and a terrible campaigner.

The other problem they had that year was that seeing us move to the left there had been a split in the Labour Party and the moderates had formed their own party called the Social Democratic Party (SDP) which subsequently was going to merge with the Liberal Party. The Liberal Party always existing through this period. The Social Democrats trying to be then what the Labour party is now, a kind of Tony Blair Labour Party. To get out from under the private unions and despairing that the union power never to be broken or at least I shouldn't say never, but a political never that is never in the period in which they would be eligible to be prime minister -- those that broke away from the Labour Party to form this movement. Widely popular initially, but the system of voting in Britain favors the established parties, and even though the Social Democrats did 18% or 19% they didn't break through the magical threshold of about 22% or 23% that you need to begin picking up various seats. They did all right, remained the wrong party. Labour was buried and Thatcher returned triumphant with all those parts of her policy intact, and that meant for us at the embassy that the issue of INF deployment of intermediate range of nuclear forces, which was essentially my brief there, had ceased to be an issue. So of course in that system there is no way parliament could effectively or ineffectively to publish the wishes of the prime minister who is after all in parliament of another parliamentary party. The issue, the policy issue was over, and there would continue to be demonstrations and so forth, but there was no longer any doubt about our ability to deploy those missiles or about how staunch the British would be in defense of our Star Wars initiative. Very staunch is the answer to that. Thatcher was one of the only enthusiastic supporters in Europe of that initiative even though her foreign ministry was not enthusiastic and again much like the current situation where Blair is an enthusiastic supporter of the Bush foreign policy for purposes of his own, but his foreign office is not.

Q: Would you say is that endemic to the situation, does the foreign office represent a point of view if the British government gets too far to the right or to the left, the foreign office feels it should balance it?

HARRISON: No, the Foreign Office has an institutionalized view, much like the State Department has, they are inherently multilateralists. They are inherent negotiators that like international agreements, they like to uphold international. All the things that established foreign policy thinkers everywhere in the world, are very distrustful of the kind of right wing recklessness that is evident both there and here, and also very suspicious of left-wing internationalism. I think that these foreign office views tend to be more alike internationally than some of them tend to be in agreement with their own administration, but there it's interesting because of this system of parliamentary democracy which gives the FCO an independent life which the State Department doesn't have. The State Department now is populated increasingly by political appointees who are sent there as an effort to control what is seen as recalcitrant bureaucracy, which is going to oppose whatever you want to do. This was certainly true of the first Republican administration. It's more true of Republicans but since Clinton came in after the Republican administration the Democrats were equally suspicious that it was a hotbed of Republicans. It's always a hotbed of what you don't like. You want to send people to control it and in our system you can down to the office director level if you want to since your political

appointees are not likely to take anything lower than that who actually have to do some manual labor. It doesn't work because it is entirely professional foreign service there are no political appointees except the minister who is also a parliamentarian of course and the under secretaries who are parliamentarians usually, but there are only two of them. The rest of the building is staffed by this establishment point of view. It tends to have a more insular approach and it's insular as well because they don't have the system of testifying of course, they don't have the hearing process, they have a kind of or a form of it, but it's not at all an imposition on the bureaucracies. That means that bureaucracies don't have to worry about Parliament as the State Department has to worry about Congress. Parliament is under the same control that they are. So everybody is going to be back in the same policy and they don't have to go testify, they don't have to explain what they've been doing. They don't have to worry about Parliament subpoenaing their notes and therefore, they can have a good deal of independence, but also they tend to have an insular view of the world, which perpetuates from one FCO generation to the next. Even if our system is superior in some ways because it is much more responsive if you have to go up and testify. You know you're going to have to go testify. We're always seeing policy in the State Department in terms of how it's going to look at the front pages of the New York Times, plus it's a leakier bureaucracy and it's a much more distorting one with rivalries that often play out in the press to a much greater extent than the bureaucratic rivalries.

Q: The traditional one being the one between the Pentagon and the State Department?

HARRISON: Yes, exactly right, but not just there, everybody in town is prepared to stab you in the back -- even some of your own bureaucratic compatriots. It makes our bureaucracy a much more responsive, changing, flexible institution. FCO is not. So, when Prime ministers come in they sometimes ignore it, which is what Thatcher did. She simply did not pay a lot of attention to the FCO bureaucracy; she built her own small foreign policy staff. Of course, the other problem they have is that they don't have a NSC either. The Prime Minister doesn't have an independent staff of foreign policy experts occupying a huge building to call on. Although they do have party experts they can use and they can call on anybody they want. The cabinet is self protective in an interesting way and of course, cabinet ministers do tend to get captured by their bureaucracies as that program has shown very well.

Q: Well, what is it, the principal, what the?

HARRISON: Yes, the PUS, the Principal Under Secretary, the senior civil serving the nation's bureaucracies and the cabinet secretary who is the sort of head bureaucrat. They'll be there when you're gone and self-protecting all of that stuff I thought very well in that series. After '82, there is a political decision to be made by the people, but this was so overwhelmingly a Tory victory, the Social Democratic moderate had failed to receive attraction, the Labour Party was completely discredited and everyone knew Foot had to go. I think they were down 140 seats, something like that. We got involved in the succession struggle for Labour Party leadership -- involved in only the sense that we were very interested in who was going to take over for the party and whether they were going to move to a new generation leadership. One of their weaknesses was that they didn't have the moderate corps of the party, which had left for the Social Democratic Party largely to turn to. Those guys were gone and what they did have was a new generation and Dennis Healey who was old generation, a very canny, very visceral politician who had made his

peace with the unilateralists of the Labour Party in order to keep an influential role. Ed Streater who was our minister then knew all these people then, was very well connected, had Healey to lunch and I was there to ask him what this Labour Party succession infight was going to bring and Healey said if it lasted six months that he would be the leader he thought and if it were more than a year it would be Neil Kinnock, a rising young Welsh politician, red haired with a radical wife, but himself relatively moderate in the terms of the Labour Party today. In fact, within three months of that lunch the party had turned to Kinnock who became the . Streater, who was chargé, had him to dinner the night he became the leader and I was at that dinner, too. I think I said this last time, the editors will take it out, that the great thing for the Kinnock when they showed up was that they had a car and driver which was for them a revelation to look around for a parking space. Kinnock talked about how he was going to move the party back to an electorally attractive ideology, about all the left-wing problems he had to face and the particular power of the unions. But now to the rescue, Margaret Thatcher, who determined after the elections to break the unions and in particular, the coal miners' union.

Q: This was Scargill?

HARRISON: Scargill was his name, the world's most pronounced combover he used to try to look under, I mean where did the hair actually start. You could see, it was like looking into an aircraft hanger. You could hear back there.

Q: In other words he combed his hair back?

HARRISON: He combed his hair over. A choice I chose not to do.

They had a lot of small collieries that were inefficient and you had to close them down. Also you had to break the kind of cycle of coal miner wage increases which were tied to productivity, but their larger goal was to break the whole of the union movement on the economy, largely based on many other things: the cultural condition, the class structure, the working man versus the manager, the aristocrat. All of this stuff was very deeply ingrained, much more so than here. With the coal miners you could hope to achieve that with building up huge surpluses of coal to begin with. So, the government started stockpiling coal and then essentially provoked a strike. The other thing you wanted to do was to pick a particularly unattractive labour leader as your opponent. Arthur Scargill was certainly every bit of that, kind of looked like a racetrack tout and talked like one, too. He was not a sophisticated kind of guy. He was the sort of guy that would rise from the ranks without much thought to public relations and therefore, when he was thrust into this battle with Thatcher he looked liked a ward heeler and he kind of was a ward heeler, so you know, they quickly went to the mattresses as the mafia says. Everybody has extreme positions and the government just waited out the coal miners by using up this great surplus of coal and broke the strike. Broke in a sense the labour movement in England as well, England, Wales and Great Britain. One of the great tragedies of that was of course, the parades which the collieries used to put on every year where their brass bands would be featured because they all had brass bands with uniforms and banners and parades in the old days were miles long where these brass bands competed and of course that tradition is all gone now. But breaking this really made it possible for the Labour Party to modernize to come out from under the shadow of that legacy which had become electorally a huge burden. You simply couldn't hope to achieve a

majority as long as you had that freight in the system. That economy, like our economy, had been becoming less and less blue collar and more and more white collar and the white collar constituencies that you had to win had different interests than the blue collar constituencies that had been your mainstay. How are you going to win?

Q: From the embassy point of view, say from your point of view, but your colleagues, I'm making the assumption that whereas a lot of the Foreign Service are essentially rather liberal, when it came to Britain, all of this had been grown up with movies like, I'm All Right Jack and the labour movement was pernicious as far as allowing the United Kingdom to be a solid economic power.

HARRISON: Oh, true, but they are so much nicer people. That kind of offset that. I think that if there was an embassy point of view in those days we had a Republican administration so we had Republican ambassadors. You have an enlightened officer corps who understood that a lot of this stuff was an anachronism and that all of that had to be modernized. You couldn't just go on with the sort of system subsidizing people who dig coal which you'd fallen into, energy modernization was necessary. It was all irrational choices and that the ideology of the late '40s was not proven, you do it and it doesn't work and therefore, you have to move on and so I think that was the general view. Offset by the fact that if you went off to a big meeting with labour people or if you had them over for dinner or you went to a reception, it was fun, because they were nice human people I mean they were a lot of fun. There was a Labour Party dinner at the residence every year, which various Republican ambassadors' wives were always threatening to cancel, but always stayed on the agenda. They'd start singing and drinking and it was wonderful. The Tory parties were all these constipated people in diamonds and you know, merchant bankers and everything.

Q: It was a fun crew.

HARRISON: Oh, just deadly, dull, boring and smelly and self-satisfied. You had to have some sympathy for the labour people as people and you also had to have some sympathy for the situation they were in. They were coal miners who had no opportunity to see to do anything else. There was sheep farming, which was the only other thing you can do in most of the areas where the coals were being mined. It was not a growth industry and no one recognized them as the kind of economic potential that the leaders in Ireland turned out to have once they could lift that yoke. Their concerns were justified. If I had been a coal miner I would have had similar concerns. Also, no one was greatly impressed with Thatcher's empathetic abilities.

Q: Warm and fuzzy were not the adjectives one would use.

HARRISON: No, that's right. She was prepared to accept no end of suffering among people with whom she had no contact. Maybe you have to be. Maybe political leadership requires a certain callousness to be effective which even Lincoln, if you look back, was able to summon up -- although the compassionate man, but could be callous when callousness was required. Thatcher was naturally a callous person who couldn't understand why anyone would think other than she did or be unwilling to make a sacrifice as she saw as so necessary to the health of the country. So at any rate that whole drama played out that Thatcher emerged triumphant. There's always the

Falklands. It was the elections; it was the breaking of the miners' union. All those things happened. It was the emergence, which eventually fizzled, of the SDP, in the Social Democrats. It was the beginning of the reform of the Labour Party. It was the completion of the intermediate weapons deployment which went forward then and was completed on the two track process and of course, the key to the deployment was the negotiation which was simultaneously going on to eliminate the missiles that we were deploying, but the negotiation then seen as largely a ploy for political purposes. Then, and this was a key thing, too, Richard Perle came up with a zero option as a way to keep European governments onboard for deployment -- and that is the option of raising the negotiation the Russians, the level of zero for these missiles rather than an equal level of about 500 warheads it seems to me it was. The Russians had deployed about 1,600 warheads, 500 missiles. They were independent re-entry vehicles, but not independently targetable re-entry vehicles, so they were difficult to intercept, but you could necessarily take out three different targets with them. So, 1,600 or so warheads, and we were trying to put 500 on the ground and negotiate a figure lower than that as an equal level for the two sides which is what the theology of this, the old nuclear doctrine of the Cold War demanded. Not that we didn't have that level in the nuclear escalatory ladder filled. It was always a dangerous part of the theology to leave a rung out of the nuclear escalatory ladder because then you would go to the next rung which was a more serious exchange and more destructive, as the British and Europeans continually pointed out, involved our central system. We wanted to get that rung filled. Then Perle came up with the idea of suggesting zero, thinking that the Soviets would never accept it. Perle not being an advocate of arms control of any kind, but thought that zero would be very popular politically, but would be unattainable in the negotiation therefore the best of both worlds. It turned out that Reagan took it seriously and so did Gorbachev and that was the eventual solution once I was back in Washington where that was also my job because I was deputy assistant secretary then. At any rate, all that played out. The other big issue was, once they were deployed, once our missiles were deployed, was that we had to exercise them and that meant because they were mobile missiles, making them mobile; taking them out of the base, running them around on the byways of England and taking them back into the base, so that the mobility would be demonstrated. Also, exercised because of the rule which I think is less true now than it used to be and that is if you have an exercise then you can't do it. I think that is very true. You've got; the military has to have an exercise plan. You can't just tell them to do something and they haven't an exercise to do. So, the idea was to take these missiles out of Greenham Common and the other places they were deployed and run them around. Well, the problem with that was there was a lot of protestors who were ready to try to stop that process and would lay down in front of the trucks or otherwise to make a political issue of this. No one thought that running nuclear missiles around the byways around England even without the warheads was going to be a public relations coup for our side. At that point we had been running this whole deployment process out of a committee which we had established at the embassy including the EUCOM people and the FCO people and kind of chaired by us. At that point, Hazleton was then British Minister for Defense stepped in and essentially cut the embassy out and made common cause with the EUCOM commander who was also not terribly happy to have embassy interfering with what he wanted to do with his missiles. He was okay with our role as long as it was a question of politically overcoming the obstacles to deployment because he didn't have missiles then. Once he had missiles he wanted operational flexibility. He didn't want the embassy sticking an oar in and Hazleton felt the same way. He didn't want the embassy sticking its oar in either, he wanted to talk to the operational commander and they could run that together. Suddenly I found my sources

on DOD on this issue drying up and eventually determined what had happened. They did not volunteer to me what the new guidance was, but I sussed it out after sitting in waiting rooms for long hours wondering why these guys who had been so friendly not a week before were suddenly unavailable. That had been Hazleton's connection. Our response to that, we didn't have any response.

Q: You're talking about, we as the embassy?

HARRISON: Yes. The embassy obviously had a political interest in staying involved, but we had an ambassador then, Charlie Price, an ex-candy manufacturer out of Kansas City. He was not about to make any waves on this. We made a kind of wave in a pro forma way. I think the argument was sound, that the missiles were essentially still political, where these things moved and when they moved and all that stuff could have great political consequences and therefore the embassy should be involved. To get the embassy involved when SACEUR (Supreme Commander, Europe) is insistent they not be requires an ambassador put his muscle on the line and Charlie Price didn't have that much muscle, and what he had he wasn't going to put on the line. We basically gave up without a fight on that issue. Then bureaucratically the position is that if they screw up, we'll document that we had nothing to do with it. We're not to blame. You know, we told them they needed our sage advice. At that point -- and I had now been there for three years and the glory days in terms of my own involvement were over because we had lost much of what I had been sent there to do, had been done -- and I began looking for an onward assignment and was offered the directorship of RPM (Regional Political-Military Affairs) and NATO which was traditionally great NATO fare in the European (EUR) office, a great job, but my supervisor would have been a person that I didn't particularly like, but even more to the point didn't like me.

Q: Who was that?

HARRISON: Jim Dobbins. He had been my predecessor in London, but was now the deputy assistant secretary -- about to leave although I didn't know it at the time or I probably would have taken that job. Instead I took the job as political counsel at Embassy Tel Aviv in May of '85 I shipped myself off to Tel Aviv into an area where I had never served before and knew nothing about.

Q: A fascinating place. Before we leave the UK, you were talking about the theology of the exchange of nuclear weapons, you know, if you use one this will signal and all this. Did you find your military counterparts say on the British side, were they buying this at all?

HARRISON: Oh, yes, in fact they had a considerable investment in the theology because they had their own Polaris submarines. They had tried in the '50s to build an independent deterrent that was independent also in hardware terms. They had had a Balkan bomber, an intercontinental bomber they'd build which they could continue building and using pretty much under their own control, but they had come to realize that their bombers were outmoded. They couldn't afford to do a new generation of intercontinental bombers or in their case intracontinental bombers. They also could not afford to develop submarine capability on their own, so they essentially turned to us for the submarine capability even though the theology of their nuclear deterrent was never that

it could on its own deter the Soviet Union, only that it could be used as a potential trip wire to nuclear war, but that meant that they had to have their own key. It couldn't be a dual key operation, which the Polaris system wasn't. One of the big issues there was whether the ground launch cruise missiles would be, would these be dual key or not. Of course, our strong preference was that they not be dual key because we didn't want to have British permission to launch. By the time you got it, with those systems they would be destroyed. They weren't hard against any kind of particular determined attack they were revetted, but they weren't really hard, so they could have been taken out preemptively without much trouble and would have been so. They were very much in the same kind of mind frame. When Reagan came out with this speech in '83 March on SDI, the Stars Wars system, they were scornful of that because among other things it interfered with what they were trying to do which was modernize their submarine base as a deterrent with a new missile. That was going to cost some money, too and now Reagan was saying that missiles were outmoded and defensive systems were the thing to do and why spend all this money on outmoded systems? So, it kind of played into the opposition to this and they didn't like it much. Also, they as purists, they saw the whole thing as antic since we'd been arguing against the Soviet defensive system for a long time on the grounds that they would destabilize them. Our systems were stabilizing and theirs destabilizing. The FCO hated it and said so to me and I reported it which was great with EUR because they hated it, too back here at the State Department, until they didn't hate it anymore, and that change occurred because they understood eventually -- and actually it didn't take too long -- that the president was serious about this, that he hadn't just kind of made a speech he didn't understand. That he wanted to do this. He was willing to promote or not depending on whether or not you were willing to talk about the theology of Star Wars with a straight face and when they saw that this was a policy with some legs they decided to get with the program which was the only rational thing for a bureaucracy to do in such cases. After which they became less tolerant of the British Foreign Office comments about it and therefore, my reports reflecting those comments about it. I got called in by Dobbins, which is what happened and was told to cool it; it was no longer in the marching orders. People didn't want to see that in Washington. They understood.

Q: While you were there did Reagan come over at any time?

HARRISON: Yes, he actually did and that's a great story, too. He came over one occasion I think in particular was a state visit which he announced the democracy initiative which actually was, as many things are, hatched by a speech writer and it's a good example of something that I was talking about a couple of tapes. That is and probably will talk about it in future tapes, too if you want to, principals are constantly making speeches and they want to say new things, they don't want to say old things. They're looking to ideas from their speechwriters who are desperately looking for ideas anywhere they can get them. If someone has one and it makes good rhetoric they are liable to put it in. The axis of evil to give a recent example on how this works and then everyone sits around and tries to figure out what the hell it means and why we're not behaving in accordance with it. This was true of this democracy initiative which sounded good. He put it in his speech to Parliament, Reagan did, a great effort to promote democracy and put some money behind it and so forth. No one really knew what we were going to do. It was just a name, it was a speech writing conceit which eventually issued the U.S. Institute of Peace downtown and I'm not sure what they do, I don't think they're sure of what they do either, but you know, one of the things they're trying to do now is trying to find programs for pay so that

they can support more programs just like every other think tank in town. That was one of the products of that Reagan visit and Thatcher of course, made a big deal of it.

The thing, lasting impression for me is a couple of things. One, I wrote some remarks Reagan used because he was going to meet the parliamentarians so we went down Parliament and picked up bus loads of them, all Tories, the Labour people didn't want to come. He just liked Tories, too. A great busload of white, well dressed people. I remember telling them as I got on that they'd have to go through the metal detector to make sure none of them was packing a rod and that got kind of a titter. We got them up to the residence, which is this great eleven-acre thing in Regents Park, and we disgorged them and they all went and stood adoringly at the end of the podium. Out Reagan came and read my remarks. Well, on my remarks I had put a heading and then and he began reading the heading. Then he assimilated to the text. He realized what he had done. It was in front of him and he was reading it. He slid way into the text so smoothly that only I of all the multitude there understood what he had done. That was really. He knew how to do that stuff. He was used to that. He could sell it. He could sell even my turgent prose like nobody I ever saw and nobody will ever see again either. He had a genius for it. The other thing about that visit was the grandeur of the United States. I mean, you come to this house and they're all standing there out on this huge lawn which stretched out like one does with these helicopters. You had a Marine band there in their resplendence and they're tooting away Hail to the Chief out he comes and then the entourage sweeps down across the lawn and gets in these helicopters, there must have been ten or so and then off they lift in this huge armada of helicopters flies off into the and it's just the modern equipment of the viceroys in India coming into their entourage of elephants to impress the villagers. It was just a hell of a deal. It was something to see. What else about this before we leave bonny old England? I guess some impression of the Labour Party that no longer exists, too because I had known all these defense people and they were nice. They were all well to left of our policy, but I always enjoyed in my career to go and talk to people that didn't like us. I used to like to go out and talk to the CND people, the Committee on Nuclear Disarmament and it made them uncomfortable to have me around. On the other hand, as an enlightened leftist movement they couldn't say they wouldn't see me. They'd have to go out there and this Monsignor Bruce somebody, the guy is gone now would take me to tea in the working class neighborhood of London. It was one of these bangers and mash teashops and we'd sit down and have tea and he'd be affable and we'd talk about the policy differences. I used to talk a lot to the Labour Party MPs who as I say are nicer people, but Denzel Davis was a Welsh MP and a lot of them were Welsh. Kevin McCormack, Kevin McNamara who is still active in Parliament after all these years. Davis in particular was an interesting guy, but a complete stone drunk. You'd call to have lunch with him and he'd be sort of watching when the pubs were going to open. They opened at noon. He'd kind of be in a half crouch to get over there to the pub when it opened. Maybe I told this story last time, too, one night Rick Burt he was the assistant secretary then and I said that I was going to have different people at dinner than I normally have. I want a new crowd, lively people. So we made the guest of honor Denzel Davis who was the defense secretary. Then we had Roger Scruton who was this rightwing columnist for the Times and he's still around, a complete, kind of insane. He was completely nuts. He was eccentric as the British. He was just nuts, you know, just very crazy, not rightwing kind of. Then we had the editor of the Sun Times who was sitting next to me. I put this whole thing together and Davis arrived roaring drunk, well not roaring drunk, but belligerently drunk. We all sat down to dinner and he got really insulting right off the bat with Burt who was sitting there. Beyond, it wasn't witty was the

problem with it. It was just nasty. He was just banging on him. It was so embarrassing that the whole dinner was over by 9:30, everybody was gone. Then there was a front office guy there, too, that actually, a quintessential Foreign Office guy you know, unctuous kind of. To calm this down, he intervened, Brian something, and said, "On the one hand, on the other hand, he begins. The editor of the Sun Times leans over the table next to me and says, "Typical Foreign Office twaddle." It went downhill from there to a point where a New Statesmen journalist had been there came up to me later and apologized because Davis he hated to have a guy like this representing the foreign view. It was good insight into what kind of Labour Party it was and Davis was. Later, he faded because he just couldn't stay away from the bottle and when he came in it was Robin Cook. Now Robin Cook was another guy who we dealt with a lot. He was a sharp little guy with a goatee mustache in those days, left-wing intellectual, more rational than most, hated by my political counselor, who couldn't stand the guy. I saw him quite a bit, had him to dinner and so forth and then he emerged as foreign secretary eventually. Then happened the scandal because he tended to take an Islamic view on the number of women he could simultaneously satisfy so he had that problem of which he survived. He's still around as spokesman for something or other I don't know, but he's not a foreign minister anymore. We dealt with a lot of interesting people.

Q: Did you run across when Reagan and Thatcher were together, somebody I interviewed, I can't think of his name now, Mike Smith maybe, who was in the White House during this period and would say how in the White House they would get very nervous when Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher were in a room alone together. The same with Brian Mulroney of Canada in that Ronald Reagan loved these people and they were afraid of commitments being made that they knew nothing about and so they always wanted somebody there to sort of keep watch and make sure that the president didn't give away the store.

HARRISON: It's always true that bureaucrats hate when the political leaderships are together and could be doing something out of control. She was incredibly influential on Reagan and very proud of her relationship with him, but it had not been without problems. One of them was something we hadn't mentioned in the England period was Grenada. Our ambassador got instructions to go over and ask her advice on the invasion of Grenada so he took himself over to Number 10. This was a rare occurrence because he was very seldom in the tip, this was Louis, you know they generally just ignored him and let him look after the house, but here was a real thing to do. Over he went and he said, "You know, we're thinking of this invasion of Grenada and we need you to give us your best advice, the president wants it." She convened her cabinet, it was already about 6:30 at night and so at 8:30 at night the cabinet is meeting and deliberating, what should she say about this back to Reagan. As they're deliberating in comes her aide with a notice that in fact we had we weren't asking her advice we were going to do it anyway; it was just a pro forma thing. She was absolutely furious and furious at poor Louis who had not had anything to do with this. He simply had gotten the thing that said for him to go over there and he'd done it and he'd said what it had said and he'd gone away and she's absolutely furious that he didn't know. It is a blow, I mean, the ambassador is supposed to know, he's supposed to understand that we are about to do this and to give her some head's up that this is not really the kind of request for concurrence that it seems to be. But he didn't know. Nobody probably could tell him and he didn't have the wit to ask and so off he went and did this. After that she didn't see any value in dealing with anyone.

Q: It may also be somewhat responsible for the coldness that our invasion of Grenada seemed to arouse in the British government because people were sort of surprised that the British government did not give its blessing.

HARRISON: She didn't hide her displeasure. She didn't know, they didn't give their blessing and this was especially painful for them because traditionally it had been an area of their responsibility. Of course, they had withdrawn from all that years before, but they still felt some paternal interest in the area and felt they should be consulted on it and hadn't been.

Q: I think the British ambassador there was nothing very, I mean, this is what I've heard, this is maybe put to dispute, but sort of sympathetic to what was happening on the island and didn't see that there was any danger which probably there was a real danger.

HARRISON: It's hard for me to reconstruct what threat that might have been. I mean the Cubans were building an airfield.

Q: Well, it wasn't that so much. I think it was really there was a certain amount of civil war there and a lot of American students.

HARRISON: Yes, but you know the response then is to send them, get them over to the embassy and send a helicopter in. There is a way to respond to that. We have that problem a lot. We have it in Pakistan now so in a much more serious way. They were looking for something to do especially because you remember this was coincident with Irangate so they were looking for a way to change the subject from arms for hostages' thing. No, I think that's an anachronism. I think Irangate was later, it must have been.

Q: It was later. Lebanon was the thing.

HARRISON: Lebanon was the thing. They were trying, yes, they had just lost all those people in Lebanon and that was interesting, too in Lebanon when the barracks explosion happened. All those marines were killed. The British were also in Beirut and I went in with the ambassador and the message was -- actually it was Streater the DCM -- to see Bulyard the political director at the FCO and the message was we're going to withdraw now; but we'd like to withdraw in order and fashion and like to go offshore. The British were already gone by the time we got over there with a demarche. They wasted no time. They were looking I think partly to change the setting for that and they were trying to assert a Reagan doctrine and you know about the hemisphere and they couldn't do anything about Cuba so this was kind of a surrogate way of getting at the Cubans. The notion that this was any security threat to the United States, no.

Q: No, I don't think that. It was put in terms of I think of American students there.

HARRISON: Yes, that was the justification. I don't think it ever was taken seriously by anybody, but it was ineptly done. We had a tremendously hard time getting it done given that the opposition was a kind of a rag tag police force with some Cuban construction workers, albeit they were armed, but we lost an inordinate number of people to do this thing and looked terrible

in the process. I remember the Sunday Guardian running a picture of this corpse of an American helicopter pilot who had been kind of blasted apart. There he was lying on this ground on this big, 8 x 10 front page picture of it, which I thought at the time must be very painful for his family to see. I think it exemplified their view of this kind of what they saw even across the political spectrum this kind of a bellicose, fatalistic spasm of American power. That was really a setback to our relations with Thatcher which took some time to heal, but because she felt as if she had been disrespected and that her relative power of position had been cast in a sharp relief.

Q: Did the bombing in Berlin and the disco and the responsive bombing of Qadhafi, did that happen on your watch?

HARRISON: Yes, that did and in fact I was sent over to CINCUSN. They sent in an area two star admiral who commanded that exercise at his headquarters across the street from the embassy and so they wanted a political person over there in his control center as the task force came down into the Gulf of Sidra to do something about that. I was the guy who was over there for much of that time watching them. The admiral wouldn't have thought of asking me for any political advice, which was just as well because I didn't know anything about it, but I was sort of an embassy presence while he was conducting this. The French refusing overfly rights and we had to go the long way around and so forth -- all of that putting one up Qadhafi's kilt. It was part of the atmosphere of this large debate about the missile.

Q: How did the people you were talking to review this response to Qadhafi because we did use American planes coming out of the United Kingdom which always struck me as a little bit odd since we had carrier planes down there.

HARRISON: But not F-111s which is what they wanted to use and in those days the F-111 had the only real precision guidance capability. The Navy ships didn't have it. What they were doing were suppressing air defense with those carriers and Qadhafi sent up some MIGs and we were sort of watching that dogfight process, but he soon determined that he wasn't going to get anywhere with that so he grounded them to try to keep them intact. Then the F-111s came in and did the actual bombing and they were all based in England. They had the range, they were refueled. We had the refueling capability in Spain and they went down and up the Mediterranean.

Q: How was using this to attack Qadhafi, how was that viewed say by the military establishment in the UK and by the public and all that?

HARRISON: I think it was not a great ripple. Qadhafi was not a sympathetic figure. He was at the height of his antic invading at that period.

Q: He was messing around in Ireland, too?

HARRISON: Yes, he was sending weapons to the IRA, so he was not a popular figure. It added to the cowboy image, which was the predominant view of Reagan and therefore, made it more difficult to talk about relying on this U.S. deterrent that we were trying to deploy. In electoral terms it made no difference. In poll terms it made no difference in terms of support for Thatcher and Thatcher's support for the U.S. and the fact that they'd used some UK based military assets,

the Labour Party made an issue of it, but it had no resilience in particular. She sailed through all that undamaged and by-elections -- which of course in a continuing barometer of political opinion in Britain -- didn't show any trend. It would give pause about a more bilious foreign policy and it was very much in keeping with Thatcher itself. Remember all this stuff is taking place after the Falklands. You've had this modern woman warrior who has charged off to this crazy thing that the British have off down the coast of Argentina and in fact it was an enormously expensive distant war to recapture this useless territory that of what, 10,000 people or 8,000 or 5,000, but an insult to the country; the last great overseas expedition I'm sure we'll ever see of British arms. The ideological base for opposing a U.S. reaction to what we saw, as a challenge was no longer there. You couldn't get very far and they didn't get very far. Although our foreign policy was not looking particularly enlightened. Our military policy was looking a little bit scatter-shot, a little reactionary, more bellicose than necessary. I don't think that the objections to it were near as serious as they are now because the Cold War was still going on and at the end of the day the United States is your guarantor whatever they were like. Politically I think it was not decisive one way or the other and also because it was successful. As the months go on and Qadhafi pulls in his horns and decides that maybe provoking the United States is not such a good idea, the argument for those people who claimed that you have to take this kind of action against people like this strengthened. Of course, Qadhafi hadn't given up as we discovered on that Pan Am flight.

Q: Lockerbie.

HARRISON: Yes. He was not a sympathetic person. Arab leaders in general are not people with whom one can build a great cause to defend, and about whom we suspect even the darker reports are true. Maybe the racism inherent in British establishment played some role in that, too, I mean it would be harder to attack the Swiss I suppose than Qadhafi. It was not a key bump in our road. We found out off our ticker, we had a ticker in the political section and somebody shouted down the hall, "Somebody's invaded Grenada." Then a second later, "It's us." We knew nothing about it and especially the ambassador didn't. I think the key point out of all of that is that it discredited Louis and she just never dealt with him again. He was already discredited because he had not known anything about foreign policy and kind of not tried to find out very much. He sort of saw himself as a figurehead.

Q: Well this is the problem in the normal course of events these political ambassadors, particularly to places like the United Kingdom, France or Germany, you can get away. It's no big deal there, sort of do the social occasions, but there are times when there is a serious issue and it's hard for them. I mean if you have a lightweight in there who essentially doesn't understand the issue, they're not a very good messenger.

HARRISON: No, and they have to be wired into our bureaucracy, I think that's the key. I mean, they have to know what's going on beneath the surface because the British know what's on the surface and don't need you for that, especially the British know. They are well wired in Washington and they're on the phone all the time in our bureaucracy and so forth. You don't want to be the least informed guy in the room. Washington will make no effort to keep you informed so you have to make the effort to stay informed and he didn't know you had to do that. Streater, to be honest, was not eager for Louis to play an activist role because that left Streater as

de facto ambassador which pleased him and you know, he liked it that people in the society saw him as the go-to guy at the embassy instead of Louis and so he was willing to kind of pamper Louis on the one hand and keep his relationship there good while he ran the operation on the other and Louis didn't interfere very much.

Q: We're talking about 1985?

HARRISON: We've been skipping around. I mean we were just back in '81 I guess.

Q: But now we're coming back to your leaving.

HARRISON: Yes, '85 May off I went and left them in good shape. It wasn't my fault what happened later, but I had pretty much worn out my welcome, too. The things I had been sent there to do had been done. We had a new ambassador my last two years, and a new DCM my last year, Ray Seitz who later became ambassador. Whereas Ed Streater had been kind of rocking boat kind of guy. He liked to shake things up which was fun for me. Ray Seitz was not and therefore, much less fun for me so I was ready to go and did off to be political counselor in Tel Aviv working for a couple of weeks for Sam Lewis. I show up in Tel Aviv and we're in the middle of a transition government in '85 resulting from an indecisive election which had resulted in a coalition government between Labour and this peculiar arrangement where in the middle of the government five-year term, Peres agreed to step down and give his position to Shamir. The issue for the first year in Tel Aviv was really actually to do this, whether he'd adhere to this or whether he'd try to break the government before that happened, go to the elections and win a mandate on his own behalf and Shamir couldn't win it. He had that and the economy because the economy had been stagnant at that point for five or six years and the currency was in precipitous decline. The labor unions there were powerful, too. The old socialist tradition, the terrible bureaucratic weight of the old socialist bureaucracy which had been imported on the back of the Ashkenazi, largely socialist immigrants from Europe, who made a settlement to form the original Labour party and who had sort of transported much of the terrible bureaucratic morass that they had been escaping from, brought with them to transplant into Israel. The burden of defense spending. All these things that added up to a kind of crippled economy and a crippled political system. In '85 I think we were seeing the beginning of the divisions in Israeli political life which had progressed at a pace, aided by their proportional representational system, which gave representation in the Knesset to even rump parties. Marginal requirement for seats in terms of votes, a percentage of votes, so you've got a lot of splinter parties and the number of splinter parties are increasing at this point. Two major parties are slowly shrinking and the need to build coalitions of parties in the Knesset is at a pace which all these trends have continued in a kind of destructive way in that society since and this transition government was the first expression of this lack of any social consensus in Israel of what to do. This is prior to the Intifada.

ROBERT HOPPER
Political Officer
London (1982-1986)

Mr. Hopper was born and raised in California and educated at the University of Southern California and New York University. Entering the Foreign Service in 1969 he was first assigned to Monterrey, Mexico. He subsequently served in Rome and London as Political/Military Officer and in Washington, D.C., where his assignments concerned primarily West European political and military matters. Mr. Hopper was also a Legislative Fellow on Capitol Hill and held a senior position at the Department's Foreign Service Institute. Mr. Hopper was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 2002.

Q: So you went to London in the summer of 1982 to work on those topics and others. You did it without language training, of course. That was a good assignment. That was not an easy assignment to get either, I assume.

HOPPER: It was a wonderful assignment. As I was deep into the congressional fellowship assignment, I still didn't have a job and I was sitting up on the Hill. I might as well have been in Kathmandu as far as knowing what was going on, but I would sort of go over to the Department every once in a while. I guess the head of RPM at that time was the late Charlie Thomas who was a wonderful fellow who had been the number two officer from my junior officer class on the staff at FSI. So I had known him. I talked to him, and I talked to people. I had friends and said, "Well what's coming up? I'd really like to..." You know, here are these things. "Is Paris going to work out?" "No, that's not going to work out." I said, but you know what? Charlie told me that Rick Melton, who was the deputy chief of the political section in London, was probably going to Uruguay as DCM, and that was coming up and it had to happen pretty quickly. So there was probably going to be an opening in the summer. And I knew Ed Streater who was the DCM, and if I planned things right maybe I could get that opening as the deputy chief of the political section. So I wrote Streater. And, actually, Roger Harrison who I had worked with in RPM, was the POL/MIL officer in London. Long story short, I got a lot of backing, but what London was going to do was that Roger was going to move up and become the deputy chief of the political section, but he did not want to do Melton's portfolio; he wanted to keep his POL/MIL things and so we worked out this deal where I got Melton's portfolio, but Roger became the deputy.

Q: He got the title?

HOPPER: Yes. And he had the responsibility of sort of being the backstop supervisor for a large section. So I ended up going out in the summer of '82 and my responsibilities were going to be primarily – the first thing was sort of working with the Labour Party, and then the second thing would be Latin America and the Caribbean, and then I also was screened to do Western Europe, Southern Europe, and it turned out the Socialist International and the Commonwealth. There were a lot of things; it was wonderful.

Q: Well, let's see. Who was political counselor then when you got there?

HOPPER: When I arrived the political counselor was Dick McCormick. Dick had been in policy planning partly doing speeches for Kissinger, and then he stayed on and was sort of the East/West and NATO person on the SP staff (Policy Planning Staff) at the beginning with Tony Lake, so I had worked with him then and knew him. By today's standards, it was a big section.

Roger Harrison was the deputy and Roger did almost exclusively NATO affairs, and was really busy doing the cruise missile issues and the deployment. It was just a huge job. That summer, Bob Frasier arrived the same time I did. Bob was the Africa watcher and did the social Democrats and the Liberals and the internal side. London had a rather relatively unique approach where a number of the officers had both internal and external responsibilities. Paul Schlamm who then went back to SE, who had been and worked on it before, and whom I had known at some point working on Greece/Turkey/Cyprus things, was in the political section doing the Conservative Party and Northern Ireland. Jim Hooper was the NEA watcher and he did not have any internal responsibilities. Casper Weinberger's office, the secretary of defense, decided that, given the upcoming cruise missile and all the defense issues, he needed somebody on the political section staff, so we ended up getting Paul Cassidy, a civil servant from the office of the secretary of defense. He came that summer also, to join the staff. There was a junior officer doing human rights and a zillion other things and a person that shared responsibilities who actually was an analyst from another agency. And we had a separate Labour attaché who was supervised by the political counselor, but was sort of a co-equal and might've even outranked McCormick. There was a guy named Roger Schrader when I arrived, a wonderful fellow. We had a suite and it worked out that I did the Labour Party, he did the Labour movement, and we had an FSN who worked for us on those issues.

Q: Why don't you talk a little bit more then about your role vis a vis the Labour Party. Were they in opposition at the time?

HOPPER: Yes. It was really an interesting period in that you had the Reagan administration and the Thatcher government, and we had really close relationships with the conservative government – very constructive, very close, very warm. I always felt sorry for the two people who did the Conservative Party in the political section while I was there; those were really hard jobs because very senior important people had the relationships with the ministers and the offices. The DCM would go and meet with the Number 10 Downing political staff, and the ambassador would try to meet with people. It's just there wasn't much room to do very much.

Perversely, the Labour Party was in the doldrums; they had just had their split with David Owen quitting and forming the Social Democrats. There were people speculating that the alliance between the Social Democrats and the Liberals was going to kill the Labour Party and they were going to die and that maybe we should just ignore them. So I was going out at that time to be the principal embassy contact with this group that was seen as the "loony left." I had to workout how to deal with them, so I had talked to people. I had used the tail-end of my period with the Congress to start talking to some people on the different democratic staff committees to think about how to manage this. When I got to London and started talking to people, my sense of how politics worked was that the Labour Party had a long history, that Britain was not a mainland European country, that the social democratic model that David Owen was trying to implement was trying to blend German and American ideas together around his personality. To me it seemed there was a good chance that it wasn't going to really work, and that the Labour Party had the Trade Union movement behind it; had constituents and tradition, and that in some ways David Owen, who had a very bright and aggressive American wife, was sort of seen as a betrayer and a troublemaker, and it just kind of very quickly concluded that no matter how bad the Labour Party was, whenever the Tories wore out their welcome with the British public, it was Labour

that would come back – no one else – and that no matter how good Thatcher was, no matter how competent, no matter how much in tune with the modern world – Britain was a democracy, Britain had a media – and they would get bored, she would make mistakes; at some point there would be a transition. So I concluded that my job should be to help identify moderate up-and-coming Labour people, put them in touch with the U.S. political scene – and that it didn't have to be done right away; there was plenty of time and that this could be a long-term project. So I started working with staffers and with young MPs, and I really had this long-term plan of getting them back in touch with NATO, helping them build relations with the democratic party, and identify like-minded people having the same problems. It was interesting. I found that you could have a plan. In London, it was clear from the day I arrived that it was a place where I would want to extend and I sort of viewed that I had four years there to work on this plan, and so that's what I did.

Q: Now was this something that you did pretty much on your own, or was this something that you were encouraged to do – to think in these terms – by others up the line in the embassy and in Washington, or as long as you didn't rock the boat and in terms of the good relationship with the Thatcher government that it was alright as long as it was done very quietly and in the background?

HOPPER: Yes. It's the latter. We never did a cable or a memo to the Department on our grand plan for rebuilding the Labour Party, or I never talked with too many people in any coherent grand way what my plan was. I just kept doing it. The ambassador would host one event a year in his home, Winfield House, for the Labour Party. That was sort of a pro forma with the senior people. I made sure that the ambassador would go to the Labour Party annual conference and I would get him to host a couple of dinners and lunches for maybe one or two nights. And those I would use as sort of pinnacle events. I'd use the DCM. The DCM traditionally in London had a very good chef, liked doing meals, and was a place people wanted to come. So I'd maybe be able to do four of those a year. I figured out there would be enough visitors that I could take them to see people. But I never did an explicit plan. I'd talked to McCormick and other people; people knew what I was doing and didn't disagree with it.

Every once in a while, like before the Labour Party conference, I would try to do a cable that would set out what we were doing. There was a hope that they weren't quite as bad, and all of that stuff, it gets, "No, no, no. They're awful. Washington will think we're crazy. Just say how bad they are and keep it real minimal." So in the end that's what would happen. But I had all these meetings. I figured out how to use USIA's international visitor program, and there were regional ones to NATO and there were the ones to the U.S. And I found key staffers and junior MPs to send.

Q: Well, I have to ask this question. Now, we're twenty years on; this is 1982, we're 2002. Labour is now in power, in government in London. Can we see any impact of what you did twenty years ago, or almost twenty years?

HOPPER: Oh, yes.

Q: Good.

HOPPER: George Robertson was one of my closest contacts and he was just a junior MP from a pretty safe district who was not taken seriously by many people in his party because he was sort of a defense intellectual. I had him meet with many people and I sent him to the U.S. and I worked with him and talked with him a lot, and considered him a good friend.

Tony Blair I picked for an international visitor's program, and sent him to the U.S. I worked with Gordon Brown, who is the chancellor of the exchequer, was from Scotland. It was clear that he had a seat he could keep for a long time, but he was also a pretty undisciplined young fellow. I had him go to the democratic convention in San Francisco, kept using him a lot. I was very close to a wonderful, wonderful fellow in Scotland who for a while was the deputy leader of the Labour Party, then was the head after Neil Kinnock for a little bit, and then had a heart attack and died. It's so awful I can't remember his name right now [John Smith]. But he was wonderful and I worked with his staff and I stayed very close to him. And there were rumors that his wife was anti-American and hated the U.S. And I said, "If you don't meet with her, how do you know that?" "Well there are rumors about her," and I said, "Well I've talked to her and she has strong views, but no stronger than a lot of our wives. She's not the MP."

I finagled an invitation to go spend a long four day weekend in Scotland with John Smith. We went up to Fort Williams in Scotland to climb Ben Nevis, which is maybe the tallest mountain in the United Kingdom. It was like 3,700 feet and I said, "Jeez, I've been to the Rockies." There's a club that for climbing these 3,000 foot peaks, you collect them – I thought what a bunch of wusses. What's so big about 3,000 feet? What I didn't realize is that, in Scotland, they're going from sea-level. You know, they were going from nothing to 3,000. Where you go to the Rockies you're sort of over a mile high and a lot of the peaks aren't 3,000 feet over where you're starting from. So it was a bigger hurdle than I'd thought. I'd never climbed a mountain. And it was a wonderful event. Families, it was about twelve of us, wives and everything, and we climbed this peak, took this ratty little train up to Fort William, were in the same hotel, drank together. It was just wonderful. And I was so lucky that that weekend it was like eighty degrees; it was the hottest it had ever been at Fort William. And so they were all kind of desperate and it didn't seem that hot to me, so it sort of put us on an equal footing.

But I found that if you would go with the Labour Party people to their districts and meet them on their home territory and be nice to their constituents, that they would think, "Wow, what a human person you are, and maybe this isn't just a capitalist land of Ronald Reagan and the plutocrats." So I was also able to get them to think, "No, we can work with the U.S." It was interesting. I actually had a plan and implemented it bit by bit. Neil Kinnock had a temper, but was a thoughtful person who actually saw the dangers and risks of communism very clearly even though he was like many Europeans – what might be called left-wingers by the U.S. And he was okay. Actually, at one point, as I was leaving London four years later, Kinnock promised me that when he became prime minister he would invite me to his first public event, but that never happened.

Q: So he didn't have to honor that commitment

HOPPER: Right. But over the four years I just constantly built with them. I stumbled on it, but the most wonderful thing which helped me in the long run, and also the State Department, was my decision to try to find similar middle-of-the-road U.S. Democrats who were patient enough to have a relationship with the Labour Party and who would see them when they came in; that worked out really well. A number of the Democrats were about a year ahead of the Labour Party on the same curve of having been in the wilderness, and a little bit toying with strange ideas and sort of coming back to the center. It was interesting. I used Republicans as well; I would put the Labour Party people in touch with middle-of-the-road Republicans and get the idea across that you can work a little bit across party lines. Because of this plan and my decision to use visiting U.S. politicians, in the end it meant that, sort of by default, I became the person in the embassy who was organizing and taking care of many of the high-level political visitors from the U.S. So that sort of got added to my portfolio.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point and pick up next time?

HOPPER: Okay. [Tape 7, Side A]

Q: Bob, last time we were talking about your assignment from 1982 to '86 in the political section at the embassy in London. You had talked about a number of visitors that you sent to the United States and some of the other work that you were doing, especially with the Labour Party. I think at the end of our session you wanted to talk just a little bit about U.S. visitors to London, particularly some that were effective – high congressional delegations or others. I don't know to what extent we really talked about that.

HOPPER: For the record, I'd like to go back. The name of the one senior Labour Party leaders who invited me up to Scotland; he had the really difficult, difficult name of John Smith.

Q: That's why you couldn't remember?

HOPPER: Yes. *(laughs)*

One thing I was thinking about was how I built my relations with the Labour Party. One thing I'd like to go back to is to fill in a little bit more on how I started with staff people, and having worked in the Congress and seeing the role of staff, and knowing this is sort of trying to just jump right in. Trying to see really senior people didn't seem right, so I did some research and found some staff people who had very good reputations and started building with them.

I also had the problem that the Labour Party had an international section and they actually had their own senior staff person in charge of international relations. That person at the time had personality problems, was very difficult, and was actually quite anti-American. So there were problems of how to deal with the international secretary, and I concluded that it would be counterproductive to appear to not be meeting with her, but that I couldn't really get anywhere. So I did the minimum; I went and paid my calls. I asked her to set up a meeting with the executive director of the Party and things went very slowly and she really didn't do it, but I didn't totally piss her off. But I also realized that there was no value in meeting with her a lot. It's sort of the first example of something I later came to call a "seed and weed" contact plan,

where you only have so much time, so you'd have to think carefully. And there would be some people who maybe were great for another officer or just didn't know enough anymore, and you had to weed them out, but you had to weed them out nicely because you never knew if they'd bounce back or you'd need them. I realized later that that was a wise approach; that you couldn't just throw people away, but you had to use them less.

Q: The other problem that I think you may talk about later on is sort of the "gate-keeper," whether it's the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and insists that all contact be through it, or perhaps this international secretary of the Labour Party – the opposition party at the time. But you found a way to get around that, if that was a problem.

HOPPER: I did and it was building up multiple contacts. But when I started meeting with staffers, I discovered one fellow who, in my first talk with him, it became clear that he was one of the leading opinion pollsters in the world. He was relatively young; I'd say he was thirty-five at the time. He was the adviser to one of the two Labour Party people and he worked for ITN, the major TV network. He was their public opinion polling expert. Through him, I got to meet an American Democrat who was an advertising executive who had lived in London for twenty years; who was actually *the* opinion pollster for the Labour Party and for the Social Democrats in Germany, I believe – and coordinated with the Democrats in the U.S. And through him I was able to learn. I did tutorials with him and tried to learn about how this opinion polling was done. And then I'd make sure that Americans visiting who cared about polling, would go and meet him. Then, through the pollster I met another American in London who was a national committeeman for the Democratic Party and had been a campaign director. He was also a lawyer who was well-connected. And I thought Britain is probably unique in just the day to day interconnections between Americans and Brits that you can use positively in your work. So I worked through this one American and his wife; they helped me keep my connections to the Democratic Party. They were giving me great lists of people they were in touch with and that added really quickly to my contact lists. And I would help them in that I would sometimes send visitors through to have them meet with them – a few people they didn't know. So that was just a way to do the contact work. I think even to visitors that's a hole.

The hardest part was just doing the plans, because visits would cancel and you'd get frustrated sometimes that you'd do work and then they would go away. After a while I always took the attitude that I never wished a visit away. I noticed that sometimes I'd say, "Well, I hope they cancel." Once I'd done the work, I really wanted them to come and finish. So I always projected, once we got going, that I wanted them to come.

Q: Were most of your visitors serious in the sense that they had people who they wanted to talk with, things they wanted to talk about, or were they more interested in the theater and shopping?

HOPPER: They wanted all of it. London was a jet-lag stop, and it was easy. Essentially, the world sort of divided into those people who wanted to stop in Paris, and those who wanted to stop in London. This was before so many of the flights went to Frankfurt. TWA (Trans World Atlantic) still had a daily flight to Paris, so you could do a Paris overnight or a London overnight. Really, people divided on which one they wanted to do, but frequently if the travelers stopped in

London on the way in and were going to Africa or going to the Middle East, going anywhere else, they would then do Paris as their last jet-lag stop on the way back. So we saw a lot of the visitors.

And then the question also was going to the airport. I had colleagues who just hated going to the airport, and I decided I'm going to do this a lot and I got to know the administrative section people well and I actually had them take me around to the airport and introduce me to people and show me how they did it. I would always get the special embassy pass to the airport and go up. In those days, even though there were a lot of security problems in London and elsewhere, the American Embassy had a special pass that we could get. We could literally get plane-side if we had to. So I would always meet people right at the end of the gateway and then take them through special diplomatic lines and they always loved it. They were getting a little better treatment, though, in fact, things would generally go so smooth for any kind of American visitor that you didn't need to do that. But it was easier to find them right when they're coming off the plane (it only had one place to be coming from) than to wait and try to find them elsewhere in the airport.

Q: Was this still a period that there was a special visitors unit in the embassy in London?

HOPPER: Yes. There was a woman who had been doing it almost since World War II, and was still there. She was very good at providing services for senior people. She bothered some people because she was really a rank-has-its-privilege kind of person. I just went with the flow and would always make sure she thought my visitors had rank and were important, and that office was always wonderful to me. It continued when I visited there a lot later with congressional visits. I was able to use them and just kept it going. But I would help them, too.

That was interesting that you had that office. Once again, Paris had exactly the same kind of office, but I visited Embassy Paris quite a bit and it was so amazing that the two embassies, London and Paris, were alike in very many ways – about the same size; did about the same things; buildings about the same size; located in relatively similar parts of the cities – and yet the two embassies operated very differently and it was because you pick up the personalities of the country and the styles of the officials. And yet, the more I thought about it, we got exactly the same things done, in slightly different ways. But they were just these prototypical big embassies in big complex countries, and we would take on the flavor of the societies.

Q: And Rome of course was yet another, but we've talked about that already.

HOPPER: And in Rome some took on the character of having trouble getting the things done sometimes.

Q: OK, anything else we ought to talk about in terms of either the domestic political reporting or visits, or should we go on maybe to some of your external responsibilities?

HOPPER: Why don't we move to the external reporting things which were a co-equal part of what I did. What was fascinating also was that to make things work in London, we had both formal and informal backstopping responsibilities and so in addition to my normal responsibilities on the international side of the western hemisphere, parts of Europe and the

Socialist international, I was also the backstop for the Middle East watcher. I wasn't originally. His name was Jim Hooper and I was "Hopper" and we found that we got one another's phone calls all the time anyway, and so we went and shifted the portfolios and decided since we'd get one another's calls, rather than have to send them back, why don't we just backstop one another. So we did that and then the second summer that I was there, in 1983, Jim Hooper went on Home Leave and so I was doing the Middle East during the summer. And that's when the Israeli/Lebanon War went crazy.

The State Department decided that to just avoid an incredible catastrophe, we might need to help evacuate the PLO from Lebanon. I forget how it came up, but it was decided that the British ship people who had helped move shipping to the Falklands were the very best people in the world at magically finding people who would take on dangerous projects. I was asked to reconnect with them. We had worked a bit with them during the Falklands War and I found some notes from Rick Melton or somebody, called these guys at the Baltic Mercantile Exchange, went down, and visited them. At first I told this Melton blah, blah, blah and didn't get too specific, but said, you know, we might need to find some shipping in the eastern Mediterranean, and would they be willing to help. And they wanted a call from the Foreign Ministry or from somebody that could really say that this was official, so I took care of that. But then we started in earnest to find some kind of roll-on/roll-off shipping so that the PLO could be evacuated. These guys were just amazing. I would go meet with them and they were in their early sixties and there were two of them, and they had these parallel two sets of ledger books that they each worked in and they had a little book that they took home at night and they did it all on the phone. They had like a school chalkboard behind them; no computers. Some Americans, as I described how they worked, ridiculed them and said, "Oh this could never work. How can you keep track? We must've made a mistake. We need people with computers." I said, "These guys are good," and as I talked to them they knew every ship in the world and where they were. That was their job. And they had a memory of which captains were reliable, who you could bargain with. And in the end, going back and forth, we found actually a Greek shipping company that agreed to provide the right kinds of ships at the right kind of price. I negotiated the price, we figured out how to pay them and then Embassy Athens also got involved in finally making the payment. It worked out well; the ships (I think it was the Cantorini or something) went in, took them out. And then the joke was that a year later some of the NEA people said that I had negotiated too well and that I must've negotiated a round-trip package for the PLO because they seemed to pretty quickly go from Tunisia back into the Middle East.

One of the wonderful things about the Foreign Service is you can work on such a variety of issues, and that project was so important to people in Washington. And to me, amazingly, the part of getting the PLO out after the one Shatila Camp Massacre ... Secretary Shultz felt personally bothered and engaged, as he had made his commitments that the PLO would not be harmed. So we were really going all out to evacuate them and I ended up being part of a Group Superior Honor Award and got a certificate directed from Shultz, and it was very nice. It was actually one of the most...one of the awards I got in the Service that was clear that it was not my boss and me going through doing it to try and get me a leg up; it was really the system utterly doing it on its own. That was very nice.

Q: I was in Cyprus in this period and I was aware generally that things were being done in London. I had no idea you were doing them. I think I would at least ask you to think about two things. I think this happened in 1982, not long after the Israeli invasion into Beirut, and secondly, I think the evacuation of the PLO fighters from the court of Beirut pretty much took place that summer of '82 before the Shatila Massacre, which was roughly in September. That led us to send the Marines back and stay engaged in the multinational force and otherwise. But a lot of the PLO had already been taken out by the Greek ships, and there was at least one Cypriot flag vessel also that was involved in the evacuation.

HOPPER: I'll look. I've got the things at home.

Q: I may be wrong, but that's sort of my recollection.

Well that was good work. Were you involved with other Middle Eastern issues, too, or mostly the western hemisphere and parts of Europe?

HOPPER: Because of how I worked with the Socialist International, and the Commonwealth association, I would get involved a little bit in everything. And because I was the contact point for the Labour Party on International, I had to know about everything. So I was involved, but I wasn't operationally responsible for anything else.

Q: The Socialist International has its headquarters in London and you would work with what, the secretary or the head ... and the same with the Commonwealth?

HOPPER: Yes. The Socialist International, in some ways, was a really unique, strange organization. It might have been in Paris and there was some squabble and they ended up moving to London. They were in a working class suburb of London and they were pretty hard to get to and they were really skeptical; as one could imagine, skeptical about working with the U.S. Embassy.

When I arrived, the secretary general was a fellow, Burt Carlson, who was a Swede who had been very close to Lilly Brant. And he was skeptical, but I sort of won him over and we became friends, and the sad end to his story is he was one of the passengers on Pan Am 103 who died; he'd been flying back to go to a UN meeting. He was like the deputy foreign minister of Sweden by that time. He was a careful, at first brush, really sort of cold person, but when you got to know him, he was just devoted to human rights and democracy. After a while, you know it may seem naïve, but I came to appreciate that the Social Democrats in Europe had really, over the last century, taken more jibes and hits from Marxists, and they actually understood the risks to democracy from Marxism as well as anybody. If you could cast things in a way that had them look at their democratic side, they were really good. But if they got looking at their sort of anti-colonialist and U.S. as the hegemon and the big clumsy Goliath, they could sort of reflexively work for the little guy in a way that would sometimes look pretty silly. I decided I would try to keep working with them as Democrats, and always project that we were allies in promoting democracy, and that worked pretty well.

I also found that they were nervous about being seen too much with us. So they were one of the few groups whom when you met with them, they really didn't want to be going to a nice restaurant downtown; they wanted it sort of either in their office or in a more quiet venue. Actually, I had Carlson come to my house a couple of times and we would just sit in my dining room at night and talk. We'd have to do representation vouchers and he was funny; I would buy, on representation vouchers, a really good bottle of scotch, and we would sit there. And I'm not much of a drinker, but we would sit there and finish a bottle of scotch and talk until one or two, and just really get a lot done. That's part of the work in the Foreign Service, where you can say, jeez, that's not work sitting down and buying single malt scotch; but, that was hard work.

Q: This was of course the Reagan administration; President Reagan's appointment was ambassador in the Court of Saint James – your boss. I mean, you've been talking about these contacts with the Democratic Party and with Labour Party and Socialist International. Did that ever become a problem for you, either in terms that the other people were saying, you know, well why are we dealing with a representative of Reagan here – you – or were there problems within the embassy that you were spending so much time on people that maybe they weren't always so comfortable with?

HOPPER: Amazingly there weren't. Obviously there weren't insurmountable problems or I wouldn't have stayed doing it. On the part of my contacts, sure there was lots of skepticism about what we were doing. I've developed an approach to diplomacy that doesn't use very many euphemisms and I'm pretty direct. I would describe that it's possibly the right thing what we were trying to accomplish, and try to explain that we are the United States and we have governments that change from time to time, but there are basic values that we're pursuing, and they needed to be careful about what they were doing. You know, did they really want to burn their bridges forever? I was generally fairly successful at getting people to see that they needed, and wanted, to continue having good relations with the U.S.

It was a little harder, but I would try to get officials to go meet with them; I would try to get visiting Republicans to meet with them. That was always a little harder to do, but it was OK. Then, as we discussed in the reporting, we weren't doing lots of reporting, "Dear Mr. President," you know, "you're really courting the Socialist International a lot." We would sort of build it into the reporting and sort of why we were doing it. But I must say, I always had a lot of support, especially from ARA, on using the Socialist International and using the Commonwealth to get our message across. And I found ARA very responsive in providing material. It worked pretty well.

The other thing I was able to do through working with the Social International, especially, was I got to meet some journalists in London who otherwise would've been quite skeptical, who didn't have close relations with USIA (United States Information Agency). As I worked with them, I was able to bring USIS (United States Information Service) along and they didn't hamper me in having contacts with journalists, and we helped one another. Two of them were really instrumental to us; there was a fellow who owned a Latin American newsletter, which was really prominent, and relied on worldwide for information on the Americas whether you agreed with the political slant or not. He was an Argentine and so he always wanted to talk a bit about the Falklands; it gave me entrée to him and then we became friends.

And then there was a journalist for the Guardian, a guy named Hugh O'Shaughnessy, who was just a prototypical guy: a hail-fellow, well-met, drink-a-lot, talk-a-lot, know-everybody-in-the-world guy. I started working closely with him and after a couple of months I concluded that I could trust him. And even though in some ways he looked and smelled anti-American, he too knew the area, was competent, was a Democrat. If I tried to keep the stories focused in long-term democracy, I could get him to be okay. And I remember we used to have a bet; I have a long standing bet with him that there would be free elections in Santiago de Chile before there would be free votes in Santiago de Cuba, and at first he did vote, but eventually he actually paid off on that.

Q: You won that?

HOPPER: It was one that I won.

Q: Now did you also spend a fair amount of time at the foreign office talking about these areas that you had regional responsibilities for in the administrative and political section?

HOPPER: Yes. I would meet with the Falklands office probably every week. They were nervous from the get-go that somehow we were going to want to get back in business with Argentina faster than they did.

Q: When you were there it was after the war?

HOPPER: After the war. I arrived sort of the day the ships came home and they were having the big victory celebrations. So I worked with that office; they had a very strong Central America and Mexico office, and I became very good friends with the director of that office. The Falklands had been the South America office and it became Falklands and South America. And then I worked a lot with the Southern Europe office. The British had a structure that was a little bit like how the State Department was organized, but figuring out the role of sort of their equivalents of DASes and assistant secretaries and under secretaries – it was always a bit more mysterious than at the State Department. In some of the offices it was clear that the office directors were really more like DASes, and had a lot of authority; at some others the assistant under secretaries were more like strong assistant secretaries in the State Department, and in others they were nothings and there would be a level that was sort of like the undersecretary in the State Department that did a lot, and then there were these political sort of junior ministers who supervised some of them. Figuring out who mattered, was a challenge. Also, some visitors from Washington – some of our senior officials and a number of the Republican Party visitors – really wanted to meet with the junior minister level and felt that they could be trusted and they were political and they were really conservatives. They didn't want to meet with bureaucrats.

There was one lovely, tough, very good woman named Baroness Ellis who worked on a lot of our issues and I would get people in to see her. Then, I found I could go to her if I really needed to; but, that was where things would get tricky because sometimes the ambassador might see that no, Baroness Ellis is getting up there and maybe he should be the one to be seeing her, or the DCM, or the officials at the foreign office. I know wives talked of going to her. He should be

working through us. After a while I figured out that even though there were certain ego thrills at going in sort of as high as one could go, you had to be really careful in that it might work once, but you could just as well find that it started hurting your daily contacts if you were seen to be too effective with really senior people. So Edson pulled that in reserve and would work with them. I usually worked with really senior people through visitors; by finding the way to either call them because a visitor was coming or take a visitor to see them, but keeping working with the regular people.

The Central America and Mexico Desk was educational and tough. A new deputy director came in, who, God knows why, really hated the Reagan administration; anything I told her on behalf of the administration she would question and just take in the worst possible spirit. And her boss was actually quite helpful, but there were times I had to work with her. Sort of figuring out how to persuade her that her boss was Thatcher and that Thatcher had good relations with Reagan, and that, sure, some of them in the foreign office might have their own views that even their own government wasn't either on policy or stylistically right. But so what? You know, we're democracies and we represent our governments. And I would have to go around her frequently, even when I would have to deliver a message to her to make sure that other people knew what we were doing. Oftentimes I would find a way to go meet with the assistant secretary within a week. I'd find some way to get word to him of what we were doing.

I also had a number of senior working levels of the foreign office that knew I held the Labour Party portfolio and they were quite curious about what I knew about the Labour Party and were intrigued. They enjoyed talking the sort of domestic policy, too. But it was all piecing it together. I found that ARA basically wanted to use me, the Socialist International, and the foreign office, and media contacts. It was like our job in London on the key western hemisphere issues was not to just use Thatcher. It was actually easy to use the Reagan/Thatcher connection to get high-level declarations that we were in sync. After a while I came to believe that Tom Enders and the team at ARA in some ways wanted to use the Brits as a bit of an anchor. We would be very open with them about where we were trying to go, and try to get their help for building sort of a centrist compromise position that would move things in Central America without actually becoming anymore of a war than it had to be. And it was sort of fun to be working in the middle of that.

Q: Do you think that part of the reason for that was because of the success, if you will, of the Falklands War and the fact that we had kind of been together on that? We respected what Britain had done, and Britain certainly appreciated the support and understanding they got from the United States.

HOPPER: It was interesting. The Brits remembered that Kirkpatrick and Haig had not been all that helpful at the beginning of the Falklands War. The Falklands was probably the more difficult part of all of it, in that one of my jobs in the Falklands was to try to get contact going again between the Argentines and the Brits. After I got there, pretty quickly it had the Alfonsín government. This one fellow who was the Argentine sort of chargé in London...

Q: He's still there.

HOPPER: In some ways he had just a great job. He'd been the sort of deputy political officer and the Brits sent everybody home and he was sort of like the lowest-highest, this min/max solution. They let him stay. He thought everybody had come back right away, but the Brits really held out. And this guy ended up (he was exactly my age at the time) living in the Argentine ambassador's house, running things out of there. He found that even though the foreign office and Number 10 and the official things were closed to him, that there were lots of Brits who actually wanted sort of dialogue, so he was on TV and running around. He had just a great job. And he was a good guy. And so I worked a lot with him and I would sometimes pass messages for him to Brits he couldn't talk to. That was interesting. But in some ways it was just going to take time. He did a good job, but Thatcher especially, was just not one to believe them or move very quickly. And I understand. She felt that people had died and that they had been wrong.

Q: Who was the U.S. ambassador at that time?

HOPPER: We had two ambassadors. When I arrived, John Lewis was the ambassador and he was a political appointee; a wealthy man from the Johnson-Wax family and he had run the Johnson family foundation. A charming, decent man who didn't know very much about foreign affairs and in many ways was in over his head. But for a while it didn't matter.

So he's the figurehead in this really well-run, big embassy, and he would go hunting, go do the things that needed to be done; a gracious host; had the beautiful Winfield House, the ambassador's residence; but was not a player – in no way was he direct player. But the embassy was good. We had a DCM who had been there forever...

Q: Ed Streater.

HOPPER: Ed Streater. Very skillful. During the Falklands War – and I wasn't there, but this was the residue when I arrived and it was this incredibly well regurgitated story over and over again – Ambassador Lewis had been on vacation in the Caribbean and when it blew he called the DCM and he asked the wrong question. Some of this is hearsay and it was so important for Embassy London that I'm not sure whether people actually remembered it totally accurately. The remembered history was that Ambassador Lewis asked, "Do you need me?" or a question to that effect. Not, "Should I come back?" but, "Does the embassy need me?" and the answer the DCM gave was, "We have a good team; we're on top of everything; the British are meeting us at this level, so no, we can get by." Like I said, wrong question. The problem was that because Ambassador Lewis wasn't there for the first pivotal week of diplomacy, he lost an incredible amount of credibility and he could never recover.

Q: In London and Washington?

HOPPER: In London and in Washington. And people had started asking, you know, "Why weren't you there?" and ironically it ended up hurting both him and the DCM because there were people who felt that the DCM had been there so long; was so good at working the British that he forgot that actually the answer he should've given was to help the ambassador and say, "You have a good team," blah, blah, blah, "Of course we can get by, but, you know, this is a watershed event. For your own good, you should get back here."

Q: As quickly as possible.

HOPPER: Yes. Ambassador Lewis was asked to leave and he was replaced by Ambassador Charles Price, who had been over at the bilateral embassy in Belgium. Ambassador Price, while a political appointee, was just exactly the opposite of Ambassador Lewis. The one had been smooth and of the establishment, but reserved, and Ambassador Price was emulent, dynamic, a little bit pushy, but in a very nice way; was much more aggressive; blanketed everybody and was very close and was going to push harder at everything and in some ways felt he had to reestablish lots of connections. In fact, things were still working very well at many levels, but he felt a need to be much more active.

Q: More hands-on?

HOPPER: More hands-on with the Brits; he didn't need to run the embassy. But he was going to be on TV more and he felt the U.S. needed a public face because he had watched that for USIA it changed how they worked. Then Ambassador Price brought in another speech writer and put them in USIS. One of the things that Price had learned overseas – in Washington was that there was a great gap between USIA and the State Department; different types of town, different missions, didn't always communicate very well, but, in the embassies I worked in, just utterly teammates in the field. And that in a political section you would see that especially the press officer of the information side in USIS, it was hard to see where the political section stopped and they started. They were a direct part of the political and policy side of the team. The cultural affairs people might be different, but the person who had to deal with the press and write the ambassador's speeches, had to be really close to the political section, and that always worked.

One example though of communications problems and how they always seem to be at the center of human fiascos (it goes to the Grenada problem and the Caribbean was one other thing) was that I was surprised, when I got to London, to realize how much of my time would be spent on the Caribbean; it was an area where there was always a bit of a disconnect between the Brits and us. From Queen Victoria's time, there was a map tradition that, as an American, I never understood. In many atlases, many maps, parts of the world that had been in the British Commonwealth were colored pink – and a person who knew that, and who was British, and who believed that the sun never set, could look at the pink shades on a map and feel reassured that that influence would continue. Well much of the Caribbean is pink.

The U.S. made the New Jewel Movement around the globe; the kind of teenage tyranny of Grenada a big issue and the Brits all thought it was silly and that it was like the Peter Sellers movie of the tiny nation, and they thought we were just obsessing over the risks of Grenada. I got a blank map from – I think USIS actually found it for me – a good map of Central America and the Caribbean, and I did 500 mile circles around Havana, Grenada, and Nicaragua and that was the flight effectiveness of certain kind of aircraft. And it was interesting; if you looked at it that way – of the three places working together lock step, and if at some point the Soviet Union might've been able to operate from all three of them, unhindered, it would really blanket the Caribbean and make it harder for the U.S. to work in South America; make it harder to get to Africa. It looked a little more frightening when you did it that way. So I had this map and I had it

on my wall and I sort of made some copies and sent it to people, but still Grenada was the problem. I would talk to visiting American experts on the Caribbean; for some reason I actually knew some people, and it was sort of like how when I went to Rome and found that Italians weren't like the Italo-Americans in San Pedro.

But one of the eye-opening things I discovered in Great Britain was that we were both right; that there were a lot of West Indians who lived in the UK; there were a lot of Caribbeans who lived in the United States; and in some ways there had been big population movements in the Depression, during World War II, and right after World War II and the people changed. A lot of the West Indians who went to Britain ended up becoming Labour Party, real Socialists; really believed that the state should do everything; were in teaching and government sectors; and were generally pretty far to the left. West Indians and Jamaicans who'd gone to the U.S. had become more entrepreneurial, and ones who'd succeeded were pushing a political agenda that was very different from their brothers. And they didn't connect. There were not very many connections between Jamaicans in the U.S. and Jamaicans in Britain. And Jamaica was the most important of English speaking Caribbean countries and you had this competition between the Ciaga Party and government who were entrepreneurial and close to Reagan, and the Manray Social Democratic Party that was close to the Brits and close to the Socialists. In some ways they were Tweedle-Dum and Tweedle-Dum, but they had important differences. It was an area where even Thatcher was closer to the British view of what the Caribbean was like, and it was one of the few areas where the administration and the senior levels in the British government did not agree.

Q: Now did the intervention by the United States in Grenada take place while you were there?

HOPPER: Oh, yes. It did. And the run-up to it was fascinating because it was a real problem. It was one of the things I was working on. I was trying to get agreement that they were a problem, and I would also, from time to time, play a little marginal role. The Grenadan high commissioner in London was a wonderful, friendly, bubbly guy who was not a professional diplomat; he was an intellectual, who had lived in the U.S. and in Canada. While the New Jewel Movement and this guy had certain views, in many ways the high commissioner was probably more on the "people should be responsible" entrepreneurial side of the split in the Caribbean. And he thought the old-fashioned Socialist tendencies supported what his government was doing, but sometimes he even had trouble working with them.

I met with him about once a month and I was doing my pro-democracy approach. I said, "Look, we have these differences and clearly some of the things you're doing really frighten our government," and, "You may think that since we're so big and strong, why should we be concerned at all, but we are big and strong, and the fact that we are concerned, if I were in your shoes, I'd be concerned that we were concerned. You may think we're silly, but we can be silly in ways that I wouldn't want to be you if we got too silly." And he could see that and he would try to... I would have to go to these meetings where people would say, "But you know Grenada is a real democracy. They're the most democratic of all the countries in the Caribbean. Why don't you back them more?" and I'd say, "What do you mean?" Well they have lots of town hall meetings and so I'd meet with the Grenadan high commissioner and ask him to describe what were they doing, and they were having lots of meetings where they would have a neighborhood; they had neighborhood councils and they would get together and they would talk. But as he

described it, and from my experience just as a person going to meetings, I could see how nice, mild, meek, humble people could be cowed at these public meetings and it would look like everybody was agreeing. I'd say, "You know, we have town meetings in the U.S., but there's another step you have to have. You have to have a secret ballot so that those nice, wonderful little school teacher ladies, who may feel a little cowed by some big loud man, can vote. So if you added town meetings and free elections, we'd have a lot harder time questioning what you're doing." And it turned out that at the same time the deputy secretary of state – there were a lot of levels that were sort of trying to make that same message to the Grenadans, and incredibly, Maurice Bishop, who was the head of the New Jewel Movement, actually came to see – I believe, though it's all a bit of a mystery still – that unless he could get more of a consensual democracy, he was going to be vulnerable to people that were more ruthless than he was. So he agreed with – I think it was Whitehead, the deputy secretary; it could've been with Ken Dam; I'm not sure exactly which deputy secretary it was – but he agreed to a process that was going to lead to real elections. And amazingly, very soon after he agreed to that, his own party sort of fell apart and there were violent movements. The pot started boiling and the British did get worried that we were going to do something.

I was briefing and going in, and there was one weekend when it started to look like God only knows what's going to happen. I arranged to be around, and ARA had my number, and we were all going to be in touch. The working level contacts were nervous that we were going to do something. The foreign secretary, Sir Jeffrey Howe, was nervous that we were going to do something and he was operating in the wake of Lord Carrington having resigned because he hadn't predicted the Falklands. So there was a real nervousness that you didn't want to be wrong on a big issue, and amazingly, the U.S. doing something would be a big issue and because Thatcher was so close to Reagan they didn't want any embarrassing surprises. The senior working levels just kept begging me, "Well, please let us know what's going to happen," and I said, "Well fine." I said, "Look, if you're that concerned, have Howe call Shultz. While we're a little bit in the loop, if something is really happening, we're going to be told to tell you, but it's going to be sort of after something is really decided. So if you're that nervous, have Howe call," and they did. I pushed a lot afterwards. And Howe in some ways was a little bit of a reticent man and I don't think he asked the right question. But whatever he asked, he got an answer that he took as reassuring. I think he got an answer like, "Don't worry. Whatever we do, it'll be smart."

Q: We're on top of it.

HOPPER: Yes. He got an answer that he took as reassuring. He went to the House of Commons, got a question, gave an answer, and he went way too far and basically said, "I've just talked to the American secretary of state. I'm confident that while they're on top of the situation nothing dramatic is going to happen." He went away for the weekend, and I guess it was the next Monday morning or something, but we sort of did it and the ambassador got these instructions to go in and tell them, but we weren't consulting – it was sort of already underway.

At that period, the two weeks before that had been really interesting because it was also a decisive period on installing the cruise missiles in Europe. It was a period when very bad things were happening again in Lebanon; the first bombing of the Marines took place, or of the embassy; one of the attacks in Lebanon took place right then. You had huge marches all over

Europe that weekend, and DS (Bureau of Diplomatic Security) had in effect sent embassies home all over Europe. So in London, we were not allowed to go into the embassy that weekend. And, amazingly, it was the weekend when Weinberger and Shultz, partly to show that things were calm, were playing golf in Georgia, and there was a little bit of an incident on the golf course and they were sort of put out of commission. So you had a lot of things happening.

In fact as that weekend went on, I got more worried that the U.S. government and the international system were kind of on sensory overload. I always felt that if the Soviets could have misinterpreted military movement and actions, that that was a weekend when things could've gone very, very wrong. Because we went in to Grenada, the ambassador had to go down and talk to them. It turned out that Queen Elizabeth was just grossly offended. She believed that because Grenada was part of the Commonwealth, because they had a governor general and because the queen was the sovereign of Grenada, (with no influence; it was an illusory relationship), that only the British could do something in Grenada and that it was like we had invaded Britain by doing this. It was very awkward.

Operationally, the first day was kind of confusing. I started getting calls, "Oh my God, our maps aren't very good. It turns out, Bob, that the best maps of Grenada are there. Can you go out and get some really good maps and FedEx them," or whatever the equivalent was, "back?" So that first day was really tense because in all of these things it was clear that once we decided to do something, that the key was to do it well. In the end it happened that the poor ambassador had to go to a series of meetings explaining what we were doing. And amazingly this was really a tense issue in Anglo-American relations. Thatcher wasn't happy. It smoothed out, but it was difficult. I was able to sort of use it later and say, "Come on. We need to consult more." It got the British a little concerned that we might do something similar in Nicaragua so they started watching all of Central America more closely. It was an interesting period.

Q: It certainly was. I don't remember exactly when that was. I think it may well have been the Marine barracks bombing.

HOPPER: I think it was October of '83.

Q: October or maybe November; it was late October at least.

HOPPER: Yes.

Q: I do remember that the Marine barracks was blown up on a Sunday in about that time frame. So I think that's probably the other event that was happening that weekend.

HOPPER: And there were Brits who believed, and there are some of them who still believe to this day, that the U.S. just felt it had to do something, and that Grenada was the easy, convenient something to do; and that there really wasn't a threat to our medical students; that we had just been talking and talking and talking about doing something and so we did it. We had been talking and thinking and thinking about doing things, and I always felt it was mostly all just bad coincidences, but at the same time there was an element of "we need to do something," and these things do sometimes fit together.

Q: One other event I remember from this period that you were there, was a European Chiefs of Mission Conference; I believe it was late in '82. I think George Shultz had recently become secretary of state. I'm not sure who the ambassador was; it may still have been John Lewis and Charles Price was there. As you said, he had been in Belgium before coming to London.

I assume that Shultz came to London a lot.

HOPPER: A couple of those chiefs of missions meetings were held in London several times while I was there. The secretary came frequently. I would say that he planned to come to London once or twice a year. In the summer of 1984, President Reagan came for the wonderful set of events related to the fortieth anniversary of D-Day in World War II. He came and the British were hosting the summit that year.

Q: Of NATO?

HOPPER: No, it was the industrial, the...

Q: The G-7...

HOPPER: The G-7; it was seven at that time. So we had the president coming on his grand trip to Europe to celebrate the fortieth anniversary, and to show that everybody was working together; that we had managed the deployment. It was symbolically a big deal to show how friendly and resolved the West was. Michael Deaver came. I got to see, and was really impressed with the very clever sense of scheduling and packaging. It was very artful and it worked with the British. It was the first occasion where you were really going to have this big Thatcher/Reagan event on British territory. I was responsible for Shultz events; there was going to be a big secretary of state meeting on substance that was going to be held at the foreign secretary's house, which was a place called Carleton Gardens, which was two blocks from the foreign office and sort of near Nelson's Column. I was responsible for that and for negotiating some of the general things. I went with the DCM to negotiate for the Secret Service to please, please, please have their guns, and the British would say, "No. We told you and you guys keep asking us. No, they can't." And getting enough frequencies so that everybody could talk. That was one of my first experiences at really working on security issues and getting to know Scotland Yard and the policemen. That was interesting. Meeting all of the advance people and working on the visit and doing some of the substantive work beforehand was amazing. The foreign office officials and the senior officials on Thatcher's staff at Number 10 (Downing Street) in some ways had a certain disdain for our administration, and felt, "Thank God Thatcher's so smart that it's really wonderful there's this team because she's smart and sensible and she's really providing the intellectual muscle for this relationship, and boy, this is really going to be Thatcher's summit and you guys think you're so smart, but you're going to see that we're really loving a lot of this."

So we all worked and did our thing, and then afterwards I went around to get a debriefing from a number of levels on how it had gone. I met with one of the senior staffers at Number 10 and met with some of my contacts at the foreign office. The DCM went too. Two things that were reconfirmed in doing that is that the British were a much more disciplined government than we

were and they would do cabinet notes and minutes and they would go around and everybody told us the same thing. It was fascinating. We discovered that we could actually economize on some of these big events; you could go meet the lowest person who you knew would get the notes, and you'd get the same briefing, or be handed the notes, and it didn't matter. Or you could have the ambassador struggle even to see Thatcher and she'd almost read him the notes. So we had that experience.

I sort of pressed some people; I said, "After you had thought that these meetings were going to go a certain way, and substance aside, just on style..." And a number of them who'd actually been note takers told me that they were just amazed that Ronald Reagan dominated every conversation; that he really cleverly, both emotionally and on substance, set and drove the agenda; that neither Thatcher nor anyone else really disagreed with him, and that he had a personal force. They were just amazed at how it went. And things changed a little bit after that.

But also, we would keep having these high-level meetings; and Thatcher went to Washington a lot. There were all of these high-level connections. Or they'd meet at some other summit. I would especially get these reports that, "You know, Thatcher is going to raise Central America. She's really concerned. She's going to do this." And after, we'd do these cables and nothing would happen. And finally, on sort of instructions, I went both to the foreign policy person on her Number 10 staff, and to the people in the foreign office doing Central America, and said, "Look, don't do that to us again. Unless you really know for sure that Thatcher personally is going to raise it, don't waste our time with your fantasies about what we should be doing. They have a good relationship and you've hurt the credibility of Embassy London, and through us you've hurt your own credibility. When we go writing these things about how Thatcher is going to object to something, when she then meets with the president and says, "Right on, Ronnie. Those Sandinistas are thugs and you've got to really keep them on the ropes." Yes, she said that and that was interesting.

I saw that over time it added to my sense that as a diplomat there isn't much room for speculating and giving your own opinion. You can help explain things, and explain how your government works, but who cares what your personal opinion is, especially if you mix up your personal opinion and government views. You can just do a bad job at being a diplomat.

On Central America, we had a lot of visits; Elliott Abrams visited several times, both as human rights, as IO (International Organizations), then I think at the very, very end he may have – I don't think he had taken over the Latin American beat yet. I don't think Enders ever came, but the DASes came a lot and we would set up meetings.

And then Otto Reich and the public diplomacy team visited frequently. Otto Reich actually came on a big round going through Europe where he was trying to build a consensus on the public diplomacy side. That was an area where I had decided that I could use that visit because of all of these complaints that I had been getting. I could set up meetings with the key policy people at the working level and let them raise their own concerns. We went around and met with everyone who was significant and who had ever had a question about what we were doing. I arranged to have the undersecretary share a brown bag with them. I told the group, "Look, if you want, this is somebody who does public diplomacy, who isn't so senior that you're going to be insulting, and

it's utterly off the record. If you're ever going to raise your questions, do it now." And they really took advantage; they went through and made clear what their concerns were.

It was easy to do the reporting cable and a summary reporting the key things. Although this was still in the period where you would generally end with a major embassy comment on what it meant, I thought about it, and decided not to do a comment and just let it go as a straight reporting cable with the summary setting up what the points were. I had also realized that if I tried to do a comment, that whatever I did it would be harder to clear, and I said, "No, it's better. Let's just leave the concerns in the mouths of the British the way they were, they're clear enough; people in Washington would be able to see them and it's not Embassy London or Bob Hopper trying to make a point." I did it very quickly so that Reich wouldn't be surprised and got him to sign it before he left town. And the cable worked really well. Ambassador Reich saw it as fair and it did start some – marginally, along with a hundred other things – thinking. I've used this cable from time to time at FSI as a training device and I would say, "Sometimes you just have to let some things speak for themselves. Every rule can have an exception."

Q: Okay. Anything else we should say about your four years in London? Great assignment.

HOPPER: Wonderful assignment.

Q: I guess I should ask you if you spent a lot of time working with the British foreign office or others about Cyprus.

HOPPER: Cyprus was one of the things I worked on, partly out of nostalgia. We probably could've split it any way we wanted, but nobody else really wanted to do it and so I did it. Richard Haas, ironically, was the special negotiator for at least some of the period while I was in London.

Q: Special Cyprus coordinator.

HOPPER: Cyprus coordinator. He visited at least twice and I was his control officer and went. It was fine. To me it was kind of clear that it was really a holding period.

Q: That's why I corrected your use of the term "negotiator" because I don't think he thought it was negotiating.

HOPPER: No, he didn't. He was just keeping things coordinated. He was very impressive and it was fun. I hadn't known him very much and then our paths would cross from time to time later. And that's another thing; foreign affairs is a village and these people who work on it, they come and go, and come and go, and go and come and you do end up crossing paths.

Q: That's one of the particularly nice things about being in a place like London where a lot of people come through: you get to know people, sometimes people who are very appreciative of small courtesies and small help and advice, who later on become much more influential and significant and so on.

HOPPER: Ah, I guess his name was Middendorf who was the U.S. ambassador to...

Q: The Netherlands.

HOPPER: He was in the Netherlands, but he also...did he go to the OAU (Organization for African Unity) or the OAS (Organization of American States)?

Q: I think so – Yes.

HOPPER: He left the Netherlands, came through London, and he was going to be the OAS. I took him places. He had this wonderful royal West and East Indies society where there was a connection sort of entrepreneurially with the Dutch and the British. In the East and West Indies they had a club and were involved in Caribbean affairs a bit. I arranged for him to speak there. I arranged for him to speak at the IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies), or the Chatham House group. He came quite a bit. He was an amazing fellow. He just had interest in everything and he was a composer and actually wrote music and he was trying to write themes for – you know, if the OAS needed a new song. But he was one of those people, who, at times, could come across as silly to some of the British, but he actually had a lot of foxy commonsense and I grew to sort of respect him. His judgment was pretty good and if you'd get him in the right setting, he would talk to people and he was very good. You got him with some people who were very sort of Oxford Don types and they thought, oh my god, what are these people doing. There's an example of your having to think a little bit about who you were putting people together with to go with their strengths and weaknesses.

You realize that in London you had to use visitors well because you were just going to be doing visitors so often, and some of my colleagues really didn't like doing it, and by the time I left it would become a problem. It was one of the few sort of personal issues that if somebody didn't want to do their fair share of going to the airport, it would become a problem. Also, in London, there really was a lot of entertaining; most of it done by the ambassador and the DCM, but the way the political section was structured, almost everybody got to take part in it a lot. I had this range of issues and contacts and visitors. I would say that my wife and I went to a sit down dinner at Winfield House maybe every other month.

Q: That's the ambassador's residence.

HOPPER: At the ambassador's residence. And I went to the equivalents of lunches and dinners at the DCM's as often. It was really a lot. And then you'd do a lot of receptions, and one came to see that you had to guard your time. I felt that the DCM and the ambassador were doing so much socially, that in some ways it was a burden on them.

Q: Anything else on London? Where did you go from there?

HOPPER: It was interesting. In the last year Ray Sites came back and became the DCM and Ray had a start-over-again. When he arrived we did some think pieces and planning documents on how to build up and use his contacts. It was very useful because Ed Streater had been there so long that much of what we did was sort of intuitive and assumed. And it worked and we knew

what we were doing, but it wasn't planned out. And when Ray came, we then started looking again, "Well, who are our contacts?" and we did new contact plans and that was very useful.

Q: Because he had previously been in the political section doing South Africa and Africa issues and so on.

HOPPER: Yes. And it was like heaven for him, coming back and being the DCM. Another thing that happened in sort of my last year in London, that was significant, was that the State Department had started the use of PIT (Part-time Intermittent Temporary) employees and started reaching out to spouses and looking at what were the skills that some spouses had that could be used. My wife had been working as an assistant to a builder in Alexandria before we went to London, and had real construction skills. It ended up she became sort of an assistant GSO (General Services Officer) and was in charge of programs to renovate a number of residential properties in London. She also ended up in charge of a project to renovate the DCM's house when Ray Sites came and was getting married. There were going to be a lot of changes in his life. Nothing had been done to the Residence since like seven or eight years before when Mr. Streator had come and there had been a lot of changes in just the infrastructure of London.

There had been things that were impossible to do in Britain in the mid '70s that all of a sudden you could do; just little things like water pressure had improved in the city, so you could actually add bathrooms and showers that you couldn't do before. So my wife was in charge of the renovation project there and she became, as one could imagine knowing how things were, very close to the DCM. We actually had a little bit of a problem in that we were almost seen by some people as being too close to the DCM. And I saw that poor Ray Sites, in many ways, was isolated; he was now back as DCM and a lot of people expected him to be always doing these high-level things and he was just a regular person. He was not that much older than most of us in the political section. He sort of made clear that he would appreciate being invited to things that the rest of us were doing; that he couldn't always come, but to think of him. And so we would do that and we were able to use him in entertaining.

Another project my wife worked on was the ... Ambassador Price's wife had helped organize the "Friends of the Embassies" program, to encourage the donations of art for embassies and residences overseas.

Q: Bob, I think when we finished last time there may have been a few loose ends related to your assignment to London in the political section from 1982 to '86 that you wanted to cover. Why don't you go right ahead?

HOPPER: One of the things I would like to outline is how we cooperated with Washington and the other posts in Europe, and the posts in Central America, to try to build European support for our Central American policies. I viewed that effort as part and parcel of what I was also doing with the Labour Party and other people to make them more comfortable with U.S. foreign policy, and to see that it was in their interest to have a partnership with us. Just as I was trying to find reasonable people to pair Labour Party hopefuls with to learn more about the U.S., I also made an effort to find occasions to take U.S. visitors who were coming to do Central America to try to find ones who would work with people who doubted our foreign policy credibility. We were

very good in Embassy London, for a long time, at using exchange programs to get people contacted with the U.S., but sometimes we don't see that long-term contact with the U.S. isn't always a panacea.

One of the defense spokesmen for the Labour Party had actually been on an exchange program, and had spent a good deal of time actually, at the University of Oklahoma and had attended football games and everything. And he took as his sort of metaphor for the U.S. the sort of "we're number one," "hook 'em," "horns," and "go Sooners," and all of that, and he actually worried that the whole U.S. was motivated – sometimes wonderfully and other times worrisomely – by the desire to be number one; you had to win every game. He would sometimes use that on the stump and one time at a Labour Party conference we were having a beer together and he was saying, "You know, Bob, I've told you before that I would worry about the 'we're number one' and that you all would try to win at all costs." He said, "I'm now getting more worried that you're going to perceive that you're no longer number one, and that you're tied for number one, or on some things you're number two and it's how you worry about the European community. And I'm really now worried that you're the ones who are going to lash out in some spasm because you think you have to become number one again." I just found that interesting. It showed how careful you had to be because sometimes it was very effective to play the card of how strong and effective we are, but other times you can see that you have to play that carefully. The marching bands can be good and they can be bad. Nothing is easy.

Q: So there was a lot of resistance in Britain at the time to what we were trying to do in Central America.

HOPPER: Absolutely. It would tend to be from the same people who were worried about what we were doing on cruise missiles, who felt we were not doing enough in South Africa. I was at a dinner where Mrs. Kinnock was sitting next to me and Jesse Jackson was there. She was just so upset that Jesse Jackson had stepped into the South African business, really, for them, at the eleventh hour on the last day, and yet was getting all kinds of credit for having moved the South Africans in ways that they felt they had prepared the way for. And it was sort of a sense of envy that was also a problem.

But we tried to work with anyone we could identify as like-minded. We realized that other Europeans were also important and so we would have, from time to time, Europe-wide meetings of the different key embassies to talk about issues. I remember we had a meeting in Paris going over Central American issues and the DAS came out from ARA and I think Otto Reich, the then Latin American public relations expert, came out. I had the idea (I was very pleased with myself) that we would often get hammered by our critics who would say, "Well I was in Nicaragua last week and the arch bishop told me this," or "Somebody told me that. When were you there? Aren't you just trumpeting the line from your main office? What do you really know about it?" So I proposed that maybe if a group of us in Europe who were doing Central America should actually pick two or three opinion leaders from our countries and then the Department and USIA should pay and we should go to Central America, do a tour, and be with them; talk to them about what they saw and build up our credibility and theirs. The Department thought that was a wonderful idea; started building on it; then, for a variety of reasons that were never clear, got cold feet on the part of inviting opinion leaders, and instead just had about ten embassy people,

like me, go. And I can see the logistics would've been a lot harder for a group with different languages.

So we went and we visited Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. It was very good. It really helped all of us to see what was going on. We ended up having to drive through Nicaragua because there had been a hurricane and so we took a van from San Jose, Costa Rica, up to the Nicaraguan border, then had to get out of the van, walk through the customs checkpoint of both countries – and it was a bit like going through a war zone as you got into Nicaragua; you could see all of their troops. For me, it was fascinating because I had heard all the stuff about Cuba troops and Nicaragua, and in looking around I could see them. I mean they weren't all that hidden. You could see this group of foreign, a little bit older professionals, and the Nicaraguan army was fifteen-year-olds. It was really depressing to see how young most of them were. Then we went through and we saw things in Nicaragua and met with the embassies, did El Salvador, Guatemala, and went home. About a month later I was at a meeting with a group of Catholic Church experts on Central America, in London, and they started announcing some positions and saying, "Well we know there's this and this," and I said, "Well that's interesting. I was just there and I did see the Cuban soldiers and I saw how young the Nicaraguans are. I saw this and I saw that." It was me personally; it's not just somebody telling me. It changed the flow of the debate. So that was a program that actually had some payoff quite quickly. So sometimes we spend little bits of money in good ways.

Q: Okay. Is there anything else, before we wind up London, that you wanted to talk about?

HOPPER: London was a country also where there were lots of representational duties for everybody. For example, on Shakespeare's birthday every year there was a festival in Stratford and there would be a parade of nations, based on the theory that Shakespeare was an international figure and had influence all around the world. The ambassador and DCM had done it several times and had other things to do, and so I was designated to be the embassy representative at the festival. We worked with one of the Lord Chamberlains who was the head of the parade; my wife and I met them beforehand and then went up and we carried the U.S. flag and marched in the parade and went to a performance at the theater. And it was interesting; while I had spoken behind the U.S. placard at international conferences, and done things where it was clear I was representing the U.S., I had never had the experience of marching in a parade. It's just me and my wife holding the U.S. flag. You know there weren't millions of people, but there were quite a few people out on the street. And it was at a time when we had some threats. I felt both proud and fairly vulnerable walking down the street. That was just an interesting experience and was the kind of thing that did happen in London more than in some other places.

Q: Did Carol, your wife, work? She was quite involved with the embassy or was she able to pretty much lead her own life there?

HOPPER: She could do whatever she wanted and she spent the first couple of years taking classes and making sure the kids were well established, and then the last two years she was able to be employed through the PIT program at the embassy and was in effect one of the assistant GSOs. She had done construction work in the U.S. and so she ended up being in charge of a project to renovate a bunch of the apartment buildings that we had for staff to live in. And she

worked top and bottom on the renovations to the ambassador and DCM's residence, and in doing that she ended up working with the "Arts in Embassies" people and helped negotiate and put together the first major survey of the art works held by an embassy. She worked with Sotheby's and Ambassador Price's wife to have a thorough survey inventory done of all the art in the possession of the embassy – at the Residences and in the embassy. And discovered that sitting in the cafeteria was a painting of Churchill that was quite valuable and there was a painting of Washington and of John Adams. People had lost track of them and when the inventory was done; the National Gallery and the Smithsonian it turned out, wanted them back. So she did a project with Polaroid, which had just invented a huge life size, room size view camera; they came out and took photos of the paintings. They could do reproductions on a canvas to where they looked exactly like the paintings; and they did duplicate frames. The copies stayed at the embassy and the originals went back. But that was an interesting project and I ran across some of those same people later in my congressional lobbying job down the road.

As we left London, one of the recurring themes of my life, as Robert Frost says "the roads not taken," came up. DCM Ray Sites had been both Secretary Shultz' executive director and he had been a senior person in public affairs. He discovered that there was an office director job coming up in PA (Public Affairs) that he thought I would be perfect for and he lobbied for me to be the head of the outreach side of public affairs. In the end they picked somebody who was already a DCM to do it. It was interesting. It actually would've been a job that I think I would've been very good at, and had I taken that path it would've been yet another one doesn't know what would've happened. The Department was very great and gracious and I went to the War College for a year. That's an experience I would recommend to anyone.

DAVID M. EVANS
Political Advisor to Commander-in-Chief, POLAD
London (1982-1986)

Mr. Evans was born and raised in Philadelphia, PA and was educated at Harvard University and the University of Belgrade Law School. After service in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service in 1963. As an Economic Specialist, Mr. Evans served in Warsaw, Belgrade, Moscow and London. In addition to his economic assignments, he served in senior level positions dealing with International Security and Counter-Terrorism. He also served as Political Advisor to the Commander-in Chief, US Naval Forces in Europe. Mr. Evans was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1996

EVANS: David Gompert saw me in the hall one day. It was a very momentous occasion and said, "Hi, what are you doing?" I said, "Well, I am still looking for a good job." He said, "I've got the perfect job for you. We are going to reopen a job that had been abolished, but we are going to bring it back. It is the Political Advisor to CINCUS (Commander-In-Chief U.S. Naval Forces), now in London." He also said, "You would be perfect, of course, because of your PM experience and everything. I'll mention it to Larry." I put on a full bore campaign to get this job. You can imagine when the word got out the competition was superior. There were a lot of people who

wanted it, some of whom had much longer credentials. I had only had hardly a year of Political-Military experience. I was still in the economic cone. To make a long story short, I was still pretty close to Eagleburger at that point. He was hospitalized at Georgetown with the beginning of major problems with his leg. An Admiral, whose name was Ronald Hays, a three-star at that time, and head of the Navy operation in London, was coming back in early February, or early January 1982, to interview the six finalists, of which I was one. I had gotten through. I think there were 25 people who were interested in this job. Good Lord, being based in London with the whole of Europe and Middle East, you would think it was a dream job. I knew I would have to really pull out some stops to get this job. I figured Larry Eagleburger's recommendation would carry weight within the European area. The Admiral would be attentive to whom Larry Eagleburger recommended. I figured I had only one, maybe two, strong competitors of the other six. I knew there were some who had good paper credentials, but I knew they weren't going to get it. I went to see Larry Eagleburger in the hospital. He was practically on his death bed. He was propped up, reading about the Arabs. I said, "What are you doing." He said, "I've got to learn about the Arabs, I know nothing about the Middle East." It was very amusing. He said, "What can I do for you?" I said, "I want you to call the Admiral. Here is the name and number, and tell him I'm your top candidate, and I'm the one to be hired for this job." He agreed to do it. That was like the day before the interview.

The day of the interview, it was snowing like crazy as I was starting to drive out to the Pentagon. The night before the plane had crashed into the Potomac.

Q: *The 14th Street Bridge, I think.*

EVANS: Right. I remember driving past, because you could still see the salvage operations going on. I got to the Pentagon in very bad weather, a lot of snow. I got in for the interview. We were being interviewed in series. The Admiral only had a certain chunk of time. This was very important to me for various reasons, both professional, I had been without a real job for a while, although Larry Eagleburger said, "David, you really want that job." I was so surprised. I realized what he meant was a political pull-out job is not exactly on the fast track. To me, it seemed tremendously interesting. I had always wanted to serve in London. I had been bitten by the political-military bug, and I was still very *au courant* with the operations. I had worked on bases in Spain, Portugal, Greece, the whole Mediterranean. I was pretty well qualified, actually, before that. I also wanted to go abroad at that point for personal reasons. I was very interested in the job. I got into the room with the Admiral. It was a very bare, stark, Pentagon room. He was very welcoming. It turned out that his son was a Foreign Service officer, Dennis Hays. You may recall him. He was President of AFSA at one point and was appointed ambassador recently to some African country. He had a favorable feeling about FSOs, which was good. Many military did not. He said, "Have a seat. I see you have an interesting background, career." Pushing the ashtray over, he said, "Oh, by the way, here is an ashtray if you care to smoke." I said, "No, I don't smoke, I never have smoked." I didn't think much about it. That was the critical test. He could not stand anybody who smoked. I think there were one or two of the candidates who did smoke. They were knocked out immediately. I learned this later. I saw it in action. He was absolutely livid if anyone smoked in his presence. At least I passed that test. We went through the interview, and I still didn't get a sense of whether I would be hired or not. I knew this was it. He was going to make the decision, based on these interviews. As we finished, and I got ready to

go, he said, "Well, Larry Eagleburger called me. He thinks very highly of you." Then, I felt there was hope. In due course, I think it was in three days, that I got the word that I had been selected. I was to get out there in a week. It is typical in the Foreign Service, you go through these ups and downs.

Q: We will pick this one up now. The next time, you had been selected to be Political Advisor, POLAD, to the Admiral. What is the title?

EVANS: The acronym is CINC/NAV/EUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, based in London.

Q: It started in January of 1982?

EVANS: February of 1982.

Q: Today is the 10th of October 1997. David, you had gone to POLAD in London. You started in 1982?

EVANS: 1982, yes.

Q: You were there from when to when?

EVANS: I was there for four and one-half years. I got there in early February 1982, after my selection, by the then Admiral in Charge, in Washington. I left in July of 1986. It was a four and a half year assignment.

Q: Could you explain first, what was the job of CINC/EUR? Was that it?

EVANS: No, it was CINC/US/NAV/EUR, which is the acronym for U.S. Naval Forces for Europe, which was one of the three component military commands under the European command, which is CINC/EUR, based in Stuttgart. USAREUR is the Army headquarters in Heidelberg, Germany. USAFE is the Air Force headquarters based in Ramstein. The naval headquarters, somewhat oddly, but due to historic reasons, is based in London on Grosvenor Square in a historic building, catty-corner from the American Embassy.

Q: During this 1982 to 1986-period, the early-Reagan and mid-Reagan period. You had John Lehman as Secretary of the Navy. It was probably the most aggressive period we had with the Navy, wasn't it? Could you talk about what our posture was in those days, Navy wise, and the politics thereof that you dealt with?

EVANS: You're right. The Navy was without question, the most prominent of the four services, depending on how you consider the Marines. This was partly due to the Reagan force projection and partly due to John Lehman's particular emphasis on Naval expansion to contain the perceived Soviet threat. The Navy was, without question, the most interesting and active in long-

range force projection of the three services. It was also the one in which there were the most political military questions that came to the attention of the Political Advisor or POLAD. I think we all know that many of these POLAD jobs are sleepy, quasi-academic jobs.

The job in London was extremely active, very hands-on, and very policy oriented. When I'm talking about policy, I'm talking about major policy initiatives throughout the whole area that the Naval Command in Europe encompassed, which was from the Northern area of Norway, right down through all of Europe, to the Mediterranean. It enhanced all of the Mediterranean, including the Sixth Fleet -- which was under my Admiral's command -- and the northern rim of Africa, namely Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, for what that was worth, Egypt, Israel, the Middle-East, right up to the Persian Gulf, which was under the relatively new Central Command, headquartered in Tampa. We dealt with all the European issues, all of the East-West issues because the European Command encompassed the Soviet Union fully. Anything to do with the Soviet Union and the Soviet threat and Soviet force projections, other than the Soviet fleet in the Pacific area, but anything dealing with the Soviet Union in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union, on the ground, I would say, to the extent that the Navy had interest in that, came under our purview. It also included base-related problems, local problems and particularly the Arab-Israeli problems. Those were all within our purview. What was not within our purview was the Iran/Iraq situation, although our intelligence outfit located in London, which was probably one of the best military intelligence outfits in the world, actively followed all U.S. Naval force activities on a daily basis. Because of what I had been dealing with in my previous position as Director of International Security Operations and the State Department's Political-Military Affairs Bureau, many of these problems came to my attention as well, even though they were slightly outside our geographic confines. Technically, our purview went all the way down to South Africa, although during my tenure, we didn't go down there. I did travel extensively throughout Northern Africa. The major problem though, and the one that I dealt with immediately upon arrival and immediately before departure, was in the Middle-East. It was the Lebanon situation. As you may recall, the Israeli forces, in early 1982, had moved into Southern Lebanon and Palestinians had fled back either to Tunisia or to other places, and a war, initially a slow war, of political and military attrition began between Israel and Lebanon/the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization). That heated up considerably. But during the four and one-half years I was there, the underlying motif and the major activity, constant activity, was the Lebanon engagement, both in and out of Lebanon.

Q: In the first place, I want to come back to this issue and several others. Just to begin with, how were you used? You had what, several admirals while you were there?

EVANS: I used to joke that during the four and one-half years I was there, I served seven admirals. That was partly because of some double-heading that went on. There was a large turnover of admirals, including a well-known Admiral, Bill Crowe, who went on to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Let me go back and say, when I went out there, this position had been empty, nonexistent.

Q: The POLAD position?

EVANS: The POLAD position had been abolished two years before by the State Department in an effort to save money. It was felt by the State Department that they could adequately furnish political advice to the Navy across the street through their Political Section at the Embassy. The U.S. Navy was not happy with that because they wanted a full-time State Department representative who was responsible to the admiral, not to the ambassador. The decision was reached in late 1981 that in response to the Navy's demarche, and probably connected to this Naval build up that we were talking about, to restore this position. I was the first POLAD to go out and reopen the position in 1982, after approximately, a two-year hiatus, in which there was no POLAD. That was both good and bad. It was good in the sense that I got a lot of attention from the admiral and the senior officers. It was bad in the sense that there was no infrastructure to build on. I had to open an office, create an office, hire a secretary, build up files. There was absolutely nothing to walk into. That took some time. Although I was very welcomed, I had to introduce myself and introduce my function. It wasn't as though I came in to replace somebody who was already active, and intertwined in the operations. That was the background under which I came in. At the time, the Naval Command for Europe was headed by a three-star admiral. It was separate from the NATO, Southern Command, which was headquartered in Naples, which is still, and was then, headed by a four-star U.S. Naval admiral.

Less than a year into my work, toward the end of 1982, the Navy decided they would double-hat the CINC/US/NAV/EUR, the U.S. National Naval Command with CINCSOUTH, the NATO Southern Command admiral. At the time that NATO four-star Commander was William J. Crowe, who came up to London quite a bit to visit because he had gotten his doctorate in London. He loved London, being of a scholarly turn. He visited frequently. Admiral Hays was the one who selected me, very carefully, I might say, in the interview process in January 1982. Having a son, who at that time, had recently joined the Foreign Service, he was more favorably disposed to the Foreign Service than perhaps a number of other senior military officers are. In any event, I was very fond of Ron Hays, who went on to become the Vice Chief of Naval Operations when the double-heading took place. The double-heading took place, as I recall, in late 1983 or early 1984. Admiral Hays, at that point, went back to Washington with a promotion to four-stars to be the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, VCNO. A new three-star came out to London who was no longer the CINC/US/NAV/EUR. He was the DCINC/NAV/EUR, the Deputy Commander in Chief for U.S. Naval Forces in Europe. Then, what to do with the POLAD, which was namely I? I was assigned to CINC/US/NAV/EUR, but CINC/US/NAV/EUR suddenly became Admiral Crowe down in Naples. Of course, he had his own other POLAD, who was the NATO POLAD. I, in a way, served two admirals. It was my senior admiral, who was the four-star CINC/US/NAV/EUR-CINCSOUTH in Naples and the DCINC/US/NAV/EUR, the three-star admiral in London. That is why I say, in the four and one-half years I was there, I actually served seven different admirals.

Q: What would you do, in general? Then, we will move to specifics. What was the function of the POLAD, as the admiral and you sort of mutually recreated the job?

EVANS: The POLAD position was largely what the admiral wanted to make of it as regards to requirements. Then, it was largely what I wanted to make of it as regards to the rest of the time or other matters. Typically, when I got there in February, the place was jumping because the Lebanon situation was already getting nasty. There were any number of political questions that

Admiral Hays would ask me to look into, on a daily basis, and several times in many days. The questions were regarding our policy and what the State Department would think of this or that, and if we did this, what would the implications be. What was the political inclination of certain parties in Lebanon, and that sort of thing? There were a lot of trips. I spent, probably in that first year, particularly the first two years, I probably traveled two weeks out of the month with an admiral, sometimes by myself because I had rank and was able to commandeer an airplane for myself. I occasionally went on missions with officers to Turkey, for example, where we were trying to establish an alternate base to Larnaca and Cyprus for military operations off of Lebanon. It was a very strategic position.

Typically, the day began at 9:00 with an intelligence briefing in the briefing room. The three-star admiral would sit in the first row, in the middle. His deputy was a two-star, and he would sit to his right. I would sit to his left. It established for all to see the ranking order of things. I, at the time, was an OC, I guess. As such, I was accorded, one-star rank which made a difference. There is a long debate about whether POLAD's should be senior officers or not.

Q: They really respond to rank.

EVANS: They do. They are told authoritatively by the bureaucracy that this person is a flag-rank official. There is a whole lot of difference. The day would start with a briefing by N2 (Intelligence), then N3 (Operations), occasionally N4 (Supply Logistics), occasionally N5 (Policy & Plans). Those were the major divisions that I would work with or how I was involved with things that I came in contact with. I did not, of course, get involved in personnel or administrative matters. It was strictly Naval. During the briefing the admiral would occasionally ask me questions on the spot which I would know or I would not know. If I didn't, I would promise immediately to find out. I would do that either by a memorandum or phone calls back to Washington, as soon as Washington opened, or I would work with one of the Ns in getting the information or the analysis, proposal, or the recommendation to him. I built on my recent connections with the Political-Military Affairs Bureau and particularly people like Arnie Raphel, who, when I went out, was working with the Under Secretary and with Larry Eagleburger with whom I served in Belgrade. Eagleburger had gone back as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. I spent a lot of time calling back to Washington, getting opinions, acting as the liaison, as it were, for the admiral. The admiral used me in a very personal way. Nobody else, for example, had any authority to ask me to do anything. It had to come from the admiral. They certainly came looking for help, particularly when I worked closely with an N2 (Intelligence) and N5 (Plans). They would often come up to my room, and I was given a rather nice room, like Admiral Hays. We would sit down and go over maps and plans, and biographies, very often, and cross-fertilize ourselves, our knowledge base in both Intelligence and Plans & Policy.

Q: Let's take the Lebanese crisis first. From your perspective, could you say how that developed, when you arrived? Also, how did the Navy get involved?

EVANS: The Navy got involved because, for one reason, to protect the American citizens that were in Lebanon, to protect those forces in Lebanon that were judged to be on our side, to provide military support and security for Ambassador Phil Habib, who was shuttling back and forth as the Middle East negotiator. I'm trying to work this thing out between the Israelis, the

PLO, and the Lebanese. The situation gradually got much more dangerous on the ground which lead to an increase buildup of our offshore naval forces. Then, it involved other countries including Cyprus, where we used the port of Larnaca as our forward operation base. Also, the desire to use Turkish facilities led me to be in the missions flying out to Turkey to try to negotiate that which did not work out. It involved closer cooperation with the Israelis in naval activities that I had not realized before. We did not particularly acknowledge the fact that we had a very active and substantive cooperation program with the Israeli military and navy in anti-submarine warfare, in particular. Our forces were increased offshore and the Marines, as you recall, were placed in Lebanon. We worked with the Israelis in trying to make sure that the Libyans and others hostile to our interests did not come up and attack us under water.

Q: Were you there when the Sabra and Shatila massacres took place?

EVANS: Yes.

Q: And the bombardment of Beirut, prior to that?

EVANS: That's right.

Q: Could you give me a bit of feeling about the attitude of our military, particularly toward the Israeli armed forces and the Israeli policy during that particular time? What were you getting?

EVANS: Well, as far as I could see, our military had nothing but great respect for the Israeli military. Our military realized what the State Department did not realize: that there was a major threat looming from the other side, the Arab side. We had good intelligence sharing with the Israelis. I was very impressed with the amount of intelligence and good intelligence that their navy had about Iranian, Syrian, hostile Lebanese and PLO activities, that were very threatening to our forces and to our interests in the area. You had a dichotomy growing that lead to the split, just before the bombing of the Marine headquarters, which I guess was in March or April of 1984. The Defense Department had a better assessment than the State Department. The State Department was terribly naive about our presence. They were talking about having our military build basketball courts. They were trying to have it both ways. They were trying to go into a hostile environment from the anti-Israeli forces' point of view, and yet, act as though we were there merely as benevolent peacekeepers. Therefore, we should be opening dental clinics and building them basketball courts, and playing basketball. At the time that George Shultz was telling Casper Weinberger that we should be building basketball courts and opening dental clinics, Weinberger was being told by his people that the Syrians were building facilities in the Bekaa Valley with Iranian money, and planning to send trucks loaded with bombs to bomb our forces. This was days, if not weeks, before the horrendous bombing that took place. I happened to be back in Washington at that time for briefings in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, so, I know whereof I speak on that issue. I at least feel I do.

Q: In the first place, it was a complicated business. First, we put our troops in to help get the Palestinians out after the Israelis colluded with some right wing Christian militia, and went in and slaughtered Palestinian families. We had already used our troops to help pull out the Palestinian armed forces. Almost by reflex, we let our Marines back in, along with the French

and Italians, I think. At that time, was there questioning at your admiral's headquarters about . . . "fine, but what is this about?" Later, this became a major issue . . . "What are we up to?"

EVANS: Yes, I think it is fair to say as we have seen in the past, and we are seeing in the present day, that policy makers decided to use U.S. military forces to carry out activities that are not those directly related to what the military thinks it should be doing: some sort of peacekeeping or separation of forces, or presence, or whatever you want to call it. You are right, with that mission, there was no tangible enemy to kill or beat. There was a great deal of frustration about being in an increasingly hostile environment where we could only take limited measures to protect our own forces. The purpose seemed to be just to hang on, while this nebulous process dragged on. This began with your question about what the military thought of Israel. I think the military perception was, and it certainly was my perception, based on all the evidence that I saw, that the PLO started the darn thing. The amount of hostile terrorist activity that came directly from Iran and Syria, as far as I know, is still going on. The creation and support of the training camps in Bekaa Valley were clearly supported financially by this Syrian/Iranian connection. This happened in the last few days of this stupid assassination attempt the Israelis did in Jordan. They occasionally bungle things and occasionally on a big scale. I think the perception that we were working under militarily was that this was a situation that had been brought on, as it normally is, by the Arabs' failure to adhere to proper behavior. Then, when you try to do something about it as police forces do sometimes in an urban riot, excessive force gets used and then all hell breaks loose. People forget the reason for the use of excessive force in the first place. That is the point I am trying to make. The PLO started it and certain things happened. But the given was that we were on the Israeli side. Whether they acted correctly or not the whole time was almost beside the point from the military point of view because they were our allies. They were and still are our NATO anchors. They are not in NATO, but they might just as well be.

Q: Well, there were some confrontations with these Israelis. One always thinks of the Israelis' tank that one of our Marine officers jumped up on with a pistol to make him stop moving in. Were you getting any reflections or concerns about a fairly heated-up Israeli force that was pushing in, and we were supposed to stop it, particularly at the lieutenant level and all? Was this a concern?

EVANS: Yes, in the sense that there was a concern that the situation was getting very ugly and messy. Neat lines of division as to who was the good guy and who was the bad guy, which is how the military likes to deal with it were disappearing. Of course, that doesn't always apply. It sure is not right in war. It was getting messy. There were a lot of doubts, as the summer of 1983 went on. I think it is fair to say that the U.S. military was increasingly unhappy with the civilian direction that it was getting because the mission became obscured. The mission seemed to be survival. Then, we had the major bombing which was a tremendous jolt to the headquarters and to everybody, including Admiral Crowe, particularly and all of us. There was this inevitable process of escalation. The Navy was not particularly happy with that, bringing in and dusting off the battleships, with the New Jersey bombarding the shore, which came later. I guess that was in 1984. We ruefully had to conclude that most of the shelling had missed its targets and probably more civilians were killed than anybody else. It was done for political purposes.

Q: When this was going on, you say you talked with officials. Was most of this driven by Washington's activists saying, "Don't just stand there, do something?"

EVANS: The whole thing was coming from Washington. The Naval command took orders. They didn't initiate anything. They grew increasingly unhappy with the orders they got and the failure to sense where this policy was leading, what the policy was, and if you could identify the policy, where it was taking you. When the Navy high command gets an order from Washington from the Joint Chiefs to carry out an operation, it is not as though I was asked what I thought about it. In some cases, I was, before it happened. That was a rarity. By that time, there was no need to know what I thought. The main thing I got involved in was informing other governments that all hell was going to break loose. The admiral wanted to make sure that the other parties were alerted beforehand. It very often involved calling embassies, like our embassies in Rome and Athens, to coordinate with them or inform them. They were informed in other ways too, but I had that particular job. Something like the New Jersey, of course, we were told to do. The chain of command, which was a very important and significant military activity, in that this was the first time a battleship had been used since World War II. The orders went to CINC/EUR in Germany, then to US/NAV/EUR, who at that time, was in Naples, then to the D/CINC/NAV/EUR, who was in London, then to Commander of the Sixth Fleet in Naples. That was the way the orders went.

Q: Was there any particular inquiry about responsibility for the bombing of the barracks and all? One of the issues was this very complicated command structure where people in London were essentially micro managing events on the ground in Lebanon. Was that a concern as this whole thing developed?

EVANS: Of course, from the point of view of the Command in London, they thought that was absolutely appropriate because that is where the Naval command was, and the Sixth Fleet works for London. That is the way it is. As you probably know, there have been proposals for years to abolish the London Command. It was saved at one critical point by Eisenhower. There are many arguments about whether the Command should just be abolished and put down in Naples. You would have one Naval Command co-located with the NATO Southern Command. So, that's where the Sixth Fleet is. Why have they got to give way to London? We had some acrimonious disputes with the Sixth Fleet. There was a lot of unhappiness between the Sixth Fleet operational people and NAV/EUR, the London Navy Command people. It was a cumbersome structure. If it wasn't for the entrenched interests one would want to scrap London and put it down in Naples. One of the reasons why we can't is the security angle. I think we have always felt that we wanted to have our Naval Command located in Britain rather than Italy.

Q: Well, there's the problem. I was Consul General in Naples, 1979 - 1981. If nothing else, you had the Camorra, which is the local Mafia that was a major problem there, among other things, as well as volcanoes, and earthquakes. While this Lebanon thing was going on, you were the liaison, for one thing, between our political-military in the State Department and the Near Eastern Bureau. Were you sensing a disquiet about developments in Lebanon at this time? Did you have the feeling that this had been picked up by higher ups, either in the White House or the Secretary of State, and all, and was getting out of the hands of the professionals or not?

EVANS: My perception was that George Shultz, himself, who I consider a professional, felt that we should be more pro-active. The frustration I was privy to was the military frustration. They got caught between a rock and a hard place in this. With this policy, they were put in to do the job that they felt they should do, which is fight somebody and win, and then, get out of there. But instead, they were put in to stay. They were exposed increasingly to physical danger when it wasn't quite clear what they were staying for and where we were going, and what we were trying to do. The overriding frustration in the whole four years I was there, was about terrorism increasing from 1984 on. The focus of the Command was in combating terrorism. In 1985, we conducted one of the most successful counter terrorist operations ever in bringing the Achille hijackers down. It was very exciting. I was very much involved with that as we tried to find the Achille Lauro.

Q: Could you explain what the Achille Lauro situation was?

EVANS: I'm trying to remember when it was. I think it was in 1985. The Achille Lauro was an Italian flag cruise ship which was hijacked by a band of, . . . I forget which group it was. It was one of the Palestinian groups.

Q: It was the Abbas group or something.

EVANS: Abu Abbas.

Q: I don't know if you call it left or right wing, but it was not mainline.

EVANS: It may have been the PLFP, Palestinian Liberation Front, Popular Front Liberation, or one of those. We all know, that there is the PLO and then there are all these other groups, certainly not doing something that the PLO disagrees with. Anyway, these hijackers boarded the ship to make a statement. In the process, they pushed a man named Leon Klinghoffer, who was in a wheelchair, off the boat, and to his death.

Q: He was an American citizen and Jewish.

EVANS: He was a Jewish American citizen. For one reason or another, they took a dislike to him, or he talked back to them, or whatever. He was chucked overboard. That brought tension to the whole thing. That is for sure. Then, the hijackers took off in a boat. We, in the Command in London, tried to find the boat. Well, obviously the Sixth Fleet was looking for it. But, the charts and the reporting responsibility were up in London. I remember sitting with the intelligence people in our big room with a map, pinpointing all the . . .

Q: When you say the boat, you mean the cruise ship?

EVANS: No. Well, yes, the cruise ship itself. For a while, we couldn't find it. I forget the entire series of events. But the hijackers made their way to Egypt. They left Egypt in a plane and we intercepted the plane in midair. That was extremely exciting. That was directed by the Operations people working with the Intelligence people in London. Eventually, the plane was brought down, escorted down in Italy.

Q: *Sicily and Sigonella.*

EVANS: I see that you are well aware of this.

Q: *Yes, it was a major incident.*

EVANS: I got involved, at that point in liaising with the Italians and others. It was tremendous that it was happening so fast. Well, as you may recall, the Italians were highly embarrassed that this happened. Instead of this event being welcomed, it was a major political embarrassment for the Italians. They eventually ended up letting the hijacker go, as I recall.

Q: *They let Abu Abbas, but not the hijackers themselves.*

EVANS: That was infuriating to the admiral and the military, of course. There was this constant problem that if you catch somebody, and it's true in local police work here too, you finally catch the bad guy and then due to one thing or another, social pressures, or whatever, you have to let him go. It is very frustrating for law enforcement authorities. Nevertheless, the mid-air interception was a great achievement by the U.S. Navy. That was one of the highlight operations that took place at the headquarters. After the bombing of the Marine barracks, the attention of the Command was really more and more focused on counter-terrorism. That was the thrust of every daily briefing. That was the thrust of the intelligence activities. That was something I was brought into increasingly. I was amazed at how much evidence there was of both the Iranian, and particularly the Syrian, support for all of this terrorism. Much has been written about that. We have never acted with the Syrians in the way I think we should have given the hard evidence that we had about their support for terrorism. That is another issue.

Q: *Did you sense a frustration while sitting in on briefings and planning? A navy is not designed to combat terrorism, as an army is not designed to do that. You do the best you can. Did you sense real frustration on the part of our military that you were looking at?*

EVANS: Of course, absolute frustration and hostility to our own political decision makers, who, in the opinion of the military, were not acting on the intelligence that we either knew or developed. They were simply letting these terrorists continue. That was the major frustration, plus being sitting ducks. Until we were taken out of Lebanon. Still, there was a feeling by the Navy that they were being used for political reasons that were not necessarily clear and could not necessarily be justified. These were political decisions that were taken by civilians comfortably sitting back in their plush offices in Washington or having a drink in the Army-Navy Club discussing the death of young men at sea. That was the feeling and it was a very strong one. In a sense, I shared that frustration with them. I must say, I developed a very high regard for our Navy.

Q: *Were you involved with, or was it on your watch, when there was the bombing of Libya?*

EVANS: Yes, that was one of the last things. That was in April of 1986.

Q: Could you explain what started that and how your office dealt with that?

EVANS: Parallel to the events going on in and off of Lebanon, was the ongoing concern about Libya and its activities in and support of terrorism, sometimes linked to the Syrian nexus, sometimes completely independent of it. Qadhafi, head of Libya, was emboldened, I think by other terrorist activities going on. He, perhaps, felt that he wanted to show them that he could play the terrorist game too. In any event, the Libyans were active in Europe. There was the bombing of the Berlin nightclub, La Belle, which was regarded as the result of Libyan terrorists, although I think you have argued that it could have been the Syrians, too. In any event, the official U.S. policy was that it was the Libyans who were involved. The second Libyan activity took place in the Gulf of Sidra, which is the Gulf north of Libya, in the Mediterranean, and brings into question how far a country has sovereign rights from ashore. The Libyans felt that they owned all of the Gulf of Sidra, which makes a large indentation. Libya, in effect, is like a "U." The Gulf of Sidra goes down the middle. Libya felt that they should have the whole area of the Gulf of Sidra. The U.S. position was that it was part of the Mediterranean Sea and, therefore, the Libyans only had sovereignty three miles off the coast. That meant the middle of the Gulf of Sidra was international waters, according to our theory. It was a constant challenge that the Libyans would try to assert their right to the whole of the Gulf of Sidra, we would then assert our right to be there and there would be some limited hostilities. As I recall, the issue that directly lead to the decision to bomb Libya in April of 1986, was the alleged Libyan role in the La Belle bombing in Berlin. That operation was the third major highlight, if you want to call it that, of the time I was there. It was taken in conjunction with the Air Force operating out of Mildenhall (U.S. Air Force base, England). One of the tricky diplomatic questions was getting flight permission for these Air Force planes to get down to Libya. The French refused them permission. So, the planes had to fly a longer way to get there, avoiding France. That was one issue. There were also other issues about the Naval forces. The Navy actually was more of a support for that operation which was a bombing mission carried about by Mendenhall. As I recall, there were Naval operations in support of it. We worked, of course, extremely closely with the U.S. Air Force.

Q: Was there any dialogue at that time? We had the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean with carrier forces with a hell of a lot of planes and all. All of a sudden, we say we have to use F-111s, which are Air Force planes based in England. It became a very sticky diplomatic incident. France got mad. We got very mad at France. Was there any discussion that you recall about people saying, "Hell, the Sixth Fleet can do this? Why do we need these Air Force planes?"

EVANS: Yes, I think there was. I'm trying to remember if there was any answer that I was aware of. The Navy felt very proprietary about Libya. Libyans are our problem. In fact, I went to Malta to talk with our ambassador about Libyan use of Malta for terrorist purposes. Speaking of that, you may recall that it was in Malta that the Libyan role was established that it was involved in the bombing of PanAm 103 in December of 1988. The Navy, I think, was a little chagrined that the Air Force was called in. But the explanation was that the Air Force could fly higher than the Navy. There was tremendous concern that no pilot be shot down and captured. I think that was one of the major reasons. Therefore, I think it was felt that the Air Force, even though there was this longer distance to go, could carry out a cleaner or safer raid than the Navy. There might have been more casualties with the Navy which were unacceptable. Obviously, the last thing you

would want is a captured U.S. military person. Then, you have to go and give away everything that you intended to be getting back. I think that was the main reason.

Q: Did you have much diplomatic footwork to do after this Libyan raid, to explain what we were doing and all?

EVANS: We all did in a sense. Particularly, when, as usual these things end up killing a lot of civilians. However, the point that perhaps we made was that we were sending a message to Qadhafi. It appeared after that time that Qadhafi did hold back on his terrorist operations. You could argue that PanAm 103 was his answer to it. I don't know if that was the case or not. It was two years later, and there may have been other reasons why PanAm 103 happened. I'm not totally sure that the Libyans were the ones involved in PanAm 103. In general, it was felt that it was successful because it did stop the very prevalent and overt terrorist operations of Libya.

Q: What about in the Atlantic, actions against the Soviet. Did that come under your admiral's jurisdiction? I'm thinking about various exercises run up near the Kola Peninsula, and things like that.

EVANS: Anything that was to the east of Iceland was under our command, yes. All the submarines that came down passed Norway, between Iceland and United Kingdom, were definitely tracked by our Command and under our authority. The Naval presence in Iceland, however, I think was under the Atlantic Command. But we worked very closely with it. The space from Iceland to the United Kingdom was under our command.

Q: The Secretary of Navy was touting a very aggressive stance of the U.S. Navy that we weren't going to wait for the Soviets to come to us. We were going to go up the Kola Peninsula. What were the professional Navy people were talking about the posturing, or maybe it wasn't the posturing, but the attitude of the Secretary of Navy. How did they react at that point?

EVANS: I don't remember that being a major issue at the headquarters, frankly. I felt that the Navy headquarters was very confident in its ability to track submarines and to be one step ahead of the Soviet Navy, although they certainly respected the Soviet Navy. I don't remember that being an issue, frankly. At least it was not one that I was in any way involved in.

Q: What about the Soviet Navy and the Mediterranean? Was the feeling that it could be taken care of rather quickly if a war started?

EVANS: Yes. Again, that was the focus of every morning's Intelligence briefing. Exactly how many, what type, and where were Soviet naval craft, how many were in the Black Sea ready to exit and about to come out of repair, that sort of thing. I never remember a situation where it was felt that the Soviets had more than we felt we could take care of. The U.S. Navy presence in the Mediterranean was probably the biggest political-military challenge that the Command had. Because whether it was Spain, France, or if you went around the rim of the Mediterranean, there were various problems and they had to be assayed. There was some dispute over the repair facility that we wanted to lease or use or something like that, or the participation, or the rights' issue or court call issues or hostility issues. There were times, of course, when we simply

couldn't dock in Greece because of hostilities and terrorist threats. Then, there was the Turkish/Greece conflict, although that was more of a NATO issue. We had continuing issues with the Italians of various sorts, although I must say, the Italians were regarded by the U.S. military as the bedrock of our existence and mission in the Mediterranean. Without Italy, everybody knew we wouldn't have a leg to stand on. I traveled with one or another admiral to Spain several times, to France, to Italy, twice a month, probably, to Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Tunisia, Morocco, Malta, Cyprus to try to resolve problems. Some of the travel was protocol. That was another part of my function too. Every time the admiral entertained, unless it was a small private dinner, I was invited as a matter of protocol. The military headquarters hosted an enormous number of visits. There was a separate English woman protocol officer who did all the seating. She would talk to me a lot about people and try to get biographies of the ambassadors that were coming. We would have dinners, and we had to do guest lists. In addition to a very active military command, it was also a tremendous protocol and diplomatic military command. That was a lot of the activity.

Q: What was the feeling of the headquarters toward France and its military?

EVANS: I think that the sentiment I felt was that the French didn't really pull their fair share. They were trying to get the benefits of working with us and being allied with us, without paying their fair dues.

Q: How about the Greek/Turkish dispute? Was that a thorn in your side?

EVANS: That was mostly a NATO issue. For example, when my admiral went there, we went to discuss strictly bilateral American/Greek or American/Turkish issues. When the admiral went there in his NATO hat, he went there with the other POLAD from Naples. Then, they discussed Naples issues. The NATO admiral in his NATO hat forbade himself in his other hat from talking about NATO issues. The Greek/Turkish dispute was one that I had enough of back in PM. I was glad to be out of it. We were aware of the problems which occasionally it made it difficult to deal particularly with the Greeks, on whom we were very dependent for facilities and repair facilities, and basing facilities. The Greeks were very supportive of the PLO, we felt, and lenient toward terrorism in general. They were not reliable partners in that sense. There was unhappiness with that. Turkey was viewed, again, from our national point of view, as a very strong ally. Our military seemed to have a really good relationship with the Turks. But the Greeks were difficult.

Q: In 1986, you left POLAD. Where did you go?

EVANS: I came back to Washington. As you can imagine, after coming off of an assignment like that, it was a let-down. I hung around for a while. Then, I was assigned in the fall to the Counter-Terrorism Office, which was headed by Jerry Bremer at the time. CT, I think it was called.

LAWRENCE P. TAYLOR
Economic Counselor

London (1985-1989)

Lawrence P. Taylor was born in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1940. He graduated in 1963 from the University of Ohio with a degree in history and economics and received his MA from American University. He served as a member of the Peace Corps in the province of Antioquia in 1963. In addition to Colombia, he was posted to Yugoslavia, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Canada, England, and Estonia. Mr. Taylor was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: *Larry, you went to London. You were in London from '85 to when?*

TAYLOR: To '89.

Q: *What were you doing there?*

TAYLOR: I did more than one thing. I started out consistent with what I had been doing in Jakarta and then in Ottawa with an energy specialty, viewing the geopolitics of oil and gas from the luxury of London with the myriad of contacts and expertise that was there. It was a great listening post, in addition to being an important oil- and gas-producing country of its own. But then half-way through I became the economic counselor at the embassy, and I also had a several-month TDY in which I was the staff director for the Laird Commission, which had been set up to look into the security situation at embassy Moscow following the discovery that some of the Marine guards had let Russian nationals and probably KGB people into the embassy.

Q: *Well, let's start first a little about the embassy's structure. Who was the Ambassador in '85, when you arrived?*

TAYLOR: Charlie Price.

Q: *And how did he operate, from your perspective?*

TAYLOR: He operated from a very lofty position in which he increasingly became effective at the higher levels of British society, including with Prime Minister Thatcher and many others, really did a tremendous job of networking and establishing close relationships and contacts with the people who were running Britain at the time. He was a very friendly and nice person to be around, but he seemed to take very little interest - I think, as appropriate in a mission like that - in the specific management of the embassy and its various offices and functions.

Q: *Who was the DCM?*

TAYLOR: Ray Seitz was the DCM.

Q: *Who later became -*

TAYLOR: Who later became ambassador and who had been in Britain earlier, and he was just an unbelievable fountain of information, knowledge, insight, and diplomatic skills with respect

to the American relationship with Britain, and he was a real treasure and a real pleasure to work with.

Q: Talk a bit about the Britain you found when you arrived, 1985, particularly economically and its political consequences, too.

TAYLOR: Well, that Britain had just passed over a significant threshold with the breaking of the coal strike and the coal miners' union and the triumph of Mrs. Thatcher through that crisis and, I think, began a period of clear sailing with respect to Thatcherism on the economic side, and so for the four years that I was there, it was a Britain that was continually on the rise economically and equally important in its self-confidence, so the psychological dimension of what I would deem the heyday of Thatcherism, between, say, '85 and '89, was clearly apparent. In fact, by '89, when I left, it had grown into a type of hubris, in which, at least intellectually and psychologically, they had overreached and thought that they had invented Nirvana.

Q: In your perspective, were we cheering this Thatcherism on?

TAYLOR: Oh, very much so. We were very closely associated with it. President Reagan, Mrs. Thatcher, I think were political and philosophical soulmates. The United States Embassy was very close to the government of the day, not just on the economic side, because that mainly was cheerleading (we didn't have, you know, a big *government* economic relationship with Britain - we had a big private sector economic relationship with Britain), but on the international issues of the day, how to deal with the Soviet Union, how to deal with terrorism, how to deal with Libya in particular, Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan were co-leaders in the Western Alliance and in the process of taking the Alliance in a certain direction in policy and strategic terms. So yes, we were very close to that government.

Q: When you talk about Reagan and Thatcher, how about the embassy, the professionals in the Foreign Service? I mean obviously you've command, but were they sort of with the program, too?

TAYLOR: Well, to a certain extent. On the economic side, I think we all believed that Britain was doing far better than it had been before Mrs. Thatcher took control. I think we all believed that breaking that coal strike and, in particular, breaking the political power of Arthur Scargill and his people was a positive development. On the political side, it is interesting. The embassy did a good job of covering the waterfront, and I think a lot of us found that the Tory politicians of the day, the people who were running the place, were a bit stuffy and arrogant, but we got along with them. We rather enjoyed more personally the Labor politicians, who seemed more down to earth and real people, but the embassy did a good job of covering the entire scene there. It was still a big embassy. This was before the big downsizing that was to come six or seven years later. It was probably overstaffed, but that level of staffing allowed the embassy the luxury of some really excellent coverage of a whole variety of issues.

Q: What about British petroleum? We're really talking about Scottish oil, aren't we?

TAYLOR: Right.

Q: North Sea oil. How did we view developments there?

TAYLOR: Well, in what sense do you mean?

Q: Well, you were the fuel attaché, or whatever you want to call it, and you've got a lot of fuel coming out of the North Sea. Were we keeping an eye on it?

TAYLOR: Well, we certainly kept an eye on it. It wasn't hard. It's a modern economy with good solid companies, good solid government; and therefore statistics and even policies and policy trends were easily knowable in a timely way. There was a concern still, in 1985, when I first went there, that Britain might be country that would want to go around the margins, fool around with production levels and so forth in order to support a higher oil price. That proved definitely not to be the case, and I think within a year everybody understood that clearly; but there was some interest in that in Washington and some difference of view in Washington when I went out there in '85.

What London was really great for, though, was as a listening post for the world, and this is why we were able to use the position I held in order to do an awful lot of reporting on what we were hearing about policy developments and policy trends in the Middle East, in OPEC as an organization, and in the global energy market. London's just so full of so many people who are high-powered and have access to information on a global basis, that the listening-post aspect of the job, within a year or so, became more important than the purely domestic part of it.

Q: Was there any, while you were there, keeping an eye on Norwegian oil?

TAYLOR: Oh, absolutely, although the embassy in Norway obviously had primary responsibility for that. We were interested in Norway as a producer, but as a big gas producer as well, not just the oil side, and particularly there was concern and interest in Washington that Norway, even more than Britain, was likely to, around the margins, adopt production and export qualities that tried to support the price of oil.

Q: London was much more the center of sort of oil interests than, say, Paris was?

TAYLOR: Oh, yes, oh, yes. Everybody was in London or came to London, and the number of international conferences at the time on these subjects that attracted the global players, for one reason or another, trying to make deals and so forth, and the energy seminars at the time that Robert Mabro held at Oxford on international energy issues, and that Paul Frankel held, just attracted people from all over the world, so it was an endless stream of the key players, ministers and presidents and heads of oil companies, consultant, contractors, everybody under the sun passed through London, and if you worked hard, you could get to know quite a few of them.

Q: What were our particular American concerns, and obviously your job, during this '85-'89 period in the oil field and gas that were of particular concern to the United States? You had mentioned controlled production? Were we looking at a revived OPEC, or what?

TAYLOR: Well, there was still concern. I think at that time there was still concern as to the power of OPEC, although the sense was that it was weak and getting weaker. But the key really happened, as I remember it - I may be wrong, but I think it was right after I got there, in September of '85; there was certainly a long stream of reporting from me on it; maybe I remember it selectively and when people look at it, it won't be as interesting as I think - there was a conference, one of these big conferences I referred to, and the chairman, the president of the OPEC conference at the time was an Indonesian energy minister, Subroto, whom I knew quite well and I knew from my time in Indonesia and his advisors, and I remember he gave a speech that, in my discussions with the Indonesians and other members of OPEC, I think we correctly reported at the time was an absolute bellwether clear signal that OPEC was going to stop supporting the price and instead go for market share. And that could only mean one thing - that the price was just going to go down very dramatically. And I remember being puzzled for at least two and a half months while the oil price rose very sharply on the international markets, thinking, I must be nuts, I just don't understand what I'm hearing, or maybe they're wrong, maybe they're misleading me. But no, eventually, everybody sort of got on the same wavelength, and in fact, prices collapsed in a period where nobody was willing to restrain production, and the Saudis in particular wanted to go for market share.

So all of that was a very interesting sort of time for us as we sort of had led the information and reporting that OPEC would be moving in this direction and that we thought it had certain consequences for global supply and demand and therefore pricing, and for a couple of months it looked like we were totally and absolutely out to lunch. But then it turned out that that was correct, and the market was flooded with oil, and the price came down dramatically.

Q: What were the concerns - this was a period when Iran and Iraq were going at each other full bore-

TAYLOR: It sure was.

Q: -how did this play into what we were looking at from the London perspective?

TAYLOR: Well, it didn't play directly into what I was looking at. Another luxury we had at the time, and maybe still do to some extent, is that London had a couple of jobs in the Political Section that really were regional reporting jobs. They used London as a listening post, too. One was on Africa, particularly South Africa; the other one was on the Middle East, and particularly Gulf issues. And there was an officer in the Political Section who followed Iran, Iraq, and many of the same countries that I was following, but she followed it from the perspective of the question you were asking, the politics and the security issues associated with the Middle East. And London was a terrific listening post for those as well as for the economic and oil issues.

Q: Well, what about countries like Libya? Was that sort of on your watch list?

TAYLOR: Yes, as well as hers, because the Libyans had an interesting presence in London, and there were a lot of people there talking to them. And so we would occasionally see them at gatherings that we went to, and we would certainly be talking to the people who would be talking to them all the time.

Q: *Well, did you feel that the -*

TAYLOR: Not an embassy, by the way. They had a commercial presence, but it was a very political commercial thing.

Q: *Well, did you feel, at the time, that the Libyans were trying to throw, using the British term, a spanner into the works, or were they out to get money like everyone else?*

TAYLOR: Both. I mean, the perfect situation is you throw a spanner into the works and you profit.

Q: *Again, from your perspective, how about the French? What sort of role were they playing in the politics of oil, if any?*

TAYLOR: I didn't see much of a role, except that they were really heavy, as they've always been, and continue to be, on the commercial side, company and government working hand-in-glove to obtain benefits, either exploration rights or major projects and so forth. I thought French petroleum diplomacy was heavily commercial rather than, sort of, political in its purposes.

Q: *Were you there when we conducted the raid on Libya?*

TAYLOR: Sure was.

Q: *How did that play in the embassy?*

TAYLOR: I think it played well in the embassy. I think it played well.

Q: *How about the British? How did they react?*

TAYLOR: I think predictably. The government of the day, which was supportive and a participant in the process, was quite strongly in favor, obviously, and the opposition parties, I think, raised sensible and interesting questions and critiques. It was not anything that brought the British public out in demonstrations in large numbers pro and con. The predictable left-wingers held a few smaller ones. But it was something that was consistent with the British government's policy of the day, supported and participated in in a variety of ways by the British government, and which engendered an awful lot, in typical British fashion, I think, of very thoughtful and critical analysis in the media.

Q: *Did Nigeria play any particular role, because there had been that time between Britain and Nigeria before on the oil side? Did that get involved?*

TAYLOR: Yes, and particularly inasmuch as one of the headquarters of Royal Dutch Shell is in London, there on the South Bank, and the head of Shell at the time had been heavily involved in Nigeria in his own background and history. So yes - it wasn't a really big thing, nor at the time

was there much interest in it from Washington, but we did report on it, based on just conversations we would have mainly with Shell.

Q: Was there anything that, being this hub of the oil business there -

TAYLOR: I'm not sure it's the hub of the oil business, but it's probably the hub of information about the oil business - right.

Q: Were you getting anything from your masters back in Washington saying push this or push that?

TAYLOR: I think there was an incessant desire for more and more information. It's hard to believe today how important it seemed that staying on top of the geopolitics of oil and gas was at the time, and on top of OPEC issues. And I had a very strong international- (end of tape)

I talked quite regularly with even the deputy assistant secretary of the State Department in the energy office there and similar levels around town in Treasury and in the CIA.

Q: Were there any developments in the European Economic Union (I guess it was called the EEC then)? There had been this gas line that was supposed to come from the Soviet Union to Western Europe, to which we - I think you've alluded to it before - had taken great exception. Where was that at this point?

TAYLOR: We were busy hammering nails in its coffin, I guess, trying to do that in a variety of ways, although the British and we, again, sort of saw eye to eye on the strategic and security aspects of that, and I think most of the action in that was on the Continent, in Brussels and in Paris and the IEA, in order to build a case that it really wasn't necessary and so forth.

Q: Well, when you became an economic counselor, you were looking at the British economy more.

TAYLOR: Well, what I tried to do, because, again, the section was very big at the time - it's probably much smaller today - what I tried to do was manage the section rather than do the job myself. Now in that sense, everything that was going on in the section I had a responsibility for, but what we tried to do was establish priorities, strategic objectives, and make sure the officers in the section were working to those priorities and toward those objectives. And a lot of that really was to beef up our ability to understand what was happening in Europe, in the EU, on European economic policy, through the insights that the British could give us, rather than to simply manage the embassy as though our job was solely to conduct the bilateral economic relationship between Britain and the United States.

Q: Almost everything in our relationship with Great Britain is really more than bilateral, isn't it? I mean it very quickly takes on not necessarily a partnership but an interest in all sorts of other areas.

TAYLOR: What I found, and maybe France is the same way - I've never served in France, so I'm not sure - but what I found in Britain - and it's the only other country that I know of in which it is true - was a natural desire and ability to think in global terms, much as U.S. foreign policy leadership does, and not to just see things through the prism of a bilateral relationship or a regional relationship but to think in global interests and global objectives and to approach issues through those. Now that gave us an affinity and, again, a common language - those things gave us an ability to have a relationship with the British that I thought was quite unusual, and in the Reagan-Thatcher period it was very much a partnership. For better or worse, that's what it was.

Q: Were there ever times when within the embassy you'd be saying, "Damn it, I wish Margaret Thatcher wouldn't keep jerking our President around," because it sounded like she was sometimes acting like almost the senior partner in the thing, in that she had very fixed ideas and Reagan thought they were good.

TAYLOR: And vice versa. I think they had a real affinity for each other's philosophy, for the direction in which they had managed to take their countries, for the sense that on a global basis the values that they cherished seemed to be in the ascendancy. So I'm not sure that we felt that Mrs. Thatcher was jerking President Reagan's chain, but rather that it was an unusual and strong partnership that seemed to be working very well.

Q: What about the British economy? Were we looking at some of the cracks in the Thatcher system? Particularly, I think of the north as having rather severe unemployment problems, that the south under the old rust and coal industry were having problems, compared to the newer types of industry.

TAYLOR: I think the record is spotty on that basis, frankly. We did recognize those things, that regions were falling behind and were in disrepair, that inner cities were having unusually difficult problems, American-style problems, not British-style problems, that there was an income gap developing that had social and political consequences. I remember starting out a cable once that London was a great place to live if you were rich or a foreign diplomat, because no British person unless they were rich could live in London any more, at least not in a nice section of London. So these things got on the radar screen, but I do have to acknowledge that, taking in the big picture, we were overwhelmingly supportive of the direction the British economy was moving and of Mrs. Thatcher's policies, and in retrospect I think that's right. I think the record shows that that's right, but as a matter of good professional analysis and performance, I probably should have anointed somebody, or played the role myself, as a stronger devil's advocate, to continually challenge that view. Again, I think the record shows the view was right, but we probably should have subjected a more critical pattern over it before just concluding it was.

Q: Were we paying any particular attention to Northern Ireland? I'm thinking from an economic point of view, because the Irish problem, which is certainly looking better as of the last week or so, in 1998, but Northern Ireland had a lot of these industries that were going down, shipbuilding and things of this nature. Were we looking at it, concerned, trying to do anything about helping?

TAYLOR: Just a little bit. Clearly the peace process there, for what ever it is at the time, the security situation, was the dominant fact of the way we approached Northern Ireland. We recognized what was happening in the economy, and in a few isolated cases where there was an American commercial interest at stake we did advocate it, either as an investment or in some way, but the economic dimension of Northern Ireland, which is really what you're asking about, was not well integrated into the embassy's approach to Northern Ireland. It sort of was like a little dangling participle off to the side.

Q: Was there anything else, sort of occurrences or anything that particularly got you involved?

TAYLOR: Well, there were just so many exciting things going on continuously in London. I think we did do a really good job of evaluating the European single market concept through our access to British thinking and information that we could obtain in London. I think we did a really good job, along with other embassies, but it was right at the beginning, where we really started covering intensely the EEU through the period of the rotating presidency of the EEU. And I think we did set a great example of how to do that during the presidency period. The only other thing that happened to me while I was there that is known - that I mentioned earlier - is that I was pulled out for several months to do this special job.

MILES S. PENDELTON JR.
Political Counselor
London (1985-1989)

Miles S. Pendleton, Jr. was born in New Jersey in 1939. He graduated from Yale University in 1961 and received his MPA from Harvard University in 1967. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1967, his postings included Burundi, Tel Aviv, Brussels and Paris. Mr. Pendleton was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: Well, you went to London from when to when? '85 to

PENDLETON: *to '89.*

Q: As political counselor. What does being political counselor in London mean?

PENDLETON: Well, that's an excellent question. I tussled with that because you are at a strange level. I used to describe it as being like the filling in a sandwich. You're at a level that isn't high enough to have your host country see you as the key representative of the US or low enough to have the kind of targeted expertise that is respected, about either arms control or the Middle East or what have you. So in a way, I was continuing what I was doing, which was trying to work with particularly the deputy chief of mission on strategy as to where we needed to put our energy and what we needed to do in terms of working with Washington, whether it be formal reporting or informal, and at the same time trying vigorously to find the right level for contacts outside the embassy and develop associations and friendships which you could build into a pattern of

communication, --not only with those who were in power but those, in this case from the UK Labor Party, who were out of power. All the while I was running a fairly large section. I had in London, just as had been true in the previous really three or four jobs in the Department, phenomenally able people reporting to me. Robin Raphel, who had been working for Larry Eagleburger, was there doing the Middle East. Bob Frazier, who was later killed en route to Sarajevo, and became a deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, was covering Africa. He had been very close to Chet Crocker and also did a lot of very useful over-arching domestic political reporting. Sandy Vershbow was the deputy political counselor, and is now our ambassador to NATO. There were many others(in other words a cadre of people(Raphel is now our ambassador to Tunisia(who were self-propelled and who quickly had earned the respect of the British. And so you looked at what the political counselor could do, and it wasn't always easy. Moreover, the deputy chief of mission, Ray Seits, had served in London early in his career and had followed the Conservative Party as well as Africa, at that time and many of the Conservatives he had known as a young officer pitched up again in government or near government by the time he was back as DCM. So I was perpetually attempting to try to find ways to reach out at levels that might be above or broader than what the folks who worked with me were able to do or doing, without intruding on the Ambassador and the DCM's contacts.

But in a way it was great. You could read about somebody in the newspaper and call them up and say, "Would you like to join me for lunch?" or "My wife and I are having a dinner party next Thursday. We're having some interesting people. We thought you might like to come." And more often than not, they would. I never dreamed you could just read about very busy people and call them up, but if you're representing the United States of America, you can, and it was astonishing how this sort of thing could lead to lasting friendships and open doors..

Of course, I had worked previously very closely with the British Embassy through the Falklands war and found that, for instance, the deputy chief of mission of the British Embassy in Washington had returned to London and was the political director at the Foreign Office. We had first met at our summer home in Maine, where he'd come with another British guest. He had graduated from the same college at Cambridge my father had. So there were ties that were beginning to build that went back a few years that allowed me to have a very frank and easy interchange with the British, which was always pretty easy as it was, and I could play that role. My father-in-law had been a British diplomat, and we had family members and lots of friendships my wife and I could build on, and I think the quality of our reporting was really excellent and the quality of our interaction was outstanding. I think it is more of a challenge for people to be a counselor than you might imagine, and it's a shame that those jobs have been basically degraded over recent years because people are so dreadfully afraid that if they haven't been deputy chief of mission in at least a tiny post, they won't get promoted into the Senior Foreign Service. Being political counselor in a place like London won't do it for you, and I think that's unfortunate.

Q: Who was our ambassador when you arrived in '85?

PENDLETON: It was Charlie Price, whom I had known (and previously mentioned) when he was preparing to go to Brussels as ambassador when I was helping look after Northern European Affairs. He was from Kansas City, Missouri, was a banker and owned something called the Price

Candy Company. His wife Carol was close to Nancy Reagan. Over time, both in Brussels and in London, both Prices became closer and closer to the Reagans. I retain a lot of fondness for Charlie Price. He was quintessentially American, a big man, an open man, a man who valued his professional staff, would listen to you and frequently do as you wanted, but good fun to be with. And I think that the combination of him as ambassador and Ray Seitz, who was the quintessential professional diplomat, as the number two actually worked very well. They both got along very well with the upper reaches of the British Government. Ray encouraged all of us, including the Ambassador to pay careful and ongoing attention to the Labor Party folk, who were on the outs. We've had almost all the members of the present Labor Party cabinet in power in Britain to my house for dinner or to my table for lunch. And we had a very good dialogue with them. Charlie Price bought into that as being a worthwhile exercise, although he was a strong Reaganite and I think, obviously, enjoyed those who were in power, the Conservatives, more. His wife enjoyed the aristocrats and landed gentry more than the rest of us did, but Charlie was willing to try to balance it all out.

Q: Did a new ambassador come before you left?

PENDLETON: Yes, the amiable Henry Catto of Texas. He replaced Charlie Price and then went on to run USIA. I had known him a bit when he was chief of protocol. He came essentially without his wife and seemed both right at home and rather unfocused at the outset. I was reassigned before I could take the full measure of his substantive focus. His arrival did mean that a half-dozen of us could go with him when he went to Buckingham Palace to present his credentials to the Queen. We were presented too. I found her surprisingly shy and stiff despite all the years of putting up with these ceremonies. In recent years Henry Catto has been of help to me in terms of access to a Texas doctor. We both have the same disease.

In my view, the embassy did good work. I thought when I went to London, that maybe the time had come to have much smaller embassies or maybe no embassies at all in some countries. But I quickly changed my mind. It became clear that embassies have a role in terms of building connections which can be very important over time, and they also can be interpreters, in a way. For instance, when George Shultz came on his first visit after I arrived and was pressing the UK foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, about a variety of issues (they each had about 20 cards with an issue on each, and they would work through them really quite informally). Sir Geoffrey said over and over again, "I will have to talk to my partners about it" and blah-blah-blah. It was clear to me that George Shultz didn't get what was being said. The word partners meant "our EC [now EU] partners." To Shultz it seemed to mean either the other people in government or maybe the opposition party or somebody. It didn't mean the Europeans one whit. And I had to send him a note saying, "When he uses the word partners, he's talking about the other EU countries." And I suddenly realized that there may be reasons to have embassies that I had fallen into the trap of overlooking.

Q: Well, I think one of the things I've noticed in this is how you feel about the diplomatic apparatus depends upon where you sit, and those who've been sort of at the hub of power, as you were with the undersecretary and all, sort of having the feeling that decisions are made here and this is the way it should be. That we're doing it and people out there will sort of take care of it, but it's not of the essence, and it's easy if you're in the center if the action in Washington to lose

sight of what embassies do. And that's supposed to keep the relation oiled, to obtain the information, and to sort of explain what is possible and not possible.

PENDLETON: Precisely, and they often do it a lot better than those of us who spend a great deal of time in Washington think. Embassies are an investment which I would hate to see given up, and I came increasingly to hate to see consulates given up, both because they're excellent training ground for younger officers or less experienced officers and because they allow you to have insights into part of the world that you wouldn't otherwise have paid attention in terms of US interests. We were going to close Edinburgh in the mid-1980s, and I see that next month it's going to be the "Post of the Month" in the State Department Newsletter, almost a decade after it was to be closed in an economy drive. But when Pan Am 103 went down on December 21, 1988, if we hadn't had a consulate in Edinburgh, we would have had a much more difficult time dealing with the issues. Not only the issues of the moment but related issues that went on for years, whether they be the legal dealing with questions or the belongings of the American citizens who were killed.

Q: You were there during the end of Thatcher, weren't you?

PENDLETON: As she neared the end of her tenure as Prime Minister..

Q: What was the feeling of the embassy at the time? Margaret Thatcher, did you feel that she was transforming Britain for the better?

PENDLETON: Well, you have to see it against the backdrop of what the Labor Party was like at that point, because the Labor Party --which is in power now-- is very different from the Labor Party at the end of Mrs. Thatcher's reign. We did go through the election of '88, when the Labor Party had a number of fundamental questions about relations with NATO, and NATO was key to our optic related to the future of Europe, our role in Europe. In that regard, Mrs. Thatcher, to the end of her reign, continued to look to us like a person who had not only helped transform Britain very usefully but understood the transatlantic bedrock and the role of NATO and the role of course struggling, with what its relationship would and should be like across the Channel. But it was hard not to have a great deal of respect for Mrs. Thatcher, even though she had her quirks, and still does. And we did tend to have a great deal of respect for her and her ministers. But that respect was, I think, enhanced by the fact that we believed there were tendencies within the Labor Party that could really be quite inimical to US fundamental interests. We set out in a very organized way to help the members of the Labor Party who were rising to understand what our concerns were, particularly about NATO, and why we were concerned. And I think we played a very useful educational role in the process. The embassy was often the one place in town, people kept telling us, where journalists and politicians from all different persuasions would run into each other and have a dialogue, because so often, in Britain as in many countries, political life is truncated along the lines of whatever party you're related to, and people don't talk directly to each other; they talk through the television.

Q: Who was the leader of the Labor Party?

PENDLETON: It was Neil Kinnock, who is now one of the EU commissioners in Brussels for the United Kingdom. He was not a very strong (thank God!) leader of the Labor Party, because he had ideas that really were pretty scattershot and lopsided, from our point of view. I think everybody in the embassy who dealt with him liked him a lot, but because he was the leader of the Labor Party his time was much more sought-after than some others, and we had less chance to sustain a dialogue with him than we would have liked. I think there was a feeling that we weren't going to be able to affect his views to the degree that would be helpful if Labor was to come to power. We wanted him to understand what was on the mind of the crazy Americans.

We also had a continual dialogue with many other senior members of the Labor Party like the gruff John Prescott, the amiable George Robertson, the engaging Jack Straw, and the newly elected Tony Blair, whom the embassy spotted as a comer very soon after he was elected.

Q: In our opinion, what was on the mind of the Laborites that was disturbing to us?

PENDLETON: I think the principal thing was their real reservations about the role of NATO and the role the United States played in NATO. That got somewhat to the core of the issues. In terms of social policy, yes, we have in the United States traditionally taken a rather non-European view about the economy and social policies, and a great many European parties (and I include the UK in this) have a more refined view of what the state owes the individual than we do in this country. But that you just live with, and you can discuss and you can debate, but it doesn't cut to the core. When you still had an apparently robust Soviet Union, and you were worried about a war breaking out between the Soviet Union and the United States/NATO, you had to worry profoundly about what kind of leadership there would be in the United Kingdom and what its approach to NATO might be. That was the core of the concern. The other issues tended to be more peripheral. As happy as Republicans and conservatives generally in this country were with Mrs. Thatcher's economic policies, those policies were not going to assure the immediate survival of the West.

Q: What was our attitude during this time towards the European Union? I mean, it's always been sort of the cornerstone of our policy, making sure that these Europeans, particularly the French and the Germans don't go at each other again. The closer they're tied economically and all, the less likely they're able to do it. This is, say, then, the one constant that's so run through American policy. But as we've gotten closer to it, there have arisen, and rightly so, concerns about what does this mean for the United States? Is there going to be a closed market? Are we going to find ourselves, as we build up an economic rival, that it's going to hurt us? Was this at all apparent while you were there?

PENDLETON: Yes, I think it's an excellent question and very well put because our rhetoric, historically, has been in support of a strong and united Europe, and that means that you have to support the EC, now the EU. And we have been constant in our rhetoric, but even during the time that I was in the UK, you could see, --as with this little story about Shultz and partners, "We'll have to ask our partners,"-- that our ability to influence Europe's thinking, much less its actions, was diminished. All the members of the EC grappled collectively with an issue and came out with an approach to it which, if we agreed with, great, but more often than not there would be some light between us and the EC. This began to become more and more apparent on

issues large and small, for instance, Cuba. The Europeans are much like the Canadians. They don't see any particular merit in our approach to Cuba, in singularizing Castro as a monumental danger and trying to punish companies and other countries which do business with Castro. As time went on, talking about Cuba with the British became in large measure a waste of time. They hid behind decisions of the European Community for a fare-thee-well.

And that's just one example of what we began to see, and the EU began to get together and decide how to approach one issue after another. We have always, to my mind, been quite unsuccessful in affecting the EU process. We are supposed to plug into the EU decision-making process through the presidency, which rotates every six months in alphabetical order. I was in London when Britain had the presidency of the EU, and you would have thought that it would be very easy to talk with British decision-makers and get good talking points from Washington and convince them of X, of Y and of Z. But that was not the case at all. The British, increasingly in the mid to late '80s, were trying to become better Europeans, no matter how painful that was for, particularly, some members of the Conservative Party. They were determined that they were not going to be perceived by the other Europeans as being the United States stalking horse every time the UK got the presidency. The result was that they held us at arm's length during the presidency, in terms of sharing the agenda of various meetings, allowing us to have significant input into the process, and giving us readouts of meetings. Some of the smaller European countries have frequently been very gracious about that for reasons of their own. I think of Denmark and Luxembourg, in particular.

Q: Yes, I'm told Luxembourg, for example, is really a very good place to get information.

PENDLETON: That's correct, based on my experience. London is a lousy place to get information about the EU, and I found that very frustrating, but understandable. The world is changing, and the "special relationship" is adjusting to not only a transatlantic relationship but also a trans-Channel relationship, which is often more important for the UK than the relationship with Washington.

Q: What about the view of the British regarding the changes that were going on in the Soviet Union at that time. Is that something we were spending a quite a bit of time with, sharing impressions, knowledge?

PENDLETON: Well, yes and no. I don't believe that we or the UK had an adequate sense of what really was going on in the Soviet Union. Fortunately, we had on our staff Sandy Vershbow, who was a keen Russian specialist and sophisticated arms-control expert. Sandy had come from the Soviet Desk and was very well respected. He in particular talked with the British about the Soviet Union and about arms control nonstop. But were we able to say to the British that we thought the Soviet Union will collapse? No. I mean, the first time that the economic situation of the Soviet Union really entered my head like a sledgehammer blow was when Brzezinski came and had breakfast with a bunch of us in the embassy and told us about the most recent Rand study, which made much clearer than direct CIA studies had made that the Soviet Union was involved in a monumental struggle that might lead to its collapse, --largely because of the economic situation of the Soviet Union, not the minorities that the Policy Planning Staff had focused on with. So even though we share more intelligence with the British than with anybody

else, I don't think that we were sharing insights that would have put us all on alert about the impending collapse of the Soviet Union. We didn't have those insights.

We were involved with things that needed to be explained. For instance, the Iceland Summit, with President Reagan's movement on arms control, came like a thunderbolt to the Brits, and we had to do a lot of putting into perspective, which was hard to do, about our shifting position. Fortunately the White House sent ambassador Jack Matlock to help brief the British, and of course we briefed at NATO. Yet there tended to be consternation all around. I gave a dinner, for instance, for Matlock with a bunch of British academics and Soviet watchers from the press and academia, and it was a hard sell because we had shifted so far that even having somebody who was there and had been working intimately with the President did not result in much calming of British apprehensions.

Another hard sell we had was Central America. We have presumably talked about Phil Habib. Phil Habib got called upon to explain our Central America policy to people, and he came to my house for dinner one night with a group of Labor Party leaders, including Dennis Healy, who had been a longtime friend of his, and a number of parliamentarians, all of whom were extremely skeptical about our approach to Central America. It was one of the most memorable meals I've ever had because Phil arrived late and started shouting at everybody. And he shouted through the whole meal, and everybody was pretty well lubricated and started shouting back. There was absolute bedlam. Finally Dennis Healy had to really take charge (I couldn't control anybody) and calm them all down. And everybody left kind of early and in a huff. We learned later that Phil had a heart attack two days earlier, and I suspect that from his point of view he was attempting to be very aggressive to show himself that he was still alive. But he stirred up a hornets' nest, and it was not something I'd like to go through again.

Q: Had John Major been somebody whom we've been working with?

PENDLETON: Major was not somebody whom we knew as well as we wished we had when he became prime minister in November, 1990. For whatever reason, he wasn't as central to our discussions, as many other people, both amongst the Conservatives, amongst the Social Democrats of the middle, and of the Labor Party had been. And that, in his case, wasn't a major problem at all, but it was something which, I think, in retrospect, was uncharacteristic and we would like to have spent more time with him--obviously.

Q: As you sit around with your British colleagues, was there much talk about the role of France?

PENDLETON: Yes, but it was never very profound. The British tend to echo the French in having an abundance of stereotypes in their kit bags which they pull out at frequent intervals. Sometimes, however, on the British sideviews of the French were embellished by the proclivity of well-heeled Brits to have summer houses in France, --which lead them to either buy into the stereotype quite quickly or start thinking a little more broadly. But in general the stereotypes were there, and you kind of had to urge a thoughtful conversation about the role of France. I think that the preoccupation at that era still often tended to be Germany, in terms of power in Europe and the evolution of Europe. I had, I would say, many more conversations about Germany's role in Europe than I did about France's role, and yet I have to confess I know less

about Germany(did even then(than about France. But increasingly, we were finding people were looking at the EC and its evolution in block terms and a little bit less in terms of individual national identity.

Q: What about at your level, did you sense a frustration, in looking at both the Ambassador and DCM, of the transatlantic telephone, the flights, the cabinet members and others who would sort of fly over and deal and do things directly and the embassy got kind of left out?

PENDLETON: Yes, of course, although you had to accept that as a reality of modern life, particularly when people speak the same language. To a degree, it was good, and there was no way of patrolling everything that happened. Some ambassadors have tried, and insisted that nobody can even send a message without them knowing about it. This is a day of faxes and phones and the common language, and there was only so much apoplexy one could fall into about such things because, in general, they helped the warp and woof of the relationship. And if the Ambassador really felt crossed and got upset, he could blow his stack, and Ray Seitz, as deputy chief of mission, had no hesitation about ringing the bell if somebody lower down in the bureaucracies got off the reservation. The Ambassador would, on occasion, let the President of the United States know that he found something unacceptable, and that at least allowed him to say, "I've told the President." Whether the President did anything about it is another matter. This would happen maybe every eight months, but it allowed him to help make sure that people knew (a) with whom he was connected and (b) that it wasn't going to get overlooked.

By and large, the visits of really knowledgeable people, both official and unofficial, were very useful in the relationship. And something did surprise me, that we got less Congressional visitors than I expected, in both London and later when I was in Paris. They also often made fewer demands on us than I expected. There were a lot, but it seemed to me that almost everybody who came to London had some kind of private agenda to go with their public agenda, and this was true of members of Congress as well. Maybe a niece was at Cambridge or a son at Oxford or they had some tie that they wanted to resurrect which was of no business to the embassy, and the result was they were a little less demanding of the embassy's than I would have thought they might be. That interested me because it left a bit more time for important work. There were also CODELs who were disgraceful, basically. I remember escorting a busload of Congressmen to a meeting with Baroness Linda Chalker, who was the head of the British equivalent to our AID (Agency for International Development), and the leader of the delegation saw a store when we were caught in traffic and decided he wanted to go shopping. And he and half the busload got off and went into the store, and the bus went on and they appeared at the meeting when it was about two-thirds over. Linda Chalker's staff told me immediately afterwards that it was never to happen again. If she was going to set out time in her schedule to meet with our members(and she was a member of Parliament herself(they were all to appear. They had arrived carrying shopping bags, you see; it was very obvious where they had been.

The embassy at the highest level once put its foot into it when a very high-level Congressional arms-control delegation stopped over in London on the weekend after a real working visit into our Geneva delegation. The ambassador gave them a small reception but then noted to *The Washington Post* correspondent that their London stop was a frolic. The Chairman of the Committee was not pleased when he read the quote in the *Post*. And the Department of State. At

another visit, Senator Dan Quail and his wife came through on the weekend. We couldn't get any Brits to meet with him. They consider weekends sacred and are usually off in the country. So we had a very small in-house reception at the ambassador's residence. Charlie Price and Quail got along very well, but I think the Senator expected more. The Brits were sorry they had not met with him when a few months earlier Bush chose him as his running mate. Of course President Reagan came to say farewell to Margaret Thatcher.

When the newly-elected President George H.W. Bush came for his first visit, his advance teams insisted initially that he could not be scheduled to do anything that President Reagan had ever done. They relented when they realized the new President would under that rubric not be able to see the prime minister or Queen.

A few additional words. When you have almost a mini-State Department in that embassy, with experts who not only are experts on a particular aspect of British society but also on another part of the world, you find that life is pretty disjointed. A political counselor, you are trying to prioritize, but you're trying to prioritize a great many different unprioritizable issues. For instance, my next door neighbor in London, Bob Frazier, who was later killed en route to Sarajevo when his vehicle went off the road, was not only an expert on British politics. In that capacity, he tended to write for us the overview cables, which were deliciously executed and very well received in Washington. But Bob he also had been a long-time co-conspirator with Chet Crocker, the brilliant Assistant Secretary for Africa, and he and Chet were in the personal touch and in touch with the British at all hours. Bob went off with Chet to Africa any number of times, and it certainly was not something where a decision by me that we needed a cable on British domestic politics would override Chet's swooping him up and taking him to southern Africa.

So one bounced around from subject to subject quite dramatically, and one never knew what would happen. Pan Am 103 went down in Lockerbie, Scotland, on the 21st of December, not long before Christmas, in 1988. I was driving home about eight o'clock at night, walked in the door and found that on the phone was a junior officer from the section who called to alert me that he'd just heard this on the radio. I immediately called the Ambassador, who was in his car and was on the phone talking, as it turned out, with our consul general about the news and what to do. I got through to him, and he said immediately that he was going to go up there. This was Charlie Price, and his instinct was actually right on, to demonstrate our concern on the ground and to lead our team on the ground, and the ambassador asked that I start getting him a plane. Of course, we all went back to the embassy, and we stayed there most of the time, through on into the New Year. It wasn't the Christmas we had anticipated, and there were a few lessons that one learned from this horrific experience, ranging from the difficulty of getting an airline to release its passenger manifest to the real challenge of working with distraught family members, who will go the extra mile to do anything to understand better what happened. We saw the need for both the embassy and the State Department to be staffed up appropriately, whether it's a holiday or not, to deal with not only all the officials but family members, --many of whom came over to London and then went on to Lockerbie-- but who were not best pleased with the way they were dealt with by the Department during the Christmas period when the task force was dissolved and phones were being answered by the Operations Center people.

We also learned the value of test runs. We had, just about a month before in the embassy, a terrorism exercise which had involved most of the same people who found themselves around the table during this Lockerbie period, and I must say, I had thought that exercise was an intrusion into other things that were higher priority. But on the night of the 21st of December I changed my mind totally because all of us had been forced to work together under quite realistic circumstances in the exercise and we had been able to make a judgment about each other's approach to challenges which proved to be very useful. We had also mechanically found out where the phones were and how to operate everything. So I changed my mind totally about the value of training in these exercises as you went along. Certainly Charlie Price taught all of us the value of his instinctive reaction, which was to involve himself and to show how much United States officials cared about what had happened to our citizens. All the pictures in the press the next morning showed Charlie Price (and he took his wife Carol with him, --standing near a very large fragment of the plane. That was indicative, I think, of the care the embassy and the consulate in Edinburgh gave to the process. As I mentioned previously, the consulate in Edinburgh was scheduled to be closed, and it spent the next three years doing little else but working with Pan Am 103 follow-up, whether it was the belongings of the victims or the Scottish judicial system in terms of making sure that we understood fully what the judicial process might be. And of course, we were reminded once again of the whole issue of terrorism and the difficulty of preventing it. We faced the question of pre-alerting embassy officials, based on knowledge which was not available to the general public, not to fly on a certain plane, and the question of openness became very much on people's mind in a way that it wasn't before.

At any rate, these sorts of events can happen at any embassy, and they are very testing. I thought that Embassy London, in part because of the quality of people there, in part because we'd had this recent run-through of a similar event, performed very professionally. Pan Am 103 was not typical, thank God, of what you faced in London, but it was one of the awful events that happens to almost everybody at some point or other in his or her Foreign Service career.

RICHARD OGDEN
Economic Counselor
London (1985-1989)

Richard Ogden was born in Norwalk, Connecticut, in 1939 and grew up in New Canaan. He attended Stanford where he majored in economics and went on to receive his masters from the Fletcher School in the spring of 1963. He entered the Foreign Service in 1964 and in 1966 he began service in Bogota, Colombia as part of the Economic Section. In addition to Colombia, he was posted to Thailand, Argentina, Peru, England, and Spain. Mr. Ogden was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Today is the 1st of December 1999, the first day of the last month of the millennium. Dick, let's talk about 1985 London. You were there from when to when?

OGDEN: We were in London from 1985 to 1989. I started out as the Economic Counselor. After about two years, I moved up to be the Economic Minister-Counselor.

Q: Alright. Can we talk about what you were doing? Let's talk about the embassy and your impression—this is a big embassy, of course.

OGDEN: Well, it is a big embassy. It was very large. Charles Price was our ambassador, and Ray Seitz, at that time, was the Deputy Chief of Mission. Kim Pendleton was our Political Counselor and Mike Calingaert was Economic Minister-Counselor. It was a very good embassy to work in with a lot of outstanding officers. I think the relationship with the British at that time was terrific. This was the height of the Reagan-Thatcher special relationship. We enjoyed excellent contact with the British, and I think that the embassy functioned well.

Q: How did we view Reagan and Thatcher as far as, I mean were they really on the same wave length?

OGDEN: I think the philosophy of Reaganism and Thatcherism were about the same. The implementation of the programs differed because the two countries faced rather different circumstances.

The pillars of Thatcherism at the time involved curbing union excesses, privatizing state companies, promoting monetary and fiscal restraint and generally increasing private home ownership. But Thatcher never really changed the education and public health system that much.

In the United States, the defense build up led to enormous budget deficits. That did not occur in Great Britain.

Q: This seemed to be with Margaret Thatcher. You've already given some of this but at the embassy because breaking the minor strike, did that happen during your time?

OGDEN: Yes. When I arrived in 1985, Thatcher was in the process of winning her battle with Arthur Scargill and the National Union of Mineworkers. Facing down the coal strike was considered a great victory for Mrs. Thatcher similar to her victory in the Falklands war. Afterwards, her popularity soared.

Q: This broke the power of the unions in a way, didn't it? I mean, not completely but you know.

OGDEN: This was major step along the way. Some of the power of the unions already had been reduced, but this was an important victory. I think Scargill was pretty far left and a bit of a tyrant so there was a lot of public support for the government in this fight.

Q: Did we find as the embassy at that point a pretty sharp division between the Thatcher government and the chattering class or the intellectuals or whatever you want to call it to a certain extent I think? Did you find that we were having a problem communicating to other parts of the British establishment? I'm talking about the left.

OGDEN: We spent a lot of time socializing with the Labor Party and with the left in general. After losing the 1983 election, Labor chose Neil Kinnock as its leader and adopted a more moderate tack. Labor still had quite different ideas on economic and defense policy, but the new leadership was more open and willing to listen to other points of view. Of course, we got along very well with the Thatcher government. Ambassador Price was well liked and we had close rapport with most of the Cabinet officials.

Q: So you arrived during this great fight with Thatcher versus the miners and Scargill. Were there mixed feelings within the economic section or something about how this thing should be done?

OGDEN: I don't think there was a big problem. We were disappointed to see the bitterness of the struggle and the sharpness of the divisions. I guess we realized, though, that it was an important turning point in British history. After that, I don't recall another comparable economic crisis, at least while I was there. Still, this was not an easy period. Unemployment was very high and the benefits of Thatcher reforms were only beginning to appear.

Q: The British economy since World War II been a concern of ours because it seemed to have been plagued by strikes and by poor management at the top. It was not quite the "Sick Man of Europe" but it certainly was not healthy and hadn't been healthy.

OGDEN: Yes, that is right. British economic power had gone down rather steadily in the post-war period. I think a variety of factors contributed to the decline including large government welfare programs, government subsidies, loss of confidence and productivity, and class divisions. The British didn't seem able to adapt well to post-war realities. Of course, the unions were still very powerful, and various governments tended to give in to labor demands. Meanwhile, the economy just kept sliding.

When Thatcher took over, she decided that this downward spiral had to be turned around. She wanted to make Britain strong and productive once more. Initially, the Thatcher programs were not very successful, as a lot of companies went under and unemployment soared. And it took some time before new entrepreneurial forces began to make some impact. But gradually the new programs took hold. Key state companies like British Gas, British Air and British Telecom were sold to the public. Residents of public housing were given an opportunity to own their own homes. New investment flowed in to take advantage of deregulation.

Q: What was your slice of the action when you first got there? What was the economic section doing and what were you specifically doing?

OGDEN: The Economic Section was very involved with trade policy. We had an excellent energy officer who followed events in Great Britain and throughout the world. Of course, we were very interested in anything going on in the European Union. We had a Civil Aviation officer. We had a Commodities Officer who took care of U.S. interests in the various commodity organizations in London. And we were very interested in export control policies at the time.

Q: We were still in the middle of the Cold War.

OGDEN: Yes. We were still in the cold war. The Reagan administration was worried that critical high technology was flowing to the Soviet bloc from western exports. So there was a big effort made to tighten up on export control policy. I remember several important high level visits on this issue.

Civil aviation was another big issue. We had a number of tough bilateral issues to work out with the British. We also were very concerned about Airbus subsidies. I don't think many weeks went by without some demarche or other on this subject.

The biggest issue during my stay in London was the EC 1992 Single Market program. In the mid eighties, the European Union decided to move ahead with integration efforts and to create a single market by 1992. This involved around 350 specific new measures. Initially, there was concern that the EU was moving toward a fortress Europe that would limit U.S. trade and investment. Gradually, these concerns were eased.

Q: How did you deal with that particular problem?

OGDEN: At the embassy, we created a high level group to deal with EC 92 developments and gave the issue a lot of priority. Key officers of the embassy were all involved such as the Ambassador, DCM, Econ Minister-Counselor, Commercial Counselor, Treasury Counselor etc. We met frequently with the American business community to share opinions and discuss strategy. For example, we were interested in the issue of national treatment. Were American companies going to be treated like European companies? We were concerned about the setting of standards. Were American companies going to be able to participate in setting standards so their products wouldn't be disadvantaged? Procurement rules were another big issue. Would American companies be able to bid on public and private procurement projects on the same basis as European firms?

In addition to meeting with American companies, we spent a lot of time making our views known to the British government and the European Commission. We emphasized the importance of maintaining an open Europe so American and other foreign businesses could contribute to European development.

Q: What was the attitude of the economic section and of the embassy towards the EC? That this was an unnatural progression or was this going to be pretty difficult?

OGDEN: We always were supportive of European integration as long as it was open and fair. At the same time, we usually worried that the process might turn inward and seek to promote the interests of European firms at the expense of foreign firms.

I recall another issue that involved American banks with home offices in London. Were they going to be able to operate in other EU countries on the same basis as a British or French bank? There were dozens of issues like this. We needed to know what the Europeans were thinking and to promote the interests of U.S. companies and banks.

Q: In the overall scheme of things dealing with Europe, was there the view that we could work with the British because we have to have the British in order to counteract the French who are—I am supposing something—going to be trying to freeze us out and doing whatever they can to keep the Americans from being around?

OGDEN: Yes and No. We always supported a strong British role in the European Community because we thought the British would help to keep the European Union open and outward looking. At the same time, we felt that the British would be one of the EU members most open to dealing with us. Sometimes we would discuss with the British how we could gain support for our views within the European Union. But this wasn't always the case. Sometimes we felt it was more useful to work directly with the Commission on an issue. And the French were not always negative to our involvement with the EU. Sometimes we worked closely with the French on issues.

Q: What about agriculture? I would have thought—this is still the main problem, I think, everywhere—preserving the small farmer is very potent politically in Europe as it has been in the United States. Was that arising as an issue?

OGDEN: It was a constant problem. European agriculture is very highly subsidized. There is a strong political commitment to maintaining rural agricultural life in France and Germany and other EU countries. After setting a high internal price, the EU charges a variable levy to keep out foreign products while subsidizing exports. We always sought to put agriculture on a more market oriented basis. The British tended to be helpful on these agricultural issues.

Q: During this time, were we making a real pitch to keep a labor attaché or someone in the economic section working with labor? I mean, labor unions as opposed to the Labor Party.

OGDEN: Yes. We had a labor attaché who was extremely active working with the unions and developing union contacts. Most of the senior officials of the embassy had extensive contacts with the labor party because there were so many important issues to discuss.

Q: Was Michael Foot still there?

OGDEN: Michael Foot was still active, as I recall, but he wasn't the leader any more. Neil Kinnock was the leader.

Q: One of the things that I've heard complaints about people who dealt both in the U.K. and France and in Germany because it's so big and because telephone calls across the Pacific that sometime an embassy can feel cut out because you have the undersecretary of the Treasury calling his counterpart in London. These contacts at sub-cabinet or cabinet or even presidential level and often the word doesn't filter down. You get bypassed a lot.

OGDEN: I don't remember that as being a big problem, except in the one area that you mentioned involving the Treasury. Senior U.S. Treasury officials did contact their British counterparts quite a bit without informing the embassy. This could adversely affect our reporting program. I recall the Treasury attaché sometimes was reluctant to report an issue because he

didn't know what his superiors might have said directly to HMG counterparts. The State Department did a better job keeping the embassy informed.

Q: What was the feeling when you were talking to the Labor people, particularly, but also the Conservatives and business people and all towards Ronald Reagan as president?

OGDEN: The caricature of Reagan in the British press and in cartoons was of a trigger happy cowboy, bombing Libya, or setting off rockets, or wiping armies off the map. The political comedies usually showed Reagan that way, with Mrs. Thatcher as his obedient poodle. They'd always have her on a leash with Reagan leading her around. This was the superficial and critical view. For those involved in politics, the view was very positive. I think even the labor party recognized that Reagan was a strong and well liked president. And of course, Reagan had a lot of support among the British masses.

Q: When you are saying, Thatcher being portrayed as Reagan's poodle, I talked to someone who was with the NSC who said one of the major concerns was trying to keep Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher from being in a room alone together because Thatcher could get commitments out of Ronald Reagan that they wished she hadn't.

OGDEN: I'm not sure sometimes who was the poodle, but that's the way it was always depicted in the British press. I don't think Thatcher was anybody's poodle. Maybe more like a Rottweiler.

Q: What was your impression of Charlie Price and what was his background?

OGDEN: Well, I was very impressed with Charlie Price. He always made a good impression on British television. I think he had a natural public relations sense. As I mentioned already, his access at the senior levels of British business and government was terrific. He was a fun person to be with. He enjoyed a good party. He was a jovial guy who liked playing tennis, which I did, too. He and Mrs. Price really kept Winfield House humming with a constant stream of high level British guests.

Q: Did you travel around much?

OGDEN: I traveled some but not a great deal. We went up to visit Scotland and got over to Wales a couple of times. I toured the south and southwest of England quite a bit. We usually would attend the party political conferences which was fun. But I tended to spend most of the time in London dealing with the government and American businesses.

Q: I was just wondering about were we concerned at that particular time about the state of the north? It was equivalent to our west belt.

OGDEN: There was a lot of concern in Britain about the growing divide between a stagnant north and a prosperous south. The country also tended to be politically divided with Labor strong in the north and the Tories strong in the south. There was an effort to get businesses to locate in the north through special subsidies. But I think Thatcher's view was that free markets, deregulation and more private ownership would lift all economic boats including the north.

Q: Was there concern at that time about Japan putting industry into Britain, the issue of foreign investment in Britain? Was there concern or maybe even a delight?

OGDEN: There was some concern about rising levels of Japanese investment. The British liked American investment because they were used to it and because we had a very open market for British investment in the United States. But Japan was a different story. The Japanese markets were quite closed to British investment.

Q: Did you find the British have their xenophobia along with every other country? Did you find that there was a sizeable hunk of influential British people who really weren't enamored with the European Union? Today they are called Euro-skeptics. I don't know what they were called then. Were you dealing with that?

OGDEN: There were certainly Euro skeptics when I was there. The main concerns were that the Commission was too big and powerful and that Britain had to pay too much to run the European Union. Usually, the Thatcher Tories are the least enthusiastic about Europe. But at that time, the Thatcher government actually was leading the charge on the 1992 European Single Market because it meant deregulation and increased business flexibility. These were very Thatcherlike objectives. Later came the Maastricht summit and the idea of a common currency and European Central Bank. I think that was the time when the Thatcher wing of the Tories started to really oppose European involvement.

Q: Something I find interesting when I talk to people who've been on the desk, I ask whether their country—let's say it's Nigeria or something—does their embassy know where the levers of power are. In other words, do they keep away from the Department of State and go after Congress, the media, the NSC, in other words, if you are dealing with Washington, you have to know where the power is and how to influence it. How about as a high ranking embassy officer in London, where do you put your finger? Where do you go around?

OGDEN: I think that was less of a problem for us in London. I'll tell you why. Here in Washington, power is disbursed among the agencies and the White House. There is a lot of competition, and an embassy can get somewhat different views depending on which agency it approaches. Based on my experience in London, the British civil servants are highly trained, value teamwork and communicate very quickly with each other. For example, if I made a demarche at the Foreign Office, the rest of the government would know about it within a very short period. So you tended to get the same view. There wasn't much advantage to shopping around so to speak.

Q: You can do end runs and bypasses and everything else in the Washington context.

OGDEN: It's much easier to play that game in Washington because we do not coordinate as well. However, it is more dangerous as well. Sometimes an embassy can infuriate an agency in Washington just by raising an issue with another agency.

Q: How about the media, how did you look at the media during the time you were there?

OGDEN: Well, we had a very active press program. Embassy officials appeared on television quite frequently, giving interviews and explaining U.S. positions on issues. The British media enjoyed that and liked it when we participated. I always was greatly impressed by the quality of British television and documentaries. I was less impressed, in general, with the quality of British newspapers.

Q: If you were instructing somebody to go out at that time, what papers would you say you should watch?

OGDEN: The Financial Times, Business Week and the Economist were all must reading for the Economic Section.

Q: How did you find as far as being an embassy officer, could you afford London?

OGDEN: It was a problem. We were alright but a lot of the junior officers and secretaries had real financial problems. They often had to live in the outskirts of the city which meant a long commute to work. The housing situation was not ideal. Apartments that were supposed to be furnished, for example, were only half furnished and there were long waits to get into housing. That was a factor in Post morale.

Q: Did you find from your perspective that you wanted to keep in touch with the media types, or was it terribly important?

OGDEN: Oh, yes, absolutely. There were a lot of media people. I remember Bill Keegan was a particular friend of mine. Journalists were writing books about Thatcher and about economic policy in general, so that was very helpful. I frequently would have lunch with journalists of one sort or another to discuss issues. *The Financial Times* had a lot of very good economic journalists and I stayed in close contact with them. The FT also had great parties.

Q: Are there any other issues or subjects we should talk about your time in London?

OGDEN: There were four or five big events that occurred while I was there that are worth mentioning.

One was the Libyan air raid in response to Qadhafi's sponsorship of terrorism. Thatcher showed a lot of political courage allowing us to use bases in Britain.

The British election of 1987 was a big event. Mrs. Thatcher won her third consecutive term by a wide margin. I believe she was the first British Prime Minister ever to accomplish that.

Then there were the American elections of 1988 won by George Bush. The embassy put on a great political party during election night and several British Cabinet members showed up.

Of course, I remember the Pan Am 103 incident with great sadness. The embassy had a special team which worked on that almost around the clock for many days and weeks.

Finally, I remember well when Bush's new Ambassador, Henry Cato, presented his credentials to Queen Elizabeth. We drove to Buckingham palace in a horse drawn carriage. Cato fed the horses carrots before we left.

FRANKLIN E. HUFFMAN
Junior Officer Trainee, USIS
London (1986-1987)

Franklin E. Huffman was born in Harrisonburg, Virginia in 1934. In 1955 he graduated from Bridgewater College and immediately joined IVS. From 1967 to 1985 he was a Professor of Southeast Asian languages and linguistics at Yale and Cornell. His second career was as a Foreign Service Officer with USIA where he was posted to London, Rangoon, Marrakech, Paris, Washington, Phnom Penh, and Wellington, with subsequent WAE tours to N'Djamena (Chad) and Phnom Penh. Mr. Huffman was interviewed in January 2006 by Charles Stuart Kennedy

Q: Well, you would have been in London from 1986 until when?

HUFFMAN: '86 to '87 – one year.

Q: And what were you doing?

HUFFMAN: Well, the idea was that, as a trainee you rotate through the various sections of the embassy. I didn't, in a year, achieve universality there but they gave me a number of special assignments, some of which maybe the ordinary JOT would not have been able to do. In other words they saw me kind of as a resource and when a special project came up, they said, "Let Huffman do it." One of the most interesting things I did during my entire stay in London was to write a speech for President Reagan. The English Speaking Union had requested that the embassy send an invitation to President Reagan to come over and address the English Speaking Union in the Guildhall on the 40th anniversary of the Marshall Plan. And of course we didn't have much hope that he would do that if it didn't fit his plans or if he didn't already have a European trip planned, but anyway we had to submit the request to the White House. We suggested as an alternative that he might be willing to do a speech on video which could then be played in the Guildhall up on a huge screen. And lo and behold he agreed to do that. Well, who was going to write the speech? So they said, "Let Huffman do it. He's a former professor of linguistics; he ought to be able to write a bang-up speech." So I settled down to doing the research, the background and I must say I was learning a lot of new stuff. I think it's an advantage when you're learning new material because it's fresh and exciting, whereas if I'd been a specialist in arms control in Europe and the Marshall Plan and so on and so forth, I'm not sure I could have brought the same spontaneity to the project. But when I learned that the United States had given over 13 billion dollars, or 6 percent of our national budget, to Europe after World War II, this was impressive to me; it was a major event in world history.

An amusing anecdote -- while I was writing it we had a dinner party one night and had some of the embassy people and some of my contacts in the cultural community there and the phone rings, my wife said "Frank, it's for you; it's the White House calling." And my guests were highly impressed. I said I'd take it downstairs. It turned out it was some young speechwriter in the bowels of the old Executive Office Building calling me to verify some of my figures and where I got them and so on, but of course I didn't point that out to the dinner guests when I came back up. I simply said, "Yes, well, I took care of that."

They sent a copy of the video to hand over to the English Speaking Union, and I must say it was an eerie experience to hear the President saying my words. At that point I realized why Reagan was considered such a great communicator -- he delivered the speech as if he were searching for the right terms and then he would come up, unfailingly, with my words, as if from the depths of his emotion.

Another highlight of my tour in London took place while I was doing a rotation in the political section. One of the political officers, Robin Raphael actually, had to take maternity leave and they needed somebody to replace her. Now she was the Asian area watcher in the political section in London and they said, "Well you know, there's Huffman down there in USIS, he has an Asian background, why not let him replace her?" So it wasn't really a training stint at all, I was replacing an actual high level officer and wrote the cables and everything else. Kim Pendleton was the head of the political section, Miles Pendleton, Jr. This was about the time that Irangate broke and Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and North Africa, Dick Murphy, decided that he would convene a conference in London with all the U.S. ambassadors to the Middle Eastern countries. Well, you would think that an event of that kind would call for the attention of at least the head of the political section but no, London was a busy embassy; Secretary Schultz was a regular. I recall that once we had three cabinet secretaries visiting at the same time, Secretary of State Schultz, Secretary of Labor Meese and another secretary whose name I don't recall. So they said, "We'll let Huffman handle Murphy's operation." And so here the assistant secretary of state came with eight ambassadors from the Middle East including Ambassador Pickering, who was ambassador to Israel at that time, and later became ambassador to the United Nations.

Q: Oh yes, Tom Pickering.

Others were Cutler and Kelley; I don't remember all of them. So there I was upstairs ensconced in the office of this senior political officer and looking very senior myself because in years I was, and they assumed that I was the legitimate political officer and they were very deferential -- ambassadors would come in and say "I'm sorry to disturb you, but could I use your phone for moment?," and I'd say, very magnanimously, "Go right ahead, Mr. Ambassador ...yes please ...no, no, never mind." I couldn't resist a bit of role-playing.

Q: Did you have any contact with the British press, the British foreign office or anything of that?

HUFFMAN: Yes we did, yes indeed.

Q: How did you find that? What were your experiences?

HUFFMAN: We had very good relations with the BBC as well as with the printed press; we would go to their offices to push various issues. I remember meeting the deputy director of BBC and we had a luncheon with him and the other members of our press section. We were comparing the BBC and the Voice of America. Now you know, on the Voice of America we had the practice, and still do, of carrying editorials, preceded by the statement, "The following is an editorial that represents the views of the U.S. government." And they read the editorial, maybe a page long, and then at the end of it they say again, "The preceding was an editorial which represents the views of the U.S. government." The deputy director of the BBC kidded us about that, saying "You know, you Americans, you're constantly throwing it in the face of your audience that you're putting things on there that represent the views of your government. So people think that you're biased. Now, at the BBC, we express our own views all the time but we just don't mention it. You should quit doing that." And in fact I have always argued that they should quit doing those editorials, because they hurt the credibility of VOA as an independent and autonomous news organization.

Q: Sure. Because when you hear that it's essentially a canned announcement, you tend to dismiss it.

HUFFMAN: Right. And we have to face the fact that the BBC is much more prestigious around the world than VOA. It's considered the last word, the most unbiased, independent voice and so on, but in fact I found in working with the BBC in various countries that they definitely had a liberal bias, and had the freedom to put their own spin on things, but I also found that they had more of a tendency to go off half cocked on stories than we did. They would sometimes report things that were not only a little bit to the left, but they hadn't done the necessary spade work to verify the story from various sources.

Q: Any other comments you'd care to make about London?

HUFFMAN: I look back on London very nostalgically – but I find that the further postings recede into the past the more I tend to see them through rose-tinted glasses. But my whole family had a good experience there. We had a very interesting 18th-century townhouse in Hampstead – sort of upscale artists' colony – only a few underground stops from the embassy in Grosvenor Square. All in all, London was an excellent entrée to the foreign service.

AURELIUS "AURY" FERNANDEZ
Press Attaché, USIS
London (1986-1989)

Aurelius Fernandez was born in 1931 in Niagara Falls, New York. He first attended a small teacher's college in Fredonia, NY but then went on to Bowling Green State University in Ohio where he completed his BA and graduated in 1953. That same year he started a master's degree in English Literature but was drafted in November 1953 served in the military for three years. Upon being discharged

in 1956 he attended the Columbia school of international affairs and concentrated on German affairs. He joined the Foreign Service and his career took him to Chile, Germany, Romania, Austria, England, and France. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: *You left there in 1986. Back to London?*

FERNANDEZ: I went back to London.

Q: *You were in London...?*

FERNANDEZ: I stayed there until 1989. I really had been scheduled to come back here to the United States. I had been abroad now, 12-14 years and there was some question about how many years I was allowed to be abroad, how they always interpreted figures. At the time I was going to go into the Department to work in ARA in [Assistant Secretary of State] Elliot Abrams' operation. That I was doing holding my nose because I just never did anything in Latin America since that Chile assignment. My interests were elsewhere. Anyway, I accepted it and the night that we were having everybody in to say "goodbye" and say, "Yes, I'm going to Washington." Six-o'clock at night I remember exactly I had to call exactly at six o'clock and Ed Streeter [was saying], "Would you like to come over here? Charlie Price wants a press attaché."

Well, this did come about, and I went back to London to work there under Bud Korngold and with Charlie Price as his press attaché. That was a very interesting period. Here was a very different sort of person from John Louis in terms of international experience in that he...he was a political contributor obviously, but he had already been the ambassador to Belgium. He was a Kansas City businessman, an enormously likable man. I am very, very fond of him and he was very, very approachable about doing things with me. So that made my work exciting. We got out and around an awful lot. I can remember going to Winfield House at 6:30 in the morning to have coffee and talk. He would do his homework and grasp the issues and on the substantive side he knew his limitations, I would call them, not in the pejorative sense, but he would just look at it and get his mind around a policy issue. He was very well liked and very open. I had been around him with Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mrs. Thatcher and people and [one could note that] they always had great affection for Charlie Price. Even after he left, went back to Kansas City to his banking [career].

He had a very interesting background and I never really knew this until one of the last interviews we had. He described his background. He said, "My father began selling apples at the railroad station." He never liked to talk about it too much, because that was not really not his banking [background]. But at any rate, his father never finished high school and I was [surprised] one time [when] Charlie said, "I never finished college." But he was a very affable person. Very hard working, very hard working. Of course, he was an outstanding businessman.

Q: *Were there any particular issues again, during this '86 to '89. Were you there at the time of Kuwait or...?*

FERNANDEZ: No, I was back here by then. The Berlin Wall wasn't down yet. The Berlin Wall came down after I left. But as I was mentioning earlier we did have the matter of the destruction of the nuclear weapons. Which was an enormously elaborate scenario which brought to the London and to the military bases teams to run through the problem of destroying some of the INF. That was interesting because then the Russians would come in and they were just moving along on this. As an information problem during that period that was without question the most interesting, complex, challenge and wide-ranging in that there were on both sides all kinds of guidance. Working with the British ministry of defense, with Number 10 Downing Street, with the FCO, the Foreign Commonwealth Office, Foreign Office, about all these things. That was a very interesting thing to be involved in. I think by then there was agreement in Britain, "Yes, let's get these out." There were still anti-nuclear protests.

Q: I was going to ask about the women at Greenham Commons. Did you ever have to deal with them?

FERNANDEZ: Never directly, yes, but sort of always, because this is always the most vocal opposition and sensational opposition to the nuclear policies. They chained themselves to the fence up there at Greenham Common they had their camp up there and their [headquarters] up there. We were going through the exercise with them and this big Russian aircraft, Illyusian, coming down to let off the Russian inspectors who were going to look after this destruction of nuclear weapons.

Q: Did anybody ever do a profile of the women of this Green? I mean, figure out who they were?

FERNANDEZ: I'm sure there were, yes. You know, the Brits have a habit, a great tradition of, what's I guess, feminine protesters.

Q: Suffragettes...

FERNANDEZ: Yes, suffragettes, you know, you go back to Lady Astor. There have been in British politics as much as it...are presented them very much of a male-dominated situation. There have been vocal opposition and very prominent women. Of course, Maggie Thatcher is the pinnacle for all this.

Q: One thing I've always been curious about. In the United States during the Reagan years as has been recently one of the great debates that's raged and there have been protests and even people killed over abortion over abortion rights in the United States. But in Great Britain there seems to be more to do over animal rights. Did you find this was a...?

FERNANDEZ: Oh, yes, you're onto an interesting thing here because this really reflects on how you present the ambassador. There always had been in Britain a certain amount of...intensive opposition to blood sports. Shooting, as they call it, we would call it hunting, is a very, very popular pastime. As you know from the recent [debate], "Well, it's always been a concern the ambassador's going off shooting." Well, he's into blood sports, you know. That was not something that one would keep up at the top of the list or the front page of what the ambassador

was up to. It was a very, very strong, deeply ingrained tradition. Just as there was opposition to restricting blood sports. Again we've seen that in recent months here in Britain.

Q: *Were there any other issues during this time that...?*

FERNANDEZ: Well, I'm a little embarrassed to say, there probably were and I just haven't gotten my mind together...

Q: *Don't worry about it, we can pick it up.*

FERNANDEZ: When we do the transcript I'm sure that we'll come up with a more coherent and exhaustive list of the kinds of issues we faced in this country that we could share this time reminiscing and such.

Q: *In '89 you went back to Washington.*

FERNANDEZ: I came back and retired.

RONALD J. NEITZKE
Political Officer, American Republic Affairs
London (1986-1990)

Ronald Neitzke was born and raised in Minnesota and educated at Sts Thomas College, the University of Minnesota and Johns Hopkins University (SAIS). Entering the Foreign Service in 1971 he served in Oslo before studying Serbo-Croatian, the beginning of his career as specialist in East European Affairs. In Washington, Mr. Neitzke served on the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department and was Country Director for Czech and Albanian Affairs. In London he was Deputy Political Counselor, and in Zagreb he served as Deputy Chief of Mission during the conflicts of the split-up of Yugoslavia. He also had several assignments in Washington in the personnel field. Mr. Neitzke was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2006.

NEITZKE: 1986. We had landed tandem assignment in London.

Q: *Well, that's just about impossible to do, is it not, I mean at mid-career, getting not one but two jobs in London?*

NEITZKE: Yes. It was, nearly impossible. And a byzantine process. Getting Paris, Rome, Bonn and a few other posts, when you're at the O-2 or O-1 level, I'm sure was also tough, but I think at that time – it may have changed now - London was almost in a class by itself. People wanted to go there for a lot of reasons. And some who made it were frustrated; it wasn't what they'd expected, especially those who'd served mainly in the developing world and gotten used to having household help and working in a tight-knit Embassy community. Help, and living in

general, was extremely expensive in London, and the Embassy was so large, hundreds of people representing some 25 U.S. Government agencies, that some I'm sure felt like mere cogs in a machine. Nonetheless, it was highly sought after. A colleague in the Department once told me, a guy who had just been paneled to be Political Counselor in London, that he'd been approached in his office at State by a grown man in tears, an FSO, pleading with him to withdraw from the job so that he could try to go in his place. I don't know whether that guy's marriage was on the line, or what, if he didn't get London, but there was definitely an allure to the place.

Getting to London at the level at which I was competing meant first getting the support of the post and then of the bureau, EUR. The Personnel system generally yielded to the post and the bureau on these jobs, assuming that their candidate was legitimate, not fair share, not a stretch or anything. I knew the Political Counselor and interviewed with the Ambassador and, with their support, was eventually paneled to the job, and my wife was paneled to a job in ECON. But after some time, weeks I think, I was informed that the Deputy Director of Personnel had summarily de-paneled us from London and assigned us to Guatemala. Other than the fact that there wasn't a real job for my wife in Guatemala, Guatemala would have been fine; in fact we'd been trying hard for two assignments cycles to get just such a post. I had briefly been the lead candidate for political counselor San Salvador, until ARA decided they weren't going to let an EUR hand have that job and bumped me for one of their own guys. Which was okay, that's how the game's played.

What I learned in that rough two-year tandem assignment hunt is that as you proceed with your career, despite what your overall reputation might be, if you hadn't earlier served in a particular region of the world, it could be very difficult for you later on to land, say, a Political Counselor of DCM job there. Which is understandable; you were going to be competing against officers who already had language and area experience and may have even served in that particular post before and who were well known to the relevant bureau. But that same prejudice didn't as often hold for Europe; there was a widespread sense, especially among officers who hadn't served in Europe, that anyone could perform equally well in Europe, no special expertise was needed, no special advantage should accrue to anyone who had served there. In fact, many felt, and the system reinforced this to some extent, that those who had already served in Europe should get out of the way and let others have a chance.

But Personnel's Guatemala move for us was clearly a makeshift assignment to get me out of the London job, which had been engineered by ARA trying to get one of their guys to London. So we said enough is enough. My wife was then seven months pregnant, had already lined up her doctor and hospital in London, and we fought this and won, thanks to a timely intervention by Derwinski. But it's difficult...

Q: It sounds like you were de-paneled because there was somebody else with clout who was trying to get the London job.

NEITZKE: London was a peculiar case. Paris too may have worked this way. Since the Brits conducted a true global foreign policy, had lots to share with us on all regions of the world, and because of the experts on every region of the world available in the global expat community in London, several of the jobs in the Political Section had typically been filled in consultation with

the respective regional bureaus. For example, NEA would sign off on whoever was going there and would handle “their” issues in London, AF the same, to a lesser extent ARA, and EAP not so much. The job I’d been paneled to did handle ARA issues, most importantly, the simmering aftermath of the 1982 Falklands War, so ARA wasn’t completely out of line. But the way they went about it, Elliot Abrams himself, ARA Assistant Secretary, I believe, was dirty pool. And we prevailed on the Director General, George Vest, I think, to overrule his deputy, and he did. And in light of what later transpired on my watch in London, which I’ll get to in a bit, I’m sure ARA doubly regretted losing that fight.

Q: Can you describe the Political Section when you got there, how large and all?

NEITZKE: There were about 10 officers, not all State Political Officers, a couple military, and others. Except for the Counselor, most of the State officers were at the 0-2 or 0-1 level. All pretty hard chargers, strong backgrounds, and with full plates of issues to work. It’s heresy today, as we transfer positions from our bloated embassies in Western Europe to meet the challenges of Transformational Diplomacy in the Middle East and elsewhere, to say that we were not overstaffed when I was in London, but it didn’t feel as though we were at the time. People worked long days, usually not by choice. Part of the problem was the incredible number of high-level official visitors that London gets, from State, the White House, other agencies, and the Congress, most of whom needed some care and feeding, escorting and note-taking, which could be time-consuming. The Cold War was still very much alive, the Brits were our closest ally, there was an unusually strong personal bond between Reagan and Thatcher, and we had important military bases in Britain and intimate military to military ties, as well as a vast intelligence relationship, dwarfing what we had with anyone else. And there was an almost inexhaustible supply of experts in London on every corner of the former empire. So a lot of people put a stop in London on their itinerary. But the main reason several of us were so busy during my first year there was the British election of 1987, which I guess we’ll come to.

Within the section, most of the five or six of us core political reporting officers covered both a region of the world, and one or more domestic political parties. So you had both an external and an internal beat. One officer might cover the Conservative Party and EU and other European issues, for example, another the Labor Party and Africa, and so on. A couple did Political-Military work; one essentially worked for the Defense Department, handling all of their visitors.

Q: And your job?

NEITZKE: My external brief included all ARA (now WHA) issues, but principally Anglo-Argentine tensions in the aftermath of the Falklands War and British popular opposition to U.S. policy in Central America, primarily Nicaragua and El Salvador. I also covered Greece-Turkey-Cyprus, Gibraltar, and Eastern Europe. Internally, I followed what started out as the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties. But I had another, much more time-consuming chore. Embassy London had for many years singled out one individual in the political section to do a spectrum spanning, state of the nation cable every few weeks; what’s the state of Thatcher’s hold on things, what are the challenges she’s facing, and how might any of this affect U.S. interests. These pieces would range over the entire political landscape. In this capacity I followed Bob Frasure, who, as you know, died tragically trying to get into Sarajevo as part of Dick Holbrooke’s team in

1995. Frasure's British politics cables from London were pretty much the gold standard, widely read for their insight, wit, and general erudition.

Q: You were there from when to when?

NEITZKE: From the summer of '86 to the summer of 1990.

Q: What job did your wife have?

NEITZKE: She started out as the U.S. representative to the International Maritime Organization, which is headquartered in London. She was our day to day liaison with it. A multi-agency team from Washington would come over for periodic IMO meetings and she would handle arrangements for those as well. Later she became Civil Air attaché. She was situated in the Econ section, which was nearly as large as the political section.

Q: Well, describe some of the work you did in the Political Section. You said you had the ARA portfolio as well as the-

NEITZKE: As I indicated, my first year there was largely taken up with the looming British general election, ultimately called for June 1987. Again, in a post-Soviet, indeed post 9/11 era, when we face such a different array of challenges, it may be difficult to fathom why we should have cared so much in 1986-87 about a British election. But we did, primarily because, although we could depend on Prime Minister Thatcher to keep British forces strong and fully committed, and nuclear, and although after the Falklands victory she dominated the British political scene, we never ceased worrying about where Britain might turn should something happen to Thatcher, or should she stumble politically. The Labor Party was beginning to shed a bit of its socialist mantle, but

Q: Was this Michael Foote, the Labor Leader?

NEITZKE: No, it was Neil Kinnock. Terrific speaker and debater, a real fighter, very likeable, except on security policy. He's the politician who gave that powerfully evocative speech about his humble origins and the unfairness of life and what the government could do to even the playing field – first in my family to go to college, and so on – the speech that Joe Biden later cribbed from a bit too literally, much to his regret.

Q: Neil Kinnock, oh yes.

NEITZKE: This was well before Tony Blair's new Labor, this was old Labor with a slightly more attractive face, but it remained bent on Britain's denuclearization and Britain's distancing itself from the United States at a time when the Soviet threat remained formidable. Despite a succession of aged and dying leaders, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev still appeared strong; its demise four years later was not then foreseeable. So the U.S. had an enormous stake in the outcome of this British election. And the wild and woolly polling industry in Britain was signaling that Thatcher might be vulnerable. The British press and polls were all over the lot. No one had a firm grip on where this election might go.

The threat could come either from a Labor Party victory alone or from a majority Labor coalition with one of the so-called centrist parties, the Liberals or the Social Democrats, resulting from a hung parliament. The latter, an intriguing possibility in British historical terms, would not have been quite as bad as a Labor victory, but it would have made working with this most intimate of our allies much more difficult.

Q: Who were the ambassador and DCM?

NEITZKE: When I arrived Charlie Price was the ambassador. He knew the President personally and had earlier been Ambassador in Brussels. The DCM, or Minister as he was known, was Ray Seitz, who later went on to become EUR Assistant Secretary and himself Ambassador in London. And Ray had served in London earlier as well, when he'd been the star analyst of another key British general election. So there was pressure to get this right. We basically took the election apart piece by piece, analyzing virtually everything. We consulted academic experts, political commentators, pollsters, politicians, and others.

Q: Well, for example, what are you talking about, what kinds of reporting?

NEITZKE: In the lead up to the election, I prepared a series of five or six so-called primers, lengthy analyses on such topics as the British Constitution – the sum total of British tradition, established practice, and legal precedent, Britain has no written constitution – and what would likely transpire if there were a hung parliament, that is, if no one party achieved a parliamentary majority. Another analyzed the British polling process and explained how it was possible that such supposedly sophisticated pollsters could routinely produce such wildly varying poll results. And it had to do mainly with how polling was then conducted in the UK. In another of these cables, I basically dissected the electoral map, analyzing region by region, district by district, and in some cases, constituency by constituency, how traditional British voting patterns had changed in the preceding decade or so, where each party stood the best prospects of making gains, and so forth. Each of these cables, I recall, was of a pretty staggering length. We would suggest that all but a few readers limit themselves to the summaries, but we sent them all over. And we would hear, not just from those following British affairs in Washington, but from various posts in Europe, that they were being closely read.

Once the election began in earnest, in May of 1987, we were doing a cable or two a day on who was up and who was down and who – this was a British election after all – who'd made the biggest fool of themselves in the preceding 24 hours. All British elections, but especially general elections, are wonderfully colorful affairs, compressed into a few weeks, filled with as much pomp and hilarity – Mad Lord Sutch of the Monster Raving Loonies would somehow manage to pose right next to Thatcher on election night - as serious policy debate. So it was fun, the outcome deadly serious of course, but nonetheless fun to watch and report on. And on many of these cables too, we got compliments from other posts, personal congratulatory messages from other Ambassadors, which doesn't happen all that often.

After the election, which the Tories won handily as it turned out, my internal beat consisted of two elements. The first was to chronicle the nearly comedic demise of the Social Democrats.

This was the small but lively left-center party founded by the David Owen-led Gang of Four following its break with Labor in 1981. The Social Democrats had allied themselves with the Liberals in the 1987 general election and, when that election failed to produce the hung parliament they had dreamed of, the center of British political spectrum more or less imploded. Most Social Democrats abandoned Owen to merge with the Liberals in a new party named the Social and Liberal Democrats, later changed to just Liberal Democrats. A tiny faction soldiered on for a couple more years under Owen, who remained, against all political odds, among the most charismatic, talked about figures in Britain. I found Owen a fascinating case study in intellectual brilliance, indomitable ego, and political death wish. By the way, Owen and another of these left-center politicians, whose fortunes I also covered closely, Paddy Ashdown, who led the Liberal Democratic Party from 1988 on, would later resurface in key roles in the Balkans, Owen teaming with Cy Vance to try to broker a ceasefire and peace agreement early in the war, and Ashdown, a decade later, as High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the guy whose job it was to knock heads together when necessary and try to refashion a workable Bosnia.

Q: Well, before we go much further, I want to talk about your other, your external reporting issues, but before we do that why don't you describe a little about what it was like living in London in those years.

NEITZKE: Ours was not your typical London tour. When we flew over, my wife was eight months pregnant. Whether from the aftereffects of the flight or of a too-strenuous day of hiking through many of my wife's old haunts – she'd been a grad student in London – my son was born a month early, a few days after our arrival, when we were still living out of suitcases in an Embassy-owned apartment complex in distant High Gate in North London. It turned out that we'd been made pawns of a sort in a nasty feud between the Admin and Political Counselors over whether Political Officers should continue to receive representational housing in central London. My son's arrival, the fact that we were a tandem, and the fact that Highgate, however charming – it's where Karl Marx is buried among other highlights – was a fairly dirty hour-long tube ride from the Embassy, ended that experiment and we moved to a small house off Kensington Gardens. When my second son was born a year and a half later, we moved again, to a beautiful, larger, Embassy-owned residence in South Kensington. So we became familiar with a bit more of the town than some did just by virtue of our expanding family and various moves.

I mentioned earlier that some people, even after fighting to get there, were unhappy in London – the nearly prohibitive cost of hired help, the long commutes, a lingering IRA security threat, and the all but nonexistent sense of Embassy family that they'd enjoyed at other posts. We, however, were not unhappy; we loved it. We traveled extensively, sometimes on business but more often for family getaways. We found most Brits not only highly literate and unfailingly courteous but endlessly interesting – entertaining is perhaps a better word. Even, contrary to their image, warm and generous. Part of that obviously reflects the fact that we were diplomats, American diplomats and, as such, were granted a limited free pass to mingle at will up and down the class structure in a way that many Brits themselves are not. And too, the closeness of our bilateral relationship, the “special relationship,” the sense that on most, though not all, issues we shared a common perspective, lent a certain additional impetus to one's work. And for us personally, the fact that our two sons were born there became part of our overall sense of the place.

As for life in London then, there was a strong sense that you were in a place that mattered. It wasn't just the ubiquitous remnants of empire, or the pomp and ceremony and formality that surrounds so many things British, or the strikingly high caliber of journalism, art, literature and so forth. There was a feeling about the place, part of which was sort of a background sense of physical insecurity. There were IRA bombings throughout the 1980s, one of which, in Brighton in 1983, had almost taken the Prime Minister's life. Whether paranoid overreaction or not, one occasionally did check under one's car before setting out in the morning in those years. Embassy security, always problematic in Grosvenor Square, was constantly being enhanced. And then there was the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie Scotland in December 1988 and all of the bitter aftermath of that.

There were occasionally other reminders as well that all was not exactly as it appeared on the surface, that although we might speak roughly the same language, and have many common interests, we and the Brits were in some ways very different from one another. For example, I remember once at a formal dinner being well into a conversation on Anglo vs. American sensibilities, or some such, with my British tablemate when she leaned over and, nodding toward a large group of Brits schmoozing together across the room, said, "You know, I shouldn't tell you this, but in private they often laugh at you Americans." Although I responded, "That's okay, in private, we sometimes laugh at them, too," her comment touched a nerve. However reined in it was most of the time, especially around us, a quintessentially British haughtiness would sometimes surface, often either amid a disagreement over policy or when you had inadvertently butchered some arcane British protocolary nicety. Also, despite Thatcher's preeminence and focus on the "special relationship" with Washington, this was a period when many in the political and chattering classes saw Britain's destiny increasingly in Europe and viewed the special relationship with us as an anachronistic hindrance to that movement. And leftwing British papers' were always caricaturing Thatcher as Reagan's poodle, an over the top sentiment that nonetheless resonated at least a bit with our British friends and colleagues. But overall, this was about as warm and intimate and mature a bilateral relationship as you were likely to encounter.

Q: I am curious whether you had any particular faux pas in mind when you referred to, was it, "arcane British protocol?"

NEITZKE: Well, yes, I can think of one or two. There were many. One of my first assignments in London was to ride herd on the visit of a just-released American hostage from Lebanon, a Father Jenco. It was a big deal at the time. The U.S. had helped secure his release, as had the Archbishop of Canterbury's envoy, Terry Waite. That's a story in itself. Waite was a giant of a man with a giant ego and taste for publicity who kept tempting fate until he too was taken hostage and released only many years later. In any event, while we were using one of the small airports outside London for Jenco's departure, there was a delay and a small plane carrying one of the Royals landed. We were all hustled out of sight – to wait while the Royal disembarked and left – but apparently not quickly enough. A few days later the Embassy received a lengthy protest, the gist of which was that we'd committed the sin of violating a Royal's privacy. I think it was Princess Margaret. It was ridiculous. We'd seen her from about 200 yards away. But the thing is, the Royals were only ever to be seen by mere mortals in carefully choreographed situations. At the Diplomatic Ball at Buckingham Palace or the Queen's Tea in the park behind the Palace – both of which we attended along with hundreds of others – every step, every encounter of each of

the Royals was planned out in advance. Spontaneity was not welcome, as when, I recall, one frustrated Ball-goer, fearing he might not be among the few selected to touch a Royal hand, burst through the crowd, hand thrust forward, and, to a taken aback Prince Philip, loudly pronounced, "Hi, I'm Jerry from Omaha." I believe he worked in the Commercial Section of the Embassy, though probably not for long..

Q: Okay, let's get back to your job. What were your external reporting duties?

NEITZKE: The most time-consuming, and frequently neuralgic of these was the aftermath of the Falklands War, or, as the Argentines called the islands, the Malvinas. During the brief 1982 war, we had aided the Brits with intelligence and other support. The Brits' victory, not certain at the outset – the Argentine generals who had seized the islands doubted London would fight at all - was an early high water mark for Thatcher as Prime Minister, and, along with her standing up to the unions, and her public demeanor, marked her thereafter as the Iron Lady.

Q: Iron Lady, yes, I remember that. And...

NEITZKE: Just on that, I don't know whether you ever saw Spitting Images. It was a weekly British TV show in which grotesquely caricatured public figures, portrayed by large puppets, were lampooned. In one famous episode, Thatcher was shown seated at a dining table with her male Cabinet members meekly gathered around. The head waiter approached and asked the Prime Minister whether she was ready to order. Thatcher turned and shouted, "Yes, I'll have steak!" To which the now-quivering waiter responded, "Very good, ma'am, and the vegetables?" And Thatcher boomed out, "They'll have steak too!" To all but Thatcher's actual Cabinet, it was hilarious, the talk of the town for weeks. Indicative of just how dominant a figure Thatcher had become, but also how grating and dismissive she was perceived to be personally, not least by her potential male rivals in the Conservative Party.

Getting back to the Falklands, when I arrived in 1986, the Brits remained in firm control of the islands and were bluntly rebuffing suggestions that even over time there might be a negotiated alteration of their status – unless the beleaguered island residents opted for such a change, which, of course, they never would. In Argentina the generals were out and there had been a modest rebirth of democracy under Alfonsín, but recovering the Malvinas, albeit peaceably, remained a touchstone of their policy, as highly emotional for them as it was for London.

Q: Well did the U.S. Government try to act as go-between between Argentina and Great Britain?

NEITZKE: When the Brits declared a protection zone around the islands, and later, an exclusive fishing zone, and tensions again flared, Washington did take the lead behind the scenes in dampening things down. Throughout, ARA, by the late 1980s under Elliot Abrams, was looking for ways to rebuild U.S.-Argentine relations, efforts which included potential weapons transfers and strengthened military to military ties, which made the Brits uneasy, at best. I think some in Washington, ARA and elsewhere, had difficulty imagining how these small, godforsaken frozen islands in the South Pacific could mean so much to Great Britain. But they did, or rather, the fact that British blood had recently been shed to secure them. And it had been costly for the Argentines. The Belgrano...

Q: A cruiser. It was actually an American World War II cruiser which we had sold them.

NEITZKE: It had gone down with the loss of over 300 lives and-

Q: Yes, it had been torpedoed by a British submarine.

NEITZKE: This had been traumatic for the British; no one had anticipated a loss of life on that scale. The Brits are intensely patriotic when the chips are down, but there's also an acute sensitive streak, and that loss of life shocked them. It didn't alter their belief that they had had to defend these islands; this was sovereign British territory. But it shocked them. Sink the Belgrano played for a long time in London and was harshly critical of the government. So this, the war that is, was a deeply felt issue by Thatcher. On the other hand you had, after the horrors of military rule in Argentina, you had a government trying to take the first steps to democratize and come to terms with its past. And an honest broker sitting in Washington, just to give Elliot Abrams his due, might have concluded that the U.S. could conduct a more dynamic, forthcoming policy towards this new Argentine government, even one with a significant military component, without necessarily raising Thatcher's hackles. Sadly, this was not the case. More than four years after the war, emotions still ran too high.

In London, I personally had to tread carefully with this issue. I got to know well the very able, likeable head of the Argentine interests section there, and of course I also had frequent dealings with FCO officials handling the issue. I recall once how personally offended my Argentine colleague seemed on confirming that I had attended an FCO briefing on, I believe it was a military training exercise the Brits planned to conduct around the islands. ARA too was in a swivet over my attendance. Special relationship or not, ARA expected the London Embassy to be strictly neutral on all things Argentine-related, however awkward that might be, but could do nothing once I laid out my rationale in a cable. Another time, I witnessed, as note taker for Price, what was probably the low point in our bilateral dialogue during my time there. In as cold and blunt a tone as I ever witnessed from a senior British official – and, especially when livid, the Brits are capable of a coolness unlike any others – they expressed what had to be Thatcher's personal anger and incredulity that Washington was making a military deal with Buenos Aires that she felt could threaten her hard won victory. How could we not have known what this meant to her?

Well, we did know, we in the Embassy, and we'd been warning Washington all along about her hyper-sensitivity on this issue. But ARA pushed ahead anyway, including promising Buenos Aires a military deal...

Q: Was this not high performance aircraft?

NEITZKE: I believe so. And on returning to the Embassy, at Price's direction I drafted a cable, in essence a bare-fisted indictment of ARA's apparent freewheeling with Buenos Aires and a challenge to the notion put out by ARA and others that we needed to strike an evenhanded balance between relations with Britain, our closest ally, and the government of Argentina. It was a very, very tough cable. Only one other time, as Chief of Mission in Zagreb, did I draft another

cable quite like that. This dustup with ARA, however, highlighted a genuine difficulty inherent in the special relationship at that time; it left the Brits with a de facto near-stranglehold on our efforts to forge better relations with a key Latin American, hemispheric neighbor. The fact that London was simultaneously cozying up to Chile as a Southern Cone counterweight further rankled in Washington. We suggested other, more modest ways to move forward with Buenos Aires, but ARA, at least for awhile, was too rattled or too pissed off, or both, to respond. It took time for the dust to settle, and when it did I was clearly on the outs with ARA; Price's signature or not, they knew who had drafted the cable and how I personally felt about the substance of the matter.

On most other ARA issues we had few problems with the Brits, or they with us, at least British officialdom. When Daniel Ortega came to London, for example, and to our surprise was received by Thatcher in Downing Street, she let him plead his case about Washington's perfidy and then lowered the boom. Opposition to our Central American policies, however, was endemic among the British Left, and in much of the press, and we never really overcame that. I recall our once receiving in the Embassy a group of protesters that included the playwright Harold Pinter. My immediate superiors in the Embassy felt that such groups were best handled by receiving them politely, letting them have their say -- however offensive that might be -- thanking them, and escorting them out. This nice/nice at all costs - we'll never change their minds anyway - attitude tended to drive me up the wall. It wasn't just their patronizing smugness, they were spouting nonsense on the issues. I wanted to take them on, challenge them point by point - what did we stand to lose after all, but I didn't prevail.

As a final point on ARA issues, I might mention that this period also marked another interesting aspect of our Nicaragua policy, our support of the Contras, and Oliver North transited London frequently on matters that we came to understand only much later.

Beyond ARA, I covered Gibraltar and London's on-again, off-again dialogue with Spain on that, as well as the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, all areas in which the British were often heavily involved.

Q: Well, let's talk a bit about how you report. I mean, here you are an American diplomat in London, and the same would be true of a British diplomat sitting Washington, you have this unbelievably rich menu of sources available to you, of educated opinion, how do you whittle that down, determine which sources are really good, really on the ball?

NEITZKE: On my external issues, there were actually only a few people whose opinions counted for much, who could consistently add value to what you were getting from your FCO and other official contacts. These were often in think tanks, occasionally in other embassies, sometimes journalists. And you would get to know them fairly quickly. Some may have been known by your predecessor and handed down, but not always. The far greater challenge in what you're referring to was on the domestic side. This was pre-internet, before Washington had direct, real-time access to essentially all the written news available to one in London. But even then, in the late 1980s, there was so much bilateral contact, so many visits between London and Washington, it was a serious challenge to tell Washington something it didn't already know, or

wouldn't otherwise quickly find out, unless you stayed down in the weeds reporting mostly trivia, for which the audience would be limited to nil.

The trick here, the task, that is, in doing periodic analyses of, say, Thatcher's political health, was to develop your own reporting style and offer a fresh perspective, not the easiest thing to do in a city with some of the best political minds in the world, more quality newspapers than anywhere else in the world, and, regarding Thatcher, on the number one topic of the political chattering classes. But if the reaction of our various readers is any indication, I accomplished at least that, a fresh perspective. Some of this was in the writing style, and, to no little extent, in the packaging of telegrams.

Q: Packaging? You mean...

NEITZKE: If you don't grab them with your title line, and draw them into a punchy, intriguing summary, they're not going to read the thing. It's a marketplace. Readers are overworked, busy. They have to read the cable on the arms control exchange, on the latest shift in an important negotiation, on a bilateral blowup. They don't have to read what you're pedaling about Thatcher's political health or mid-term threats to that health, unless, of course, they're on the desk. So it has to be good, it has to be fresh, it has to grab them.

I know what this sounds like. Most political and econ officers have it drilled into them to keep it short, keep it tight, just the facts, a bit of commentary for policy context, but don't go off on tangents. If it's five pages, make it three, if it's two pages, make it one, and, if it doesn't really need to go at all, don't write it, unless, of course, your boss insists. If everyone hewed to these principles, then Washington would no longer be drowning in paper, and priorities would be attended to in a more efficient, rational manner. But, as you know, that's not how the world actually works. There's often a fierce competition for attention to one's issues, and for the limited reading time of senior officials, in hopes of affecting their thinking, and, consequently, policy.

So, in the kind of reporting I'm talking about here, having something new to say was critical, but knowing how to package it to get it read was equally important. And it's all done on tight deadlines. Invariably the piece has to be on someone's desk by two o'clock this afternoon, no excuses. And it's usually not a simple cable memcon from the day before. It's an original think piece that they want, and they want it to be literate and penetrating, with humorous asides and historical allusions. This is London after all, there's a reputation to uphold.

Q: Okay. Well let's turn back to Thatcher then. How did we view the Thatcher Government at the time?

NEITZKE: As our closest, most reliable ally. And on a personal level, between Thatcher and Reagan, I doubt there'd been a relationship between a British prime minister and a president remotely as warm since Churchill and Roosevelt, and perhaps not even they were as close. They were different people with different styles, of course; Reagan the charmer and Thatcher more openly feisty. And a British Prime Minister had to have a mastery of policy detail, and debating skills in the Commons of a very high order. But on the major ideological points, foreign and

domestic, they appeared to me to be soul mates. And they obviously enjoyed being around one another. I had the sense that Thatcher felt close to Nancy Reagan as well. I had several assignments in connection with a Reagan visit to London that brought me close enough to get some sense of this. I don't think any of them were acting. You could see that there was personal warmth.

Q: A real personal warmth?

NEITZKE: Yes. That doesn't sum up the entire relationship, of course. There were ups and downs, and issues, such as the Falklands as I've mentioned, on which our respective interests occasionally diverged. But I think both leaders had a great deal of respect for what the other was attempting to do to reshape their own society, and they largely saw eye to eye on meeting the challenge of the Soviet Union. The tabloid press would often refer to Thatcher as Reagan's poodle. Well, some poodle. I don't think that was the nature of the relationship at all; Thatcher was quite adept at using her closeness to Reagan to advance Britain's interests as well. And let me add, this didn't all happen just by chance, or some quirk of personal chemistry. The relationship required constant tending at all levels.

You've probably heard of the Powell-Powell channel. That was the active communications link between Charles Powell, pronounced Pole, Thatcher's Private Secretary, and Colin Powell, then Reagan's National Security Advisor. That was certainly a measure of the intimacy of the Thatcher-Reagan relationship and of our two governments at that time. Of course that channel could complicate the life of an Ambassador in London, if he weren't quickly apprised of what was being passed back and forth by the Powells. But generally it worked smoothly, in part because of the front office we had in London.

Q: This was Price, you said.

NEITZKE: Yes. Price, and Ray Seitz, his DCM, an extremely able, likeable guy, who probably understood the Brits better than any other American diplomat of the last generation or two. Price left London shortly after Reagan left office and both Seitz and the Political Counselor departed at the end of my third year there, in the summer of 1989. Price's successor was Henry Catto, another friend of the president, from Texas, later head of USIA (United States Information Agency).

Q: I have talked to people who worked in the White House at the time. They said they never liked to see Reagan alone in the office with Maggie Thatcher, or with Brian Mulroney, because Reagan was a person who really liked these two and they were never quite sure that he might not give away the store if left alone.

NEITZKE: I'm not sure what store that might have been. Possibly on some third tier issues, but what exactly were the major issues, from 1986 through 1988, on which Thatcher or Reagan would have had to twist the other's arm? Again, there were all kinds of issues in play, arms control, economic issues, dealing with Gorbachev, UN votes, the Falklands-Argentine cluster of issues, the gamut. And I'm not saying Thatcher lacked the ability to charm Reagan into a

concession here or there. I'm sure she did. I just don't think that the "afraid to leave them alone" take on the relationship is any more valid than the Reagan's poodle theme.

Thatcher was basically doing so much that was in our interest, in our shared interest for the most part, that I'm not sure what the fuss would have been about, a fear that Thatcher could privately somehow get to Reagan in a way injurious to our interests, unless perhaps you're talking about how Washington's Latin American hands viewed the Anglo-Argentine situation. Yes, they probably would not have wanted Thatcher to be alone with Reagan.

Q: But, you know, the people in the outer office, the staff, always get nervous that the principals might be saying something or doing something off script. Well, continue. You were talking about how the front office in London was sometimes cut out of the action, out of communications...

NEITZKE: The point I was trying to make is that U.S. relations with Great Britain are so multifaceted, so active and so intimate in so many areas that staying atop all of that is a perennial difficulty for whoever is running the London Embassy. Price and Seitz were acutely aware of this dimension of the relationship and I think handled it, stayed on top of things, about as well as they could have done. But again, the amount of bilateral contact that officials in various agencies would have with their British counterparts, usually through the embassy but sometimes directly, was enormous. And if as an embassy officer you lagged a couple days in getting up to speed with some communication or another, that wasn't the end of the world. On the other hand, if there were a direct communication between No. 10 Downing Street and the White House on an important breaking issue, you would hope to be made aware of that as quickly as possible, or it could be very awkward, and my sense is that we nearly always were. I understand that this aspect of the relationship, keeping the London Embassy informed, has deteriorated significantly in the succeeding, internet years, however.

Q: People refer to the ambassadors in some of these very high-profile places as being more like travel agents...

NEITZKE: That's not how I'd characterize London. Yes. There was an enormous flow of official travelers. I'm sure the Ambassador's guest bedrooms at Winfield House saw plenty of use. And I'm sure that might occasionally have been distracting, unless, of course the visitors themselves were sufficiently important to dominate that day's official activities. But none of this inhibited the principal officers in the embassy from focusing on their priority issues. Most understood Washington pretty well to begin with. And the flow of Washington travelers was a means, not available on that scale to most posts, of staying abreast of the latest thinking in Washington, thinking that may not yet have made its way into official communications, so it was valuable. And the contact, face time, one could have in London with senior Washington visitors, Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries whom you might not see all that often even if you were in Washington, could be useful from a career standpoint. So although there could be frustrations on this front, we didn't tend to regard the flow of visitors, at least not senior visitors, as sort of time wasted on babysitting freeloaders.

Now CODELs visiting London were in a different category, and there were many of them. Although there were notable exceptions, individual Congressmen or staffers whose visits were

all business and always value added - Steve Solarz comes to mind in that regard - many of the larger CODELs especially, which would tack a stop in London onto their itinerary, conducted little or no useful business and did require a lot of care and feeding. But, as I indicated earlier, I have a different take on CODELs than most FSOs, even so-called Congressional junkets. If I had to choose between devoting time to casual Congressional travelers or, on the other hand, having a Congress too politically fearful or simply too uninterested to travel abroad much, I'd opt for the former in a heartbeat. From what I saw, Congressional travel, even if it wasn't always strictly business related, opened minds and broadened perspectives.

Q: Let us talk a bit more about your reporting of British political events and forces. You had the Liberals and the Social Democrats and others had Labor and the Tories. What was your reading of some of these groups and their leaders, their view of the world?

NEITZKE: In the June 1987 election Thatcher led her party to a third consecutive general election victory, something that hadn't been done in over a century and a half. So she felt in a position to press forward with her domestic reform agenda, taking on the local councils and so forth. And she did so in a pretty headstrong way, which eventually led to the so-called poll tax fiasco a couple years later, one of the first significant signs of her political vulnerability. But 1988 marked the height of her power and dominance. There was serious speculation that she might still be in power in the year 2000. It was actually hard even to imagine the British political scene without her.

I recall that, just as in Belgrade we would every year drag out and update the "after Tito, what?" analysis, so too in London we and others would periodically speculate on Britain's future if Thatcher, as it was sometimes put, fell under a bus. The stock answer to that, by the way, was, "what bus would dare?" But the possibility of her sudden departure was, at the height of her power, almost imponderable, which seems strange in retrospect, since her political end, when it came, was rather swift. She rubbed a lot of people who might have sympathized with her on policy the wrong way. And although most Tory backbenchers would endure nearly any slight to stay in power, to keep their seat in a Parliamentary majority, some of Thatcher's closest male Tory colleagues in and out of the Cabinet, I'm thinking here of Michael Heseltine, Geoffrey Howe, and others, found it increasingly hard to abide her manner. Some too, even some who shared her strong aversion to the Brussels bureaucracy, found her attitude toward certain aspects of European integration needlessly hostile. So even as she dominated, her margin for serious error was narrowing.

I've already described what happened to the center-left parties after 1987, their implosion and realignment and renaming, after they failed in that election to replace Labor as Britain's second leading political grouping. I recall in the immediate run-up to the election a widespread feeling, in the center-left and beyond as well, that Labor might never again win a British general election. Seriously. You could have gotten decent odds on such a bet at that time. Which of course sounds crazy now in the light of Tony Blair's radical makeover of Labor and his three general election victories, tying Thatcher. But that was the reality back then; Labor had sunk that low. In a way, one almost felt sorry for Neil Kinnock; he was a terrifically engaging politician, but he and his shadow cabinet always seemed to me transitional figures, excellent debaters, formidable Parliamentary opponents, but I could never visualize Neil Kinnock in Downing Street or, say,

Gerald Kaufman, the shadow foreign secretary, in the FCO. But, just to be honest, I also could not see a John Major succeeding a Margaret Thatcher. And he did succeed her.

Q: Well, on the Labor leadership, I had the impression these guys were way to the left, that they would get together and sing The Red Banner or something...

NEITZKE: Even under Kinnock the party had begun to move a bit. These were not the hardened Socialists of old Labor, bent on tearing down much of British society. They were still way out of the mainstream of Thatcher's Britain, but not as bad as you suggest. In terms of wallowing in one's self-centered convictions, I don't think that Labor had a monopoly on that; they would all do it. Which reminds me. There was a curious and terrifically entertaining British political institution that I should mention: the annual fall conference season. Chautauqua time by the seaside is I think how I once described it in a cable. You had your social season starting in the spring and going through the races and the concerts and all of that and moving on to this political spectacle in the fall. It was all part of the cycle of British public life. In any event, every autumn, after the August doldrums, the faithful of each political party would gather convention-style in some resort town, usually by the sea, to mix and mingle, listen to endless speeches, booze it up, and generally reassure themselves of their own innate goodness and wisdom and their adversaries' misguided ways.

And it was part of our job, those of us who followed domestic politics in the political section, to attend these gatherings, mingle with the luminaries and the locals, and try to detect where things might be headed. It was a unique experience. And, to give them their due, Thatcher may have run the country but Labor and the center-left parties almost always put on a better show, lots more eccentrics, lots weirder digressions, many more hotheads grabbing the mike for their annual rant. More seriously, some in the Labor Party in those days were struggling with how to become more electable, struggling against their ideological predisposition to adopt positions patently unpopular with the generally conservative bent of the population at large. Thatcher had effectively gutted the union movement. They weren't a significant force. Although we still had a labor attaché in the political section who followed them closely, attended their annual conferences and so on, none of that was taken terribly seriously. And although once in a while there would be a direct blast from a significant player at one of these conferences at the U.S., Anglo-American ties, or Britain's nuclear defense, most often they focused on domestic issues, attacks on Thatcher's social agenda.

Q: Now, moving back to other events in this period, this may not have been your area, but you had the earthshaking events of the latter part of 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down-

NEITZKE: Well, I did want to talk about that, for two reasons. The first is that Bush's inauguration in January 1989 brought about a change in the atmosphere of the bilateral relationship. Thatcher and Reagan had been, in a sense, equal partners, in terms of how they regarded one another, in an extraordinarily close, long-term relationship. They had been through a lot together. Although Thatcher obviously preferred Bush over Dukakis in the 1988 election, and was anxious to be on good terms with him, it's fair to say that privately, at least initially, she didn't view Bush as, well, fighting in the same weight class as her friend Ronnie. She was more experienced on the world stage than Bush, had been Prime Minister for nearly ten years at that

point, and appeared to regard herself, although not in a gratuitously arrogant way, as the senior partner, at least in one sense, in this new relationship, notwithstanding the gross disparity in power and influence between our two countries. This was all a very muted thing, though. I don't recall a specific statement, or incident, or slight. It may have been more her tone than anything. She often sounded schoolmarmish, even imperious. Whatever it was, and it's possible this originated more on our side of the Atlantic than in London, the Bush team signaled early on, although again in a muted way, not only that they didn't see Thatcher as the senior partner of anything but that Thatcher's counsel might carry somewhat less weight under Bush than it had under Reagan. This was not an open falling out or anything, but there was a distinct early change in the bilateral atmosphere.

And one issue on which this faint discord manifested itself in 1989 and 1990 was precipitated by the falling of the Berlin Wall in late 1989, that is, the sudden possibility of a reunited Germany. You know, you live in a place for a few years, read widely, speak to lots of experts and commentators, and you think you've pretty much figured it out. And then something happens to alter your basic perception of the place. You couldn't travel anywhere in Britain without appreciating that the nation's long history of warfare, and especially the two World Wars, were an elemental part of the national identity. So too was British standoffishness, its clinging stubbornly to its currency and system of weights and measures, for example, despite Continental pressures. But what you didn't see every day, until the Wall fell, was the reservoir of anger and mistrust of the German nation that many Britons still felt. And I'm sure you recall that Thatcher was not bashful about expressing her strong misgivings over what a reunited Germany might portend for the future of Europe. Support for reunification became one of the hallmarks and signal successes of Bush's approach to Europe, but it came essentially against the backdrop of Thatcher's kicking and screaming. That didn't prevent Thatcher and Bush, who essentially liked one another, from getting on together. As Bush placed his stamp on the Presidency, the push to German reunification became unstoppable, and our two governments cooperated very closely in the showdown with Saddam Hussein after he invaded Kuwait in the summer of 1990. The relationship did settle into a groove, based on genuine mutual respect, but it was never quite the same as it had been with Reagan.

Q: Well, you said you followed Eastern Europe. Did the events there affect your work in any way?

NEITZKE: Yes. And that's the second point I wanted to make, in addition, that is, to the brief cooling of the bilateral atmosphere. Despite the size of Embassy London, no one else there had anywhere near the experience that I had had with the region and our policy toward it. So I watched this closely. Another benefit of serving in a place like London is that everybody sends you their cable traffic. You could read all you wanted, and I welcomed that. And there were first-class local experts to compare perspectives with.

I mentioned earlier that during my time both in Eastern European Affairs and in Derwinski's office I had closely followed and occasionally ventured into the endless debate over the extent to which the U.S. had been or could be a critical long-term player in Eastern Europe, whether we had the political will or wherewithal to effect dramatic change in that area. And I think I mentioned the almost reflexive reluctance of State's East European hands to respond forcefully when there was a crackdown of some sort in Eastern Europe, lest they find themselves cut out of

the action. By the mid-1980s, the question was whether the limited ferment then evident in Eastern Europe would lead to permanent change and, if so, whether the agents of that change were more likely to be reformed communist elites in the various countries or non-government, non-Party actors.

I recall a trip that Deputy Secretary Whitehead made to a number of Eastern European capitals in 1987 or so, in which he repeatedly, clearly indicated a USG belief that our best bet in the looming change question lay with the Communist elites, that engaging them would be key in our helping to facilitate change in the region. I thought that take on things was wrong, that whether change was imminent anywhere in the region or not, we ought not indiscriminately embrace the powers that be in hopes of steering them toward a more humane, democratic type of rule. It was, in essence, an abandonment of differentiation. I thought that any additional effort or resources we were willing to put into the region should go to groups on the outs, the dissidents, human rights activists, and so forth.

And then something remarkable happened. The EUR front office, in a cable to all European posts from EUR Principal Deputy Tom Simons entitled "Invitation to the Dance," opened the floor to a frank, no-holds-barred, front channel discussion among EUR chiefs of mission on these very policy issues. I don't know what got into Tom, or, for that matter, Roz Ridgway, then EUR Assistant Secretary, why they thought such an effort would go anywhere given the seasoned reticence of most senior FSOS to challenge policy in a frontal way, let alone in a front channel debate with their peers. But I thought Simons and Ridgway deserved enormous credit for having undertaking the effort.

Q: This cable went out when?

NEITZKE: Early 1988 I think.

Q: But this was before the collapse?

NEITZKE: Yes, of course. The Wall was still up. The Soviets were still in charge. And nobody had then predicted the collapse of communism. At the time Simons invited everyone to this grand debate, it appeared that we'd already cast our policy lot, exemplified by the Whitehead trip, with those who had long argued for a less discriminating ratcheting up of our engagement with nearly all of the ruling communist elites of Eastern Europe. Predictably, the silence was deafening; nobody wanted to take the floor, or the mike, as it were. After further urging, a couple of posts ventured brief cables offering support for our heightened pace of activity in the region. The rest said nothing.

I couldn't resist the challenge. This was a subject I knew about and cared about. And here was an unexpected invitation to an open debate. So after Simons sent out another plea, essentially "come on guys, let's hear what you think," I drafted a cable entitled "Invitation to the Dance: The Punch Bowl Perspective," and got the front office in London to send it out untouched. I argued, mainly through posing a series of questions, that key elements of our emerging new approach to Eastern Europe were wrong-headed. I said there seemed to be a lot of loose talk about historic opportunities, dynamic strategies, and the supposedly decisive role the U.S. could play in the

region. I said that in fact there was precious little the United States could do to alter the course of events in Eastern Europe in any fundamental way and that in the preceding several administrations we had shown clearly that we were incapable of consistently marshalling the will and resources to support any creative, potentially transformative policy line with these countries. I argued that, in any event, the forces most likely to transform this region were not those in government and Party ranks, to which we were then in the process of cozying up; real change, if and when it came, was far more likely to come from the currently disenfranchised. Trying to foster a somehow more natural relationship with these necessarily very authoritarian regimes was taking us down the wrong path. I suggested that we tone down the exuberant rhetoric and aim our efforts, instead of at the elites, at cultural penetration, to reach more of the people, and I suggested a few modest steps to that end.

I said all of this after offering apologies to the ambassadors and FSOs in the front line Eastern European missions, lauding the tough work they were doing day in and day out, and noting what a genuinely rare opportunity it was to be invited to offer views on other posts' main foreign policy preoccupations. It was a lengthy cable. It was blunt, and, as I said, it went out untouched by others in the mission. The punch bowl perspective was an allusion, I said, to the perhaps alcohol-induced euphoria of some of those most anxious to jump into the Eastern European dance and presume that we could critically influence events in the area.

Now in normal times, if Embassy London or anyone else in Western Europe had sent in a cable like this, unsolicited, on sensitive issues supposedly beyond their ken, you would have opened yourself up for a strong, possibly even *ad hominem* blast from posts in the region, plus a call from somebody way up in State saying, you know, what the hell do you think you're doing? But this was different. We'd been invited not once but twice to weigh in.

The reaction to my cable was not long in coming. Posts not on our long list of addressees were calling in asking for repeats. Officers began hearing from colleagues to the East that the cable was not only being read but was provoking extended debates within embassies. They wanted to know who had written it. A couple of posts thanked us for airing our views while neither agreeing nor disagreeing with their thrust. And a day or two later, Simons himself sent out a congratulatory cable to London, info-ing the rest of Europe, not agreeing or disagreeing with us, but noting how well we had laid out one side of the debate. So that was gratifying. In the meantime, however, I learned that a colleague in Embassy London, a water-walker's water-walker, who has since risen in the Service higher and faster than all but a couple officers of my generation, had been at pains to assure Simons and others in Washington that he'd had absolutely nothing to do with the cable.

I mention this episode not to pat myself on the back for being right on every point, because I wasn't, although, when the Wall did come down at the end of 1989, the elites in most countries were pretty swiftly swept aside. This episode illustrated in spades the extreme reticence of many senior FSOs to do anything that might place them – on the written record – on the wrong side of an eventual policy decision, and potentially threaten their careers.

After retiring, I led the dissent portion of several sessions of the mid-career or political tradecraft course at FSI, and I would cite this example to illustrate both the aversion to open policy debate,

let alone dissent, among many FSOs and the possibility that front channel reporting occasionally affords for airing dissenting views.

Q: Okay. Well, on the policy matter, Eastern Europe, or any other key area for that matter, it is very hard, the people involved there in policy matters cannot really say, you know, we cannot control this, we're not important players, it will just all be played out within Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We're just minor players.

NEITZKE: Yes. That's the tendency. A gung-ho approach, inflated rhetoric, and a clouded perspective about what realistically can and can't be done. Which made what Simons and Ridgway did, inviting everyone to debate our policy toward Eastern Europe, extraordinary.

As for the marked reluctance to downplay one's own or one's government's importance in an issue, however, this is really something of a disease. We tend to focus on the disease of clientitis, whereby the embassy overseas falls in love with local culture and society, gets too close to the local government, and becomes an advocate for that government's views with Washington. Well, there is a related disease in Washington, particularly dealing with regimes with which we have a tenuous relationship, that at all costs, whatever happens, we must not react so strongly that we foreclose future options. We must never take ourselves out of the game. That attitude, at its worst, is going to limit, perhaps severely, your options for responding to what might be truly egregious actions by an authoritarian regime.

Q: Well, regarding a full-blown debate on an important issue, or new policy course, which you point out is very rare, one of the other things I have noted is a tendency in Washington that when an issue comes up, some of the first people dropped off are the experts. I think we already discussed this a little. They may be arguing that you cannot do this or that or they may point out things that nobody wants to have pointed out. And those cutting off the debate are not just political types, they are Foreign Service too. They may have already gotten the National Security Council onboard. They may have already gotten media support for whatever they are trying to do. They may have already gotten Senate staff onboard. And they are ready to go ahead with their plan. They don't want a lot of discussion or second guessing by experts, whether it's coming from Embassies overseas or anywhere else.

NEITZKE: Right. Again, that's what made this invitation to the dance, to the policy debate on Eastern Europe, so unusual. Some in Washington may have had misgivings themselves about an overly activist approach, or they may have tried and failed to win the kinds of backing for such an approach from outside the Department, from the NSC, the Pentagon, media, and so on, that you mentioned. Whatever the genesis of this exercise, though, it was incredibly refreshing, however short-lived, as events in Eastern Europe itself quickened and let ultimately to the transformation we witnessed in late 1989 and early 1990.

Q: Did any of those changes, those earth-shaking events, affect any of you in London?

NEITZKE: Not personally, other than in the sense, of course, that they altered history, rocked one's basic sense of what the future was likely to hold, in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and beyond. As an Embassy, however, we were just distant observers, wonder-struck like everyone

else when the Wall came down. It was a fascinating thing to behold, but it took time for what this might mean to sink in, and then the Soviet Union itself began to unravel. How many of us expected to see that in our lifetime? Meeting the Soviet challenge, after all, was what had preoccupied us during most of our working lives.

Q: Sure.

NEITZKE: And it wasn't long after the fall of the Wall that this rift in perceptions between us and the Brits, Thatcher herself, over the inevitability or desirability of German reunification, began to surface. On this issue I don't think Thatcher ever came around before she left office. As I said, that issue added strain to a Bush-Thatcher relationship that was never on a par with the Reagan-Thatcher relationship. And Thatcher in this period was going all out on her domestic reforms, some of which were beyond the pale even to some of her former supporters. She was beginning to encounter real resistance. Although this happened very shortly after I left, she did get a boost after Saddam invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and international tensions rose. We and the Brits saw more quickly than most others what needed to be done. And there was that meeting between Bush and Thatcher at the home of our ambassador, Henry Catto, in Colorado I believe, at which Thatcher is said to have urged Bush not to "go wobbly" on militarily confronting Saddam. Planning for the liberation of Kuwait with Britain's active cooperation did a lot, I understand, to infuse the Bush-Thatcher relationship with some of the warmth that had earlier been lacking.

Q: Okay. Well anything to add before leaving London? You had been there, what, four years? We did not discuss the running of the Embassy. Was there anything especially notable in that regard, anything that affected you personally?

NEITZKE: We were there four years. As for the running of the place, maybe just to note the de facto decapitation of the Embassy after my third year, in the summer of 1989, when the Ambassador, DCM, Political Counselor, and Deputy Political Counselor all left along with, I believe, the ECON Counselor. That left me the senior Embassy holdover on the Political side. I became Deputy Political Counselor, a position that doesn't exist in many embassies but in London at that time was a significant supervisory job. I became rating officer for all of my former peers in the section and had authorizing authority for their outgoing cables. It was my first serious supervisory job since running the Visa Section way back in Belgrade. And with everybody above me in the Embassy new to London, I was called upon in a number of instances when events were breaking rapidly and historical context was needed quickly. We left London in July 1990.

LYNNE LAMBERT
Trade Policy Officer
London (1987-1990)

Lynne Lambert was born in Ohio in 1943. After receiving her bachelor's degree from Smith College in 1965, she received her master's degree from Johns

Hopkins in 1967. Her career has included positions in Athens, Teheran, Paris, London, and Budapest. Ms. Lambert was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in January 2002.

Q: In '87, here you had been dealing with somewhat the same issue for some time now. Where did you go?

LAMBERT: I dealt with it again. I went to Britain, to the embassy in London. I was very fortunate. I had a terrific job. I was the trade policy officer in the embassy and also filled a void more than anything else as the person in the embassy who did the European integration, which became the downfall of Mrs. Thatcher. So, I had a very hot, major portfolio. I was dealing with trade disputes, consultation on the Uruguay Round, and a European single market, which was being negotiated within the Community at that time and was something that U.S. business was very afraid would shut it out. They thought it might produce something in industry and services akin to the Common Agriculture Policy. So, on the trade side, I had those three quite large portfolios. My reporting on the single European market was read rather widely in Washington, because London was considered a good source on what was happening. The British saw a benefit in being our intermediary, or one of them, for several reasons: telling other Europeans what the U.S. position was one of their self-appointed roles. It was something they wanted to bring to the Community. But, also, the British tended to have the same positions as we did, and they used the U.S. to bolster London's position. There were a couple of capitals that performed the same role - the Netherlands comes to mind, and in the Dutch case, the reasoning was probably similar.

On the political side, the UK was undergoing a tremendous, and divisive, political debate over Europe. The UK at that point - and still - was an unwilling member of Europe, I think largely because they had nowhere else to go. The British have always opposed federalism in Europe. I think the Thatcher government saw Europe as a customs union. That was the Europe Britain joined, and they didn't really want to move much farther. Britain certainly supported the Single Market, but it seemed more an improvement to the customs union, and especially a way to include services. Europe, and what the Tory right wing called the loss of sovereignty, split the Conservative Party bitterly and eventually caused Thatcher's downfall. It was a big issue in all the other political parties as well. Probably the most solidly pro-Europe politicians were the left-wing of the Conservative Party (sort of like moderate Republicans, but there are more of them), the Liberals, and what at that time was a very attractive party, the Social Democratic Party, which attracted the right-wing Labourites. Roy Jenkins, David Owen, Shirley Williams, and others who were really interesting thinkers left the Labour Party to form the Social Democratic Party. These groups were solidly pro-Europe. The most anti-Europe groups were the right-wing of the Conservative Party. The Labour Party was a little bit hard to judge. It struck me at the time - and now I think probably I was wrong - that Labour came out with a mildly pro-Europe posture purely to take advantage of the split in the Tory Party. However, Tony Blair as Prime Minister has consistently taken a pro-European stance, at least for a Brit, and I think he has pulled the rest of the country along - slowly, sometimes grudgingly, but it has moved. This said, Gordon Brown, the current Chancellor, the Exchequer, has been a brake on European progress, for example by deferring and deferring a referendum on joining the common European currency. Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were in Parliament when I lived in London. Both were fairly young, and they were considered Labor's comers. They were not in the leadership of the Labour Party, but they were in Parliament. Mrs. Thatcher was so dominant that people like Tony Blair and Gordon

Brown were quite accessible to the embassy. I met with both Gordon Brown and Tony Blair to talk about Europe.

Q: You were there from '87 to when?

LAMBERT: '90.

Q: When you went there, how did you find people dealing with Margaret Thatcher in our embassy? Was she considered a good thing for Great Britain or a problem? Was there any kind of mood you were getting from the embassy? She is a figure like de Gaulle. Sometimes the embassy in Paris was quite divided on de Gaulle.

LAMBERT: In the first place, she had huge electoral majorities. She was the longest serving prime minister of the century. Her dominance was just indisputable. We did work well with her government. When I first went to London, Reagan was President, and then Bush. Particularly under Reagan, she was that awesome character. Our political appointee ambassador, Charles Price, had a good one-on-one relationship with her. She delivered. When the going was rough, she was there. She asked for favors in return. She was just a very dominant political personality. We did have a special relationship. She looked very solid.

There were many of us in the embassy who felt she was missing the boat on Europe, and that her stridency about it all was a liability. When we had these philosophical debates within the embassy, a lot of us felt the train was leaving the station and she was still shouting from the platform. I think she was a bigger than life character. You had to take notice or laugh or admire her, whatever. One of the European Union summits was in France. It was on the bicentennial of Bastille Day. There was this wonderful celebration with all the fireworks. I don't think anybody does fireworks like in France. Thatcher was on camera lecturing Mitterrand on the reign of terror under Robespierre. She was just a formidable lady and nothing daunted her. We had similar situations when we'd have groups of senators or congressional delegations that would get to meet her. It was the same thing. She lectured them on whatever she chose. She often told them what they'd think when they visited Brussels, but it would be wrong. She was a character that was larger than life.

There's a funny story that was making the rounds when I lived in London. Helmut Kohl, a conservative, was just elected Chancellor in Germany, and Thatcher was thrilled. She thought everybody else in office in Europe was a flaming socialist, but here was someone like her. She had trouble arranging an initial meeting, and finally canceled her schedule to meet him during his annual visit to a reducing spa in a small village in Germany. Her staff tried to negotiate a lengthy substantive agenda, but his staff wanted something more informal, and relatively short. The resulting agenda was a compromise, and a two-hour meeting was envisioned. After about 40 minutes, Kohl pled another engagement and left. Thatcher, with nothing to do, strolled around window shopping. She saw Kohl in a café, eating a cream puff and reading a newspaper.

Q: What were some of the major issues that you were dealing with?

LAMBERT: The negotiation of the single European market and the possible exclusion of U.S. exports or presence from Europe was fundamentally the most important one. This was a negotiation that affected us (we have a lot of business with Europe) but one where we were absent from the table. As it turns out, the Single Market wasn't as protectionist as we had anticipated. Maybe we did a good job with all our markers and our intense attention. I'm sure there are a few problems at the margins, but basically the Europeans weren't interested in the protectionism and subsidy system that they had in agriculture. One exception to the generally liberal market was in broadcasting, in the cultural area.

The Uruguay Round was also important. The special relationship was important. Most British prime ministers and civil servants have to answer to this. No British prime minister wants to lose the special relationship or be accused of losing it. Some civil servants may feel that the special relationship is not in Britain's interest, that their future should be more in Europe, but I think that they're always mindful of guarding that special relationship, because of the political imperatives. This is something that takes a lot of tending on a lot of levels, because any of these disputes can get up to the prime minister's level fast in Britain. In the States, it takes a lot longer. With Britain in its isolated position in Europe, the special relationship maybe was especially important. And Britain seemed to be guarding against European measures that threatened North Atlantic relationships.

Q: Could you have the special relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain becoming part of the European Union or were they exclusive?

LAMBERT: Well, you have it, so they're clearly not exclusive. But there is a tension between the two roles that Britain was trying to play. The Community's interesting in a way. In the days I followed it, I never thought Britain was in the core of the Community. Under Thatcher, I don't think they chose to be. But the key political alliance in the Community was at that point, and still, is France and Germany. The Community is basically a political bargain between those two countries. Originally, it gave Germany room to grow economically. It protected French interests and kept French political ambitions alive. I think Britain was always somewhat marginal in that particular equation. When you came to economic interests and trade negotiation, Germany, the Netherlands, Britain, and Denmark would be more natural allies because they were the more liberal countries economically. But that wasn't really what made the Community work. So, Britain was an outsider in that context. One of the things that Britain does bring to the table – did then anyway and probably still does – is a better knowledge of the U.S. and a better knowledge of what U.S. positions on some of the things that they're dealing with are. In a way, it keeps them an outsider. In a way, it also gives them a role. Certainly in those days, that was the case. Particularly on the economic side, they were quite familiar with U.S. positions. I can't know what happens behind closed doors at European meetings, but apparently, we're represented very accurately.

Q: Did you find that you would see your counterparts in the British government... Did you find there was a special relationship, a closeness in talking about problems?

LAMBERT: Sure. There is a real rapport. The American access in Britain is terrific. British access here is good. You have the common language. There is a lot that can be understood. It's

not difficult to get to business. A lot of your business can be done by phone, whereas in other countries you have to go in, make niceties, speak in a foreign language. It's a very easy, natural relationship. We have the same type of relationship with Canada. It's one I've not seen with other countries.

The British civil service is worth a comment. First of all, they're spectacular. They're very well informed, very dedicated, very professional, and bright. This is a formidable group of people, chosen through a very rigorous selection process. In that kind of milieu of British society, eccentricity is accepted and valued. You worked with tremendously colorful characters who were always professional, but usually also willing to say what they thought personally. There was a broad spectrum of civil servants who were upset with the Thatcher administration's policies and, even more, the anti-European antics. They were also perfectly willing to see through everything that the Europeans were doing. They were very honest, very intellectually challenging. But again, they were loyal whenever they went out to represent their government. There was no question of what their personal opinions were because they didn't matter. Just the brilliance of some of these people and how they saw through things was a treat to share.

Q: Did you have a feeling that Britain would be losing something if it went into the European Union? In many ways, this started out and the core idea behind it was to keep the French and Germans from killing each other. We started out promoting that right from the beginning to get these two squabblers to lay down their arms and work together. Even if the British came in full blast, would they be almost on the periphery?

LAMBERT: You mean if they come in now full blast?

Q: Even at the time that we're talking about.

LAMBERT: Well, Britain had a history of not wanting to be in and then being rejected. It's an interesting organization. Certainly Germany has never used the full weight of its power. Had Britain been in earlier, more European, more committed, and more federalist, you could have had a triangular relationship with Germany still being the pivotal one and Britain being more influential than it is and France maybe less. They were certainly the three great powers.

Q: During this time, was there a concern about when the German shoe might drop – in other words, when Germany might start to exercise its true weight?

LAMBERT: I don't recall that ever being a concern of the United States. For one thing, economically, Germany was much more liberal than France and was a more natural ally in any kind of economic negotiation. We were hoping for a strong German position on almost anything of interest to us. Politically, I don't think that there's been a fear of Germany at any time that I've worked on European issues. Again, the Germans were a more amicable political force than France. They had much more modest ambitions. So, from the U.S. standpoint, no, I think a fuller role of Germany would be welcomed. Also, the European monetary policy that was then backed the German mark and the German economy was again something that found favor with us in its stability and just good management.

Q: Towards the end of the time you were there, Germany became united. Did that send shockwaves around from where you were?

LAMBERT: No, I think it was welcomed. It was a tremendously emotional moment. There were many things that had happened the ten or so months before, and we knew the communist regimes of East Europe were crumbling. The fall of the Berlin Wall was the most dramatic, the most symbolic. It was one of those moments like when Kennedy was assassinated and when 9/11 happened. Everyone remembers what he or she was doing when the news came. It seemed like years of unfortunate history was reversed. I didn't catch any feeling in Britain of anything other than kind of a liberation feeling. I was talking to my colleagues, who were more or less my age and class. I'm not sure what World War II veterans thought.

Q: Looking back at Margaret Thatcher, one of the things that strikes one – and I think it's a positive thing but others might feel differently – was her essentially breaking the power of the left-wing unions, which seemed to be a tremendous inhibitor on the development of Britain's economy. How did the people you spoke to feel about that?

LAMBERT: This had happened before I got there, so- (end of tape)

Q: You were saying she was a polarizer.

LAMBERT: Yes. You had to respect her and you had to grant that she was a factor that was there to be dealt with, but a lot of the more intellectual Brits were totally soured by not only what she was doing but the way she did it and her way of demeaning foreigners and Indian people and her stridency. There was, among the people I knew anyway, an admiration for her. Certainly at that point the economy was going better than the British economy had gone in many years. The place was getting spruced up. Money was coming in. The life of the city was picking up in both richness and brightness. She would be given credit for that. Her style and some of her substance was just repugnant to a lot of people. The more powerful, strident, or isolated she got – I think there were all three – the less acceptable it became. Even within her own party, this was prompting divisions.

Q: When you were dealing with British civil servants in the foreign ministry, were they by and large Europeanists but were serving a mistress who was not a Europeanist?

LAMBERT: They were almost all from Oxbridge, of course. I think most of them were Europeanists. They saw a lot of flaws in the Community, especially in the bureaucracy of the Commission, which was pretty much in place before they joined. I think they regarded Americans warmly, both as personal friends and friends of Britain. But I think that they were certainly much more pro-European than the government and were also pragmatically more pro-European. In other words, Europe was the future. Many felt that they weren't managing it in a way that would promote their future. They were managing it in a way that would isolate them.

Q: Had Kuwait been occupied by the time you left?

LAMBERT: No. There was a buildup on the border and it was increasing rapidly, but I left before the Gulf War.

Q: Is there anything else we should cover about this British time?

LAMBERT: We had a lot of presidential, Cabinet, and congressional visits. I think we always do in Britain, but this was a time when there was a lot going on. Any one of these visits in and of itself is kind of interesting.

Q: Did you get involved in any of these visits that went particularly right or wrong?

LAMBERT: I think they all went well. The British rolled out the red carpet to our VIP visitors. But I do remember some members of Congress who were particularly thoughtful and came in fearing a single European market. They went away somewhat shocked, maybe even saddened, at the vehemence of the Thatcher government's antipathy to Europe. They came away kind of wondering what Britain's future was going to be if this was the club they chose to be in. The fact that this was the perception of some of the more thoughtful senators and administration officials, it was surprising because they had come to seek basically Britain's help against the Community and they went home wondering what Britain's future was going to be.

Q: You were saying there was a senator who came away with a different view was who?

LAMBERT: Senator Benston was on a prestigious CODEL that I controlled, and the delegation included seven or eight senior senators. That was an opinion that they were all a bit perplexed about where Britain was going.

Q: Were we pushing in any way as an embassy or did we just say, "This is your problem?" Were we concerned that Britain might become marginalized?

LAMBERT: It's not my recollection that we were... I think that we realized that the Tory Party was being ripped in half and that they would have some difficulty continuing to govern and that this was a fundamental issue that would be there for a while to come. But I don't remember taking a European side against the British or telling them they needed to be more European. That would have been one of the last things we would have done.

DONALD A. KRUSE
Political Advisor to USCICUSNAVEUR
London (1988-1989)

Donald A. Kruse was born in Philadelphia in 1930. He later attended Wheaton College and majored in history. Following his graduation in 1952, he received a masters degree in political science at the University of Pennsylvania and then joined the army. Following his two year run in the army, Kruse joined the Foreign Service and served in posts in Canada, Luxembourg, France, Belgium,

Jerusalem, Italy, and England. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in March 1997.

Q: In '88, whither?

KRUSE: I told the admiral that I would have to leave Naples after my four years came up. My counterpart up in London, Art Woodruff, was leaving the job there as the political advisor to my same admiral. Frankly, that looked to be the best and most attainable assignment for me. I was working with Personnel trying to get something better, but nothing was working out. So, I told the admiral, if he wanted me in London he would have to ask State. It was certainly not against my interests to go and spend a year in London. So, with his request in the Department, they agreed to have me move over to this U.S.-only job and go to London in the fall of 1988.

Q: You were there from '88 to '89?

KRUSE: Right. It was at the end of that year that I retired.

Q: What were you doing there?

KRUSE: I became the political advisor to the admiral, in his hat as USCINUSNAVEUR and to the U.S.-only staff in London on U.S.-only stuff, which essentially would be what the Sixth Fleet was up to on any given day.

Q: Did you find that it was handy coming from where you were because you had been looking at the Mediterranean to get up into the London atmosphere, where I'm sure that there was a difference in attitude. They were looking at the Fulda Gap and everything else like that.

KRUSE: That's right, although it's true that U.S. NAVEUR, the headquarters in London, recognized that Washington was most concerned about what the Sixth Fleet was doing in the Mediterranean. During that year, we had more problems in Lebanon. The hostage taking was in full bloom. So, we had naval forces around and about. We're talking about '89 at this point. It was still hostage time, so we had forces poised to support any kind of a rescue operation if we were to do it. As it turned out, we didn't do that. But the focus was clearly... The Sixth Fleet was concerned primarily about safety and protection of Americans in the region and also any security threats that might come from either the Arab world or any other part.

Q: At this point, was the Iraq-Iran War still being waged?

KRUSE: It had ended, as I remember, in about '88. We then had about a year before Saddam took his interest in Kuwait. But it was soon after the end of the Iran-Iraq War that we got into this other problem of preparing for our Gulf War. That really didn't begin to heat up until after I left in '89. As a chronological point of reference, the Intifada had just begun in '87.

Q: This was the Palestinian uprising in the occupied part of the East Bank.

KRUSE: Which led to many changes. It led the King of Jordan to cease to claim his rights in the West Bank. It led to, I think, a whole relooking at the question of Palestinian nationalism and what was going to be the final outcome of this struggle between Palestinians and Israelis when you had such a clear spontaneous rebellion against the occupiers.

Q: Wearing the Sixth Fleet hat up in London, was this your concentration basically?

KRUSE: I think every paper I wrote was about this concern, how the Eastern Mediterranean was going to be affected by the Arab-Israeli struggle.

Q: Were you able to tap into American Middle Eastern experts when you were doing this or were you sort of drawing on the cables and all?

KRUSE: Whatever came along. I did not attempt to bring people over to the headquarters who were experts. It was mostly just conversations with the Admiral. This was mostly Admiral Busey, although Admiral Howe came later. Admiral Howe came from the NSC, so he was totally wired into what the U.S. was really going to do whether it made sense or not. He was going to do it because he had to. There were slow changes in our policies. We did recognize the PLO very briefly, finally, in 1988. It was the last year of George Shultz's tenure. So, that gave me an entree to begin to speak about dealing more naturally and normally with Palestinians rather than, "We can't even talk about it because we can't deal with the PLO." But when the CINC in London running the Sixth Fleet gets the order for the use of military force from Washington, he isn't going to say, "Now, wait a minute. I really think long term this is going to give us trouble." That's not what a four star is going to say at that time. He's going to figure out how he can do what he's ordered to do.

Q: Right. Going up to London in this '88 to '89 period feel within the headquarters up there, although you were Sixth Fleet looking at the Middle East, which was hot and got hotter, did you feel a feeling of sort of almost a let down or a relaxation or something about what was going on? We had Gorbachev and Reagan and then Bush were practically in bed with each other during that year or so. The Soviet threat was obviously dwindling away.

KRUSE: I remember writing a paper a year after Gorbachev came in in which I said, "Let us really look at what he is doing." He was still being dismissed in some quarters as "the drugstore cowboy." You remember that famous comment of Marlin Fitzwater, Bush's press secretary. I wrote something like, "If this continues, if the Perestroika and other policies continue (We already were beginning to see the start of the pullout from Afghanistan.), this could be a fundamental change in the Soviet Union." What did we feel up in London? There is just no doubt that operational interests were all in the Eastern Mediterranean. But there was also the recognition that, if indeed our Cold War opponent was going to disappear or change, then this is going to change everything down the road.

I might just say (I haven't mentioned this.) that there has been a big question over the years as to why U.S. Naval Forces Europe is still headquartered in London when, in fact, all of its forces by and large are in the Mediterranean. When the Commander in Chief NATO Forces South, became also double-hatted to be Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, something which

occurred just before I arrived in 1989, then people began to say, "Look, why do we have two separate headquarters? Why are we still up in London when that's far away from where we're going to go? Maybe we should bring those guys from London down?" I'm told this was John Lehman's idea when he was Secretary of the Navy, to actually bring the headquarters out of London. That sent waves of fear into the heart of most naval officers--that they would have to leave London. So, it didn't happen, although a lot of people would say that there is really no great overriding reason that it continues to be in London in terms of what the U.S. Navy is doing with the British anymore. But I wouldn't bet on that headquarters ever leaving London.

Q: Then you retired in '89.

KRUSE: I retired in '89.

KATHERINE P. KENNEDY
Pursuing Ph.D., University of Kent
Kent (1988-1991)

Ms. Kennedy was born and raised in Massachusetts and earned degrees from the University of New Hampshire and the University of Kent in England. After a tour with the Peace Corps in Kenya, Ms. Kennedy taught briefly and then went to Northern Ireland, where she became involved in searching for a solution to the North/South Irish Problem. A large part of her career thus far has revolved around the subject of Conflict Resolution, both in teaching assignments and work with governmental and private organizations. Ms. Kennedy was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: You went to the University of Kent for two years?

KENNEDY: I was there for three years.

Q: You got a Ph.D.?

KENNEDY: Not in three years, as I came back to write it up.

Q: Well, you had to write your dissertation and all that. But, anyway, you ended up with a Ph.D.?

KENNEDY: In International Relations.

Q: International Relations. How did you find the university? Here you are, in the Ivy Towers in the heart of Kent, which is as far removed as you can get from Ireland.

KENNEDY: Well, I went to the University of Kent because I had met a man named John Burton. John Burton was the foreign minister of Australia during World War II, and one of the signatories. He was one of the founders and signatories to the United Nations. He then settled in

London. For many years at the University in London, he really was the godfather of conflict resolution political work. He started his program in London, and then, eventually moved to the University of Kent. I met him at a conference, and ended up in a conversation about these conferences that we had run. He had actually been hired by the British government and the community relation services in Northern Ireland in the 1970s to try to get some insight into the paramilitaries. He had met with all sides, and anyway, he handed me his private... I guess you are going to end up with here, a transcript of all this stuff. He just gave it to me. Because of that trust, I read it and we became good friends. God Bless him, his health isn't very good. He is back in Australia. He's like 87 now. Anyway, in his last academic post in England, he was head of this program at the University of Kent. In the Department of this National Relations, he founded this concentration on what he called "political conflict resolution." It was focused on longstanding, intractable, ethnic, sectarian kinds of conflicts. He had done a lot of work in Cyprus, Malaysia and in the Middle East. He had done a little work in Ireland..

So, with my background in cross-culture theory and work, I thought that I would practice what I preach. I decided now was the time for another long-term experience, living and working while I was a student, in another culture. Also, because of Northern Ireland, the Protestant unionists would always say, "I'm British, I'm British, I'm British," and my question was, "Are you, because I don't think you are, culturally?" I had been to London, but I didn't know the British culture. Just like I found out that the northern Catholics had more in common with their Protestant neighbors in the north, culturally, than they did with Catholics in the south. I thought that that same motherland affiliation isn't true for them, either. I thought the best way is to live in that culture, to try to understand it. Because I already had a master's degree, the British system requires a longer, more intensive dissertation and less course work. That also appealed to me. So, that is why I went there, because of John Burton. I made an assumption that the faculty would be in agreement with his orientation to conflict resolution. Many of them were not. In fact, they thought he was a crackpot, and disagreed with him on everything. I was the only American, and the only female student in the department.

Q: Well, when you get into the academic world as a student you often get caught in the crossfire between the professors.

KENNEDY: Absolutely.

Q: Cultural battles.

KENNEDY: The British system, in particular, has its own unique element of that. Then, this department specialized and many of the faculties had done practical, sort of intervention, conflict resolution work, in these areas of conflict, in these hot spots, but let's not touch Ireland. Let's not even talk about Ireland, because it was too close to home. None of them had ever done anything. So, then they get this woman from Boston named Katie Kennedy who lived in Northern Ireland.

Q: What was your dissertation?

KENNEDY: I looked at the Mourning and Political Conflict Resolution, the Northern Ireland Case. I was looking at the role grief plays in these conflict situations, since it affects, the psychological, societal and political levels.

Q: *Of course.*

KENNEDY: Continuing grief over loss of identity and territories is why historic grievances can be passed down from generation to generation.

Q: *Also, you were catching it at a time when we were beginning to look at the stages of mourning grief, and all this, and death. And, looking at it in a much more, almost structured way, I think.*

KENNEDY: But, in a British culture, they thought this was crazy. Nothing to do with international relations, nothing to do with politics.

Q: *Did you find you were sort of out on the periphery?*

KENNEDY: Oh, the periphery of the periphery, yes. I mean, I actually lost my self-esteem in that process. I really got beaten up pretty badly. I have regained it, but it was painful. My ideas came from real experiences, living there and doing the community level work, this high political level stuff, too. Then, it was all being discounted.

Q: *Were these people supporting their theories which kept them...*

KENNEDY: Real politics. The only theory that exists in international relations, in part. Then, my faculty adviser who was supporting my research was involved in the politics between of the Department.

Q: *I've known a lady who did her dissertation on one theory of linguistics, and it turned out that the board disagreed with her professor, so she was caught between a professor and the certifying board.*

KENNEDY: Then, they said, "Well, you have to get at least 50 interviews to prove there is anything to this." So, I set it higher for myself. I said I would get 100. I actually ended up with 126, including Margaret Thatcher, and Garret FitzGerald.

Q: *How did you find Margaret Thatcher on this?*

KENNEDY: When I interviewed her, it was after the experience with the bomb. So, she would agree with me, but then she wouldn't agree with me. Of course, she wouldn't admit she made any mistakes with the hunger strike. I tried to talk to her a lot about it.

Q: *Whom were you interviewing?*

KENNEDY: I interviewed across the spectrum. I interviewed unemployed people, business people, educators, clergy, politicians from every political party across the spectrum. I

interviewed paramilitary from both sides. Again, when I think about going into some of the places I went and meeting with some people who told me what they did.

Q: Well, looking at this, were you trying to prove something, or were you doing it to see what came out of it?

KENNEDY: Well, I was trying to prove that unless people doubt what I call the “psychological task of conflict resolution” and deal with the issue of grief and how it effects change. The sad thing about the Good Friday Agreement is that there has been no final implementation. People always identify the issues as police reform, de-commissioning (getting rid of the weapons), and the demilitarization (getting the British army out of Northern Ireland). But, I would argue it’s not going under because of those issues; it’s all about how identities are changing and the lack of trust. It’s the psychological issues and tasks that have not been dealt with.

Q: Well, how can you deal with these things? While you were doing your dissertation, did you have any suggestions?

KENNEDY: We did some of this kind of stuff at the Airlie House conferences. You need to have more informal track two, out of the public eye, without any political pressures to make stuff public. I also think you need to have individual work with different political people, almost semi-counseling, not from a psychotherapist, but from a conflict resolve cross-culture. I had amazing conversations with people who helped look at some of the issues and act on them.

Q: In doing your interviews, did you find the British, again, trying to say, “These are the bloody Irish.”

KENNEDY: Absolutely! They dehumanized them and spoke of them as second-class citizens.

Q: One senses an awful lot of this in the Arab-Israeli thing, on the part of the Israelis.

KENNEDY: Absolutely.

Q: Well, you got your Ph.D. when?

KENNEDY: 1991.

PAUL H. TYSON
Energy Officer
London (1989-1993)

Mr. Tyson was born in Virginia into a US military family and was raised in army posts in the United States and abroad. Educated at Dartmouth College and George Washington University he entered the Foreign Service in 1974. As a trained Economic Officer, Mr. Tyson served in a number of foreign posts,

including Bonn, Dhahran, London and Kuwait City. His Washington Assignments were primarily in the petroleum and international economic fields. Mr. Tyson also served with the Sinai Multi-National Force & Observers. Mr. Tyson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: 1989 comes a year that was sort of the year the Earth shook in a way, but you're off to London.

TYSON: I'm off to London.

Q: You were there from...

TYSON: '89 to '93. Leaving New York - I cannot emphasize just how difficult that year and the whole administrative mess was for me and others. We got on that plane and we were so happy to get to London.

We were in a temporary apartment in a building that's actually at Number 1 Abbey Road in London. We got there in late August. It was actually very cute; you'd go out and you'd see all the Japanese tourists in the crosswalks from the Abbey Road album. And you'd be walking around the neighborhood and disoriented people would have disoriented maps and some Japanese tourist or German would tentatively approach you and ask for directions. And it was really terribly sweet. We were two doors down from the EMI recording studios. We were there for about three weeks and then we moved into our townhouse just north of Hyde Park, and started settling in. As I said, Susan was pregnant with our daughter.

London was just nice. It was a big embassy. I was working for Anne Berry, the economic counselor. Henry Catto was the ambassador. I liked my job, liked the work, the house was nice; everything in many ways was just rolling along. It was just one of those things: nice place, nice assignment, a particular time in your life.

I loved doing the oil work. '89 also brought cataclysmic changes in oil. For years we'd been looking at Eastern Europe and Russia, particularly the oil fields, and guesstimating that, "Well it probably has this or that." All of a sudden all of these Russians are coming up to conferences in London and doing presentations on the Timan Oil Fields or other matters. You know, you're standing there saying to someone, having read the briefing materials on it, "Well, if you're looking at a billion barrels," and they'd look at you and go, "Five - five billion." So I mean there were just these little bits and pieces of fascinating information. It was a wonderful reporting job because there was just a lot happening.

Q: You were the petroleum officer?

TYSON: Energy officer.

Q: Energy officer. What did you do?

TYSON: Basically followed North Sea developments. This was also a time when the British were privatizing their electric industry and I reported on that. If they ever pulled it up, the California government should have read about power-pool pricing. There was a lot of stuff that was aggressively happening in England that was ahead of what the States was doing. They had a huge commercial presence in both the Norwegian and British sectors of the North Sea. But London is also a wonderful listening post for the world oil industry – better than Houston because it's Russia, it's Africa, it's Asia. You go to these conferences up at Oxford. I was doing stuff on off-shore Vietnam; any number of things. I would also arrange for dignitaries to visit the four big companies: BP (British Petroleum), Shell, British Gas which was becoming a major international player, and British Coal which was government-owned and was undergoing a lot of restructuring and mines closures. We had American companies operating there, but if they want to talk to Exxon, they can talk to Exxon in the States. So I'd end up sitting in on some of these "whither the world" sessions with senior American officials. I also consulted on the Middle East with some of Shell and BP's Middle East experts. It was fairly interesting – new people in the oil trading community, and I was doing stuff like off-shore oil safety issues. There's a broad range of things, including power.

Q: Did the breaking down of the Iron Curtain and Germany joining and all - did that make much of an energy difference or a challenge?

TYSON: Yes it did because a lot of assets in Eastern Europe were suddenly up-for-grabs: refineries in East Germany, pipelines, any number of other things. And then of course you had the companies interested in going in to look for prospects. So it really changed. The reunification was actually harkening back to the UN. I honestly think that certain people - including the Thatcher government in the UK and probably the French, were less than thrilled with the prospect of German reunification.

I'm not sure exactly when, but we had a reception in the atrium of the embassy and a German diplomat from their embassy in London was chatting with me and we were speaking in German; he basically said, "Well, what is the U.S. view on reunification?" And I said, "The same as it's been for a long time. We support it. We want to see Germany within NATO," and there was this sort of smile and "Thank you very much." I think there are people in Europe who would've been happy to see America be the bully-boy, but when it became clear that we weren't going to do that, that to stop it they would have to stand up and be counted, they weren't willing to do that. Reunification went forward.

Q: Did you see both the reunification of Germany and were you getting reports about all these facilities that were available in Eastern Europe? Were sub-standard a problem; I mean, was this going to be a huge re-doing job or not?

TYSON: Oh, yes, the environmental impact and cleanup was going to be huge. There was a lot of concern about the nuclear plants. Remember, too, that it was an interesting time to be in Britain, particularly that fall because it was the anniversary of the start of World War II, and the very time Germany is reunifying. And of course the beginning of that war is all over the television and so forth; they had the newscasters reading the news from that era as though it were

today. I mean it was just in-your-face. So the combination of what's happening in Berlin and the reality of what had happened was just all there. So it was quite an exciting time to be in Europe.

Q: By this time, was Thatcher still in, or...?

TYSON: Thatcher was still in.

Q: What was sort of our attitude towards Thatcherism, vis a vis the British economy?

TYSON: At that point Thatcher was punching through a lot of real reforms, and as I said, in my little area, if anything, they were further along or more aggressively free-market or privatized than the U.S. was. Also remember that there was that great love feast going on between Thatcher and Reagan - and then Bush. She just always had this rapport, starting at the White House. That was a real reality.

Q: Somebody I interviewed that was in the White House at the time said they used to get very nervous when Margaret Thatcher came to the White House - and also Brian Mulroney, because they didn't like to see Ronald Reagan alone in the room with them because God knows what might come out of that as far as agreements and all this.

TYSON: Yes. Well I think Thatcher, of course, the iron lady with her handbag, was one hell of a politician and personality. What was becoming clear though, was that Thatcher was probably more popular outside the UK than she was in. Like Nixon and Reagan were also more popular outside the U.S. The Tory Party historically has had a tendency to eat its own young and I think the downfall of Thatcher, which was hard for many Americans to understand given the parliamentary system, was very real. It was funny because we had actually had John Major into the embassy three weeks before he became prime minister. And I mean for us Major initially was viewed as, "Who is this Brixton-born nothing who is coming along?" You know, this someone who had gone off to make some money doing banking in Nigeria or something like that, but then he really came along.

The ambassador used to have people in for breakfast...

Q: Who was the ambassador at that time?

TYSON: This was Henry Catto. He used to have personalities in for a breakfast and then they'd join in an expanded country team meeting. I remember the Major breakfast because the night before my boss called me to plant a question on agricultural policy - just to make sure it wasn't a total dud. He was actually quite engaging in person. I had also seen Thatcher when I helped escort Vice President Quayle out to Checkers during a visit that he made. A much shorter woman than one would've expected.

Q: The great confrontation - the great battle of Western Europe, was when Thatcher confronted the miners under - was it Cargill or Scargill?

TYSON: Arthur Scargill.

Q: Scargill. It looked very dubious. This was a little before you got out there. This basically was the breaking of the power of the unions. Was there a feeling energy-wise that things were looking better?

TYSON: Not necessarily better; things were changing and indeed the National Union of Miners did have a lot to say while I was there. The issue was privatizing coal and then even before that as a run-up to it, a lot of what they call “pit closures.” It’s hard to really describe – you almost need sort of like a black and white 1960s Rita Tushingham film of how these local towns and these mines are all bound up with each other; that’s your life and your father did it and you’ll do it, too. If you’re one of the local lassies, you’ll marry one of the miners, and stuff like that. And then they’re going to close the pit and what do you do because there’s nothing but that.

I did Wales which had a development commission which was trying to attract newer and lighter industry with some success. But the pit closures in certain areas were just devastating, and we had miners’ marches in London. Michael Heseltine got involved in some of the face-offs in parliament there. Scargill, in a sense, was past its peak, but there were still some very real issues there: would they go for nuclear power, would they go for gas-fired power – how would they be doing that. They were also importing coal from a number of places. We exported metallurgical coal, some steam coal. They were beginning to look into bringing in Colombian coal, South African coal, which is often strip-mined and just cheaper.

Q: What was the attitude of our government towards nuclear power at that point; that you were getting reflected from your principals back in Washington?

TYSON: Nuclear power at that point had essentially stalled after Three-Mile Island. The nuclear issue that tended to come up was much more waste storage. The Yucca Mountain in Nevada. And then the Brits were doing nuclear reprocessing in Celafeld and elsewhere, and the shipments of nuclear waste from Japan to Britain, and back and forth, were issues. We were tending to follow some of the choices that Britain was making, but there really weren’t any new plants being built in the U.S. France was going gang-busters on nuclear energy. So in many ways, I think if you’re looking for practical experience on building and operating nuclear plants these days, it’s in France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere; not in the States.

Q: Were you there during the Chernobyl business?

TYSON: Yes, must’ve been.

Q: I was wondering if this put a damper on things.

TYSON: Well, it caused a lot of concern, but this issue concerned the safety of facilities in Eastern Europe. Chernobyl threw the spotlight on all of those types of reactors in Eastern Europe and Bulgaria and elsewhere, where it was not only the issue of a deteriorating physical plant but the lack of a corporate culture of safety. Did they have a safety culture? And in many ways they didn’t. People who were going into these plants were just horrified at what they saw.

Q: Did we find ourselves at odds with the energy community that you were dealing with over in Libya at that time?

TYSON: What an interesting description. Yes and no. Yes, in that actually I dealt with the UK branches of some of the American companies that had interests in Libya, such as Marathon and others that were part of the Oasis Group. No, in that any time the U.S. had sanctions, European companies - particularly some of the smaller ones, saw that as an opportunity to get in. All other things being equal, they wouldn't be at the high table. The minute you knock out or keep out the Americans, they've got a shot. Libya was one; you had the Austrians and others going in there. Vietnam at that time was another. You had British companies in there off-shore when Americans weren't. I used to meet with the British companies who'd say, "My God, I hope you're continuing your sanctions." So it was much more like that.

Q: Did you see, by this time, a change in the energy culture? One thinks of the earlier years as OPEC versus the consumer, and all this. From your vantage point in London - which is always a good place to have a vantage point, was there a coming together - a more rational approach on energy?

TYSON: Not particularly. I did a lot of OPEC watching and meeting with OPEC officials. Of course a lot of it goes on in Vienna, but they'd come through London. I'd do reports on that. OPEC politics was a big staple as was curiosity about what Iran was doing. I had a timeline of the OPEC meetings and I'd step stuff back three to four weeks; you know, do the round of usual suspects of, "Well, what do you think is going to happen?" throw together a cable, address it to the world, get other people referencing me; that's how I was a player in energy policy.

There was always an ambivalence about producer-consumer dialogues and quota or price-fixing coming up, so we'd always dance around that, as would OPEC. There were also certain institutions like the Oxford Energy Seminar and other events in London that were off the record where you got senior officials from both sides with an opportunity to talk about whatever they wanted to discuss, off the record or in reasonably private circumstances. But in terms of a great coming-together and meeting of minds, not particularly.

Q: Did other nations - the Germans, the Japanese, have their own energy watcher in London, too?

TYSON: Actually, interestingly enough, with the Japanese it was much more the companies that had traders in the city. I think the Germans and others tended to follow more the IEA in Paris. But I used to meet with, and brief the Japanese fairly regularly; I did it with my counterpart who was doing the Middle East watching type of thing.

Q: I'm trying to pick up the nuances of diplomacy. What was in it for you to brief the Japanese?

TYSON: Information.

Q: They would give you information on...

TYSON: Sure, on Asia. Or what they're hearing in the market. In any number of things. In the first place, the Japanese tend to be very interesting. If you get to the poor, shy, little chrysanthemum flower fairly early on you basically say, "Look, I know who you guys are. I know how competent you are. Fair is fair. If we're talking about things, it's not a one-way street. I'm going to have some questions or issues for you." There were things like the Japanese concessions in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, what they were looking at in China, whether they had anything on North Korea - certainly Vietnam, what they were looking at in terms of the world gas business with LNG and stuff. You know, one just never knew. There would be different topics. They're out there, too; they're talking to other people and two or three of them were fairly knowledgeable observers that I found very good value in - and probably vice-versa, which is why we continued to see each other.

Q: Well you were there '89 to '93, so you were there when Iraq invaded Kuwait. How did that play when you were there? Did this come as a shock to everybody or what?

TYSON: Actually yes. To back up, my daughter had been born in February of 1990, and we're there and my job is going along. The summer of '90 there's a rattling of sabers with Iraq and I think a lot of "knowledgeable Middle Eastern observers" just basically figured that this was another effort to shake the piggy bank to get some cash out. There was a feeling that, "Well maybe Iraq might do something like take Warba and Bubiyan, the two islands, and/or a little bit of a strip," or, you know, "It could be difficult, but basically bottom-line, Saddam wanted cash." I mean, he had a river of money, the war ended, and the river ended, and he didn't like it. So this is all fine and good. The saber rattling is going on and one particular evening my new daughter - she was just a baby, was up and cranky so my wife and I were juggling this back and forth. I don't look at a paper, don't look at anything, get to work, and Walt Lockwood, my boss, says, "What do you think?" I said, "About what?" He said, "Iraq invaded Kuwait last night," and I said, "I think my work requirements have just changed." In fairly short order, this is just shocking and of course a lot of the Kuwaitis are in Europe. What does it all mean? Are the Iraqis going to go into Saudi Arabia?" You know, we've got friends in ARAMCO and stuff like this. So everybody is very spun up. It's an adrenaline rush at the embassy.

Also in fairly rapid order - I don't know whether we were between Middle East watchers or not, but it was the sort of, "You've done the Arabs; you go do them," because we were getting a lot of inquiries. So suddenly I was doing liaison with the Kuwaitis in exile, in particular. I remember one American working for Kuwait Petroleum International - Ralph Brown, a good friend, who called up with the ever typical designed-to-endorse-yourself-to-FSOs comment, "Well we've got a problem because all of the Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets have been frozen. We're actually selling jet fuel in Hong Kong. Here's who we are. Who's this. I'm being forced to call you even though I know that U.S. Embassies are totally ineffectual on this. No good will come of this." "Thank you very much for calling," and I said I'll look into it. Basically we were all sort of cutting and pasting; this was very ad hoc. And I basically said, "Okay, we'll need copies of the transactions. The transactions can go forward. No money can be transferred to Iraq or back to occupied Kuwait. Here's who you'll need to contact at the Treasury." You know it's like Casablanca; it was the beginning of a great relationship. And fairly rapidly, I was getting a lot of calls because you're seen as responsive.

The Assets Control Office at Treasury was trying to do every five pound or hundred franc transaction without additional staff and it rapidly became clear that they were going to get overwhelmed. We're talking with the Bank of England about the freeze and the Kuwaitis are beginning to stabilize because they've got this huge operation overseas. They've got the Kuwait Investment Office in London; they've got a major oil company in Europe with refineries in downstream assets, and a whole bunch of other things. So I just start dealing with them. Of course there are many sources of information. People calling up, "Well, what is the state of their industry? What did they have in the country?" What does that mean if the Iraqis take the additives the Kuwaitis had and use it for military fuel, and so on and so forth. So there was a wide series of reporting requirements, or things that you could get into, that were of interest to many people. I just felt as though I was feeding this maw; that it all went in and very little came out.

They started getting people out and we started giving block grants of their own money to Kuwaiti Embassies to handle their people in exile. We always retained the right to go in and look at it, but I don't think we ever did. They really started getting Kuwait, Incorporated in exile up and running again, and I was very, very involved in this. In October two Kuwaitis from the oil company came in who needed visas. They were going off to hire Red Adair, Boots and Coots, and other firefighters. Texana Stubbin Papworth, my secretary - God love her, just did absolutely Herculean efforts. She had stacks of these applications and just knew the Kuwaitis, dealt with them, was always very civil to them at a time when they'd lost their country, and they're feeling shattered and oppressed. She was really just a sweetheart in dealing with them.

What also happened is various committees started evolving to publicize the Kuwaiti cause because we lived in an Arab neighborhood and in the first week there was a pro-Iraqi demonstration on one side of Edgware Road and a pro-Kuwaiti on the other, with the Bobbies in between. So this was getting interesting. The Palestinians were getting involved. But I started working this, and one day I was over at Kuwait Petroleum International and they'd gotten a batch of "Long live free Kuwait" t-shirts in. They said, "Do you want some?" and I said, "Oh sure," so they handed me some and I said, "Actually can I have, oh, about twenty?" They said, "Fine," so I took them back to the embassy, walked in, dropped them off at the Front Office, had them in my office, and it rapidly became, "Where did you get those?" "I got it from Kuwait Petroleum." "Can you get more?" So I called them up and said, "I think you've got a winner here, guys," and what started to happen was a Mercedes would pull up behind the American Embassy in London and 1000 t-shirts in boxes would come out. I would be there with my little loading cart, our people would x-ray it and scan it, and I'd bring the t-shirts in. It was all free; the Kuwaitis were donating it. One of the most astute things they ever did. And I just had a sign up saying, "Send it to whoever you want, but please, whoever gets it, send a thank-you note to the Kuwait Investment Authority in Kuwait Petroleum International, 80 New Bond Street in London." This is becoming like this perpetual motion machine. The Kuwaitis are thrilled that it's going to Pocatello, Idaho and the middle of Kansas, so whenever I want t-shirts I can have them. And they started branching out to baseball caps, umbrellas, sweatshirts. We gave Marilyn Quayle a "Free Kuwait" sweatshirt and umbrella.

The baseball hats were particularly popular and at this point I had friends in the Gulf in Riyadh, and elsewhere, and I just took a box of the baseball hats and sent it out in the APO (Army Post

Office), and apparently Schwarzkopf was walking through the embassy in Riyadh one day and saw one and said, "I want one, where did this come from?" So I came back and had four yellow slips on my desk, "Call the following military people," and it was basically, "Norm wants." So I called the Kuwaitis and got about 100 hats and handed them to the Air Force and they were packed off to Riyadh. I think when it was all said and done, we went through 8000 t-shirts.

Q: Good God.

TYSON: It was some of the best publicity that the Kuwaitis ever did. All free, and as I said, "Send a thank-you letter."

Q: Were the British pretty much aghast at this whole thing? I keep thinking of that small little boy – Saddam Hussein tousling his hair, a British boy and hostages, and it just turned your stomach.

TYSON: For you who have been in the Middle East, that was a very interesting one. Of course I understand exactly what you're saying, and yet, from his cultural context he is trying to show that he is protective of children and cares for them and would not do harm them, while the rest of the western world looks at it and sees it almost as a sexual assault or something like that. And, no, that had a lot of impact there and getting the hostages out and then the build-up and everything else.

Q: Did you find as the build-up went on that whatever problems there might be, there was a drawing together of the Americans and the British?

TYSON: Oh my God. Problems - hardly. "Excuse me, let me bring my bag of state secrets over to you and you can hand me your bag of state secrets." The cooperation with the UK – the Bank of England, the Treasury, FCO, and State - was just phenomenal, this was really the special relationship in war. I remember being the duty officer and having to go over to FCO one Saturday morning...

Q: FCO would be?

TYSON: Foreign Commonwealth Office. ...to see the duty officers there and I'm sort of American weekend casual; boat shoes, blue jeans, work shirt, baseball hat. They're in sort of tattered corduroys and a jumper and stuff like that. It's these cultural moments. I mean, literally, it was hauling out some of our classified stuff and then reading theirs, taking notes, taking our stuff back, "Thank you very much." It was actually an interesting incident because they looked at me, the two duty officers, and said, "What are you doing about Jews in your forces?" and I said, "We're sending them and the women, too." "Oh, are you sure about that?" and I looked at them and said, "I was one of the tokens who has already done Saudi Arabia. We're sure about it and this is what we're doing." I think that had some influence on some of their decisions, too.

The cooperation with the British was just phenomenal on the freeze. Indeed, later, after Kuwait was liberated and the freeze was lifted, Kuwait Investment Office hosted a dinner for a number of the people who had worked with them in London. I mean, it's extraordinary that you're

thanking the two countries that have basically slammed a hold on a hundred billion of your assets. A hundred billion. Just a huge amount of money.

I think it was handled in a very civilized and a remarkably sensitive and respectful basis. And that's paid out down the line.

Q: Paul, you mentioned that there is something else you might want to add onto before we leave London.

TYSON: Right, it's the oil spills in the Gulf just before Desert Storm went in and liberated Kuwait. The Iraqis were pumping millions of barrels of oil out into the Gulf from their facilities in Al Ahmadi in Kuwait and this was obviously becoming something of a problem and one of the things that I did – was asked to do – was I went to Kuwait Petroleum in London; walked over there one day through the square, down the streets and all, met with them, and they pulled out a facilities map, schematic and marked, and basically said, "Bomb here, and bomb here." I put it in my briefcase, walked it back to the embassy, handed it to the Air Force. And a few days later the bombing did occur. Later on when I was in Kuwait I talked to some of the people, the Kuwaitis who were involved in the resistance there, about their side of that, but we can get into that later.

I ended up doing an awful lot after the liberation. For some reason or another, my phone and my fax, or the fax in the econ section, became the contact point and we were dealing with what we called the "purple death ray people," and that would be, you know, someone calls up and says, "I have a purple death ray that can solve the fire fighting. If you give me a million dollars (or whatever), this will go on." We toasted about four fax machines just overloaded with stuff coming in; engineering drawings and everything else. But it was an interesting process, once again involving Bechtel and Kuwait Petroleum. It was the type of thing that everybody was rushing to get into Kuwait and there was no particular reason for me to go there. There were problems getting equipment in and at one point Kuwait Petroleum came and basically asked to charter a C-5A in order to bring in a whole work over rig from Houston, which I helped arrange. It was one of the more bizarre moments of go and rent an Air Force plane.

Q: The C-5 is the biggest plane in our inventory.

TYSON: Right. It's a huge cargo plane.

Q: Who was making the decisions of who knows what they're talking about and who doesn't, on this fire-fighting thing?

TYSON: There really weren't all that many decisions. First of all, a lot of it was experience. On the fire-fighting in the past, what had happened is that basically it came down to the difference between a one-off construction or making a custom-made suit versus an assembly line. This was one of the few situations in the world. There was something in, I think '47, in Borneo or whatever, where there was a field on fire, but most of the time fire-fighting involved one, perhaps two, wells going out. Red Adair or Boots and Coots or one of the well-known people comes out, handles it, and it's very specific to that. In Kuwait you had close to 500 wells on fire and a number of them gushing oil, but not on fire. There were different problems. There were the

ones gushing, but not on fire, the ones on fire, and then a subset of that - about 60 of them were extremely high pressure with hydrogen sulfide, and extremely dangerous. So there was a basic effort to first get water pumped in, and then gradually an assembly line sort of development to handle the well-killing and the fire-fighting. And it went along surprisingly fast. There had been predictions that it might take as long as five years and ultimately it was done in somewhere between nine and ten months. As it went on, there were a whole lot of different groups wanting to get involved in it – the Hungarians and others, and some of them were very good at it.

The Kuwaitis had a lot of their own indigenous engineers involved in this, including one woman. So with the support of Bechtel and a number of other things, Red Adair, Boots and Coots, and the fire fighters - I think there were four groups, the fire fighters specifically, it went remarkably well. A lot of it was cutting red tape; getting stuff to move and doing things like that. I don't think there was any one real set decision making process; there was an awful lot of autonomy and by working and coordinating with the Kuwaitis we just got a lot of stuff done, and frankly didn't ask Washington in many instances.

Q: Just for the record, these fires were started by the Iraqis to be beastly, was that it?

TYSON: Pretty much. They wired the well heads and exploded them on the way out. It was truly one of the great crimes, and ecological crimes, of all time. I guess eventually the Kuwaitis will have an estimate on how much oil they lost, but at the initial stages I seem to recall that six million barrels a day was either going up in flames or just flowing out onto the desert. So it was a huge loss.

Q: Well then, this would be what – '81?

TYSON: It would be '91. Kuwait would've been liberated by about May, so it would basically be the end of '91, early '92.

Q: And then where did you go?

TYSON: I stayed on in London and I actually got paneled very early on to become economic counselor in Kuwait. So my tour ended in July of '93. We came back home and did home leave and consultations and we flew into Kuwait City on September 1st of 1993.

BERNARD F. SHINKMAN
Information Officer, USIS
London (1990-1994)

Bernard F. Shinkman was born in New York City and raised in Vienna. He graduated from Dartmouth College. After entering the Foreign Service in 1978, he served in Accra, Mindanao, London, Belgrade and Ottawa. Mr. Shinkman was interviewed in 2004 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: And what happened?

SHINKMAN: I went off to London. By the spring of that year, I had no assignment. USIA was already pretty much through the assignments process. It must have been February or March and the PAO, one of the more famous PAOs in USIA, Sam Courtney, who I knew well because I had been his Desk Officer, called me up and said “things aren’t working out between me and the current IO. If I let him go, would you come and be the IO?” I said “Well, I certainly can’t have anything to do with anyone else leaving post.” But I went home and talked to my wife and she agreed that if there was a posting on the Open Assignments List, that if press spokesman, or IO London, suddenly became available, we would bid on it. And so it did come available. And that summer, in August, we went to London.

I timed our arrival for August thinking that all West Europeans are off on vacation for the whole month. And a week before we got there, of course, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. So it immediately became just the most frantic job I’ve ever had. I’ve never worked so hard in my life and I’ve never enjoyed the work so much.

Q: What were you doing?

SHINKMAN: I was the press spokesman. I had two deputy Information Officers there. A staff of about eight FSNs. London is an extraordinary media environment. You have 11 daily newspapers. The full spectrum from sports tabloids to the Times and the Telegraph, but all of them broadly read. The British are a great newspaper reading public. So you had those journalists to take care of, who of course all had their own sources of information. The weren’t really relying on us. But when we had speeches by the President or something that we wanted to get out, we could get the press the full text of something where they may have just seen the news report from Washington. Our job was to get full materials to them absolutely immediately.

We also had of course the large broadcasting networks there, the BBC – world famous. We worked very closely with the BBC World Service that is listened to all over the world. Most of the major American media who have offices in Europe or the Middle East have those offices in London. A lot of the Middle Eastern and Northern African coverage from American media comes out of their bureaus in London. So again, another big audience for us.

In the Middle East – as I say, the first Gulf War was going on – all of the expatriate Middle Eastern media have their bureaus in London because of British historical links to that part of the world.

So we had just everybody there. It was extraordinary the amount of media and the number of media outlets in London.

With the Middle Eastern media, we started a brand new thing when I was IO; we found an guy in the mail room at the Embassy who was Egyptian and absolutely bilingual. So I got money from Washington to hire him half time, 20 hours a week, just to read the expatriate Middle Eastern media in Arabic and do a synopsis which we could then send back to Washington. It was a frenetically busy time and of course the ambassador was constantly in demand.

Q: *Who was the ambassador?*

SHINKMAN: Originally, my first six months there it was Henry Catto. USIA had been going through a very difficult stage with its leadership. Henry Catto was very close to the Bush family professionally and I think personally also. The first President Bush called him up and said “Henry, I need you to come back here and take over USIA.” And so he, I think reluctant to leave London, of course, but given really a great challenge and from the president, came back and did a terrific job of pulling USIA back together.

At that stage we got a guy who had been the Department’s Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Ray Seitz, who had previously served in London as the DCM. He came back as ambassador, and was the first ever – and only – career officer to be the American ambassador to the Court of Saint James’s. He was there from the spring of ‘91 until about the spring of ‘94, when he left. And that’s when Admiral Bill Crowe came in and became the ambassador. I worked with him for four or five months and again, I had three absolutely brilliant ambassadors and I got along enormously well with them. They were all media savvy, media friendly. They were also greatly in demand. The phone at home would ring all weekend long with requests to speak to the ambassador. And they’d want him in their studios at seven o’clock Monday morning.

There’s a radio program called Today on BBC Radio Four, which is absolutely the agenda-setter for the day, every day, in the United Kingdom, and it went on I believe from seven to nine, or six-thirty to nine. The key period to be on that show was between seven-thirty and eight-thirty, when people were getting up and shaving and had the radio on. And inevitably if the Ambassador was on, later during the day someone would come up to him and say “well I heard you on Today this morning and you said this, that and the other.” So we wanted to get him on; he was always amenable to being on, and the BBC wanted to have him on. I would guess almost once a week, maybe once a fortnight, I’d be at the curb picking up the newspapers at five in the morning, reading all the newspapers that were important, then going to Winfield House to brief the ambassador as he went on live on-the-air on the BBC from Winfield House at seven-thirty or eight o’clock in the morning.

And the only way – my wife would say – that we could get away from this was we would occasionally take a long weekend at a cottage somewhere in Wales where they didn’t have a telephone. Of course we didn’t have cell phones at that stage. And so it was the only way really to get away from the work. But it was so much fun. And you felt you were accomplishing a lot, because you were really getting a lot of material, a lot of information into the media. Dealing with the BBC World Service, whatever you are saying is being broadcast around the world.

Q: *The British press – and I’m not sure about radio, because I’m less familiar with the BBC – I mean, they’ve got some really vicious papers. Some of their press is beyond belief practically.*

SHINKMAN: Yes. Most of the press we dealt with were main stream. A lot of it was, I wouldn’t call it anti-American, but papers like the Guardian naturally will be inclined to look skeptically at American foreign policy. The Times and the Telegraph would be more amenable, usually, but not always. I would always say to myself and to the journalists, “I don’t really care what your

opinion is. I would like it if you like us, but that's not my job. My job is to make sure you are informed and make sure that you have got all the information and that the information you have is accurate and accurately reflects U.S. government foreign policy. If that's the case, then you write what you like. As I said, I hope you will write that you like it, but that's not my job." I found them generally to be fair, not always, but generally to be fair in their reporting and they may just have had opinions that differed from ours.

Q: Well did you find yourself every once in a while coming up against the, what was it the Sun or whatever it is . . .

SHINKMAN: The Sun I think is the largest circulation English language newspaper in the world. And I used to about once every two or three months go and take the editor – not the editor, the editorial page editor – to lunch, just to chat with him. He usually figured we weren't conservative enough as a country. I always remember, he had something about Abraham Lincoln. He thought that Lincoln had just not been that great a president. He used to tick off things that he should have done but didn't do, that sort of thing. It was sort of an odd relationship. But I just wanted to know what this guy was thinking. I figured there were more people reading what this guy writes, no matter what it is, than just about any other writer or editor in the English language press in the world. So I wanted to know.

But we didn't spend a lot of time with the Sun or the Daily Mirror, which is the Labor equivalent of the Sun. Our time was mostly with The Guardian, The Times, The Telegraph and The Independent, and then also with the Daily Express.

Q: How about TV?

SHINKMAN: Television we did a fair amount, usually commentary programs. Not a lot with their news reporting because they have big bureaus in Washington and New York and we just were not able to contribute to that. But the ambassador would go on news commentary programs – sort of the Ted Koppel type programs – quite regularly. And again, there were only a couple of programs - there was one in particular, and I can't remember what the interviewer's name was, but he was just such a nasty piece of work. His goal – as far as I could tell from watching the program regularly – was just to be unpleasant. And I thought "We don't have to go there. His program is not so important that it is critical that we be on that man's program." So I regularly turned down requests from his producers to have the American ambassador appear on the show. But we appeared on lots of the evening news analysis programs, as I said, the Ted Koppel, the Jim Lehrer type of commentary programs.

And radio. Radio was *the* big thing. I mean if you take NPR here and American broadcast television and sort of invert their importance. That's the way it is. Radio news, particularly for the people we were dealing with, was the way to get your message across, much more than television.

Q: Would they listen to it in the car in the morning?

SHINKMAN: Yes. As they were shaving, getting ready to go to work in the morning, and then listen to it in the car. But BBC Radio Four really was the agenda setter for the day and inevitably, to repeat myself, if you were on in the morning, someone would come up to the ambassador, or many people would come up during the day and say "I heard you this morning on the Today program and you said this and what about that."

Q: Here in Washington, it's usually the Washington Post and the New York Times that are the agenda setters.

SHINKMAN: More than radio. I mean some people listen to NPR, but it doesn't have the clout that, as I say, in the UK radio really does.

Q: How did you find the chattering class, the political commentators and all that? You know, one always thinks of the French intelligentsia as being somewhat anti-American. How did you find the British?

SHINKMAN: You got elements of that. I don't think you got a lot of it. I mean I think you found it not just, as you say, in the chattering classes. You know, it's a very, very hierarchical social structure and they also have titles and all that sort of stuff. As much as they say it's not important, it is still very important. And you will have that relatively small subset of Brits who can't get over the idea that theirs isn't still the empire ruling the world. And those certain people can be sort of tiresome and you just knew who they were and got used to them and dealt with them. But the vast majority of people I think – intelligent, thoughtful people – admired us for what we've accomplished, admired our society, had strong differences with us on things like gun control – of course, the obvious one that comes up time and again – but generally admired the United States, loved to travel in the United States. And we'd get into healthy discussions if not arguments.

But I always felt that they were fair. Usually felt that they were fair. You know, you quickly identified those people who just were not interested in your point of view. They were going to dislike it or disagree with it no matter what it was. You just got used to those people and had less to do with them than with those who were open to a good discussion.

Q: How was George Bush, Sr. treated there?

SHINKMAN: I think he was treated well. Of course he and Margaret Thatcher had a very close relationship. As did they both with Henry Catto. Ambassador Catto was very well received in the government in London and I think, if I'm not mistaken, that George Bush and Margaret Thatcher were at Henry Catto's ski lodge in Aspen when word came that Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait. I think so.

Q: I think so. This was when, at a certain point where Thatcher told George not to get involved.

SHINKMAN: "It's not a time to go wobbly, George." That's right. And of course they were our biggest allies in the first Gulf War, clearly. So we had a very close relationship between the two governments. Everybody wants to travel to London, but we calculated, in the first years of the Clinton administration, that – which would be my second two years in London – that literally

every member of the cabinet came through. Every single member of the American cabinet. For good business reasons, I'm sure. But they all found some reason to come through. There is a whole large section of the embassy devoted to looking after official visitors because it is so important to have them treated well. They just come through non-stop.

Q: Were there any sort of issues during this four years you were there – American-British issues – that were really controversial or insolvable?

SHINKMAN: Um, no not really. The Northern Ireland issue was always a bit of a problem. And we would have from time to time ambassadors in the Republic who felt that they could freelance a bit and maybe move the peace process forward faster than American foreign policy directed, and that would confuse things sometimes in London. And the government in London wouldn't quite be able to figure out what was going on. However, most of the sophisticated people in the Foreign Office understood our system well enough to know what was going on. But that was regularly an issue. There may well have been others, but I just don't remember what they were.

Of course Margaret Thatcher was turned out of office while I was there. And John Major came in. But again, we dealt of course with whomever the Prime Minister was.

Q: From the embassy officers, what was the evaluation you were getting from them about the time of Margaret Thatcher?

SHINKMAN: Well I think she was a very, obviously, historically strong leader. She was popular. The Labor party had a very hard time gaining any traction because she was such a steamroller in office. But she was thrown out. I think it is broadly felt that she broke the back of the unions. When I was working on Fleet Street in the late '60s early '70s the unions absolutely ruled it then, and the cases of feather bedding were just horrible. There was nothing that the publishers could do about it. And that was spread throughout industry. The automotive industry was famous for it also, as well as all others. And she really did take them, you know, directly on and won, and transformed British society in doing that. Transformed the British economy I think in doing that.

But I think she was also one of these people that people seem to love to hate. Wildly unpopular in some sectors of British society.

Q: Well Oxford never gave her an honorary degree.

SHINKMAN: Is that right? I hadn't heard that, but I can believe that. The academic community weren't always great supporters of Margaret Thatcher.

Q: Did Rupert Murdoch or his operation cross your path?

SHINKMAN: Yes. Well, sort of. I mean he was just starting to really get a hold . . . I'm trying to think of when he bought the Times. He was starting to get a hold. And there was the typical sort of British wariness about a foreigner coming in and having quite so much control. But again there was respect for the fact that he was such a dynamic businessman and had really turned some publications around and made them very profitable. The Times had sort of lumbered along

for whatever it was – more than a hundred years as a newspaper – and I think he really shook it up and made it a better newspaper. But there was a lot of gnashing of teeth when he did so.

Q: *And then where did you go after this? 1992.*

SHINKMAN: '94. After London I came back to Washington.

WILLIAM P. KIEHL
Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS
London (1991-1992)

William P. Kiehl was born in Pennsylvania in 1945. He received a BS from the University of Scranton in 1967 and an MA from the University of Virginia in 1970. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1970, he was posted in Belgrade, Zagreb, Colombo, Moscow, Prague, Helsinki, London and Bangkok. Mr. Kiehl was interviewed in 2003 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

KIEHL: I was in Helsinki, and I had no particular job offer out there since Leningrad had evaporated, so I said, "OK, I want a year of leave without pay. I'm going to go to England, I'll be a spouse for my wife for a year and enjoy the UK and maybe do something academic." I talked to a friend of mine at the University of Helsinki, who was a Sovietologist there, and he arranged for me to be appointed as an honorary visiting fellow at the University of London School of Slavonic and East European Studies. St. Anthony's College of Oxford, also was interested in having me do a lecture series up there. I said, "Well, there. That settles it. I'm not going to make any money out of this but I have some interesting things to do. I have my housing paid because my wife's an officer at the embassy, and that's it. I want a year of leave without pay," and it was approved by USIA.

Deleted: the

Deleted: thing

Deleted: stuff

Deleted: and the

Then USIA thought better about it. They said, "Really, maybe we do owe Bill some consideration." So USIA personnel said, "Look, why don't you be the counselor for public affairs at the embassy in London? We were going to abolish this job – it's the number two job." There was a minister for public affairs and then there was a counselor for public affairs, which is like the deputy PAO. "We were going to eliminate this job, because we were running out of money, but we'll keep it open for you. If you want that job, it's yours." I thought about it for about a minute and a half and I said, "Well, on the one side, there's my salary. On the other side, there's no salary." So I decided to take it, but I said, "On the provision, I'll take it, if I can continue to lecture at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, because I can't let these people down. They held this slot for me, these are very prestigious slots and I don't want to just pull the plug on a couple months' notice." They agreed to that, and the post agreed to it, no problem, that I would spend some time over there as well as in the office in London, at the embassy. So that's what I did, and it was a great experience. It opened up a whole part of the UK which I would not have really seen as an embassy officer, because I was a member of the faculty at the University of London.

Deleted: they

Deleted: this guy

Deleted: they

Q: What area were you talking about – I mean, what were you working on?

KIEHL: Well, believe it or not, I was doing a seminar on public diplomacy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and among my students – around me were students of the school of Slavonic and East European Studies – were a number of people from the British foreign ministry, including a couple of former ambassadors to East European countries. They were not on pension, but they were on a kind of sabbatical. Also, Yuri Luik, whom I mentioned before as Lennart Meri's young protégé, who became foreign minister. He was also in my seminar.

Deleted: kind of on –

Deleted: yes.

Deleted: that guy

Deleted: Lulik

Deleted: the guy

Deleted: who was Leonard Mary's

Q: How did you find – did you find a different cast in the way the Brits that you were working with looked at things than we did?

KIEHL: Oh, of course. The Brits always think of themselves as worldly-wise, and we are kind of bushy-haired, “gee whiz” types, and that really does overlay their perception of things. The last thing I think a British scholar would ever admit to was being surprised by anything, but one thing that really struck me was how poor – how good their scholarship is – but how poor their resources are. I was actually appalled by the library at the University of London, the School of Slavonic and East European Studies library. There wasn't a book in the place, practically, that was dated after 1966. They had no money for books or other library resources.

Deleted: ,

Deleted: kind of

Deleted: after about

Q: I noticed this at Oxford. I mean, they had, of course – I don't want to say booted (ph) libraries, but each university had its own library, of which they were very proud, but to me, it reminded me of library of my prep school back in the '40s.

KIEHL: Well, they're very much like that. The thing is – I mean, Oxford and Cambridge and LSE (London School of Economics and Political Science) are the places that actually get money, but they don't get money from the British government. They don't get British philanthropy, they get American philanthropy. Almost all the money that's raised for Oxford comes out of the U.S., and unfortunately, the School of Slavonic and East European Studies didn't have much of an American constituency. They did, in me, however, because I arranged to give them the FBIS reports.

Q: You might explain what the FBIS reports are.

KIEHL: FBIS is the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, an overt, unclassified branch of the CIA. These were printed copies of translations of radio, television, some press and publication in various countries. They have a series for every region of the world and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have their own series. They come in booklet form on a daily basis and they always have special reports that you can get on subscription, and I think the subscription, in those days, was somewhere on the order of \$390 or \$420 a year. A lot of journalists subscribe to it, a lot of organizations, a lot of libraries subscribe to it. Government people can get it for free. What I did was we got them in our office for free, so what I said was, “OK, I'll set up a system so that every month when we are ready to throw these away, instead of throwing them away we'll box them up and send them over to your library, so you'll have this forever.” As far as I know it's still going on. We sent that FBIS over there and they were just so thrilled, I mean, it was almost sad to think that this is the premier school at the University of London for former

Deleted: up

Soviet and East European studies, Baltic studies, and Balkan studies and all this sort of thing were centered right there. It was founded at the same time as LSE, and it didn't quite prosper the way LSE did.

LSE had 25,000 students, and the School of Slavonic and East European Studies had about 300 students. It was in a building near Russell Square close to SOAS, the School of Oriental and Asian Studies, and SOAS, of course, had 5,000 or 6,000 students. So it was really a starved institution, and in many ways, St. Anthony's College, in Oxford, which has a lot of connections with the British foreign and intelligence services, has taken a lot of the prestige away from SEES (School of Slavonic and East European Studies), as they call it, but it was still a great place to be, and the scholars there were top notch. The students were really quite good. It was a very enjoyable time whenever I went over there. I would occasionally go in for a beer in the senior commons room of SEES, which was pretty pathetic. It was really a dusty little bar on Russell Square. Of course, then SOAS would have its senior commons room, and it was like a ballroom, practically, in comparison. They were really a very under funded organization. I tried to do what I could. I gave them those FBIS reports and I think I gave them a lot of books that I had that didn't seem to be on their shelves that I thought would be useful. Beyond that, there's not much I could do.

Q: What about on the embassy side? What were you doing?

KIEHL: I was the deputy PAO. In essence, the minister for public affairs there communed with Buckingham Palace and the great movers and shakers of British society. I did everything else. The deputy PAO ran the office, including the rather intricate and elaborate relationship between the Voice of America and the BBC world service, a big Fulbright program, but the main occupation of the USIS office in London was media. It was essentially a press office with a few other responsibilities, because we had, at that time, about 15,000 official visitors a year, over a thousand CODELs ([Congressional Delegations](#)). We had, I think we said, something on the order of 50 Cabinet-level visits a year. At least one presidential visit a year, if not more. So we were constantly gearing up for VIP visitors, which meant everything from renting hotel ballrooms and putting in press filing centers to arranging interviews with the BBC. The sound truck would come over to their hotel and interview them at 7:00 in the morning for a major talk radio program, if it was just a secretary of treasury— some minor visit. This was endless, and it was the all-consuming aspect of it. I would say 90% of all the human resources that we put into USIS there was directed to high-level visits, because they never stopped. The Fulbright commission had its own board so it more or less did its thing, and the cultural affairs officer was charged with keeping an eye on that, and the VOA and the BBC world service – VOA being a part of USIA then, of course, rather than an independent organization – they did a lot of things directly but we, very wisely, I think, always sat in on all of these meetings so that there would be a different perspective, and also unity of purpose in dealing with the BBC.

Deleted: – actually it was public affairs –

Deleted: or whatever

Deleted: , basically

Deleted: there essentially

Deleted: Coordination in Development Consortium

Deleted: or something

Deleted: and so on,

Q: Who was the ambassador while you were there?

KIEHL: Well, there were a couple [of Ambassadors](#). When I was going there on TDY and just, I think, just at the [beginning](#) of the time I was there, Henry Catto was the ambassador, and he, being a media person, was really very supportive of USIS. He later came back to be the director

Deleted: end

Deleted: and so on

of USIA for a brief period in the Bush I administration. And then Ray Seitz became ambassador, the first and only career person ever to hold that Court of St. James position. He probably more than anyone else, knew the UK inside and out, having been there five times, from junior political officer or consular officer to political section director to DCM and chargé and ambassador. So there was not much about the UK he didn't know. I think he had lived out in Windsor at one time and so he had a real perspective on British society, at least in southern England, and the Tory country, I would say – a very, very exhaustive knowledge of that.

Deleted: Port

Deleted: Of course, he was a guy who,

Deleted: like,

Deleted: EC (Economics and Social Sciences) and

Deleted: ed

One of the things he didn't like to do was go to the north of England. I don't think he liked all those left-wing Laborites.

Deleted: wingers up there,

Deleted: perhaps

Q: Why?

KIEHL: He didn't like the mangled speech of the north, perhaps? I'm not quite sure, but every time there was an invitation for him to go to Scotland or Liverpool and that area, he bucked it down to USIS and, actually, to me, because the minister didn't like to travel to those places, either. So I got a lot of great opportunities subbing for the ambassador at various and sundry events, speaking about everything from Christopher Columbus to U.S. foreign policy. I remember the tall ships coming in to Liverpool – that was a big deal. I was on board along with Prince Philip and the King of Spain and we were the three representatives for our respective countries.

Deleted: sort of

Deleted: ,

Deleted: ,

Q: When you went up north – I mean, this is after the Thatcher revolution, wasn't it?

KIEHL: Yes.

Q: Did you find – how did you find, sort of, the British Labour party, particularly at this point? How was it interfacing, or whatever you want to call it, with American foreign policy?

KIEHL: Well, the British Labour party, in those days, was far more left than it is today.

Q: Futt, was it? I don't remember ...

KIEHL: No, it was – well, the Livingstone wing of the Social Democratic party really held sway in those days. They were, basically, I don't want to say anti-American, but they weren't very pro-American.

Q: Was it still – I mean, the Blair revolution has brought it before into the center but – I always think of the certain part of the Labour party – you think of making a circle and singing, "The Red Flag Forever," and all that sort of stuff.

KIEHL: Oh, yes, that was still very much the case. We lived in Highgate, which was north London, although it wasn't the proletarian part of north London. We often shopped and visited around in north London, and the whole north London scene is very left-wing, Social Democrat or Socialist, basically – or even Trotsky-ite. There was clearly a very large element in the UK then – the Labour party in particular – but all these fringe groups as well, who were well-beyond the

Deleted: even

Labour party's level of left-wing feeling. They were really vehemently anti-U.S. policies, in general. You have to remember, too, that this was a period during the Gulf war – there was an incident in particular that was a very souring one, a friendly fire incident where the U.S. strafed some British armor. I inherited that portfolio, you might say, because it was a major media storm. It was my job, as I saw it, and I think the ambassador saw it, to try to set the record straight, that the U.S. was doing whatever it could to be transparent and open about what was, essentially, a mistake of war. What actually helped us was the fact that the British MOD was so secretive and so manipulative.

Deleted: ishness

Q: Ministry of Defence.

KIEHL: The British Ministry of Defense was so secretive and so manipulative, and essentially lied to people about it. The U.S. was pretty open about it, and, I think, in the long run, we actually came out OK on this, although there was an awful lot of bad feeling in the U.K. and some terrible press reports about the U.S. as, you know, blundering cowboys again. This is a theme that people love to latch onto about us. We do our best to reinforce it every so often.

Deleted: c

There was the inquest at Oxford. Whenever there's a death of a British citizen there's an inquest, and this was the inquest over the deaths of these British soldiers. Despite our urgent suggestion that they not do so, the Pentagon sent observers to the inquest, who were immediately seized upon by the press and, as DOD representatives, tried to influence the proceedings or were up to no good. We said, "Look, just stay away from it. We'll have observers there from the embassy. You don't need to send lawyers from the Pentagon to go to this inquest. All you're going to do is create a higher profile than we need to have." Of course they ignored us and they paid the price for it.

Deleted: One of the things that was interesting – there

The real blunders were largely made by the British government itself. It just wasn't as open with its own people as we were with their own people. One of the things we did want to keep quiet about – we certainly wouldn't lie about it but we would certainly not want it to be known – is that the very squadron and the very pilots who did this were based in England. They were still in England during that inquest. That's why it was a particularly sensitive point, because if they were in England then they could be called forward and that would really complicate the U.S. and British bilateral and it might complicate their lives quite a bit, too. Because it was – after thorough investigation by everybody – it was proven to be one of those real accidents of war. There was no bad intent here. It was just an unfortunate event, but it was a big deal, a very big deal during the entire time I was there.

Q: Did you get involved with – I mean, what was your impression of the British press and the chattering class and all that?

KIEHL: Well, the chattering class is even more so there than it is here. More so, in the sense that it has more influence there than our chattering class does, which is considerable. It's also much smaller. The members of the chattering class in America don't all know each other. The members of the chattering class in the UK all know each other. They've all slept with each other – I mean it's like that. It's a very tight group of people. That doesn't mean, necessarily, politically tight, but they all know each other, they've all gone to school with each other, they've

Deleted: es

Deleted: s

| all had some kind of ties in one way or another. So it's a very powerful collection of people. If you get the chattering class against you, you're in big trouble, because they can topple a government. They can change policy, no question about it.

Deleted: organization

The media, of course, is unlike the American media. It doesn't really pretend to be unbiased. I think that's a major difference which a lot of Americans don't seem to understand, particularly when they first come to England or they begin to live in England or read the British press. The British press has no pretensions that they are unbiased. They're human beings, and therefore, they will be biased. They will have a point of view in their editorials and they will have a point of view in their news stories, which is quite different from what American journalists attempt to do, which is to have a point of view in editorials but not to have a point of view in news stories. Once you understand that they're a lot easier to deal with because there are people who you can find whose point of view matches yours. And there are people whose point of view will never match yours no matter what you do.

Deleted: and so on

Q: So in a way, certain moderates will write-off...

KIEHL: Yes.

Q: What about the chattering class? Did you get involved with them at all as far as trying to win some over or do something?

KIEHL: Well, the chattering class doesn't necessarily mean that they're not win-overable, and a lot of our contacts in the UK would be considered members of the chattering class. A lot of the journalists and the TV people and the public relations people and the marketing people in the UK are part of that chattering class, and, of course, there are cultural people who are part of it as well. We didn't have as deep a contact in the cultural world as we would have in a normal country because of the preoccupation with media that we had.

Deleted: to do

Q: I was thinking, with the media – the British media seems so much more sensationalist...

KIEHL: Well, an element of it is, certainly.

Q: Than ours is, but maybe that's because I live in Washington and you don't get hit with the New York ...

| KIEHL: Well, the New York Post ...

Formatted: Font: Italic

Formatted: Font: Italic, No underline

Q: The Post and things like that.

Formatted: Font: Italic, No underline

| KIEHL: But you get hit at the supermarket counter with the National Enquirer.

Formatted: Font: Italic, No underline

Q: Yes, you were saying the British tabloids ...

Formatted: Font: Italic, No underline

| KIEHL: The British tabloid press is something we really don't understand here because even the Post, the New York Post, which is considered a tabloid – or the Daily News and that kind of

Deleted: ose

Deleted: s

Formatted: Font: Italic, No underline

tabloid press in the U.S. – are mild in comparison. It’s actually a closer match to the *National Enquirer* or the supermarket tabloids. The Brits don’t really take that seriously, at least according to the polling that I’ve seen and the marketing people. I might say, one thing the Brits have on an exceptional scale is manipulation. They are really the marketing people and the political spin folks, and the polling and so on is of a very, very high order. They, earlier than the United States, managed to bring advertising and marketing into the core of politics, which, of course, is now in the United States. They’ve been at it longer, and because they’ve been at it longer, the Thatcher-Major folks in the Conservative party in the UK actually were almost mentors to a lot of the Republicans in the U.S., and the Social Democrats and the Labour party and the left – and to some extent, even the Liberal party in the UK – were kind of mentors to the Democrats in the United States. A lot of the techniques that our political parties use are real stem from the British use of them.

Formatted: Font: Italic, No underline

Deleted: ly

Deleted: ming

Q: But the Centrists and the British talk about American-style political campaigns creeping into their thing.

KIEHL: Oh, yes.

Q: So this is sort of feedback ...

KIEHL: It goes both ways, I mean, the mass audience, the focus on a single individual as the symbol of the party, is more American than British, obviously. But the spin control and, quite frankly, the dirty tricks that the Brits use – they’re of a higher and more sophisticated order than most American politicians heretofore have used, anyway. They’re learning a lot from the Brits in that regard.

Q: Your wife was working, what, as a consular officer?

KIEHL: Yes, in London she was a consular officer, and then went over to – because she’s in what they call management cone today – she went over to the administrative office and was the post housing officer. She’s had an interesting career. She’s done consular and admin in London and then she did assistance programs to the former Soviet Union which is an Econ job in what they called ISCA then, in the European bureau, and then in Bangkok she did consular, but it was extraditions and that sort of thing. We extradited a lot of people, including a Member of Parliament – on drug charges. She would ride out to the airport with all these armed guards, and the prisoner, to turn him over to the U.S. Marshals. And then she was a GSO, so she was running a motor-pool, an interesting combination of jobs.

Deleted: e

Deleted: O

Deleted: for

Deleted: m

Deleted: for

Deleted: and so on.

Deleted: It’s been interesting.

Deleted: So she

Deleted: and so on

Deleted: she did –

Deleted: and all kinds of stuff like that.

Deleted: So it was

Deleted: I mean, again, it’s much similar to that kind of stuff, and again, all

Deleted: sort of

Q: Is there anything else we should cover in the UK period?

KIEHL: Well – no, I don’t think so. All these visits blur after a while. There’s not that much juicy stuff there to really talk about.

Q: There used to be a lady there, at the embassy, I mean, this was way back ...

KIEHL: Oh, Jane Auden, of course.

Q: Yes. She was a name to be reckoned with.

KIEHL: She was great, because I made friends with her a long time ago, and anything I needed in UK, before I was assigned there, I'd give her a call and I could get the tickets or I could get the discount or whatever. If she liked you, she had every string to pull in the UK, and that office still exists, which she had, that little kind of protocol office, but I don't think – well, maybe they're as powerful as they once were but I doubt it. Certainly by the time I got there, on a regular tour, I never needed them. I had my own contacts to get things or to make a travel arrangement.

Deleted: , I guess,

Deleted: or something

NANCY E. JOHNSON
Political Officer, Middle East
London (1991-1994)

Ms. Johnson was born in Washington, DC and was raised in Germany and the Washington, DC area. She was educated at Oberlin College and attended several colleges and Universities in the United Kingdom. After returning to the U.S. Ms. Johnson joined the State Department as a contract employee and later joined the Foreign Service, serving as Political Officer in Colombo, London, Algiers and Baghdad. Her Washington assignments were primarily in the Near East, South Asia bureau. Ms. Johnson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: Where did you go after that?

JOHNSON: I went to the job I thought I always wanted, it was the NEA watcher in London. As David Mack said to me, it had to be somebody at grade with NEA experience who had just come off a really tough year. And he said nobody touched me for that one. So I went to London to be the Middle East watcher. That was fascinating.

Q: What times were you there?

JOHNSON: I was there from August 1991. I did it for two and half years and then I started to miss the challenge of being in the trenches, in a difficult or dangerous situation somewhere. I bid on and got the job as the POL Chief in Algiers via six months of French training. I am probably the only person on record who curtailed out of London, but I spent 13 years there as a student and so I knew England.

Q: Let's talk about a bit about the embassy and how you fit in. Who was the ambassador?

JOHNSON: The ambassador was Ray Seitz, who was wonderful, a career diplomat -- the only career diplomat ever to be Ambassador to the Court of Saint James. The first week, I was sent in to say hello to him. I asked him how long he'd been in England. He said he had been there as a junior officer, as head of the political section and then he was there as DCM and then

ambassador. I asked him how many years he was there and he said, "About ten." I said, "Well, you are just a relative newcomer. I was here for thirteen." We got on very well. I think I made him laugh. I was so impressed with him. One day he had to talk with the BBC about a Middle East issue and I went and briefed him. Then I listened to him. He came to see me afterwards and asked how it had gone. I said, "I would have thought you'd been dealing with this issue your whole life." He was very bright, very able, a smooth operator and an awfully nice fellow.

The head of the political section was Bruce Burton another wonderful guy. It was a really nice section. I did the Middle East only and had no responsibility for domestic British politics. Mike McKinley did Africa and the Liberal Democrats. Asian issues were done by Larry Robinson, who also did the Conservatives, I think. There was one man who did all of the defense stuff.

We had a young officer who did things like UN and extraneous things. For a while we had Avriham Ramey, a blind officer, who spent a year or two years in London. He also did assorted issues, too. There are moments I treasure and will always remember. I came in late one morning because I had to go to the dentist. I found all my colleagues standing around the central desk waiting for me. It was the day after the Israelis had moved 400 Palestinians out of Israel in December into no man's land between Israel and Lebanon, where they had no food or shelter. The demarche I had to make was essentially saying the Israelis did the right thing. My colleagues were waiting to say, "Rather you than me, mate." I went over to the Foreign Office and I saw a really nice man. I began by saying, "My country. . .," because I had been instructed to make the following demarche. After I finished, he said to me, "Well, Nancy, I have heard worse. Not often. But I have heard worse." And he gave me a reply. That was the only time in my career that it was personally embarrassed to carry my government's message. Our relations with the Brits were wonderful. Sometimes I would get a call first thing in the morning from somebody from the Foreign Office, saying, "You're going to have instructions to make a demarche on blah, blah, blah. Come see me at 10:00. We'll have a reply ready." They had been given a heads up by the Middle-East watcher at the British Embassy here. I would go in and make my demarche and they would give me their answer. Sometimes, they would actually give me the cable. I think you know it's a very special relationship. Even if Presidents and Prime Ministers are not talking, the munchkin level is very busy. Whatever the issue, we cooperate, we work very well on taxes, if its legal issues, immigration, drugs, you name it.

Q: What were some of the things you handled.

JOHNSON: I was standing on the bus this morning trying to remember. The war in Iraq was over so it was essentially a very quiet period. Frankly, I can't remember. I got to do all kinds of things and meet all sorts of interesting people. I became a member of Chatham House, the Royal Institute for International Affairs, and went to lectures there. I met all kinds of interesting people, but, I can't remember anything really outstanding. I'm sorry.

Q: Did you feel the United States was too supportive of Israel compared to the _____? I mean, was this a particular issue?

JOHNSON: No, everybody knew where we stood. We didn't fight about these things. We cooperated on an awful lot of issues. I was there for the election of --it was after Margaret

Thatcher left. I guess it would have been 1992-93. We had a pool with various people at the Foreign Office about who was going to win, how many votes, what have you. An old friend from my boarding school days was married to a Member of Parliament. One day I went campaigning with him in his constituency, just standing back and looking to see what he did. I got a lot of information from him and I told my colleagues that the Tories were going to win and win by 23. On the day of the election, the Embassy reported that the Tories were going to win, but fudged the issue of size of the victory. My predictions were right on. Bruce came into my office and said, "I just got a call from the Assistant Secretary of State who congratulated the Embassy on getting in right. I told him, the only person who got the numbers right was the damn Middle East expert."

It was also the time of the Madrid Conference.

Q: This was taking advantage of the aftermath of the Gulf War to talk about things between the Palestinians and the Israelis and also to follow through on the Oslo Accords.

JOHNSON: We had all the back and forth about details of the Madrid Conference. As a result of that, I got to meet Hanan Ashrawi. We were making contact with the Palestinians.

Q: Yes, because she was a spokeswoman for . . .

JOHNSON: For years we were not allowed to meet with Palestinians. It was our policy not to meet with the PLO and Hannan was in London on some business. I had to deliver a message from Jim Baker. Then there was one memorable occasion when Bruce came into my office and said, "The Secretary wants to talk with Prince Bandar." Bandar was the Saudi Ambassador to this country for a long time. He was in London where his daughter was going to school. Bruce said, "He is coming in tonight so you get to wait." I waited and Bandar drove into the Embassy. I met him down in the garage and escorted him up to Bruce's office. Bruce is a Redskin fan. In his office he had Redskin pennants and all kinds of paraphernalia -- team pictures, cups and what have you. Bandar walked in and said, "I am a Cowboys fan." We had set up the call with Washington. I had to call into the Secretary's office when Bandar was in Bruce's office and it all worked. I walked out the door as Bandar was saying, "Hi Jim, it's Bandar." He wrote a note to Bruce saying, "I'm a Cowboys fan. Thanks for the use of your phone." He was involved in the negotiations leading up to Madrid. We had endless senior people passing through all the time.

Q: I have to agree with Admiral Crowe. He said, "I felt like a travel agent more than anything else." All these people coming through.

JOHNSON: And, if it was a Middle East person, I met them and arranged their program of visits, the cars, the hotel, the whole bit with the help of a wonderful woman called Fran who worked in the Embassy for years. There was a conference in London at Lancaster House as part of the Madrid process. We had six senior people from the department. Afterwards, my secretary said, "I have never seen anything like this. We ran six separate schedules." Sometimes these people got together and were at the same meeting and sometimes they were doing their own thing. They had meetings in their hotel and in the Embassy. At one point we had people in three or four different rooms in the Embassy. Among the six people were Dan Kurtzer and Ed Djerejian, senior

management of NEA. Organizing the schedules was very complicated. I didn't go to the meetings.

Q: You mentioned Fran. Could you talk about her a bit?

JOHNSON: She was in the admin. section and she was a facilitator. She made hotel reservations. She was a real pro. She could get tickets for anything. She helped with scheduling. She was one of those really valuable people. She and the young woman who was the Ambassador's social secretary put together dinner parties and other events. I don't think the Embassy could have functioned without either of them. I only had dealings with Fran and her assistants when I had visitors, but she was wonderful. She would say, "Don't put them in that hotel, put them in this one because its more convenient to blah, blah, blah." She had been at the Embassy for a while.

It was a strange embassy because it had a pub in the basement. It had a cafeteria, but it also had a pub. British people like their pint at lunchtime and the pub served beer. It was a bar, which was rather nice actually. You could go and have a pub lunch instead of the standard cafeteria fare.

Q: Did you get any feel, obviously you had had your time, your thirteen or so years before, but did you see a change in the official . . . in other words was the foreign ministry getting more democratic or was it still sort of a rather precious group of people? I don't use this as a bad term.

JOHNSON: Oh, I know. I think that I was surprised there were a number of women in senior positions, desk officers. The Iraq desk officer was a young woman with whom I dealt all the time. In that sense, it was probably changing slowly. Early on in my tenure, Bruce took me to lunch with the equivalent of the Assistant Secretary for the Middle East. As we came back into the Foreign Office we walked down a corridor and I said, "Oh, look." There were portraits of all the men who had been Foreign Secretary and Colonial Secretary from the beginning. I said, "Look, there is so and so and so and so." I recognized the photographs from my years doing British History. Bruce and the Brit looked at each other and shrugged. They had never had anybody who was quite that familiar with the nineteenth century cast of characters. It was really funny.

Q: Were you noticing a variety of accents with your contacts at the Foreign Ministry? It used to be, and I go back to ???, talking on the phone, if somebody had other than an Oxford accent or mainly a highly developed Scottish accent, then you were talking to an administrator or consular officer.

JOHNSON: No, that has varied now some, but not a lot. In fact, my old friend's second son is now in the British foreign service. He has a very pukka accent. He had the credentials, Eton and Oxford. There were a number of people like him. When you actually go around looking at accents in the State Department, there are not too many the equivalent of working class Yorkshire accents.

Q: The accent really isn't an indicator in American society as much.

JOHNSON: But some. It is use of the language more than anything else. There are really quite a number of southerners in the Department. Most of the people I dealt with in Britain were men. I have always enjoyed dealing with fellow munchkins because you get a lot of information from them than the higher up people will give you. Munchkins will tell you things.

Q: Were you able to tap into the newly emerging feminine contingent at the Foreign Office?

JOHNSON: There wasn't anything organized that I know of.

Q: Nothing I mean anything informal?

JOHNSON: Far as I know, there wasn't. But there was an outfit in Parliament, the kind of effort we have here like Emily's List. Women from across the board, from all political parties, had breakfast together. I was invited to one of those one day. There was a speaker and we got together and talked. There was a certain amount of camaraderie. I enjoyed the Foreign Office because I did my PhD on the Third Marquis of Salisbury, who was Foreign Secretary at the end of the nineteenth century. The Foreign Office building was his building. It just gave me a kick every time I went in to be tripping around in his place.

Q: I take it was very easy to break out of London as far as the personnel system. There were probably people panting to take your place.

JOHNSON: It was not that easy because it was off cycle. I left in January. Of course, there was always the battle of who owns that position. Was it NEA? It was on EUR's books, but NEA had controlled it. I was succeeded by two people from the Agency. Each did three months. My Foreign Service Officer successor was free in June and he came then. For those six months, the two people never pretended to be Foreign Service Officers. They had not served in the field before so it was reckoned to be really good experience for them. They both learned a lot.

Q: Was this fill in the off season? You expose people from the analysis branch?

JOHNSON: Yes.

Q: This makes good sense.

JOHNSON: There wasn't anything really hot and exciting going on. I was really a field person. I needed to get back to the challenge of the trenches.

Q: How did you feel about the outlook and the expertise of the British on the Middle East?

JOHNSON: Oh, they are sharp. They have been there a long time. And they are good linguists and they have good contacts.

Q: Did you get any feel for the other player, the French?

JOHNSON: No. They are not big players. At least not in Iraq they are not.

Q: When you get into Syria and Lebanon, they are.

JOHNSON: Yes. That's their turf. We struggled to keep them out. They did arms sales in order to get fuel, but . . . After the British pulled out in '69, I guess, the Gulf has really been our pond. We protected it. We tried to convince people not to buy arms from the Soviets, not to make arms deals with them because we didn't want the Soviets to get a foothold.

Q: Did you cover Iran?

JOHNSON: I did but only vaguely. It was not a big issue at that time.

EDWARD C. MCBRIDE
Cultural Attaché, USIS
London (1991-1995)

Mr. Edward C. McBride joined USIA in 1964. His career postings included France, Senegal, Yugoslavia, Romania, Spain, and England. Mr. McBride was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

MCBRIDE: I did indeed go to London. I got there in the summer of 1991. I spent the next four years very happily working as cultural attaché in embassy London. I did so under two very interesting ambassadors. The first, who was ambassador when I arrived was Ray Seitz, who has the distinction of being the only career ambassador who has ever served to the Court of St. James's. I still keep up with him and in fact go back to London quite frequently to see him in his new capacity as a very distinguished international banker. I think for J.P. Morgan. I may be wrong on that, but at any rate, I began the assignment in London as cultural attaché. The main thrust of the work there was not unlike Spain. It was basically educational exchange and other duties that involved American studies and trying to keep a little bit of interest in the performing and visual arts without a real budget. There were a lot of opportunities as it turned out because London was a popular destination for traveling exhibitions and many distinguished American performing artists who came there because it was a commercially viable situation. But let me begin if I may with the work in the embassy. We had a very active Fulbright exchange program with the United Kingdom. It was not large, not small. I guess it was something in the neighborhood of two million dollars a year in terms of budget, but we had a very wide ranging exchange program, and we facilitated it a great deal more because the Fulbright secretariat served as a screening vehicle for many other private exchanges. We were happy to do that because we had a very able Fulbright commission there. The most significant issue in terms of Fulbright were related to staffing, well two related problems, one of which was fairly long term and the other was of fairly recent origin. The first challenge was to find a suitable accommodation for the offices because the leased space in which the commission had been operating for the last several years was suddenly no longer going to be available to us because the owner had decided to develop the property. We were given unfortunately a rather short time to find other accommodations for the commission. It was a difficult time because we had to face

the commercial real estate market in the United Kingdom which in London as you probably can imagine is really pretty heavy going. What we did in the end was a fairly creative solution. I tried to convince my people in Washington that rather than doing this again and again, i.e. moving from one rented or leased property to another that if they could see their way from the present resources to give me a sum of money that was more substantial than the rent, that I would go to the British government to see if I could find matching funds, and we would try to buy a suitable property that would become then the permanent headquarters of the Fulbright commission. It worked, to make a long story short, but not without some fairly fancy footwork on both sides. We did indeed get permission from the two governments to proceed to buy a property. We then began the search for a suitable place, and we did ultimately find a very interesting old building, an 18th century building, but in very good shape because it had been renovated totally about three or four years prior to our purchase. It was in an interesting part of London very near London University in the Bloomsbury district. In the same street was the house where Charles Dickens lived, so it was altogether a very nice place to be. So we brought the house in Doughty Street. The two governments shared the cost. Actually we shared it in an interesting way. We shared it in a direct proportion to our contributions to the Fulbright commission. At that time, the U.S. government was putting up slightly less than $\frac{2}{3}$ of the money and the British government was putting up about $\frac{1}{3}$ of the money. That is roughly the percentages we each produced to buy the property. We had a very interesting board member who was a London real estate developer and a very successful one. He helped us with a lot of the details and helped us locate the property, and negotiated a very good price for us. He also helped us arrange a commercial loan with one of the big London banks. With the two substantial inputs from the governments we managed to buy a property for something in the neighborhood of just under a million pounds, which is very good because it was a five story building on a corner, good real estate, good access. Everybody was happy with it, and it solved the long term housing problem.

Q: With the tube and all that.

MCBRIDE: It was perfect. A better location than we had before, so it all worked out very well. We then decided what we wanted to do was to name it in honor of the program founder, Senator Fulbright. So we called the Senator who had a very good and long standing relationship with London, and he agreed to come over and dedicate the building for us. So we were very pleased to have all that. One of our other board members at the time was John Cleese, the actor. He agreed to serve as master of ceremonies for our event. He was a very good draw in himself, so we used it as a fund raiser of sorts, and we had a very nice invitation printed up, and did it all properly. Sadly about two or three weeks before, Senator Fulbright had a stroke and obviously couldn't come. We were in a bind, and in the end, his charming wife came and agreed to open the building on behalf of her husband and read a nice little note from him. It wasn't obviously the same thing, but it certainly saved us from a difficult situation. She was gracious and charming about it, and was very much able to play the role of Mrs. J. William Fulbright, which she did with great distinction, and we were very pleased. So the building opened and the program prospered. What it enabled us to do was to launch the Fulbright program in a new direction, which then brings us to the second problem that I said we solved. We had at that point a very distinguished retired naval officer, Captain John Franklin who had run the commission for many years, but who had reached the mandatory retirement age as far as the British law was concerned. So we had to find a new executive director. We launched a search for a new director, did it with

the help of a very big and successful international head hunting firm who worked with us very closely. We recruited a new director, and ultimately succeeded in getting the commission headed in a new direction. What we tried to do was to bring the private sector into it in a major way because we were concerned that the two government's resources were not adequate to meet the demands of the program. We were also concerned because we had to turn down so many extraordinarily good candidates. So we mounted a drive not only to get ourselves moved which we did, but we then with the new executive director launched a real appeal to reach out to the private sector. In the process, I guess in about two years, we virtually doubled the budget of the Fulbright commission. We did it by going again to corporations who had an interest in the exchange program in terms of the qualifications of the people it would produce who ultimately become potential employees for them. So we in the end I think, turned it around. The program is still flourishing, and it has become kind of an example for others. I think there were a lot of firsts there. We were the first to actually go out and buy a place. A lot of offices had been donated to the commission through the years, but I think we were actually the first to mount the search and the purchase a building. We also succeeded in getting a professional head hunting agency involved in the search for an executive director. I think we really got a good and professional look at what was out there in terms of choice. We also got the commission into the business of sort of co-sponsoring awards. By that I mean if we found a sponsor in say Lloyds Bank, we would name the scholarship the Lloyds Bank- Fulbright award. We would brand it so to speak. That required some negotiations with the legal offices in Washington because in those days it was considered not perhaps the way to go, but we did finally overcome those obstacles. That I think, is now fairly well established as a legitimate way to augment the government resources for these kinds of exchanges. Let me stop for a minute.

Q: I just want to ask a question. I take it the place where you put the Fulbright commission was known as Fulbright House?

MCBRIDE: It is called Fulbright House, right.

Q: In the British terms I was thinking it would.

MCBRIDE: Yes, that is exactly what we decided to call it. It became a mecca. We used it. We used it for educational counseling, and that generated a little extra money for the commission because we could charge a fee for that. We also used it for college day events in connection with various American universities who wanted to sponsor events to recruit students. So we were able to use the property, and that was part of the justification for buying it. I think we did it with a fair amount of success. The other thing I would like to talk about for a minute with respect to London was something that was only peripherally related to the education and cultural exchange, but somehow involved the embassy and almost everybody else in London at the time. By this time we were under the leadership of Ambassador Crowe who had come along to succeed Ray Seitz. Ambassador Crowe, as you know, had a very distinguished career before coming to diplomacy, and came to us from being chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. He was appointed by President Clinton to come to Embassy London. Under his leadership the so called Irish question came yet again to another head. The Irish question was interesting because there was a situation where we had an ambassador in Dublin, Jean Kennedy Smith, who was also very determined to see if she could find some way to help solve the problem. It frequently became a little bit difficult for the

embassy in London because Ambassador Smith would, I don't think frequently, but she would occasionally decide to go up to Northern Ireland And she did so of course, crossing a boundary into another sovereign country, but it was still, you know the island as far as many people were concerned. But that caused, as you could imagine, difficulties in London, because without letting anybody in London know, and she would do that from time to time, occasionally making public speeches. Some of the points didn't necessarily reflect the current position of the US Government as far as the Irish question was concerned. So we did have some difficulties there. I think Ambassador Crowe represented the one saving grace in all of this because he dealt with what was obviously a very delicate situation very professionally, never lost his cool, or never started screaming about his counterpart in Dublin who didn't realize that there was an international border up there. But we obviously had some friction. The issue in question was of whether or not the United States would talk to Gerry Adams, who was at that time and still remains the head of the political wing of the IRA. Our position was that the IRA was by everyone's standards a terrorist organization, and that we didn't talk to terrorists basically. Mrs. Smith and to some extent the embassy in Dublin lobbied very strongly for the position that we weren't going to get anywhere unless we did talk to Gerry Adams if we wanted to play a role in all this. I think that sort of generated a certain amount of tension. I believe Ambassador Crowe ultimately intervened to reaffirm the position that the USG didn't believe Gerry Adams should get a visa to travel to the United States to solicit money and of course win Congress to the cause of the IRA, because we were on record that the IRA was a terrorist organization. He was its leader, and there was a very clear prohibition against giving him a visa. Ultimately as you know, the president personally intervened and decided to give him a visa. That was certainly his right to do it, but it did, as you can imagine, cause a little tension as far as working at the embassy was concerned. The decision was in a way a problem for all of us who had territorial responsibilities in Northern Ireland, because Northern Ireland or the Northern Ireland programs were administered from embassy London. We were doing other programs in Northern Ireland outside of the context of the Fulbright program. We were trying very hard to do a lot of conflict resolution programs up there among various strata of society. We would occasionally promote conflict resolution programs in an academic setting where the Fulbright program was involved. Sometimes we would use it in union terms in working with labor organizations. Sometimes we would promote it in a broader social context. Thus we had many ways to reach out to try to help, and so we were frequently in Northern Ireland. Sometimes it seemed that from the point of view of the government of Northern Ireland, we seemed to be speaking out of both sides of our mouth, depending on whether you were listening to the Dublin or the London view. So there was a little inherent tension in what we were doing. Looking back I guess, I felt very strongly that our position was very clear that the IRA was a terrorist organization, and that we shouldn't compromise on that. But in the end the president intervened, and we have all closed ranks and said that was his decision and we supported it. It proved to be a very smart move. In the end it brought the IRA to the table and although the situation is far from resolved, it certainly is better than it was five years ago when nobody was talking to anybody. So the Irish question was quite interesting. That, as I say, was the other activity that was going on. In terms of the more traditional cultural and exchange programs in London, the British could be a little arrogant and liked to talk down to us about American culture. The usual line was, "What is that?" We did a great deal to try to turn the other way and not pay any attention to the utter nonsense that that point of view represented. But it was fortunately rather old stuff, and the younger generation was very eager to learn more about America and its institutions, more than just the pop culture. But

fortunately there were a lot of institutions on both sides of the Atlantic that were very keen to promote these kinds of exchanges through their own means. I guess the most active was a fine arts exchange program because there were many very important institutions in the UK that has strong and long standing ties to American institutions. The Tate museum was one example. They had every year at least one or two major American exhibitions. The Royal Academy did the same thing. The National Gallery was also less directly involved, but certainly a player in all of this as was the Hayward Gallery, all these were public institutions. What we could do is when we learned about a project, we could help by bringing the embassy into it as a player. The Ambassador would frequently host events when the two institutions, the American institutions and the British counterpart institutions were trying to raise money for the projects. We would work with the development offices, and occasionally the ambassador would host a lunch or a dinner, and the development director would use that as a means of making an appeal. It was quite effective. So I guess we would have to call this in the traditional sense, facilitative assistance. But it was a conscious effort to try to help the institutions that were bringing major American cultural events to London and to other places in the UK. We also worked, for example, with the Edinburgh Festival which I guess, is one of the oldest festivals in the world. They also were very good about bringing important, particularly avant garde American events there. So we saw a lot of the visual and performing arts, and our role was to try to be a helpful presence and to use our good offices in any way we could. I would usually work with the Ambassador's office to try to get him to host some sort of social event in connection with the exhibition or performance and obviously attend the event. Both Ambassador Seitz and Ambassador Crowe were really very good about that. I will tell you one little story about Ambassador Crowe that was quite amusing. I am sure he wouldn't mind; I have told it many times, and I have told him I told it. There was a big exhibition of William DeKoonig, the American abstract painter at the Tate Gallery. DeKoonig as you know, painted a series of women, portraits. They were very unflattering, some were extremely abstract, not what you would look at as a pin up exactly. So we went off to this opening exhibition at the Tate Gallery. Ambassador Crowe was there and his charming wife, Shirley. We were all walking around with the director of the Tate who was trying to give us sort of a little highlight tour of the exhibition. When we got to one of these particular paintings that was quite small but a rather ferocious looking woman who had very hard, chiseled features and was against an abstract background, a typical DeKoonig painting. Ambassador Crowe turned to Nick Serota who was director of the Tate and looked at his wife and said, "It looks like a girl I used to date before I met Shirley." So he did have a sense of humor about it. He really confessed to me afterwards that he found that abstract paintings a little hard to deal with sometimes, but he never lost his sense of humor. Also he never hesitated to support one of these activities, if you could make a case for why it was important for the United States and particularly the American ambassador to be involved. He was a good sport about it, and I enjoyed working with him very much. He did a great deal in a quiet and very different way from Ray Seitz, but he certainly was a very fine ambassador, and it was a great pleasure and honor to work with him.

What else? We worked very closely with American studies in the UK, is the other single and the final thing I would like to talk about as far as London is concerned. The American studies programs in various British universities had mixed fortunes over the years. I mean it depended almost on the power of a personality who became interested in a particular subject. One of the places where the program had been very well run but had fallen into a period of decline with the retirement of the professor who had run it. The program was something that we the embassy had

helped to create back in the '60s called the Institute for United States Studies at London University. The Vice Chancellor of the university called me up one day and asked if I could come down and talk. He said that he wanted to talk about resurrecting the American Studies program. I was delighted and said, "Yes, we would be very pleased to help." So we did work very closely with London University to establish, to re-establish the Institute for United States Studies. The tangible way we helped them was first of all to use the Fulbright program. We awarded a grant to the university to recruit an American Studies specialist who would come and run the program for a year while the university mounted a search for a serious full-time professor to run the program. In the end we at the embassy put up additional funds to help the actual recruitment process. In the end the institute did recruit a very distinguished professor of American studies from Harvard University who accepted the position and in fact is still there. I was in London about two or three weeks ago, and I saw him and he says that he is as happy as can be. He says it was the smartest move he has ever made. He has turned it around in a fabulous way because he has taken it off in new directions. By that I mean he is using a lot of American institutions and some very good connections that he had to build a distinguished lecture series. He brought the director of the FBI one time. It was William Webster I think. He brought the Reagan attorney generals through a personal connection that he had. He has brought many new and interesting people. Arthur Schlesinger came to lecture a couple of times. He has appointed a number of both distinguished British and Americans to the board. The current chairman of the board is Lady Thatcher. So he has done very well by American studies and has turned it around financially. It now is a very successful program that turns out about 20 or 30, no I guess they turn out about 20 masters students a year. They have a Ph.D. program and a basic undergraduate degree as well. He really put it back on the map, and I tip my hat to him for his perseverance in holding out. He has now also accepted a tenured position by London University, and I think the fate of American Studies, at least at London University is secure. Also when I was there a few weeks ago, Oxford University saw the opening of a brand new building dedicated to American Studies that got its genesis in the last year that I was at the embassy in the '90s when Oxford mounted a very massive and well funded and well organized campaign to reach out to the Oxford graduates in the United States and in the UK to raise money to build a building and to fund an American Studies chair, which they did. That, I gather, is going very well now. There are now at least half a dozen other serious American studies programs that are working very well in the United Kingdom. The Fulbright program is a possible helping hand, but by and large the programs are now very well established and seem to work quite well on their own.

Q: I went through the American prep school educational system, and we got a good solid dose of English history. What about British schools? Probably more of the public schools than the state schools? But in your time did you see were they getting much of an opening to the United States.

MCBRIDE: It is not bad across the board as a generalization, and it isn't that sweeping, but it is certainly better than a lot of other European Secondary Schools Program. There is a bias obviously, and there is room for improvement, but by and large, in American history and American geography, the British secondary school student is pretty reasonably informed. I mean as well as we would be with respect to American students studying in British institutions. I think it is not bad.

Q: Because I have done this my understanding of French, German, and Italian schools it is abysmal.

MCBRIDE: It truly is. My experience in Francophone countries would certainly support that. But I think in Britain they tend to be a little more interested, and also because there are so many American schools in the United Kingdom. In London alone I think there are at least six American secondary schools including the American School of London which has long been established there, and has a student body of well of 2,000 students. So it is a huge force and an enormous campus in north London and a very good record. I think they do a pretty good job. They also reach out to non American students obviously, but the fees are so high that it is kind of restrictive. But the public school system, that is in the American sense public, the state run schools in the UK, do in my view a pretty reasonable job. Now I can say that fairly confidently at least in the time that I was there, because we worked with the department of education on the secondary level, and we had a huge and maybe the biggest teacher exchange program in the world on secondary school exchanges. We had a program run jointly with the British and American governments that did teacher exchanges, so they exchanged houses, dogs, classrooms, everything. It was highly successful, and every year we had about 100 that went in each direction. So the American input to the state run system was pretty good.

Q: Well, I just was thinking, you were there from '91 to '95.

MCBRIDE: Oh, how could I forget this? One incredibly important thing, well important to me. The other two events that I was involved with that I should take a minute and talk about were we had two presidential visits while I was there. One of them was a fairly major one because it involved the commemoration of the 50th. anniversary of the D-Day Normandy landing. So it involved not only our president but also many heads of state who were present there. The part that did involve us in the bilateral sense was that the President was also offered an honorary degree by his old Oxford college, well it was offered by the University but it was all orchestrated by University College Oxford where he had been a Rhodes scholar. I was asked by the embassy to be the embassy control officer for the President's visit to Oxford. That was an experience like no other that I had had in the foreign service. But in this case it was a huge, huge whiff or nostalgia for the president because he had not been, I guess he had been back once, but he had not really been back to stay for very long since his days as a Rhodes scholar there. So he was really very keen to have this visit to Oxford. It was quite an experience working with the White House on the one hand which has a pretty good idea about how it wants things to work, and an institution like Oxford University which also has a pretty good idea about how it wants things to work. You would get these wonderful show stopping lines when you would go with some perfectly outrageous demand from somebody on the President's staff or somebody in the White House that was inconsequential. I mean it was not something directly from the president. I would go to the vice chancellor of the University and ask some outrageous thing. They would be very calm about it and then they would ask, You know, "Could you tell me why the president wants the parade route to be changed?" I would give the reason or whatever. They would say, "No we don't think we would like to do that because our experience, and we have been doing it this way for 600 years is that it works very well going this way." So you would get all that sort of stuff. But in the end it was a highly successful visit. The President obviously enjoyed it enormously. He stayed three hours longer than he was supposed to on his schedule which was quite

frustrating for the folks down the line. But instead of surface transportation to the next event that had been programmed, we got a helicopter and flew him down to the coast somewhere afterwards. But the event at Oxford was really quite an eye opener. He loved it. The folks at Oxford I think, were quite pleased in the end about the way it went. We had an event at not only University College where he was a student, but because he was a Rhodes scholar and we involved the Rhodes establishment, we had a nice reception for all the current Rhodes students, American and others at Rhodes house in Oxford. That went down very well. The university authorities were very pleased that he spent so much time there. He gave a very nice speech in the Sheldonian Theater in Oxford. And to prove that Oxford is still the quirky kind of place, there was a very loud and pretty well organized demonstration going outside at the time of this speech. So when you listen to the recording of it, which we did, you can hear these voices of dissent in the background. To his credit, the president made reference to how important free speech was, and that he respected their right to do just what they were doing. He recalled that as a student himself, he had done that once or twice as well. So he did it all with a good deal of style and everything went down very well. That was a great experience, and the whole embassy London experience was very nice, too. Also on a personal side at that time, my youngest son was the last of our children who was actually living with us at the time. But he was fortunate enough to win a scholarship to go to Eton. And he was at there for five years, and had a wonderful experience himself.

Q: How did he find when he went from there, I suppose he went back to an American university.

MCBRIDE: He did. He came back to Harvard.

Q: I talked to somebody who did that one time, a foreign service officer, and said that it was difficult, but he was brought up sort of in a British family, a British-American family. He found that this kind of back in the '40s.

MCBRIDE: It was interesting. I had conversations like that, too. I was always very pleased and flattered because it was a competitive scholarship. The thing at Eton was based on a competitive examination. When the time to go to university came, he was tempted to follow most of his colleagues to Oxbridge, and indeed applied to and got into Oxford. But in fact he didn't get into the first college that he wanted. He applied I think it was to Balliol. I forget what the other one was. But whatever it was, Balliol didn't offer him a place and the other one did. He decided that he really was only interested in Balliol. I said, "Well what are you going to do in terms of application to other institutions, because if you don't want to go to Oxford if you can't get into Balliol, where are you going to go?" So he did apply very quickly. I thought, although I wanted him to go to an American university, his attitude could use a little work here. He said, "I am going to apply to Harvard." I said, "Great, but where else?" He said, "No, I am only going to apply to Harvard." He did and he got in, so this story has a happy ending. But he went to Harvard from Eton with a little bit of a chip on his shoulder because I think the one thing that Eton turns out is boys with an attitude. But he also got a first rate education, I don't mean to belittle that. It comes with a little baggage. They call it confidence; I call it arrogance. But anyway he went to Harvard, and fortunately it worked. I mean fortunately because I think he jumped in and sort of saw this as totally different kind of experience, but one that he found pretty exhilarating. He had a great time at Harvard, and I think it worked for him. I could see, however if it hadn't worked,

he would have been in a terrible mess. He took to Harvard like a duck to water. I think Harvard could also eat you alive if you weren't careful and sort of have a little give and take there. But I mean it worked okay and I am glad he did it. He is glad he did it, too, but it is also as a footnote interesting to report he went back and is currently working as a foreign correspondent for The Economist, So the London anchor is still there.

Q: Okay. Well, I think this is a good place to stop.

MCBRIDE: I think it is.

TIMOTHY DEAL
Deputy Chief of Mission
London (1992-1996)

Timothy Deal was born in Missouri and educated at the University of California at Berkeley. Entering the Foreign Service in 1965, he has served in a variety of foreign posts in Honduras, Poland, the Czech Republic and England. Mr. Deal also worked in the National Security Council for several years. He was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 2004.

Q: Okay, where did you go from the White House?

DEAL: Well, in my final year at the NSC I began to look at possible onward assignments. One thing I had always tried to do in my Foreign Service career was to pick places where Jill might have the best chance to continue her legal work. She had been able to find good positions in all of my overseas assignments after Warsaw. The Ambassadorial list for what would be an election year did not look promising, and I knew that in many places it would difficult, if not impossible, for the wife of an Ambassador to work, especially in any high-profile legal position. So I thought I should look for a posting at the DCM-level at a place where we both might do something interesting. London seemed the ideal choice. I recalled the tenures of Ed Streater and Ray Seitz and my own previous assignment there and thought the DCM's job offered the kind of intellectual and management challenge that I was looking for. So at the conclusion of the Economic Summit in London in 1991, I spoke with Ray Seitz, who was Ambassador there and told him of my interest. He was in complete accord because he said he wanted a DCM with an economic background. So the usual negotiations then began with the Department, leading ultimately to my selection for the position. I went to London in the summer of 1992.

Q: Ok, let's talk about London then.

DEAL: In London, I had the benefit of working for two pros: Ray Seitz, who was the first and only career person ever to hold the position as U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James's, and Admiral Bill Crowe, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In essence, this was a much more traditional Foreign Service assignment than, for example, my tours at the NSC. In large missions such as London with a staff of 500 plus, the DCM's role is overall coordinator

and manager. Ray Seitz, who was on his third or fourth assignment to the UK, was simply the best Political Officer in the Embassy. He had impeccable contacts going back to his first assignment, where he was the primary liaison with the Conservative Party.

Q: And his second assignment, as I recall, to London was also in the Political Section. He was very much involved in the Zimbabwe negotiations and maybe some other things at that time. So, he certainly knew the Foreign Office, as well as the foreign policy community.

DEAL: And he had been DCM as well. Ray was extremely well wired into all aspects of the British political scene, and there was not much you could tell him about the UK that he didn't already know.

With Ray in the lead, we had a very talented team in the Embassy. For my part, initially I was involved with some specific issues related to the Gulf War, in particular, questions over the extension of the "no fly" zone in southern Iraq. We had differences with the British over how far that line should go and I worked very closely with Pauline Neville-Jones, who at that point was Deputy Cabinet Secretary. We reached an agreement on a way to extend the line to the Western border of Iraq to close any possible gaps, an issue of great concern to Washington.

On the representational side, I took on responsibility for increasing our contacts with the Labor Party and some junior Ministers within the government with whom Ray did not have much contact. That outreach paid off when Labor came to power.

Q: Did you have contact with Tony Blair?

DEAL: No, I didn't know Blair, but over my four years in London I became acquainted with Labor politicians who eventually became Ministers of State in Blair's government, the second echelon in most of the major Ministries.

The two most important substantive issues during my watch were the Northern Ireland question and Bosnia. We had quite a difficult time when the administration changed after the 1992 elections. Ray Seitz was popular with the American community, which joined the British government in lobbying for him to stay in London. In fact, he did stay for the first eighteen months of the Clinton administration, which is a true credit to his personal standing in both Washington and London. In any event, he was bound to be replaced at some point.

Early in 1993, while Ray was still Ambassador, the White House under National Security Advisor Tony Lake and NSC Counselor Nancy Sodeberg embarked on a new approach to Northern Ireland. This approach involved direct contacts with Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Among other things, the White House took the unprecedented step of inviting Sinn Fein to St. Patrick's Day events in the U.S. Such actions were very controversial in London and opposed by Ray, who took the position of the British government that this was a matter that needed to be solved by negotiations, but not negotiations with "the terrorists".

The problems that started in Ambassador Seitz's tenure actually worsened after the arrival of Admiral Crowe because the White House continued to run its own Northern Ireland program with no meaningful input from State or the Embassy.

Q: Was the reason for that situation partly because Ambassador Seitz had made very clear his adamant opposition to that kind of approach and perhaps the feeling that...I think he even publicly made known his feeling...he couldn't be trusted to carry out a different approach, a different policy?

DEAL: Possibly, but the unfortunate thing is that the situation continued under Admiral Crowe even though he had been selected for the Ambassador's position by the President himself. Suffice it to say, this was a matter totally out of the State Department's control. No one in State had any significant say in the matter. The British Government had a hard time understanding that we were completely out of the loop. We had some unfortunate and embarrassing incidents where we were basically told by the White House to let Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein use our secure phone in the Consulate in Belfast to communicate with Lake and Sodeburg, conversations to which we were not a party. That was just typical of the whole thing.

Q: There were issues of technique and style, but that is the way the White House chose to operate.

DEAL: That's right. On the other hand, perhaps what was done ultimately paved the way for the progress on Northern Ireland that came later. Once George Mitchell became involved, the process became more orderly.

Q: But that was after you left, right?

DEAL: Well, Mitchell began his mission while I was still in London.

Q: And as DCM did you supervise the Consul General in Belfast and the other posts (there aren't too many in the UK anymore)?

DEAL: Yes, we had posts in Belfast and Edinburgh.

Q: Where did the Consul General in Belfast figure in the operation?

DEAL: The Embassy and the Consulate General were in full accord. Of course, the Consul General's position was especially uncomfortable because he could see first hand what was happening. Relations with the Protestant parties were especially difficult.

Q: And the British government was unhappy too, as you indicated?

DEAL: Yes.

Q: And they expressed that, I suppose, in different ways to the White House, as well as to you?

DEAL: Yes, but we heard their complaints at all levels. Traditionally, relations between the White House and the Prime Minister's Office have been close, but they became quite tense because of Northern Ireland.

Q: Who was the Prime Minister at the time?

DEAL: John Major. Again, as I said, once George Mitchell became involved in the process, tensions eased. I sat in on Mitchell's initial meetings with Major and his team. The British respected him and began to believe that the U.S. would be more even-handed than in the first part of the Clinton Administration.

Q: And the Embassy London felt that it was in the loop and more aware of what was going on?

DEAL: Well, we never really felt that we were in the loop, but the process was more transparent and less secretive. George Mitchell was more balanced in his approach and took account of the multiplicity of interests involved, not just the views of Sinn Fein.

Q: Did he work out of the State Department?

DEAL: Yes, I believe so.

Q: All right, let's talk about some other things that happened in the period from '92 to '96 that you were in London. I noticed that there was a big staff reduction at Embassy London. What was your involvement in that effort?

DEAL: Well, as DCM, I, of course, oversaw the reductions, but I had the able support of my Administrative Counselors. It was the usual situation: State cuts back its overseas positions at the same time as other agencies are adding staff. Nonetheless, we managed to reduce staff over time without really affecting core operations. Both Nick Baskey and Lynn Dent, the two Administrative Counselors who had primary responsibility for framing the proposals, were pros and made it possible to carry out this reduction in a sensible way.

Q: You talked some about your relationship with Ambassador Ray Seitz. Let me ask you before we leave him, he left that position in '93, early '94?

DEAL: 1994, yes. He stayed on for the first eighteen months of the Clinton Administration.

Q: Okay, after leaving his post in the Embassy Ambassador Seitz stayed in London and worked on a book on the bilateral relationship. How did he conduct himself in London? Was he discreet and careful?

DEAL: Absolutely. He kept out of the public eye, quietly working on his book in 1994-95. He never saw himself as an alternative voice of the United States in London. He was very diplomatic in that regard. After the 1995, his public profile increased. He gave some marvelous

interviews to the BBC about U.S.-UK relationship akin to Alistair Cook, but from the UK side of the ocean. By the second year he also became more active in the business world. He served on a number of boards and had a senior full-time position with Lehman Brothers. So, as a result, we never really saw much of Ray and his wife Caroline. They did give us a farewell dinner, but that was one of the few occasions that we met after he left the Embassy.

Q: And were you there when the book came out?

DEAL: I am not sure when the book came out.

Q: It did attract press attention, at least certain aspects of it.

DEAL: Yes, it did. Ray was especially outspoken on the subject of Northern Ireland, criticizing the Administration and Ambassador Smith in Dublin for the conduct of U.S. policy.

Q: Admiral Crowe came in as the new ambassador in 1994. He was a political supporter (fairly rare in the retired military) of Bill Clinton's campaign in the 1992 election. He, of course, had been Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff and Commander in the Mediterranean (southern command). He was very experienced. How did he set up his relationship with the DCM, and how did your role change? You had been charge d'affaires, I suppose, for a period of...

DEAL: About a month. Well, it was a very smooth transition. He may not have known a lot about the State Department, but he certainly knew a lot about government. He had worked, of course, at the highest levels of the U.S. Government and was very familiar with the interagency process. He allowed me to continue to manage day-to-day Embassy operations, as most DCMs do, and he chose the issues that he wanted to be involved with. He took a strong interest from the start in the Northern Ireland question. He functioned very much like a career Ambassador. He respected the opinions of people and didn't try to run things on his own. He had close contacts with John Major's government and used them to good effect. He was especially active on the speaking circuit. He probably gave more speeches and public appearances than most of his predecessors. He presented a good image of the U.S. He was well liked and respected by the staff and the British. Obviously, he did not have the rich in-country experience of Ray Seitz, but he was a quick learner and very able. He was in charge of an Embassy with high morale despite the personnel reductions.

Q: To what extent were you involved in defense issues such as defense sales? Did that change when the former Admiral came to the mission?

DEAL: No, our approach on advocacy efforts was the same under both Ambassadors Seitz and Crowe. From the outset, I believe we needed a coordinated approach within the mission to be effective. I took lead responsibility for bringing together the appropriate agencies, e.g. Defense, Commerce, and deciding how we could best support U.S. contractors in the competition for defense sales to the British Government. In many cases, I made a direct appeal on behalf of the U.S. contractor to the Ministry of Defense and Foreign Office. We were quite successful in my time there, winning about four or five major competitions in the defense procurement area.

Q: Most of the conversation we've had so far has been about things in London. To what extent did you or others in the Embassy travel around the United Kingdom?

DEAL: Well, the Embassy staff traveled much more than I. Both Ambassador Seitz and Crowe had active speaking programs throughout the country. While I made a few public appearances, I felt it was my job to mind the store at home. As is true of all Embassies, we tried to gather views about what was happening around the country. And we used speaking opportunities to explain U.S. policy priorities. Aside from Northern Ireland, we probably did less political and economic reporting from the provinces than might be true in another country because of the centralized nature of the British Government.

Q: You mentioned earlier that one of the reasons that Ambassador Seitz was interested in you to be the DCM in '92 was because of your economic background, which was obviously very extensive. I'm not sure if we've talked too much about economic issues. To what extent were you involved? There was a very large, and I'm sure able, economic section.

DEAL: Well, I was involved, but perhaps not as deeply as I had originally expected. Internal management consumed most of my time in London. I did some public speaking on international economic issues. And I generally fielded the requests for media comments on economic and trade issues, whereas both Ambassadors tended to address political matters such as Bosnia or Northern Ireland. I followed the activities and reporting from the Economic Section quite closely. In my last year in London, I lost both my Economic Minister and Economic Counselor due to unexpected retirements and reassignments. Consequently, in addition to being DCM, I took on the role of Acting Economic Minister during the last nine months of my tour.

Q: Did you and others in the Embassy spend an awful lot of time on matters related to Britain's participation in the European Union?

DEAL: We participated in a lively debate among missions in Western Europe about Britain's role in the EU. In 1994, I attended a Chief of Missions' conference in Brussels in place of Ambassador Seitz, who was about ready to leave post, where European integration was a major item on the agenda. Stu Eizenstat, whom I had known from the Carter White House, was, as the U.S. Ambassador to EU Commission, the principal spokesman for the view that deeper European economic integration was in the best interest of the U.S. Perhaps, reflecting to some extent British views, I tended to take the more skeptical approach supported much to my surprise by Ambassador Harriman in Paris. The debate continued on and off throughout my four years in the UK. I had the feeling then, as I do now, that the UK does best in preserving a degree of independence from many of the policies espoused by France and Germany. And I am not all sure that the U.S. should endorse every European action to integrate their economies further. I believe we need to look first at how U.S. interests are affected. Depending on the issue, closer economic integration in Europe may or may not be good for the U.S. Our support for European economic integration has deep political roots, but the situation today is far different than in the 1950's when the integration process was in its infancy.

Q: One of the things that struck lots of us over the years is the number of visitors that come to London. The visitor load may be greater than any other embassy in the world. Do you want to say anything about that in the time that you were there?

DEAL: The visitor load was indeed heavy. We had two Presidential visits. The Secretary of State came four or five times. And other Cabinet members made regular appearances. But we had an experienced local staff and top-notch Administrative Counselors, and most of these visits went off without a hitch.

Q: Good. Anything else about your four-year tour?

DEAL: I should mention something about Bosnia, the other big issue on my watch in addition to Northern Ireland. EUR Assistant Secretary Holbrooke had a game plan for involving DCMs in the five-Party talks on Bosnia. In principle, this was a good idea, but it was difficult to execute in practice. The problem was the flow of information and the tendency for Holbrooke to deal directly with the Political Directors in the countries concerned. We weren't really kept in the loop, although the British, and I assume others, thought we were. It was fine when the meetings took place in London, but when they occurred elsewhere we frequently did not know what had been discussed. It was frustrating to say the least. I did host a number of meetings and working luncheons for U.S. negotiating teams and their British counterparts. I believe we could have contributed more actively to the promotion of U.S. policy initiatives if we had been better informed. I suppose this way of doing things is the new reality in American diplomacy.

In any event, early in 1995, I started having heart problems once again, which, after many fits and starts, led to bypass surgery in May. The illness and recovery essentially sidelined me for many weeks.

Q: During that period, who acted as DCM?

DEAL: Tom Gewecke, the Economic Minister.

Q: Ok, anything else about London?

DEAL: No, looking back over that time, I believe the health issue put a damper on what should have been (and was) one of the most interesting jobs I've ever had. The change in Ambassadors midway through my tour also was not what I had expected either. Because of the Washington connections that Ray Seitz and I both had, we felt much more engaged and involved in the foreign policy process during the Bush Administration. The 1992 election changed that to some extent. Bill Crowe had personal lines to the White House, but it was still a much more difficult operating environment for the Embassy in 1993 to 1996.

Q: Well, it certainly could have been worse.

DEAL: Of course. And you could do things in London as a DCM that you could not do in many other places. You could invite people as diverse as John Cleese and P.D. James to your dinner

parties, and they would come willingly. The entertainment side of the job proved enjoyable and rewarding. We made some lifelong friends in the process.

GEOFFREY W. CHAPMAN
Deputy Political Counselor
London (1993-1996)

Geoffrey Chapman was born in England and raised in England and Boston. He became a naturalized American citizen in 1957 and attended Bowdoin College and Princeton. He later entered the Foreign Service in 1971 and served in Germany, the USSR, and England. He also held several positions within the State Department. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

CHAPMAN: I went to London in the summer of '93.

Q: London, oh.

CHAPMAN: I was deputy political counselor at the London embassy for three years. The job came open unexpectedly, and I took it as much for personal as professional reasons. My mother, who was English born, had gone back to live in England after my father died and was only an hour's drive or so from London. So obviously the idea of being able to see her quite frequently was obviously attractive to me.

Q: Well then, what were you doing from '93 to '96 in London? I mean, what were you mainly?

CHAPMAN: I had sort of a mixed portfolio, with certain substantive responsibilities of my own but also acting as alter ego to the political minister-counselor.

Q: Who was that?

CHAPMAN: Mike Habib.

Q: How do you spell that?

CHAPMAN: H-A-B-I-B. I did a fair amount of contact work with the British political parties. At that time the Conservatives were still in power, but it became increasingly clear by 1995 or so that Labour was going to win the next election. So a lot of our efforts were directed at getting to know senior Labour politicians better, to build relationships with them, and to brief them on U.S. thinking on key foreign policy issues. I found this fascinating. The Conservatives had of course been in power since 1979, and they were very few Labour politicians still active in 1995 who had served in the Callaghan government – maybe a few who had been very junior ministers at that time. By and large the Labour leadership had been in opposition for their entire political careers. We set out to establish working ties with all the shadow ministers with portfolios related to foreign and defense policy, in the hope of being able to convince them of the rightness of U.S.

views on the major issues in these fields. Mike Habib and I had several sessions with Robin Cook, the shadow foreign secretary, who had started out on the left wing of the party and had been affiliated with the unilateral disarmament movement in the 1970's, and who in 1995 still entertained serious doubts about NATO. Cook was very personable, charming, with a brilliant mind, and one of the best public speakers in the Labour ranks. He listened to us carefully and in the end I think we managed to convince him of the continuing importance of NATO and to get across to him U.S. viewpoints on the major issues of the day. We sought to cultivate many other prominent Labour parliamentarians, with the goal of learning what they thought on issues of importance to us and making a bit of a head start in trying to encourage them to see our points of view.

In the foreign policy area, I focused on the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. Bosnia took up a lot of my time, with the conflict then in full flight. For at least a year or so the U.S. tried to keep out of it, the Clinton administration taking the position that this was something for the Europeans to handle. But the Europeans after a while openly admitted that they could not resolve the issue without American help and intervention. The British pushed very strongly for us to get more deeply involved, and eventually that led to the formation of the so-called contact group of ourselves and the British and the French and the Germans to coordinate efforts to bring the conflict to an end. There were some major disagreements in the contact group, and we certainly had our differences with the British. Ironically, after pressing us to get involved the Europeans then complained loudly during the Dayton negotiations and afterwards that we were taking too active a role and were excluding them from the process. There was a lot of unhappiness in London as in Bonn and Paris over the way Holbrooke ran the show at Dayton.

I remember that during a diplomatic reception at Buckingham Palace shortly after Dayton, Pauline Neville-Jones, who was political director at the Foreign Office and had headed the British delegation at Dayton, came up to me and gave me an earful for 20 minutes on how impossible it was to work with Dick Holbrooke and how he had eviscerated the U.S.-UK relationship. Holbrooke got what he wanted but certainly ruffled a lot of feathers in the process.

Q: Well did you find, you know the Labor movement, well Labor, the Labor party has sort of gone all over the place. They had, was it Michael Foote or something at one time, they were really, had joined the, I mean, from an American point of view, almost the left wing crazies, some of them and all, and now, I mean, they're very much a part of the establishment.

CHAPMAN: They are the establishment.

Q: Were you seeing a change or sort of, how were you seeing the Labor people you were seeing at that time? They were out of power.

CHAPMAN: Right.

Q: And, were they making adjustments to a new world or were they still ideological?

CHAPMAN: By the mid-nineties there were new people in charge, both in the leadership ranks and in the level immediately below. Certain of them had migrated from the far left to the center.

Robin Cook had been a left-winger, a prominent member of the unilateral disarmament faction in the eighties, but had swung far enough to the center so as to be able to join Tony Blair's shadow cabinet in 1994. The party generally had been moving towards the center ever since Michael Foote had been eased out in the mid-eighties. Kinnock, Foote's successor as party leader, was a leftist and a Welshman to boot, but over his long period in office he moved the party away from extreme positions, recognizing that it stood no prospect of regaining power the way it was. Kinnock came very close to defeating John Major in the 1992 election. It was not an easy thing to do to move the party towards the center given the strength of the trade union movement within the party at that time and the radical views of the trade union leadership. So as Kinnock, John Smith and Blair sought to make Labour electable one of their main objectives was to limit the strength and authority of the trade union movement within the party by changing the rules on nominations and on voting at the annual conferences – steps like this designed to lessen the trade union role while not causing the unions to bolt from the party for fear they might form their own more left wing party which would then hopelessly bifurcate Labour and leave the Conservatives in power for generations to come. Many of the new people coming to the fore had made their way up through the party rather than the trade unions, and they were practical politicians rather than ideologues – men and women who wanted to be in power and to be able set national policy. There was an entirely new mindset in the Labour party, strongly influenced by the example of Bill Clinton moving the Democratic party towards the center and his articulating a Third Way.

Q: Were you there when the Dayton Accords were signed and all that?

CHAPMAN: Yes, I was.

Q: How did that, I mean, okay, the negotiations, everybody was bypassed in a way, I mean, in something like that you almost have to do that, I mean, it's hard for allies to negotiate I think, but anyway, how did things, did things come back together again or not?

CHAPMAN: They did to a considerable extent. Obviously we had to cooperate on implementation of the agreement. The British hosted a Bosnia implementation conference in London in December of '95. Our approach post-Dayton was to give the Europeans as great a role as we possibly could in implementing this agreement. Christopher was not present at the London Conference, which was at the foreign minister level and well-attended by foreign ministers. Deputy Secretary Talbott, who chaired the U.S. side, left halfway through the conference.

Q: Well, also were we pushing the, I guess it was the OSCE by that time wasn't it?

CHAPMAN: Yes, we were bringing the OSCE into the picture at that time. My recollection is that we wanted to give the OSCE, rather than the UN or NATO, the principal role in monitoring the agreement, and to put a senior European figure in charge of Bosnian reconstruction.

Q: How did you find the British public was viewing the United States at this time? I mean, you know, right now you have a rather anti-American strain. Was there a residue of anti-Americanism did you find among, say, the chattering class or something like that?

CHAPMAN: It's always out there to a certain degree, in Britain as in most other European countries. But by the same token it has been my experience that when you get out of the capital and talk to people in the small towns and villages – and this is true, I think, in France as well as in Britain – you find that people are very friendly towards the United States. They remember the good things that we have done for them. They admire the United States for what we've achieved economically, technologically and culturally in a very broad sense, and tend to ignore the twists and turns of politics. Even amongst the chattering classes at that time there was not that much anti-Americanism or disagreement with U.S. goals and policies. It was still relatively early after the end of the Cold War. We were jointly resolving the issues that had arisen out of the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia being the main one. So I think it was an era of essentially good feelings. I think the British people felt very good towards the United States at that time.

Q: Being in London, did you ever get the feeling that it was the Americans and the Brits against the French over various issues or not? Was there a French factor in there?

CHAPMAN: I don't recall much of this in connection with Bosnia. The policy disputes generally ranged us against the Europeans as a whole.

Q: Well then, who was the ambassador while you were there?

CHAPMAN: Ray Seitz was the ambassador when I arrived, and he was succeeded by Admiral Crowe in the spring of 1994. These were two very different ambassadors. Seitz of course was a career officer who was on his third tour in London and had in fact served as DCM only a few years before being named ambassador. He knew everyone worth knowing in the capital and outside, was on top of a broad range of issues, and in effect was his own political section. Crowe was no stranger to Britain and had been close to the British military leadership. But this was his first diplomatic assignment, and he did not have same energy level or the same hands-on approach that Seitz had. He tended to focus on two or three issues, Bosnia and Northern Ireland chief among them. One obvious difference between the two was that Crowe could pick up the telephone and call the president or the vice president and get through directly; which Ray Seitz as a career man couldn't do. My impression was that Crowe was an effective ambassador. I got along very well with him personally. He was a charming, easy-going, likeable individual, not a military man in the accustomed mold.

Q: Well you were there when Labor took over?

CHAPMAN: No, I left in the summer of '96. Labour took over in May of '97.

Q: How did you find the Conservative party? I mean, were they, do you feel we were close to them or not?

CHAPMAN: Oh yes. We had been working with them for many, many years. Since they were the party in power, only the ambassador had access to ministers; the rest of us had to be content with talking to Members of Parliament and officials at party headquarters. But they were ready

interlocutors, particularly so on the margins of the annual party conferences, where things were more informal and the bar was the usual venue.

Q: Well then you left there in '96?

CHAPMAN: '96, yes.

WILLIAM J. CROWE JR.
Ambassador
United Kingdom (1994-1997)

Admiral William J. Crowe Jr. was born in Kentucky and was educated at the Naval Academy, Stanford University and Princeton University. He was a United States Navy Admiral who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, and as the Ambassador to the United Kingdom under President Bill Clinton. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: How did your appointment to the Court of St. James come about?

CROWE: Early in the Administration, the President and I talked about what I would like to do. I said I was connected with several Boards and I was having a pretty good life. I enjoyed my work outside the military. I said I'd like to be the Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. I wanted that because I didn't have to be confirmed and I didn't have to give up any of my activities. I was not paid. I said, "PFIAB," and he said, "What's PFIAB?" So, I had to tell him what it was and that's how I became the Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Q: PFIAB?

CROWE: President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. PFIAB! That suited me very well. I had been in that job about six months when he called me one time and asked me if I would be interested in any kind of job in Washington. I said, "I don't think I would, I've done that, I had 47 years in the Navy. I spent about half my career in Washington." The only thing I'd really be interested in, I wasn't eligible for, and that was to be Secretary of the Defense. There is a law that you can't be the Secretary of Defense until you've been out of the military 10 years. He didn't know about that, he was sort of surprised at that.

He said is there anything else you'd like to do, would you like to be an Ambassador? I said I might like that, let me think about it. I saw him again and he said would you like to go to Russia? I gave it some thought, I had some medical problems, mainly knee problems. I mentioned it to my doctor and he said, "Don't go to Russia." I get cold, and I felt if I was a younger man, the intellectual challenge of Russia would be wonderful. I don't speak Russian and I wasn't a younger man. When I went to see Secretary Christopher to tell him I wasn't interested in the job, as I walked out of the house my wife hollered "You tell that S.O.B. you're over 70 years old!"

Consequently, I went immediately to the hospital and put a new knee in my leg. I figured if I was going to do anything in life I'd better get a new knee. I did that.

Then the President called back and said would you like to go to China. I said the same thing is true, you should send somebody that speaks the language, somebody that's younger and somebody that's in better health. He said how about Great Britain, and I said I may be back to you on that! I talked to my wife. I did my doctoral dissertation on Great Britain, I've been an Anglophile most of my life and I have many, many friends in the British military. I said two things: number one, I'd like to go; and number two, you have a professional over there right now and I don't think you should order him out of that billet until he's had a full tour.

Q: Ray...

CROWE: Ray Seitz. I said if he was a political appointee, sure throw him out of there right now. That's fair game, but you shouldn't pull Ray out ahead of time. He said what's a full term, and I said three years. He called me back and said, "Well you dug your own grave. You won't have three years for a few months yet are you willing to go then? I said sure I'd go then.

Q: How about confirmation?

CROWE: I had a little problem, a little problem, with John McCain. He never liked my testimony on pre-Desert Storm, where I thought we should have tried sanctions a little longer. I wasn't against attacking Iraq. Even my testimony got all torqued in the newspaper and John McCain never did like it very well. He held my nomination up for a full three or four days, but otherwise I didn't have any problems. My confirmation hearing was not a serious hearing.

Q: When you went there, obviously you were talking with the European Bureau and the United Kingdom desk at the Department of State, what were the issues you were carrying in your portfolio?

CROWE: Let me say ahead of that, the big problem I had with the State Department were the conflict of interest people. I never forgot that experience. These are the lawyers and the ethical section of the State Department who subscribe wholly to preemptive surrender. Instead of saying well, the Congress may object to so and so, let's go find out; they say if Congress objects let's do it right now and get rid of it! Stocks and so forth and so forth.

The biggest problem I had was when I served on the Texaco Board, they gave all the Directors a million dollar insurance policy to go to the school of their choice when they died. Texaco continues to pay those policies even after you retire from the Board. The State Department lawyer told me I couldn't do that. I asked why not and they said, "If Texaco continues to pay the premiums, it means they're paying you." I said that was sort of strange because number one I have to die in order to get this and number two the million dollars is going to go to a U.S. organization, the U.S. Naval Academy. I believe if you keep this up the next lawyer in this office is going to be the one from the Naval Academy! You're literally saying that you're not going to allow this million dollars to go to the U.S. Government.

Then I brought my lawyer in there and we argued about it for awhile and they finally gave in. I had to sign a picky letter saying I would not change the beneficiary of that policy while I was in the Government, which really upset me something fierce. I thought it was the stupidest argument I have ever been in. In any event, I didn't like their whole approach to ethics. I thought I should be allowed to do certain things and if the Congress wanted to object at the confirmation hearing, then let's hear about it. Then we'll do something about it.

When I went to Great Britain it was clear right away that I was going to be involved in a problem I knew nothing about. That was the Irish problem. That did consume an awful lot of our time. Otherwise, the reorientation of NATO and Yugoslavia and the British position vis-a-vis the European Union and their position on Russia, were all major issues we would be dealing with. In all fairness, on those issues, with some very seldom exceptions, we were in lockstep with the British. As far as nourishing the special relationship we enjoy with Britain, and it is special whether we like it or not, those substantive arguments really were not fierce enough to complicate my stay very much. Ireland was very complicated but being Ambassador to Great Britain in this day and age is a very pleasant experience.

Q: Did you find the Clinton Administration, being Democratic and tending to be a little more viscerally on the side of the Irish Republicans, as a problem?

CROWE: Very much so. First of all, it became obvious very quickly that State wasn't going to handle this problem. On Irish matters. I did not deal with the State Department. I dealt with the National Security Council. State Department literally opted out.

Q: It just didn't want to get into this...

CROWE: They wanted to and they tried, but they discovered early in the game that Lake wasn't going to let them in it.

Q: This is Tony Lake the National Security Advisor.

CROWE: And Nancy Soderburg, his deputy. They were going to handle Ireland problems. Of course it was peculiar to begin with. Ireland may be a foreign policy problem with us but to the British it's a domestic policy problem. So I didn't deal with a foreign office on Ireland, I dealt with the NIO, North Ireland Office. In my own government I talked with Lake and Soderburg. I don't think the President had the attitudes you described but I think his lieutenants did. They were very pro-Irish. They weren't IRA-pro, but their sympathies were with a united Ireland and their sympathies were anti-British. Their attitudes put them partially in the Sein Finn camps.

We were playing on a larger foreign policy canvas with Great Britain and we had nothing going with the Republic of Ireland of any great moment. Had the British been more aggressive, they would have stuck it in our ear time and time again. We treated the British poorly on the Irish problem; the British, however, never lost their restraint - privately, they were often very upset.

Q: Is this going back to the Irish immigrant in the United States? This has gotten almost ingrained in the body politic.

CROWE: I don't know where this came from, but everybody in the business had their own agenda, their own background and their own experiences. Part of it was, I think, that the NSC was more anti-British than it was pro-Irish. It was a very narrow-minded policy that really didn't take into account the larger world problems we had at all.

Then over and above that, I could not believe at times the number one foreign policy priority of the United States was counterterrorism! We were endorsing the Sein Finn. They were overlooking the IRA in order to get them to talk. They were counting some things that were completely contrary to our number one approach to terrorists around the world. The IRA was every bit as much terrorists as the Palestinians or anybody else. The idea they're political martyrs is just nonsense. We violated our own principles something fierce and I was surprised the Administration didn't get more heat in this regard. On the other hand, the President gets a lot of heat he doesn't deserve so why shouldn't he get a lot of credit where he can find it?

Q: What was the role of the American Ambassador during this time?

CROWE: Northern Ireland was part of Great Britain and we have a Consul there now, which we probably wouldn't have had except for this problem. We would have eliminated it. It was essentially the lead-in to North Ireland politics. The Sein Finn was very wary, however. They much preferred to deal with the Ambassador down in Dublin because she was very sympathetic to them.

Q: Who was this?

CROWE: Jean Kennedy Smith.

Q: President Kennedy's sister.

CROWE: Seitz wrote a lot about that in the book he just published. All of it was essentially correct. He was roasted by many sympathizers, but it was true. It probably wasn't the smartest thing in the world to talk about. In any event, we followed and reported developments in Northern Ireland and conveyed messages. I met with all the leaders in the Northern Ireland parties and went over there quite a bit. I spoke some in Northern Ireland.

At one point I delivered a demarche to Gerry Adams which was one of my...

Q: Gerry Adams being...

CROWE: The political leader of Sein Finn and a former terrorist. Clearly an IRA member, no matter what he might say otherwise. I got a big kick out of that. I had heard about demarches all my life and had never seen one. All of a sudden I presented one! I did a lot of calling on the Irish leaders that were in the Parliament in London. I liaised with the British, Patrick Mayhew who was the head of the Northern Ireland Office. I used to discuss and talk with him all the time. We would give our advice to Washington, advice that was seldom listened to.

Q: Do you think that over the years the British had gotten so used to this American almost irrationality about Ireland that rather than disturb the basic relationship, they'd sort of grit their teeth and let the NIO man/woman be the flak-catcher?

CROWE: Exactly. They put such great stock in the overall relationship that they overlooked an awful lot that we do. They're willing to go to great lengths not to jeopardize our relationship. Many times I sat there while people in Washington came to talk to them, including Lake. Lake would propose some outrageous scheme and I know they (British) just detested what he was suggesting but they would very calmly deal with it, pacify him in some way and never really get upset. I was probably more upset than they were. I was sort of ashamed of my Government at times with the Irish problem. I didn't feel we were very ethical about it. We were dealing with real murderers. I'm not against that, there comes a time in all these problems when you have to deal with those people. You don't have to put a halo around them to deal with them however. Deal with on their terms, not on some fanciful, mystical plain.

Q: We've come to terms with Shamir and Begin, Jonial Quinata in Kenya. This is how you get the power in a lot of places. Were you trying to make us more forceful in trying to keep money coming from the United States going into IRA coffers?

CROWE: We certainly followed that problem. Actually, there wasn't much coming, even with Gerry Adams fund-raising. I didn't think such fund-raising was absolutely necessary. Adams wanted U.S. government recognition and money.

Q: You were saying you were actually for...

CROWE: We were for neutrality. Over a period of months it dawned on Washington that they weren't getting anywhere with this "tilting" sides and so forth, and that they should do what we said we were going to do. The problem was that we weren't neutral in some of the things that we did. The idea that our gestures and compromises with the IRA brought them to the table I think is sort of fanciful. It may have helped some people reach that conclusion. The IRA was too tough for that. They would act in their own interest no matter what. They weren't going to let some government talk them into doing something they didn't want to do. If we had suggested something they didn't like they would have stuck it right down our ear. They were very hard-nosed and battle tested.

The kind of things the President said, when he was over there, in his speeches was just right. It was we're for the people who are risking peace, take risks for peace, we want peace, etc., etc. When he actually visited Northern Ireland the outpouring of emotion was just incredible. I've never seen anything like that. How a country could honor a third country's President more than they do their own leaders was really interesting. On the other hand, six months later, I forget the name of the little place they had the showdown, the changed attitude that we hoped would develop just disappeared in an afternoon.

Everybody talked peace but to erase those emotions and prejudices that have been built over the centuries, you don't get rid of them that way. I really think that the genius of the whole mechanism, as Mitchell put it, was to keep people talking. That was a British idea, not an

American one. So we were sponsoring talks, under great trying circumstances, in order to get these people all to the table. I don't think they came to the table because of the atmosphere we created. They came to the table because nobody wanted to be out in the cold when talks did start, that included Adams. If they let him, he'd come to the table no matter what the United States had done.

So we did the only thing we could. The best move the President of the United States made in the whole business was to appoint George Mitchell. George Mitchell turned out to be a superb negotiator, a man of infinite patience. He sat through some of the damndest discussions you can imagine and some of the nonsense day after day, hour after hour just to keep those talks going. He never lost his cool, he never panicked and he kept them right back in the center, everybody gets part of the deal.

Major would have been much more forthcoming in bringing people to the table because he started it. The political courage for starting this effort was Major's. He had a majority of three, then two, then one. He had a strong right wing that was more than happy to throw him out of office if he didn't lean toward the Protestants in Northern Ireland. His flexibility was severely restricted. He really did a marvelous job considering the trying circumstances he had. He was a very courageous man. I'm a tremendous admirer of John Major.

Then Tony Blair comes in. He and Major had the same ideas on Ireland. Blair supported Major when he was in power and Major turned right around and supported Blair when he was in power. Blair had one great difference though he had a majority of 200 and something! He could waste a lot of shots.

I'd say the first [inspired] move was Mitchell and the second crucial attempt was taken by Blair and Mollen, the minister for Northern Ireland, when they said we're going to set a specific date. That's the end of this and we're going to set a date. When that date comes, if there is no agreement the two governments will submit for referendum their suggestions. They stuck to that and that really put the political leaders in a hell of a bite. In the end, under Mitchell's exceptional leadership, they hammered out an agreement. That's what they should have done earlier. It was not a new idea, it had been discussed many times. I suggested our government support an idea like that. I thought whether Sein Finn came to the table or not was irrelevant. I suggested we should get these talks going and if Sein Finn wants to come fine, if they don't, go ahead without them. Washington just couldn't believe that for a minute. In the end, Sein Finn did come and the agreement was not only a constructive step forward - it was a great political victory for the government of Ireland.

A year or two before the agreement, I sat down with the Irish Ambassador to Britain one day and asked what do you really think is going to come out of these talks? In the end, what is the best we can do? He essentially described what has happened. He said we're not going to satisfy everybody, and this agreement is not going to satisfy everybody. There are going to be some extremists outside this agreement and they're still killing some people. We're going to cut out those extremists, and to marginalize them, hopefully, with progress. Just like the provisional IRA wasn't as big as the first IRA and the next group won't be as big as the PIRA.

I think this agreement, with any luck, has done that. Not everybody's for it. Something that gets lost in the publicity in the United States, it is difficult to determine exactly who supported the agreement, because people don't vote on the ballot whether they are Protestant or Catholic. The Protestants who voted for this are probably a very small majority, somewhere between 50-55%. That's not good news for the agreement, but that doesn't make it into the newspaper here. They needed more than that. The Catholics probably voted 95% for the agreement. Now we have to just wait and see.

Q: While you were there did Senator Kennedy cause problems?

CROWE: He caused some severe problems for the government through his sister going through him instead of State or the White House.

Q: His sister being the American Ambassador to Ireland.

CROWE: He didn't cause me any problems, but he caused people in Washington a lot of problems.

Q: How about your relations with Ambassador Smith?

CROWE: They were pretty good. I actually like her. As an Ambassador she was terribly well liked by the Irish people, and in that regard she was a wonderful Ambassador. In regard to keeping her mind focused on the entire foreign policy of the United States, she was a mediocre ambassador. She didn't realize there were any issues besides Ireland, and she thought the British should get the hell out of the way and quit blocking progress. Offending the British didn't bother her in the least. The fact that we had other strong interests with Britain, she thought was irrelevant.

She was not kind to the people that worked for her. In the Foreign Service, she got involved in an investigation that found her to be a real autocrat. She was tough to deal with and thought Northern Ireland was her territory. That didn't upset me as much as it did the people that worked for me. They really got upset by that.

Q: You had to say "down boy," "down boy"?

CROWE: Yes, lots of times. She wanted to go to Northern Ireland and I was all for anything that would help get this thing solved. She was highly admired in Northern Ireland, she was a Kennedy! She's the best Ambassador the Irish people ever have had from the United States. Fortunately, that wasn't her job but she never figured that out.

Q: You've already mentioned it once, but did you deal with John Major or his foreign minister?

CROWE: I dealt with him a little. On Ireland he called me over a few times and said I want you to tell the President so and so, and so and so. In retrospect, I wonder why he didn't tell the President? People used to ask me if I talked to the President and I said the person who talks most

to the President in this town is John Major, not me! On these issues he didn't want to say it directly to the President.

Q: How about some of the other things that were going on, such as Yugoslavia?

CROWE: We went through a host of problems and did deal with the Foreign Office on that and with the military. In essence what happened was the United States got fed up with what was going on in Europe and pushed hard for the British to enter Yugoslavia. Finally, the British said "we'll go" and then we started telling them what to do. That was a very divisive issue. Their theory was if you don't like it come over here with us and get into the pool.

I came back to Washington and got to see the President and said this telling the British what to do when we're sitting 3500 miles away is hard to defend. If you want to tell them what to do militarily, we have to go there. Don't sit back here, let them do it and then tell them how to do it. He agreed with that. That didn't mean anything because his people didn't agree with that.

Q: Was this again the NSC?

CROWE: Largely, but not solely. It was also the State Department. People like Holbrooke, they know about everything and don't mind telling people how to do things.

Q: Leaving it to the Ambassador to carry their dirty linen over to the Foreign Office and all.

CROWE: In all fairness, I don't think this is true of smaller embassies, I think they are still very powerful because they are on issues the people in Washington haven't focused on. If an issue comes up they ask the Ambassador what should we do? In a place like Britain, on big issues like NATO orientation, or Bosnia, nothing goes through the Embassy. They send over envoys, delegations, and the President talks to the Prime Minister on the phone. I had a hard time finding out what they said and I usually found out from the British, not from the Americans. Three weeks later I'd get a message, saying the President said so and so, by then that was three weeks old.

In big Embassies on big issues the Embassies are no longer in the mainstream of policy advice. Particularly in communications and meetings. They all know each other. The Embassy reports constantly, vociferously but it doesn't mean very much at all because these guys are all in the loop, particularly when the language is the same. Pena would call up the DTI on our air problems, and later say to me maybe we could use your help. I asked what he meant and he said we're talking to the British on this air control problem. I'd ask how long he'd been talking to them and he'd say several months.

Q: We're talking about the Secretary of Transportation.

CROWE: Yes, but this tendency was widespread, not confined to Secretary Pena. Someone would say we didn't need you before because we didn't have any problems, but now we need you. I said we could have helped you much more if you had come to us two months ago. It never occurred to them to go the Embassy until trouble brewed.

Q: How about dealing with NATO? Here you had been the Southern Commander of NATO, CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, Pacific], military was your bag. You were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

CROWE: It was irrelevant.

Q: Did this play any part at all?

CROWE: When you're in the policy business nobody wants to admit that anybody else knows more than you do. NATO is also a problem too, for many of those issues I was talking about. Russia and Bosnia were handled in Brussels instead of individual capitals. So much business goes across borders now.

Q: Did you feel there was a frustration within the ruling class, not the social class, but with the politicians and the military in Great Britain that the power was slipping away over to Europe and to Brussels?

CROWE: This was a constant theme. I don't think they understand how much it has slipped. They constantly argue about it. That's their problem with going into Europe. They don't want to sacrifice all their leverage, all their authority, all that controls their own destiny in Europe. It's much more of a problem in their Councils than it is in ours. They are in Europe; we aren't.

On the other hand, it's interesting about their economy. The British have little faith in the European economy. If you talk to the average British businessman, he'd much rather invest money in the United States than in Western Europe. They are investing heavily in the United States, 100 billion dollars! In fact I've had them say to me we have more confidence in the American economy than you do.

Q: Was it a gut reaction, you know Asia starts at Calais, or was it looking at it with this peculiar fit, particularly with France?

CROWE: They are a European country and they have all kinds of jokes about it. They can't deny they're European. They fly over every day and do business with France. We have to form a delegation, but they can get on a plane and be in Paris in 20 minutes. They don't trust each other. In dealing with a Frenchman and a German they're really scared of Germany. Many British people don't like the idea of combining with Germany.

On the other hand, the realists, who are the business people, are for a common currency. Most of the people aren't for it. Blair said we won't have it until we hold a referendum. I think in four or five years they will join the common currency.

The British are a very emotional race despite their reputation for being unemotional. They don't want to give up something to the French, they don't want to give up something to the Italians, they want control over their own lives. Yet, they know the realities are that Europe is becoming one community and they can't afford to stay outside of it. They are not going to give up the tie to

the United States for Europe. If they had their way, they'd rather be part of the United States than Europe.

Q: In France you have the intelligentsia which plays a role, in Britain you have the chattering class, how important were they during your time there. Were they somebody you could tap and work with?

CROWE: They loved to talk to you and they loved to chatter, that's just about it. Most of the people that are very suspicious of the United States, and they are a definite minority in Great Britain, come from the chattering class, the intelligentsia. There are quite a number that dislike the United States because of what we've allegedly done to their culture, their language and their society. They differ in what they would prefer to do. They don't like close ties with America and can't accommodate the reality at they're not as great as they once were. They are very confused and very noisy. They are almost all Tories, extreme right. Clearly they are not the most influential people in the country, by any means. Blair's marching off without them and he's a most popular Prime Minister.

Q: Where did you see the seat of power?

CROWE: It is unlike this country. There is one seat of power and it's in London. It's not only political, it's artistic, it's industrial, everything is situated in London. In this country if you want business you go to New York, if you want Hollywood you go to Hollywood.

Q: You want oil you go to Houston.

CROWE: When I did my dissertation on the Navy in Great Britain I interviewed 120 people, not active duty but retired people and politicians. I only interviewed three people outside of London. I'd say where's this guy and they'd say he's retired in Belfast. There were only a half a dozen of them, everybody else retired in London. In the seat of power in London is the party in power Whitehall?

Q: As a practical matter, this a reachable thing. The Embassy can get to the right people quite easily.

CROWE: Oh, yes, we were wired into both the party in power and the opposition. I saw a lot of Blair before he ever came into office.

Q: Were you seeing the Tory tide was over and that Blair was coming up?

CROWE: We did very much. We didn't predict the landslide but we predicted he would win and win comfortably. Nobody predicted he would win overwhelmingly.

Q: From the time you were there were you comfortable with Blair?

CROWE: Yes, very much so. I never got any idea that he was harboring a desire to change the relationship with the United States. If you track British Prime Ministers since World War II,

there has only been one that came into office with an anti-American position and actually held it the whole time and that was Edward Heath. There were several, three or four, that came into office with the idea they didn't want to get along with the Americans, but they all changed their minds rather quickly.

A British Prime Minister, with any sense at all, very quickly, no matter what his past history, comes to the conclusion I've got to get along with the United States. No question about it. The last two, Major and Blair, and Thatcher, had it as a plank in their platform. Edward Heath, he is the one who thought by cutting ties with America it would move them closer toward Europe. He believed it, he held that belief and he tried to do it in office. He's the only one who tried to distance himself from the United States.

Q: You were there at a time when the Labor Party seemed to have changed its stripes.

CROWE: Blair changed it.

Q: Before the Labor Party had always had a rather strong socialist viewpoint which turned out to be a kind of disaster.

CROWE: Blair literally took the Party by the neck and wrung its neck. I can remember him saying I didn't join the Labor Party to be a Party of protest, I joined it to be a Party of governance. We can't govern if we're not elected. He changed the Party.

Q: Did you find his left wing mumbling in the corridors?

CROWE: They were getting run over right and left to make a pun. I knew the heads of the Labor unions in the country, the head of the Association of Labor unions a very reasonable, rational man. He knew what was happening and he wasn't going to waste his capital and worked out a new arrangement with the Labor Party. There are all kinds of old labor hands that don't agree with what is going on now. That's not unique to the British Party, they've always had people in every Party that didn't agree with what the Party leadership was doing.

The revolution that Blair wrought was really one of his most amazing achievements. You would hear the Tories constantly say during the campaign, I don't trust him, will he do that after he's in power, all those Labor unions will come back. None of that has happened.

Q: You left the Ambassadorship when?

CROWE: September 20, last year.

Q: That would be 1997. Did you find a growing maturity in the White House, particularly the NSC, and the President with regard to foreign events, or was it more reactive?

CROWE: The President struck up a very fine relationship with Blair. It was almost business as usual. They discovered you could change Parties and things wouldn't change very much. The United States is the world's leader and it doesn't just deal with Great Britain. All British are

fixated on what America is doing. They're much more familiar with what we're doing in our country than we are with what they're doing in their country.

They are much more historically oriented. You don't meet a Brit that isn't conscience of his history and talks about these forces, pressures, countercurrents and currents. They are much more politically oriented than Americans. It isn't true of the whole society, they have a large under class that's worried what's going to happen to their soccer team next Sunday. On the other hand, the middle class is much more consumed with government policies on trade, economy, politics, and social movements than we are.

Q: How did you find the social life there?

CROWE: I found it burdensome. I had some conversations with Ray Sietz and asked him that very question. I made it clear to Secretary Christopher that I was not an Annenberg and I would not be able to entertain on the scale that Annenberg did. He said that's not why we're sending you there. Ray said if you're prudent, you can get along on the money they give you. I found that was absolutely true. Living in Winfield House you are superbly equipped to do anything you want to socially. It's a marvelous place to entertain and the British are eager to get into it. You can do anything you want. One of things you can do, if you prefer, is buy more flowers than you can grow and have eight courses instead of three courses, and you can do anything you have the money to do there. You can lay it on really thick, if you have the money. I did not have the money. I think it's a fair statement to say the Brits don't come there to see money spent. You can have a good dinner party with what the government gives you. We entertained a lot and didn't overspend our allowance. We didn't renovate Winfield House like Mr. Annenberg did. When Mr. Annenberg was there he gave a swimming pool to Checkers, the Prime Minister. A wonderful gesture, which I could not match! I'm sure this doesn't surprise you. Incidentally, Mr. Annenberg is beloved in Great Britain, which he should be!

Q: When he went there he had a very rough time in the beginning. I've talked to people who served with him. He had a speech impediment. The British press gave him a difficult time to begin with because he tended to use long words rather than short words. I believe he could speak them easier, with his speech impediment. It made him sound stilted. It was like blood to the press, at least to begin with. Then they came around.

CROWE: I'm sure he a very difficult time. We used to talk about it a bit. I spoke a great deal in Britain. That was really my number one function, in many respects. I think today the Ambassador is not in the mainstream of policy, no matter how much he thinks he might be. His main function is interpreting what the United States is doing for the British.

Q: How did you find the staff at the Embassy?

CROWE: Great! I'm very worried about the future of the Foreign Service. I think they're in deep trouble.

Q: How is that?

CROWE: I think [the population of] Washington is worried about it. I had two executive assistants leave my office and shortly thereafter resign from the Foreign Service. They were terribly bright young people, one a woman and the other a man. I asked them why are you going to go? I gave them letters of recommendation. They said they had no future in the Foreign Service. The Foreign Service does not run the foreign policy of this country. They said there is no real assurance of advancement, nobody listens to what we do in Washington and the one thing the Foreign Service told me I would do that is true is travel a lot. That's not enough to keep us in the Foreign Service. They wanted more of future than that. People constantly do things without consulting with the Embassy. I think this Administration has been very negligent in that regard.

Q: I think these are difficulties with a new group coming in. Again you have these hard charging...

CROWE: You don't have any leadership in Washington that worries about the Foreign Service. No Secretary of State is going to worry about it, they'll give lip service to it. The number three guy is supposed to but he's pretty busy. I went to talk to Tom Pickering about some of my frustrations. He said oh yes, we'll have a Blue Ribbon Commission look at this problem. He asked if I would like to be on it, and I said yes. I came back after London and concluded that they're not so worried about this problem, why should I be so excited about it?

Q: There are real institutional problems. We're still getting good people in, whether we retain them...

CROWE: That's not going to keep up. The whole thing has to be redone. We're working in a new mode with an archaic structure. I agree that the change in the Embassy structure, or to change who you send over there would cause problems overseas. With modern communications, however, foreign policy is not done the way it used to be developed. If you really want to influence foreign policy, you have to get a job in Washington and come right up and never leave the Department.

Q: Often the path is through being, unfortunately I think, staff aides who never really have real responsibility. They spend their time running around giving advice and getting their principals to do things. I think this is a very serious problem.

CROWE: The military has the same problem. At least in the military you're taught from the beginning to worry about your people. We fight for our people. I don't see that in the State Department.

Q: How did you find the Embassy as far as its contacts and getting things done?

CROWE: Very good. They work hard at it. We had superb people with great leads in the British Government, at every level. With my military experience we had great leads into the military of Great Britain.

Q: What was your impression of the British Military? One thinks of its role as continually diminishing, yet they have a very good professional Military.

CROWE: They do. Highly trained and disciplined and the point of the sword is very sharp. They don't have anything behind the point of the sword. The bulk of the cuts they've made are in logistics and support functions. They can't go anywhere without us, they need a lot of fundamental help every time they deploy.

Their Navy is very small and the Air Force is about to disappear. Their Army is highly experienced in Ireland and can tell us a lot about counterterrorism and civil control, but we don't listen because we think we know everything. That's not true, we can get a lot of advice from them. They are not a global army or global force anymore. We're the only one that can move them around, but they fight well. They are professional and highly trained.

Q: When you left there, after Blair's election in April, did you find there was this affinity between Clinton and Blair?

CROWE: It was extremely strong.

Q: Did this come up at all?

CROWE: Yes, I sat in on meetings with them. I think they do have a political instincts which draw them together.

Q: You left there in September, have you retired? You do have another job now.

CROWE: I don't have any regular work, I just hang out here.

ROBIN BERRINGTON
Cultural Attaché
London (1995-1999)

Mr. Berrington was born and raised in Ohio and educated at Wesleyan University Harvard Universities. After service with the Peace Corps in Thailand, he joined the Foreign Service (USIA) in 1969. During his Foreign Service career Mr. Berrington served at posts abroad in Thailand, Japan, Ireland and England, variously as Public and Cultural Affairs Officer. He also served several tours at USIA Headquarters in Washington, DC. Mr. Berrington was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Yes, we are not alone in that. I mean there is that famous statesman Hermann Goering who said whenever I hear the word culture I reach for my pistol. Anyway, London. This is your last post, 1995-'99. What did you do? I don't have to ask about American-United Kingdom relations because there weren't problems, well maybe there was.

BERRINGTON: Well, I went to London kind of assuming it would be like Tokyo, a big post, big embassy, very close relationship. In fact, the British and the Japanese are often compared. You know they are both major states off of continental land masses, island states, naval powers, close relations to the U.S., key monarchies, key elements in the regional power structure, important trading partners the list goes on and on. I mean they are very similar countries in that respect. But when I got there I realized that in fact there was quite a bit of difference. The USIA program in the United Kingdom wasn't nearly as large as that in Japan. There was one very clear and simple reason for this. English is the common language or as Mr. Churchill once said, "This is the language that divides the two nations." But English is the common language between the UK and the U.S. and it is not in Japan. The cultures are so totally, I mean Japan and U.S. the culture is just positive and negative in terms of similarities or any commonalities. Whereas in the U.S. it couldn't be closer, more similar, and more common other than maybe the Canadians or the Irish are. So, all the things we did in Japan to sort of get over the linguistic barriers, the cultural, religious and social barriers because of the differences, we didn't have to do in England. There was a much greater reservoir of understanding, and knowledge, and spirit. With Japan you had a devastating war. We never had anything like that with England at all.

Q: The War of 1812, but that has been a while ago.

BERRINGTON: That was some time ago and it's more than made up for that over the years. We didn't have to do the kind of basic speaker programs and all with libraries and the things that are fundamental to an Asian USIA program. Having said that, it is very easy to assume that everything is hunky dory and we don't need to do much. It might even lead to the question why do we bother with a cultural program there at all. Well, the Brits are not as similar to us as you might think. In fact, many of the commonalities they have with the Japanese, the hierarchical society, the very island, kind of insular outlook. The provincialism, very tradition oriented. The Brits are increasingly looking towards Europe more than to the U.S. Now they are part of the European Union. It just makes for a slightly more complicated, not quite as easy going flow of information and understanding as you might ordinarily assume.

One of the points I used to make frequently to my British friends when I was making speeches was that the Anglo-American alliance of WWII was kind of our high point. You know when you had FDR and Churchill and all of that where Americans looked to Mrs. Miniver, the plucky Brit. We all thought that we knew and understood each other very well at that point. Both of our societies have changed radically since then, and changed not just in terms of economy or social mobility or anything like that, but have changed radically in terms of the demographics. American society now includes, not just the Blacks, but we have Asians, Latin Americans, increasing numbers of Islamic immigrants, so that America today, the European or English antecedents are getting smaller and smaller whereas the Pacific and Latin American Americans are getting larger and larger. And the same thing happened in England. The number of people there that are all Hubert Smith and Robert Jones are decreasing in comparison to the sheer number of immigrants coming from the Caribbean, black that come in from the Caribbean, from Africa, Nigeria and Kenya, as well as huge numbers of what they call Asians, but are really more South Asian - Indian, Pakistani - immigrants. Most of these people come from the old colonies of course. But where ever they come from, what ever complexion they have, they are adding to an ethnic mix that Britain has never had before, and is fundamentally changing their society and

their outlook just as what happened here with Asian Americans and Latin Americans or Hispanic Americans who our fundamentally changing American society. So the kind of familial ties that we used to have over the years, you know where somebody from Yorkshire had a relative in Illinois, or a Californian could go back and trace his roots to Devon. That is not going to happen anymore. And the unifying experience we had in WWII in common is decreasing, as more and more of these people are showing up in the U.S. They don't even know who Churchill or FDR were. So more than ever, this requires that we do more of the cultural information program because of the radical changes in the two societies. Now having said that, that sounds nice, but where does the money come from? With the kinds of budget cuts we have suffered, it is not there. So it was frustrating because there was a great need to reach out to this new British society, but we just didn't have the resources the people or whatever it took to do it.

Q: So what did you do?

BERRINGTON: Well, one of the cultural attaché's main functions is he is the chairman of the Fulbright program. Now in Japan when I was cultural attaché, I had been one of the Fulbright commissioners. You know, one of the people on the board so to speak. But, in the UK, I was the chairman. That took up a lot more time. The U.S.-UK Fulbright program is one of the most active in the world and the oldest as well. Whether it was selecting grantees, or just getting involved in the daily management of the program, or fundraising. We had a large fundraising program in the UK because Fulbright gets its money from the U.S. government just like other operations, and there was always the threat that that would be cut. We didn't get many cuts in the Fulbright program in the UK, but we didn't get increases, and of course, when you don't get any increases, inflation in effect means a cut. So to help make up for that, we would go out and fundraise the money, and the British and American corporations in the UK might be interested in educational exchanges. One of the ways we did this was we sensed a great interest in the American MBA (Masters in Business Administration) degree. A lot of British wanted to go to the U.S. for an MBA. If Fulbright would provide MBA opportunities, so much the better. Okay, Fulbright doesn't care whether they are going for an MBA, or a degree in art history, or computer science. It is up to the individual student to design his program, but by emphasizing the MBA we could get the corporations to provide money so that say Joe Smith could go to the U.S. on the Smith Klein Beecham scholarship. They saw this as good PR for their company. They also saw it and wisely so, as a good way to kind of help identify who are the good kids out there so that Joe Blow goes on the Smith Klein Beecham scholarship say to the Wharton School in Pennsylvania. Then he comes back, he may very well work for Smith Klein Beecham. So it was one of those arrangements that made almost everybody happy. We were able in the first two years I was there to raise over a million pounds, which is close to 2 million dollars. Now I did not do this all myself.

The board and I would go out and twist arms of friends and you know, get the money. This also turned out to be the time when Fulbright was having its 50th anniversary celebration around the world, the 50th since Senator Fulbright started the program. So we had a big 50th anniversary dinner in London in which we invited Bill Gates to be the guest speaker. He came out.

Q: He is the chairman of Microsoft.

BERRINGTON: Microsoft and one of the biggest names in business in the world. Most people thought that was quite a coup getting Bill Gates to come to London to speak at the Fulbright dinner. It was a black tie dinner. We collected... oh gosh I don't know how many hundreds of thousands of dollars just on the basis of that dinner alone. The Fulbright program was quite a large piece of the pie for me in the UK.

In addition, the American embassy is probably, I think it is safe to say, the most visited embassy in the world based in London. When I say visited, I don't mean the man on the street; I mean by governors, senators, government officials, congressmen, Presidents, Vice Presidents, cabinet officials and so on. Everybody who is going to Europe is going to stop off in London. Everybody who stops off in London to put a nice gross underneath their trip might give the impression that they are there for business, so they will go to the embassy for at least one day or for one morning or afternoon and have briefings or something involving the embassy. Maybe the ambassador will throw a dinner or one of us will do something. Maybe we might set up meetings with them and university people or the media. Maybe we might arrange for them to go someplace outside of London to meet with important target audience members. But in any case all those bodies passing through London put an incredible drain on our time. There was somebody there almost every day. Now that didn't necessarily involve me every day, but I as a member of an increasingly smaller team as positions were eliminated and budgets were shrunk meant that we all had to contribute day after day, after day, as a joint mission effort.

Q: I'm under the impression that some posts use their Fulbright alumni as a real sort of tool for getting around, getting into society; while other posts just sort of let it go. The UK would be somewhat different because the ties are so close anyway.

BERRINGTON: It is not a bad idea, but I am not sure how good it is. I mean yes, we did that too. We took advantage of the alumni association. We nurtured the relationship, we kept up the contacts. But in the UK, most of the Fulbright alumni were in fact academics. Very few of them became businessmen or government officials. So it was not the most useful element of the population for us to deal with. As I say, it wasn't bad. We enjoyed having them there, but they just weren't that relevant to all the things we were doing.

Q: In the Fulbright program you were talking about the new Brit, the south Asians. Were we making an effort with the Fulbright program to explain what we meant by diversity?

BERRINGTON: Oh, yes, but we didn't have to make an effort. I mean we were happy if it was there, but we really didn't have to try that hard because, most of the young British students of any kind of ambition or aspiration really looked to the United States for better education opportunities particularly in the high tech or business fields. So most of our applications included names and skin colors that you would have never seen say 15 or 20 years before in London. I wasn't there to compare, but others have told me that it was quite a change. So we were getting them because they were coming to us. You also have to remember that one of the downsides about Britain is it is a very class oriented society. It still is. Like the Japanese and other island societies, Britain has its racism as well. So even though there were say the Barbados or Jamaica immigrants or Pakistani or Kenyan immigrants or whatever. These folks did not find an easy time for themselves in the UK. If they were able to get through a University, first of all most of

them never made it to Oxford and Cambridge because Oxford and Cambridge are still very reluctant to open up to all aspects of society. But most of them would make it through a good Redford college and then because of the problems in the UK, they were often the ones mostly to get to the U.S. or someplace else.

Q: While they going to the U.S. to study, they had to come back. But that would give them an imprimatur that would be more salable back in the UK.

BERRINGTON: Yes, exactly.

Q: I've heard the comment the Oxford system was beginning to show its age. It no longer was really producing educated people for the present society, as compared to institutions like Leeds and other universities.

BERRINGTON: In fact you have just said the right thing. It is producing scholars, but it is not producing educated people. I mean it is producing all sorts of people who are specialists in very arcane fields. But as far as providing the well rounded educated man or woman, no. As a result, we used to think of Oxford and Cambridge as the top two with Oxford having the edge. Nowadays, like the Japanese the British have embarked on rankings mania that list things one, two, three, four, or five. Cambridge was always number one. What was absolutely shocking for Oxford is that it wasn't necessarily even number two or number three. It might very well be four or five depending on the list. A number of people at Oxford, the more progressive younger concerned professors or administrators were very worried about this. Some of the Oxford colleges were really taking steps to do something about this, and other colleges were just totally unaware of what to do or maybe weren't even concerned. But no, the London School of Economics (LSE) was always right up there. Imperial College was always right up there. Then you had places like Edinburgh University, Durham University, Birmingham and Manchester University. These were all very high ranking schools too. Nevertheless, Oxford and Cambridge still have the kind of cachet that very few other schools had, except maybe the LSE, London School of Economics.

Q: Were we in your job sort of monitoring the British educational system.

BERRINGTON: No. Again that was such a domestic issue. Again first of all we didn't have the staff to do it. I mean the cultural office, in Japan if I had deputy and several assistant CAO's. In London I had one assistant period. That was it, so there weren't the bodies there to do it. In Japan I must have had 30-35 Japanese Foreign Service national staff. In London I had three. You know, we were doing all we could just to keep our heads above water. I mean I was saying about how we were so heavily visited. We were also one of those embassies that got an incredible amount of mail day after day, not necessarily addressed to me as the cultural officer. Most of it would go to the ambassador. Much of it concerned, I want my son to go to college in America. Please help him do that, or I am an American who wants to come and get a job in London. How can I do that. Or my daughter wants to exhibit at a London art gallery. Please tell me how that is possible. Some of them were very serious and worthy writers; some of them not so. Then the ambassador was constantly being invited to things, the Queen's garden parties. But then also maybe to get an honorary degree at University or to open up an exhibit at a museum or to attend

the dinner in honor of Lady Pushbottom or whatever. Because he had such a huge amount of this, whether it was the mail or the invitations or the requests for participation in something, he needed somebody to tell him hey you should do this or you shouldn't do it, and if he should do it, what he needed to know to be able to do it credibly, intelligently, without embarrassing. So, we in the cultural office which tended to get probably a large amount of this mail, passed some down to the ambassador's office for reply, direct or draft a reply for the ambassador's signature. And we would also often have to meet with the ambassador to talk about it, or would have to do a memo with talking points about if he goes to the dinner for Lady Pushbottom, what he needs to know about her so that he doesn't ask a stupid question, or that he knows that Lord Pushbottom has just been released from jail for molesting little boys or something. These are the things that are a part of embassy business in a town like London, so the cultural office in particular got a lot of this. I was just day after day, cranking out the memos, drafting letters, meeting with the ambassador, just dealing with the sheer tidal wave of mail and communication.

Q: It sounds like you were caught in one of the things that is sort of unintended consequences of cut backs on staff, you are trapped in our offices.

BERRINGTON: You have just put your finger on it. There's the biggest dilemma right now. The Congress wants to cut our budget, or they want to allocate what used to be part of our budget over to security affairs, and in the meantime they don't want to cut the program. They don't want to cut any of the activities. You can't have it both ways. If you are going to cut the money, you have got to cut what it going on as well. They don't cut the number of visits they make to London, so we still have to deal with them as visitors and all of the hoo ha that goes on with that. The President was in and out of London it seems like every other month. You can't say no Mr. President, we are not going to handle your visit. I mean it is just an insurmountable issue. Quite frankly it is one of the things that I am happy to be done with. [Editor's Note: President Clinton visited London from November 28 to December 1, 1995; May 28 to 29, 1997; May 14 to 18, 1998; and September 3, 1998. Secretary Christopher visited London on official trips from July 20 to 22, 1995; September 5 to 6, 1996; and October 6 to 7, 1996. Secretary Albright conducted 12 visits to London from February 1997 to March 6, 1999.]

Q: I was going to say it stops being fun.

BERRINGTON: Yes, when it is such a drain on your time, and when you are so tied down to a desk, and you are dealing with kind of bureaucratic nit-picking and other details that anybody could do, that a junior officer could handle but can't because there is no longer a junior officer then right. It is not as much fun. Well, the proof is in the pudding. I developed a high blood pressure problem that I never had before while I was in London. I am sure I wasn't the only one. You know, when I was in Tokyo we just had a much larger staff and were able to cope better. But I am sure there are many places just like London that have serious staff and work responsibility issues like this. They are probably all wondering at this very moment how they are going to deal with it tomorrow.

Now I have to say at the same time, London was one of those interesting assignments where I had both the best and the worst ambassadors. When I arrived it was a man by the name of William Crowe who had been chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe. [Editor's

Note: Admiral Crowe served as Ambassador to the UK from June 1994 to September 1997.] Admiral Crowe was one of absolutely the best, well I think of him and Mike Mansfield as the two best ambassadors I worked for. Men who were comfortable with themselves, who had already had achievement in government, who knew how to manage staff, were good at going out and dealing with the public, knew the issues, were professional in every sense of the term. My only problem with Crowe was that I don't think he knew an art object from...he was an Oklahoma boy who had no pretensions about being an art lover of any kind. Okay.

I would much rather have somebody like that who is honest about it with no pretension. As a result, he pretty much as Mike Mansfield had done when he was in Tokyo, he pretty much said, "Robin, art and culture, that's your job. If you need me, let me know and I will do whatever you want me to do, but keep in mind it is not my strong suit." As a result many of the things he was invited to or asked to or came his way, he would delegate down to me. If it was worth doing, I did it, and if it wasn't I didn't do it. Fortunately he didn't look over my shoulder and say, "Robin, you said you don't want to do it but I think you should." No, he had confidence in me as he did in other members of his staff, as any good military officer will with this stuff, delegate and then be done with it. He is not constantly second guessing or micro managing from another floor away. So Bill Crowe was fabulous, and the day he left that embassy, September 20, 1997, there were very few dry eyes. I am very lucky to have worked with a great American like him.

Unfortunately his successor was not like that. I felt like saying Phil Lader, you are no Bill Crowe. Philip Lader was a South Carolina property and real estate investor, management office who had had some political activity in South Carolina and became a member of President Clinton's staff in the White House. [Editor's Note: Ambassador Lader presented his credential on September 22, 1997 and left post in February 2001.] I think he was the assistant chief of staff or deputy chief of staff. He also ran a small business administration. Ambassador Lader was a very bright, very capable guy, extremely good looking, and very nice dresser, carried himself very well, and absolutely brilliant speaker. You know, in carrying out the role of ambassador he looked like he came out of Hollywood central casting. But unfortunately he didn't know the issues, and he really didn't care that he didn't know the issues. He was a terrible manager. He was constantly second guessing the staff. He was very poor on communication. Often we didn't know what he was up to. I mean this is part of the management problem. If he was a good manager he would have been regularly in touch with us so that we knew and there wouldn't have been these gaps of information between us. He kept bringing in staff people who would become barriers between us and him. It was a very difficult situation. As time went by it became pretty clear to us that Ambassador Lader was far more interested in going to the dinner parties with the Lady Pushbottom types and dealing with the sort of glamorous elements of British society much more than doing what many of us thought..

Q: Great traps because these don't really go anywhere.

BERRINGTON: No, they don't. I can assure you from my own, I mean other than the ambassador, the cultural attaché is probably the one most likely to also be included in this kind of thing. I cannot tell you how boring and excruciating some of these events were. Talk about pretentious. Talk about shallow, I mean some of these people and their events were just you know, trials of patience. I couldn't wait to get out of there. In fact there were several times when I

would just dream up excuses why I had to leave. For some reason, well it is seductive when you are dealing with people with titles like that. I guess, I can't speak for Ambassador Lader but I guess he felt it was important and he got something out of it. Unfortunately, none of us knew about that. As far as we could tell, this was an extension of the mission at large. So I was there with the Crowes for about two and a half years and with Lader for about a year or year and a half. My final year there was difficult. He is still there.

Q: I take it you left with a certain sigh of relief in a way.

BERRINGTON: Well, I left with very mixed feelings, because London is a very curious mission. I mean forget the role of the ambassador although the role of the ambassador can play a key role. The role of the ambassador can play a key element in setting a tone, morale, that sort of thing, and proud of the job, trying to keep morale high. I don't think Lader ever thought about if morale was high or low. It just wasn't one of his concerns. But setting the ambassador aside, London was one of those missions, and there are a number around the world, you probably know of some of them yourself, that no matter what happens, seems to have bad morale.

I think it is probably based on expectations. A lot of people go to a place like London assuming oh the theater, oh the glamour, high society, the important policy issues, the ability to travel around England, blah, blah, blah. Well, it doesn't work that way. Many people live far away from the embassy. It is expensive. They have a hard time getting baby-sitters, so they can't do all those things that they would like to do. So they are kind of frustrated by seeing all these opportunities that just don't come their way. Also, it was very curious.

In Japan, many of us in that mission, as I alluded to at the beginning of this, had the Japan experience together with other officers. We went through language school together, or we went to area studies together, or we had been in Japan together. So that we would have repeat experiences and you would come back on your second or third assignment, it's like you are back with old friends. Brothers or sisters or it is like you can sit and have a drink and say hey remember when President Ford came and he forgot his pants, and we had to run out had get his pants. Yes, that is a real story.

Most of the people in London served there once and never again. Now there were a few that had a repeat, but that was very rare very unusual. Most people go there once and that's it. There is no kind of familiarization program like language training or area studies or whatever so you don't have that kind of chance to develop relationships at FSI or someplace beforehand. In a place like Tokyo because of the language and the different culture, there tends to be a little bit more bonding automatically. In a place like London where everybody speaks the same language, no problems, and people live all over town. I mean I happened to live next door to another embassy officer, but that was only one. Most of the other embassy people lived way miles away. In Tokyo everybody lived in a compound. A compound is not necessarily a good thing, but they do provide that kind of bonding and other experiences that lead to, I think, a little bit better morale. So London is one of those places where morale has never been that good. As a result for the mission, I think many people are frustrated, many people are disappointed, and many people are negative about their time there.

Fortunately my job was one that, many people thought I had one of the best jobs of course, because I did get invited to the royal opera and the ballet. I was out to universities. I traveled a lot around the country, opportunities to meet. Well, have you seen the movie Chicken Run?

Q: No.

BERRINGTON: Okay, I knew the guys that made Chicken Run. These are people you would just meet automatically. So that kind of opportunity makes for a more interesting experience. Everybody else in the embassy did not have those opportunities. So, I was aware of all these problems, of the morale problems. I was aware of the difficult experience many people were having. But fortunately my job more than made up for it. The job made my time in London much more worthwhile and more interesting. There is one other important element here which I cannot overlook and that is the attitude of the British toward Americans. To put a fine point on it, a lot of Brits don't like we Yanks. There is a lot of patronizing attitude towards the United States. It is the sort of mother colony against the baby. Particularly the United States has risen up so high, and the British Empire has collapsed and Britain is now not even a second or third rate power. So there is a lot of that, I am sure, behind the attitude toward the United States. Most Brits see Yanks as being uncouth, totally lacking in etiquette or manners or loud or pushy or demanding. They would just as soon do without us.

Now having said that, government to government relations were extremely good. I am sure Bill Clinton and Tony Blair pick up the phone and talk to each other like old friends. The official relations were extremely good. Over the years I did develop relations with a huge number of British friends. There were a lot of people who didn't have this attitude about the U.S. But it is a pervasive thing throughout British society. How often do you run into people that would say something disparaging about the U.S. It is like Americans are fair game. You can knock them down and, like that doll, will spring back up, and they just automatically assume that. You know, take a punch out at Uncle Sam, that is a good way to get your frustrations out for the day, and they do it. Whether it is articles in the paper, whether it is comments on television, these just flow off of British tongues as though everybody knows it and everybody does it. When you are an American there living and working in British society, it gets very tiresome after awhile. It gets very wearying. Particularly I noticed among Fulbrighters, I noticed after about six months some of them would get quite bitter about it. Particularly those that were going to places like Oxford and Cambridge where you had bastions of British tradition and sort of arrogance about the Anglo-American relationship. So that clearly affected what a lot of people experienced in their time in London. So it was not an easy embassy. I was happy to put all of that behind me, not having to deal with that anymore. It was not only once or twice that I would go into a party and would look around the room and I would see I didn't know anybody there. Okay, that's fair enough, that is often the foreign service experience. Then I would walk up to somebody who looked like somebody I should know or talk with, and I would say, "Hello my name is Robin Berrington and I am the cultural attaché of the American embassy." They would look at me and they would say, "Oh, I didn't know America had culture." They would go Ha, Ha Ha, aren't I being clever. And just having to deal with that mentality, that I mean well I can remember one luncheon I went to while having minister of state, high ranking cabinet official sit next to me, and from the very first hello I am blah, blah, blah, within minutes he was after me about America this or America that. This was at a Christmas dinner where we were both at the head table. After

about fifteen minutes of this, I just got so fed up with it I turned to him and said, "Look I came to this country to build great relations between our two countries. Americans like Britain and I think a lot of British like America. I didn't come here to put up with this kind of crap," and I got up and left. The sponsors of the lunch said, "Why are you leaving? What is wrong?" I said, "You know, I don't feel well." That could be an extremely troubling aspect of living and working in Britain. Now, having said that, let me emphasize a lot of Englishmen, Scotsmen, Welshmen and others are marvelous, and I had a lot of good friends and professional relationships without that problem. But that problem is always there.

Q: Did you ever find a certain affinity or natural cohesion with a Scot an Irish or a Welshman, in other words against the English attitude?

BERRINGTON: Yes. Definitely. In fact I found I went to Wales and Scotland quite a bit. Northern Ireland I was there all the time because of the Northern Ireland problem. So, yes, they would often talk about these exact same things to me as though we were all in the same boat together. It was very moving. I also found that the other commonwealth, the Australians, the Canadians, would often; I mean my duties didn't include them, but we would occasionally bump into each other at a cocktail party or something, and they would often say the same thing. "Oh, when is the last time you had to listen to blah, blah, blah" or whatever. So it was a kind of a common cause.

Q: How did you get involved in Northern Ireland? I mean you tried to bring culture to the IRA?

BERRINGTON: Goodness, no. The mission program in Northern Ireland had a number of tools in its bag of tricks. Among them were educational programs and cultural activities. One of the main goals we had was to show that America was not just Irishmen. That it wasn't just those people in Boston or New York or Chicago who would be giving to NORAD or one of the other organizations that support the IRA. The Americans have a lot of people that are totally unrelated to this. Also, USIA would issue grants, USIA Washington, would through the embassy issue grants to various organizations in Northern Ireland that contribute to the peace process. For example there was a number of educational programs involving the police where we would have conflict resolution exercises with police and other extremist groups to show that violence was not the way to solve the problems. The Fulbright program there was quite active.

We had another program which was called a Fulbright program but it was slightly different. It was the Fulbright teacher exchange. I don't know if you are familiar with that, but this is where a teacher in England and an American teacher would literally switch places for one year. The American would go to say Belfast or it might be Birmingham or Bristol, not just Northern Ireland. Then the person from that town would go to the teacher's school and they would teach in each other's school for one year. I mean in some cases they would even swap houses and cars and things like that. It was I think, one of the most effective programs at bringing real kind of grass roots people into the other's turf. Particularly in Belfast it was effective because maybe you could bring a Hispanic Catholic into a Protestant community in Belfast. Of course, they weren't allowed to say we want only a Protestant or we only want an Irishman. You had to take who you got. It did more to build bridges just across the sectarian divide, not necessarily between the groups in Northern Ireland, but among, you know, increase understanding and awareness

between Catholics and Protestants and what is a Catholic and Protestant role. Many people in Northern Ireland who were Catholic or Protestant never had any experience seeing or meeting each other. You know, they all kept to themselves so much. The teacher exchange was a really effective program at that sort of thing. I was often up there meeting with those people.

We almost had a policy of...well, the cultural office or the deputy or the assistant cultural attaché had a Northern Ireland portfolio so to speak. If he or she was unable to do something, then I would often go up there. I mean it was as if we had a policy of trying to have somebody up there almost every month in some form or fashion. I mean I would go to a dinner party to represent the ambassador or I would go give a speech at a school or whatever. It is the same with the political section and the economic section and the commercial office. Because we had a consulate in Northern Ireland, you know they were more than happy to have us there as well. It was a plum for them because they were understaffed like we were. They were happy to have somebody from the embassy come up and help share the business. But Northern Ireland was probably one of the major responsibilities for us, for the mission at large. So it affected all of us.

End of reader